Karma Yoga Sastra Vol-1

SRI GANESAYA NAMAH OM TAT SAT

SRIMAD BHAGAVADGITA RAHASYA.

OR

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ENERGISM (PROPER ACTION)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

Narayanam namaskratya narain caiva narottamam I
devim Sarasvatim Vyasam tato jayam udirayet II

Mahabharata (opening verse)

The Srimad Bhagavadglita is one of the most brilliant and pure gems of our ancient sacred books. It would be difficult to find a simpler work in Sanskrit literature or even in all the literature of the world than the Gita, which explains to us in an unambiguous and succinct manner the deep and sacred principles of the sacred science of the SELF (Atman), after imparting to us the knowledge of the human body and the cosmos, and on the authority of those principles acquaints every human being with the most perfect and complete condition of the Self, that is to say, with what the highest- manhood is, and which further establishes a logical and admirable harmony between Devotion (bhakti) and Spiritual Knowledge (jnana), and ultimately between both these and the duties of ordinary life enjoined by the Sastras, thereby inspiring the mind, bewildered by the vicissitudes of life to calmly and, what is more, desirelessly adhere to the path of duty. Even

GlTA-RAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

if one examines the work looking upon it as a poem, this work, which simplifies to every reader, young or old, the numerous abstruse doctrines of Self-Knowledge in inspired language and is replete with the sweetness of Devotion plus Self-Realisation, will certainly he looked upon as an excellent poem. The pre-eminent worth, therefore, of a book which contains the quintessence of Vedic religion, uttered by the voice of the Blessed Lord can best only be imagined. It is stated at the commencement of the Anugita, that after the Bharata war was over, and Sri Krsna and Arjuna were one day chatting together, Arjuna conceiving the desire of hearing the Gita. again from the lips of the Blessed Lord, said to Sri Krsna : — " I have forgotten the advice you gave me when the war commenced ; so, please repeat it to me. " In reply the Blessed Lord said to him that even He could not repeat that advice in the same way, because on the previous occasion the advice had been given, when His mind was in the highest Yogic state (Ma. Bh.5. Asvamedha. 16, stanzas 10-13). Really speaking, nothing was impossible for the Blessed Lord, but His answer that it would be impossible for Him to repeat the Gita, clearly reveals the excellent worth of the Gita. The fact that the Gits is considered by all the different traditionary schools of the Vedic religion for over twenty-five centuries to be as venerable and authoritative as the Vedas themselves is due to the same

INTRODUCTORY

cause ; and on the same account, this work, which ie as old as the Smrtis, has been appropriately, though figuratively described in the Gita-dhyana as follows ;—

sarvopanisado gavo dogdha Gopalanandanah I

Partho vatsah sudhir bhokta ducjdham Gltamrtafh muhat II

that is :— " All the Upanisads are, so to say, cows, the Blessed Lord Sri Krsna is Himself the drawer of the milk (milk-man), the intelligent Arjuna is the drinker, the calf (which causes the flow of the milk in the cows), and (when these unpreceden- ted circumstances have come about) the milk which has been drawn, is the Gita-nectai of the highest order. " It cannot, therefore, be a matter of surprise that any number of translations, commentaries, or expositions of this work have appeared in all the vernacular languages of India ; but, after the Westerners have got acquainted with Sanskrit, there have been made any number of translations of the Gita into Greek, Latin, German, French, English etc., and this wonderful work has now come to be known throughout the world.

Not only does this work contain the quintessence of all the Upanisads, but the full name of this work is "Srlmad Bhagavad- glfca Upanisat ". The enunciative words, convoying that the chapter is closed, which are ussd at the end of each chapter of the Gita contain the words "iti srlmad Bhagavadgitasu- Upanisatsu Bralimaadyayavi. yogasastre 8ri-KriRiarju.nasaiiiixide" etc. i.e., " thus the conversation between Sri-Krsna and Arjuna on the Karma-yoga science, (that is to say, on the science of the yoga based on the knowledge of the Brahman) in the Upanisad sung by the Blessed Lord. " Although these enunciative words are not to be found in the original Bharataj yet as we find them in all the editions of the Gita, one may draw the inference that, that mode of enunciation must have come into vogue, when the Gita was for the first time separated from the Mahabharata for daily recital, that is to^ say, before any commentary was written on it ; and I shall explain later on the importance of these words in determining the import of the Gita from this point of view. For the present, it is necessary for us to consider only the words " Bhagavadgitasu Upanimtsu. " Although the word " Upanisat " is of the neuter

GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

gender in the Marathi language, yet as it is of the feminine gender in Sanskrit, so the idea " the Upanisad sung, that is, told by the Blessed Lord " is conveyed, in Sanskrit, by the expression " Srimad Bhagavadglta Upanisat ", a compound of an adjective and a noun in the feminine gender ; and although the work is singular in number, yet as it has become customary to refer to it in the plural number by way of respect, one comes across the plural seventh-case-ended form of " S'rimad Bhagavaclgitasii,panisatsu". Even in the commentary (bhasya) written by S'arhkaTacaTya, we come across the expression " iti gitasu ' ' in the plural number with reference to this work. But in contracting the expression, the affixes or words used for indicating respect and also the common- noun " Upanisat " at the end, indicative of a class, being dropped, the two first-case-ended singular words " S'rimad Bhagavadglta " and " Upanisat " have at first been changed into " Bliagavadgita " and later on merely " Gita ", which is a feminine and extensively contracted form,— as has been the case with the names Kena, Katha, Ghandogya etc., If the word " Upanisat " had not occurred in the original name, then the name of this work would have been contracted into the neuter form " Bhagavadgitarh " or merely " Gltam " as has been the case with " Bhagavatarh " or " Bharatarh " or " Goplgltarh ", but as, instead of that, the word has remained in the feminine form as " Bhagavadglta, " or " Gita, " we must always take the word " Upanisat " as implied after it. The word " Anuglta " has been interpreted in the same way in the commentary of Arjunamisra on the Anuglta.

But we find that the word " Gita " is applied not only to the Bhagavadglta of 700 verses but also in an ordinary meaning to many other works dealing with Spiritual Knowledge. For instance, in certain sundry chapters of the Moksaparva included in the Santiparva of the Mahabharata, we find that the names Pihgalagita, Sarhpakaglta, Mankiglta, Bodhyaglta^ Vicakkhyuglta, Haritaglta, Vrtragita, Parasaragita, and" Harhsagita have been used and one part of the Anuglta in the Asvamedhaparva has been called by the separate and special name of " Brahrnanaglta ". Besides these, there are also- numerous other gltas which are well-known, such as the-

INTRODUCTORY 5

AvadhQtagita, Astavakragita, Isvaragita, Uttaragita, Kapilaglta, Ganesaglta, Devlgita, Pandavaglta, Brahmaglta Bhiksugita, Yamaglta, Ramagita, Vyasagita, Sivaglta, Sutaglta, Siiryaglta, etc. Some of these exist independently, whereas the others are to be found in different Puranas. For instance, the Ganesagita, is to be found at the end of the Ganesapurana in the Krida- khanda in the 138th to 148th chapters and one may say that it is a faithful copy of the Bhagavadgita, with slight verbal differences. The Isvaragita is to be found in the first eleven chapters in the Uttaravibhaga of the Kurmapurana, and the Vyasagita starts in the next chapter. The Brahmaglta is to be found in the first twelve chapters of the latter portion of the fourth i. e., the Yajna-vaibhava kharida of the Suta-Samhita included in the Skandapurana and the Sutaglta is in the subsequent eight chapters. There is to be found a Brahmaglta different from this Brahmaglta of the Skandapurana, in the 173rd to 181st stanzas of the latter half of the chapter on " Nirvana ", in the Yogavasistha. The Yamaglta is of three kinds. The first is to be found in the seventh chapter of the 3rd part ( arhsa ) of the Yisnupurana, the second one in the 381st chapter of the 3rd division ( khanda ) of the Agnipurana and the third one in the 8th chapter of Nrsimnapurana. The same is the case with the Ramaglta. The Ramagita which is in common acceptance in this part of the country is to be found in the fifth sarga of the Uttarakanda of the Adhyatma Ramayapa and this Adhyatma Ramayana is looked upon as a part of the Brahmandapuraiia. But there is also another Ramaglta to be found in the work known as " Gurujnana- vasistha-tafctvasarayana " which is well-known on the Madras side. This book deals with Vedanta philosophy and is divided into three divisions ( ka-nd/ts ) called the Jnana, Upasana, and Karma. In the first eighteen chapters of the second part {padaj called the Upasanakanda, we find the Ramagita and in the first five chapters of the third part ( pada ) of the third kanda, called the Karmakanda, we find the Suryagita. The Sivaglta is said to be in the Patalakhanda of the Padmapurana. But, in the edition of this purana which .has been printed in the Anandashrama Press in Poona, we do not find the Sivaglta. Pandit Jwalaprasad has stated in his book called Astadasa-

GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

puranadarsana ( Survey of the eighteen Puranas ) that it is to be found in the Gaudiya Padmottarapurana, and in the table of contents of the Padmapurana which is given along with those of other Puranas in the Naradapurana, we find a reference to the Sivaglta. Besides these, the Hamsaglta is to be found in the 13th chapter of the 11th skandha of the Srf BhSgavatpurana and the Bhiksuglta is to he found in the 23rd chapter of the same skandlm, ; and the Kapileyopakhyana contained in the chapters 23 to 33 of the third skandha, is also known as Kapilagita. But I have seen an independent printed book by the name Kapilagita. This Kapilagita deals principally with the Hathayoga, and one finds it stated in it that it has been taken from the Padmapurana ; however, not only do we not find it in the Padmapurana, but as we find in it in one place (4. 7) such words as " Jaina " " Jangama " (lingaita), and "Sophi" (a Mahomedan saint), we have.to say that it must hare been written after the Mahomedan rule commenced. As in the BhSgavatpurana, so also in the Devlbhagavata, we find a Glta from the 31sfc to the 40th chapters of the seventh skandha, and as that glta is supposed to have come out of the mouth of the Devi, it is called the " Deviglta ". Besides {these, a summary of the Bhagavadgita itself is to be found inj the 380th chapter of the third khanda, of the Agnipurana as also in the 247th chapter of the purmkluinda of the Garudapurana. In the same way, although it is stated that the work " Yogava- ^ sistha " was recited by Vasistha to Raroa in the Rama incarnation, yet we find a summary of the Bhagavadgita t which was preached to Arjuua by the Blessed Lord in the subsequent Krsna incarnation, reproduced in the last, that is r in the Nirvana chapter, in which many verses are taken as they are from Bhagavadgita, and it is given the name "Arjunopakhyana"(Gf. Yoga. 6, Pu. Sarga. 52-58). I have stated above that the Sivaglta is not to be found in the Padmapurana printed at Poona, but though that is so, yet a Bhagavadglta-mahStmya is described from the 171st to the 188th chapters of the Uttarakhanda of this edition (of the Padmapurana), and one chapter of this mahalmya is dedicated to each chapter of the Bhagavadgita and it also contains traditionary stories about the same. There is besides one

INTRODUCTORY

Gita-mahatmya in the Varahapurana and it is said that there is also a third Gita-mahatmya in the Saiva or Vayupurana. But I do not come across it in the Vayupurana printed in Calcutta* A small chapter of nine verses called " Gita-dhyana " is to be found printed in the beginning of the printed editions of the Bhagavadglta, but I cannot say from where it has been taken. Nevertheless, the verse " Bhismadroiia-tata Jayadratha-jala " (from these nine verses) is to be found, with slight verbal differences, at the very commencement of the recently published drama of Bhasa called " Urubhanga ". There- fore, it would seem that this Gita-dhyana must have come into vogue probably after the date of the dramatist Bhasa. Because, it would be more proper to say that the Gita-dhyana has been prepared by borrowing different verses from different texts and writing some new verses, rather than to say that a well-known dramatist like Bhasa has taken that verse from the Gita-dhyana. As the dramatist Bhasa lived before Kalidasa* his date cannot at most be later than Saka 300. *

From what has been stated above, one can understand which and how many copies, and good or bad imitations; summaries and mahuhnijas of the Gita are to be found in the puranas. One cannot definitely say to what puranas some gitas like the Avadhutagita, the AstSvakraglta, etc., belong, and if they do not form part of any puranas, then by whom and when they were independently written. Yet, if one considers the arrangement or the disposition of subject matters, in all these gitas, one will see that all these works musC have been written after the Bhagavadglta had come into, prominence and acquired general acceptance. Nay, one may even go further and say that these various gitas have been, brought into existence with the idea that the sacred literature of a particular sect or a purana does not become- complete unless it contains a gita similar to the Bhagavadglta. As in the Bhagavadglta, the Blessed Lord first showed to Arjuna his. Cosmic Form and then preached to him the Divine Knowledge,

• Moat of the above-mentioned Gitas and also several other

Gitas (including the Bhagavadglta) have been printei by Mr. Uari Raghunath Bhagwat.

GITA-RAHASYA ok KARMA-YOGA

-so also is the case with the S'ivaglta and Devigita, or the -Ganes'agita; and in the S'ivagita, Is'varagitS, etc., we find •many verses taken literally from the Bhagavadglta. Considering the matter .from the point of view of Spiritual Knowledge, these various gitas do not contain anything more than the Bhagavadglta; but, what is more, the wonderful skill of establishing a harmony between the Realisation .of the Highest Self (adhyatma) and Action (karma) which is seen in the Bhagavadglta, is not to be found in any- one of these gitas. Somebody has subsequently written the Uttaragita as a supplement to the Bhagavadglta in the form of a conversation between Krsna and Arjuna, in the belief that the Patafrjala-yoga or the Hatha-yoga or the Philosophy of Renunciation (sammjusa) by Abandonment of Action (karma) has not been sufficiently well described in the Bhagavadglta, and the Avadhuta, the Astavakra and some other gitas are ■purely one-sided, that is to say, they are only in support of the

path of Renunciation ; and the Yamagita, Pacdavaglta, and

■some other gitas are very small and purely devotional, like •eulogistic hymns. It is true that the same is not the case 'with the Sivaglta, the Ganes'agita and the Suryaglta and they ■contain a skilful harmonising of Action and Spiritual Knowledge ; yet, as that exposition in them has been more or less adopted from the Bhagavadglta there is no novelty about them. Therefore, these pauranic stale gitas which have come into existence later on, fall into the shade before the profound and comprehensive brilliance of the Bhagavadglta and the excellence of the Bhagavadglta has been all the more established ■and enhanced by these imitation gitas ; and the word " gita " has come to mean Bhagavadglta principally. Although the ■works Adhyatma Ramayana and Yogavasistha are more exhaustive, yet from their construction, they are evidently of a later date. The (Jurujnanavasistha-tafctvasarayana of the Madras Presidency is a very ancient work according to some, but I am not of that opinion, because it contains a reference to 108 Upanisads and it cannot be said that all of them are ancient ; and if one considers the Suryaglta, we find in it a reference (see 3. 30) to Qualified-Monism (visistadvaita), and in some places the arguments too seem to have been adopted from

INTRODUCTORY

the Bhagavadglta (1. 68), and therefore, one has to come to the ■conclusion that even this work was written much later on, possibly even after the date of S'ri S'amkaracarya.

Although there were many gltas, yet inasmuch as the Bhagavadglta was of unquestionable excellence, as shown above, later philosophers, following the Vedic cult, thought it proper not to take much notice of the other gltas and to examine only the Bhagavadglta and explain its import to their ■co-religionists. The examination of a work is of two kinds ; there is the internal examination and the external examination. If one considers the book as a whole and extracts the inner meaning, the import, the implied meaning, or conclusions Bought to be proved by it, that is called the " internal examination ". Considering where a particular work was written, who wrote it, what kind of language is used in it, to what extent good sense or sweetness of sound are to be found in it from the poetical point of view, whether the diction of it is grammatically correct, or it contains any old archaic •constructions, what opinions, places or personages are mentioned in it, and whether or not such references enable you to determine the date of the work or the social conditions availing at the time when the work was written, whether the ideas in the book are original or are borrowed from some one else, and if borrowed, then which they are, and from whom they are borrowed, etc. — which is an exposition of the purely external aspects of the book, — is called the " external examination " of the work. Those ancient commentators who have written -commentaries ( bhusya ) or criticisms ( tlka ) on the Glta have not given much attention to these external aspects. Because, -considering these matters, while examining a supernatural work like the Bhagavadglta, would, in their opinion, be like wasting time in merely counting the petals of an excellent flower, instead of admiring its scent, colour or beauty or in -criticising the combs of a honey-comb full of honey ; but ■ following the example of Western critics, modern scholars are now devoting much attention to the external examination of

• the Glta. One of these has counted the archaic constructions

in the Gifca and come to the conclusion that this work must have been written at least a few centuries before the birth of

10 GITA-RAHA.SYA OR KARMA-YOGA

Christ ; and that, the doubt that the path of Devotion described, in the Gita may have been adopted from the Christian religion ( which was promulgated at a later date ) is absolutely without foundation. Another scholar has taken it for granted that the atheistic opinions which have been mentioned in the 16th chapter of the Gita, must, most probably, be Buddhistic, and come to the conclusion that the Gita must have come into- existence after the date of Buddha. Another scholar says that as in the verse " brahmasuira padais-caiva " in the 13th chapter, the Brahma-Sutras have been mentioned, the Gita must have been written after the date of Brahma-Sutras; on the other- hand, several others say that as the Gita has undoubtedly been taken as an authority in some places at least in the Brahma-- Sutras, one cannot imagine that the Gita was later than the Brahma-Sutras. Still other scholars say that there could have been no time for Sri Krsna to recite the Bhagavadgita of 700 stanzas to Arjuna on the battle-field during the Bharata war. In the hurry and scurry of the war, the most that Sri Krsna . could have told Arjuna would be about 40 or 50 very important and crucial verses or the import of them and that the expansion of these verses must have been made later on when the story of the war was recited by Sarhjaya to Dhrtarastra or by Vyasa to Suka or by Vaisampayana to Janamejaya, or by Suta to Saunaka, or at least when the original Bharata was expanded by some one into the ' Mahabharata '. When such an idea has taken root in the mind regarding the construction of the Gita, scholars have taken to diving into the ocean of the Gita and some scholars have declared seven * and others twenty-eight or thirty-six or one hundred verses to be the original verses of the Gita 1 Some

• At present, there is one Gita which consists only of seven

verseB, namely, the following : — (1) "Om ilyeialsaraih Brahma etc." (Gi. 8. 13); (2) " sthune ffrfikesa tava prakirtya etc." (GI. 11. 36) (3) "sarvatah pmipudam tat" etc, (Gi. 13. 13); (i) kavim purmam- amiaiitciram" etc. (GI. 8. 9). (5) "urdhva mulamadhah sakham" etc. (Gi. 15. 11); (6) " sarvasya caham hrdi sammvifto etc." (Gi. 15. 15); (7) manmam bhava madbhakto -etc" (GI. 18. 65); and there are various other abbreviated editions of the Gita based on the^ same sample.

INTRODUCTORY 11

have even gone to the length of saying that there was no- occasion whatsoever for explaining to Arjuna the philosophy of the Brahman on the battle-field and that this excellent treatise on the Vedanta philosophy has been interpolated by some one later on into the Mahabharata. It is not that these questions of external examination are totally useless. For instance, let us take the illustration of the petals of the flower or of the honey-comb which was mentioned above. In classifying vegetables, it is very necessary to consider the petals of their flowers ; and it has now been proved mathematically that there are to be found combs for storage of honey in a honeycombi which are made with the idea of economising as far as possible the quantity of wax and thereby reducing as far as possible the surface area of the external envelopes or combs without in any way reducing the cubic contents of the comb in weight of honey, and that thereby the inherent skill and intelligence of the bees can be proved. Therefore, taking into account these uses of such examination, I too have in the appendix at the end of this book, considered some important points arising in the external examination of the Gita. But those who want to understand the esoteric import of any book, should not waste time in these external examinations. In order to show the difference between those who understand the hidden message of VakdevI and those who formally worship her, the poet Murari has given a very excellent illustration. He says : —

abdhir kwghita eoa vauarabliutaih Mm I aisijn

gatiibhimlam I apatrUanimagnapivanitantir-jaiiati mantlulnilah II

If one wants to know of the immense depth of the ocaan, whom should he ask of it V It is true that on the occasion of the war between Rama and Ravaua, powerful and agile monkey warriors crossed the ocean without difficulty and reached Ceylon (Lanka); but how could these poor fellows have gained any knowledge of the immense depth of the ocean ? The only one who can know truly of this depth is the great Mandaracala (Mandara mountain) rooted in paljala, which was placed by the gods at the bottom of the ocean, in order to make of it a "mantha" or churner at the time of the churning of the ocean.

n gita-kahasya or karma-yoga

According to this logic of the poet Murari, we must now take into account only the words of those scholaTS and learned pereonB who have churned the ocean of the Gita in order to ■draw out its moral. The foremost of these writers is the writer of the Mahabharata. One may even say that he is in a way the author of the present-day Gita. I will, therefore, in the first place shortly explain what is the moral involved in the Gita according to the writer of the Mahabharata.

From the fact that the Gita is called " Bhagavadgita " or " the Upanisad sung by the Blessed Lord " one sees that the "advice given in the Gita to Arjuna is principally of the Bhagavata religion, that is to say, of the religion promulgated by the Bhagavan, because, Sri Krsna is known by the name " Sri Bhagavan " usually in the Bhagavata religion. It is stated in the commencement of the fourth chapter of the -Gita (4. 1-3) that this religion was nothing new, but was something which had been preached by the Bhagavan to Vivasvan and by Vivasvan to Manu and by Mann to Iksvaku. And in the exposition of the Narayaniya or Bhagavata religion at the end of the Santiparva of the Mahabharata, after the tradition of the Bhagavata religion in the various incarnations of Brahmadeva, that is, during the various kalpas has been described, it is stated in the description of the Tretayuga out of the present life of Brahmadeva, that : —

Tretayuaadau, ca tato Yivauvn Manave dadau I Manns' ca lohubhrlijarthafn sutayekwakave dadau I Iksmkund cu kathito vyupya lokvnawsthitah II

(Ma. Bha. San. 348. 51-52).

i.e., "the Bhagavata religion has been traditionally handed down by Vivasvan to Manu and by Manu to Iksvaku ". These two ■traditions are consistent with each other (see my commentary on Gi. 4. 1). And in as much as the traditions of two different religions cannot be the same, one comes to the necessary conclusion, on seeing this unity of traditions, that the Gita religion and Bhagavata religion must be one and the same. But this matter does not depend on inference alone. Because, in the exposition of the Narayaniya or Bhagavata religion which is to be found in the Mahabharata itself, Vais'arhpayana

INTRODUCTORY 13

has described the summary of the G-ita to Janamejaya in the following words ;-

e mm esa mahun dharmah sa te purmm nrpottama I hithito HarigUami sainasauidhikalpitah U

(Ma. Bha. San. 346. 10). that is ; "Oh excellent king, Janamejaya ! this magnificent Bhagavata religion together with its ritual was described by me to you concisely on a former occasion namely, in the Harigita, that is, in the Bhagavadglta. ' ' And in the second foilowing chapter, it is clearly stated that this exposition of the Marayanlya religion :-

samupodhesmnlkem Kumpandavaijor mrdlie I Arjune vimanaske ca glta Bhagavata svayam II

(Ma. Bha. San. 348. 8). that is ; " was made by the Blessed Lord when during the fight between the Kauravas ar.d the Pandavas both the armies had become ready for war and Arjuna had become dejected i.e. 'mnumski.' " From this it follows beyond doubt that the word " Harigita " in this place means the Bhagavadglta and nothing else. Thus, the preceptorial tradition of these two religions is the same. This " Bhagavata " or " Narayaniya " religion which has been twice mentioned in the G-ita as being the subject matter of exposition, has the other names of " Satvata " or " Ekantika " religion, and where that religion is being expounded in the Mahsbharata, its two-fold quality is described thus :-

Ntirayauaparo dharmah punara urttidurlabhdh I pravHtilaksams caiva dharmci Naivi/ayatmatoh II

(Ma. Bha. San. 347. 80-81) that is ; " this Narayaniya religion is such as'obviates re-birth (pumr-janma) i. e. gives complete Release (moksa) and is also Energistic ( pravrttipara)" and then it is clearly explained how this religion is Energistic.

The word " Energism " (praurtii) is understood in popular acceptance as meaning, performing desirelessly the duties which pertain to one's status" in life, according to Hie arrangement of the four castes, without taking up Asceticism {saHimjasa). It, therefore, follows that the senium given J« 

14 GfTA-EAHASYA OB KAKMA-YOGA

the Gita to Arjuna is of the Bhagavata religion and, in as much as that religion is Energistic, it also follows that the -writer of the Mahabharata looked upon that advice also as Energistic. Nevertheless, it is not that the Gita. contains only the Energistic Bhagavata religion. Vais'ampayana has further said to Janamejaya :

yatlnam capi yo dharmah m te purmm nrpottama I

kathito Harigilasu samasavidhikalpitah II

(Ma. Bha. S'an. 348. 53). that is : — " this Bhagavata religion and side hy side with it ( capi I the renunciatory religion of ascetics (samnyasi) together with the relative ritual has, excellent King, been explained hy me to you before in the Bhagavadgita ". Still, although the renunciatory religion has in this way been mentioned in the Glta side hy side with the energistic religion of Action, yet the tradition of the Glta religion of Manu, Iksvaku etc. which has been mentioned in the Gita does not at all apply to the renunciatory religion ; it is consistent only with the tradition of the Bhagavata leligion. It, therefore, follows Irom the statements referred to above that according to the writeT of the Mahabharata, the advice which has been given to Arjuna in the Glta relates principally to the Energistic Bhaga- vata religion traditionally handed down from Manu to Iksvaku etc., and that it contains a'reference to the renunciatory path of ascetics only as a side reference. That this progressive or Ener- gistic Naray amy a religion in the Mahabharata and theBhagavata religion of the Bhagavata-Purana are fundamentally one and the same, will he seen to be quite clear from the statements made by Prthu, Priyavrata, Prahlada and other devotees of the Blessed Lord or from the other descriptions of the path of Desireless Action which are to be found elsewhere in the Bhagavata ( Bhagavata. 4. 22. 51-52 ; 7. 10. 23 and 11. 4. 6 ). But the true purpose of the Bhagavata-Purana is not to justify the Energistic principles in favour of Action contained in Bhagavata religion. This justification is to be found in the Mahabharata or principally in the Gita. But, it is stated in the earlier chapters of the Bhagavata, that while justifying ■these principles, Sri Vyasa forgot to define the moral value of

INTRODUCTORY 15

the devotional aspect of the Bhagavata religion, and as Desireless Action ( miskarmya ) by itself is useless without Devotion ( Bhagavata. 1. 5. 12 ), the Bhagavata-Purana had to be subsequently written to make up for this deficit. From this, the real import of the Bhagavata-Purana becomes quite clear ;' and on that account, the Euergistic aspect of the Bhagavata religion has not been as forcefully emphasised in the Bhagavata as the devotional aspect of devotion to the Blessed Lord, which has been explained by the recitation of numerous stories. Nay, the writer of the Bhagavata says that all yoga of Energism ( Karma-Yoga ) is useless in the absence of Devotion ( Bhag 1. 5. 34 ). Therefore, the Bhagavata-Purana which lays stress on Devotion is not — although it relates to the Bhagavata religion — as useful for determining the moral laid down in the Glta, as the Narayamya Upakhyana of the Bharata itself which contains the Glta ; and if the Bhagvata-Purana is made use of for that purpose, then one must do so, bearing clearly in mind, that both the object and the time of the Bharata and the Bhagavata are quite different. The various questions as to -what were the original forms of the renunciatory religion of monks and of the Energistic Bhagavata religion, what the reasons were for this difference, in what respects the form of ithe original Bhagavata religion has changed in present times ■etc. will be considered later on in detail.

I have so far dealt with what the moral of the Glta is according to the writer of the Mahabharata himself. Let us now see what the purport of the Glta is according to those persons who have written commentaries [bhasya) and criticisms on the Glta. Among these commentaries and criticisms, the bhasya on the Glta, of Sri Sarhkaracarya is considered to be the most ancient. But there is no doubt that there had been numerous other commentaries or criticisms on the Glta before that date. These commentaries, however, are not now available and therefore, there are now no means for determining in what way the Glta was interpreted in the interval between the date of the Mahabharata and the birth of Sarhkaracarya. Nevertheless, - it is quite clear from the references to the opinions of these earlier critics which are to be found in the Samkarabhasya itself ( Gl. Sam. Bha. Introductions to Chap. 1 and 3 ) that the

16 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

commentators who had come before Samkaracarya had placed, an Energistic interpretation on the Gita, as combining Actiotu with Spiritual Realisation, that is to say, to the effect that every man who had acquired spiritual knowledge had never- theless to continue performing the duties pertaining to his- particular status in life so long as he lived— as had been done by the writer of the Mahabharata. But as this doctrine of the Vedic Karma-Yoga was not palatable to Samkaracarya, he has- in the commencement of the Bhasya, in the introduction, clearly stated that he had written the Bhasya with the sole intention, of refuting that opinion and of explaining what the esoteric moral of the Gita was according to himself. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what the word " bhasya " means. The two* words "' commentary " ( bhasya ) and " criticism " ( t'ika, ) are, it is true, often used as being synonymous. But ordinarily " tlka " means explaining the plain meaning of the original work and making the understanding of the words in it easy ; but the writer of the "bhasya" does not remain satisfied with that ; he critically and logically examines the entire work and: explains what its purport is according to his opinion and how that work has to be interpreted consistently with that purport. That is the nature of the Samkarabhasya on the Gita. But th& different way in which the Acarya has interpreted the moral of the Gita requires the previous history to be shortly mentioned before one understands the underlying reason for it, The Vedic religion was not purely ritualistic (tanfrilca) and the TJpanisads had minutely considered even in very ancient times, the deep underlying import of it. But as these Upanisads have been written by different rsis at different times, they contain various kinds of thought and some of them are apparently mutually contradictory. Badarayanacarya has reconciled these inconsistencies and he has in his Brahma-Sutras harmonised all the Upanisads ; and on that account, the Vedanta-Sutras are considered to he as authoritative on this matter as the Upanisads themselves. These Vedanta-Sutras are also known by the other names of " Brahma-Sutras " or " Sariraka-Sutras ". Yet the consideration of the philosophy of the Vedic religion does not end here. Because, as the spiritual knowledge in the Upanisads is primarily ascetical, that i=>

INTRODUCTORY ' IE"

renunciatory, and as the Vedanta-Sutras fcaire beam wrattiasc only with the intention of harmonising the Upaoisatk, ™« iw& nowhere even in the Upanisads any detailed sad fegial exposition of the Energistio Vedic religion. Therefore, wIkb as stated above, the Energistio Bhagavadgita for the first time supplemented the philosophy of the Vedic religion it became, as a supplement to the religious philosophy in the Yedas and in. the Upanisads, a work as authoritative and acceptable as both; and later on, the Upanisads, the Vedanta-Sutras and the Bhagavadgita acquired the colbctive name of "Prasthana- trayi " (the Trinity of Systems). " Prasthana-trayl " means the three principal authoritative works or pillars of the Vedic religion which systematically and scientifically expounded the two paths of Renunciation (mvrfti) and Energism (pixivrtti). When once the Bhagavadgita came in this way to be included in the " Prasthana-trayl " and tha sovereignty of this "Prasthana-trayl" came to be firmly established, all religious opinions or cults which were, inconsistent with these three works or which could not find a place in them, came to be eonsiderc-d as inferior and unaccept- able by the followers of the Vedic religion. The net result of ■ this was that the protagonist Acaryas of each of the various- cults which came into existence in India after the extinction of the Buddhistic religion, such as, the Monistic fadvaita), the Qualified-Monistic ( visistudmita ), the Dualistic (dvaita) and and the Purely Monistic (sudtlhadiaila) cults with the super- added principles of Devotion ( bhakii ) or Renunciation ( sanvmjasa ) had to write commentaries on all the three parts of the Prasthana-trayl ( and, necessarily on the Bhagavadgita. also ), and had somehow or other to prove that according to> these three works, which had become authoritative and acceptable as Scriptures long before those cults came into- existence, the particular cult promulgated by them was the correct cult, and that the other cults were inconsistent with those Soriptures. Because, if they had admitted that these authoritative religious treatises would support other cults besides those propounded by themselves, the value of their particular cult would to that extent suffer and that was not desirable for any of these protagonists. When once this rule 3-4

18 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

of writing sectarian ( santpradayilca ) commentaries on the Prasthana-trayi supporting a particular doctrine came into vogue, different learned writers began to propound in their criticisms their own interpretations of the moral of the Gita ■on the authority of the commentaries pertaining to their particular doctrine and such criticisms began to gain authority in those particular sects. The commentaries or criticisms which are now available on the Gita, are more or less all of this kind, that is to say, they are written by Acaryas pertaining to diverse sects ; and on that account, although the original Bhagavadgita propounds only one theme, yet it has come to be believed that the same Gita supports all the various cults. The first, that is the most ancient of these cults is that of Sri Samkaracarya, and from the point of view of philosophy, that cult has become the one most accepted in India. The first Samkaracarya was born in the year 710 of the Salivahana ■era (788 A. D.) and in the 32nd year of his age, he entered the caves (Salca. 710 to 742.) i. e. 788-820 A.D. The Acarya was a superman and a great sage and he had by his brilliant intellec- tual power refuted the Jain and the Buddhistic doctrines which had then gained ground on all sides and established his own Non-Dualistic (advaita) doctrine; and, as is well-known, he established four monasteries (mafha) in thef our directions of India for the protection of theVedic religion contained in the Srutis and Smrtis and for the second time in the Kali-Yuga gave currency to the Vedic renunciatory doctrine or cult of Asceticism < saiimnasa ). Whatever religious doctrine is taken, it naturally falls into two divisions ; one is the philosophical aspect of it and the other, the actual mode of life prescribed by it. In the first part, the meaning of Release (moksa) is usually explained in a scientific and logical way after explaining what conclusions must be drawn as to the nature of the Paramesvara after a proper consideration of the material body fpinda) in its relation to the Cosmos (bmhmanda) ; in the other part, there is an explanation of how a man has to lead his life in this world, so that such mode of life should become a means for obtaining

• In my opinion, the date of the first Samkaracarya' mnst be

pushed back by at least 100 years, and I have given my reasons for doing so in the Appendix.

INTRODUCTORY 19

that Release (mokfa). According to the first of these, that is to say, according to the philosophical aspects of the doctrine, Sarhkaracarya says that (1) the multiplicity of the various objects in the world, such as, " I ", " You ", or all the other things which are visible to the eye, is not a true multiplicity, hut that there is in all of them a single, pure, and eternal Highest Self ( Parabralimmi ), and various human organs experience a sense of multiplicity as a result of the Illusion (mm/S) of that Parahrahman ; (2) the Self (Ahimn) of a man is also fundamentally of the same nature as the Parahrahman- and (3) that it is not possible for any one to obtain Release fmoksa) except after the complete Realisation (jnuna) or personal experience of this identity of the Atman and the Parahrahman. This is known as Non-Dualism ( admita-vada ), because, the sum and substance of this doctrine is, that there is no other independent and real substance except one pure self-enlightened, eternal, and Released Parahrahman ; that the multiplicity which is visible to the eyes is an optical illusion or an imaginary experience resulting from the effect of Illusion (maya) ; and that Maya is not some distinct, real, or indepen- dent substance, hut is unreal (mthyu) ; and, when one has to ■consider only the philosophical aspect of the doctrine, it is not necessary to go deeper into this opinion of Sri Sarhkaracarya. But that does not end there. Coupled with the Non-Dualistic philosphy there is another proposition of the Sarhkara doctrine relating to the mode of life, that, although it is necessary to perform the Actions pertaining to the state of a householder in order to acquire the capacity of realising the identity of the Brahman and the Atman by the purification of the mind, yet it will be impossible to obtain Release unless one discontinues ihose aotions later on and ultimately gives them up and takes up samnyasa (asceticism); because, in as much as Action'(/ca?-ma) .and Knowledge (jMna) are mutually antogonistic like light .and darkness, the knowledge of the Brahman does not become ■perfect unless a man has entirely conquered all root tendencies .(■msaria) and given up all Actions. This second proposition is known as the Path of Renunciation ( nivrtti-marga ), or because in this path one ultimately gives up all Actions and remains rsteeped in Knowledge or Realisation it- is also called

30 GlTA-RAHASYA OH KARMA-YOGA

" sai'unyasa-ni&tha" (the Path of Renunciation) or "jrlana-nidha' ( the Path of Realisation ). It is stated in the SarhkarabMsy: on the Upanisads and on the Brahmasutras that not only th Non-Dualistic philosophy hut also the Path of Rtnunciatioi that is to say, both the aspects of the cult of Samkara hav been preached in those books ; and in the Bhasya on the Glta, . definite conclusion has been drawn that the teaching of th Bhagavadgita is the same ( GI. Sam. Bha. Introduction; ai> Brahnia-Su. Sam. Bha. 2. 1. 14 ) ; and as authority for that. 1 has quoted such sentences from the Git a a,s " jPanatjiah san karmuni Ihisma-sut kurute " i. e., " all Action {karma) is redue to ashes in the fire of jnana " (Gi. 4. 37) and "sarm hirnuikML Partita jiiaiie jxjrisantapyaie " i.e., " all Actions culminate i Realisation (jiianaj " ( Gi 4. 33 ). In short, the Siir±arabhL=y has been written in order to show that the teaching of the GM is consistent with that particular Yedie path which — aftt proving it to he the most excellent one — was recommended "nj Sarhkaraearya, after he had refuted the Buddhistic .doctrines : and further, to show that the Glta is net in favour of the combination of Knowledge with Action, which was prescribed by the previous commentators: and to show that the Blesssd Lord has in the Glta preached to Arjuna the dc-etrine of the Samkara cult, that Action is only a means of aocjalring Knowledge and is inferior and that Release is ultimately obtained only by Knowledge combined with Renunciation of Action. If there had been any commentary on the Gits, bsfcre the date of Saiiikaiacaiya. interpreting it as favouring Asoeiieism, such a commentary is not now available. Therefore, we must any that the first attempt to deprive the Gita of its Energistic form and to give it a Renunciatory doctrinal form was made by the Samkarabhasya. Those commentators on the Gita who eaaie after Sri Samkaracarya and who followed bis doctrines, such as, Madhusudana and others, have in this natter principally adopted the procedure of the Acarya. Yet, later on, there came into existence another queer idea, namdy that the principal saeied canon enunciated in the Chaniegyopanisaa, namely, " TAT TTAM ASI " ie., "THAT ( Paiabrahnian ) ART THOU ( SVetaketu ) ", which is one of the sacred canons of the Non-Dualistic cult, is the canon which has.

INTRODUCTORY U

"been expatiated upon in the eighteen chapters of the CfltS, hut that the Blessed Lord has changed the order of the three parts of that sacred canon and taken " (mm " first and " tat " after that and " asi " last, and He has in this new order impartially allotted six chapters of the Gita to each of these parts' equally I The Paisaca-bhasya on the Gita does not pBrtain to any particular doctrine but is independent and it is believed to have been written by Hanuman i. e., by Marutl. But such is not the case. This Bhasya has been written by the philosopher Hanuman, who has also written a criticism on the Bhagavata and it supports the path of Renunciation and in it, in some places, interpretations have been copied verbatim from the Sarhkarabhasya, In the same way, the older or modern Marathi translations of or commentaries on the Gita principally follow the Sarhkarabhasya ; and the English translation of the Bhagavadglta by the late Kashinath Trimhak Telang, published in the Sacred Books of East Series brought out by Professor Max Muller, is stated by him at the end at the introduction to that translation, to be as far as possible consistent with Sri Sarbkaraclrya and the commentator;-; of hi-; school.

When once in this way, doctrinal commentaries on the Gita and on the other two works out of the Prasfchina-fcrayl "began to be written, the same course wan later on followed by persons holding other doctrinal views. About 250 years after the coming to existence of the Sarnkara tradition which maintained the theory rjf Illusion (nwii/U). Non-P:mli«im (idaiiia) and Renunciation {miitmjwa.1, Sri Ramsvnujac&rya (born Saka 93S i. e, 1016 A. DJ founded the Qualified-Monism ( diidail ixtHa) tradition ; and in order to substantiate that cult he also, like Sri Sariikaraearya.lias written independent commentaries (Itlinimu) on * "the Prasfijanartrayi. including, of course, the Gits, This school is of the opinion that the doctrines of the UnranUty of Illusion (nidga} and Ncsn-Thialism laid down by Sarhkarac&rya were not ■correct and that although the three principles of ComefgumwCB (fun), Cosmos ( jagal / and Isvara were independent, f(4 )l) flf much as jim, Lie., consciousness (a//, and fcho Oomw (wlijpb is aai L a, unconscious ) were both the body of ntic 'Mul Wl§ same Isvara, therefore, the dl-aa(-bodUn1 Tfivfij'tt wse (W» iWu one abae and that out of this mUU ' ell ' ftlld 'wit * ill t^

22 GITA-RAKASYA OE KARMA-YOGA.

body of the Isvara, the gross at and the gioss acit 01 the numerous forms of Life and the Cosmos came into existence later on ; and Ramanujacarya says that from the philosophical point of view, this is the doctrine which has been enunciated by the Upanisads and the Brahma-Sutras (Gl. Rama. 2. 12 ; -IS. 2). One may even say that the works of Ramanujacarya were responsible for the Qualified-Monism doctrine finding its way into the Bhagavata religion; because, the previous exposition of the Bhagavata religion to be found in the Mahabharata and in the Glta is seen to be on the basis of the Non-Dualistic cult. As Ramanujacarya belonged to the Bhagavata religion, he ought to have naturally realised that the Glta enunciated the Energistic path of Karma-Yoga. But as at the date of Jlainauujacarya, the Karma-Yoga of the original Bhagavata religion had practically come to an end and it had acquired a Qualified-Monistic ( visistadvaita ) form in its philosophical aspect, and principally a Devotional form from the point of view of the mode of life, Ramanujacarya drew the further conclusions that although jrlam, Icanna and bltakti (Devotion) are all three referred to in the Glta, yet the doctrine enunciated in the Gita is in essence Qualified-Monistic from the point of view of philosophy, and of Devotion to the Vasudeva from the point of view of mode of life; and that the Path of Action ( Imrma-nistha ) was something which led to Path ofifcnGwL;>ge_( Jiiwm-nisiUU ) and was not something indepen- dent ( Gi. Ra. Bha. iu.-l-&od-3rl ). But although Ramanuja- carya had effected a change in the cult of Samkara by substituting the Qualified-Monism for Non-Duality and Devotion for Renunciation, yet if Devotion is looked upon as the highest duty of man from the point of view of mode of life,, then the lifelong performance of the worldly duties pertaining to one's particular status, becomes an inferior mode of life ; and on that account the interpretation put on the Glta by Ramanujacarya must also be looked upon as in a way in favour of Renunciation of Action. Because, when once the mind has become purified as a result of an Energistic mode of life, and man has attained Realisation ( jnaim j, whether he, thereafter, adopts the fourth stage of life and remains steeped in the contemplation of the Brahman or he is steeped in the.

INTRODUCTORY 23-

unbounded loving worship of the Vasudeva is just tie same- from the point of view of Action (karma) ; that is to say, boii are Renunciatory. And the same objection appliss to the other cults which came into existence after the date of Ramanujs- carya. Although Ramanujaearya may have been right in. saying that the theory of the Non-Reality of Illusion is wrong and that one ultimately attains Release only by devotion to the Vasudeva, yet looking upon'the Parabrahman and the Conscious Ego (jiva ) as ONE in one way, and different in other ways is a contradiction in terms and an, inconsistency. Therefore, a third school which came into existence aftor the date of Sri Ramanujaearya, is of the opinion, that both must be looked upon as eternally different fiGm each other and that there never can be any unity between them, wnetnoi partial or total, and therefore, this school is known as the Dualist.\\ school. The protagonist of this school was Sri Madhvacarya"; -Efiig^ Srimadanandatlrtha. He died in Saka 1120 ( 1198 A.D. ) and according to the Madhva school, he was then 79 years old. But Dr. Bharidarkar has in the English Book "Vaisnavism, Saivism, and other sects" recently published by him, established on the authority of stone inscriptions and other books ( see page 59 ) that Madhvacarya must ha taken to have lived from Saka 1119 to 119S ( 1197 to 1276 A. D. ). Madhvacarya has shown in his commentaries on the Prasthana-trayl (which includes the Gita) that all these sacred books are in favour of the theory of Duality. In his commentary on the Gita, he says that although Desireless Action has been extolled in the Glta, yet Desireless Action is only a means and Devotion is the true and ultimate cult, and that when once one has become perfect by following the Path of Devotion, whether one thereafter performs or does not perform Action is just the same. It is true that there are some- statements in the Glta such as, " dhijanut Icannuphalatyayah '" ...i. e., " the abandonment of the fruit of the action ( i. e. t Desireless Action ) is superior to the meditation on the Paramesvara ( i. e., Devotion ) " etc. which are inconsistent with this doctrine ; but, says the Madhvabhasya on the Gita, such sentences are not to be understood literally but as mere expletives and unimportant ( Gi. Mabha. 12. 30). The fourth school is the

24 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA- YOGA

school of Sri Vallabhacarya (born in Saka 1401 i. e. 1479 A. D.) This is also a Vaisnava School like those of Ramanuja and Madhvacarya. However, the opinions of this school Regarding ihe Conscious Ego ( jlva A Cosmos < jagat ), and Isvara are different from the opinions of the Qualified-Monism or the Dualistic Schools. This school accepts the doctrine thai the •Conscious Ego (jlva) when pure and unblinded by Illusion ■(maya) and the Parabrahman are one, and are not two distinct things ; and that is why, this school is known as the pure Non-Dualistic (suddhudvuila), school. Nevertheless this School •differs from the Sarhkara school on account of the other doctrines pertaining to it, namely that, the Conscious Ego i(jiva) and the Brahman cannot be looked upon as one and the same in the same sense as , ' ""ubne by Sri Sarhkaracarya but that the varioup Souls are particles of the Isvara, like sparks of firo ; that the Cosmos, which is composed of Illusion, M not unreal ( mithya ) but Illusion is a Force which has separated itself from the Isvara at the desire of the Para- anesvara, that the Conscious Ego (jlva) which has become •dependent on Illusion, cannot acquire the knowledge necessary for obtaining Release except by divine pleasure ; and that, therefore, Devotion to the Blessed Lord is the most important means of obtaining Release. This pleasure of the Paramesvara is also known by the other names of ' pusti ' ' posana ' etc. and, therefore, this cult is also known as ' pusti-marga '. In ■the books of this school on the Gita, such as the TaUmdlpika And others, it is laid down that in at; much as the Blessed Lord has, after first preaching to Arjuna the Sarhkhya philosophy and the Karma-Yoga, ultimately made him perfect by treating him with the nectar of the philosophy of Devotion, Devotion but above all, the Devotion included in 'pasti-marga' — which entails the abandonment of home and domestic ties — is the most concentrated moral of the Gita and that on that account ithe Blesssd Lord has in the end given the advice : — " sarm- dhannan parityajya lrmmehiiii saranam iraja " — i.e.," give up all other religions and surrender yourself to Me alone " ( Gi. 18. 66 ). Besides these, there is .another Vaisnava cult, entailing the worship of Radhakrsna, which- was promulgated by ITimbarka. Dr. Bhandarkar has established that this Acarya

INTRODUCTORY 25

Hived after the date of Ramanujacarya and before the date of Madhvacarya ; that is to say about Saka. 1084 (1162 A. D.) Tin ■opinion of Nimbarka carya regarding the Conscious Ego (Jim) th< ■Cosmos /jagat) and the Isvara is, that although these three an different from each other, yet the existence and activity of th< ■Conscious Ego (jlva) and of the Cosmos are not independent bul depend upon the desire of the Isvara; and that the subtle elements of the Conscious Ego (jiva) and of the Cosmos are contained ir ■the fundamental Isvara. In order to prove this doctrine Nimbarka has written an independent bhaxi/a on the Vedanta- siitras, and Kesava Kasmiri Bhattacarya, who belongs to this ■ school has written a commentary on the Bhagavadglta called " " Taltvapralaisika ' and has shown in it that the moral laid down by the Gita is consistent with the doctrines of this school. In order to differentiate this school from the Qualified-Monism .school of Ramanujacarya, one may refer to it as the Daal-Non- Dual (dixutadvaita! school. It is quite clear that these differenl Devotional sub-cults of Duality and Qualified- Monism which • discard the Samkara doctrine of Maya have come into existence because of the belief that Devotion, that is, the worship of a tangible thing, loses foundation and to a certain extent becomes forceless, unless one looks upon the visible objects in the world as real. But one cannot say that in order to justify Devotion, the theories of Non-duality or of Illusion have to bb discarded. The saints in the Maharastra have substantiated the doctrine of Devotion without discarding the doctrines of Illusion and Non-Duality ; and this course seems to have been followed from before the time of Sri Saihkaraoarya. In this cult, the doctrines of Non-Duality, the illusory nature of things, and the necessity of abandonment of Action which are the concomitant doctrines of the Samkara cult are taken for granted. But the advice of the followers of this school, such as the Saint Tukaram, is that Devotion is the easiest of the means by which Release in the shape of realising the identity of the Brahman and the Atman, can be obtained : " if you want to reach the Isvara, then this is the easiest way " ( Tuka. •Ga. 3002. % ) ; and they say that the path of Devotion based on Non-Duality is the principal moral of the Gita in as much as the Blessed Lord himself has first told Arjuna that "Idesodlri-

26 GITA-BAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

katarastesam avyaldasaldacetasam " ( Gl. 12. 5 )...i. e., " con- centrating the mind on the Intangible Brahman is more difficult " and subsequently told him that : " bhaktastetiva me priyah " i. e., " my devotees are most beloved of me " ( Gi. 12. 20 ). The summing up of the Gita. which has been made by Sridhar SvamI in his commentary on the Glta. ( Gl. 18. 78 ) is of this kind. But, the most valuable work relating to this school, though in the Marathi language, is the Jfianesvari. In this work it is stated that the Doctrine of Karma is dealt with in the first four out of the 18 chapters of the Glta, the Doctrine of Devotion in the next seven and the Doctrine of Jnana in the subsequent chapters and Jfianeavara himself has at the end of his book said that he has written his commentary " aftti- consulting the Bhasyakaras (Sarhkaracarya)." But, as Jnanesvara. Maharaja had the wonderful skill of expounding the meaning "of the Glta, by numerous beautiful illustrations and com- parisons and also, as he has propounded the doctrines of Desireless Action and principally the doctrine of Devotion in a much better way than Sri Sarhkaracarya, the Jfianesvari must be looked upon as an independent treatise on the Gita. Jnanesvara Maharaja himself was a yogi. Therefore, he has written a very detailed commentary on that verse in the sixth chapter of the Glta which deals with the practice of the Patanjala Yoga, and in it he has said that the words of the Blessed Lord at the end of the chapter namely : " tasimdyoyi bhavurjuna "...i. e., "therefore, Oh Arjuna, become a Yogi, that is, become proficient in the practice of the Yoga " show that the Blessed Lord has declared the Patanjala Yoga to be the ' pantktni.ja ' i. e., the most excellent of all paths. In short, different commentators have interpreted the Glta in their own ways by first declaring the Energistic path of Action ( Karma-Yoga ) preached by the Gita to be inferior, that is to say, merely a means for Realisation (jilana), and then going on to say that the Gita has preached the various philosophical doctrines, as also the highest duties from the point of view of Reltase, which are prescribed, by their respective schools, such as: Non-Dualism based on the doctrine of Illusion, coupled with Renunciation of Action; or Qualified-Monism based on the- reality of Illusion, coupled with Devotion to the Vasudeva; or ■

INTRODUCTORY

Dualism, coupled with worship of theVisnu; or pure Non-dualism,, coupled with Devotion; or the Non-Dualism of the Saihkara oult, coupled with Devotion; or Pataiijala yoga, coupled with Devotion; or Devotion pure and simple; or Yoga pure and simple; or Realisation of the Brahman pure and simple,* — all of which are paths of Release, based on Renunciation. No one says that the Bhagavadglta looks upon the Karma-Yoga as the most excellent path of life. It is not that I alone say so. Even the well-known Marathi poet Vaman Pandit is of the same opinion. In his exhaustive commentary on the Gita, in the Marathi language known as Yathartlia-dipika, he first says : — ■ " But Oh, Blessed Lord, in this Kali-yuga each one interpretes the Gita according to his own opinion ", and he goes on to say : " Everyone on some pretext or other gives a different meaning- to the Gita but I do not like this their doing, thoughjhey are great ; what shall I do, Oh, Blessed Lord ? " This isTS^ complaint to the Blessed Lord. Seeing this confusion of the diverse opinions of the commentators, some scholars say that in as much as these various traditionary doctrines of Release are mutually contradictory and one cannot definitely say that any particular one of them has been recommended by the Gita, one has to come to the conclusion that the Blessed Lord has on the battle-field at the commencement of the war described individually, precisely, and skilfully all those various means of attaining Release — and specially, the three paths of Action (karma), Devotion (bhakti), and Realisation (jilana) and satisfied Arjuna in whose mind there had arisen a confusion about these diverse means of attaining Release. It is true that- some commentators do maintain that these descriptions of the various means of Release are not several or unconnected with each other, but the Gita has harmonised them with each other ; and finally, there are also to be found others who say that although the teaching of the Biahman in the Gita is apparently easy, yet the true import of it is very deep and no one can

4 *The Beveral commentaries on the Gita by the Aearyos of the various cults and the important criticisms pertaining to tho-e cults in all fifteen, have been recently published at the Guzrathi Printing Press. This book is very useful for studying the opinions advanced by the various commentators Bide by side.

28 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

understand it except from the mouth of a preceptor (Gi. 4. 34.), and that though there may be numerous criticisms on the Gita, yet, there is no other way to realise the true meaning of it, except from the mouth of a preceptor.

These numerous interpretations of the Bhagavadgita,

namely, the Energistic interpretation consistent with the

Bhagavata religion made by the writer of the Mahabharata

.and the other purely Renunciatory ones made by several later

Acaryas, posts, yogis, or devotees of the Blessed Lord,

consistently with the different traditionary schools to

which they respectively belonged, are likely to cause

confusion and one will naturally ask whether it is possible that

all these mutually contradictory interpretations can be put on

one and the same work ; and if it is not only possible but even

desirable, then why so ? !No one can entertain any doubt that

Jhsse-^arTous Acaryas who wrote the commentaries were

learned, religious and extremely pure-minded. Nay, one may

even say that the world has not to this day produced a

philosopher of the calibre of Sri. Sarhkaracarya. Then why

should there have been such a difference between him and the

later Acaryas ? The Gita is not such a pot of jugglery, that any

one can extract any meaning he likes out of it. The Gita had

been written long before these various schools of thought came

into existence, and it was preached by Sri Krsna to Arjuna not

to increase his confusion but to remove it ; and it contains a

preaching of one definite creed to Arjuna( Gi. 5. 1, i ), and the

effect uf that advice on Arjuna has also been what it ought to

Jiave been. Then, why should there be so much confusion about

the teaching of the Gita ? This question seems a really

difficult one. But the answer of it is not as difficult as would

appear, at first sight. Suppose, looking at a sweet and nice

food-preparation, one says that it is made of wheat, and another

one says it is made of ghee and a third one says, it is made of

sugar, according to his own taste ; then, which one of them will

you call wrong ? Each one is correct in his own way and

ultimately the question what that food-preparation is, remains

unsolved. Because, as it is possible to mix wheat, clarified

butter, and sugar and to prepare from them various kinds of

eatablessuoh as 'ladus,' 'jilebi', 'ghiwar' etc. the particular eatable

INTRODUCTORY 29

cannot be sufficiently defined by saying that ghee or wheat or sugar is the principle element in it. Just as when the ocean was churned, though one person got nectar, another one got poison, and others got LaksmI, Airavata, Kaustubha, Parijata, and other articles, yet the real nature of the ocean was not thereby fixed, so also is the case of the commentators who have churned the ocean of the Gita on a doctrinal basis, or one may even say that just as, the same Sri, Krsna Bhagavana who had entered the Durbar at the time of the assasiuation of Kamsa, appeared to various persons in different forms, that is, he appeared to athleteslike adamant and to women like the God of Beauty ( Madana ) and to parents like their own son etc. (Bhag. 10. Pu. 43. 17), so also although the Bhagavadgita is one and the same, people following different cults see it in a different light. Whatever religious cult may be taken, it is quite clear that ordinarily it must be based on some authoritative reli^ious^ text or other ; otherwise that cult will be considered to be totally without authority and will not be acceptable to people. Therefore, however numerous the different cults of the Vedic religion may be, yet with the exception of a few specified things, such as, the Isvara, the Conscious Ego and the Cosmos and their mutual interrelations, all other things are common to all the various cults; and therefore, in the various doctrinal commentaries or criticisms which have been written on our authoritative religious texts, ninety per cent of the statements or stanzas in the original work are interpreted in more or less the same way. The only difference is as regards the remaining statements or doctrines. If these statements are taken in their, literal meaning, they cannot possibly be equally appropriate to all the cults. Therefore, different commentators, who have propounded different doctrines, usually accept as important only such of these statements as are consistent with their own particular cult, and either say that the others are unimportant, or skilfully twist the meanings of such statements as might be totally inconsistent with their cults, or wherevsr possible, they draw hidden meanings or inferences favourabla to them- selves from easy and plain statements, and say that the particular work is an authority for their particular cult. For instance, see my commentary on Gita 2. 12 and 16 ; 3. 19 ; 6.

30 GTTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

3 and 18. 2. But it will be easily seen that laying down in this way that a book has a particular purport, and examining in the first place, without prejudice, the whole of the work, and drawing its implied purport without insisting that one's own cult is propounded by the Glta, or on any such other thing, are two totally different things.

If one gives up the doctrinal method of determining the purport of a book as faulty, one must show what other means there are for determining the import of the Glta. There is an old and more or less generally accepted rule on this matter in the form of a verse of the Mimarhsa writers, who were extremely skilful in determining the meanings of a particular book, chapter, or sentence. That verse is as follows ;— upakramopasamharav abhyaso 'purvatu phalam I arthamdopapattl ca liiiyaik tWpari/aniryaye tt The Mimarhsa writers say that if one has to find out the purport ■of 'any particular writing, chapter, or book, then the seven things mentioned in the above verse are necessary ( i. e., liiiga ). and all these seven things have got to be considered. The first two out of these are ' upakramopasaniharau ', which mean the beginning and the end of the book. Every writer starts writing a book with some motive or other in his mind ; and when that particular object has been achieved, he completes his book. Therefore, the commencement and the end of the work have first to be taken into account in determining the purport of the book. Geometry has defined a straight line as a line which goes from the point of commencement straight to the last point without swerving above or below or to the right or to the left. The same rule applies to the purport of a book. That purport which is properly fixed between the beginning and the end of the book and does not leave or divert from either of them, is the proper purport of it. If there are other roads for going from the beginning to the end, all those roads must be considered as crooked roads or bye-paths. When the direction of the purport of a work has in this way been fixed with due consideration for the commencement and the end, one should ssa what things are told repeatedly in it, that ie to say, of what things an ' abhyasa ' has been made. Because, whatever

thing is intended by the writer of a book to be proved, he shows

INTRODUCTORY 31

numerous reasons in support of it on numerous occasions and

refers to it as a definite proposition over and over again, saying

each time : " therefore, this thing is proved ", or, " therefore,

this particular thing has got to he done ", The fourth and the

fifth means for determining the purport of the work are the

new-ness ( apurmta ) and the effect [phala ) of it. ' ApTtrvata '

means something new. Unless the writer has something new

to tell, he is usually not induced to write a new book ; at any

rate, that used to be so when there were no printing-presses.

Therefore, before determining the purport of a book one has in

the first instance to see what it contains which is new,

particular, or not previously known. In the same way. if some

particular result has been achieved by that writing or by that

book, that is to say, if it has had some definite effect, then one

.must also take into account that result or effect. Because, in

■as much as the book has been written with the express

intention that that particular result or effect should be

■achieved, the object of the writer becomes clearer from the effect

•which has been achieved. The sixth and the seventh means

are ' artharacia ' and ' upapntti '. ' Artharuda ' is a technical

• erm of the Mimamsa school ( Jai.-Su. 1. 2. 1-18 ). Although

the thing about which a statement is to be made or the fact

which is to be proved is fixed, the writer nevertheless, deals

with many other things as occasion arises, whether by way of

illustration or by way of comparison in the course of the

argument, and whether for showing consistency or for showing

the similarity or the difference, or in order to support his own

side by showing the faults of the opposite side, or for the sake

of grace or as an exaggeration, or by way of stating the

previous history of the question, or for some other reason, with

the idea of supplementing the argument, and sometimes

without any reason whatsoever. The statements, which are

made by the writer on such occasions, are given by way of

glorification merely or of further elucidation or are only

supplemental, though they might not be totally irrelevant to

the subject-matter to be proved ; and therefore, it is not certain

that such statements are always true. *

• : I£ the Btatamsuta miide m the arlhaviida are consistent with the actual state of things, it is oalled 'amwada,' if inconsistent it is

33 GlTA-BAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA

One may even say that the writer is not particularly careful to see whether or not the statements made in the- artliavada, are literally true ; and therefore, one is not justified in looking upon the statements made in an artliavada, as authoritative, that is to say, as indicating the conclusions arrived at by the writer with reference to the various subject- matters in it. Looking upon them as pure glorifications, that is to say, as hollow, irrelevant, or mere praise, the Mimarhsa writers call them ' artliavada ', and they do not take into account these statements in determining the final conclusion to be drawn from the work. Even after all this, one has still to sea ultimately the u-papatti. ' VpapaUi ' or ' upaptxdana ' is the name given to the refuting of all things which would prove the contrary case and the subsequent logical and systematic martialling of things, which support one's own case,, when you are proving a particular point. When the two ends,, being the upalmana and the upasaiiJiura, have once been fixed, the intervening line can be defined by the consideration of the artliavada and the upapatti. As the arthamdcc shows you what subject matter is irrelevant or merely atixilliary, the man who attempts to determine the conclusion of the book, does not touch the several bye-paths when once the artliavada has been determined ; and when once all the bye- paths have been abandoned and the reader or the critic takes to the correct path, the ladder of upipafti like the wave of the sea pushes him forward from stage to stage further and further from the beginning until at last he reaches the con- clusion. As these rules of determining the purport of a book laid down by our ancient Mimamsa writers are equally accepted by learned persons in all countries, it is not necessary to further labour their usefulness or necessity. * called 'gmmuAa', and if it is neither, it is called 'Uuiartliuvada' . 'Jrthamda' Is a common word and these arc the three Bub-divisions- of arthttvada according to the truth or falsj-hood of the statements made in it.

• These rules of determining the import of a book are seen to.

be observed even in English Courts of justice. For instance, if it is not possible to understand any particular judgment, such, meaning is decided by considering the result (phala) of that.

INTRODUCTOKY 33

Here some one may ask : Did not the various Acaryas, who founded the various cults, know these rules of Mimamsa ? And, if one finds these rules in their own works, then what reason is there for saying that the purport of the Gita drawn by the Mimamsa school is one-sided ? To that, the only answer is, that once a man's vision has become doctrinal, he naturally adopts that method by which he can prove that the cult which he follows is the cult established by authoritative religious treatises. Because, doctrinal commentators start with this fixed pre-conceived notion regarding the purport of a book, that if it yields some purport, inconsistent with their own doctrine, that purport is wrong, and that some other meaning is intended ; and though some rule of the Mimamsa logic is violated when they attempt to prove that the meaning, which in their opinion is the proved correct meaning has been accepted everywhere, these commentators, as a result of this fixed pre-conviction are not in the least perturbed thereby. The works Mitaksara and Dayabhaga etc. which deal with the Hindu Law, attempt to harmonise the Smrti texts on this principle. But the books of Hindu Law are not unique in this respect. Even, the numerous sectarian writers belonging to the numerous subsequent sects, of Christian and Mahomedan religions, twist in the same way the original works on those religions namely the Bible and Quran, and it is on the same principle that tho followers of Christ have ascribed meanings to some of the sentences in the Old Testament of the Bible, which are different from those given to them by the Jews. Nay, wherever the number of the authoritative treatises or writings on any subject is fixed in advance and one has to subsequently justify one's own position on the basis of these limited authoritative books, the same method of determining the meaning of any book is seen to be followed. This also accounts for the way in which present-day legislators, pleaders or judges, very often twist judgment, namely, the Decreo or order passed on it; and if the judgment contains any statements wlich are not necessary for determining the point at issue, these statements are not taken as authorities ior the purpose of later cases. Such statements are known as "obiter dicta" or " useless statements ", and strictly speaking this is one kind of '< arthacadi ". K R

34 G-lTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

one way or the other, former authoritative or legal treatises. If such be the case with purely worldly matters, what wonder is there that divergent commentaries based on different traditions have been written on the Upanisads and the Vedanta- Sufcras and side by side with them, on the third book out of the Prasthanatrayi, namely, the Bhagavadglta ? But if one leaves aside this doctrinal method, and pays a little attention to the upakrama, wpaminlura etc., of the Bhagavadglta, it will be seen that the Blessed Lord preached the Gita to Arjuna at the critical moment before the Bharata war was actually started, when the armies of both sides had formed themselves into ranks on the Kuruksetra and were on the point of opening the fight, and that He has done so with the idea of inducing Arjuna, — who had become dejected and was on the point of renouncing the world, — to perform his duties as a warrior by preaching to him the gospel of the Brahman. When Arjuna began to see who had come to fight with him taking the part of the unjust Duryodhana, he saw the old ancestor Bhisma, the preceptor Dronacarya, the preceptor's son Asvatthaman, the Kauravas ( who though antagonistic were yet his cousins ), and his next-of-kin, relations, friends, maternal uncles, paternal uncles, brothers-in-law, kings, princes, etc. ; .and realising that in order to win the kingdom of Hastinapura, he would have to kill these people and thereby incur the greatest of sins like the destruction of one's own clan, his mind suddenly became dejected. On the one hand, the religion of the warrior was saying to him: "Fight!", and on the "other hand, devotion to his ancestors, devotion to his preceptors, love for his brethren, affection for his relatives, and other natural laws were pulling him backwards. If he fought, it would be a\ fight with his own people, and thereby he would incur the terrible sin of killing his ancestors, preceptors, relatives etc. ; and if he did not fight, he would be failing in his duty as a warrior ; and when in this way he was between the frying-pan and the Are, he was in the same position as a person caught between two fighting Tarns ! He was indeed a great warrior, hut when he was suddenly caught in the moral net of righteousness and unrighteousness, he felt faint, his hair rose on end, the bow in his hand fell down and he suddenly flopped

INTRODUCTORY 35

down in his chariot, crying : "I shall not fight 1 ", and ultimately the distant feeling of his duty as a warrior was overcome by the naturally more proximate feeling of love for his brethren and he in self-deception began to think to himself : — "It would be better to beg in order to fill the pit of the stomach, rather than that I should win the kingdom by committing such terrible sins as killing ancestors or preceptors or brethren or relatives or ex- terminating even the whole clan. It does not matter one whit if my enemies, seeing me unarmed at this moment, come and cut my throat, but I do not wish to enjoy that happiness which is steeped in the blood of my own relatives killed in warfare, and burdened with their curses. It is true the warrior-religion is there, but if on that account I have to incur such terrible sins as killing my own ancestors, brethren, or preceptors, then, may that warrior- religion and warrior-morality go to perdition. If the other side, not realising this, have become cruel in heart, I ought not do the same thing ; I must see in what consists the true salvation of my Self, and if my conscience does not consider it proper to commit such terrible sins, then, however sacred the warrior-religion may be, of what use is it to me in these circumstances ? " When in this way his conscience began to prick him and he became uncertain as to his duty ( dliarma- sammudjia ) and did not know which path of duty to follow, he surrendered himself to Sri Krsna, who preached the Gita, to him and put him on the right path ; and when Arjuna, wanted to back out of the fight, fearing that it would entail the death of Bhisma and others— though it was his duty to fight — Sri Krsna made him take up the fight of his own accord. If we have to extract the true purport of the teaching of the Gita, such purport must be consistent with this ' upakrama ' ( beginning ) and 'upasamhara' (conclusion). It would have been out of place here for Sri Krsna to explain how Release could be obtained by Devotion ov by the Knowledge of the Brahman or by the Patanjala-yoga, which were purely renunciatory paths or paths entailing asceticism and abandon- ment of Action. Sri Krsna did not intend to send Arjuna to the woods as a mendicant by making a samnyasin of him, filling his mind with apathy (vairiigya), nor to induce him to go to the Himalayas as a yogin wearing a loin cloth (kaupina)

36 GITA-RaHaSYA OR KARMA-YOGA

and eating the leaves of the nim-tree. Nor did the Blessed Lord intend to place in his hands oymhals and a drum and a harp instead of bow and arrow.? and to makehim dance again like Brhannali before the entire warrior community of India, on the sacred field of the Kura, steeped in the beatific happiness of loudly reciting the name of the Blessed Lord with supreme devotion, to the tune of those muBical instruments. The dance which Arjuna had t-o make on th& battle-field of Kura, after having finished his period of remaining incongnifco (ajnula-vasa) was of quite a different nature. When the Blessed Lord was preaching the Gita, He has in numerous places, and showing reasons at every step and using the conjunction 'lasmat' i.e., 1 for this reason ' — which is an important conjunction showing the reason — said: — "tusmudyudhyasm Bliarata" — i.e., " there- fore, Arjuna, fight " (Gl. 2. 18), or "fasmad uttitflia Kamitei/a yaddhaija krluniscayah" — i.e., "therefore, determine to fight and rise ( Gi. i. 37 ), or " tasnuid asahtah sutatain karyam karma mvwaun " — i. e., " therefore, give up attachment, and do your duty" ( Gi. 3. 19 ), or, "~ku.ru karmaiva tasnuit team " — i.e.

" therefore, perform Action " ( Gi. 4. 15 ), or " tasmut

mdmanumara yudhya ca " — i.e., "therefore, think of me and fight " ( Gi. 8. 7 ) ; " the doer and the causer of everything is I myself, and you are only the tool ; and therefore, fight and conquer your enemies " ( Gi. 11. 33 ) ; " it is proper that you should perform all Actions, which are your duties according to the Sastras *' ( Gi. 16. 24 ) — all which is a preaching definitely Energistic ; and in the eighteenth chapter of the upasamhura (conclusion), He says again : " you must do all these duties " (Gi. 18. 6), as His definite and best advice ; and ultimately asking Arjuna the question : — " Oh, Arjuna, has your self- deception, duo to ignorance, yet been removed or not ? " ( Gi. 18. 72 ), He has taken an acknowledgment from him in the following words : —

imUomohnh smrlir labdha tvatprasadan mayacyuta I slbito'smi gulusamdehah Icarisye vacanam tava II i. e., " my doubts and my ignorance about my duties, have now been removed ; I shall now do as You say ". And it is not that this acknowledgment was merely orally given by Arjuna, but thereafter, he did really fight and in the course of the fight

INTRODUCTORY 37

arising on that occasion, he has actually killed Bhlsma, Karna, Jayadratha, and others as occasion arose. The objection taken to this by some is that : the advice given by the Blessed Lord preached Realisation (jnana) based on Renunciation (safmnjasa), or Yoga or Devotion, and that that was the principal subject- matter of proof ; but that as the war had already started, the Blessed Lord has here and there briefly praised in His preaching the worth of Action and allowed Arjuna to complete the war which had been started ; that is to say, the completion of the war must not be looked upon as the central or the most important factor hut something which was auxilliary or merely an artliavada. But by such a spineless argument, the vpakrama, upasamhara and phala of the Gita is not satisfactorily accounted for. The Blessed Lord had to show the importance and necessity of performing at all costs the duties enjoined by one's dliarma while life lasts, and the Gita has nowhere advanced any such hollow argument as the one mentioned above for doing so ; and if such an argument had been advanced, that would never have appealed to such an intelligent and critical person like Arjuna. When the prospect of a terrible clan- destruction was staring him in the face, whether to fight or not, and, if fighting was the proper course, then how that could be done without incurring sin, was the principal question before him ; and however much one tries to do so, it will be impossi- ble to dismiss, as an artliavada, the definite answer given to this principal question in the following words, namely : — " Fight with a disinterested frame of mind," or " Perform Action ". Doing so would amount to treating the owner of the house as a guest. I do not say that the Gita has not preached Vedanta, or Devotion or the Patafijala Yoga at all. But the combination of these three subjects which has been made by the Gita must be such that thereby Arjuna, who was on the horns of a terrible dilemma of conflicting principles of morality, and who had on that account become so confused about his proper duty as to say : " Shall I do this, or shall I do that ? ", could find a sinless path of duty and feel inclined to perform the duties enjoined on him by his status as a warrior. In short, it is perfectly clear that the proper preaching in this place would be of Energism (pravrttij and that, as all other

38 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

things are only supporting Energism, that is, as they are all auxiliary, the purport of the Gita religion must also be to support Energism, that is, to support Action. But no com- mentator has properly explained what this Energistic purport is and how that implied moral can be authoritatively based on Vedanta philosophy. Whichever commentator is taken, he totally neglects the upalmma of the Gita, that is, its first, chapter and the concluding upasainliCira, and the phala, and becomes engrossed in discussing from a Renunciatory point of view how the preaching in the Gita about the Realisation of the Brahman or about Devotion support their respective cults: as though it would be a great sin to link together a permanent union between Knowledge and Devotion on the one hand and Action (karma) on the other ! The doubt mentioned by me was experienced by one of these commentators who said that the Bhagavadglfca must be interpreted keeping before one's eyes the life of Sri Krsna himself ;* and the Non-Dualistic philosopher Paramahamsa Sri Krsnananda Svami, who has recently died at Kasi (Benares) has in the short Sanskrit monograph written by him on the Gita entitled Gitartlia-paramarsa made the definite statement that : "tasmat gita nama Bmhviavidyamulum nitisastram" — i. e., " therefore, the Gita is the philosophy of Duty, that is, the philosophy of Ethics based on the science of the Brahman (bralunuMya) " t The German philosopher Prof. Deussen, in his work called The Philosophy of tlte Upanisads has given expression to the same thoughts in one place with reference to the Bhagavadglta, and several other

• The name of this commentator and some extracts from his

commentary were communicated to me many years ago by a respectable scholar, but I cannot trace that letter anywhere in the confusion of my papers ; and I have also forgotten the name of the commentator ; so I have to beg this respectable scholar to

communicate that information lo me again if he chances to read this book.

t Sri Krsnananda Svami has written four monographs on this subject which are named Sri Gita-Rahasya, Gitaitha-p'aiaia Ol&rtha-paramarsa and Gita-saroddhara, and they have all been collected and published together at Rajkot. The above quotation is from the GUni'tha-paramarsa.

INTRODUCTORY 39'

Eastern and Western critics of the Gita have expressed the same opinion. Nevertheless, none of these persons have thoroughly examined the Gita or attempted to clearly and in detail show how all the statements, deductions,' or chapters in it can be explained as being connected together on tho basis of the philosophy of Enorgism (Ivrma). On the other hand. Prof. Deussen has said in his book that such a conclusion would be very difficult to justify. * Therefore, the principal object of this book is to critically examine tho Gits, in that light and to show the complete consistency which is to bo found in it. But before I do so, it is necessary to deal in greater detail with the nature of the difficulty experienced by Arjuna as a result of his having been caught on the horns of the dilemma of mutually contradictory ethical principles, for other- wise, the readers will not realise the true bearing of the subject- matter of the Gita. Therefore, in order to understand tha nature of these difficulties in the shape of having to decide between Action and Inaction and to explain how a man on many occasions becomes non-plussed by being caught in the dilemma of " Shall I do this, or shall I do that ? ", we shall now first consider the numerous illustrations of such occasions, which are come across in our sacred books and especially in the Mahabharata.

• Prof. Deussen's The Philosophy of the Upanisadt, P. 362, Eng:

Trans. 1906.

CHAPTER II.

THE DESiRE TO KNOW THE RIGHT ACTION

(KAR-MA-JIJNASA.)

kim kanra kirn akarmeti havwjo'py at fa mohituh I *

Gifca. 4. 16.

The critical position in which Arjuna had found himself in the commencement of the Bhagavadgita, as a result of heing caught between two mutually contradictory paths of duty and become doubtful about bis proper duty is not something unique. The cases of persons who, taking up Asceticism (samnyasa), give up the world and live in the woods, or of self-centred weaklings who meekly submit to all kinds of injustice in the ■world without a nmrmei, are different. But those great and responsible persons, who have to live in society and to do their duties consistently with righteousness and morality often find themselves in such circumstances. Whereas Arjuna got confused and was filled with this desire to know his proper duty in the commencement of the war, Yudhisthira, was in the same position when he was later on faced with the duty of performing the sraddha ceremonies of the various relatives who had been killed in the war ; and the Santiparva has come to be written in order to pacify the doubts by which he was then puzzled. Nay, great writers have written charming poems or excellent dramas based on such puzzling situations of duty and non-duty which they have either found in history or imagined. For instance, take the drama Hamlet of the well-known English dramatist Shakespeare. The uncle of the Prince of Denmark, named Hamlet had murdered his ruling brother, that is, the father of Hamlet, and married his widow and seized the throne. This drama has portrayed in an excellent manner the state of mind of the young and tender-hearted Hamlet, who on this

• " What is doable (right action), and what it is not-doable

(wrong action or inaction) is a question which puzzles even sages". In this place, the word "a/carmn" (not-doable) must be interpreted as meaning < absence of action' or 'wrong action' according to the context. See my commentary on the verse.

KARMA-JIJNASA 41

'Occasion was faced with the puzzle as to whether he should put to death his sinful uncle and discharge his filial obligations towards his father, or pardon him, because he was his own uncle, his step-father, as also the ruling king ; and how he later on became, insane because he did not find any proper path- shower and guardian like Sri Krsna ; and how ultimately the poor fellow met his end while vacillating between " to be " and " not to be ". Shakespeare has described another similar occasion in a drama of his called Coriolanus. Coriolanus was a brave Roman potentate, who had boon driven out of Rome by the citizens of Rome and on that account had gone • and joined hands with the enemies of Rome, whom he promised never to forsake. After sometime, the camp of the hostile army under his command came to be placed outside the gates of Rome itself, he having attacked and defeated the Romans and conquered teiritory after territory. Then, the women of Rome put forward the wife and the mother of Coriolanus and advised him as to his duty to his motherland, and made him break the promise given by him to the enemies of Rome. There are numerous other similar examples of persons being puzzled as to duty and non-duty in the ancient or the modern history of the world. But it is not necessary for us to go so far. We may say that our epic Mahabharata is a mine of such critical occasions. In the beginning of the book (A. 2), while describing the Bharata, Vyasa himself has qualified it by the adjectives " sulamrirtha-uytiijayukkim " (i. e., filled with the discrimination between subtle positions ) and " anelca samayaiwitam " (i.e., replete with numerous critical occasions ), and he has further praised it by saying that, not only does it contain the philosophy of Ethics ( dharma-sastra), the philosophy of wealth {arlha-sastra) and the philosophy of Release ( molcsa-saxtra ) but that in this matter, "yad ihasii tad anyatra yan nehasti na hi! kvacit", i.e., "what is to be found here, is to be found everywhere and what cannot be found here can be found nowhere else". (A. 62. 53). It may even be said that the Bharata has been expanded into the ' Mahabharata ' for the sole purpose of explaining to ordinary persons in the simple form of stories how our great ancient personages have behaved in numerous difficult circumstances of life; for,

42 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

otherwise, it would not be necessary to writs 18 partus (cantos) for describing merely the Bharata war or the history known as Maya'.

Some persons may say : " Keep aside the case of Sri Kisna and Arjuua ; why is it necessary for you or us to enter into such deep questions ? Have not Manu and the other writers of the Smrtis laid down in their own books, clear rules as to how persons should behave in worldly life ? If one follows the ordinary commandments prescribed for everybody in all religions, such as : 'Do not commit murder ', ' Do not hurt others', ' Act according to moral principles', ' Speak the truth ', ' Respect your elders and your preceptors', ' Do not commit theft or adultery', etc., where is the necessity of enter- ing into these puzzling questions ?" But I will in reply ask them : "So long as every human being in this world has not started living according to these rules, should virtuous people, by their virtuous conduct, allow themselves to be caught in the nets spread by rascals or should they give measure for measure by way of retaliation and protect themselves ?" Besides, even if these ordinary commandments are considered as unchanging, and authoritative, yet responsible persons are very often faced with such situations, that two or more of these commandments become applicable simultaneously ; and then, the man is puzzled as to whether he should follow this commandment or that commandment, and loses his reason. The situation into which Arjuna had found himself was such a situation ; and the Mahabharata contains in several places critical descriptions of similar circumstances having engulfed other illustrious persons besides Arjuna. For instance, let us take the precept of "Harmlessness" (ahimsa) which is one of the five eternal moral principles enjoined by Manu (Manu. 10. 63) as binding on all the four castes namely, "ahimsa sat yam asteijaih saucamindriya- nigrahah " i. e., Harmlessness (ahiihsa), Truth (satya), Not- stealing (asteyai, Purity of the body, the mind, and of speech (saucal, and Control of the organs {indriya-nigraha). "Ahimsa paramo dharmah" i. e., "Harmlessness is the highest religion"' (Ma. Bha. A. 11. 13.), is a principle which has been accepted as pre-eminent not only in our Vedic religion but in all other- religions. The religious commandments given in the Buddhistic.

KARMA-JIJUTIM. 43

and Christian sacred books have given the first place to the- commandment 'Thou shalt not kill' as has been done by Manu. 'Hi'hsa' does not mean only destroying life but also includes, harming the minds or the bodies of others. Therefore, 'ahimsa' means 'not harming in any way any living being'. Patricide, matricide, homicide, etc. are the most terrible forms of himsa and this religion of Harmlessness is looked upon as the highest, religion according to all people in the world. But, assuming for the sake of argument that some villain has come, with a weapon in his hands to kill you, or to commit rape on your wife or daughter, or to set fire to your house, or to steal all your wealth, or to deprive you of your immoveable property ; and, there is nobody there who can protect you ; then should you close your eyes and treat with unconcern such a villain (atatayin) saying : " ahimsa paramo dliarmah ?" or should you, as much as possible, punish him if he does not listen to reason ? Manu says : —

gurum va btUaurddlum va brahmanain va baliusrutam 1 atatayinam ayaniani hanyad evavicarayan II

i.e., " such an atatayin that is, villain, should be killed without the slightest compunction and without considering whether he is a preceptor {yum) or an old man or a child or learned Brahmin ". For the Sastras say : on such an occasion, the killer does not incur the sin of killing, but the villain is killed by his own unrighteousness (Manu. 8. 350). Not only Manu, but also modern criminal law has accepted the right of self-defence with some limitations. On these occasions, self-protection is considered to be of higher importance than Harmlessness. The killing of tender infants {bhrfiiia-liatya) is considered to be the most objectionable of murders; but, if the child is being born by transverse presentation, is it not necessary to cut the child and deliver the mother T The slaughter of animals for the purposes of ritualistic sacrifice (yajiia) is considered blameless even by the Vedas (Manu. 5. 31) ; yet, that at least 'can be avoided by making an animal of flour for purposes of sacrifice (Ma. Bha. San. 337 ; Aim. 115. 56). But how are you going to stop the killing of the numerous micro-organisms with which the air, water, fruit

44 GITA-'RAHASYA OE, KARMA-YOGA.

etc., and all other places are filled ? Arjuna in the Maha-

WiM-ata sa.yi :-

stiksmaijoifuii bhTitani larkaqamijfmi kladcit I pakxmano 'pi aipatc.nn ye.sdm syat slcandha-pari/ai/ah II

(Ma. Bha. San. 15. 26).

i.e., " there are in this world so many micro-organisms invisible to the naked eye, of which the existence can, however, he imagined, that merely by the moving of one's eye-lids, their limbs will be destroyed " 1 Then, where is the sense of repeat- ing orally : ' Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not kill " ? It is on the basis of this discrimination, that hunting has been justified in the Anusasanaparva (Ami. 116). In the Vana-parva, there is a story that a Brahmin, being urged by anger to destroy a virtuous woman, and heing unsuccessful, surrendered himself to that woman ; then, that woman sent him to a hunter in order to learn from him the true import of one's duties. This hunter earned his living by selling flesh and he was extremely devoted to his parents. Seeing the way in which the hunter was earning bis living, this Brahmin was filled with intense surprise and sorrow. Then the hunter explained to him the true principle of Harmlessness and opened his eyes ! Does not everybody eat everybody else in this world 1 " Jh'o jimsya jivanam ' (Bhaga. 1. 13, 46) i.e., " life is the life of life ", is an eternal truth; and it is stated not only in the Smrtis (Maim. 5. 28 : Ma. Bha. 15. 21) but also in the Upanisads (Ve. Su. 3. i. 28; Chan. 5. 2. 1 ; Br, 6. 1. 14) that in times of distress " pruii'isyun- nam id am Mr nam", i.e., " all this is the food for life ". If every one becomes harmless, how is warriorship to continue ? And when once warriorship has come to an end, subject-people will have no protectors and anybody will he in a position to destroy anybody else. In short, the ordinary rules of morality are not always sufficient, and even the most principle maxim of Ethics, namely that of Harmlessness, does not escape the necessity of discrimination between the duty and the non-duty.

The Sastras have recommended the qualities of forgiveness, peace and kindness 'consistently with Harmlessness, but how will it be possible to practise peace on all occasions 1 Prahlada in the Mah&bharata first points out to his grandson Bali, that people will not stop at openly running away with even the

KARMA-JTJXaSA 45

wife and children of an always peaceful man and he advises Bali as follows :-

na sreyah sntatam tejo na nityam sreyani kfamn I

tasman nityam ktsamii tata pandilair apamdita II i. e. " Forgiveness in all cases or warlikeness in all cases ia not the proper thing. Therefore, 0, my son ! the wise have mentioned exceptions to the law of forgiveness" (Vana. 28. 6, 8). Prahlada has then described some of the occasions which would be proper occasions for forgiveness, but Prahlada does not explain the principle by which these occasions are to be recognised ; and if some one takes ad vantage of the prescribed exceptions, without knowing the occasions when they apply, he will be guilty of misbehaviour ; therefore, it is extremely important to understand the principle by which these occasions are to be recognised.

There is another law which has become wholly authori- tative and acceptable to everybody in the world, whether old or young, and male or female, in all countries, and among all religions, and that is the law of Truth. Who can sufficiently praise the worth of Truth ? ' Stain' and ' satyain- ' came into existence before the world. The Vedas extol the worth of Truth by saying that it is satya which controls the firmament, the earth, tho air and the other primordial elements. See the incantations : " Hani ca satyain (vhhidilhat tajiaso 'dhyajayata " (R. 10. 190. 1) i. e. " Law (rtum) and Truth (safi/am) have been brought into existence after tho performance of effulgent penance ", and " satyenotfabhiia bhumih. " (Ft. 10. 85. 1) i.e. " the Earth has become dignified on account of Truth ". The root meaning of the word ' satya ' is ' which exists, ' that is, ' which never ceases to exist, ' or ' which is not touched by the past, present or the future ' ; and therefore, the value of salya has been properly described by saying : " there is no religion like Truth, Truth is Parabrahma ". The statement : " nasti satyUt parn dharmah " (San. 162. 24) i. e. " there is no religion higher than Truth ", is found in many places in the Mahabharsta. which also says :-

asvamedJiusahasram ca satyam ca Maya dhrtam I nkamedha-sahasrad did satyam em -cisivjate II

UX1A l^A^^AU J

i. e. " when the respective merits of a thousand asmmedha yajrias and of Truth were weighed in the scale, it was found that Truth weighed more " (A. 74. 102). This refers to the ordinary rule of Truth. Manu in addition says about speaking the truth that :-

vacy artha niyalah sarve vufimTda vagvinihsrtuh I tain fu yah stenayed vacant sa sarcasteya-krnnarah II

(Manu. 4. 256).

i. e. " all the activities of mankind are carried on by speech; there is no other means like speech for the communication of thoughts ; then, that man who sullies this fountain-head of speech, which is the basic foundation of all these activities, that is to say, the man who is false to his own speech must be said to be despoiling everything at one stroke". Therefore, says Manu: " satyaputam vaded Tucaih " (Manu, 6. 46) that is, "Speak only that which has been purified by Truth. " In the Upanisads also, the law of Truth has been given a higher place than all other laws, in the following words: "safyam, mda \ dharmam, cam I ' ' (Tai. 1. 11, 1) that is : "Speak the truth, do what is right " ; and Bhiama, who was lying on the bed of arrows, after having in the Santiparva and the Anusasanaparva taught to Yudhisthira all the various laws, has before yielding up his breath preached to every one the law of Truth as being the sum and substance of all laws, in the following words : "satyesu yatitavyam mh sal yam, hi paramam balam" i.e. "You should strive for Truth, in as much as Truth is the highest power." (Ma. Bha. Anu. 167. 50). "We find that the vary same laws have been adopted into the Buddhistic and Christian religions.

Can any one dream that there can be exceptions to this eternally-lasting law of Truth, which is thus established on all hands? But life in this world, which is full of villains, is difficult. Suppose, you have seen some persons escaping from the hands of marauders and hiding in a thick forest; and the marauders, who follow them with naked swords in their hands, stand before you and ask you, where those people are ! What answer will you give ? Will you speak the truth or will you •save the lives of unoffending and innocent people ? I ask this

KARMA-JIJNASA 47

"question because, preventing the murder of innocent people is -according to the Sutras a religion, as highly important as 'Truth itself. Manu Ra,ys:—"iuiprs(ah kasyadd bruyun na ■canyuyeiia prcclmfah" (Maim. 3. 110; Ma. Bha. San. 287. 34) — that is, "Do not speak to anyone unless he questions you, and if .some one asks you a question unjustly, then, do not give a reply, even if you are questioned"; and, "junaim api hi medhavl jadarcd loka acaret ' ' — i.e. "even if you know the answer simply say : 'hm ! hm !' like an ignorant person", and save the situation. Very well ; hut, is not saying merely : 'Hm 1 hm !' in effect speaking the untruth V It is stated in many places in the Bharata itself that : na ri/Ujena cared dliarmam", i.e. "do not ■somehow satisfy yourselves by being false to morality; morality is not deceived, it is you who are deceived" (Ma. Bha. A. 215. 34). But if you cannot save the situation even by saying : ' Hm 1 hm ! ', what is to be done ? What will you do if a thief is sitting on your chest with a dagger in his hand and asking you where the money is, and you are sure to lose your life if you do not give a proper reply ? Tho Blessed Lord Sri Krsna who understood the inner meaning of all laws says to Arjuna in the Karnaparva (Ka. 69. 61), after giving him the illustration of highway robbers mentioned above, and later on in the Satyanrtadhyaya, of the Sfintiparva, Bhisma also says to Yudhisthira : — "

akUjanena ceil moltso nuvakujii hrtiliafncmm I avasyaih kujitavye va saiikemn i:Up\j ahTijanut I ireyas iatranrtaih valdam xutyad ifi dcurUum II

(San. 109. 15, 16.)

i.e. "if you can escape without speaking, then do not speak under any circumstances: hut if it is necessary to spwk, or if hy not speaking you may rouse suspicion in the mind (of another), then, telling a He has been found, after mature deliberation, to be much better than speaking the truth." Because, the law of Truth is not confined to speech, and that conduct which leads to the benefit of all, cannot be looked upon as objectionable merely on the ground that the vocal •expression is untruthful. That by which everybody will

48 GriA-RAHASYA ok KARMA-YOGA

harmed is neither Truth nor Harmlessness. Narada says to Suka in the Santiparva on the authority of Sanatkumara :-

salyasya vacanam sivyah satyildapi hitam vadet i ynd bhuta-hitam atyantam etat satyam matarn mama II

(Ma. BhS. San. 329. 13 ; 287. 19).

i. e., "speaking the truth is the proper thing ; but rather than truth, speak that which will lead to the welfare of all ; because, that in which the highest welfare of all consists is in my opinion the real Truth ". Seeing the words ' yad bhuta-hitam ', one will certainly think of the modern western Utilitarians, and these words may be looked upon as an interpolation. I, therefore, say that these words have appeared more than twice in the Vanaparva of the Bharata in the conversation between the Brahmin and the hunter ; and in one of those places, there is a verbal change as : " ahinisa satya-uacamin sarm-bhUta- hitam param " (Vana. 206. 73), and in another place, there is another verbal difference as : "ijad bhuta-hitam atyantam tat satyam iti dliaranu " (Vana. 208. 4). There is no other reason for the fact that the truthful Yudhisthira confused Drona by the ambiguous answer : " naro va kuiljaro va " i. e., "either the man (named Asvatthama) or the elephant ", and the same rule applies to other similar things. Our religion does not ask us to save the life of a murderer by telling a lie. Because, as the Sastras themselves have prescribed the punishment of death for a murderer, such a person is certainly punishable or fit for death, All the Sastras say that one who bears false witness on such or similar occasions, goes to hell personally, and also sends to ths" same place seven or more of his ancestors (Manu. 8.J9-49 ; Ma. Bha. A. 7. 3). But what are you going to do ""when, as in the illustration of the highway robbers given above from the Karna-parva, speaking the truth will lead to innocent persons being unnecessarily killed ? The English writer Green has in his book named Prolegomena to Ethics said that books on moral philosophy are silent on this question. It is true that Manu and Yajhavalkya look upon such situations as excep- tions to the law of Truth. But as even according to them,

KARMA-JIJNASA 49

untruthfulness is the less praiseworthy conduct, they have prescribed a penance for it in the following words :- tat pauanai/a nirvapyas caruh sarasvato dvijaih II

( Yajiia. 2. 83 ; Manu. 8. 104-6 ). i. e., "Brahmins should expiate that sin by offering the 'Saras- vata' oblation". ?

Those learned Western philosophers who have not been surprised by the exceptions to the law of Harmlessness, have attempted to blame our law-givers on account of the exceptions to the law of Truth 1 I will, therefore, explain here what, authoritative Christian preachers and Western writers on. Ethics have said on this subject. The following words of St. Paul who was a disciple of Christ namely : for, if the truth of" God hath more abounded through my lie unto His glory ; why yet am I also judged as a sinner ? " ( The Romans 3. 7 ) are to- be found in the New Testament of the Bible ; and Millman, who has written a history of the Christian religion says that ancient Christian preachers very often followed the same principle. Moralists will not in the present times, as a rule,, consider it justifiable to delude people or to cheat them and convert them. Nevertheless, even they do not say that the law of Truth is without exception. Take, for instance, the book on. Ethics written by the scholar Sidgwick, which is being taught in our colleges. Sidgwick decides questions of morality, where there are doubts as to what is doable and what not-doable, by the rule of the ' greatest happiness of the greatest number' ; and by the test of that principle he has ultimately laid down that : "We do not think that truth ought always to be told to> children, or madmen, or invalids, or by advocates ; and we are not sure that we are bound to tell it to enemies or robbers, or even to persons who ask question! „kich they know they have no right to ask (if a mere refusal to answer would practical!?., reveal an important secret)". (Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics Book III Chapter XI, Paragraph 6, p. 355, 7th Edition. Also see pp. 315-317). Mill has included this exception to the law of Truth in his book on Ethics. * Besides these exceptions,

• Mill's Utilitarianism, Chapter II, pp. 33-34 ( loth M.

LoEgman's 1907 ).

.50 GITA-RAHASYA OB KAEMA-YOGA

Sidgwiok also says in his book that : "Again, though we esteem candour and scrupulous sincerity in most persons, we scarcely look for them in a diplomatist who has to conceal secrets, or in a tradesman describing his goods, (for purchasers can find out the defects of what they buy)". * In a third place, he says that similar exceptions are made in favour of Christian missionaries and soldiers. Leslie Stephen, another Western writer, who discusses Ethics from the material point of view, gives other similar illustrations and says ultimately that : " It seems to me that the known consequences of an action must always be relevant to its morality. If I were absolutely certain that a lie would do good, I should certainly hesitate before speaking the truth, and the certainty might be of such a kind as to make me think it a duty to lie ". f Green, who has considered the subject of Ethics from the metaphysical (adhi/afma) point of view, definitely says with reference to such occasions, that in these cases the principles of Ethics do not satisfy the doubts of men ; and ultimately comes to the conclusion that : " A true Moral Philosophy does not recognise any value in conformity to the universal rule, simply as such, but only in that which ordinarily issues in such conformity, viz., the readiness to sacrifice every lower inclination in the desire to do right for the sake of doing it ". I The same is the opinion of other Western writers on Ethics, such as, Bain, vVhewell, and others. §

If you compare the rules laid down by the Western philosophers mentioned above, with the rules laid down by our

• SidgwicU's Methods of Ethics, Book IV Chap. Ill, Para. 7.

P. 454, Ifk JM. and Book II Oliap. V Para. 3, P. 169.

f Leslie Stephen's, Science of Ethia Cha. IX. Para 29, p, 369 ij^tii 'Ed) " And the certainty might be of such a kind as to make ine think it a duty to lie ".

t Green's Prolegomena to Ethics Para 315 p. 379, 5th Cheaper Edition. ,

§ Bain's Menial and Moral Science, p. 445 (Ed. 1875); Whewell's Elements of Morality, Bk. II, Oh. XIII and XIV, (4th Ed. 1864).

KARMA-JIJNASA 51

lawgivers, you will clearly see who had greater respect for Truth. It is true that our religions texts (Sastra-s) say :-

na narmayuktain vacanam Mnasti

m strisu rajan na vivahakale I pranatyaye sarvadhanapahare

pancamtuny ahur aputakani II

(Ma. Bha. A. 82. 16).

i.e., " There is no sin in speaking the untruth on the following ") ' five occasions, namely, if in joke or wh ile speaking with wom en ■; or at th e time of marria ge, or if yo ur lif e is in danger, or for protecting youT own property. " (See alecT^an" 109 and Mami._ 8. 110). But that does not mean that one must always speak the untruth in speaking with women, and these exceptions are to be understood in the same way in the Mahabharata, as those mentioned by Prof. Sidgwick with reference to " children, ■or madmen or invalids ". But Western philosophers, who have shelved the metaphysical as also the next-world view of the matter, have gone further and have barefacedly permitted even merchants to tell any lies they like for their own benefit, which is a thing our lawgivers have not done! It is true that where there is a conflict between Verbal Truth, that is to Bay, truthful speech, and Practical Truth, that is to say, the benefit of humanity, they have permitted that the situation may be saved by telling a lie, if, from the practical point of view, that is unavoidable. Nevertheless, as they look upon the moral laws of Truth etc. as permanent, that is to say, immutable under all circumstances, they have considered this speaking of untruth as a sin to a certain extent, from the next- world point of view, and have prescribed relative panances. Purely materialistic philosophers will say, that these penances are mere bug-bears. But as those who prescribed these penances or those for whom these penances were prescribed, were not of the same opinion, one has got to say that both these classes look upon these exceptions to the law of Truth as the less proper course of conduct ; and the same moral has been conveyed by the relative traditional stories on this point. For instance, Yudhisthira, on a difficult occasion, half- heartedly and only once, uttered the words " nam va

52 GlTA-RAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA

kuiijaro va." But on that account his chariot, which till then used to move in the air about four inches above- the surface of the earth began to move in contact with the earth like the chariots of other people, and he had also to spend a few hours in hell, as has been stated in the Maha- bharata itself (Drona. 191. 57, 58 and Svarga. 3.15). In the same way, as Arjuna killed Bhisma, taking shelter behind Sikhandi, though according to the laws of warfare, he had to suffer defeat later on at the hands of his son Babhruvahana,, as has been stated in the Asvamedhaparva (Ma. Bha. Asva. 81. 10). From this it will be seen that these exceptions, which have been contigently permitted, are not to he treated as the rule or as authority, and that our religious writers have drawn, the following ultimate philosophical proposition, namely :- almahetoh pararthe va narmahasySsrayat tatha I ye mrsa na vadantVia te mrah svargayamlnah II that is : " those persons alone attain heaven, who never speak the untruth in this world, whether for their own benefit, or for the benefit of others, or in joke ; " as was explained by Mahadeva to Parvatt. (Ma. Bha. Anu. 144. 19).

The law of Truth consists in performing one's promisee or vows. Sri Krsna and Bhisma both said, that the Himalaya might move from its site, or fire itself would become cold, but ■what they had said would not be otherwise (Ma. Bha. A. 103 and U. 81. 48) ; and even Bhartrhari has described righteous- persons in the following terms :~

tejasrinah wkham asun api samfyajanti I satymratavysanino 11a puuah pivtijmm II

(Nitisataka.110)

that is : " illustrious i.e. high-principled persons will willingly sacrifice their lives, but will not break a vow ". In the same way, the vows of Dasarathi Ramchandra of being true to his speech and shooting only one arrow have become as famous as his- vow of monogamy, as appears from : " dvih saram liabhisamdliatte Rumo dvir nabhibhasate " i.e., " Sri Rama had not to draw an arrow twice nor did lie prevaricate " — (Subhasita) ; and there are tales in the Puranas ; that Harishchandra served as a domestic for drawing water in the home of a burner of dead.

KARMA-JIJNASX 53

hodies in order to cany out a promise whioh lie had given in a dream. But, on the other hand, it is stated in the Vedas that even the gods themselves broke the pledges made by them with Vrfcra' or found out some loop-holes in them and killed Vrtra; and the murder of Hiranyakasipu is justified in the Puranas on the same basis. Besides, some agreements made in ordinary life are such as are considered unlawful or unfit for observance according to law. A similar story is related in the Maha- bharata with reference to Arjuna. Arjuna had made a vow that he would immediately behead any person who asked him to surrender his Gandiva bow to another. Later on, when Karna had defeated Yudhisthira in the war, and Yudhisthira naturally said to him (Arjuna) in despair : " What has been the use of your Gandiva bow to us 1 Throw it away from your hands ", Arjuna rose, sword in hand, to behead Yudhisthira. But as Sri Krsna was near him at the time, he critically expounded to him the religion of Truth from the philosophical point of view, and said to him : " You are a fool, you do not understand the subtle points of morality, and you must learn them from your elders; you have not learnt at the feet of elders — ' mi vrddliah sevitas Ivatja '. If you wish only to be true to your vow, then deprecate Yudhisthira, because for respectable persons, deprecation is as painful as death, etc."; and he thus saved him from the sin of murder .of an elder brother which he would have thoughtlessly .committed, as has been stated in the Karnaparva. ( Ma. Bha. Karna. 69 ). The discrimination between Truth and Falsehood which was made by Sri Krsna on this occasion, has been subsequently preached by Bhisma to Yudhisthira in the .Satyanrtadhyaya of the Santiparva ( San. 109 ) ; and all must bear it in mind in relation to the affairs of ordinary life. Yet, it is difficult to explain how to recognise these subtle excep- tions, and my readers will readily notice that although the law ■of fraternity was in this particular case looked upon as superior to the law of veracity, yet, the occasion mentioned in the Gita was just the oppposite, and there the warrior-religion has been pronounced to be superiot'to the law of fraternity.

If there is so much difference of opinion with reference to Harmlessness (ahinisa) and Veracity (satya), then why should

54 GITA-RAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

one be surprised if the game line of reasoning is applied to the third common law, namely of. Not-Stealing (asteya)'! If stealing or taking away by force that wealth which a man has lawfully acquired is permitted, then people will stop accumula- ting wealth, and all will suffer ; and chaos will reign as a result of the arrangement of society being broken up. But, there are exceptions to this rule. When such a calamity (apatti) arises that food cannot be had, whether for money or by labour or for charity on account of a general famine, shall we look upon as a sinner, some person who thinks of saving his life by committing theft ? There is a story in the Mahabharata that when such a difficult contingency befell Visvamitra, as a result of famine for twelve consecutive years, he was on the point of saving his life by stealing a leg of dog's flesh hung up in the home of a butcher (San. 141), and by eating that uneatable food ; thereupon, this butcher gave him. much advice based on the Sastras, not to commit the sin of eating such uneatable food, and that too by theft, and quoted : " palica panmnakliu bhakw^b " ( Manu. 5. 18 ). * But Visva- mitra rejected that advice, saying :-

pibanty evodakam gavo maydukesu ruvatsv api I >ia te 'dhikaro dharmc. 'sti ma bhur atmaprasamsakah II

• Out of the animals who have five toes, such as, the dog, the

monkey etc. Maim and Yajfiavalkya have prescribed the porcupine (which has arrow-like hair), sallaka, (this is a kind of a porcupine), the iguana, the tortoise, and the hare as edible (Manu 5. 18 . YajBa. 1. 177). Manu has included in the list also tbe 'khadga' that is, the rhinoceros ; but commentators say that there is a doubt about that animal. If this doubtful case is omitted, only five animals remain, of which the flesh is edible, and this is what is meant by the words :- pafica pancamkhci b/m&§yah " i. e., "it ia only five five-toed animals which are edible". Still, the Mimamsa writers interprete this as meaning that, those who are allowed to eat flesh should not eat the flesh of any five-toed animals except these ; and not that one must necessarily eat the flesh of these animals. This technical interpretation is known as 'parisamkfiyn' . The rule paiica pancanakha bhuksyah " ia an illustration of this 'parisamkhya'. "Where flesh-eating is itself unlawful, the eating of the flesh of these animala is also unlawful.

KARMA.-JIJNASA 55

that is :-" butcher !, cows do not stop drinking water, although frogs remonstrate. Keep quiet ! you have no right to explain principles of morality to me, do not boast un- necessarily ". Visvamitra has on this occasion also said: " jivitam marauat sreyo jiuan dharmam avcipnuyut " i. e., "if one- remains alive, then he can think of religion ; and therefore, even from the point of view of religion, keeping alive is better than dying " ; and Manu has given the illustration not only of Visvamitra but also of Ajigarta, Vamadcva, and other rsis whc> have, in similar circumstances, behaved similarly ( Manu. 10. 105-108 ). The English writer Hobbes says in his book that r "If in a great famine, he takes the food by force or stealth, which he cannot obtain for money nor charity ; or, in defence of his life, snatch away another man's sword, he is totally excused for the reason next before alleged " ; * and Mill has said that in such circumstances, it is the duty of every human being to save his own life even by commiting theft.

But are there no exceptions to this theory of Visvamitra. that : ' Keeping alive is better than dying ' ? Keeping aliv& is not the only thing worth doing in this world ' Even crows keep alive, for many years, by eating the pinda offerings. Therefore, Virapatni Vidula says to her son that : "Rather than that you should rot in the bed or remain cooped up in the house for a hundred years, it is better that you show warrior- like prowess even for a few hours and then die " — " muliurtam jralita'h sreyo na ca dhumayituw ciram " ( Ma. Bha, U. 132. 15 ). If one is bound to die either to-day or to-morrow or at any rate aft9r a hundred years ( Bhag. 10. 1. 38 ; Gi. 2. 27 ), then why be afraid of it or cry or dread it or lament ? Prom the metaphysical point of view, the Self (Atmaii) is eternal and never dies. Therefore, in considering the question of death, all that one has to consider is the body which has fallen to one's lot according to one's destiny ( prarabdlta ). This body is perisha- ble in any case. But in as much as this perishable human body is the only means by which one can perform whatever is

• Hobbes' Leviathan, Part II Cliap. XXVII P. 1S9, ( Morley'ff

Universal Library Edition) ; Milk', Utilitarianism, Chap. V. P. 95 (loth Ed.). — " Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty to steal etc. "

A

56 GTTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA.

to be performed in this world for the benefit of the A traan, even Mami says : " atmanam salataih rak/tet durair apt dhamir api "— i.e. " it is better first to protect one's Self (utman) before protect- ing one's wife, children or property (7. 213). Yet, noble souls have willingly sacrificed their lives in the fire of duty, in order to obtain something much more permanent than this peri- shable human body, e.g. for their God or religion, or for the sake of truth, or for acting according to their avowed purpose or sacred vow, or their professed course of conduct, ov for protecting their reputation, or for the sake of success, or for the benefit of the entire world 1 There is a story in the Raghuvamsa that Dilipa, while offering his body to a lion in order to protect the cow of Vasistha from him, said to him : " People like me are indifferent towards the human body which is made up of the five elements; therefore, look at my virtuous body rather than at my physical body " (Raghu, 2. 57) and the story of Jimiitavahana having sacrificed his own body to an eagle in order to protect the lives of serpents, is to be found in the Katliasmtsagara, as also in the Nagananda drama. In the Mrcchakatika (10. 27) Carudatta says :-

na bhlto maranad asmi kevalam dutitam yasah \ visuddhasya hi me mrtyuh putmjanmasamah lala II

that is : " I am not afraid of death; I am unhappy only because my reputation will be tarnished. If my reputation remains untarnished, then even if I have to suffer death, I will be as happy about it as if a son were born to me"; and on this same principle, the king Sibi, in order to protect a kapota bird, which had surrendered itself to him, took the form of a syena bird and cut off pieces of flesh from his own body and offered them to the Dharma who was hunting the Icapola bird; and when a sword made out of the bones of a rsi named Dadhici was needed for killing Vrtra, the enemy of the gods, all the gods went to that rsi and said to him : " sarlratyugam loka- hilartliam bhavan Icartum arkati " i. e. " Rsi, be pleased to give up your life for the sake of the benefit of all ", and thereupon, that rsi most willingly gave up his life and allowed the gods to take his bones. These stories are to be found

KARMA-JIJN1SA

respectively in the Vanaparva and the Santiparva of the Bharata (Vana. 100 and 131 ; San. 342). When the god Surya i(Sun) came to know that India was going to the most generous Karua in the form of a Brahmin for begging from him the shield and ear-ornaments {kavuca-kundala) with which he had •come to birth, he (Siirya), warned Kama not to part with the •same by gift to anybody and said to him that though he '(Earns) was known as a most magnanimous person, yet he should not part-with the shield and ear-ornaments to anybody, as his life would be in danger if he did so ; and " mrtasya klrhja kirn karyam " i. e. " once he was dead, fame would be of no use to him. " Hearing this message of the Sun-god, Karna gave him the fearless reply that: " jwifenapi me raksya kirtis tad -uiddhi me vratam " i. e. " I do not care, if I lose my life, but protecting my reputation is my avowed purpose " -{Ma. Bha. Vana. 299. 38). I may even say that such warlike .doctrines as : " If you die you will go to heaven and if you win, you will enjoy the wealth of the earth" (Gi. 2. 37) or "" svadliarme nidhanam sivi/ah " (Gl. 3. 35), i. e. " Even if you meet your death, in acting according to your own religion, yet there 3s virtue in that", are based on the same principle ; and ■consistently with that principle Sri Samartha Bamadasa Svami has preached that : " If you think of your reputation , you wil l have no happiness and if you_pursne happines s, _vou will hav e 'to"sacrTrTciryour r eputat ion " (Dasa. 12. 10. 19 ; 19. 10. 25) ; and that therefore : " When you have shed your body, your renown should survive you ; my mind ! righteous persons should act in this way ". Nevertheless the questions : " What is the use of renown after you are dead, though it may be true that by doing good to others you obtain renown ?" or, " Why should a righteous man prefer death to disgrace ? (GI. 2. 34), or prefer doing good to others to saving his own life ?" will not be satisfactorily answered unless one enters into the consider- -tiori of the Self and the Non-self (utmanatma) ; and even if these questions are answered otherwise, yet in order to under- stand on what occasions it is proper to sacrifice one's life and when it is not proper to do so, one has also to consider the ■question of the philosophy of Action and Non-Action (karmakarma) ; otherwise, far from acquiring the glory of

58 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

having sacrificed one's ] jfe, one will have incurred the sin of having foolishly committed suicide.

The religion of worshipping and serving one's mother, father, preceptor, etc., who are worshipful persons, as if they were deities, is looked upon as an important religion out of the several general and generally accepted religions, Because, if such were not the case, the family, the gurukula and even society itself will not ho properly arranged. Therefore, not only in the Smrti treatises but also in the Upanisads, it is stated that each preceptor after firjt preaching " salaam vada I dharmam cava I ", i.e., " speak the truth, live righteously " to the disciple who left him to go home after finishing his instruction, used next to preach to him : " matrdevo bhava I pitrdevo bhava ' ucanjadevo bhava I " i.e. " treat your mother, your father, and your preceptor as if they were gods " (Tai. 1. 11. 1. and 2); and that is the sum and substance of the chapter on the coversation between the Brahmin and the hunter in the Mahabharata (Vana. 213). But even in this religion, unexpected difficulties arise. Manu has said :

upadhyayun dasacaryah acaryanam satam pita I mliasiwh tu pitrn mata gauravertatiricyate II

(Manu. 2. 145).

i. e. " thep receptor is more in worth than ten lecturers, th e father is worth more_than a hundr ed prec eptor s ! _and th e mothe r is worth more than a thousand fathers '. Yet, it is a well-known skiryTIrat because his mother had committed a grievous sin, Parasurama, at the instance of his father, cut her throat (Vana. 116. 14); and in the Cirakarikopakhyana of the Santi- parva (San. 265) the question of the relative propriety of killing one's mother at the behest of one's father or of disobeying one's father, has been considered in all its bearings with arguments pro and con in a separate chapter by itself. From this it will be seen that the practice of discussing such subtle positions in life from the ethical point of view was fully in vogue at the date of the Mahabharata. Every one is conversant with the story of Sri Ramacandra ha-ving at the behest of his father willingly accepted banishment into the forests for 14 years in order to give effect to the promise made by his father. But the

ETARMA-JUNiSA 59

prinoiple which has been enunciated above with reference to- the mother, has occasionally to be applied to the case of the father. For instance, if after a son has become a king by his own prowess, he has occasion to try some crime committed by his father, should he in his capacity as a king, punish his- father or let him off because he is his father ? Manu says :-

pitacaryah suhrn rriata bharya putrah purohtah I nadaivjyo nama rajno 'sti yah svadharme na (istliati II

i. e. "May he be a father or a preceptor or a friend or a son or a priest, may she be a mother, or a wife, if he or she have not behaved according to their own duties, they are not unpuni- shable for the king; that is, the king must give them condign punishment" (Manu. 8. 335; Ma. Bha. San. 121. 60). Because, in this situation, the religion of sonhood is inferior to the religion of kinghood. And it is stated both in the Bharata and the Ramayana, that the most illustrious King Sagara, belonging to the Suryavamsa banished his son, acting on this principle, because he found that his son was unreasonable and ill- behaved and was harassing his subjects. (Ma. Bha. 107; Rama. 1. 38). Even in the Mami-Smrti, there is a story that a rsi named Angirasa, having acquired excellent knowledge already at a tender age, his uncles (paternal and maternal) and other elders began to learn at his feet; on one such occasion Angirasa, . in addressing them, naturally used the words : 'my children' which are used by a teacher in addressing his pupils-'putovfca iti hoKica jnanena parigrhi/a tan" i.e. "having imparted know- ledge to them, he addressed them as 'my children' !" — Then what an uproar arose I All the old people became livid with anger, and were convinced that the boy had become arrogant; and they made a complaint to the gods that he should be properly puni- shed. The gods listened to the pleadings on either side, and ultimately gave the decision that the words which Angirasa had used in addressing them were perfectly proper; because :-

na term vrddho bhauati yenasya palitam sirah I

yo vai yuvapy adhiyanas tan devah sthaoirain viduh II

that is :-" if his hair have become white, a man does not on that account alone, beoome old ; although a man may be young,

60 GITA-BAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

yet if he is learned, the gods look upon him as old " (Manu. 2. 156 ; and also Ma. Bha. Vana. 133. 11 ; Salya, 51. 47). This principle has been accepted not only by Manu and Vy asa but also by the Lord Buddha. Because, the first line of the above verse from the Smrti has been adopted verbatim into the well-known Buddhistic treatise on Ethics, in the Pali language, known as the ' Dliammapada ' * (Dhammapada, 260) ; and later on it is said in the same book that the man who has become mature only by age, has lived in vain ; and that in order that a person should become truly religious and old, he must have acquired the virtues of veracity, harmlessness etc. ; and in another treatise named ' Cullavayya ', the Lord Buddha has himself permitted that even if the bliiksy, ( mendicant ) who may be preaching may be young, yet he should sit on a high pedestal and preach the religion to other bluksus who had been previously invested into the creed and may be older than Mm (Cullavagga, 6. 13. 1). The story of Prahlada having disobeyed his father Hiranyakasipu, and won the Blessed LoTd mentioned in the Puranas is well-known; and from these stories it will be seen that as a result of other important considerations coming into existence, one has unavoidably to temporarily forget not only the relationship between the older and the younger in age, but also the universally accepted relationship between father and son. But if, when such an occasion has not arisen, an arrogant son begins to abuse his father, will he not be looked upon as a brute ? Bhisma has

• The work ' Dhammnpada ' has been translated into

English in the Sacred Books of the East Series Vol X and the Cullaeni/ga has also been translated into English in the Volumes XVII and XX of the same aeries. Mr. Yadavarao Varvikar, has ako translated the Dhammapada into Marathi, and that was first published in the Kolhapur Oranthamala and later on as an independent book. The verae in Pali in the Dhammapada is as follows :-

MB tenathero hoti ymassa palitam siro \ St* paripaHo vayo tctssa moghct-jinno ti mccati \\

vrll t word 'thera' is applied to Bnddhist mendicants. It is a Order ,pti on from the Sanskrit word " sthavira".

KAKMA-JUNlSA 61

said to Yudhisthira : " ivmir aar'njTw piirto matrtas ceti me matsh " (San. 108. 17), i. p. " the preceptor is superior even to the mother ot the father. "' But it is stated in the Mahabharata itself, that when the preceptor of the king Marutta had abandoned him for his seltisli interests, Marutta said :-

guror apt/ amltptasi/a hiiriiaWmvn ajUmilah I utjmthapratipaiutdit/a ■iiya!/n,im hlijvati siiijmm fl

(Ma. BUS. A, 142. 53-53).

i. e. " Even a preceptor, who, disregarding what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, takes up arrogantly the wrong path, deserves punishment ". This verse lias appeared four times in the Mahabharata. (Ma. Bha. A. 142. 52-53 ; IT. 179. U ; San. 57. 7 ; 140. 48). Out of these, the reading in the first reference is as above and in the other references, the fourth part of the verse reads: " tlando bhamli sasvatah " or " pnriti/ago lidhiyate . But where this verse has appeared in the Valmiki Bamayana (Rama. 2. 21. 13), the reading mentioned above is the only reading which has appeared; and. therefore, I have adopted it in this book. The fights between Bhlsma and Parsurama and between Aijumi and Drona were justified on the same principle and when the preceptors of Prahlada appointed by Hiranya- kasipu began to advise him against worshipping the Blessed Lord, he has disregarded their advice uii the same principle. In the Santiparva, Bhlsma hiin&eli ;:-ays to Sri Kisna that, although a preceptor may be venerable yet he also must be bound by rules of Ethics ; otherwise .-

mma,tjaty~igiii<~i Inbdhun quruii apt ca Kesarn I nihamSi samare pTipjn ksatriyah. sa hi dharmaiit II

(San. 55. 16).

that is : " Oh Kesava, that ksatriya is truly law-abiding, who kills such persons as break laws, ethical principles, or rules of proper conduct, or is greedy or sinful, notwithstanding that they occupy the position of pracaptors." So also, in the Taittiriyo- panisad, after first stating : " acanjadevo bhaoo, ", i.e., " Treat your proceptor, as a deity ", it is immediately afterwards stated that : " yany asmilhaih sucaritam i tuiii tvaijopasijani I no itarmii II" (Tai, 1. 11. 2), i.e., " Imitate only such of our actions as are

62 GITA-BAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

good, and disregard the others ". From this, it is quite clear that the net advice of the Upanisads is that, even if the elders are god-like, because they are preceptors, or parents, yet, do not become addicted to drink, because they were addicted to drink ; because, the position of ethical principles or of laws is even nigher than that of the mother or the father or the preceptor, etc. The statement of Manu that : " Follow your religion ; if any one destroys his religion, that is to say, disregards it, that religion will, without fail, destroy him." (Manu. 8. 14-16), has been made on the same principles. The king is a deity who is even more worshipful than the preceptor (Manu. 7. 8, and Ma. Bha. San, 68. 40). But, the Manu-Smrti says that even he does not escape the binding force of laws, and that if he breaks them, he will be destroyed ; and the same idea is conveyed by the histories of the two kings Vena and Khaninetra mentioned in the Mahabharata (Manu. 7, 41 and 8. 128 ; Ma. Bha. San. 59. 92-100 and Asva. 4).

Control of the organs is placed on the same level with Harmlessness {ahimsa), Veracity {satya), and Not-stealing (astei/a), in the ordinary general religions (Manu. 10. 63). All the Sastras contain the advice that Desire (kama ), An ger lykrod lm) and Avarice \iobha) a re the en emies of "man, and that unless they are fully conquered, neither he nor society will in any way be benefitted ; and it is stated in the Viduraniti, as also in the Bhagavadgita, that :-

irividham narakasyeda/h dvarain nasanam atmamh I kamah krodhas tatha loblias tasmad etat trayam ti/ajef II

i.e., " Ka ma, krodha and Ic bba are the three gateways of hell ; and as they are destructive agents, they must be eschewed " <GI. 16. 21 ; Ma. Bha. IT. 32. 70). But the Blessed Lord has in the Gita itself described his own form in the following words : " dharmaviruddko bhutesu kamo 'smi Uharatarsablia " (GI. 7. 11), i.e„ " _Ajjunal Jjtmjhat kama (desire) which exists in the hearts of l iyjngthings, bBingconsistenTwitbTTaw (dliarma)". Therefore, UiaTllmold^slrerwBcTnsTncOTs^ent with dliarma is the gateway of hell and other kinds of kama are not proscribed by the Blessed Lord ; and even Manu has said : "parityajed arthakamau yau syatam dharmavarjitau", i.e.,

KABMA-JIJNASA 63

"' that wealth (artha) and desire (hlma) which are inconsistent with justice (dhanna) should be eschewed" (Manu. -4. ITS). If to-morrow all living beings decide to say good-bye to the Lord Kama, and to observe celibacy the whole of their lives, the entire living creation will come to an end within fifty or at most one hundred years, and the silence of death will reign everywhere ; and that creation, in order to save which from destruction, the Blessed Lord takes incarnations every now and then, will within a short lime, be destroyed. Kama and krndlta are enemies, it is true, but, when ? : if you allow them to become uncontrolled. Even Maun and the other writers of the Sastras have accepted the position that kdma and krodlia are extremely essential, within proper limits, in order that the world should go on ( Manu. 5. 56 ). The highest civilisation consists in putting a. proper restraint on these powerful mental impulses, and not in totally destroying them. It is stated in the Bhagavata that :-

lake vtjamyanusamadijascm

mti/anti jantor na hi tatm co'hmi l ryavastliitis tcsti viwluiuajiln- ' !

sitrugrahat'ruxu nhrlfir isffi II

(Bhag. 11. 5. 11).

i. e. " In this_ worl d, it is not n ecessary Jjg_ t ell any »ne_ to indulge in the enjoyment of jiexuaMiiteroourse or in e ating fleslTor drinking~wiiie7 These arc things which humarTliBings wanTn"atura ny7~Snd it is" in order to systematise 'ITiesethreo impulses, that is to say, in order to give them a systematic basis by subjecting them to limitations or restraint, that the writers of the Sastras have ordained marriage, and the Soma- yaga and the Sautramani-yajfia respectively for them ; but even with reference to these mattors, the most excellent course is Renunciation (mvrlti), that is to say, Desire] ess Action". Although the word ' nivrttt ', when used in relation to fifth- >case-ended nouns, means, ' renunciation of a particular thing ' ■or 'giving up a particular Action altogether'; yet, iw the .adjective ' nivrtta ' is in the Karma-Yoga applied to the noun 'karma', the word 'nivrllu-lcarma', it must be borne in mind, means 'Action which is to be performed desirelesely'; and the

64 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

word has been used clearly in those meanings in the Manu- Smrti and in the Bhagavata-purana ( Manu. 12. 89 ; Bhag. 11. 10. 1 and 7. 15. 47 ). In speaking about anger (krodha) Bharavi. says in the Kirata-kavya (1. 33) that :-

amarsasunyena janasya jantima

na jatahardena na -ridvisadarah II

i. e., "if a man does not get angry or annoyed when he has been insulted, it is just the same whether he is your friend or whether he hates you I" Vidula has said, that from the point of view of the warrior (ksatriya) religion :-

etavan eva puruso yad amarsi yad aksami I ksamavan niramarsas ca naiva stri na punah puman II

( Ma. Bha. U. 132. 33 ).

i. e., "he who gets angry ( on account of injustice ) and wk>' does not submit (to insult), is truly a man. He who does not get angry or annoyed is neither a woman nor a man". It has already been stated above that in order that the world should go on, there must not be either angeT or valour at all times, or forgiveness at all times. The same law applies to avarice (lobha) ; because, even if a man is a samnyasi (ascetic) yet he wants Release (moksa).

Vyasa has stated in various stories in the Mahabharata,. that the various virtues of valour, courage, kindness, probity,, friendship, impartiality etc., are, in addition to their mutual oppositions, also limited by considerations of time and place. 'Whatever the virtue may be, it is not equally appropriate in all circumstances. Bhartrhari says that :-

upadi dliain/am alhabhyudaye ksarria sadttsi vakpatuta yudhi vikmmah I

( Niti. 63 ). that is : "Courage is a virtue in days of misfortune, forgiveness- in days of power (that is, notwithstanding that you are in a. position to punish), oratory in an assembly, and valour in warfare". In times of peace, there are not wanting mere talkers like Uttara; but although there may be many Hambira- raos who are courageous enough to shoot arrows through the nose-iings of their wives, it is only one of them who acquits

KARMA-JTJNASA 65

himself with credit as an archer on the battle-field ! Not only- are courage and the other abovementioned virtues really- appropriate in the respective circumstances mentioned, but they cannot even be properly tested except in such circumstances. There are not wanting shoals of school-friends; but, "mlcasagravw tu tesam vipat", i.e. "adversity is their touchstone". Misfortune is the true test for trying them. The word ' circumstances ' above includes considerations of worthiness and unworthiness, in addition to considerations of time and place. No virtue is greater than impartiality. The Bhagavadgita itself clearly says that being: " samah sarvesu bhtUesu", i.e., "impartial towards all created things", is a characteristic feature of a perfect being (siddlia). But, what does this impartiality mean ? If somebody showers charity on each and every one alike, that is to say, without considering their respective merits, shall we call him a wise man or a fool ? This question has been answered in the Gita itself in the following words : "dese laM capalre ca tad danam sattvikam viduh", i.e., "that charity which. is made with proper regard for the place, the time, and the worthiness (of the party) is the pure (saltvilca) charity" (Gi. 17. 20). Considerations of time, are not limited to the present time. As times change, bo also changes take place in the laws relating to worldly life; and therefore, if one has to consider the propriety or otherwise of any thing psi-taining to ancient times, one has necessarily to consider also the ideas of righteousness or unrighteousness prevailing at that time. Mann (1. 85) and Vyasa (Ma. Bha. San. 359. 8) say :-

amje krtayuge dharmas tretayam dvupare 'pare I anye Jtaliyuge nrnain yugahraaunurupatah II

i. e., "the laws relating to the Krta, Treta, Duapam and the- Kali-yuga are all different according as the yugas (eras) change". And it is stated in the Mahabharata itself that in ancient times, women were not restricted by marriage, and they were entirely independent and unchecked in that matter ; but, when the evil effects of this kind of life manifested themselves later on, Svetaketu laid down the limitation of marriage ( Ma. Bha. A. 122 ) ; and Sukracarya was the first one to promulgate the prohibition against drink (Ma. Bha, A. 76). Needless to say,

9-10

66' GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

there must be different standards for considering the laws pertaining to the times when these restrictions were not in vogue, than those relating to the times when they came into vogue ; and in the same way, if the laws which are in force in the present age are changed in the future, then the considera- tion of the righteousness or unrighteousness of actions in the future will also be on a different basis. As there are considera- tions of time, so also are there considerations of the customs of the country, the customs of the family, as also the customs of the community ; for, custom is the root of all religion. Never- theless, there are inconsistencies even among customs. Bhlsma has described the differences between customs in the following words :

na hi sarvaMIdh kascid ucarah sampravarlate I tenaivanyah prabhavati so 'param badliate puruA II

( San. 259. 17. 18 ).

"that is : "One cannot find any custom, which is "beneficial to everybody, at all times. If you take one custom, another one is better, and if you accept the second custom, it is again ■contrary to a third one " ; and he has said that we have to discriminate between customs and customs.

If I go on solving in this way all the riddles about what should be done and what should not be done [Icarmdlcarma) and what is righteous and what unrighteous (dliarmadliarma), I shall have to write a second Mahabharata myself. I have laboured on this subject so long only with the idea of impressing on the mind of my readers how the circumstances in which Ai'juna -found himself in the beginning of the Gita as a result of a conflict between fraternal affection and a warrior's duties were not something out of the common ; and how similar circum- stances very often befall great and responsible persons in life, giving rise sometimes to a conflict between the principles of Harmlessness and Self-protection, or of Veracity and general welfare, or between the protection of one's person and one's imputation, or again between different duties arising out of different aspects of the same situation ; and how, many excep- tions thus arise, which are not provided for by ordinary and

generally accepted moral laws; and lastly, how^-pa such

KARMA-JIJNASA 61'

occasions, not only ordinary, but even very clever and learned persons, naturally feel the desire of finding out whether or not there is some definite formula or basis for determining what should be done and what not, or, what is one's duty and what is not one's duty. It is true that some concessions have been made in the Sastras to meet calamities like a famine which are technically known as 4 apaddharma '. For instance, the writers of the Smrtis say that in such calamities ( apatlmla ) a Brahmin incurs no sin, if he takes food in any place; and in the Chandogyo- panisad, there is even a story of Usasticakrayana having done so. (Yajfia. 3. 41; Chan. 1. 10). But there is a world of differ- ence between those circumstances and the circumstance men- tioned above. In the case of famine, there is a conflict between religious principles on the one hand and hunger, thirst, and other bodily needs on the other, and the bodily organs drag you in one direction and religious principles in the opposite_direc- tion. But in many of the circumstances mentioned above, the conflict is not between bodily impulses and religious principles but there is an inter-conflict between two principles laid down in the Sastras themselves and it becomes necessary to consider minutely whether to follow this religious preoept or that; and though it may be possible for person? of ordinary intelligence to arrive at a decision on a few such occasions by considering what pure-minded persons have done in the past in similar cir- •cumstances, yet on other occasions, even sages are puzzled; because, the more one thinks about a particular matter, more and more of doubts and counter-arguments come into existence, and it becomes very difficult to arrive Jat a r definite conclusion; and if a proper decision is not arrived at, there is a risk of one's committing an unlawful thing or even a crime. Consi- dering the matter from this point of view, it will be seen that the discrimination between the lawful and the unlawful or between the doable and the not-doable becomes an independent science by itself, which is even more difficult than the sciences of logic or grammar. In old Sanskrit treatises, the word J nlti-sMra ' ( Ethics ) used to be applied principally to regal jurisprudence (raja-nlh) and the doable and the not- idoable used to be technically called ' dliarma-sastra '. But as

68 GITA-RAHASYA OS KARMA-YOGA

the word ' niti ' includes both duty arid good conduct, I have va this book referred to the discussion of the questions of righteousness and unrighteousness or of what ought to be done and what ought not be done, by the name ' mti-sastra '. In order to show that this science, which expounds Ethics, or shows what is doable and what is not-doable, or what is righteous and what unrighteous, is indeed a very difficult science, the sentence " suksma gatir hi dharmasya ", i.e. " the true nature of righteousness, that is to say, of the Ethics of worldly life, is very subtle ", occurs several times in the Mahabharata. It is extremely difficult to satisfactorily answer such questions as : — How did five Pandavas many one Draupadi 1 or, Why did Bhisnia, Drona and others sit quiet, as if with a dead heart, when attempts were made to denude Draupadi ?, or, Whether the principle ; '" arthisya puniso dasah dusas to artho na kasyacit" i.e., " man is the servan t o f wealt h (art ha), wealth is the s ervant of nobody " (Ma. JJha. ±iM. 43. 35), e nunciated by Bh]sm a~"an3 Drona, in justification of their having sided with the wicked Duryodhana in the civil war is or is not correct ? or, if service is looked upon as dog-like, as is shown by the words : " seva soavrttir akhyata ", i.e., " servitude is said to be the tendency of a dog " (Manu. 406) and is accordingly considered eschewable, then why did Bhisma and others not give up the service of Duryodhana, rather than becoming the slaves of wealth ? Because, on such occasions different persons arrive at different inferences or decisions according to different circumstances. Not only are the principles of justice extremely subtle (" suksma gatir hi dliarmasya ", Ma. Bha. Anu. 10. 70 ), but, as is stated later on in the Mahabharata itself, there are numerous branches to those principles and the inferences which can be drawn from them are numerous ( " bahusakha hy anantika ", Ma. Bha. Vana. 208. 2). Tuladhara also, where he is discoursing on questions of morality,. in the Tuladhara-Jajali conversation, says': " suksmatvan na sa vijnatum sakyate bahurdhnavah ", i. e., " as morality is subtle and complicated, one very often does not know what it is " (San. 261. 37). The writer of the Mahabharata was fully conversant with these subtle occasions, and he has.

KARMA-JIJNASS. 69

collected together different traditionary stories in the Mahabharata in order to explain how great men behaved in the past in those ciTcumstanc.es. But it was necessary to scientifically examine all these subjects and to enunciate the universal principle underlying them, in a religious work like the Mahabharata. Vyasa has explained this underlying principle in the Bhagavadgita, taking his stand on the advice given in the past by Sri Krsna to Avjuna on the piotoxt of removing his doubts about his duty ; and, therefore, the Glta has become the mystic Upauisad and the crown jewel of the Mahabharata, and the Mahabharata has become an illustrated and detailed lecture on the fundamental principles of Right Action (Karma-Yoga) which have been enunciated in the Gita. I have to suggest to those who imagine that the Glta has been subsequently interpolated into the Mahabharata that they should pay close attention to this fact. Nay, the uniqueness and special feature of the Gita consists in this very thing. Because, although there are numerous treatises like the Upanisads etc. which deal with the pure science of Release (moksa) that is, with Vedanta, or like the Smrtis which merely enunciate rules of righteous conduct such as Harmlessness etc., yet there is not to be found, at least in these days, another ancient work in the Sanskrit literature like the Gita which, discriminates between the doable and the not-doable (karya- kUrya-i-yamsthiti) on the authority of the extremely recondite philosophy of the Vedanta. Devotees of the Glta need not be told that the word ' kuryakarya-vijavasthiW has not been coined by me, but is from the Gita itself (Gita. 16. 24). In the Yoga- vasistha, Vasistha has ultimately preached to Sri Rama, the path of Energism (Karma-Yoga) based on Self-Realisation ( jTuma ), as has been done in the Gita; but such works, which have been written after the date of the Gita, and which are only imitations of it, do not in any way detract from the .uniqueness of the Glta, to which I have referred above.

CHAPTER III

THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT ACTION

( KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA )

tasmad yogaya yujyasva yogah karmasu kausalam I *

Gita 2. 50 r

If a man is not actuated by the desire of acquiring tee- knowledge of a particular science, he is unfit to study that science, and explaining such a science to such an unfit person is like pouring water on an obverse vessel. Sot only is the disciple not benefited by it, but even the preceptor wastes his labour, and both waste their time. Therefore, the aphorisms "atliato dliarmajijnasu, " and "athato brahmajijnasa " appear at the beginning of both the Jaimini and the Badarayana- Sutras. Just as the teaching of the Brahman is best imparted to a 'mumuksu' (one who is desirous of Release) or as the teaching of Law or justice is best imparted to one who seeks that knowledge, so also is the teaching of the Science of of Right Action (Karma) most properly given to the person who has been inspired with the ' jijnasa ' ( desire of knowing ) how to rightly perform Action while leading a worldly life ; and that is why I have -disposed of the ' athato ' in the first chapter and have outlined the nature of ' kwmajijfuisa ' and the importance of the science of Karma-Yoga in the second chapter. Unless a man has by experience found where his difficulty lies, he does not realise the importance of the science of getting over that difficulty ; and if this importance is not realised, a science which has been learnt merely by rote, is later on found difficult to remember. Therefore, good teachers- first ascertain whether or -not the disciple has been inspired with, desire for the knowledge, and if there is no such inspira- tion, they attempt to rouse the desire. The Science of Right Action (Karma-Yoga) has been expounded in the Gita on this

• "Therefore, take shelter in the Yoga ■ ! < Yoga ' is the name

given to the skill, the wisdom or the gracefulness of performing Action [Karma)" : such is the definition or connotation of the term 'Yoga', which has been more fully dealt with later on in thia chapter.

KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA 71

basis. When, being beset with the doubt whether or not he* should take part in a war in which he would be responsible for the slaughter of ancestors and preceptors 'and also of all kings and brethren, Arjuna was inspired by the desire to give up the- war and renounce the world, and when he was not satisfied by the ordinary arguments that abandoning a duty which had befallen him was a foolish and weak act and that by doing so, far from obtaining heaven he would on the other hand, suffer disgrace, Sri Krsna preached to him the science of Karma- Yoga, after in the first instance seeming to ridicule him by saying : " asoci/au aniiasoaas tvaih prajnavadaihs ca bliasase" i. e., '" you lament those for whom you ought not to lament and at the same time, tell me big tales about the know- ledge of the Brahman ". I have shown in the last ^chapter that the doubt by which Arjuna had been beset, was not groundless, and that even great sages are in certain circum- stances, puzzled as to 'what to do and what not to do '. But the starting advice of Sri Krsna to Arjuna is : that it is not. proper to give up Action (karma) on the ground that numerous difficulties arise in the consideration of what should be done and what should not be done]; that, a wise man should practise such a 'yoga' or device whereby instead of Actions being done away with in the world, one will only escape their evil effects or binding ['force, and that: " tasniad yogaya wjliasva" i.e., " therefore, you, should do the same ". This 'Yoga' is the science of 'KARMA-YOGA' ; and in as much as, the circum- stances in which Arjuna found himself were not unique, but every one of us comes across small or big difficulties of the same nature in worldly life, it is necessary that we should all profit by the exposition of this Karma-Yoga science which has been made in the Bhagavadglta. But whichever science is taken, it is necessary to properly define the important words occurring in its exposition so that their meanings are properly understood, and to first precisely explain the fundamental outline of the exposition of that science; otherwise, many misunderstandings or difficulties subsequently arise. Therefore, following this usual practice, I shall first examine and explain the meanings of some of the important words which occur in. this science.

73 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

'The first of these words is 'KARMA'. The word ' karmi ' comes from the root ' At ', and means ' doing ', ' affairs ', or 'activity' ; and that same ordinary meaning is intended in the Bhagavadgita. My only reason for explaining this is, that the Teader should not he confused by the limited and restricted meaning 1 ; in which this word has been used in the Mimarhsa philosophy or in other places. Whichever religion is taken, it prescribes some Action or other for reaching the Is vara. According to the ancient Vedic religion, this Action was sacrificial ritual ; and the Purva-Mimamsa of Jaimini has been written with the sole purpose of showing how the various different and sometimes apparently contradictory statements which are to be found in the Vedic treatises regarding the performance of this sacrificial ritual can be reconciled with «ach other. According to Jaimini, the performance of this Vedic or Srauta ( prescribed by the Srutis ) sacrificial ritual was the principal and the ancient religion. Whatever a man does, must be taken to have been done by him for the purpose of the 'yajiia' (sacrifice). If he earns money, he must earn it for the sake of the yajiia ; and if he collects grain, that also must be understood to have been done for the yajiia ( Ma. Bha. San. 26. 25 ). In as much as the Vc-das themselves have enjoined the performance of the yajnas, any Action done for the purpose of the yajiia cannot of itself be a source of bondage to man ; it is a "•^Sniffor theyaina an5~"h0t,- 3E- independent object; and therefore, the effect of that Action is included in the result to be achieved by the yajna ; it has no independent effect. But although these Actions, which are performed for the purpose of the yajiia, may not have an independent effect, yet the yajiia itself leads to heaven (which, according to the Mimarhsa6chool, is a kind of happiness), and the performer of the yajiia performs it willingly, only in order to attain heaven. Therefore, the performance (karma) of the yajiia itself falls into the category of ' purusdrtha ' (something which a man desires). Any parti- cular thing which a man likes and which he desires to attain' is called ' purtisartha' (Jai. Su. i, 1.1 and 2). ' Kratu' is a synonym for ' yajiia ' and therefore, the word ' kratvartha ' is also used in place of the word ' yajMrtha ' and therefore, all Actions fall into the two divisions of 'yajiiartlia' ('kratvartha' )

EA.RMA-YOGA-SASTRA 73

that' is, Actions which do not give' any independent fruit or benefit and are, therefore, non-binding, and 'pnrusartha' that is, .Actions performed for the benefit of the doer and, therefore, binding. The Sarhhitas and the Brahmanas contain nothing else but a description of sacrificial ritual. It is true that in the Rg-Veda-sarhhita there are verses (sukta) in praise of Indra ■and the other gods ; but as these are to be used only at the time ■ of the yajiia, the Mimarhsa writers say that all Sruti treatises preach only the yajiia and other sacrificial ritual. These ■orthodox ritual-masters, and pure karma-mdins say that heaven can be attained only by performing the sacrificial ritual prescribed by the Vedas and not otherwise ; and that, that is so, whether you perform the yajilas ignorantly or after Realising the Brahman. Although this sacrificial ritual is accepted by the Upanisads, yet their worth is declared to be lower than that ■of the Knowledge of the Brahman, and the Upanisads say that though heaven may be attained by the yajiias, Realisation of the Brahman (brahma-jiiam) is necessary for attaining the true Release. The desire-prompted Actions in the shape of sacrificial ritual, described in the second chapter of the Bhagavadgita by the words " vedavudaratah Purlha namjadastiti vadinah " ( Gl. 2. 42 ) are the above-mentioned sacrificial ritual, performed without having realised the Brahman. In the same way, the sentence yajnarlhat karmavo 'uyalm loko 'yam Icarnuibmtdluirmh" i.e., " Actions performed for the purpose of the yajiia, do not ■create bondage ; all other Actions have a binding force " ( Gl. 3. 9 ) is only a repetition of the opinion of the MlmarhsS school. Besides this sacrificial ritual, (being the Actions prescribed by the Vedas and the Gratis), there are other Actions, necessary from the point of view of religion, which have been prescribed by the Manu-Smrti and other religious treatises, having regard to the division of society into the four castes. For instance, fighting has been prescribed for the warrior (kgatriya), trade for the merchant (aiisya) etc. ; and, as these have been for the first time systematically prescribed in the .Smrti writings, they are referred to as 'Smarta' (prescribed by the Smrtis) Actions or yajiias* There are besides these Actions prescribed by the Srutis and the Smrtis, other leligious Aotions, e.g., fasting, austerities etc., which have

74 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOeA

for the first time been described in detail in the Puranas r and these may, therefore, be described as ' pauranika, karnur ( Actions ). All these Actions are again sub-divided into- everyday (nitya), occasional (naimiUika), and for-a-particular- purpose (kamyaj Actions. Such Actions as must be performed every day, such as bathing and offering prayers at twilight, ar& called nitya-karma. By performing these, no special purpose- (artha-si'Mhi) is achieved; but if they are not performed, one. incurs sin. Naimittika (occasional) Actions are such as have to be performed because some occasion necessitating thr-m has. arisen, such as, the pacification of unauspicious stars, penances etc. If that occasion for which we perform this pacification or penance had not come into existence, there would be no necessity for performing this Action. In addition to these > there are certain other Actions which we very often perform because we desire a particular thing and for acquiring that thing, as enjoined by the Sastras. These Actions are kumyu (desire-prompted) actions; e.g., sacrificial ritual for causing rain or for obtaining a son. In addition to these everyday, occasional, and desire-prompted Actions, there are other Actions such as, drinking etc. which have been pronounced to b& totally objectionable by the Sastras and therefore, they are- named nisiddlui (objectionable) actions. Which Actions are. everyday Actions, which occasional, which desire-prompted and which objectionable has been laid down by our religious treatises ; and if any parson versed in religion is asked whether a particular act performed by a particular person is sinful or virtuous, he will consider whether that particular Action is yajnartha or purusarthu or nitya or mimitiika or kamya or nisiddha according to the directions of the Sastras and give his opinion accordingly. The view-point of the Bhagavadglta is. more exhaustive than this or may even be said to be beyond this. It may be that a particular Action has not been pro- nounced as objectionable by the Sastras ; nay, it may even have been prescribed as proper, e.g., in the case in point, the warrior- religion was the 'prescribed ' (vihita) thing for Arjuna; but on that account, it does not follow that one should always perform

^ that Action, nor also that it will always be certainly beneficial;

i sp.it the injunctions of the Sastras are very often mutually

KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA 75

contradictory, as has been shown in the previous chapter. The subject-matter of the Gita is to show whether or not there are any means for ascertaining what course should be followed by a person on such an occasion and if so, what those means are. It is not necessary for the purpose of this exposition to pay any special attention to the divisions of 'karma ' mentioned above. In order to explain to what extent the doctrines laid down by the Mimamsa school regarding the sacrificial ritual etc. prescribed by the Vedas or the other duties prescribed for the four castes are consistent with the Karma-Yoga advooated in the Gita, their theories have been examined in the Gita as oocasion arose ; and in the last chapter, the question whether or not a Self -Realised (jiianin) man should perform sacri- ficial ritual has been precisely answered (Gl. 18. 6). But in as much as the principal subject-matter of the Gita is more exhaustive than this, the word ' Karma ' as used in the exposi- tion made in the Gita must not be taken in the restricted meaning of Actions prescribed by the Srutis or the Smrtis, but in a more comprehensive meaning. In short, all the Actions which a man performs, e.g., eating, drinking, playing, sitting, rising, residing, breathing, smiling, weeping, smelling, seeing, speaking, hearing, walking, giving, taking, sleeping, waking, killing, fighting, meditating or contemplating, commanding, or objecting, giving, performing sacrificial ritual, agriculture or commerce, desiring, deciding, keeping quiet, etc., etc., etc., are all included in the word ' Karma ' as used in the Bhagavadglta, whether those Actions are bodily (liayilca) or vocal (vacilca) or mental (manasika) (Gita 5. 8-9). In short, even the remaining alive or the dying of the body itself, are Actions, and as occasion arises, it becomes necessary to consider whioh of the two actions of 'remaining alive ' or ' dying ' is to be chosen. - When this consideration arises, the word ' karma ' (Action) can also be understood in the meaning of Duty (kartaoya-lairma) or proper action (rihita-luirim) (Gl. 4. 16). We have so far considered the actions of human beings. Going beyond this, the word ' karma ' is also applied to the activities of the moveable and immoveable world, 'that is to say, even of life- less things. But that matter will be considered in the- subsequent chapter on Cause and Effect (karma-vipalca-prabiya).

7fi GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

The word " YOGA " is even more complicated in its meaning than the word ' karma '. The present-day ordinary meaning of this word is ' controlling the mental impulses of the organs by means of prunayama, i.e., 'control of the breath' or ' the Yoga of mental absorption or meditation prescribed by the Patarijala-Sutras ', and the word has been used in the same meanings also in the Upanisads (Katha. 6. 11). But it must first be borne in mind that this restricted meaning is not the meaning in which it has been used in the Bhagavadglta. The word ' Yoga ' comes from the root ' yuj ' which means ' to join ', and its root meaning is 'the state of union', 'combination', ' addition ' or ' co-existence ' or ' staying together ', and later on, it has also come to mean the ' means ', ' device ' or ' method ' or ' thing to he done ', that is, the ' Karma ' (Action) which is necessary for acquiring that state, and the Amarakosa has given all these meanings of the word in the following sentence: "yogah sahnakanoixji/a-dhyam-sai'Hgati-yiiktisu ( 3. 3. 22 ). In practical astrology, if some planets have become propitious or unpropitious, we say that they are forming a propitious or unpropitious 'yoga', and the word 'yoga in the phrase 'yoga-ksemd means 'acquiring such things as one has not got' (Gi. 9. 22). On seeing that Dronacarya would not be vanquished in the Bharati war, Sri Krsna has, in the following words said that: " there was only one ' yoga ' (means or ' trick ') for vanquishing him " .— "eko hiyogo 's.i/n bhaved vadhaya", i.e., "he can be killed only by one trick " (Ma. Bha. Dro. 181. 31) and later on He has narrated ,bow He had killed Jarasaihdha and other kings for the protection of the Religion by means of ' yoga '. It is stated in the TJdyoga parva that after Bhlsma had taken away the damsels Amba, Ambika and Ambalika, the other kings pursued Jlim crying : " Yoga, Yoga " (U. 172), and the word ' yoga ' has been used in the same meaning in numerous other places in the Mahabharata. In the Gita, the words ' yoga ', ' 1/09/ ' or other compounds from the word ' yoga ' have occured about 80 times. 'But nowhere except in at most four or five places has it been used in the meaning of ' Patanjala-yoga ' (Gi. 6. 12 and 23). "We find almost everywhere the word used more or less in the ■meaning of ' means ', ' skilful device,' 'method', ' the thing to be -done';', ' union ', etc., and it must be said that this is one of the

KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA 77

comprehensive words used in the Gita-science. Still, it is not enough even to say in a general way that 'yoga' means 'means' 'skilful device' or 'method'. Because, according as the speaker may wish, it may be a means of Renunciation (samnyusa) or Action (Icarma.) or mental control (citta-nirodha) or of Release {Moksa) or of something else. For instance, the word 'yoga' has been used in the Gita itself, in three or four places, to signify the divine skill or wonderful power of the Blessed Lord in creating the variegated perceptible creation (Gi. 7. 25 ; 9. 5 ; 10. 7 ; 11. 8) and on that account, the Blessed Lord has been referred to as ' Yogeivara (Gi. 18. 75). But this is not the principal meaning of the word 'yoga in the Gita. Therefore, in order to explain what particular skill, means, method or process is principally signified in the Gita by the use of the word 'yoga', this word has intentionally been clearly defined in the Gita itself as : "yogah kwtnasu kausalam" (Gi. 2. 50) i.e. " 'yoga' means some special skill, device, intelligent method, or graceful way of performing Actions"; and in the Sarhkara- bhasya on this phrase, the phrase 'karmasu Icausalam' has been interpreted as meaning : "the device of eliminating the natural tendency of karma to create a bondage". Normally, there are numerous 'yoga or means of performing one and the same action, but the best of all these methods is specially referred to as 'yoga'. For instance, the earning of money can be achieved by theft or deceit or by begging or by service or by borrowing or by physical labour, and many other such ways ; and although the word ' yoga ' can be applied to each of these ways, according to the root meaning of the word, yet, 'earning money by one's own labour without sacrificing one's independence ' is principally referred to as " the yoga of acquiring wealth " ( dravya-prapti-yoga ).

If the Blessed Lord Himself has intentionally and specifically defined the word ' yoga ' in the Gita itself as : " yogah Icarmam Icausalam " i. e., "'Yoga' means a special device of performing Actions", then, there should strictly speaking remain no doubt whatsoever about the primary meaning of this word in the Gita. But, as several commentators have extracted various hidden meanings from the Gita by twisting the meaning of this word, disregarding this definition of the

78 ~ GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

word given by the Blessed Lord Himself, it is necessary here to go deeper into the meaning of the word 'yoga\ in order to ■clear that mis-interpretation. The word 'yoga' appears for the first time in the second chapter of the Gita and at that very place the meaning of that word is explained. AfteT haying justified the war on the authority of the Samkhya philosophy, the Blessed Lord goes on to say that He will next give Arjuna the justification of the war on the authority of the Yoga ( Gl. 2. 39 ), and He, to begin with, describes how the minds of persons .

■ continually engrossed in desire-prompted Action like sacrificial ritual, become disintegrated on account of the desire for the reward { Gi. 2, 41-46 ). He then goes on to say that Arjuna should not allow Ms mind to he disintegrated in this way, and should " give up all attachments ( asakti ), but not think of giving up Action ", and He has further said to him :

'" become steeped in the yoga ( yogastlia ) and perform Actions "

■ (Gi. 2. 48) and in the same place the word ' yoga ' has been to begin with clearly defined as meaning : " ' Yoga ' means

■ equability of mind towards success or failure ". Then, He goes ■on to say : " this ' yoga ' of equability of mind is better than performing Actions with the desire for the fruit " (Gi, 2. 49) and that " when the mind is equable, the doer is not affected by the sin or the virtue of the Action, and, therefore, acquire this Yoga". Immediately thereafter, He again defines the nature of

' ' Yoga ' by the words : " yogah karmam kausalam " (Gi. 2. 50). From this, it becomes clear that the special device mentioned to

■ start with by the Blessed Lord for the sinless performance of Actions, namely an equable mind, is what is known as

leausala ' (skilful device) and that performing Actions by this ' kausala ' or device is, in the Gita, known as ' yoga ' ; and this very meaning of that word has further been made perfectly •clear by Arjuna who says: " yo 'yam yogas tvayo proktah .samyem Madhusuciam" (Gi. 6. 33), i.e., "this yoga of equality, that is, of an equable frame of mind which has been prescribed by you to me". There are two ways in which the Self-Realised man should live in this world which have been prescribed by the Vedic religion in existence long before the date of Sri Sarhkaracarya. One of these ways is the literal abandonment (samnyasa) or giving up itgaga) of all Action after Self -Realisation, and the

KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA - 79

other way is of not giving up Actions even after Self-Realisa- tion, but going on performing them while life lasts, in such a way that one does not thereby incur either sin or merit. It is with reference to these two paths that the words 'samnyasa' and

• karma-yoga ' have been used later on in the Gita (Gl. 5. 2).

samnyasa ' means ' give up ' and ' yoga ' means ' stick to '; therefore, these are two independent paths of the giving up or the sticking to Action. The two words ' samlchya ' and ' yoga ' ■(Samkhya-yogau) are two abbreviated terms, which are used later •on with reference to these two paths (Gl. 5. 4). It is true that the sixth chapter of the Gita contains a description ■of the postures (asanas) of the Patanjala-yoga necessary -for steadying the mind; but for whom has that description been given ? Not for the ascetic, but for the Karma- Yogi, i. e,, for the person who continues skilfully -performing Actions, and, in order that he might thereby acquire an equable frame of mind. Otherwise, the sentence '" tapasvibhyo 'dhiko yogi", i.e., "the yogi is superior to the ascetic" is meaningless. Also, the advice given to Arjuna at the end of this chapter in the terms "tasmad yogi bhavarjuna" (6. 46), i.e., "therefore, O Arjuna, become a yogi", does not mean "take to the practice of Patanjala-Yoga" but has to bs taken as meaning "become a yogi, who performs Actions skilfully or a Karma-Yogi", in which meaning that word has been used in the phrases : "yogasthah (cam kurmuni" (2. 48) i.e., perform Action, having become a yogi", or after that : "tasmad. yoguya yujyasoa yogah karmasu kauialam (Gi. 2. 50), i.e., "therefore, take shelter in yoga; 'yoga' means the skill of per- forming Action", or at the end of the fourth chapter, "yogam Stisthottistha Bharata' (4. 42), i.e., "take shelter in the yoga, O, Bharata, and stand up". Because, His saying "follow the Patanjala-yoga and stand up and fight" would be impossible and even improbable. It has been clearly stated previously that : Icarmayogeija yoginam" (Gi. 3. 3) i.e., "yogis are persons who perform Actions"; and in the exposition of the Narayaniya or the Bhagavata religion in the Mahabharata, it is stated that persons belonging to that religion 'do not abandon worldly- affairs but perform them skilfully ( "suprayuktena Icarmana" ) and attain the Paramasvara ( Ma. Bhs. San. 34S. 56 ). From

80 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

this it follows, that the words ' yogi ' and ' Icarma-yogi ' have> been used synonymously in the Gita, and that they mean : " a- psrson who performs Action according to a particular device. "' Yet, instead of using the long word ' karma-yoga ', its abbrevia- ted form ' yoga ' has been more frequently used both in the Gita and in the Mahabharata. The word ' yoqa ', which has been used by the Blessed Lord three times in succession in the stanza : " this yoga which I have explained to you had been taught by me before to Vivasvan ( Gi. 4. 1 ) ; Vivasvan taught it to Manu, but as this .(/03a subsequently ceased to exist, I had once more to-day to explain that yoga to you ", has not beea intended to mean the Patanjala-yoga ; and one has to under- stand it a3 meaning " a particular kind of device, method, or process of performing Action ". In the same way, the reference- by Safijaya to the conversation between Sri Krsna and Arjuna as ' yoga ' ( Gi. 18. 75 ) means the same thing. Although Sri Samkaracarya himself followed the path of Renunciation, yet he has in the beginning of his Glta-bhasya pointed out the two divisions of the Vedic Religion into ' pravrtti ' and ' nivrtti ' and the word ' yoga ' has been interpreted by him in some plaoes. according to the definition given by the Blessed Lord as; " samyag darsanopaya Icarmanusthanam " ( Gi. Bha.. 4. 42 ) and in. other places as " yogah yuktih " ( Gi. Bha. 17. 7 ). In the same way also in the Mahabharata, these two words have been clearly defined in the Anugita in the phrase "pravrtti laksam yogah jiiawuii samnyasa laksavam " i. e., " yoga means the path of Energism {pravrtti-marga) and juana means the path of Renunciation ( samnyasa or nivrtti-marga ) (Ma. Bha. Asva. 43. 25 ) and even in the Narayaniyopakhyana at the end of the Santiparva the words ' samkhya ' and ' yoga ' have occurred on numerous occasions in these two senses, and it is explained how and why these two paths were created by the Blessed Lord in the beginning of the creation itself (Ma. Bha. San. 240 and 348). That this Narayamya or Bhagavata religion has been pro- pounded in the Bhagavadglta will become perfectly clear from the quotation from the Mahabharata which has been given at the beginning of the first chapter. Therefore, one has to say that the meanings of ' samkhya ' as ' nivrtti ' and of ' yoga ' as- 'pravrtti ', which are their ancient technical meanings accord-

KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA 81

ing to the Narayaniya religion, are also their meanings in th» Gita ; and, if anybody has any doubts about this, these doubts, ought to be fully cleared by the definition of that word given in the Gita as : "samatmm yoga neonate", i.e., " 'yoga' is the name given to equability" or " yogah karmasu kausalam ", i. e., " 'yoga' means skill in Action, " as also by such phrases used in the Gita as " lairma-yogeya yoginam " etc. ; and, it is established beyond argument that the word ' yoga ' has been used in the Gita in the sense of only the path of Energism (jn-avrtti-rmrga) 1 i. e., the " KARMA- YOGA ". Not only in the Vedic religious treatises, but also in the Buddhistic religious treatises in Pali and in Sanskrit, the word Yoga is found to have been used in this meaning. For instance, in the Pali work, named Milinda- prasna written about Sake 200, we come across the word. "Pubba-yoga (pUroa-yoga ) " where its meaning has been defined, as "pubbakamma" fparva-karma) (Mi. Pra. 1.4); and in the 50th. verse of the first canto fsargal of the Sanskrit poem Buddha- carita written by the poet Asvaghosa in the beginning of the- Salivahana era, we find the following statement :— " (karyahcah yogavidlum dcijamm-apmplam-myair-Javaho jaguina " i. e. "The king Janaka had become an UcUrya (preacher) for teach- ing the Yoga methods (yoga-vidhil to Brahmins, and such a, preceptorship had not been acquired by any one before him. '" In this place, the word ' yoga-vidhi ' has to be interpreted as meaning "the method (vidhi) of the Desire-less Karma- Yoga". Because, the Gita, and all the other works emphatically say that that was the true bearing of the mode of life of Janaka and Asvaghosa has in the Buddlia-carita (9. 19-20) given the illustration of Janaka himself in order to show " how Release can be obtained notwithstanding that one leads the life of a. house-holder ". When it has been in this way proved that even according to the Buddhistic treatises, this path of Action, prescribed by Janaka was known as 'yoga', one has to under- stand the word ' yoga ' used in the Gita also in the same meaning ; because, the Gita itself says that the path prescribed by Janaka is the very path it advocates (Gi. 3. 20). We will later on consider in greater detail the two paths of 'Samkhya ' and 'Yoga'. The matter under consideration at present is in what meaning the word 'yoga' has been used in the Gita. 11—12

S2 GLTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

When the principal meanings of the words 'yoga, namely, " Karma- Yoga', and ' yogi ', namely ' Karma-Yogi ', have in this way been established, it is not necessary to say in so many words what the subject-matter of the Bhagavadgita. is. The Blessed Lord Himself refers to the advice given by Him as ' yoga ' ( Gi. 4. 1-3 ). Not only that, but as I have already .stated above, Arjuna in the sixth chapter ( GI. 6. 33 ), and •Sanjaya in the conclusion ( upasamhara ) at the end of the Gita ( Gi. 18. 75 ) have characterised the preaching of the Gita as ' yoga '. In the same way, in the enunciatory words used at the end of each chapter of the Gita signify- ing the conclusion of the chapter ( which is technically •called samkalpa ), it is clearly stated that the Science •of Yoga ( yoga-sastm ) is the subject-matter of the Gita; but none of the commentators on the Gita, seem to have paid any attention to this meaning of the word in the samkalpa. After the the two opening words "Srlmad-Blmgavadgltusu npanisastu"in this samkalpa, come the two words "brahrta- vidyayam yoga-sastre" '. Out of these, the first two words mean "in the Upanisat sung by the Blessed Lord" and it is quite •clear from the following two words that "the Yoga-Sastra which is one of the Brahma-Vidyas", that is, the KARMA-YOGA- ■■SASTRA, is the subject matter of the Gita. ' Brahma-vidya ' means 'Knowledge of the Brahman' {Brahmajumia); and when that has been acquired, the Self -Released man has two cults or paths open before him (Gi. 3.3). One is the Samkhya path or the xa/imyasa (Renunciation) path, that is, the path of abandoning all wordly affairs or Actions after Self-Realisation, and living like an apathetic (viralda) person ; and the other path is the path of Yoga or of Kamia-Yoga, that is to say, of not giving up wordly affairs but continuing to perforin them in such a ■way that they do not create any difficulty in the matter of obtaining Release. Out of these two paths, the first one is also known as the 'path of Self -Realisation' (jilana-mstha ) and .an exposition of that will be found to have been made by many rsis in the Upanisads and other writers. But there is no scientific exposition anywhere, except in the Gita, of the Karma-Yoga, which is included in the Brahma-vidya. There- fore, it now becomes quite clear that those persons who first

KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA 83

prepared that samkalpa — and, as I have stated above, it must have been there before any of the commentaries on the Gita were written, since it is to be found in all the editions of the Gita — must have added the words "brahm-vklyayam yoga-sastre" in this samkalpa. on proper authority, and intentionally, for emphasising the uniqueness of the subject-matter of the GitS- sastra, and not uselessly or frivolously ; and at the same time, we also easily understand what the import of the Gita was understood to be before any commentaries in support of particular cults came to be written on it. It is our great fortune that this work of preaching the Karma- Yoga was taken on his. own shoulders by Sri Krsna Bhagavan, who was the promulgator of this path of Yoga and who was the personified 4 Is vara of all y ogas' ( ' Yoges vara ' is 'yoga' plus 'Isvara'), and who has explained the esoteric import of it to Arjuna for the benefit of the whole world. It is true that the words 'karma- j/oga' and ' kanna-yoga-sastm' are longer than the words 'yoga' and 'yoga-sastra' used in the Gita; but in order that there should no more be any doubts as to what the Gita preaches, I have intentionally given the name "Karma-Yoga-Sastra" to this work and to this chapter.

That science by means of which we can decide suoh ques- tions as : Which is the best and purest of the several 'yogas', means, or processes in which a -particular Action can be perfor- med; whether it can be always followed; if not, what are the exceptions to it, and how they arise ; why is that path which we call good, really good, or that which we call bad, really bad, and on the strength of what, is this goodness or badness to be deoided and who is to do so or what is the underlying principle in it etc. is known as the ' KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA ' (science of Karma- Yoga) or, as expressed briefly in the- Gita 'YOGA-SASTRA ' (the science of Yoga). 'Good' or 'bad' are words in ordinary use and the following other words : propitious and unpropitious, or bene- fioial and harmful, or meritorious and non-meritorious, or sin and virtue, or righteous and unrighteous, are used in the same ■sense. The same is the meaning conveyed by the word-couples ■doable and not-doable (kanja and akarya), duty and non-duty {kai-tamja and akartavya), just and unjust (nyayya and amjayya). Nevertheless, as the various persons who have used these

""fUr ,.

84 GIT1-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

words have different ideas about the formation of the universe? there have also come into existence, different ways in which the ' Karma-Yoga ' science has been expounded. Whatever science is taken, the subject-matter of it can be discussed ordinarily in three ways :— (1) considering the various objects- in the physical world from the point of view that they really are as they are perceived by our organs, and that there is nothing- beyond, is the first of these methods, which is known as- "ADHI-BHAUTIKA" (positive or materialistic) way of considering them. For instance, when you look upon the Sun not as a deity, but as a round-mass of gross matter made up of the five primordial elements, and examine its various properties, such as its heat, or light, or weight, or distance, or power of attraction, etc., that becomes the positive or material- examination of the Sun. Take the tree as another illustration. If we do not consider the internal force in the tree which is responsible for its getting leaves etc., but consider the tree purely externally, that is, consider only the facts that when the seed is put into the earth, it takes root and becomes a sprout,, whioh grows later on and goes through the visible changes of leaves, flowers, fruits etc., that is a purely material examina- tion of the tree. The examination of the subject-matter in Chemistry or Physics or the science of electricity or other- modern sciences is of this kind. Nay, materialists imagine, that when they have examined in this way the visible properties of any object, that is all they need to do and that it is useless to further examine the objects in the world. (2) When we discard this point of view, and examine what there is at the root of the object in the material world and whether the activities of these objects are due to some inherent properties in them or there is some other power or principle behind those activities, then one has to transcend the material, examination of the object. For instance, if we believe that in the gross or'lifeless globe of the Sun, made up of the five primordial elements, there exists a deity called the ' Sun ' which dwells within it, and that this deity carries on the activities of the'material Sua, such examination is called an ADHI-DAIVIKA (Theological) examination of the object. According to this point of view, there are in the tree, water*

KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA 85

air, etc., innumerable deities, which are distinct from those objects, and which activate those objects. (3) But, when instead of believing in this way that there are millions and millions of independent deities in all the various objects in the gross world, we believe that there exists in this world.some Spiritual Force, i.e., factor of consciousness (ctccliakti) imperceptible to the organs, which carries on all the activities of the external world ; and that this Spiritual Force exists in the human body in the shape of an Atman and acquaints the human being with the entire creation ; and that this cosmos is kept going by that force, such consideration of the object is called an ADHYATMIKA (metaphysical) examination of the object. For instance, metaphysicians believe that the movements of the Sun and the Moon or even of the leaves of the tree are inspired by this unimaginable Power and that there are not different and independent deities in the Sun or in other objects. These throe ways of examining any subject-matter have been in existence from times immemorial and they seem to have been followed even in the Upanisads- For instance, in the Brhadaranyaka and other Upanisads, while considering whether the organs of perception { J nanendriija ) or the vital force ( prana ) is superior, their respective strengths are considered, once from the point of view that they have deities like Agni etc., and again by considering their subtle ( metaphysical i. e., adliyatmika ) forms ( Br. 1. 5. 21 and 22 ; Chan. 1. 2 and 3 ; Kausi 2. 8 ) ; and the consideration of the form of the Isvam at the end of the seventh chapter and in the beginning of the eight chapter of the G-ita is also from this point of view. Out of these three methods, our religious writers attach a higher importance to the metaphysical ( adhyatmika ) method of consideration than to others, relying on the authority " adlujatma-vidtja vidyunam " (Gi. 10. 32) i. e. " the metaphysical science is the highest of all sciences ". But in modern times, the meanings of these three words are to a certain extent changed and the well-known French Materialist Comte * has given the hig hest importan ce

• Augusts Comte was a groat philosopher who lived in

France in the last century. Ha wrote a very important book on Sociology and has shown for tbo first time how tie constitution of

86 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

to the Positive ( material ) exposition. He says that there is no sense in trying to find out the fundamental element, if any, which exists at the root of the world ; and in as much as this element is always unknowable {agarnya) it is neither possible nor proper to found on it the edifice of a science. When the aboriginal man for the first time, saw trees, clouds, volcanoes and other moving objects, he credulously began to believe that they were all deities. According to Comte, this was the Theological consideration of the universe. But man very soon gave-up this idea and began to think that there must be some element in the shape of an Atman in all these objects- According to Comte, this is the second stage of the progress of human knowledge; and this stage is called by him the Metaphysical stage. But when even after considering the universe in this way, actual practical scientific knowledge did not grow, man ultimately began to examine deeper and deeper only the visible properties of the objects in this world ; and on that account, man has now begun to exercise greater control over the external world, as a result of his having been able to invent steam-engines, telegraphs etc. Comte calls this the Positive adhibhautika ) consideration and he has come to the conclusion that this method of consideration of any science or object is the most profitable one. According to Comte, we must adopt this method for scientifically considering Sociology or the science of Karma-Yoga ; and after a careful consideration of the history of the world, this philosopher has drawn the following conclusion regarding the science of wordly life, from that point of view, namely that: the highest religion of society can be scientifically considered. He has come to the conclusion after considering numerous sciences, that whichever science is taken, the consideration of it is first Theological and then Metaphyseal and that, lastly it attains the Positive form. These three systems have been respectively given by me the ancient names- of ' adhiduwika ' ' adhyatmiia ' and ' adhibhautika ' in this book.. Comte has not invented these methods. They are old methods 1 but he has fixed a new historical order for them and the only discovery made by hiia is that of all tile three, the positive ( adhibhautika ) system of consideration is the best. The most important of thc- • tvotBb of this writer have been translated into English.

KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA. 8?

every human being is to love the whole human race and to continually strive for the benefit of everybody. Mill, Spencer and other English philosophers may be said to- support this opinion. On the other hand, Kant, Haegel, Schaupenhaur and other German philosophers, have proved, that this positive method of considering Ethics is inefficient, and they have recently revived in Europe the method of basing. Ethics on Metaphysics adopted by our Vedanta philosophers. This matter, however, will be dealt with in greater detail later on.

The reason why different writers have used the different, words ' karija ' and ' akarya ' (doable and not-doable), ' dliarnvya " and ' adliarnuja ' (moral and immoral) in the meaning of ' good ' and ' bad ' although they all convey the same meaning, is that every one has his own different way or view of dealing; with a particular subject-matter. The question of Arjuna was- whether or not that war in which he would have to kill Bhlsma, Drona, etc., was meritorious (Gi. 2. 7); and if a. Materialist had to answer this question, he would have, critically considered the palpable profit or loss of it to Arjuna personally, as also the results of it on the entire society and would have declared whether the fight was just ( nyayya ) or unjust ( anijaijya ) ; because, these Materialists do not admit of any other test for determining the goodness or badness of any particular Action except the material, that is, the actual, external results of that Action on the world. But such an answer would not have satisfied Arjuna ; his vision was more comprehensive ; what he wanted was to know whether that war would in the end benefit his Self (atman), not in this world alone, but from the next-world point of view. He had no doubt as to whether or not he would acquire the kingdom or material happiness as a result of the death of Bhlsma and Drona or whether his rule would be more benefioial to people than the rule of Duryodhana. In short, he had to see whether or not what he did was 'dharinya' (moral) or 'adlmrmya' (immoral), ' pimya ' (non-sin) or ' papa ' (sin); and the exposition in the Gita has been made from that point of view. Not only in the Gita but also in other places in the Mahabharata has the examination of karma (Action) and alcanna (non-Action)"been

S8 GtTA-RAHASYA OH KARMA-YOGA

made from this next-world and Metaphysical point of view and in it, the two words 'dharma and 'adharma have been primarily used in order to show the goodness or badness of any particular act. But as the word 'dharma' and its opposite correlative 'adharma are likely to create confusion on account of their very comprehensive meaning, it is necessary to discuss here in greater detail the meanings in which those words have been principally used in the science of Karma- Yoga.

The word 'DHARMA' is in ordinary practice very often used to imply only the path leading to next-world happiness. When we ask some one "What is your dharma (religion)"? our intention is to ask him by what path he goes — whether "Vedic, Buddhist, Jain, Christian, Mahomedan or Parsi — for acquiring happiness in the .next world ; and the reply which he gives is also from the same point of view. In the same way, where the subject-matter of the Vedic yajftas and yagas instru- mental to the acquisition of heaven is being considered, the word 'dharma' is used in the same [meaning, as in the canon "ailiuto dliarmajijuUsu" etc. but the word 'dharma is not to be understood in such a restricted meaning, and it is very often used for indicating the limitations of worldly morality, as in the phrases, 'rajarlharma' (the duty of kings), 'praj adharma (the duty of subjects), 'desadharma (the duty of a country), ' j natidlmrma {the duty pertaining to a caste), ' kuladlmrma' (the duty pertaining to clan or family), 'milradharma' (one's duty as a friend) etc. If these two meanings of the word 'dharma are to be individually explained, the dhurma relating to the life after death may be called ' moksadhaniKi ' or simply ' moksa ' and the dharma relating to this worldly life, i. e., Ethics may be given the name of ' dharma ' simply. For instance, in enumerating the four ideals of manhood (puru&rtki), we say 'dharma' (morality), J artha' (wealth), 'kTnwt (desire), 'moksa' (Release). If 'mokt-a is meant to be included in the first word 'dlianm, then it would not be necessary to mention 'moksa' as an independent ideal at the end. Therefore, we must say that the writers of our scriptures use the word 'dharma in this place as meaning the numerous ethical duties -which form part of our worldly life. The same meaning is conveyed by the words kartavya- karma ( duty ), 'niti' ( Ethics ), ' nitidharma ' ( morality ) or

KARMA-YOGA-SS.STRA 89

"sadacarava' (good conduct) used now-a-days. But in ancient Sanskrit treatises, the words ' nili ' or 'nitisastra were used principally with reference to regal jurisprudence (rajaniti) and therefore, the ordinary exposition of duty (kartainja-karma) or good conduct (sad-rar(ana) used to be called the 'exposition of dharma (dlmrnvi-prarai'ana) instead of the ' exposition of nlti ' ( 'niti-pramcana' ). But this technical distinction between the two words nlti. ' and ' dharmi ' has not been adopted in all Sanskrit treatises; and, therefore, I too, have used the terms 'nlti', 'Icaiiartja or simply 'dliarmu' as synonymous ; and, where the subject of Release (molcsaj has to be considered, I have used the independent terms ' adhyutma ' (Metaphysics) or ' bhakti- marga (Path of Devotion). The word 'dharma' has appeared on numerous occasions in the Mahabharata, and whenever it has been said there that a particular person is bound to •do a particular thing according to his 'dharma', the word 'dharma means ethical science ( kartaiya-sastra ) or the then sociology (xamuja-vyaazstha-sustra) ; and wherever there has been occasion to refer to the paths leading to next- world happiness, in the latter half of the Santi-parva, the specific word ' nwkbu-dharnia ' has been used. So also in the Manu-Smrti and other Smrti texts, in mentioning the specific duties of the four castes, Brahmin, ksatriya, vaisya, and sudra, the word 'dharma ' has been used on many occasions and in many places ; and even in the Bhagavadglta the word 'dliarnia' has been used as meaning ' the duties of the four castes in this world ' in the expression " svadlwrmam api caveksya" (Gl. 2. 31 ) where the Blessed Lord is telling Arjuna to fight, having regard to what his 'dharma' is, and also later on in the expres- sion :" svadharme nidlianam sreyah paradliarmo bhayavahah" (Gl. 3. 35), i.e., "it is better to die performing one's caste duties ; following the duties enjoined on another caste is dangerous ". The ancient this had created the institution of the four castes — which was in the nature of a division of labour — in order that all the affairs of society should go on without a hitch, and that society should be protected and maintained on all sides, without any particular person or group of persons having to bear the whole burden. Later ■ on, people belonging to this sooiety ".fcecame 'jatimatropajivi' that is "persons, who forgetting their

90 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

respective caste duties, belonged to a particular caste merely by- reason of birth." and became mere nominal Brahmins, ksatriyas, vaisyas, or sudras ; but let us keep that thing aside for a time. Originally, this institution had been made for the maintenance- of society and it is quite clear that if any one of the four castes. had given up the 'dliarma' i. e., duties allocated to it, or if any particular caste had totally ceased to exist and its place had not been taken by some other persons, the entire society would to that extent have been disabled and would later on have either been gradually destroyed or at least have sunk to a very low stage. There are numerous societies in the Western hemisphere,- which have come to prominence notwithstanding that they do- not have the institution of the four castes. But we must not forget that although the institution of the four castes may not be in existence among them, yet all the duties of the four castes are seen being performed in those societies, if not in th& shape of castes, at any rate by some other arrangement in the shape of professional divisions or classes. In short, when we use the word ' dharma ' from the worldly point of view, we- consider in what way society will be maintained (dharana) and benefited. Manu has said that that ' dharma ' which is- 'asukhodarka', that is to say, 'from which unhappiness ulti- mately results' should be given up (Manu. 4. 176) ; and Bhisma says in the Satyanrtodhyaya of the Santiparva (San. 109. 12), where the exposition of 'dharma' and 'adiianna ' is made, and before that, Sri Krsna also says in the Earnaparva ( Ma. Bha- Karna. 69. 59 ), that :-

dharaifdd dharmam ihj ahar dliarmo dharuyate prajah I yat syad dliaraiia sanyuktam sa dharma iti niicayah II;

that is, " the word Dharma comes from the root dhr, i. e.,. to hold or uphold, and all human beings are held together by dharma. That by which the holding together (of all human beings) takes place is dharma". Therefore, when this dharma ceases to be observed, the binding-ropes of society may be said to have become loose, and when these binding ropes are loosened, society will be in the same position as the planetary system consisting of the Sun and the planets would be in the sky*without the binding fores of gravitation or as a ship-

KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA 91

would be on the ocean without a rudder. Therefore, Vyasa in* the Bharata gives the advice that, in order that society should not come to an end by reaching such a lamentable state, money (arthal if it has to be acquired, must be acquired by 'dharma', that is, without disturbing the arrangement of society ; and if the desires, such as the sex impulses (kama) etc. have to be satisfied, that should also be done consistently with 'dharma ' ; . and he says at the end of the Bharata that :-

Urdhvabahur viraumy esah na ca Icascic chrnoti mam I dharmad artlias ca kamai ca sa dhanmh lam na sevyate II i. e,, "Oh people I am haranguing you with raised hands, (but) ' no one listens to me ! if both wealth (artha) and desires (kama) • can be acquired by dharma, (then) why do you not follow such a dhanna? " My readers will from this understand the chief meaning in whioh the word ' dharma ' has been used in the expression dharma-sam/u'ta, when the Mahabharata, from the point of view of 'dharma', is looked upon as the fifth Veda or- dharma-samhita ; and for the same reason, namely, on the ground that it is a dharma-grantha, has the Mahabharata been included among the religious texts prescribed for daily recital in the Brahma-yajfia (ritual for Brahmins) — as is shown by the use of the symbolical words : " Narwja-nai'n namaskrtya " — along with the two treatises Purva-Mlmamsa and Uttara-Mlmamsa (which deal with the question of next- world happiness).

Reading the exposition made by me above of what is . dhanm and what is adharma, some one may object : if you accept these principles of 'the maintenance of society' (samaja- dmramj and 'general welfare' (surm-bhuta-hitani), as mentioned in the second chapter when discussing the question of Truth and Falsehood (satyanrta), then there is no difference between your point of view and the Materialistic point of view ; because. - both these principles are outwardly real, that is Materialistic. This question has been dealt with by me in detail in the next chapter. For the present, I will only say that although we accept maintenance of society as being the chief outward use of dhanna, yet we never lose sight of the Redemption of the Atman falma-kalyanaj or Release (rholcsa) which is the highest ideal according to the Vedic or all other religions and which is the special feature of our view-point. Whether it is mainten—

-92 GlTA-RAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA.

ance of society or the general material welfare of everybody, if these externally useful principles obstruct the Redemption of the Atman, we do not want them. If even our works on medicine maintain that the medical science is a useful science, because it serves as a means for obtaining Release (moksa), by protecting the body, then it is absolutely impossible that our religious writers would divorce the Karnia-Yoga-Sastra, which ■ considers the most important subject of the performance of various worldly Actions, from the Metaphysical philosophy of Release. And therefore, we look upon that Action which is favourable to our Metaphysical betterment as 'pumja (reli- giously meritorious), 'dharma' (moral), or 'svhlta (good) and that which is unfavourable to it, as ' papa ' (sinful), 'adharma (immoral), or 'asubhd (bad). It is for this very reason that we use the words ' dharma ' and ' adharma ' (notwithstanding that they have a double meaning and are to a certain extent ambi- guous) in place of the words ' kartavya ' (duty) ' akartavya ' (non-duty) and ' karya ' (doable) and ' aluirya ' (non-doable). Even when the worldly affairs or activities in the external world are primarily to be considered, we consider whether or not these activities are conducive to Atmic * benefit, simul- taneously with considering their external effects. If a Mate- rialist is asked why I should sacrifice my own benefit for the benefit of others, what answer can he give except by saying : "That is ordinary human nature " ? The writers of our Sastras have seen further than this and the science of Karma-Yoga has been considered in the Mahabharata from this comprehensive Metaphysical standpoint, and Vedanta has for the same reason been dealt with in the Bhagavadgita. Even the ancient Greek philosophers were of the opinion that one has to take 'the greatest benefit' or 'the climax of virtue' as the highest ideal of mankind and dealt with the question of the doable and the not-doable from that point of view ; and Aristotle has in his book on Ethics said that all these things are included in the Atmic benefit (1. 7, 8). Yet, Aristotle has not given due importance to Atmic benefit. That is not the case with our philosophers. They have 'laid down, that Atmic benefit or [*TMs word 'Atmic' (i. e., of the 'Atman') has been coined by

me on the analogy 'Vedic' Trans.]

KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA 93

Metaphysical perfection is the first and the highest duty of every man ; that the question of the doable and the not-doable ■ must be considered on the basis that Atmic benefit is more- important than any other benefit; and that, it is not proper to consider that question without reference to Metaphysical philosophy. The same position seems to have been accepted in modern times by some Western philosophers, in dealing with the question of the doable and the not-doable. For instance, the German philosopher Kant first wrote the metaphysical book Critique of Pure Reason, that is, of ' vyavasayatmika ', (i.e., pure) ' buddhi ' (i.e., Reason), and subsequently the book Critique of Practical Reason, that is, of ' vasanatmaka ' (i.e. practical) 'buddhi' (i.e., Reason). * And even in England,. Green has started his book entitled Prolegomena to Ethics with the consideration of the Atman, which is the bed-rock of the entire universe. But, as the works of purely materialistic philosophers on Ethics are principally taught in our colleges the fundamental principles of the Karma-Yoga mentioned in the Gita, are not well understood even by learned persons among us, who have had an English education.

It will be clear from the exposition made by me above why we apply the common word ' DHARMA ' chiefly to wordly morality or to systems laid down for the maintenance of society. Not only in the Sanskrit treatises, Mahabharata and Bhagavadglta, but also in vernacular works is the word ' dharma ' always used as meaning worldly duties or laws- We understand the words ktiladliarrna and kidacara as synonymous. The Marathi poet, Moropant, has used the word ' dharma ' in this sense, in describing the incident in the Bharata war when Karna had got out of his chariot for raising the wheel of his chariot which had sunk into the earth, and Arjuna was on the point of killing him. Karna then said : " It is not the ethics of warfare (yuddhadliarma) to kill an enemy when he is unarmed," and Sri Krsna retaliated by reminding him of the previous incidents of the attempted

• Kant was a German philosopher, and he is looked upon at

the father of modern philosophy. Two of -his works, the Critique ■ of Pure Reason and the Critique of Pratical Reason are well-known.. The work written by Green is known as Prolegomena to Ethics.

<I4 GITA-RAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA

•denuding of DraupadI, or the murder of Abhimanyu, when alone, by a number of persons, and asking him : "Where was then your dharma, Oh, Radhasuta ?' ' with reference to all those incidents ; and even in the Mahabharata the word ' dharma' has been used in relating this incident in the expression " leva te dharmas tada gatah ", i.e., " where did your ' dharma ' (morality) go then?", and it is shown that it is morally right to give measure for measure to such immoral persons. In short, as it has become usual, whether in Sanskrit or in Prakrit literature, to use -the word 'dharma' as indicating the rules of morality which have been laid down by high and reverend persons, with reference to various matters, for the maintenance of society, I have -adopted the same word in this book. These rules, which have been laid down by reverend people (sista) and which have become acceptable on all hands and are known as ' respectable behaviour ' (sistucara), are, from this point of view, the root of morality {dharma) ; and therefore, in the Mahabharata (Anu. 104. 157) and also in the Smrti treatises there are such statements as : ' acaraprabhavo dliarmah ", i.e., '" morality springs from custom " or : " acarah paramo dharmah", i.e., " rules of custom are the highest morality " (Manu. 1. 108), ■•or (where the origin of morality is mentioned), "vedah smrtih sadacarah svasya ca p, riyarnutmanah ", (Manu. 2. 12), i.e., 'the Vedas, the Smrtis, good conduct and that which we ourselves •desire." But that is not enough for the science of Karma. Yoga, and, as has been stated by me before in the second chapter, it is necessary to fully and critically consider what ■ causes led to a particular acura or code of conduct being fixed.

We must also here consider another definition of the word dharma ' which is come across in ancient treatises. This is the definition given by the Mimamsa school. That school •says : " codanalaksano 'rtho dfuirmah " ( Jai. Su. 1.1. 2 ) Oodana ' means ' inspiring,' that is, some authoritative person rsaying or ordering : " Do this " or " Do not do this ".So long as no one has laid down such a limitation or such a limitation has not come into existence, bne . is at liberty to do what he likes. This means that dharma originally came into existence .as a result of suoh limitations, and this definition of morality

KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA * 95

is to a certain extent similar to the opinions of the well-known English writer Hobbes. The human being, in the aboriginal condition behaved according to the particular frame of mind ruling at the time. But when he later on found out that Buoh unrestricted behaviour wag not beneficial on the whole, he came to the definite conclusion that it was in the best interests •of everybody to lay down and observe certain restrictions on the self -inspired actions of the organs, and every human being began to observe these limitations, which have gained ground on account of general acceptance ( sistucara ), or for some other reason, as if they were laws ; and when such limitations grew in number, they formed themselves into a code. I have mentioned in the previous chapter that the institution of marriage was not at first in vogue, but was brought into existence by Svetaketu, and also that the prohibition against drink was first laid down by Sukracarya. In defining the word dlmrma as : " codamlaksano 'tiho dliarmah " only the fact of such restrictions having been dictated by these law-givers has been taken into account and the motives of Svetaketu or of .Sukracarya in laying down these limitations has been lost sight of. Even in the case of a rule of morality ( dharma ), some one first realises its importance and then it is promulgated. It is not necessary to ask anyone to eat, drink, and make merry, because, those are the inherent tendencies of the physical organs. That is what is meant by Manu when he says : " na mamsabhaksane doso na madye ivx ca maitlmne " ■( Manu. 5. 56 ), i. e., '^Eating flesh or drinking wine or enjoying sexual intercourse, is not sinful. ", that is, there is nothing in them which is contrary to the rules of nature. All these things are the inherent desires, not only of ,'men but of

every living being[ "pravHtir esa bhutanam", i. e., " these are

the tendencies of created beings ". Morality consists in putting proper limitations on an unrestricted course of life resulting from passions in the interest of the maintenance •of society or of general welfare. Because : —

Uharanidra bluiyamailhunam ca

samanyam etat pasubhir nafanam I

dliarmo hi tesam adhlko visefto

dharmem hinah pasubhih mmanah II

96 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

i. e. " eating, sleeping, fear, and sexual relations are the? heritage of men, same as of animals ; dlianna, ( that is, restrain- ing them by rules of morality ), is the difference between man and beast ; and those who are not governed by this code of morality may be looked upon as beasts. " There is in the Santiparva of the Mahabharata, a similar verse ( San. 294. 29 } and the verse in the Bhagavata, which prescribes limitations on the desires of hunger etc. has been quoted in the previous chapter. In the same way what the Blessed Lord is referring to, is the nature of morality to lay down limitations on unrestricted mental impulses, where in the Bhagavadgita, He says to Arjuna : — ■

indriyasyendriyasij arthe raga dvesau vvavasthitau I tayor m vasam agacchet tau hy asya paripanlhinau II

i.e. "the attractions and repulsions between the organs of sense on the one hand and the various objects which are pleasurable or repulsive to them on the other are unchangingly inherent. One should not become their slaves, because, both love and hate are enemies". The organs of a man urge him to behave like a beast, and his intelligence pulls him in the opposite direction. 'Those persons who redeem themselves by sacrificing the animal tendencies rampant in their bodies into the fire of this warfare are the true sacrificeTS, and are indeed blessed.

Call dharma, 'Ucam-prablmva' (born of custom), or call it 'dharanat' (something which upholds or keeps together), or call it 'codanalaksava' (some precept which has been dictated), which- ever definition of dharma (worldly morality) is accepted, none of them is much, useful for coming to a definite conclusion, when«*pne has to decide between what is moral and what imnforal. The first definition only tells us what the funda- mental form of dharma is! The second definition tells us what its external use is, and the third definition tells us that moral restrictions were laid down in the beginning by some persons or other. Not only is there much difference between customs and customs but, as there are numerous consequences of one and the same act, and also as the 'cotiana' i.e., precepts of different rsis are also different, we have to look out for some other way of . determining what the dharma is, when there are doubts in the.

KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA

99

matter. When Yaksa asked Yudhisthira -what this othe?rt aln

was, Yudhisthira replied :- ' a "' e

. It

tarko 'pratisthah srutayo vibhinnah •

" ' , 1. o.,

naiko rsir yasya ■vacah pramanam I ,. ^

dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhayam f 0T

mahdjano yena gatah sa, pantluih II \ a ^

(Ma.Bha. ¥ana. 312. 115).

that is : " inferential logic is uncertain, i. e., it is such that if will give birth to various inferences according to different degrees of keenness of intelligence in me'n ; the Srutis, that iff the precepts of the Vadas, are all mutually conflioting ; and,-af regards the Smrtis, there is not a single rsi (sage) whose preoepi we can look upon as more auftoritative than that of othera Well, if we seek the fundamental principle of this^(woil||| dharma, it is lost in darkness, that is ; 'tt)»^ cannot be understood by a man of i Therefggg^bg jgath whi ch"' hW ; ~._^.,.^ x,^-!^ oidMrma". ; Very\^I^KMf "S-ib'-i^f

(rmmjanOii't iT SHf ' ; " ' Ul: ^ : ' -^•'^ L

id to meaii'*aiai

pereciBaHMB!^- -Bfecause; fbl laM dronby ordinary minds are never trout] and what is wrong$ like " andhenaiva niyct: led by the blind ", as* interprete the word venerable persons'— and

above verse-^then, .where is there, any >iiniformity1 behaviour?: The sinless "RamaCaridra "discarded' though she had passed through'thte r ciraeal of fire, merely 'o'fl ground of public criticism; and the same Ramacandra, order that Sugriva should be on his side, entered into an- offensive and defensive alliance with him, by making him, 'tulyarimitra', i. e., ' with common friends and enemies ', and killed Vali who had in no way wronged him ! Parasurama. murdered his own mother at the behest of his father 1 , mt, as regards- the Fandavas, five of them had only one wife ! I 13 ' 13-14

96 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

'nsider the gods in the heavens, then some of them are the

jours of Ahilya, whereas others are seen lying in the sky

mutilated bodies, being wounded by the arrows of Rudra,

i Brahmadeva because he ran after his own daughter in

form of a stag (Ai. Bra. 3. 33). With these things

e his mind's eye, Bhavabhuti has put the words :

idhas te na vicaramyacaritah", i.e., "one must not attach too

Auch importance to the doings of these old people " in the

iiouth of Lava in the Uttararamaearitra. A writer, who

"has written in English the history of the Devil, has said

in his book that if one considers the history of the warfare

between the supporters of the gods and of the Devil, we see that

very often the gods (dews) have cheated the non-gods (daityas) ;

and in the same way, in the IJausitakl-Brahmanopanisad (See,

Kausi. 3. 1 as also Ai. Bra. 7. 28), Indra says to Pratardana :

"I have killed Vrtra (although he was a Brahmin) ; I have

aces the ascetic Arunmukha, and thrown the

lives ; and, breaking all the various treaties which

Be by me, I have killed the friends and clansmen

find also killed the demons named Pauloma and

yet on that account, " tasya me tatra na loma ca

I e., " not a hair of my head has been touched ".

pays : "You have no occasion to consider the evil

these venerable persons, but, as stated in the

Taittiriyopanisad ( Taitti. 1. 11. % ), imitate only their good

actions, and neglect the rest ; for instance, obey your father,

as was done by Parasurama, but do not kill your mother ",

■then, the primary question of how good actions are to be

•differentiated from bad actions again arises. Therefore, after

laving described his various deeds as mentioned above, Indra

says to Pratardana : "Bearing in mind that that man who has

fully Realised his Self is not prejudicially affected by patricide,

matricide, infanticide, theft, or any other sinful actions, try

and realise in the first instance what the Atnian is, so that all

your doubts will be answered" ; and he has thereafter explained

to Pratardana the science of the Atnian. In short, although

the precept "nmhajano yena yatah sa panthah" may be easy to

allow for ordinary persons; yet it does not meet all possible

ontingencies ; and thoughtful persons have ultimately to enter

KARMA-YOGA-S ASTRA

into the Philosophy of the -Atman (atma-jnava) and ascertain the true principle underlying the actions of the venerable persons (maliajanah), however deep that principle may be. It is for this reason that the advice : "m devacaritam caret ".i.e., "one must not follow only the external actions of gods", is given, Some persons have hit upon an easier way for determining the doable and the not-doable. They Bay that whatever virtue is taken, we must always take care against excess of it, foT such excess turns a virtue into a vice. Charity is a virtue; but, " atidanad balir baddkah ", i. e., " because of too much charity, Bali was undone ". The well-known Greek philosopher Aristotle has in his book on Ethics prescribed the same test for distinguishing between the doable and the not- doable ; and he has clearly shown how every virtue, in excess, is the cause of one's undoing. Even Kalidasa has come to the conclusion ( see Raghuvarhsa 17. 47 ) that courage, pure and simple, is like the cruel behaviour of an animal like a tiger ; and morality, pure and simple, is nothing else but cowardice ; and that the king Atithi, used to rule by a judicious admixture of the sword and regal jurisprudence. If a man speaks too much, he is talkative, if he speaks too little, he is reserved ; if he spends too much, he is a spendthrift, if he spends too little, he is a miser ; if he is too advanced, he is wayward, and if he lags behind, he is a laggard ; if he insists on anything too much, he is obstinate, and if he insists too little, he is fickle ; if he is too accommodating, he makes himself cheap, and if he remains stiff, then he is proud : this is how Bhartrhari and •others have described some good and bad qualities. However, such a rule of the thumb does not overcome all difficulties, because, who is to decide what is 'too much', and what is ^moderate' ? What may be 'too much' for one or on any parti- cular occasion, may be too little for another person or on another occasion. Jumping into the firmament at the moment of his birth in order to catch hold of the Sun was as nothing to Maruti (VS. Rama. 7. 35). Therefore, as the syena bird advised the King Sibi, every man, when faced with the discernment between the duty (dharmal and the non-duty (adharrna) should on every occasion consider the relative merits and the importance or unimportance of mutually conflicting duties,

100 GITA-BAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

and intelligently arrive at a conclusion as to the true duty or proper Action :—

avirodhat tu yo dliarmah sa dharmah satyavikrama I

virodhisu mahlpala itiscitya gurulaghawm I

na iadha vidyate yatra tarn dharrmni samupaearet II

(Ma. Bha. Vana. 131. 11. 12 and Manu. 9. 299X

i. e., "Oh, Satyavikrama 1 that is dharma (duty) in which there is no contradiction ; Oh, King !, if there is such a contradiction,, then come to a decision as to the relative worth of the act and the opposition, and follow that path of duty in which, there is no opposition-". But one cannot, on that account only, say that the true test of determining the proper conduct on a doubtful occasion is to discriminate between the duty and the non-duty. Because, as we often see in ordinary life, different learned people discriminate in different ways. j,o their own lights, and arrive at several different. ! regards the morality of a particular act ; and this, meant by the words, "tarko 'pratisthah " in the. Ibove. We must, therefore, now see whether or not py other means for arriving at a correct solution of Iful points about the duty and the non-duty ; and if |ose means are ; and if there are more than one ways,, i is the best way of all. This is what science has to determine for us. The true characteristic feature of a science- is : " anehasamsayocchedi paroksarthasya darsakam ", i. e., " it must remove confusion regarding matters which the mind cannot at first grasp on account of numerous doubts which spring up, and make their meaning free from doubt and easy,, and, even give a proper insight into matters which might not. be actually before the eyes or which may be matters of the future " ; and the fact that by learning astronomy, one can. predict the occurrence and the time of future eclipses justifies. the words "paroksarthasya darsakam" used in the latter part of the above definition. But in order that all these various, difficulties should be solved, one has first to see what these, difficulties are. And, therefore, ancient as also modern writers, before dealing with the subject-matter to ba proved by a science' first enumerate all the other existing aspects of the same-

KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA 101

'subject-matter, and show the faults or insufficiency in them. Following this method, I shall, before mentioning the YOGA or devioe established or preached in the Gits for determining the doability or non-doability. of any . particular Action, first consider the more well-known of the other devioes which are prescribed by philosophers for the same purpose. ■ It is true that thea&'other devices were not very much in vogue in India but were promulgated principally by Western philosophers. But it cannot, on that account, be said that I shquld not ^consider them in this book ; because, it is necessary to be acquainted- with these other devices, if even to a small extent, not only for the purpose of comparison, but also in order to understand the true importance of the Metaphysical ( adkyat- mika) Karma- Yoga expounded in the Glta.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MATERIALISTIC THEORY OF HAPPINESS

(IDHIBHAUTIKA SUKHAVADA)

duhkhad uddvijate saruah saroasya sukhafit Ipsitam I * Mahabhaiata. Santi. 139, 61.

As we hare seen that stock precepts like : 'mahajano yena gatah sa panthah', i. e. 'follow the path which has been followed by venerable persons', or, 'aU. sarwtra varjayet', i. e., 'do too- much of nothing', do not satisfactorily explain : (J-)' why Manu and the other legislators laid down the rules of 'aUfnsa satyamasteya' (Non-Violence, Veracity, Not-stealing) ?so., (ii) whether those rules are mutable or immutable, (iii) what their extent or the fundamental principle underlying them is, and (iv) which precept should be followed when two or more of them are equally in point and yit conflict with each other, it is STneoessary for us to see whether or not there are any Tnitft means for properly determining these questions, and aging which is the most beneficial or meritorious path of J^jVas also, in what way and from what point of view we aine the relative importance or the greater or less p£, mutually conflicting principles of morality. I have- ^^^ past chapter explained that there are three ways of considering the questions involved in the exposition of Action and Non-Action, namely, the Positive, (Mkibkautika), the Theological (adhidaivika), and the Metaphysical (adhyatmika), just as in the case of the scientific exposition of other matters. According to our philosophers the most exoellent of these ways is the Metaphysical way. But, as it is necessary to carefully consider the other two methods in order to fully understand the importance of the Metaphysical method, I have in this ohapter first considered the fundamental Materialistic principles under- lying the examination of the question of Aotion and Non- Action. The positive physical sciences, which have had an immense growth in modern times have to deal principally with the external or visible properties of tangile objects.

• that is : — Every one is unwilling to suffer pain and every-

one wants happineBs".

ADHIBHAUTIKA SUKHAVADA 103

Therefore, those persons who have spent their lives in studying' the physical sciences, or who attach much importance to the critical methods particular to these sciences, get into the habit, of always considering only the external effects of things ; and their philosophical vision being thereby to a certain extent, narrowed, they do not, in discussing any particular thing, attach much importance to causes which are Metaphysical, or intangible, or invisible, or which have reference to the next, world. But, although on that account, they leave out of consideration the Metaphysical or the next-world point of view, yet, as codes of morality are necessary for the satisfactory regulation of the mutual relations of human beings and for public welfare, even these philosophers, who are indifferent, about life after death or who have no faith in intangible or' Metaphysical knowledge, ( and also necesssarily no faith in. God ), look upon the science of Proper Action (Karma-Yoga) as. a most important science ; and, therefore, there has been in the. past and there is still going on, a considerable amount of discussion in the West, as to whether the science of Proper andi Improper Action can be satisfactorily dealt with in th& same way as the physical sciences, that is to say, by means of arguments based on purely worldly and visible, effects. As a result of this discussion, modern Western- philosophers have made up their minds that the science of Metaphysics is of no use whatsoever for the consideration of Ethics, that the goodness or badness of any particular Action, must be determined by considering only those of its external effects which are actually visible to us, and that we can do so. Any act which a man performs, is performed by him either for obtaining happiness, or for warding off unhappin3ss. One may even say that ' the happiness of all human beings ' is the- highest worldly goal, and if the ultimate visible resultant of all Action is thus definite, the correct method of deciding Ethical, ■problems, is to dstermins the moral value of all Actions by weighing the greater or lesser possibilities of each Action producing happiness or preventing unhappiness. If one judges, the goodness or badness of any particular object in ordinary life by considering its external usefulness, e. g., if we decide- that that cow whioh has short horns and which is dooile, and

204 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KABMA-YOGA

■at the same time gives a large quantity of milk is the best flow, then on the sams principle, we must also consider that Action as the most meritorious one, from the ethical point of view, of which the external result of producing happiness or preventing unhappiness is the highest. If it is possible to ■decade the ethical value of any particular act in such an easy ■and scientific way, namely, by considering the greater or less value of its purely external and visible effects, one should not trouble about entering into the discussion of the Self and Non- Self (Ufmaruttinal ; "arte cen madhu liiukla kimartliam parvatam vrapl "* i. e., "if one can get honey near at hand where he sits, then where is the sense of going into the hills to look for honey-combs ? " I call this method of determining the morality of any particular Action by considering merely its external results the ' adlubliautika suk/uivt'ila ' (the Materialistic Theory of Happiness), because, the happiness to be considered for determining the morality of any Action is, according to Litany, actually visible and is external — that is, is such as Tom the contact of the organs with external objects, and fteiilly Materialistic (UdhibluiiUika) — and this school has Ireen brought into existence by those philosophers who

he world from the purely positive or Materialistic (fiew. But, it is not possible to fully discuss this this book. It would be necessary to write an nt book to even merely summarise the opinions of the different writers. I have, therefore, in this chapter collected together and given as precisely as possible as much general information about this Materialistic school of Ethics as is .absolutely necessary for fully understanding the nature and importance of the science of Proper Action expounded in the Bhagavadgvta. If any one wants to go deeper into the matter, he must study the original works of the Western philo-

'•' 1'ke wotd 'aria' in this atanaa has been .interpreted by some as meaning the 'rut' tree (swallow-wart or calotropis gigantea). IS nt, in his commentary on the SumkarabliSsya on the Brahma-Sutras 3, 4, 3, Anandagiri has defined the word 'arks' as meaning 'near.' Tha other p&it of this verse is "stidhasy artfiasya mmpraplav k$ «idt'«n yuittam-acant" ', i.e., if the desired object is already achieved, •what wise man will make further efforts ?

ADHIBHAUTIKA STJKHAVADA 105

-gophers. From my statement above, that Materialistic philo- sophers are apathetic about the science of the Atman or about the next world, one must not draw the conclusion that all the learned persons who subscribe to this path, are selfish, self- centred or immoral. There belong to this school high-minded philosophers like Comte, Spencer, Mill, and others, who most earnestly and enthusiastically preached that striving for the benefit of the whole world by making at least one's worldly outlook as comprehensive as possible (if •one does not believe in the next world), is the highest duty of every man; and as their works are replete with the most noble and deep thoughts, they ought to be read by every one. .Although the paths of the science of Proper Action are many, .yet, so long as one has not given the go-bye to the external ideal of 'the benefit of the world', one must not ridicule a ^philosopher on the ground that his method of dealing with the philosophy of Ethics is different from one's own. I shall now .precisely and in their proper order, consider the various divi- sions into which the modern or ancient Materialistic philoso- phers fall, as a result of differences of opinion between them as to whether the external material happiness which has to be -considered for determining the ethical propriety or impropriety of an action is one's own happiness or the happiness of another, .and whether of one person or of several persons; and I shall also consider to what extent these opinions are proper or faultless.

The first of these classes is of those who maintain the theory of pure selfish happiness. This school of thought says ■that there is no such thing as life after death or as philan- thropy; that all Metaphysical sciences have been written by dishonest people to serve their own ends; that the only .thing which is real in this world is one's own interest; and /that, that act by which this self-interest can be achieved or whereby one can promote one's own material happiness is the most just, the most proper, and the most meritorious act. This opinion was, at a very early date, vociforously proclaimed in India by Carvaka. and the mischievous advice given by Jabali to Sri Eama at the end of the Ayodhyakanda of the JRamayana, as also the Kanikanlti in the Mahabhirata (Ma,

106 GfTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

Bha. A. 143), pertains to this school of thought. The opiniom

of the illustrious Carvaka was that when the five primordial

elements are fused together, they acquire the quality of an.

Atman, and when the body is burnt, the Atman is burnt with.

it; therefore, a wise man should not bother about the Atman,.

but should enjoy himself so long as life lasts, even borrowing.

money for the purpose, if necessary; one should mam krtva

ghrtam pibet ", i. e., "borrow money and drink clarified butter",.

because there is nothing after death. As Carvaka was born

in India, he satisfied himself with prescribing the drinking:

of clarified butter (ghrtam pibet) otherwise, this canon would

have been transformed into ' math krtva surarh pibet ', i. e.,

'borrow money and drink wine'. This school says: "What

is this dharma and this charity ? All the objects which have.

been created in this world by the Paramesvara, — what did I

say ? I have mads a mistake ! Of course, there is no-

Paramesvara— all the things which I see in this world have

oome into existence only for my enjoyment, and as I can see

no other purpose for them, there is, of course, no such purpose.

When I am dead, the world is over; and therefore, so long as-

I am alive, I shall acquire all the various things which can,

be acquired, acquiring this to-day and that to-morrow, and

thereby I shall satisfy all my desires. If at all I go in for

any religious austerity or charity, that will be only to

inorease my reputation and worth; and if I make a rajastiyct.

yajna or an asvamedlia yajiia, that too will be for the sole

purpose of establishing that my power is unchallenged in all

directions. In short, the EGO, the 'I' is the only focus of

this world, and this 'I' is the sum and substance of all

morality; all the rest is false ". The description of godless.

endowment (asuri sampatti) given in the 16th chapter of the Gits

in the words: "isvaro 'ham ahcuh bhogi siddhdham balavan

sukhi " (Gi. 16. 14), i. e., " I am the Isvara, I am the one who

enjoys, and I am the siddha (perfect), the all-powerful,and the

happy", applies quite appropriately to the opinions of persons-

. who follow this philosophy. If instead of Sri Krsna, there had

been some person like JabaK belonging to this sect for advising

Arjuna, he would, in the first place, have slapped Arjuna on the-

face, and then said to him : "What a fool are you ! When yom

ADHIBHAUTIKA SUKHAVADA 107

jave without effort got this golden opportunity of fighting and conquering everybody and enjoying all kinds of royal enjoy- ment and happiness, you are uttering the most foolish things, being lost in the futile confusion of 'shall I do this, or shall I do- that' ! You will not get such a chance again. What a fool are you to think of the Atman and of relatives 1 Strike I and enjoy the empire of Hastinapura after having removed all the thorns from your path ! In this lies your truest happiness. Is there anything in this world except one's visible material happiness 1" But, Arjuna was not anxious to hear such a disgustingly selfish, purely self-centred, and ungodlike advice ; and he had, already in advance, said to Sri Krsna :

eta?i no, hantum icchami ghnato 'pi MadhusUdana l api trmlohjarajuasija lietdh Mm nu mahikrte II

(Gi. 1. 36).

that is, "If I had to acquire for myself (by this war), the- kingdom even of the three worlds — to say nothing of the- kingdom of this world — (that is, such physical pleasures), I do not desire for that purpose to kill the Kauravas. I do not mind if they slit open my throat". Even a mere reference to- this ungodlike self-centred and entirely selfish doctrine of material happiness, which Arjuna had, in this way, denounced in advance, would amount to a refutation of it. This extremely low stage reached by the school of Material Happiness, which looks upon one's own physical pleasures as the highest ideal of man, and throws religion and morality to the winds, and totally disregards what happens to other people, has been treated by all writers on the science of Proper Action, and even by ordinary people, as extremely immoral, objectionable and disdainable. Nay ! , this theory does not even deserve the name of Ethics or of an ex- position of morality ; and therefore, instead of wasting more time in considering this subject, we will now turn to the next class of Materialistic philosophers.

Pure and naked selfishness or self-centredness never suc- ceeds in the world; because, although physical and material pleasures may be desirable to every one, yet, as is a matter of actual experience, if our happiness interferes with the happi-

GITA-BAHASYA OR KABMA-YOGA

mess of others, those others will certainly do us harm. Therefore ■other Materialistic philosophers maintain that although one's happiness or. selfish purposes may be one's goal, yet, in as much as it is not possible for one to acquire such happiness, unless one makes some sacrifices for other people similar to .those one oneself wants from them, one must long-sightedly take into account the happiness of others in order to obtain -one's own happiness. I put theBe Materialistic philosophers in ■the second class. It may be said that the Materialistic exposi- . tion of Ethics truly begins at this point. Because, instead of saying like Carvaka, that no ethical limitations are necessary for the maintenance of society, persons belonging to this school have made an attempt to explain their own view as to why -these limitations must be observed by everybody. These people say that, if one minutely consid ers how the theory o f Har mlessneBB camTTnto this _world, and why people follow that doctrine, there is no other reasonliTthe root "oT~it excep t thelear b ased on s elfish consid erations that, ' ifl _ kill others , ■ otherB will kill me, and then Twill lose my happ iness', andthat .all other mora l precepts have come into existence a s a result ■oft his selfish fear in the same way as this la w of Harm less- Jiesg, If we suffer pain, we cry, and if o thers suffer pain, we i eel pity for them . But why ? BMaus£the_Jejitha^_we_in our turn may have to suf fer th e same pain, that is, of course, . theth ought of our jwgsible future unhappin gs~comes to our .rninpX Charity, generosity, pity, love, gratefulness, humble- ness, friendship, and other qualities which at first sight appear to be for the benefit of otheTS are, if we traoe them to their .origin, nothing but means of acquiring our own happiness or warding off our own unhappiness in another form. Every body- soever helps others or gives in charity with the internal motive that -if he found himself in the same position, other .people should help him; and we love others, only in order ■that others should love us. At any rate, the selfish idea that ■other people should call us good is at the back of our minds, 'The expressions ' doing good to others ' and ' the welfare of -others' are words based on confusion of thought. What is real, is one's own selfish purpose; and one's own selfish purpose .means obtaining one's own happiness or warding off one's own

ADHIBHAUTIKA SUKHAVADA 109"

Junhappiness. This amount s to saying that a mother suckles* i her baby not on~aceount of love, but she does this selfish act' in order to~iase herself (as herTr eastiT are full of milk and' she feels tbe^mconvenTenceTof the pressure), or in~or3er that the" child, after growing up, shOUl fTovFler and" give her happiness^ The tact that peopli~of this school of thought , ' axEflttEat it is neoessary to long-sightedly observe such moral; principles as will permit of the happiness of others — though that may be for obtaining one's own happiness — is the im- portant difference between this school of thought and the school of Carvaka. Nevertheless, the idea that a human, being is nothing but a statue cast into the mould of selfish physical desires, which is the opinion of the Carvaka sohool, has been left untouched by this school. This opinion has been supported in England by Hobbes and in France by Helvetius. But there are not to be found many followers of this school in' England or anywhere else. After the exposition of Ethics by Hobbes had been published, it was refuted by philosophers like- Butler, * who proved that human nature as a whole is not absolutely selfish, and that there exist in a human being from birth such other qualities as humanity, love, gratitude etc., to a greater or less extent, side by side with selfishness ; and', therefore, in considering any act or any dealing from the ethical point of view, one should instead of considering only the qualities of selfishness or even of long-sighted selfishness, always consider the two inherent distinct tendencies of human beings, namely, 'selfishness', [svartlia) and the 'unselfishness', (parurtlia). If even a cruel animal like a tigress is prepared to- sacrifice her life for the sake of her eubs, it follows that saying that the emotions of love and philanthrophy come into- existence in the human mind merely out of selfishness is futile, and that weighing between the duty and the non-duty merely from the point of view of long-sighted selfishness is

• The opinion of Hobbes has been given in the book called

Xeviathan 5 and the opinions of Butler are to be found in his Essay called Sermons on Human Nature. M.orrey bas given the summary of the book of Helvetius in his (Morley's) book on Diderot, (Volume

TT. Ohnn VV

110 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

scientifically incorrect. Out ancient writers had not lost sight ■of the fact that persons, whose intelligence has remained "unpuiified on account of their having remained wholly engrossed in family life, very often do whatever they do in this world for others, only with an eye to their own benefit. The saint Tukaram has said : "the daughter-in-law •weeps for the mother-in-law, but the motive in her heart is quite different " ( Ga. 2583. -2 ) ; and some of our philosophers have gone even beyond Helvetius. For instance, in commenting on the proposition laid down by Sri Sarhkaracarya in -his Brahma-Siitrabhasya (Ve. Su.Sam. Bha. %. 2. 3) on the authority of the Gautama-Nyayasutra (1. 1, 18) ' prawrtana laksaiia dosa\', i. e., 'all human activity, whether selfish or unselfish, is faulty', inandgiri says that : " We practis e kindness or benevolencD towards others only in order to remove that pain" which results from the emotTorTarpity awa^enrngm our hearts? 1 This~argumenfoF Anandgiri is "to be found in .almraFail our books on the Path of Renunciation, and all that is principally attempted to be proved from it is, that all Actions are selfish, and, therefore, noa-performable. But in the conver- sation betwean Yajnavalkya and his wife Maitieyi, which appears twice in the Brhadarariyakopanisad (Br. 2. 4 ; 4. 5), this very argument has been made use of in another and a strange ■way. In answering the question of Maitreyi: "How can one acquire immortality ? ", Yajnavalkya says to her : "0 Maitreyi, the husbandjsjoyedby the wife, not for the sake of theTfusband, but? or thesake of her own atman; in t he same w a^t6e^so"n~"is not loveTBy us tor his own sake; we love him for our own sake! * 'Theiame law applies towealth, animals,liria~aTr61heTo^iicts. J utmanastu kamaya sarvpni priyam bhavati', i, e., 'We like all things for the sake of our Self (utimn)', and if all love is in

• "What say you of natural affection ? Is that also a species of

self-love? Yes; all is self-love. Your children are loved only because they are yours. Your friend, for a like reason. And your gantry engages you only so far as it has a connection with your- self" : this is the way in which Hnme has referred to this line of argument in his hook Of lie Dignity or Memnus of Human Nature. Hume's own opinion in the matter is different.

ADHIBHAUTIKA SUKHA.VADA. Ill

this way based on Self, must we not, in the first place, find •out what our Utman (Self) is ? " And, therefore, the concluding advice of Yajfiavalkya is; "atma va are drastavyah srotavyo mantavyo nidiihyasitavyah" , i. e., "See (first) what the atman '(Self) is, hear the -utman, and meditate and contemplate on the atman ". When the true form of the Atman has in this way baen realised by following this advice, the whole world becomes Self-ised {atma-maya), and the distinction between selfishness {svHrtlia) and unselfishness (parartha) in the mind ■ceases to exist. Although this argument of Yajfiavalkya is apparently the same as that of Hobbes, yet, as can be easily seen, the inferences drawn by them respectively from that advice are contrary to each other. Hobbes attaches higher importance to selfishness, and, looking upon all philanthrophy as long-sighted selfishness, says that there is nothing in this world except selfishness; whereas Yajfiavalkya, relying on the woT&'sva' (one's own) in the phrase ' svartha' (selfishness), ■shows, on the authority of that word, that from the Meta- physical point of view, all created beings are harmoniously ■comprised in our Atman and our Atman is likewise harmo- niously comprised in all created beings; and he, in that way, gets rid of the apparently dualistic (dvaita) conflict between the interest of oneself and the interest of others. These opinions of Yajfiavalkya and of the school of Eenun- ciation will be considered in greater detail later on. I have referred here to the opinions of Yajfiavalkya and others only for the purpose of showing how our ancient writers have more or less praised or accepted as correct the principle that 'the ■ordinary tendency of human beings is selfish, that' is, is con- cerned with their own happiness ', and drawn from it inferences which are quite contrary to those drawn by Hobbes.

Having thus proved that human nature is not purely selfish and is not governed wholly by the tanas quality, nor totally ungodly (as has been maintained by the English writer Hobbes and the French writer Helvetius), and that a benevolent (sattvika) mental impulse forms part of human nature from birth along with the selfish impulse, and that •doing good to others is not long-sighted selfishness, one has to give equal importance to the two principles of smrtha, i. e..

112 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

one's own happiness and parartha, i. e., the happiness of others,, in building up the science of the doable and the not-doable 1 (karyakarya-vyavasthiti). This is the third division of Materialistic philosophers. Nevertheless, the Materialistic view- that both svartha and parartha deal only with worldly happi- ness, and that there is nothing beyond worldly happiness, is also held by this school. The only difference is that people' who belong to this school consider it their duty to take into- account both self-interest (svartha) and other's-interest {parartha) in determining questions of morality, because they look upon the impulse of doing good to others as, as much an inherent impulse, as the selfish impulse. As normally there is no conflict between self-interest and other's-interest, all the Actions which a man performs are primarily also beneficial- to society. If one man accumulates wealth, that ultimately benefits the whole society; because, society being a collection-' of numerous individuals, if each individual in it benefits himself without harming others, that is bound to benefit the whole society. Therefore, this school of philosophers has laid' down that if one can do good to others without neglecting one's own happiness, it is one's duty to do so. But, as this school does not admit the superiority of other's-interest and advises that one should each time, according to one's own lights,, consider whether one's own interests or the interests of others- are superior, it is difficult to decide to what extent one should- sacrifice one's own happiness for the happiness of others when there is a conflict between self-interest and other's-interest,. and there is very often a chance of a man falling a prey to considerations of his own interests. For instance, if self- interest is considered to be as important as other's-interest, it is difficult to decide by reference to the doctrines of this school of thought, whether or not one should, for the sake of truth,, suffer considerable financial loss— to say nothing of the much more serious question whether or not one should, for the sake- of truth, 'sacrifice one's life or lose one's kingdom. Persons belonging to this school may possibly praise a benevolent man who sacrifices his life for the advantage of another, but if they are themselves faced with a similar situation, these philoso- phers, who habitually sit on the two stools of self-interest and.'

ADHIBHAUTIKA SUKHAV1DA 115

other's-interest, will certainly be dragged towards self-interest. This school believes that they do not look upon other's-interest as a long-sighted variety of selfishness (as was done by Hobbes), but that they minutely weigh self-interest and other's-interest in a scale, and very skilfully decide in what self-interest lies; and, on that account, they glorify their doctrine by calling it the path of ' enlightened ' (udfitta) or 'wise' self-interest (but self- interest in any case ! ) * But see what Bhartrhari says :—

eke satpurusuh pararthaghntakah svarthan parityajya ye I sanzanyastu parartham udyamabhrtah svartha 'virodliena ye I te'mi mamvarakmsah parahitani svarthaya nighmnti ye I -. . yetu ghnanti nirarthakam •parahitam teke na jrmimafie II M 1 - (Ni. Sa. 74)

[that is, "those who do good to others, sacrificing their own > interests are the truly good persons ; those who strive for tha ; 'good of others, without sacrificing self-interest, are ordinary ( \ persons; those who harm others, for their self-interest, must be < looked upon not as human beings but as godless beings (raksasah) ; ' but I do not know how to describe those who are- worse than these, that is, those who needlessly harm the interests of others". In the same way in describing the most exoellent form of regal morality, Kalidasa says : — ""—

svasuklmnirabhilamh khidyase lokalwloh \ pratidimm athava te vrttir evam vidhaiva I!

(Sakuntala 5. 7).

that is, "you strive every day for the welfare of others without considering your own happiness, or it may be said that such is your natural instinct or vocation". Neither Bhartrhari nor Kalidasa had to see how to discriminate between Eight Action or Wrong Action (karmakarma) or righteousness and unrighte- ousness (dkarmadharma) by adopting both the principles of self-interest and other's-interest into a science of Right Action (Karma-Yoga), and judiciously weighing them. Nevertheless,

• This is called in English ' enlightened self-interest '. _ I

have translated the word 'enlightened' into Marathi as ' udaita ' or

15-16

114 GlTA-RAHASYA. OR KARMA-YOGA

the highest place which has been given by them to persons who sacrifice self-interest for other's-tateiest is justifiable even from the point of view of Ethics. Persons belonging to this school of thought say, that although other 's-interest may be superior to self-interest from the philosophical point of view, yet, in as much as we have not to consider -what ideally pure morality is, but only how 'ordinary' persons should act in the ordinary affairs of the world, the prominence given by us to 'enlightened self-interest' is proper -from the worldly point of view. * But in my opinion, there is no sense in this argument. The weights and measures used in •commerce are as a rule more or lesB inaccurate ; but if, taking •advantage of that fact, the greatest possible accuracy is not maintained in the standard weights and measures kept in public offices, shall we not blame the persons in authority ? The same rule applies to the philosophy of Karma-Yoga. Ethics lias been formulated only in order to scientifically define the ■pure, complete, and constant form of morality ; and, if any science of Ethics does not do this, it must be said to be useless. •Sidgwick is not wrong in saying that 'enlightened self-interest' is the path of ordinary people. Bhartrhari says the game thing. But if one examines what the opinion of these ordinary people about the highest morality is, it will be seen that, even in their opinion, the importance given by Sidgwick to en- lightened self-interest is wrong, and the path of spotless morality or the path followed by saints, is looked upon by them as something much better than the ordinary selfish path; and, that is what is intended to be conveyed by the stanzas of Bhartrhari quoted above.

I have so far dealt with the three divisions of the School of Material happiness, namely, the purely selfish, the long- sighted selfish, and the enlightened selfish (which is both the former ones combined), and I have pointed out what the

• Siigvmk'a Methodt of EthksBookl, 0^ v II 8 2 pp 18 29-

also Book IV Chap. IV, § 3 p. 474. Sidgwick has no't invented this third path ; bat ordinary well-educated English p 00 ple usually iollow this path of morality which is also known as 'Common sense morality'.

IDHIBHAUTIKA SUKHAVADA 115

principal short-comings of their respective systems are. But this does not exhaust all the divisions of the Material happi- ness school. The next division, that is to say, the best division of this school is the one of the henevolent (sattvito) Materialis- tic philosophers, who maintain that: one should decide the ethical doability or non-doability of all Actions by judiciously weighing the Material happiness of not only one human being, hut of the entire human race.* It is not possible that one and the same act will cause happiness to all persons in the world or in a society at one and the same time. If one person looks upon a particular thing as productive of happiness, it produces unhappiness to another person. But, just as light is not considered objectionable on the ground that the owl does not like it, so also if a particular thing is not profitable to some persons, it cannot be said, even according to the Karma- Yoga science, that it is not beneficial to all; and on that account, the words 'the happiness of all persons' ■fsarvabhutahita) have to be understood aB meaning the 'greatest happiness (good) of the greatest number'. In short, the opinion of this school is that, "we must consider only suoh acts as ethically just and fit to be performed, as are conducive to the greatest good of the greatest number ; and that, acting in that way is the true duty of every human being in this world." This doctrine of the school of Material happiness is acceptable to the Metaphysical school. Nay, I may even say that this principle •was propounded by the Metaphysicians in very ancient times, and the Materialistic philosophers have now turned it to use in a particular way. It is a well-known fact, as has been said by the Saint Tukaram that, " saintly _j£rsons_comeJ2 i . life only for the_bene fit of the world; th ey suffer in bod y i n order to do good to o thers". Needless to say, there is no dispute about the correctness or the propriety of this principle, Even 'in the Bhagavadgita, in describing the characteristic features of saints (jfianin) who practise the perfect Yoga— of course, the Karma- Yoga— the words " sarvabhutahite ratah " 1. e., " they are engrossed in doing good to all created beings "

• BeEtham, Mill etc. are the protagonists of this Sohool. I hava

translated, the words 'greatest good of the greatest number' as the ^greatest happiness of the greatest number', in this book.

116 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KAEMA-YOGA

have been clearly used twice (Gl. 5. 25 ; 12. 4) ; and it becomes-- quite clear from the statement from the Mahabharata quoted in the second chapter above: "yad bkutahitam atyantam tat salytm iti dharana". (Vana 208. 4), i. e., "that is Truth according to dharma in which the highest benefit of all lies, "' that our ancient writers used to take into account this principle in deciding what is just {dharma) and what unjust (adharma). But, looking upon the promotion of the welfare- of all created beings as the external characteristic feature of the conduct of jnamns, and occasionally making use of that principle in a broad way for determining what is just and what unjust, is something absolutely different from taking, for granted that that is the substance of Ethics, and dis- regarding everything else, and erecting an immense structure of the science of Ethics on that foundation alone. Materialis- tic philosophers accept the latter course and maintain that Ethics has nothing to do with Metaphysics. It is, therefore, necessary for us to see now to what extent they are correct. There iB a great deal of difference between the meanings of the two words ' happiness '(mkha) and 'benefit'- (i#a); but, although' for the moment that difference is not taken into coneideratioa and the word ' saroabhutahita ' is taken as meaning 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number ', yet it will be seen, that numerous important difficulties arise, if we rely only on this prinoiple for distinguishing the doable from the not-doable. Suppose, a Materialist follower of this principle was advising. Arjuna: what would he have told him ? Would he not have said: If as a result of your becoming victorious in the Bharatiya war, you bring about the greatest happiness of the greatest number, then it is your duty to fight, even if you might kill Bhisma. Apparently, this advice seems very easy But, if we go a little deeper, we realise its insufficiency and the difficulties involved in it. 'Greatest number' means how much? The Pandava army was of seven aksauUnis (a unit for measuring the numbers of soldiers). But, the Kaurava army was of eleven aksauhwis. Can one, therefore argue that the Pandavas were in the wrong, on the ground that if the Pandavas had been defeated these eleven Kaurava. akscmhws would have become happy? To decide questions of

ADHIBHAUTIKA SUKHAVADA UT

morality merely on the basis of numbers would be wrong.on any number of occasions, to say nothing of the Bharatiya war. Even in ordinary life everyone believes, that that act whioh ipleases even one good man is more truly a good act than the aot which gives happiness to a hundred thousand evil-doers. In order to justify this belief, the happiness of one saint has to be given a higher value than the happiness of a hundred thousand evil-doors, and if one does that, the fundamental principle that ' the greatest external happiness of the greatest number is the only test of morality' becomes, to that extent, weak. One has, therefore, to say that numbers have no fixed bearing on morality. It must also be borne in mind that some thing which is ordinarily considered as productive of happiness by all persons is, by a far-sighted person, seen to be disadvantageous to all. Take for example the cases of Socrates and Jesus Christ. Both of them were preaching to their ■countrymen what, in their respective opinions, was ultimately beneficial. But their eountrymen denounced them as 'enemies of society', and put them to death. The people, as also their leaders, were acting on the principle of the 'greatest good of the greatest number' ; but, we do not now say that what the ordinary people then did was just. In short, even if we for a moment admit that 'greatest good of the greatest number' is the ■only fundamental principle of Ethics, yet, we do not thereby ■solve to any extent the questions, in what lies the happiness of millions of persons, how that has to be ascertained, and by whom. On ordinary occasions, the task of finding this out may be left to those persons whose happiness or unhappiness is under consideration. But, as it is not necessary to go so deep into the matter on ordinary occasions, and, as ordinary persons do not possess the mental grasp to understand and decide fault- lessly in what their happiness lies on extraordinary and ■difficult occasions, putting into the hands of such uneducated persons the solitary ethical principle of 'the greatest good of the greatest number' js like placing a fire-brand into the hands ■of an evil spirit, as is apparent from the illustrations of the

• wo leaders given above. There is no sense in the repartee :

"Our ethical principle is correct ; what can we do if ignorant ipersons have WTongly applied it ? " Because, although the

118 GlTi-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

principle may be correct, one must at the same time explain who are the proper persons to give effect to it, and when and} how these persons do so, and other similar limitations of the principle. Otherwise, ordinary people will needlessly indulge in the fond belief that they are as capable of determining questions of morality as Socrates, and serious consequences are likely to follow.

This theory is open to other objections which are more serious than the two objections : (i) questions of morality cannot be properly decided by reference to numbers alone and (ii) there is no definite external measure for logically proving in what lies the greatest good of the greatest number, which I have mentioned above. For instance, only a little considera- tion will show that it is very often impossible to fully and satisfactorily decide whether a particular Action is just or unjust by considering merely its external effects. It is true- that we decide whether a particular watch is good or bad, by seeing whether or not it shows correct time ; but before applying this rule to human actions, one must bear in mind, that man is not merely a watch or a machine. It is true that all saints strive for the benefit of the world. But we cannot draw the definite converse conclusion that every person who strives for the benefit of the world must be a saint. One must also see what that man's frame of mind is. This is the great difference between a man and a machine ; and therefore, if some one commits a crime unintentionally or by mistake, it is legally considered a pardonable offence. In short, we cannot arrive at a correot decision as to whether a particular act is good or bad,, just or unjust, or moral or immoral by considering merely its external result or effect, that is, by considering whether or not that act will produce the greatest good of the greatest number. One has also necessarily to consider at the same time, the reason, the desire, or the motive of the doer of the act. There was once an occasion to construct a tramway for the benefit and happiness of all the citizens of a big city in America. But there were delays in obtaining the requisite sanction from the proper authorities. Thereupon, the direotors of the tramway company gave a bribe to the persons in authority, and the necessary sanction was immediately obtained ; and, the

ADHEBHAUTIKA SUKHAVADA 11»

construction of the tramway being complete soon afterwards,, all the people in the city were in consequenoe considerably convenienoed and benefited. Some time after that, the bribery- was found out, and the manager of the tramway was criminally prosecuted. There was no unanimity in the first jury, so a second, jury was empanelled and the second jury having found the manager guilty, he was convicted. In such a case, the prin- ciple of the greatest good of the greatest number is useless by itself. The external effect of the bribery, namely, that, the tramway came to be constructed because the bribe was given, was the greatest good of the greatest number r yet, on that account, the fact that the bribe was given does not become legal* Though the external effects of the two several acts of giving in charity desirelessly in the belief, that it is one's duty to do so (datavyam), and of giving iru charity for the sake of reputation or for some other purpose- are the same, yet, even the Bhagavadgita distinguishes between, the two by saying, that the first gift is satlvilm (benevolent) and that the second gift is rajasa (desire-prompted) (Gi. 17, 20-23); and the same gift, if made to an unworthy person is said to be tamasa and objectionable. Even ordinary people consider a poor man's giving a few pies for a charitable: purpose as of the same moral value, as the gift of a hundred rupees by a rich man. But, if the matter be considered by an. external test like ' the greatest good of the greatest number ', we will have to say that these two gifts are not of the same moral value. The great drawback of the Materialistic ethical principle of the ' greatest good of the greatest number ' is, that, it does not attach any importance to the motive or the reason, of the doer, and if one says that the inner motive has to be taken into account, then the fundamental condition of the greatest external good of the greatest number being the only test of morality is not satisfied. As the Legislative Council or Assembly is a collection of many individuals, it is not necessary to ascertain what the state of their conscience was, when we consider whether or not the laws made by them are- proper; and it is enough if one considers only the external

• This illustration is taken from the book, Th Ethical Problem

of Dr. Paul darns, (pp. 58 and 69, 2nd Edition).

120 GITA-BAHASYA OB KAKMA-YOGA

aspect of the laws, namely, whether or not the greatest good of the greatest number will result from them. But, as will be clear from the illustrations given above, the same test does not apply to other oases. I do not say that the principle of 'the greatest good or happiness of tha greatest number' is utterly useless. One cannot have a more excellent principle for con- sidering external matters; but in considering whether a parti- cular thing is morally just or unjust, it is very often necessary to consider several other things besides this external principle ; and therefore, one cannot safely depend on this principle alone for determining questions of morality ; and all that I say is, that it is necessary to ascertain and fix upon some principle, more definite and faultless than this. The same moral is conveyed by the statement : "The Reason (buddhi) is of greater importance than the Action" (Gl. 2. 49), made in the very beginning of the Gita. If one considers only the external Action, it is often misleading. It is not impossible for a man to be subject to excessive anger, notwithstanding that he continues to perform his external Actions of religious austeri- ties. But on the other hand, if the heart is pure, the external act becomes immaterial, and the religious or moral value of ■an insignificant external act like the giving of dried boiled rice by Sudama to Sri Krsna is considered by people to be as great as the public distribution of tons of food, which will give great happiness to a great number. Therefore, the well-known German philosopher Kant * has treated the weighing of the external and visible effects of an act as of minor importance and has started his exposition of Ethics witn a consideration of the jurity of mind of the doer. It is not that this shortcoming of the Materialistic theory of happiness was not noticed by the -principal supporters of that theory. Hume has clearly said -that in as much as the acts of a person are considered a test •of his morality as being the index of his disposition, it is impossible to decide that they are praiseworthy or unworthy merely from their external effects ; t and even Mill

• Kant's Theory of Ethics (Trail, by Abbott) 6th Ed. p7o\

) For as actions are objects of our moral sentiment, so far «raly aa they are indications of the internal character pa9Bions, and affections, it is impossible that they can give rise either to

SDHIBHAUTIKA SUKHAV&DA 12-1

accepts the position that 'the morality of any act depends entirely upon the motive of the doer, that is to say, upon the reasoning on which he bases that act. ' But, in order to ■support his own point of view, Mill has added a rider to this principle that, ' so long as the external act is the same, its moral value remains the same, whatever may have been .the desire which prompted it '. * This argument of Mill is only doctrinal. Because, if the Reason (buddhi) is different, then, though two acts may be the same in appearance, yet they can never have the same value essentially. And Green, therefore, objects that the limitation : ' so long as there is no difference in the (external) act ' etc. laid down by Mill, itself falls to the ground t. The same is the opinion expressed in the Gita. Because, the Gita says that even if two persons have given the same amounts for the same charitable purpose — that is, even when their external act is just the same — it is possible that one gift will be aattoika, and the other one will be rujasa or even tamasa if the two persons have different reasons for the gift. But I shall deal in greater detail with this question later on, when I compare the Eastern and the Western opinions in the matter. All that I have to prove at the moment is, that even this refined form of the Materialistic theory of happiness, — which depends only on the external results of an Action — falls short on the mark in determining questions of morality; and Mill's admission quoted above is, in my opinion, the best possible proof of that fact.

praise or blame, where they proceed not from these principles but are derived altogether from external objects". Hnme's Inquiry ■concerning Human Understanding. Section VIII Part II ( p. 368 of Hume's Essays. The World Library Edition ).

• 'Morality of the action depends entirely upon the inten-

tion, that is, upon what the agent mils to do'. But the motive, that is, the feeling which makes him will so to do, when it makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality. "

Mill's Utilitarianism p. 39 (27 f).

| Green's 'Prolegomena to Ethics' § 292 Note. p. 348 (5th Cheaper Ed.).

122 GftA-BAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

The greatest drawback of the theory of 'the greatest good of the greatest number' is that it does not take into consideration the Beason (buddlti) of the doer. Because, the writings of Mill himself show that, even if his arguments- are accepted, this principle of determining questions of: morality merely by external results, is applicable only within- specified limits, that is, is one-sided, and cannot be equally applied to all cases. But, there is a further objection to this theory, namely that, as the entire argument of the theory has been developed on the basis that other 's-interest is. superior to self-interest, without explaining why or how it is- so, the theory of 'enlightened self-interest' gets a chance of pushing itself forward. If both self-interest and other's- interest have come into existence with man, why should one look upon the good of the greatest number as more important than one's own interest ? The answer, that other's interest should be protected because it involves the greatest good of the greatest number is not satisfactory ; because the question itself is why I should bring about the greatest good of the greatest number. It is true that this question does not always arise, since one's interest, as a general rule, lies in promoting the interests of others. But, the difference between this last and fourth stage of the Materialistic theory of happiness and its- third stage is, that the followers of this last school believe that where there is a conflict between self-interest and other 's- interest, the duty of everybody is to sacrifice self-interest and to strive for other's-interest, instead of following the path of 'enlightened self-interest.' Is not some explanation due in support of this particular feature of this Materialistic theory of happiness ? As "one learned Materialistic philosopher belonging to this school realised this difficulty, he has examined the activities of all living beings, from the minutest organisms to the human race, and come to the conclusion that in as much as the quality of maintaining one's own progeny or community just as one maintains oneself, and of helping one's fellows as much as possible without harming any one, is to be seen being gradually mora and more developed from the stage of minute organisms to the human race, we must say that that is. the principle feature of the mode of life of the living world-

ADHIBHAUTIKA 8UKHAV1DA 123

This feature is firstly noticed in the living world in the pro- duction of progeny and protecting it. In those minute organisms in which the difference of the sexes has not been developed, the body of one organism is seen to grow until it breaks into two organisms ; or, it may even be said, that this minute organism sacrifices its own life for the sate of its progeny, that is to say, for the sake of another. In the same way, animals of both sexes in grades of life higher than that of these organisms, are seen to willingly sacrifice their own interests in the living world for the maintenance of their progeny; and this quality is seen to be always growing; so- that, even in the most aboriginal societies, man is seen willingly helping, not only his own progeny, but also his tribe; and therefore, the highest duty in this world of man, who is the crown jewel of the living world, is to attempt to perma- nently do away with the present apparent conflict between self-interest and other's-interest by further developing this ten- dency of created beings of finding happiness in other's-interest as if it was self-interest, which is observed to become stronger and stronger in the rising grades of creation.* This argument is correct. There is nothing new in the prinoiple that, as the virtue of philanthrophy is to be seen even in the dumb world, in the shape of protection of progeny, it is the highest duty of enlightened man to carry that virtue to its perfection. Only,. aB the knowledge of the material sciences has now considerably increased, it is now possible to develops more systematically the Materialistic demonstration of this principle. Although the point of view of our philosophers was Metaphysical,, yet, it has been stated in our ancient treatises that :

asladasa puranSnam saram. saram samuddhrtam l paropakarah punyaya papaya parapidartam II

that is, "doing good to others is meritorious, and doing harm, to others, sinful ; this is the sum and substance of the eighteen

• This argument is to be found in the Data of Ethics written by

Spencer. Spencer has explained the difference between his opinions and the opinions of Mill in his letters to Mill, and this bouk con- tains extracts from this correspondence. See pp 57 and 123. Also- see Bain's Mental and Moral Science, pp. 721 and 722, (Ed. 1875;.

124 GITA-aAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA

^Puranas" ; and, even Bhartrhari says that : "svartho yasya

parartha em sa puman ekah satam agranih", i. e., "that man with

whom other's-interest has become self-interest is the best of

good men". But, when we consider the scale of life gradually

rising from the minutest organisms to the human race, another

• question also arises, namely : is the virtue of philanthrophy the

only virtue which has been fully developed in the human race,

■ or have other benevolent (sattvika) virtues, such as justice,

.kindness, wisdom, far-sightedness, logic, courage, perseverance,

forgiveness, control of the organs, etc., also been developed in

.man ? When one thinks of this, one has to say that all virtues

.have been more fully developed in the human race than in

any other living being. We will for the present refer to this

aggregate of sattvika qualities as 'humanness'. When in this

-way 'humanness' is seen to be superior to philanthrophy, one

has, in determining the propriety or impropriety or the

morality of any particular Action, to examine that Action

from the point of view of its 'humanness' — that is, from the

ipoint of view of all those various qualities which are seen to

be more developed in the human race than in other living

beings— rather than from the point of view of its philanthropi-

.calness. We must, therefore, come to the conclusion, that it is

better to call that Action alone virtuous, ot to say that that

alone is morality, which will enhance the state of being human

or the 'humanness', of all human beings, or which will be

■ consistent with the dignity of such 'humanness', instead of

merely relying on the virtue of philanthrophy, and somehow or

other getting rid of the matter. And when one accepts this

comprehensive view-point, the consideration of 'the greatest

good of the greatest number', becomes only an insignificant

part of such view-point, and the doctrine that the righteousness

or unrighteousness of all Actions has to be tested only by that

test falls to the ground, and we see that we have also to take

'humanness' into account. And when one considers minutely

in what 'humanness', or 'the state of being human' consists,

vthe question "atma va are drastavyah" naturally crops up, as

stated by Yajfiavalkya. An Amerioan writer, who has written

-an exposition of Ethics, has given this comprenensive quality

■of 'humanness' the name of 'Atma'.

ADHIBHATJT1KA SUKHAVADA US-

From what has been stated above, one will see how even "the upholders of the theory of Material happiness have to rise from the lowest stage of pure selfishness or pure physical happiness of one's self to the higher stage of philanthrophy, and ultimately to that of humanness. But, as even in the idea of humanness, the upholders of the Material happiness theory attach importance solely to the external physical happiness of all human beings, even this final stage of Materialism, which disregards internal purity and internal happiness, is not flawless in the eyes of our Metaphysicians. Although we may accept in a general way that the whole struggle of mankind is directed towards obtaining happiness or preventing unhappiness, yet, until one has in the first place satisfactorily solved the question as to whether true and permanent happiness is material, that is, lies in the enjoyment of worldly physical pleasure or in something else, one cannot accept as correct any Materialistic theory. Even Materialistic philosophers admit that mental happiness stands on a higher footing than physical happiness. If one promises to a human being all the happiness which it is possible for a beast to enjoy, and asks him whether he is prepared to become a beast, not a single human being will say yes. In the same way, an intelligent person need not be told that that particular peace of mind which results from deep meditation on philosophical problems is a thousand times better than material wealth, or the enjoyment of external pleasures. And even considering the general opinion on the matter, it will be seen that people do » not 'accept as wholly correct the doctrines that morality depends on numbers, that whatever a human being does is for Material happiness, and that Material happiness is the highest ideal of a human being. We believe that the humanness of a human being lies in possessing such an amount of mental control as to be able to sacrifice external happiness and even one's own life in order to act up to such moral principles as Veracity etc., which are of greater importance than life or external happiness from the Metaphysical point of View; and also- Arjuna had not asked Sri Krsna how much happiness would' result to how many persons by his taking part in the war,.

126 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

hut he had said: "Tell me in what lies my highest benefit, that is the highest benefit of my Atman" (Gi. 2. 7; 3. 2). This constant benefit or happiness of the Atman lies in the peace {sanfi) of the Atman; and it is stated in the Brhadaranya- kopanisad (Br. 2. 4. 2) that however much of material happi- ness or wealth one might obtain, there is no hope of obtaining by that alone the happiness or peaoe of the Atman — "amrtatvasya tu nasasti vittena"; and in the Kathopanisad, it is stated that although Death (Mrtyu) was ready to bestow on Naciketa, sons, grand-sons, animals, grain, . money and other kinds of material wealth, he gave to Mrtyu the definite leply : " I want th e know ledge of the Atman, I do not want wealth"; and after differentiating between 'preya', i, e., that worldly happinesB which is pleasing to the organs, and 4 sreya ', i. e. the true benefit of the Atman, it is stated : —

sreyas ca preyas ca manusyam etas

tau samparitya vivinakti dhirah I sreyo hi dhiro 'bHpreyaso vrrate

preyo mamdo yogaksemad vrtfite II

(Katha. 1. 2. 2)

fthat is, " when man is faced with 'preya' (trans ient external plea sure of t he organs) antPsra/q' (true and permanent benefit), Tie elects betw een the two. He who is wise prefers sreya to jtreya, and the weak-minded man prefers preya, that isrexternal "Egpin^Lioi^l? 11 ^ °^ *^ e Atman". It i s, the refore, - not ■correct to believe that trie highest goal of man in JhjT world js theJpEysicaT happiness 'obtainable through theTorgans in worldly life^and that whatever a man does~is~do'ne~by him ^merely fbr^the sake of obtaining' eiternalTTihat'^s, Material happiness or for preventing unhappines^

Not dnlyTTthe internal happiness obtainable through Reason, or Metaphysical happiness of greater worth than the -external happiness obtained through the medium of the organs, but the physical pleasure which exists to-day comes to an end to-morrow, i. e., is transient. The same is not the case with rules of Ethics. Non-violence, Veracity and other moral principles are looked upon by people as independent of external

ADHIBHATJTIKA SUKHAVADA 12?

circumstances, that is, of external happiness or unhappiness and as being constant in their application at all times and in all circumstances, that is to say, they axe looked upon as permanent by everybody. Materialism cannot satisfactorily explain the reason why moral principles have this permanence which does not depend on external matters, nor how it comes into existence. For, whatever general doctrine is laid down by reference to happiness or unhappiness in the external world, yet, in as much as all happiness or unhappiness is inherently transient, all doctrines of morality founded on such a transient foundation are equally weak, i.e., non-permanent; and, on that account, the ever-lasting permanence of the law of Truth seen in one's being ready to sacrifice one's life in the interests of Truth, irrespective of considerations of happiness or unhappi- ness, cannot be based on the doctrine of the ' greatest happi- ness of the greatest number'. Some persons advance the argument, that if in ordinary life even responsible persons are seen taking shelter behind falsehood when faced with the problem of sacrificing their lives, and if we see, that in suoh Bircumstances even philosophers are not punctillious, then it is not necessary to look upon the religion of Truth etc, as aternal; but this argument is not correct. Because, even those people who have not got the moral courage or do not find it Bonvenient to sacrifice their lives for the sake of Truth, admit by their own mouths the eternal nature of this principle of morality. On this account, in the Mahabharata, after all she rules of ordinary life which lead to the acquisition of wealth (artha), desires (kama) etc have been dealt with, Vyasa ultimately in the Bharata-Savitri, (and also in the Viduranlti), has given to everybody the following advice namely :—

na jatu teaman na bkayan no. lobhad

dharmam tyajed jivitasyapilietoh I dharmo nityah sukhaduhkhe to anitye

jivo nityoh hetur asya tv a?utyah " II

(Ma. Bha. Sva. 5. 6; U. 39.13, 13),

that is : " although happiness and unhappiness is transient, yet norality is constant: therefore, one should not abandon moral

1*8 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA*-

principles, whether for desire of happiness or out of fear, or avarice, or even if life itself is threatened. Life is funda- mentally eternal and its objects, such as, happiness, or un. happiness, etc, are t ransien t. " And that, therefore, instead of wasting time in thinking of transient happiness or un, happiness, one should link eternal life with eternal religion. In order to see how far this advice of Vyasa is correct, we have now to consider the true nature of happiness and un- happiness and to see what permanent happiness is.

CHAPTER V

THE CONSIDERATION OF HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS

( SUKHA-DUHKHA-'VTv'EKA. )

mkham atyantikam yat tat buddHgrahjam atindriyam I *

Gita. 6. 21.

Our philosophers have accepted the position that every human being in this world is continually struggling in order to obtain happiness, or to increase the amount of happiness which he has obtained, or to obviate or reduce his unhappiness. In the Santiparva, Bhrgu says the Bharadvaja (Ma. Bha. San. 190. 9) that :-"iha khdu amumims ca loke vastupravrttayak sukhartham abMdhlyante na hy atahparam visistataram asli", i. e., "in this world or elsewhere, all activity is for obtaining: happiness, there is no other goal except this for dharma, artfoa, or kama." But, our philosophers say, though a man is suddenly seized by the hand of death, while he is grabbing a false coin in the belief that it is true because he does not understand in what true happiness lies, or while he is spending his life in the hope that happiness will come sometime or other, his neighbour does, not become any the wiser on that account, and follows the same mode of life ; and the cycle of life goes on in this way, nobsdy troubling to think in what true and permanent happiness lies. There is a great deal of difference between the opinions of Eastern and Western philosophers as to whether life consists only of unhappiness, or is principally happy or principally unhappy. Nevertheless, there is no difference of opinion about the fact that whichever position is accepted, the advantage of a man lies in obtaining the highest measure of happiness by preventing unhappiness to the greatest possible extent. The words 'Mtarn' (advantage), or 'sreyas' (merit), or 'kdyanam' (benefit) are ordinarily more often used than the word 'sukham' (happiness) ; and I shall later on explain what the difference between them is. Yet, if one takes for granted that the word ' happiness ' inc ludes all kinds of benefits, then the

• "That happiness is the most beatific happiness which

being obtainable only by means of Reason Ibuddfii). is inilfmnnrlont of the organs (indriyavi)." 17-18

130 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA- YUUA

proposition that ordinarily every human being strives to obtain happiness may be said to be generally accepted. But, on that account, the definitions of pain and happiness given in the Parasaraglta included in the . Mahabharata, (Ma. Bha. San. 295. 27) namely : "yad istam tat sukham prahuh dvesyam duhkham ihesyate", i. e., "that which is desired by us is happiness, and that which we dislike, or which we do not desire is unhappi- ness", do not become entirely faultless from the philosophical point of view. Because, the word 'ista' in this definition car. also be interpreted to mean 'a desirable thing or object'; and. jf that meaning is accepted, one will have to refer to a desirable object as 'happiness'. For example, although we might desire water when we are thirsty, yet water, which is an external object, cannot be called 'happiness'. If tbii were so, one will have to say that a person who is frowned in the waters of a river, has been drowned in happiness I That organic satis- faction which results from the drinking of water is happiness. It is true that men desire this satisfaction of the organs or this happiness, but we cannot, on that account, lay down the broad proposition, that all that is desirable must be happiness. Therefore, the Nyaya school haB given the two definitions: "anukulavedanlyam sukham", i. e., "desirable suffering is "happiness ", and "pratikulavedaniyam duhkham' ', i.e., "undesirable suffering is unhappiness", and it has treated both pain and "happiness as some kind of suffering. As these sufferings are fundamental, that is to say, as they start from the moment of hirth, and as they can be realised only by experience, it is not possible to give better definitions of pain or happiness than these given by the Nyaya school. It is not that these sufferings in the shape of pain and happiness result only from human activity; but, sometimes the anger of deities gives rise to intractable diseases, and men have to suffer the resulting •unhappiness ; therefore, in treatises on Vedanta, this pain and "happiness is usually divided into 'adhidamka' (god-given), 'adhibhautika' (physical), and ' adhyatmika' (metaphysical). Out of these, that pain or happiness which we suffer as a result of the blessings or the anger of deities is known as ' adhidmvika ', and that pain or happiness, in the shape of warmth or cold, which results from the contact of the human organs with the

HiFiTNESS AND UNHAPPINESS 131

external objects in the world composed of the five primordial elements (such as the earth etc.), is called ' adhibhautika'; and all pain and happiness which arises without any such external contact, is called 'adhyatmika'. When this classification of pain and happiness is accepted, pain, like fever etc., when it results from the disturbance of the internal ratio of wind, bile etc. in the body, and the peaceful health, which results from that inter- nal ratio being correct, fall into the category of Metaphysical (adhyatmika,) pain and happiness. Because, although this pain and happiness is bodily, that is to say, although it pertains to the gross body made up of the five primordial elements, yet, we cannot always say that it is due to the contact of the body with external objects. And therefore, even Metaphysical pain and happiness have, according to Vedanta philosophy, to be further sub-divided into bodily-metaphysical, and mental-metaphysical pain and happiness. But, if pain and happiness is, in this way further divided into bodily and mental divisions, it is no more necessary to recognise the adhidaivika pain and happiness as a distinct class. Because, as is clear, the pain or happiness which arises as a result of the blessings or the anger of deities, has ultimately to be borne by man through his body or through his mind. I have, therefore, not followed the three-fold division of pain and happiness made in Vedanta -terminology, but have adopted only the two divisions, external or bodily {bahya or sarir), and internal or mental (abhyantara or minasika); and I have in this book called all bodily pain .and happiness 'adhibhautika' (physical) and all mental pain .and happiness ' adhyatmika ' (Metaphysical). I have not made .a third division of adhidaivika ( god-given ) pain and happiness, as has been done in books on Vedanta philosophy, because, in my opinion, this two-fold classification is more convenient for dealing scientifically with the question of pain and happi- ness; and this difference between the Vedanta terminology and my terminology must be continually borne in mind in reading the following pages.

Whether we look upon pain and happiness as of two kinds or of three kinds, nobody wants pain; therefore, it is stated both in the Vedanta and the Sarhkhya philosophies (Sam. Ka. 1: Gl. 6. 21, 22), that preventing every kind of pain to the greatest possible extent, and obtaining the utter-

132 G1TA-RA.HASYA or KARMA-YOGA.

mast and. the permanent happines is the highest goal' of niam When in this way, the uttermost happiness has become to highest goal of man, we have naturally to consider tlw questions: what is to be called the uttermost, the real, and' the permanent happiness, whether or not it is possible to> obtain it, and if so, when and how it can be obtained etc.; and when you begin to consider these questions, the nest question which arises is, whether pain and happiness are two independent and different kinds of sufferings, experiences, or things, as defined by the Nyaya School, or whether the. absence of the one can be referred to as the other, on the principle that ' that which is not light, is darkness '. After

'"saying that : " When our mouth becomes dry on account of thirst, we drink sweet water in order to remove that un- happiness; when we suffer on account of hunger, we eat nice food in order to alleviate that suffering ; and, when the sexuali desire is roused and becomes unbearable, we satisfy it by sexual intercourse with a woman "j Bhartrhari in the lastj

~ line of the stanza saysr-

pratikdro vyadheh. sukham Hi viparyasyati japak I

that is, " when any disease or unhappiness _has_J>e£ alien, you, the_ removal of it^^y^wrWswiTdf thought, referred- to^ai^happiness 1 """! There is no such independent" thing as- happiness ^which goes beyond the removal of unhappiness. It is not that this rule applies only to the selfish activities of men. I have in the last chapter referred to the opinion of Anandagiri, that even in the matter of doing good to others, the feeling of pity invoked in our hearts on seeing the un- happiness of another becomes unbearable to us, and we do- the good to others only in order to remove this our suffering in the shape of our being unable to bear it. If we accept this position, we will have to accept as correct the definitions of pain and happiness given in Mahabharata in one place,, namely : —

tTStiaiiiprdbhavam duhkham duhkhartiprabhavarh sukham I (San. 25. 22; 174. 19). that is, "some Thirst first comes into existence; on account Of the suffering caused by that Thirst, unhappiness comes

"HAPPINESS AND UNHAPHNESS ' 133 -

into existence; and from the suffering caused by that un- happiness, happiness subsequently follows". In short, according to these philosophers, when some Hope, Desire, or, Thirst has first entered the human mind, man thereby begins to suffer pain, and the removal of that pain is called happiness,; happiness is not some independent thing. Nay, this school has even gone further and drawn further inferences that all, the tendencies of human life are Desire-impelled or Thirst- prompted; that Thirst cannot be entirely uprooted, unless all the activities of worldly life are abandoned ; and that, unless Thirst is entirely uprooted, true and permanent happiness, «annot be obtained. This path has been advocated as an alternative path in the Brhadaranyaka (Br. 4. 4. 22; Ve. Su. 3. 4. 15); and in the Jabala, Sarhnyasa and other Upanisads, it has been advocated as the principal path. This idea has also been adopted in the Astavakraglta (9. 8 ; 10. 3-8) and in the AvadhutagltS (3. 46). The ultimate doctrine of this school is that the man who desires to obtain the highest happiness or Release, must give up worldly life as early as possible, and follow the path of Renunciation (samnyasa)'< and the path of the Abandonment of the Actions which haye been prescribed by the Srutis and the Smrtis ( srauta-smartor karma-samnyasa), described in the Smrti treatises, and which was established in the Kali era by Sri Samkaracarya is based on this principle. If there is no such real thing as happiness, and, if whatever is, is unhappiness, and that too based on Thirst, then it is clear, that all the bother of self-interest or other's-interest will be obviated and the fundamental equable frame of mind ( sand) will be the only thing to remain, when these diseases in the shape of Thirst etc. are in the first place entirely uprooted; and for this reason, it is stated in the Fingalaglta in the Santiparva of the Mahabharata, as also in the Mankiglta, that .—

yae ca kammkfiam loke yac ca divyam mahat sukham I tT&uiksayasukhasyaite riarhatah sodasifo kalam II

(San. 174. 48 ; 177. 49)

i. e., "that happiness which is experienced in this world, by the satisfaction of desires (kama), as also the greater happiness

134 GlTi-EA.HASYA OR KARMA-YOGA.

which is to be found in heaven, are neither worth even one- sixteenth of the happiness which results from the destruction of Thirst". The Jain and the Buddhistic religions have later on copied the Vedic path of Renunciation ; and therefore. in the religious treatises of both these religions, the evil effects and discardability of Thirst have been described as above, or possibly in even more forcible terms. (For example, see the Trsnavagga in the Dhammapada). In the treatises of the Buddhistic religion to be found in Tibet, it is even stated that- the above-mentioned stanza from the Mahabharata was uttered by Gautama Buddha when he attained the Buddha-hood. *

It is not that the above-mentioned evil effects of Thirst have not been acknowledged by the Bhagavadglta. But, as the doctrine of the Gifca is that the total abandonment of Action is not the proper course for obviating those evil effects, it is necessary to consider here somewhat minutely the above explanation of the nature of pain and happiness. We cannot, in the first place, accept as totally correct the dictum of the Saihnyasa school, that all happiness arises from the preventing of pain, such as Thirst etc. Wishing to experience again something, which one has once experienced (seen, heard, etc.) is xnown as Desire (kama, vasana, or iccha). When this desire becomes stronger as a result of the pain due to one's not obtaining soon enough the desired object, or when the obtained happiness being felt to be insufficient, one wants more and more of it, this desire becomes a Thirst (trsya). But if Desire is satisfied before it has grown into Thirst, we cannot say that the resulting happiness arises from the removal of the un- happiness of Thirst. For instance, if we take the case of the food which we get every day at a stated time, it is not our experience that we feel unhappiness every day before taking food. If we do not get food at the proper time, we will suffer unhappiness as a result of hunger, but not otherwise. But

• See Rockhill's Life 0/ Buddha, p. SS. This atanza has

appeared in the Pali book called Uicma (2. 2) ; but, it is rot stated there that it was uttered by Buddha when he attained the 'Buddha- hood', from which it can be clearly seen that these stanzaB could not have been originally uttered by Buddha.

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS 135

even if we do not in this way distinguish between Thirst and Desire, and say that both are synonymous, the doctrine that the root of all happiness is Thirst is seen to be incorrect. For instance, if we suddenly put a piece of sugar-candy into the mouth of a child, the happiness which it experiences cannot be said to have resulted from the destruction of a previous Thirst- Similarly, if while walking along the road, one comes across a beautiful garden and hears the melodious notes of a cuckoo, or coming across a temple on the way, one sees in it the beautiful image of the deity, one thereby experiences happiness, though there had been no previous desire of obtaining those particular objects. If we think over these illustrations, we have to- abandon the above-mentioned definition of happiness of the Sarhnyasa school, and say that our organs have an inherent, capacity for feeding on good or bad objeots, and that when they are in that way carrying on their various activities, they come into contact sometimes with a desirable and sometimes, an undesirable object, and we, thereupon, experience either pain or happiness, without having had any previous Desire or Thirst for it. With this purport in mind, it is stated in the Gita (Gi. 2. 14), that pain and happiness arises as a result of 'matrasparsa', that is, of contact with cold or warm objects etc. The external objeots in the world are technically known as ' matra ', and the above statement in the Gita means- that the contact (sparsa), i. e., the union of these external objects with our organs results in the suffering (vedana) of pain or happiness. That is also the doctrine of the science of Karma- Yoga. Nobody can satisfactorily explain why a harsh sound is undesirable to the ear, or why a sweet drink is pleasurable to the tongue, or why the light of the full moon is pleasing to the eyes. All that we know is that when the tongue gets a sweet liquid to taste, it is satisfied. As Material Happiness is, by its very nature, wholly dependent on the organs, happiness is very often experienced by merely carrying on the particular activities of the organs, whatever the ultimate result of our doing so may be. For instance, the words which sometimes naturally escape oar lips when some idea enters our mind, are- not uttered by us with the idea of acquainting someone else-

136 GIT&-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

■with our thoughts. On the other hand, there is sometimes even a risk of some hidden design or scheme in our minds being •divulged by these automatic activities of the organs, and of ■our being thereby harmed. When little children first learn to walk, they aimlessly walk about the whole day, because they -then experience happiness by the mere act of walking. Therefore, the Blessed Lord, instead of saying that all happiness ■consists of the absence of unhappiness, says that -.-"imiriyasyen- driyasyarthe raga dvesau vyavasthitau" (Gl. 3. 34), i. e,, the attrac- tion and repulsion which exists between the organs of the sense on the one hand, and their relative objects, such as, sound, touch, etc., on the other hand, are both 'vyavastMta', i.e., funda- mentally self-existing ; and His advice is that all that we have to see is how these activities will become beneficial or can be made by us beneficial to our Atman; and that therefore, instead •of attempting to destroy the natural impulses of the mind, or of the organs, we should keep our mind and organs under control in order that those impulses should be beneficial to us, and not let the impulses get out of control. This advice, and saying that one should destroy Thirst and along with Thirst all other mental impulses, are two diametrically •opposite things. The message of the Gita is not that one should do away with all activity or prowess in the world; but, on the other hand, it is stated in the 18th Chapter of the Gita (18. 26) that the doer must, side by side with equability of mind, possess the qualities of perseverance and enthusiasm. But we will deal with this matter in greater detail later on. All that we have to see for the present is whether pain and happiness are two independent states of imind or whether one of them is merely the absence of the ■other; .jad what the opinion of the Bhagavadglta on this matter is will be easily understood by my readers from what has been stated above. Not only have 'sukham' (happiness) and ' duhkham ' (pain) been independently dealt with in des- cribing what the 'kaetra' (field) is (Gl. 13.6), but (Gl. 14.6,7), Happiness is said to be the sign of sattazm (purity) and Thirst ■of rajas ( passion ), and sattvam and rajas are considered two independent qualities. From this also it is clear, that pain and happiness have, in the Bhagavadglta, been considered as

HAPPINESS AND UN-HAPPINESS 137

two mutually opposite and distinct frames of mind. The fact that the Gita looks upon rujasa-tyaga (abandonment "based on passion) as inferior , as is shown by the words : ■"One does not derive the result of Abandonment by abandoning some Action on the ground that it leads to unhappiness; for suoh an abandonment is rajasa " (Gi. 18. 1), also refutes the doctrine that all happiness is based on the destruction of 'Thirst.

Even if we believe that happiness does not consist of the ■destruction of Thirst or of the absence of unhappiness, and that happiness and unhappiness are two independent thingSi yet, in as much as both these sufferings are mutually opposite •or contrary to each other, we are next faced with the question whether it is possible for a man to experience the pleasure of happiness, if he has never suffered unhappiness. Some philosophers say that unless unhappiness has in the first instance been experienced, it is impossible to realise the ^pleasure of happiness. Others, on the other hand, pointing at the perpetual happiness enjoyed by deities in heaven, say that previous experience of unhappiness is not at all necessary for realising the pleasure of happiness. One can experience the sweetness of honey, jaugery, sugar, the mango-fruit or the plantain before having previously tasted any saltish object. In the same way, since happiness also is of various kinds, one can, without any previous experience of unhappiness, «xperience perpetual happiness without getting tired of it, by enjoying in succession diverse kinds of happiness, e. g., by moving from a mattress of cotton on to a mattress of feathers, •or from a fixed palanquin to the more comfortable swinging jpalanquin. But, if one considers the ordinary course of life in this world, it will be seen that all this argument is useless. As the Puranas show cases of even gods coming into •difficulties, and as even heavenly happiness comes to an end after one's acquired merit has been exhausted in due course of time, the illustration of heavenly happiness is not appropriate ; and even if it were appropriate, what use is the illustration of heavenly happiness to us ? Although we may believe that : "rrityam eva sukham svarge", i. e., "in heaven there is permanent happiness", yet, it is stated immediately afterwards that .—

138 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGi

" sukham duhkham ihchhayam " (Ma. Bha. San. 190. 14), i. e., " in this world, pain is mixed with happiness " ; and consistently with that position even Ramdasa Svami has described his own personal experience as follows : " JWho is there in t his world who is wholly happy 1 Consult your mind, s earch and see ". And, as is actually experienced by us ui this life, we have also> to admit the correctness of the following advice given by Draupadi to Satyabhama, namely : —

sukham sukheneha na jatu labhyam

duKkhena sadhvi labliate sukhani 1

(Ma. Bha. Vana. 233. 4)

that ie, " h appine ss never comes out of happiness ; in order that a saintly woman should experience hap~pmess7 she must suffer- unhlippmesa or trouble^". Because, though" a fruit may be placed on your lips, you have still to take the trouble of pushing it into the mouth, and if it falls into your mouth, you have still to take the trouble of chewing it. At any rate, this much is unquestionable, that there is a world of difference between the sweetness of the happiness which comes after unhappiness, and the sweetness of the happiness which is experienced by a man who is always engrossed in the enjoyment of the objects of pleasure. Because, by continually enjoying happiness, the keenness of the appreciative power of the OTgans which enjoy the happiness is dulled, and as is well-known :—

prayeqa srlmatam lolte bhoktum saktir na wdyate I kasthany api hijlryante daridraruim ca sarvasah II

(Ma. Bha.. San. 28.59)

that is, " rich people do very often not have even the power of enjoying tasteful food, and poor people can appreciate and digest even uncooked wood ". Therefore, in considering worldly life, it is uselss to consider further whether it is possible to enjoy continual happiness without unhappiness, "sukhasyanantaram duhkham duhkhasyanantaram sukham" (Vana, 260. 40 ; San. 25.23), i. e., " unhappiness follows on the steps of happiness, and similarly happiness comes in the wake of

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS 139'

unhappiness ", or as has been described by Kalidasa in the- Meghaduta :-

kasyaikardam sukliam upanatam duhkham ekaniato va I nicair gacclwtty upari ca dasa cakranemikramena II that is, " no one experiences continual happines s or con tinuaj- unhappinessTpain_anf happiness always move alternately up- and down like the points on tEe circumference of "a'wh'eeT*^ Sufi^s^rIe~c"ase7 r wMther~becli, : use' this" "unhappiness lias been created in order to increase the sweetness of happiness or because it has some other purpose in the scheme of activity of Matter {prakrti). It may-not be quite impossible to continually obtain one object of pleasure after another, without getting tired of enjoyment ; but it is absolutely impossible, at any rate in this Icarma-bhumi, i. e., world of Action (destiny ?) to- totally abolish unhappiness and continually experience nothing but happiness.

If worldly life does not consist only of happiness, but is always a mixture of pain and happiness, the third question which naturally arises in due course is, whether there is more of happiness or of unhappiness in life. Many Western philosophers, who look upon Material Happiness as the highest, goal of life say, that if there were more of pain than of happiness in life, many, if not all, persons would not have troubled to live worldly life, but would have committed suicide. But, in as much as man does not seem to be tired of living, he must be experiencing more of happiness than of unhappiness- in life, and therefore, happiness must be looked upon as the highest goal of man, and the question of morality and immorality must also be solved by that standard. But, making suicide depend in this way on worldly happiness in not, really speaking, oorrect. It is true that sometimes a man, getting tired of life, commits suicide; but people look upon him as an exception, that is, as a lunatic. From this it is seen that ordinarily people do not connect committing or not committing suicide with worldly happiness, but look upon it as an independent thing by itself ; and, the same inference follows if one considers the life of an aborginy, which would be looked upon as extremely arduous by civilised persons. The well- known biologist Charles Darwin, while describing in his-

140 GlTi-RAHASTTA OR KA$MA-YOGA„

"Travels the aboriginies he oame across in the extieme south of South America says, that these aboriginies, men and women, ■remain without clothes all the year round, even in their ■extremely cold country ; and, as they do not store food, they have for days together to remain without food; yet, their numbers are continually increasing* But, from the fact that ■.these aboriginies do not commit suicide, no one draws the .inference that their mode of life is full of happiness. It is true that they do not commit suicide ; but if one minutely •considers why that is so, one will see that each one of these persons is filled with extreme happiness by the idea that "_I_am a hum an being and not a beast " ; and he considers the happiness of being a humaiTbeing so much greater than all ■other happiness, that he is never prepared to lose this superior happinesB of being a man, however arduous his life may be. .Not only does man not commit suicide, but even birds or .beasts do not do so. But can one, on that account, say that -their life is full of happiness ? Therefore, our philosophers .say, that instead of drawing the mistaken inference that the life of a man or of a bird or beast is full of happiness from the fact that they do not commit suicide, the only true inference which can be drawn from that fact is that: what- ever the nature of a man's life, he does not set much store by it, but believes that an incomparable happiness lies in having become a living being (saeetana) from a lifeless being iaeetam), and more than anything else, in having become .a man. It is on that basis that the following rising grades have been described in the Sastras : —

bhufanam prarjinah sresthah prartiriam buddhijmnah\ buddhimatsu varah srestka narem brahmanah smrtah II brahmaTiesu. ca vidvamsah vidvatsu krtabuddhayah I krtabuddhisu kartarah kartrsu brahmavadinah II

(Manu. 1. 96. 97; Ma. Bha. Udyo. 5. 1 and 2). that is, "the living being is superior to the dead; the intelli- .gents are superior among the living; men aTB superior among •the intelligent; Brahmins, among men; learned Brahmins among Brahmins; doers, among the enligtened-minded, and

• Darwin's Naturalist's Voyage round tht World, Chap. X.

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS 141

brahmavadin (those who belong to the cult of the Brahman),, among the doers "; and on the same basis, it is stated in verna- cular treatises, that out of the 84 lakhs of forms of life (yoni)> the human life is the most superior; that among men, he who- desires Eelease (mumuksu) is most superior; and, that among mumuksus, the perfect (siddha) is the most superior. That- is also the purport of the proverb " life is dearer than anything, else", (sabase jiva pyara); and for this very reason, if someone eommits suicide, finding life full of unhappiness, people look upon him as insane, and the religious treatises count him as a sinner (Ma. Bha. Karna. 70. 28); and an attempt to commit, suicide is looked upon as a crime by law. When in this way it has been proved that one cannot, from the fact that a man does not commit suicide, properly draw the conclusion that, life is full of happiness, we must, in deciding the question, whether life is full of happiness or unhappiness, keep aside for the time being the natural blessing of having been bom. a human being oil account of previous destiny, and consider- only the events of the post-natal worldly life. The fact that- man does not commit suicide or continues to live is accounted: for by the Energistic principle of life; it is not any proof of the preponderance of happiness in worldly life as stated by Materialistic philosophers. Or, saying the same thing in other words, we must say that the desire not to commit suicide is a natural desire; that this desire does not arise as a result of the weighing of the happiness and unhappiness in life; and that therefore, one cannot from that fact draw the- conclusion that life is full of happiness.

When in this way we do not, by confusion of thought,. mis up the blessing of being born a human being with the nature of his subsequent life, and recognise ' being a human, being ' and ' the ordinary life or the usual activities of men ' as two distinct things, there remain no other means for deciding, the question whether there is more of happiness or of un- happiness in worldly life for the being which has taken the superior human form, than considering low many of the- ' present ' desires of every man are satisfied and how many disappointed. The reason for saying 'present ' desires is that,, those things which have become available to all persons in.

142 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

■oivilised life, become every-day happenings, and we forget the happiness they produce; and we decide the question of the happi- ness or unhappiness of worldly life by considering only how many of the things, which have newly become necessities, are obtained by us. There is a world of difference between (i) com- paring the means of happiness which are available to us to-day with how many of them were available to us a hundred years ago, and (ii) considering whether or not I am happy to-day. For instance, anybody will admit that the present-day travelling by train is much more comfortable than travelling "by bullock-cart, which was in vogue a hundred years ago. But we have now forgotten this happiness of train-travel, •and we are unhappy only if some day a train gets late, and we receive our mail late. And therefore, the ' present ' happi- ness or unhappiness of man is usually considered by thinking of his present needs and disregarding all the means of happiness which have already become available; and, if we try to con- sider what these needs are, we see that there is no end of them. If one desire is satisfied to-day, another new desire takes its place to-morrow, and we want to satisfy this new desire; and as human desire is thus always one step ahead of life, man is never free from unhappiness. In this place, we must bear ■oarefully in mind the difference between the two positions that 'all happiness is the destruction of desire' and that 'however much of happiness is obtained, man is still un- satisfied'. Saying that 'all happiness is not the absence of unhappiness, but pain and happiness are two independent kinds of OTganic sufferings' is one thing, and that 'one is dissatisfied, because new kinds of happiness are wanted, without taking into account the happiness which may at any time already be part of one's life', is another thing. The first -of these two dicta deals with the actual nature of happiness; and the second, with whether or not a man is fully satisfied T)y the happiness he has obtained. As the desire for objects of pleasure is a continually increasing desire, a man wants to enjoy over and over again the same happiness which he has already enjoyed, though he may not get new kinds of happiness everyday, and thus human desire is never controlled. There is a story told of a Roman Emperor named Vitalius that in order

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS 143

ito experience over and over again the pleasure of eating tasteful food, he used to take medicines for vomitting the food which he had already eaten, and dine several times every day ' But the story of ,the repentant king Yayati is even more instructive than this. After the king Yayati had become old as a result of the cursa of Sukracarya, the latter, by a pang of kindness, gave him the option of giving his old age to another person and taking in exchange his youth. Thereupon, he took the youth of his son Puru in exchange for his own oldness, and, "having enjoyed all objects of pleasure for a thousand years, he found by experience that all the objects in the world were incapable of satisfying the desire for happiness of even one human being; and Vyasa has stated in the Adiparva of the Mahabharata that Yayati then said :

na jatu, kamah kamanam upabhngena samyati l havisa krsvavartmeva bhuya wablduardhate II

(Ma. Bha. A. 75.49)

that is, " by enjoying objects of pleasure, the desire for the objects of pleasure is not satisfied, but on the other hand this desire grows more and more, just as fire burns more and more by sacrificial offerings being thrown into it " ; and the same stanza is to be found in the Manu-Smrti (Manu. %. 94). The inner reason for this is that, notwithstanding the abundance of means of pleasure, the desire for happiness is never quenched only by enjoying happiness, in as much as the hunger of the organs is always on a rising scale, and it has to be restrained in some other way; and this principle has been fully accepted by our religious writers who have in the first place prescribed that every one must put a restraint on the enjoyment of pleasure. If those who say that enjoyment of objects of pleasure is the highest goal in this world apply their mind to this doctrine which is based on experience, they will easily Taalise the absurdity of their beliefs. This doctrine of the Vedic religion has also been accepted in the Buddhistic religion and there is a statement in the Buddhistic treatises that the following words came out of the mouth of the king

-144 GTTi-BAHASYA on KARMA-YOGA

named Mandhata mentioned in the Puranas (instead of Yayati)> at the moment of his death : —

na kahupanavassena titti kamesu vijjati\

api dibbesu Tcamesv, ratifn so nadhigacchati II

(Dhammapada, 186-187). that is, "although coins called ' Mr^apana' fall as a shower of rain, there is no satisfaction {titti means trpti) of Desire, and the desires of a desirer are not satisfied even by getting- the happiness of heaven ". As it is thus imposible that the happiness of enjoying objects of pleasure cau ever be con- sidered sufficient, every man thinks that 'I am unhappy',, and when this mental frame of mankind is taken into account, then, as stated in the Mahabharata :-—

sukhad bahutaram duhkham jivite riasti samsayahl (San. 305. 6; 330. 16). that is , " in this life (samsara), unhappiness is more thani happiness "; or as stated by the Saint Tukaram : " if yoiL consider happiness, it is as small as a grain; and if you con- sider unhappiness, it is as big as a mountain (Tuka. Ga. 2986). The same is the doctrine laid down by the writers of the' TJpanisads (Maitryu 1. 2-4), and it is stated also in the Gita that the life of man is inconstant and the 'home of unhappiness',. and that life in the world is not lasting and is ' devoid of happiness ' (Gl. 8. 15 and 9. 3). The same is the opinion of th&> German philosopher Schopenhauer, and he has made use of a. very curious illustration for proving it. He says that we measure the happiness of a man by considering how many of his desires for happiness, out of the total possible desires for happiness, are satisfied; and if the enjoyment of happiness- falls short of the desire for happiness, we say that the man is- to that extent unhappy. If this ratio- id to be explained mathematically we have to divide the enjoyment of happiness by the desire for happiness and show it in the form of a.

c l- a. enjoyment of happiness. „ L ^. '■

fraction, thus : desira fcr happiness But tins is such a queer

fraction that its denominator, namely, the desire for happiness,. is always increasing in a greater measure than its 'numerator,, namely, the enjoyment of happiness; so that,' if this'fraotiori i*

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS 145

in the beginning J^ it becomes later on 3/10, that is to say, if the numerator increases three times, the denominator increases, five times, and the fraction becomes more and more incomplete. Thus, it is futile to entertain the hope of a man becoming fully happy. In considering how much there was of happiness in ancient times, we consider only the numerator of this fraction by itself and do not pay any attention to the fact that the denominator has now increased much more than the numerator. But when we have to consider only whether a human being is happy or unhappy without reference to time, we must consider both the numerator and the denominator ; and we see that this fraction will never become complete. That is the sum and substance of the words of Manu: "najatu kamahkamamm" etc. (2. 94). As there is no definite instrument like a thermometer for measuring happiness and unhappiness, this mathematical exposition of the mutual ratio of pain and happiness might not be acceptable to some; but if this argument is rejected, there remains no measure for proving that there is a preponderance of happiness in life for man. Therefore, this objection, which applies as much to the question of happiness as of unhappiness, leaves un- touched the general proposition in the above discussion, namely, the theorem proved by the uncontrollable growth of the desire for happiness beyond the actual enjoyment of happiness. It is stated in Mahomedan history, that during the Mahomedan rule in Spain, a just and powerful ruler named Abdul Rahiman the third * had kept a diary of how he spent his days and from that diary he ultimately found that in a rule of 50 years he had experienced unalloyed happiness only for 14 days; and another writer t has stated that if one compares the opinions of ancient and modern philosophers in the world and especially in Europe, the number of those who say that life is full of happiness is seen to be about the same as of those who say that life is full of unhappiness. If to these numbers we add the numbers of the Indian philosophers, I need not say which way the scale will turn.

• Moors in Spain p. 128 (Story of the Nations geriea).

t Macmillan's Promotion of Happiness p. 26.

146 GlTA-RAHASYA oe KARMA-YOGA

Reading the exposition made above regarding the happi- ness and unhappiness of worldly life, some follower of the Sarhnyasa school will retaliate : " although you do not accept the doctrine that there can he no peace unless one gives up all Thirst-prompted Actions on the ground that happiness is not some actual entity, yet, if even according to yourselves, dissatisfaction arises from Thirst and unhappiness later on springs from dissatisfaction, why do you not say that man should give up Thirst and, along with Thirst, all wordly Actions — whether those Actions are for his own good or for the .good of others — at any rate for removing this dissatisfaction, and then Temain perpetually satisfied ?". In the Mahabharata itself, we find statements like: " asamtosasya nasty antas tustis tu jparamafo suhham", i. a, " there is no end to dissatisfaction, and xsontentment is the soul of bliss." (Ma. Bha Vana, 215. 22); .and both the Jain and Buddhistic religions are based on the same foundation ; and in the Western countries, Schopenhauer has maintained * the same opinion. But on the other hand, one may ask whether one should cut off the tongue altogether because it sometimes utters obscene words, and whether people have discontinued the use of fire and given up cooking food on the ground that houses sometimes catch fire. If we make use of /electricity, to say nothing of fire, in daily life, by keeping them Tinder proper control, it is not impossible for us to dispose of Thirst or dissatisfaction in the same way. It would be a •different matter, if this dissatisfaction was wholly and on all occasions disadvantageous ; but on proper consideration we see that such is not the case. Dissatisfaction does not mean merely craving or weak-kneedness. Such a kind of dissatisfaction has been discountenanced even by philosophers. But the dissatis- faction which is at the root of the desire not to remain stagnant in the position which has fallen to one's lot, but to bring it to as excellent a condition as possible by gradually improving it more and moTe, with as peaoeable and equable a frame of mind

• Schopenhauer's World as Will and Representation Vol. II Chap.

46. The description given by him of the unhappiness of worldly life is excellent. The original work is in the German language, and it has been translated into English.

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS 147

-A3 possible, is not a dissatisfaction which ought to he discoun- tenanced. It need not be said that a society divided into four ■castes will soon go to rack and ruin if the Brahmins give up the desire for knowledge, the Ksatriyas for worldly prosperity, and the Vaisyas for property. With this purport in view, Vyasa has said to Yudhisthira: — " yajno vidya samuttkanam -asamtosah sriyamprati " ( San. 23. 9 ), i. e., "sacrifice, learning, effort, and dissatisfaction in the matter of worldly acquisitions", are virtues in the case of Ksatriyas. In the same way, Vidula in advising her son says: " samtoso vai iriyafii hanti " " ( Ma. Bha. U. 132. 33 ), i. e.," by contentment, worldly prosperity is destroyed "; and there is also a statement on another occasion that: " ammtosah iriyo mvlam" (Ma. Bha. Sabha. 55.11)* i. e., " dissatisfaction is the root of prosperity". Although contentment is referred to as a virtue in the case of Brahmins, it only means contentment with reference to wealth or worldly prosperity, according to the four-caste arrangement. If a Brahmin says that the knowledge which he has acquired is enough for him, he will bring about his own undoing, and the same will be the case with the Vaisyas or the Sudras, if they always remain satisfied with what they have acquired accord- ing to their own status in life. In short, discontent is the seed of all future prosperity, effort, opulence and even of Release ; and, it must always be borne in mind by everybody, that if this discontent is totally annihilated, we will be nowhere, whether in this world or in the next. In the Bhagavadglta itself, in listening to the advice of Sri Krsna, Arjuna has said: "" bhuyah kathaya trptir hi srnvato nasti me 'mrtam " (Gi. 10. 18), i. e., "I am not satisfied with what I have heard of your nectar- like speech, therefore, describe to me more and more of your manifestations" ; and then the Blessed Lord has again started enumerating his manifestations. He did not say to him : " -restrain your desire, dissatisfaction or discontent is improper". From this it follows that even the Blessed Lord Himself considered it proper that One Bhould entertain disoontent about a good or beneficial matter, and there is a

• cf : " Unhappiness is the oauae of progress." Dr. Paul

-Cams in The Ethical Probkm p. 251 (2nd Ed.)

148 GlTA-RAHASYA OR ' KARMA-YOGA

stanza of Bhartrhari that : "yasasi cabMracir vyasamm srvtau " etc., i. e., "there ought to be liking or desire, but that should be for success ; and one must also have a vice, but that should be of learning ; that vice is not prohibited". Still, we must control discontent, in the same way as Desire, Anger etc., because if it becomes uncontrolled, it will clearly end in our undoing ; and therefore, the endowment (sampaiti) of those persons who continually run after worldly happiness piling thirst on thirst, and hope on hope with the sole object of enjoying objects of pleasure is referred to as " ungodly endowment " ( asara sampat ) in the 16th Chapter of the Gita. Not only are the pure (sattvika) tendencies in the human mind destroyed by such greediness and the man undone, but, in as much as it is impossible that Thirst should ever be quenched, the desire for enjoyment of objects of pleasure grows continually, and man's- life is ended in the greed. But on the other hand, giving up all kinds of Thirst, and with it, all Actions, in order to escape this evil effect of Thirst or discontent is also not the pure- ( sattvika) path. As has been stated above, Thirst or discontent is the seed of future prosperity : and therefore, instead of attempting to kill an innocent man out of fear for a thief, one has to carefully consider what Thirst "or discontent causes- unhappiness, and adopt the skilful middle path of giving up only that particular hope, thirst or discon^snt which produces- unhappiness, and it is not necessary for that purpose to give ujf all kinds of Action whatsoever. Tba devioe or skill (tosa/a*/ of giving up only that hope which causes unhappiness and performing one's duties according to one's status in life is- known as Yoga or Karma-yoga ( Gi. 2. 50. ) j and, as that is the Yoga which has been principally dealt with in the Gita, I shall consider here in a little more detail what kind of hope has been looked upon by the Gita as productive of unhappiness.

In describing above the, actual nature, of human pain and unhappiness, I have stated that a man hears by his ears, feels by bis skin, sees by his eyes, tastes by his tongue, andsmells by his nose ; and that a man is happy or unhappy according as these activities of his organs are consistent with their natural tendencies. But, the question of pain and happiness is not completely exhausted by making this definition. Although it

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS 149

is necessary that the organs should, in the first instance, come into contact with external objects in order that Material pain or happiness should arise, yet, if one considers in what way this pain or happiness is subsequently experienced by man, it will be seen that a man has ultimately to perform the function of realising, that is, of taking on himself, this pain or happi- ness, which results from the activities of the organs, by means of his Mind {manas). ' caksuk. pasyati rupani mamsa na tu caksusa", i. e., " the function of seeing is not performed solely by the eyes : the assistance of the mind is absolutely necessary for it" (Ma. Bha. San. 311. 17) ; and it is stated in the Mahabhara- ta that if that mind is in pain, then even having seen is as if you have not seen, and even in the Brhadaranyakopanisad, there are such statements as : " anyatramam abhuvam nadarsam ", i. e., " my mind was elsewhere, and therefore, I did not see ", or, '"anyatramam abhuvam riasrausam", i. e., "my mind was else- where, and therefore, I did not hear " ( Br. 1. 5. 3 ). From this it becomes clear, that in order to experience Material pain or happiness, the organs are not sufficient by themselves, but require the assistance of the Mind ; and as regards Metaphysical pain or happiness, it is purely mental. It, therefore, follows that all experience of pain or happiness ultimately depends on the Mind ; and if this is true, it naturally follows that it is not impossible to control the experience of pain or happiness if one controls the mind. With regard to these facts, Manu has described the characteristics of pain and happiness in a different way than the Nyaya school. He says :

sarvafn paravaiam duhkham sarvam atmavasam sukham I etad vidyat samasena laksanam sukhaduhkhayoh 11

( Manu. 4. 160 ). •that is, " all that which is subject to the control of others (external objeots) is unhappiness, and all that which is subject to the control of oneself (of one's mind) is happiness ; these are in brief the characteristic features of pain and happiness". The word 'suffering' (vedana) used in the connotation of pain and happiness given by the Nyaya school, includes both physical and mental suffering, and it also shows the actual external nature of pain and happiness ; and when one bears in

150 GlTA-BAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

mind that Manu is referring principally to the internal experience of pain and happiness, there remains no incon- sistency between these two definitions. When in this way, we do not make the experience of pain or happiness depend on. the organs :

blmwjyam etad duKkhasya yad etan ndnudtttayet t

that is, " not brooding on one's unhappiness, becomes the most potent medioine for doing away with unhappiness" (Ma, Bha. San. 205. 2 ) ; and we find numerous illustrations in history,^ of people having hardened their minds, and willingly sacrificed their lives for the sake of their Religion or of Truth. There- fore, says the Gita, when one does what one has to do with- perfect mental control and after giving up the DESIRE FOR THE RESULT (phalasa) and with a frame of mind which k equal towards pain and happiness, there remains no fear or possibility of experiencing the unhappiness of Actions, and it does not become necessary to give them up. Giving up the desire for the result does not mean giving up the resulting benefit, if it has been acquired, nor entertaining a desire that no one should ever get that benefit. In the same way, there is a world for difference between the desire for the result and the Desire, Hope, or Motive for performing Action, or employing a particular means for obtaining a particular result. There is a difference between merely desiring to move one's hands and feet and desiring to move one's hands for catching or one 's feet for kicking some one else. The first desire extends merely to the doing of the act and there is no other motive behind it ; and if we give up this desire, all Action will come to an end. Besides having this desire, a man must also have the knowledge that every act is sure to have some result or consequence; and not only must he have that knowledge, but he must entertain the desire of doing a. particular act with the intention of thereby producing some particular result; otherwise, all his Actions will be as pointless as those of a madman. All of these desires, motives, or arrangements do not ultimately produce pain ; nor does the Gita ask you to give them up. But if one goes much further than that, and allows his mind to be afflicted by the.

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS 151

ATTACHMENT (asakti), ambition, pride, self-identification, or insistence of MINE-NESS (mamatva ), which exists in the.- mind of the doer with reference to the result of the Action in the shape of the feeling that : "whatever action is performed by ME is performed by ME with the intention that ' I ' should: necessarily get a particular benefit from a particular act of MINE "; and if thereafter there is any obstruction in the- matter of getting the desired result or benefit, the chain of misery starts. If this obstruction is inevitable and is an act of Pate, man only suffers from despair ; but, if it is the handi- work of another person, it gives rise later on to anger or even- hate, and this hate leads to evil action, and evil action leads to- self-destruction. This attachment, in the shape of MINE- NESS, for the result of the Action, is also known as 'phatasa " ( hope of benefit ), ' sarnga ' ( fondness ), ' ahamkara-buddhi * ( egoism ), and ' kama ' ( desire ) ; and in order to show that the- chain of unhappiness in life really starts at this point, it is: stated in the second chapter of the Gita, that Desire springs, from Attachment for objects of pleasure, Anger ( hrodha ) from. Desire, Mental Confusion (moka) from Anger, and ultimately,, the man himself is destroyed ( Gl. 2. 62, 63 ). When I have thus established that Actions in the gross material world, which are lifeless in themselves, are not themselves the root of unhappi- ness, but that the true root of unhappiness is the Hope for result* Desire, or Attachment with which man performs those Actions,, it naturally follows that in order to prevent this unhappiness, it is quite enough if a person, by controlling his mind, gives up. the Attachment, Desire or Hope of result entertained by him towards the objects of pleasure ; and it follows logically that it is not necessary to give up all objects of pleasure, or Actions, or Desires as prescribed by the Sarhnyasa school. Therefore, it is next stated in the Gita ( Gi. 2. 64 ), that that man who- partakes of the objects of pleasure he comes across in the world,, with a deBireless and unattached frame of mind, without entertaining any hope of result, is the true ' sthifaprajna * ( steady-in-mind ). The activity of Action in the world never comes to an end. Even if man ceases to exist in this world. Matter (prakrti) will carry on its activities according to its constituent qualities ( ffura-dharma ). Gross Matter would not

153 GlTA-RAHASYA. OB KARMA.-YOGA

in any way be happy or unhappy on that account. Man arrogates to himself an undue importance, and becomes attached to the activities of Matter, and in that way suffers pain and happinesB. But if he gives up this attachment, and performs all his Actions in the belief that 'gurfi guyesa vartante', i. e., " all activities are going on according to the constituent qualities of Matter " ( GI. 3. 38 ), there will remain no unhappi- ness in the shape of discontent. Therefore, Vyasa has advised Yudhisthira that instead of lamenting that worldly life is principally unhappy, and attempting to give up such life, one should believe that Matter is carrying on its own activities, and that.—

sukham va yadi va duhkham priyam va yadi vapriyam I praptam praptam upasita hrdayenaparajitah H

(Ma, Bha. San. 25. 26).

"that is, "one should put up with whatever takes place, whenever

it takes place, without being disheartened, ( that is to say,

without becoming dejected, and giving up one's duty ), whether

it causes happiness or unhappiness, and whether it is

pleasurable or unpleasant." The full importance of this

advice will be appreciated when one bears in mind that

one haB to perform some duties in life, even suffering the

pain which they cause. In the Bhagavadgita itself, the

characteristic features of the sthitaprajfia are described in the

words: "yah sarvatranabhsnehas tat tat prapya suhhasvhhm"

{% 57), i. e., "that man who, when anything favourable or

unfavourable happens, always remains unattached, and

neither welcomes it nor dislikes it, is the true sthttaprajna" ; and

in the fifth chapter it is stated that, "naprahrsyet priyam prapya

■nodvijet prapya capriyam " ( 5. SO ), i. e„ "when you experience

happiness, you should not on that account become excited ;

and when you experience unhappiness, you should also not on

that account become dejected " ; and it is stated in the second

•chapter, that this pain and happiness must be borne with a

■desireless frame of mind (2. 14, 15) ; and the same advice has

been repeatedly given in various other places ( Gi. 5. 9; 13. 9 ).

In the terminology of Vedanta Philosophy, doing this is called .

HAPPINESS AND TINHAPPINESS 153

'dedicating all Actions to the Brahman' (Brahtriarparfa), and in the Path of Devotion, the word ' Krsriarparia' (dedication to Krsna) is used instead of ' Brahmarpava ' (dedication to the Brahman) ; and this is the sum and substance of the whole of ihe preaching of the Glta.

Whatever the nature of the Action, when one does not give ■up the Desire to do it, nor also one's activity, but goes on performing whatever one wants to do, being equally prepared "for the resulting pain or happiness, with an aloof frame of mind, and without entertaining the hope for the result, not only ■does one eseape the evil effects due to non-control of Thirst or ■discontent, but also the danger of the world becoming desolate .as a result of Action being destroyed in the attempt to destroy Thirst; and all our mental impulses remain pure and become beneficial to all created beings. It is clear beyond doubt that , in order in this way to be able to give up the hope for the result, one must obtain perfect control over the mind and over the organs by means of Apathy {vairagya). But, there is a world ■of difference between (i) keeping one's organs under control and allowing them to perform their various activities, not for a sel- fish purpose, but apathetically and desirelessly and for the wel- -fare of others, on the one hand, and (ii) deliberately destroying all Actions, that is to say, all the activities of the various organs in order to kill Thirst, as prescribed by the Path of Renunciation, on the other hand. The Apathy and Control, of the organs prescribed by the Glta is of the first kind and not of the second kind ; and in the same way, in the conversation between Janaka and the Brahmin in the Anugita ( Ma. Bha. Asva. 32, 17-23 ) the king Janaka says to Dharma, who had appeared to him in the form of a Brahmin that :

smu buddhim ca yam jnatva sarvatra visayo mama II naham atmartham icchami gandlian ghranagatan apt, I

mham atmartham iccltami mano nityam manontare I mano me nirjitam tasmad vase Ksthati sarvada ll

that is, "I will describe to 'you that apathetic frame of mind (vairagya) with which I enjoy all objects of pleasure. I do not

154 GITA-RAHAYSA OK KABMA-YOGA

'for myself smell any scent, nor do I not 'for myself see any- thing with my eyes etc ; and I do not also put to use my mini for my Self (atmartha), that is, for my own benefit ; therefore,. I have conquered my nose (eyes etc.) and my mind, and they are all under my control ". This is what is meant by the' statement in the Gita ( Gi. 3. 6, 7 ) that he who merely chokes up the impulses of the organs but contemplates objects of pleasure by his mind is a hypoorite, and he who conquers the desiring frame of mind by means of mental control, and allows all his mental impulses to carry on their various activities for the benefit of the world is the real superman. The external world, or the activities of the organs are not something which- we have brought into existence, but they aTe self-created ; and' however self -controlled a samnyasi may be, yet, when hi* hunger becomes uncontrollable, he goes out to beg for food (Gi. 3. 33) ; or when he has sat for a considerable length of time in one place, he gets up and stands for some time. If we see that however much there is of mental control, one cannot, escape the inherent activities of the organs, then the wisest course is seen to be not to perversely attempt to destroy the- impulses of the organs, and at the same time all Actions and all kinds of Desire or Discontent (Gi. 2. 47 ; 18. 59), but to givfr up the hope for the result by controlling the mind, and to loot upon pain and happiness as alike (Gi. 2. 38), and to perform all Actions desirelessly and for the benefit of the world as prescribed by the Sastras. Therefore, the Blessed Lord first tells Arjuna in the following stanza :

harmony evadhikaras te ma phalesu kada.ama I ma karmaphalahetur bhuh ma tesango 'stvakarnmrdK

( Gi. 2. 47 ). that, in as much as you have been born in this world of Action, therefore, " your authority extends only to the per- formance of Actions' ' ; but bear in mind that this your authority extends only to the performance of Action which ought to be- performed (that is, to kartavya). The word 'eva' which means 'only', clearly shows that the authority of man does not extend 1 to anything other than Jcarma, that is, to the result of the karma. But the Blessed Lord does not leave this important matter to bes

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS 155

understood merely by inference, and He again, and in per- fectly clear words, says in the second quarter of the stanza, that, "your authority never extends to the result of the Action", be- cause, getting or not getting the result of the Action is not a. matter which is within your control, hut is always in the gift . of the Paramesvara or is dependent on the entire Effect of Causes (karma-vipaka) in the world. Hoping that a particular- thing whioh is not within one's control should take place in a particular way, is a sign of madness. But the Blessed Lord has not left even this third thing for inference, and has in the. third quarter of the stanza said : " therefore, do not perform any Aotion, keeping in mind the hope for the result of the Action";, whatever may be the result of your Action according to the- general law of Cause and Effect, will be its effect ; it is not pos- sible that such result should be more or less, or take place earlier or later, aocording to your desires, and by entertaining any such, desire, it is only you who suffer unnecessary pain and trouble. But here some persons — especially those who follow the Path of" Renunciation — will object : " Is it not better to give up Action ( karma ) altogether rather than engaging in the useless procedure, of performing Actions and giving up the hope of the result 1" And therefore, the Blessed Lord has in the last quarter of the. stanza made the definite statement that " do not insist upon not performing Action," but perform Action according to the- authority which you possess, though without entertaining any hope for the result. These doctrines are so important from the. point of view of Karma-Yoga, that the four quarters of the above stanza may be said to be the four aphorisms (catuh-sutri) of the science of Karma-Yoga or of the Glta religion.

If worldly activity is not to be given up, although happi- ness and unhappiness always befall you alternatively in life, and although it is an established fact that the sum total of" unhappiness is greater than that of happiness, then some persons- are likely to think, that all human efforts towards the total eli- mination of unhappiness and the acquisition of total happiness- are futile ; and if one considers only Material Happiness, that, is to say, happiness in the shape of the enjoyment of external objects of pleasure through the medium of the organs, this- their objection will have to be admitted to be substantial. Just.

156 GITA-BAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

.as &9 Moon never comes within the grasp of the little children who spread out their little hands towards the heavens in order to catch hold of it, bo also those persons, who run after Material Happiness in the hope of reaching the highest form of happi- ness, will in any case And it very difficult to reach the highest form of happiness. But as Material Happiness is not the only kind of happiness, it is possible to find out the way of acquiring the highest and the constant form of happiness, even in this .difficult position. As has been stated above, when happiness is divided into the two divisions of physical and mental happiness, one has to attach a higher importance to the activities of the mind than to the activities of the body or of the organs. Even the well-known Materialist philosopher Mill has admitted in his book on Utilitarianism, * that the theorem that the merit of Mental happiness is higher than that of bodily (i. e., Material) happiness, which has been laid down by scients(jrearem), is not made by them as a result of any arrogance about their own knowledge but because the true greatness or appropriateness of the superior human birth •consists in Knowledge. Dogs, pigs, oxen etc. also like the happiness of the organs in the same way as human beings ; and if the human race was of the opinion that enjoyment of objects of pleasure is the only true happiness in the world, then man would be ready to become a beast. But in as much ag nobody is willing to become a beast, notwithstanding that he can thereby obtain all the physical happiness which can be got by beasts, it is clear that there is something more in a human being than in a beast. When one begins to consider what this something is, one has to investigate into the nature of that Atman which acquires the knowledge of one's Self and •of the external world by means of the Mind and of the Iteason .(buddhi ); and when one has once begun to think of this matter, one naturally comes to the conclusion that, that happiness

• " It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig

satisfied ; better to be Secrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question ". Utilitarianism p. 14 (Longman's, 1907).

HAPPINESS AND TJNHAPPINESS 157

which is to be found in the extremely noble activities and iru the purest state of the Mind and of the Reason is the highest, or the most ideal happiness of mankind, as compared with the happiness of the enjoyment of objects of pleasure, which is common to man and beast. This kind of happiness is self- controlled, that is, it can be acquired without depending on external objects, and without reducing the happiness of others, and by one's own exertions; and as a man becomes better and better, the nature of this happiness becomes more and more pure and unalloyed. Bhartrhari has said that " mamsi ca paritu$te ko'rthavan ko daridrah ", i. e., " when the mind is satisfied, the begger is the same as the rich man ", and the well-known Greek philospher Plato has main- tained that Mental Happiness is superior to bodily ( that is, external or Material ) happiness, and that, that happiness which can be realised only by means of the Reason, (which is the highest Metaphysical Happiness), is superior even to' Mental Happiness. * Therefore, even if we for the time being keep aside the question of Release, the fact that that Reason, alone can obtain the highest happiness, which is engrossed in the contemplation of the Atman, is definitely proved; and therefore, after happiness has been divided in the Bhagavad- gita into the three divisions of sattvika, rajasa and tamasa, it is first stated that " tat sukham sattvikam proktam atmabuddhi- prasadajam ", i. e., " that Metaphysical Happiness which is the result of the contentedness of the Self-engrossed Reason (that is, of the Reason which having realised the true nature of the Atman, namely, that there is only one Atman in all created beings, is engrossed in that idea) is the sattvika (placid), that is, the most superior kind of happiness (Gi. 18. 37)r and the Gita goes on to say that the Material Happiness arising from the organs and the objects of the organs is of a lower grade, that is, is rajasa (Gi. 18. 38); and that the happi- ness which arises from sleep, or idleness or which confuses the mind is the most inferior form, that is, is tamasa. That is the meaning which is conveyed by the stanza from the Gita which has been quoted at the commencement of this chapter.- and the Gita itself says (Gi. 6. 25) that when a man has onos

• Republic (Book IX).

158 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

•experienced this beatific happiness, he is not shaken from this peaceful mental frame, whatever the magnitude of the misfortune which subsequently befalls him. This beatific happi. ness is not to be found even in the enjoyment of heavenly -objects of pleasure, and the Reason of a man has in the first instance to become absolutely contented before he can experience it. He who is always engrossed in the enjoyment •of the objects of pleasure, without seeing how he can keep his frame of mind contented, experiences happiness, which is temporary and inconstant Because, that organic happiness which exists to-day, ceases to exist tomorrow ; and what is more, that thing which our organs look upon as productive of happiness to day, becomes for some reason or other, productive . of unhappiness tomorrow. For instance, the same cold water which is desirable in summer, becomes undesirable in winter ; .and even if one acquires the happiness, the desire for happiness, as has been mentioned above, is never fully quenched. Therefore, although the world 'happiness' can be applied comprehen- sively to all kinds of happinesB, yet, one has to differentiate between happiness and happiness. In ordinary practice, the word ' happiness ' means principally ' organic happiness'. But when it becomes necessary to differentiate between the happiness of the enjoyment of objects of pleasure from that happiness which is beyond the organs, that is, which is beyond organic happiness, and which can be realised only by the self- engrossed Reason, the Material Happiness which consists of the enjoyment of objects of pleasure, is called simply ' happiness ' {sukhamoi preyas), and the Metaphysical Happiness which is born of Self -Realisation (atma-buddhi-prasadaja) is called "* beatific happiness ' ( sreyas), blessing ( tedyanam), amelioration Y Mam ), beatitude (ananda), or peace ( ianti). The distinction made between 'preyas' and 'sreyas' by Naciketa in the sentence from the Kathopanisad quoted at the end of the last chapter, has been made on this basis. Mrtyu ( Death ) had already in the beginning explained to him the esoteric

secrets of Fire (agm). But, when after having acquired that

happiness, Naciketa asked for the blessing of being explained what was meant by the Knowledge or -Realisation of the Atman ( atmainam ), Mrtyu tempted him

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS 159

■with many other kinds of worldly happineBS instead. But Jfaciketa was not tempted by these transient Material kinds ■of happiness, or things which appeared pleasing { preyas) on the face of them, and extending his vision, he insisted on having, and ultimately succeeded in acquiring, that philosophy •of the, Atman which led to the blessing ( sreyas ) of his Atman i Self ) and was ultimately beneficial. In short, our philoso- phers have been looking upon that Reason-born happiness or Metaphysical beatitude, which results from the Realisation of the Atman, as the most superior happiness and their advice ia .that this happiness is such as can be obtained by everybody, in as much as it is self-controlled, and that everybody should ■tiy to acquire it. That wonderful and special happiness which belongs to mankind in addition to its beastly qualities is this happiness; and this happiness of the Atman (atma- mnda) is the most constant, the most independent and the most excellent of all happiness, in as much as it is independent of external circumstances. This peace is called in the Glt3 X CrI. 6. 15 ) by the name of the Peace ( santi ) of Emancipation ,{ nirvana I ; and it is also the climax of happiness which pertains to the Brahmi state of the sthitaprajiia ( steady-in- mind ) described in the Glta ( Gi. 2. 71 ; 6. 28 ; 12. 12 ; 18. 62 ).

In this way, we have proved that the peace or happiness ■of the Atman is the most excellent of all happiness, and that .as it is self-controlled, it is such as can be acquired by every- body. But by proving that gold is the most valuable of all metals, iron and other metals do not oease to be useful ; and though sugar is sweet, one cannot do without salt ; and the «ame is the case with the happiness of the Atman or of Peace .(santi). At any rate, it cannot be disputed that Material ■ objeots are necessary for the protection of the body, along with this Peace; and therefore, in the phrases used for .blessing, one does not say simply : " santirastu, " (May- there be santi 1 , i. e., Peace ), but say : " santih pas/it tuftii ■castu", that is, 'May there also be pusti ( Material Happi- ness ), and tusti (contentedness) along with saidi (jmea)\ If our philosohpers had been of the opinion that <a»% nought to acquire contentedness (tusti) by haviug «ws»£j Peace ( santi ), there would have been no oecasfoa to *Kl

160 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

to this phrase, the word l pusti'. Nevertheless, it is also not proper to have an inordinate desire for increase of Material Happiness (that is, pusti). Therefore, this phrase means: " May you have Peace, Material happiness and also Contentedness- in proper proportions, and that you must obtain them ". The- same is the moral of the Kathopanisad. The only matter which has been described in detail in this Upanisad is that after Naciketa had gone to the sphere of Yama, that is, of' Death, Yama asked him to ask for three blessings, and that. Yama accordingly gave him the three blessings which he had asked for. But after Mrtyu had asked Naciketa to ask for blessings, Naciketa did not in the first place ask for the blessing: of Brahman-Realisation [Brahmajnana), but first said : " My father has got angry with me; may he become propitious to me "; and then, "teach me the science of Fire (agni), that is, of all sacrificial ritual which will give me material opulence " ; and, when he had acquired these blessings, he asked for the third blessing saying: "teach me the Knowledge of the Atman". But when Mrtyu began to say to him that he would give him! (Naciketa) additional happiness instead of this third blessing, Naciketa has insisted: "now explain to me that Brahma- jnana which will lead to sreyas", instead of aspiring for possessing more of the knowledge of sacriflcal ritual than was necessary for obtaining preyas. In short, as stated in the last mantra of this Upanisad, Naciketu obtained both the 1 Brakma-vidya ' (knowledge of the Brahman), an&'yoga-vidhi" (sacriflcal ritual ), and he was emancipated (Katha 6. 18).. From this it follows, that the combination of jnana and karma is the summary of the preaching of this Upanisad. There is also a similar story about Indra. Not only had Indra himself acquired fully the Knowledge of the Brahman, (Brahmajnana) but he had taught the science of the Atman (atmavidya) to. Pratardana, as has been stated in the Kausitakyupanisad. Yet, after Indra had lost his kingdom and Prahlada had become the king of the three spheres, Indra went to Brhaspati,. the preceptor of the gods, and asked him to explain to him in what sreyas lay. Then Brhaspati taught the dethroned Indra the Brahmavidya, that is, the Knowledge of the Atman,. (fflrmjnana) and said to him that that was all which was-

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPI5TESS - 161.

sreyas (eliirac chreya iti)r But 'Indra was not satisfied audi again asked the question: "koviseso bhai)et')",i.e., >" Is" there. anything more ? "; thereupon Brhaspati sent him to Sukraoarya. There, there was a repetition of the same process, and 1 Sukracarya said to him : ' " That something , more is known to Prahlad. " Then at last Indra went to Prahlada in the>. form of a Brahmin and became his disciple, and after same time had passed, Prahlada explained to him that ' iUam ', { the habit • .f behaving consistently with Truth and Morality ) was the master-key for gaining the kingdom of the three spheres, and that that was also known as sr eyas. Then, when Prahl34a. said to him : " I am very much pleased by your service, I shall- give you whatever blessing you may ask ", Indra, in the form of the Brahmin, said to him: " Give me your ' illam ' ". When Pra- hlada consented, the deity 'silam', and after it Morality fdharm- am), Veracity (safyam), good conduct (vrtta), and ultimately opulence (iri) and other deities left the body of Prahlada and entered the body of Indra, and in this way Indra regained his kingdom : such is the ancient story which has been told by Bflisma to Yudhiathira in the Santiparva ( San. 124 ). Although the Knowledge of the Brahman by itself may be wortb more than prosperity {aisvanjain) by itself, yet, in as much as who- ever has to live jn this world is under the obligation and has also the moral right to acquire material prosperity for himself or for his own country in the same way ae it is possessed by others or by other countries, the highest ideal of man in this world, as is apparent from this beautiful ptory, is seen to be the combin- nation of Peace (sanii), and Material Happiness (pufti), or of desired things (preyas) and true and lasting benefit (sreyas), or of Knowledge (jnanam) and prosperity (aisvaryam), according to our Ka.rma-Yoga w>i m».e. Has that Bhagavan than Whom there is) none higher in this world, and Whose path is followed ,by. others ( Gi. 3. 33 ), Himself given up prosperity and wealth? The word 'bhaga' has been defined in the Sastras as :

aiivaryasga samagrasya dliarmasya yasasah iriyah I

jnamvairagyayos caiva sarmam bhaga itiraria H

(Visnu. 6. 5. 74). 21—22

162 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

that is, "the word ' bhaga ' includes the followings six things,

namely, complete Yogic prosperity, righteousness, success (

property, knowledge, and apathy". The word 'aisvaryam' in

this stanza is usually taken to mean ' Yogaisvaryam' (Yogic

prosperity ), because the word ' srl ', that is, wealth, appears

later on. But as ordinarily, the word ' aisvaryam ' is used to

mean and include authority, success, and wealth, and the word

• jMnam ' includes apathy and righteousness, we may say that

in ordinary parlance, the entire meaning conveyed by the above

stanza is included in the two words 'jnanam' and 'aisvaryam,

and in as much as the Blessed Lord has Himself accepted the

■combination of jnanam and aisvaryam, other persons should

■consider that as proper and act accordingly ( Gl. 3. 21 ; Ma. Bha.

San. 341. 25). The doctrine that the knowledge of the Atman is

the only ideal of man in this world is a doctrine of the school

of Renunciation, which says that, as worldly life is full of

unhappiness, it should be given up ; it is not a doctrine of the

Karma-Yoga science, and it is not proper to mix up these

doctrines of different schools of thought and pervert the meaning

of the Glta. And as the Glta itself says that mere prosperity

without Knowledge is a godless prosperity (asurasampatti), it

follows that we must always maintain the union of jnanam

•with aisvaryam, or of ais uaryam with jnanam, or of santi with

jtusti. When it is admitted that aiivayram is necessary, though

along with jnanam, it necessarily follows that Action must be

performed. Manu has said that: " Jcarmany arabharrianam hi

pwmsam srlr nisevate " ( Manu. 9. 300 ), i. e., " in this world,

only those persons who perform Action, acquire srl

(prosperity)". The same thing is established by our personal

experience, and the same is the advice given in the Glta to Arjuna

<Gi, 3. 8 ). Some persons take the objection to this position

that in as much as Action is not necessary for Release, all

Action must be given up ultimately, that is, after the

acquisition of Knowledge. But, as I am at present considering

the question only of pain and happiness, and also as I have not

yet gone into the examination of the natures of Action ( karma)

and Release ( moksa ), I shall not here answer that exception.

I shall explain in detail in the ninth and tenth chapters what

Metaphysics, and the Theory of Cause and Effect are, and then

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS 163

in the eleventh chapter, I will prove that even this objection is groundless.

I have so far shown that pain and happiness are two independent and different sufferings ; that, as it is impossible to satisfy the desire for happiness by the enjoyment of happiness, we find that in ordinary life the sum total of unhappiness is always greater ; that, in order to escape this unhappiness, the most meritorious thing to do is not to totally destroy Thirst or Discontent and at the same time Action itself, but to continue the performance of all Actions without entertaining any hope ior the result; that, the happiness of enjoying objects of pleasure is in itself a happiness, which is always insufficient, inconstant, and beastly, and that the true ideal of man, who is endowed with Reason, must be higher than such happiness; "that, this true ideal is the happiness of the peace (sonft) which results from . Self-Realisation ; but that, although Metaphysical Happiness is, in this way, superior to Material Happiness, yet, one must possess with it also a proper quantity of worldly objects; and that therefore, we must also make Effort, that is, perform Action, desirelessly. When these conclusions have been firmly established by the Karma- Yoga science, I need not further say that it is wrong to decide questions of Morality by the consideration of the external effects of Actions in the shape of pain and happiness on the basis that Material Happiness is the highest ideal of man — ■even looking at the question from the point of view of Happi- ness merely. Because, looking upon a thing which can never by itself reach the state of perfection, as the 'highest' ideal, is misusing the word 'highest' ( parama I, and is as unreasonable as believing that water exists, where there is only a mirage. If one 's highest ideal is itself inconstant and incomplete, then, what else, except something inconstant can one acquire, by keeping that ideal before one's eyes ? This is what is meant by the words : "dharmo nityah sukliaduhkhe to anitye ' ', i. e„ ■"morality is immutable; pain and happiness are mutable". There is much difference of opinion among Materialistic philosophers themselves as to how the word 'happiness', in the phrase 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', is to be understood. Some of these philosophers are of opinion that, in

164 Giri-BAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

as much as man is very often willing to sacrifice his life for the sake of Veracity, or of his Religion, casting aside all Material Happiness, it is not proper to say that his desire is always to acquire Material Happiness; and they have, therefore, maintained that we must use the word 'benefit' {kiiam), or the word 'good' (kcUyariam) instead of the word 'happiness' (sukham), and change the phrase 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' into the phrase 'greatest good or benefit of the greatest number'. But, even doing so, the objection that the Reason (tmddhi) of the doer has not been taken into account, as also several other objections apply to this point of view. If one says that Mental Happiness must be taken into account, along with Material Happiness, then, the fundamental theorem that the morality of any particular Action must be decided by its external effects, is falsified, and one, to a certain eitent, accepts the Metaphysical aspect of the matter. But, if in this way, you cannot escape accepting the Metaphysical aspect of the matter, then where is the sense of accepting it only half way 1 Therefore, our philosophy of ' Earma-Yoga has ■ultimately come to the conclusion that the doctrines of 'the benefit of everybody', or 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', or the highest development of humanness' or other such external tests or Materialistic methods of determining ■questions of Morality are inferior tests, and that what \s Right Action, and what Wrong Action or Non-Action must be determined by the Metaphysical tests of beatific happiness in the shape of Self -Realisation, and the attendant Pure Reason of the doer. The case is different, of course, of those persons who have sworn not to enter into the philosophy of things beyond the external world, under any circumstances. Other- wise, it only logically follows that one has got to go beyond Mind and Reason, and look upon the permanent benefit of the- permanent Atman as the most predominant factor, even in the Karma-Yoga science. The belief of some persons that when one enters into Vedanta, everything becomes Brahmised (Brahma-maya), and the necessity of worldly life' cannot satisfactorily be accounted for, is wrong. As the varidus works on Vedanta, which can ordinarily be read now-a-days have been written principally by followers of the Path of

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINBSS 165

denunciation, and as in the Path of Renunciation, worldly life in the shape of Thirst is looked upon as totally insipid, it is true that the science of Karma-Yoga has not been properly expounded in their works. Nay, these writers, who are intolerant of rival cults, have foisted the arguments of the Path ■of Renunciation on the Karma- Yoga, and attempted to create the belief that Samnyasa (Renunciation) and Karma- Yoga, are not two independent paths for obtaining Release (moksa), but that Samnyasa is the only correct Path according to the Sastras. But such a view is incorrect. The Path of Karma-Yoga has- been independently followed from times immemorial, side by side with the Path of Renunciation, aocording to the Vedic religion; and the promulgators of this path have very .satisfactorily expounded the science of Karma-Yoga, without departing from the elementary principles of Vedanta. The Bhagavadglta is a work pertaining to this Path of Karma- Yoga. But, leaving aside the Gita for the moment, it will be seen that the system of expounding the science of the doable and the not-doable from the Metaphysical point of view was started, even in England itself, by writers like Green, * and long before him, in Germany. However much one may ■consider the visible world, so long as one has not properly understood who is the HE who sees this visible world, or who Tpsrforms these Actions, the consideration of the highest duty of man in this world will always remain incomplete from the philosophical point of view. Therefore, the advice of YajBavalkya: u atma va are drastavyah srotavyo maniavyo mdidhyasifavydh ", is literally applicable to the present case. If even after the examination of the external world, one ultimately comes to basic principles like philanthropy, then, "we must say that by such examination, the importance of the soience of the Highest Self (adhyatma) is not in any way belittled, but that this is one more proof of there being only ■one Atman in all created things. If Materialistic philosophers ■cannot transcend the limitations which they have placed on themselves, there is no help for it. Our philosophers have

• ProUgonum to Ethiei, Book I ; and Kant's Mttaphytus of

Morals ( trans, by Abbott, in Kant's Theory ofEthta).

166 Gm-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

BXtended their sight far beyond that, and have fully justified the science of Karma- Yoga on the basis of Metaphysics. But, in as much as it is necessary to consider another contrary view (■purva-pakqa), which deals with the subject of Right Action and Wrong Action or Non-Action, I shall deal with that view before explaining how that justification has been made.

CHAPTER VI.

THE INTUITIONIST SCHOOL AND THE CONSIDERATION OF THE BODY AND THE ATM AN.

(ADHIDAIVATA-PAKSA AND KSETRA-KSETRAJNA- YICARA).

satyaputain vaded vacarh manahputam samacaret *

Manu. 6. 46.

There is another method of the consideration of the- question of Action, Non-Action, and Wrong Action, besides the Positive or Material method, namely, the Intuitionist (adhidaivata) method. Those who belong to this school say that, when a man decides as to what is Action, Non-Action, or Wrong Action, or as to the doability or non-doability of any particular Action, he never troubles to find out how pain * or happiness will result from any particular Action, and whether the sum total of happiness caused by it is greater than that of unhappiness, nor does he enter into the con- sideration of the Atman and the Non-Atman; and many- persons do not understand these intricate questions. Nor even- does everybody do every particular act for his own happiness. Whatever arguments may be advanced by Materialist philoso- phers, if one considers minutely for a moment what the state of mind of a person is in determining the righteousness or unrighteousness of any particular Action, it will be seen that inherent and noble mental impulses like pity, kindness, philanthropy etc. impel him to do any particular act on the- spot. For instance, when a man sees a beggar, his mind is inspired by the feeling of pity before the thought as to what benefit will be acquired by his Self or by his giving the beggar something in charity entere it, and he gets rid of the matter by giving the beggar whatever he can; in the same way, when her child begins to cry, the mother does not stop to consider

• " Speak that which has been purified (become pita) by satyam

(veracity); and behave in that way which your Mind considers as pure ".

168 GETA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

low much how many people will be benefitted by her feeding it, but she at onee begins to feed it. Therefore, the true foundations' of the seience of Karma-Yoga are- these noble mentanmpulses. These "mental impulses have Hot been given to us by anybody, but they are Nature-born ot inherent, or, in a .sense, serf -created deities. When a judge is seated in his judicial chair, he is inspired by the deity of Justice when he administers justice, and if he defies this inspiration, he administers injustice. The inherent mental impulses of kind- ness, pity) philanthropy, gratitude, love for one's duty, courage and other virtues, are deities just like the deity of Justice. Every one by nature knows what the true forms of these deitias are. If ha defies the inspirations of these deities on account of avarice, hatei or jealousy, or for some such other reason, what can these deities do ? ,Now, it is true that there is sometimes a conflict between these deities themselves; then, we are in doubt as to the inspiration of which deity we should consider as predominant in doing a particular Action ; and then it becomes necessary fqr us to consider some .other power besides the deities, of Justice, Kindness, etc. in order to satisfy this doubt. But even if, on these occasions, we do not enter into the intricacies of Metaphysical considerations, or of the weighing of pain or happiness, but only consult our Mental Deity (manodenita), that is, our Conscience, that deity immediately shows us which path is the more meritorious one; and therefore, ^Conscience is superior to all deities. The word " Conscience ' (mmodevaiu) is not to be understood as meaning and including desire^ anger,;, avarice, or the other emotions which inhabit the mind, but as jnea.ning, in the present contest, the God-given or., inherent power which every one possesses of choosing between good and bad. This very power has got the high-sounding name of, " Power of discriminating between the good and the bad" (sad-asad-mveka-buddh), * and if a person, on any occasion of doubt, thinks for a moment quietly and with a peaceful mjnd, this deity which, discriminates between the right and the wrong (sad-amd-uvecana-demta)

• Thia ' aad-asad viveka-buddhi ' tiieans ' Oonacienca' in English';;

and the ' adhidaivata paij» ' ia the Intuitionist School.

INTUITIONfer SCHOOL & th!b 66d^ & ATMAN 169

■will never fail him. Nay", on such occasions, we say to other persons: "Consult your own mind". What importance to attach to what virtue is ready listed with this sovereign deity ■which immediately gives you her decision on any matter in accordance with this list, as occasion arises. Suppose, there is an occasion 1 when there is a conflict between the prin- ciples of Self-protection and Harmlessness, such as a famine, when we are in doubt as to whether Or not to eat uneatable food; then, we should consult- our Conscience, and immediately it will come out with the decision : " Eat the uneatable food ". Similarly, if there is a conflict between Self-interest, and philan- thropy, that situation too must he -solved by the help of this Mental Deity. Orie writer 1 has after peaceful thought stumbled ■on 'this list of the relative values' of righteous and unrighteous actions prepared by" the deity of Conscience, and he has published it in his book. * In this list, the highest place has been given to the feeling 1 of Reverence combined with Humi- lity; and Kindness, Gratitude, Generosity, Affection etc. are given the consecutive lower grades. This writer 3s of the opinion that when there is a conflict between a virtue of a low'er order, and a virtue of a higher order, one must attach higher importance to the virtue oi the higher order. According to this writer, there is ho other proper way of determining the doability or non-doabillty 6r the righteousness or unrighteous- ness of any Action; bedause, even if we extend our vision as fax as possible, and decide in what the ' greatest good of the greatest number ' lies, yet in as much as our discriminating Reason does not possess the power or authority to order "us to dd that in which the good ' of the greatest number lies, the question whether or not one should do that which is beneficial to 'the greatest number ultimately remains unsolved, and again the whole niatter remains in abeyance. The decision of J the doability or non-doability of an Action arrived

sX after a far-sighted consideration of pain and happiness

' i

• This writer is James Wartinein, and hs has pnbli9hed 4Mb

list in his work entitled " types of Ethical Tfieoty" (Vol. II. p. 266; 3rd Ed.). MaitiAean calls Ms school the Kio-psychologioal School. But I include this school in the Intnitioniat School.

170 GM-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

will meet the same fate as that of a decision which may- have heen given by a judge who has not received proper authority from the king. Mere far-sightedness cannot tell a person to do something, or that he must do some particular thing ; because, far-sightedness being a human product, it cannot control human beings. On such occasions, there must be some one else having a higher authority than ourselves who gives the command ; and this function can be satisfactorily discharged only by this God-given Conscience, which is superior to man, and therefore, in a position to- exercise authority over man. As this deity is self-created it is also usual, in ordinary parlance to say : "My Conscience- (manodevata) tells me a particular thing". The fact that when, a man has committed a sinful action, he is subsequently ashamed of it, and that his inner consciousness bites him, is- nothing else but the punishment of this Mental Deity ; and that proves the existence of this independent Mental Deity. For otherwise, we cannot, according to this school of thought,, explain why our Conscience pricks only ourselves.

The summary given above is of the opinions of the Intuitionist School in the Western countries. In these- countries, this body of thought has been principally promulgated by Christian preachers ; and in their opinion, this- God-given method is superior to, and easier to follow than the purely Materialistic methods for determining the righteousness- ot unrighteousness of an Action, and is, therefore, the method which should be acted upon. Although in India there was no ■ such independent section of the science of Kamia-Yoga in. ancient times, yet we oome across similar opinions in many places in our ancient treatises. We find in many places in the Mahabharata that the various mental impulses have been given> the forms of deitieB. I have referred in the foregoing pages to the story of the deities of Morality (dharmamj, Prosperity fsn) etc. having left the body of Prahlada and entered the body of Indra. This deity who discriminates between doability and: non-doability, or righteousness and unrighteousness is called: 'JQharmam', and there are stories that this deity had manifested himself in the form of a syena bird for testing the truthfulness- of the King Sibi, and first in the form of a yakqa and later oa

INTUITIONIST SCHOOL & THE BODY & ATMAN 171

in the form of a dog for testing Yudhisthira. Even in the Bhagavadglta (10.34), Fame (klrti/, Opulence (iri), SpeeohYwfc), Memory (smrti), Acumen (medha), Perseverance (dhrti), and Forgiveness (ksama) are called deities; and out of these, memory, aoumen, perseverance, and forgiveness are qualities of the mind. The Mind itself is a deity, and the worship of it has been prescribed in the Upanisads, as being a symbol of the Parabrahman (Taj. 3. 4; Chan. 3. 18). When Manu says: "mamhpTUam samacaret" (6. 46), i. e., "Do what the Mind believes to be pure", he may be said to have intended the Mental Deity by the word 'mams' (Mind). In ordinary affairs, we say instead : "Do as the Mental Deity (manodevata) pleases. In the Marathi language, the word 'manahpVta' has acquired quite the contrary meaning ; and on many occasions, when a person does whatever he likes, he is said to behave 'manahputa 1 . But the true meaning of this phrase is that : 'One should do only that which the Mind considers as sacred or pure'. In the fourth chapter of the Mam-Samhifa, Manu himself has made the meaning clearer by saying :

yat karma kurvato 'sya syat pariiown, 'taratmanah I tat prayatnem kurvlta viparitam tu, varjayet II

(Manu-Samh. 4. 161).

that is, "One should perform by efforts that Action by which i one's innermost Atman is satisfied ; and one shonld give up whatever is disliked by it", So also, Manu, Yajnavalkya, and the other Smrti-writers, in mentioning the fundamental rules of practical morality such as the rules of Morality applicable to the four castes, etc. have said :

vedah smrtih sadacarah svasya ca priyam atmanah I etao caturvidltam prahuh saksad dltarmasya laksanam II

(Manu. 2. 13).

that is, "the Vedas, the Smrtis, good behaviour, and the satisfaction of one's Atman, are the four fundamental elements of righteousness (dhxrmam). The meaning of the words 'the satisfaction of the Atman' is, 'that whioh one's Mind looks upon as pure' ; and it is quite clear that where the righteous-

173 GIT5.-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

mess or unrighteousness of any particular Action could not be •decided by consulting the Srutis, the Smrtis, and the principles of gojbd behaviour (sadacara), the fourth means of deciding the matter was considered to be its 'manah^mtata', i. e., its 'being ■ considered as pure by the Mind'. In the Mahabharata, Dhrtarastra, after relating the stories of Prahlada and Indra rmentioned in the last Chapter, has said in describing 'silam', ithat :

yad amjetptii Mam m mjad atmanah karma paurusam I apatrapeta va yena va tat Jmryat kathaniama H

(Ma. Bha. San. 124. 66).

-that is, "That Action of ours which is not benefioial to others,

• or of vi;hich we ourselves would feel ashamed, should not be

performed in any case. My readers will notice that by using

ihe expressions 'is not beneficial to others' and 'feel ashamed '■

this verse haB included in the same place both the doctrines of

'the greatest good of the greatest number' and the 'Mental

Deity'. Even in the Manu-Smrti, that Action for having done

which or when doing which one feels ashamed, is referred to as

tamasa', and that Action of doing which one does not feel

ashamed, and whereby our innermost self (antaratman) remains

happy, is referred to as 'sattvika' (Manu. 12. 35. 37) ; and these

ideas are to be found also in the Buddhistic treatise

' Dhammapada (See Dhammapada, 67 and 68). Ealidasa says that

when there is a doubt as to the doability or non-doability of

any Action :

satam hi samdehapadew vastusu

pramanam antahkaravapravrttaydh I

(Sakun. 1. 20). <ihat iB, "saintly persons always consider as authoritative the dictates of their own Conscience". Controlling the mental impulses by concentrating the mind on a single object is the ^province of the Patanjala Yoga, and as this Yoga-Sastra .has been in vogue in India from very ancient times, it was at no time necessary to teach our people the method of making the mind peaceful and quiet, and doing that which the Mind considered as proper, whenever there was any doubt about

INTUrriONIST SCHOOL & THE BODY & ATMAN 173

any matter. It is stated in the various Smrtis at the very commencement, that the Rsis who wrote them, used always to • define righteousness and unrighteousness after first completely concentrating their minds (Manu. 11) ; and the method of thus- consulting the dictates of Conscience on any matter also- seems at first sight extremely easy. But when one minutely considers what is meant by a ' pure mind ' from the philoso- phical point of view, this facility of the matter disappears ; and on that account, our philosophers have not based the edifice of Karma-Yoga on it. We must now consider what this philosophical point of view is; but before I do so, I will here explain briefly how the Western Materialistic philosophers have refuted this Intuitionist theory. Because, although the reasons adduced by the Materialists and the Metaphysicians may be different, yet as the result arrived at by both is the same, I shall first deal with the arguments of the Materialists,- in order that the importance and the propriety of the argu- ments of the Metaphysicians should be the better understood by my readers.

As the Intuitionist School has, as mentioned above, given, the highest place to Conscience Pure, it is clear that the objection against the Materialistic philosophy or morals,, namely, that they do not attach any importance to the Reason of the doer, does not apply to the Intuitionist theory. But when one minutely considers what is to be called the ' Pure i Conscience' in the shape of a Mental Deity which dis- j criminates between the Right and the Wrong {sad-asad-iiveka' ] buddhih), it will he seen that other unconquerable difficulties] arise with reference to this theory also. Nobody need be ^ told that whatever thing is taken considering it in all its bearings, and finding out whether or not it is performable or unperformable, doable or not-doable, or whether or not it will be advantageous or pleasant, is a thing which is not done by the nose or the eyeB or any other organs, and that there is an independent organ, namely, the Mind, which serves that purpose. Therefore, doability or non-doability, righteousness or unrighteousness are things which must be determined by the Mind, whether you call it an organ or a deity. If that were all that the Intuitionist school said, nobodjr

174 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

would find any fault with it. But, Western Intuitionists have gone far beyond that. They say that deciding whether a thing is good or bad (so* or asat), just or unjust, righteous or un- righteous, is quite different from deciding whether a particular object is heavy or light, white or black, or whether a cal- culation is correct or incorrect. The Mind can, by logical methods, decide matters which fall within the second category; but the Mind itself is incapable of deciding on the matters mentioned in the first category, and that is a thing which oan be •done only by the Mental Deity in the shape of the Power of discrimination between good and bad. They explain this by saying that in determining whether a particular calculation is correct or incorrect, we first examine the additions or multi- plications involved in it, and then arrive at a decision, that is to say, before determining this question, the Mind has to go through some other actions or activities ; but the same is not the .case in the matter of the discrimination between good and bad. As -soon as we hear that somebody has murdered somebody ■else, we immediately utter the words: "What a bad thing has been done by him I ", and we have not to think about the matter at all. As the decision whioh we arrive at without

any consideration, and the one which we arrive at after con-

sideration, cannot both be said to be the functions of one and the same mental capacity, we must say that Conscience 1 is an independent Mental Deity. As this power or deity is ■ equally awake in the hearts of all human beings, every k -one looks upon murder as a crime, and nobody has to I '.be taught anything about the matter.' This Intuitionist ••argument is answered by Materialistic philosophers by saying, that from the fact that we can spontaneously arrive at a deoision on any matter, we cannot draw the conclusion that such matter must be different from .another matter as to which we come to a decision after proper consideration. Doing a thing quickly or slowly is a matter of practice. Take the case of calculations. Merchants quote the rate for the seer immediately on being given the rate for the khandy, by mental calculation. But on that account, their deity of calculation does not become different from the same deity of the best mathematicians. By habit, something

INTUITIONIST SCHOOL & THE BODY & ATMAN 175

leconies so much part and parcel of oneself, that one does it easily and without the slightest consideration. An excellent marksman easily shoots and kills birds on the wing; but mo one, on that account, says that there is soma independent •deity of marksmanship. Not only that, but no one, on that .account, considers the science of marksmanship or of cal- culating the speed of flying birds or other scientific calculations as unnecessary. There is a story told of Napoleon Buonaparte, that as soon as he stood on the battle-field and cast only one glance all round, he could immediately find out the weakest point of the enemy. But, on that account, nobody said that the science of warfare is an independent deity, and that it is in no way connected with other mental faculties. It may be that one man has a greater aptitude for a particular thing than another. But on that account, we do not say that the two have two different kinds of intelligence. Besides, it is not that the decision on questions of doability or non-doability, or of righteousness or unrighteousness is made instantaneously on all occasions. Because, if such were the case, there would never have been any doubt as to whether ' a parti- cular thing ought to be done or ought not to be done '.■ Not only is such doubt occasionally experienced by every one, but, what is more, the decisions given by different persons as to the ■doability or non-doability of the same Action are different. If there is only one self -created deity in the form of 'Conscience', why should there be this difference 1 Therefore, we have to say ,- •that a man comes to a decision on any particular matter, . according as his mind is evolved or educated. There are many : aboriginal tribes who do not consider murder a crime, but even ' ■eat human flesh with pleasure ! But if we for a moment leave aside the case of uncivilised human beings, yet, according to the customs of different countries, something which is ■considered objectionable in one country is wholly acceptable in another country. Marrying a second wife when the first one is alive, is considered a crime in England ; but nobody thinks much of it in India. Indians would feel ashamed of sitting in ■an assembly without their turbans on ; but in England people •consider taking off one's hat as a sign of respect ! If it were true that one feels ashamed of a wrong act as a result only of

176 GETA-EAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

God-given or inherent Conscience, should not every one feel equally ashamed of the same act ? Even marauders consider it disgraceful to draw a sword against a, person whose food th,ey have eaten ; but, even powerful civilispd nations in the West consider it a sign of patriotism to murder people who are subjects of a neighbouring nation ! !. If there is only one deity in the shape of Conscience, why should there be thiB difference ? And if one admits different kinds of Conscience, according to- civilization or according to the customs of countries, then the self-created immutability of Conscience itself suffers. As man leaves the uncivilised state and is gradually more and more oivilised, so also are his Mind and Reason developed;, and when in this way, the Reason has developed, man becomes capable of spontaneously conceiving such ideas as he would have been incapable of conceiving in his former uncivilised condition. We may even say that the Reason being developed in this way is a sign of civilisation, Just as a civilised or educated person's not asking for everything which he casts his. eyes on is a sign of the control over the organs which has become ingrained in him, so also has the mental faculty of choosing between good and evil gradually grown in mankinds and it has now become so much part of human nature that we give our decision as to the morality of a thing spontaneously and without consideration. If we have to see things which are near or which are far, we have to contract the muscles and tendons of the eyes to a greater or lessT extent, and this is done so quickly that we never realise it ; but has any one, on that account, looked upon the consideration of the reasons for this process as useless ? In short, the Mind or the Reason of man are the same at all times and with referenoe to all matters. It is not that we decide between black and white by one kind of Reason and between good and evil by another kind of Reason. The only difference is that the Reason of a particular person may bB more developed, whereas the Reason of another person may be uneducated or incompletely developed. Western Materialistic philosophers have' thus drawn the conclusion that when we bear in mind this difference, and also take into aocount our experience that being able to do any particular thing quickly is only a matter of habit or practice, we have no

INTUITIONIST SCHOOL & THE BODY & ATMAN 177 -

(

.reason for imagining that there is an independent and wonder- ful power like Conscience in addition to the natural faculties of the Mind.

The ultimate decision of our ancient philosophers on this matter is similar to that of the Western Materialistic philosophers. They admit the principle that it is necessary to- consider any particular matter quietly and with a peaceful mind. But they do not accept the position that there is one kind of Reason which decides the question of righteousness and unrighteousness and another kind of Reason which decides whether a particular thing is black or white. The Mind arrives at a correct or incorrect decision according as it has been educated. They, therefore, say that everybody must m^ke an effort to develop his Mind ; and they have also given rules explaining what this development is and how it is to be made. But they do not accept the position that the power of discrimination between good and bad (aad-aaad-oioeunta-sakti) is some independent heavenly gift whioh is different from the ordinary Reason of a man. The question as to how a man acquires knowledge and how the activities of his Mind and Reason are carried on, have been very minutely examined in ancient times. This examination is technically known as "the consideration of the Body and the Atman" (ksetra-ksetrajrla- viwTaj. 'ksetra' means the body and 'ksetrajfia' means the Atman. This ksetra-ksetrajna-oicara is the foundation of Metaphysics ; and as it is impossible to look upon the Power of discrimination between good and bad or any other Mental Deity as higher than the Atman when once one has properly understood this science of the Body and the Atman, it becomes perfectly clear how the IntuitioniBt arguments are insufficient. I shall, therefore, in this place briefly considar the science of the Body (ksetra or Field) and the Atman (ksetrajila). Thereby, my readers will be able to properly understand trie correct meanings of many of the doctrines of the Bhagavadgita.

The body of man ( pinda, ksetra, or sarira ) may be said to be a great factory. As in any factory raw material U first taken in from outside, and then all the material is selected or arranged, and having determined which of the material is useful for the factory and which not, the raw material taken 2a— 24

178 ' GITA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

In is manufactured into different articles and sent out, so also are there numerous activities going on, every moment in the human body. The first of the means man has for acquiring the knowledge of the various objects in the world, made up of the five primordial elements, are his organs. The, true or fundamental form of the objects in the world cannot be iealised by any one by means of his organs. Materialists say that such form is the same as it appears to oul organs; but if tomorrow a human being acquires another new organ, then, from his point of view the qualities of the different objects in the world will be different. Human organs are of two kinds, namely, organs of Action ( htrnwndriya ) and organs of perception (jfkmendriya). The hands, the feet, the voice, the anus and the generative organs are the five organs of Action. All the Actions which we perform by means of our body are performed through these five organs. Besides these, there are the five organs of perception, namely, the nose, the eyes, the ears, the tongue and the skin. "We perceive ■colour by the eyes, taste by the tongue, sound by the ears, •smell by the nose, and touch by the skin. All the knowledge that we acquire of any external object, is the effect of its _ ■colour, taste, sound, smell or touch, and nothing else. For instance, take a pieoe of gold. It looks yellow, it seems heavy to the touch, and it is elongated on being hammered. These and its other qualities which we perceive by means of our organs, is what is 'gold ' in our eyeB; and when these qualities are seen to recur in any particular object, then suph object becomes an independent physical objsct named 'gold' in our opinion. Just as there are doors in a factory for taking material in from outside and for sending out the material

Ijinside, so also, the organs of perception are the doors aan body for taking material inside and the organs

| are the doors for sending that material out. When of the Sun fall on any object and enter our eyes on

lected, our Atman perceives the colour of that object ;

In the minute atoms of soent, emanating from that ae and strike our olfactory nerves, we smell it. The > of the other organs of perception are carried on in the same way ; and when the organs perception are functioning in

INTUITIONIST SCHOOL & THE BODY & X.TMAN 179

this way, we become aware of the external objects in the world through their medium. But the organs of perception do not themselves acquire the knowledge of the activities whitth they carry on ; and therefore, these organs of perception are ! not called 'jnata ' (Knower), but they have been referred to 1 as the portal* for taking in material from outside. When external material has come inside through these doors, the dealing with it afterwards is the function of the Mind. For instanoe, when at noon the clock strikes twelve, it is not the ears which understand what o'clock it is. Just as each stroke falls, aerial vibrations come and strike the ears, and when each of these strokes has in the first place created a distinot effect on the mind, we mentally calculate the sum of all these phenomena and decide what o'clock it is. Even the beasts have got the organs of perception, and as each stroke of the clock falls, it causes an effect on their mind through their ears. But their mind is not sufficiently developed to be able to total up the number of strokes and to understand that it is twelve o'clock. Explaining this in technical language, it is said that although a beast is capable of perceiving individual phenomena by themselves, yet, it is not able to perceive the unity which results from that diversity. In the Bhagavadgita, this is explained by saying : "indriyani parany ahuh indriyebhyah param manah", (Gri. 3. 42), i.e., "the organs are superior to the external objects, and the Mind is superior to all the organs". As has been stated above, if the Mind is not in its proper place, we do not see anything although the eyes may be open, nor do we hear anything though the ears may be open. In short, the external material comes into the factory of the Body through the organs of perception to the clerk called 'Mind', and this clerk subsequently examines that material. We will now consider how this examination is done, and how it becomes necessary to further sub-divide that which we have so far been broadly referring to as the 'Mind', or how one and the same Mind acquires different names according to difference in its funotions.

All the impressions which are created on the mind through the organs of perception have first to be placed together in one place and by comparing them with each other, one has first to

180 GlTA-RAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

decide which of them are good and which bad, which acceptable- arid which objectionable, which harmful and which beneficial p and when this examination has been made, we are induced to- do that thing which is good, beneficial, proper, or doable. This- is the ordinary course. For instance, when we go into a, garden, impressions of the various trees and flowers in it are made on our minds through our organs of perception. But unless our Atman has acquired the knowledge of which of these flowers have a good smell and which a bad one, we do- not get the desire of possessing a particular flower, and 1 consequently perform the Action of plucking it. Therefore,, all mental activity falls into the following three broad divisions, namely : (1) having acquired the knowledge of external objects by means of the organs of perception,, arranging all these impressions, or carefully classifying them for purposes of comparison, (2) after this classification has- been made, critically examining the good or bad qualities of the different objects and deciding which object is acceptable and which not; and (3) when the decision has been made,, feeling the desire to acquire the acceptable and reject the unacceptable, and getting ready for appropriate action. It is not that these three functions must take place immediately one after the other, and without there being any interval of time between them. We may in the present feel the desire of acquiring some object which we may have seen in the past ;. nevertheless we cannot, on that account, say that any one of these three functions is unnecessary. Just as though the Court of Justice is one and the same, the work in it is divided in the following way, namely, the two parties or their respective pleaders first place their respective evidence and witnesses before the Judge, and the Judge gives his decision after considering the evidence on either side, and the Sheriff ultimately carries out the decision which has been given by the Judge, so also are the acti- vities of that clerk whom we have so far broadly referred to as the* Mind', divided. Out of these activities, the function of considering discriminatingly all the various objects which are perceived, and deciding that a particular thing is of a particular kind (euameva) and not of another kind {rianyatha) r that is to say, the function of a Judge, belongs to the organ.

INTUrriON-IST SCHOOL & THE BODY & ATMAN 181

called 'Eeason' (buddhih); and all the mental functions referred to above, except the functions of this faculty of discriminating between good and evil, are carried out by the organ called ' Mind ' (mams), according to the terminology of both the Vedanta and the Sarhkhya philosophies (Sam. Ka. 23 and 27). This (minor) Mind, like a pleader, places ibefore the Eeason the various ideas that a particular thing is like this (samkalpam) or is like that (vikcdpam) etc., for decision; and therefore, it is called an organ which is 'samkalpa- mkalpatmakam', that is, which merely forms ideas without arriving at any decision. The word 'samkalpam' is sometimes made to include also the factor of decision (Chandogya. 7. 4. 1.). But in this particular place, the word ' samkalpam ', has been used to mean and include merely realising, or believing, or taking for granted, or understanding that a particular thing as of a particular kind, or such activities as planning some Action, desiring, thinking, or conceiving, without arriving at

any decision (mscayah). But the function of the Mind is not

.exhausted after placing various ideas for decision before the Eeason in this way like a pleader. When the Reason has decided on the goodness or badness of any particular act, and has decided what is acceptable, the Mind has also to perform the Registrar's function of bringing about, through the organs •of Action, that thing which has been found acceptable, that Is to say, of carrying into execution the decisions of Reason; .and therefore, the Mind can also be defined in another way. It is true that considering how to carry into execution the decision which has been arrived at by the Reason is in a sense ■samkalpa-vikalpatmaka; nevertheless thatprocesB has been given ithe independent name ' vyakaranam', that is, 'development', In the Sanskrit language; all the other mental activities except these are the functions of Reason. The Mind does not •discriminate between the various ideas in the mind. Dis- criminating between them and giving to the Atman the accurate knowledge of any particular object, or deciding that a particular thing is only of a particular kind after proper classification, or arriving at a definite inferenoe, and deciding .as to the doability or non-doability of any particular Action .after inferentially determining the relation of Cause and

182 • GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

Effect between two things, are all functions of the Reason »nd are known in Sanskrit as ' vyavasayah' or 'adhyavasayah'. Therefore, ■ these two words have been defined in the Maha- bharata in the following way in order to show the difference between the Reason and the (minor) Mind, namely : —

" vyavasayatmika buddMh memo vySkaranStmakam "

(Ma. Bha. San. 251. 11). ihat is, "the 'buddhih' (Reason) is an organ which does the vyavasayah, that is, which discriminates and arrives at a decision, and the Mind (minor) is an organ which does the vyaharayam, that is, carries out the development or the further arrangements. In short, the Reason "is vyavasayatmika and the mind is vyakarar/atmakam ". Even the Bhagavadgita. uontains the words "vyavasayatmilca buddhih" (Oil. 2. 44); and in that place, the word buddhih means the organ which dis- oriminates and decides. The buddhih ■ is like a sword. Its. Eunction is only to cut whatever comes before it or is brought before it. It has no other quality or function (Ma. Bha. Vana. 181. 26). Planning, desiring, wanting, memory, perse- verance, faith, enthusiasm, kindness, interestedness, affection, pity, gratitude, sexual impulses, shame, joy, fear, love, attachment, hate, avarice, arrogance, . jealousy, anger etc., are all qualities or faculties of the Mind (Br. 1. 5. 3; Maitryu. 6, 30), and man is prompted to perform any particular actr according to the particular mental impulse which has .sprung into the Mind. . However reasonable a man may be, and even if Jia fully " understands how poor people suffer, yet, if the feeling of pity is not aroused in his heart,, he will never be inspired by the desire to help the poor ; or, though he might feel the desire to fight,' he will not fight if "he is wanting in. courage. The Reason only tells us what the result will be- at those things which we want to do. But as desire, courage etc., are not the faculties of the Reason, Reason by it-self, that is r without the help of the Mind, never inspires the organs to do- anything. On- the other hand, though, -the Mind can inspire the organs when under the sway of Anger "etc., yet an Action- which may have been performed without the discrimination^ of the Reason and .merely by . the inspiration of the mental

INTUITIONIST SCHOOL & THE BODY & ATMAN 18?

impulses, will not necessarily be morally pure. For instance, if something is given in charity without exercising the Reason and merely under the impulse of the feeling of pity, there is a chance of its having evil effects if the charity is given to an. undeserving person. In short, the mental impulses by them- selves are blind without the help of Reason. Therefore, in order that any good Action should be performed by a man, there must be a combination of a Reason which is pure, that is to' say, such as will arrive at a correct deoisioa between good and bad, a Mind which will act according to the dictates of the Reasou, and organs which are subject to the oontrol of Mind. Besides the words 'buddluh' and 'manas\ the other 1 words 'antahkaranam' and 'cittam' are also in vogue. As the word awtdhkarayam out of these means the internal (i. e., antah) organ (i. e., kamnmn or indriyam),' it usually includes the mams (Mind), buddluh (Reason), cittam. (Consciousness) and afta«fraram(Egoism) etc; and when the Mind first contemplates external objects, it becomes cittam, (i. e.» Consciousness), (Ma. Bha. San. 274. 17). But, as in ordinary parlance these words are used as being synonymous, there is very often a confusion as to what meaning is intended ia which place. In order that such a confusion should not arise* only the two words Mind and Reason, out of the various words mentioned above, are used in scientific terminology in the specific meanings mentioned above. When in this way a differentiation has been made between the Mind and the Reason, the Reason in its capacity of a judge, necessarily becomes superior to the Mind, and the Mind becomes the clerk of the Reason. This is the purport of the following words, used in the CHta, namely, "irianasas hi para buddluh", i. e„ ' the Reason is superior to or beyond the Mind" (Gl. 3. 42). Never- theless, even this clerk has, as mentioned above, to perform two. different functions ; the first of these is to properly arrange all the impressions whioh have come from outside, through the medium of the- organs of perception, and to place those impressions' before the Reason for decision; and the second one is to carry "the order Or the message of the Reason to the organs of Action after the Reason has arrived at a < deoision> and make these organs perform those external Actions whioh

184 GlTA-KAHASYA OS KARMA-YOGA

are necessary to be performed for carrying out the decision of the Reason. Just as very often in a shop, the duty of purchasing merchandise for the shop and also the duty of sitting in the shop and selling the goods are both carried out by one and the same clerk, so also is the case with the Mind. Suppose, you see a friend of yours and being inspired with the ■desire of calling him, you say to him 'hullo !' ; then, let us see ■what are the ^various functions which are carried out in your antahkaraTfam. First, your eyes, that is, the organ of perception, have sent a message to the Reason through the medium of the Mind that your friend is near you, and that knowledge is conveyed through the Reason to your Atman. Here, the first function, namely, of the acquisition of knowledge, is over. Then the Atman, through the medium of the Reason decides to call the friend ; next, the desire to speak springs into the Mind in order to execute the decision of the Reason, and the Mind causes the word 'hullo !' to be uttered by the organ of Action. In the SiksU-grantha of Panini, the function of the utterance of words has been described on that hasis as follows :—

atma buddhya sametyarthan mano yunkte viwksaya I rnanah kayagmm almnii so prerayaii marutam I marutas turasi caran mandram jamyati svaram II

that is, "the Atman in the first place grasps all things through the medium of the Reason, and creates in the Mind the desire to speak ; then the Mind sets in action the bodily heat (kayagni) which in turn Bets the breath in motion ; then this breath entering the chest, creates the lowest sound ; and this sound ultimately comes out of the mouth in the shape of labial, guttural, or other sounds." The last two lineB of the above stanza are also to be found in the Maitryupanisad (Maitryu. 7. 11.) ; and from this it is clear, that this stanza must be older than Panini. * 'kayagni' is known in present-day medical

• Max MUller has said that Maitryupanisad mnBt be earlier

in point of time than Panini. Bee Sacred Books of the Essfc Series Vol. XV pp. xlvii— li. This matter lias been more fully dealt with by me in the Appendices,

INTUITIONIST SCHOOL & THE BODY & ATMAN 185

science as 'nerves'. But according to that science, the nerves •which bring in the perception of external objects are different from those which carry the message of the Reason to the organs of Action through the medium of the Mind; and therefore, according to Western medical scientists, we must have two kinds of Mind. Our philosophers have not thought that there are two kinds of Mind; they have differentiated ietween the Reason and the Mind, and have said that the Mind is dual, that ia to say, where the organs of Action are coacerned it acts according to the organs of Action, and where the organs of perception are concerned, it acts according to those organs. Both these ideas are essentially the same. According to the points of view of both, the Reason is the judge who decides, and the Mind becomes samkalparvikalpatmakam, that is, performs the function of conceiving ideas in relation to the organs of perception, and becomes vyalcaranaimakam. that is, executive, in relation to the organs of Action, that is to say, it becomes the actual provocator of the organs of Aotion. Nevertheless, in developing (i. e., making the vyakaranam of) anything, the Mind has very often to conceive ideas (that is, make safnludpam and vihalpam) in order to see in what way the dictates of the Reason can be carried out. Therefore, in defining the Mind, it is usual to say simply "mmkalpa-'dkdpaimakam manah" ; but, it must not be forgotten, that even according to that definition, both kinds of functions of the Mind are inoluded.

The definition of Reason given by me above, namely, that it is the organ which discerns, is intended only for the purpose of minute scientific discussions. But, these scientific meanings of words are always fixed subsequently. It is, therefore, necessary to consider here also the practical meanings which the word 'buddhih' had acquired before this scientific meaning had been fixed. We cannot acquire the knowledge of anything unless it has been identified by the Pure Reason (vyavasaya- imika buddhih); and unless we have acquired the knowledge of that object, we do not conceive the intention or the desire of obtaining it. Therefore, just as in ordinary parlance, the word 'mango' is applied both to the mango-tree and the mango-fruit, so also ordinary people very often use ths single word 'buddhih' (Reason) for signifying the Pure Reason

186 . . GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

(vyavasayatmika buddhih), as also the fruits of- that Reason in the shape of Desire etc. For instance, when we say that the buddhih of a particular person is evil, we intend to say- that his ' Desire ' is evil. As ' Intention ' or ' Desire ' are both faculties of the Mind from the scientific point of view, it is not correct to refer to them by the word ' buddhih '. But, before the word 'buddhih' had been scientifically analysed, the word! 'buddhih' had begun to be used in ordinary parlance in the two meanings of (i) the organ which discerns and (ii) the Intention or Desire which subsequently arises in the human mind aB a result of the functioning of that organ. Therefore^ just as the additional word ' tree ' or ' fruit ' is used when it is: intended to show the two different meanings of the word 'mango', so also, when it is necessary to differentiate between the two meanings of the word ' buddhih ', the ' buddhih ' which discriminates, that is to say, the technical 'buddhih' is referred to by qualifying it by the ad jective ' vyavasayatmika * and Desire is referred to as Bimply 'buddhih' or at most as ' vasanatmika buddhih'. In the Gita the word 'buddhih' has been used in both the above meanings (Gi. 2. 41, 44, 49 and 3.; 42); and in order to properly understand the exposition of the Karma-Yoga, both these meanings of the word 'buddhih ' have to be continually kept before the mind. ■ When man begins to do any particular act, he first considers whether it is good, or bad, doable or not-doable etc., by means of his Pure Reason. {vyavasayatmika buddhih), and when the Desire or Intention (that is, the vasanatmika buddhih) of doing that act enters his- mind, he becomes ready to perform the act. This is the order of the mental functions. When that buddhih out of the two- ( namely the vyavasayatmika ) which has to decide between the- doability and the non-doability of any particular Action is functioning properly, the Mind is not polluted by improper- Desires (buddhih) entering it. Therefore, the first theorem of the Karma-Yoga preached in the Gita is that the vyavasa- yatmika buddhih (Pure Reason) must be made pure and steady (Gi. 2. 41). Not only the Gita, but also Kant has- differen- tiated between two kinds of buddhih and he has described the functions of the vyavasayatmika buddhih (Pare Reason) and of the vyavaharika or vasaruitmika buddhih (Practical Reason) in

INTUmONIST SCHOOL & THE BODY & A.TMAN 187

two different books. * Really speaking, steadying the Pure- Reason ib the subjeot-niatter of the Patafijala Yoga-SSstra,- and not of the Karma- Yoga SSstra. But in considering any particular act, one must, according to the doctrine of the' Glta, first consider the desne or the uosanflfjiiifca buddliih of the doer of the act, before one looks at the effect of the act ( Gi. 2. 49 ); and in the same way when one considers- the question of Desires it will be seen that the man whose pure Reason has not become steady and pure, conceives different shades of desire in his mind, and therefore), it is not certain that these desires will be always pure or holy (GI. 2. 41). And if the desires themselves are not pure, how will the resulting Action be pure 1 Therefore, one has to consider in detail, even in the science of Karma-Yoga, the methods or means which have to be employed to keep the vyaoasuyatmika buddhih pure, and therefore, the Patafijala Yoga has been, desoribed in the sixth chapter of the Bhagvadgita as one of the means by which the vyavasayatmka buddliih oan be made pure. But some doctrinal commentators have disregarded this fact and drawn the inference that the Glta supports and" preaches the Patafijala Yogal From this it will be olear- to my readers how necessary it is to bear in mind the above- mentioned two meanings of the word ' buddhh ' and their mutual relation.

j I have in this way explained what the respective functions- df the Mind and the Reason are, after explaining the internal working of the human mind, and I have also mentioned the- other meanings of the word 'buddhih.'. Having in this way differentiated between the Mind and the ' vyauisayatmka Uuddhih' (Pure Reason), let us see how this aspect affecte- the question of the deity which discerns between good and evil {Sad-asad-viueka-devctia). As the only purpose which this deity serves is to choose between good and evil, it cannot be included in the (minor) Mind; and as there is only one

• Kant calls the vyavasayitmika buddhih Pare Reason; and the

vasanatmika buddhih Practical Reason^ and he has dealt with these - two kinds of Season in two separate books.

188 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

• ' vyamsayatmika buddhih' (Pure Reason) which considers all

matters and comes to a decision on them, we cannot give an independent place for the sad-asad-mvecam sakli (power of

-discriminating between good and evil). There may ob numerous matters about which one has to think, discriminate, and come to a conclusion. In commerce, war, civil or criminal legal proceedings, money-lending, agriculture, and other trades, there arise any number of occasions on which one has to discriminate. But, on that account, the vyaraMyat- mikd buddhih in each case does not become different. The function of discrimination is common to all these cases; and therefore, the buddhih (Reason) which makes that dis- crimination or decision must also be one only. But in as much as the buddhih is a bodily faculty (sarira-dharma) just like the Mind, it can be sattviki, rajasi, or tamasi according to previous Actions, hereditary impressions, or education or for other reasons; and therefore, a thing which might be acceptable to the buddhih of one person may be looked upon as unacceptable to the buddhih of another person. But on that account, we cannot say that the organ of buddhih is

■ different in each case. Take for instance, the case of the eye.

■ Some people have squint eyes, while others have half -closed eyes, and others one eye only, and some have dim vision, while

• others have a clear vision. But, on that account, we do not Bay that the eye is a different organ in each case, but say that the organ is one and the same. The same argument must be applied to the case of the buddhih. That same buddhih which differentiates between rice and wheat, or between a stone and a diamond, or which distinguishes between black and white, or sweet and bitter, also discriminates between what is to be feared and what not, what is good and what evil, what is profitable and what disadvantageous, what is righteous and what unrighteous, or what doable and what not-doable, and oomes to a final decision in the matter. However much we may glorify it in ordinary parlance by calling it a 'Mental Deity' yet from the philosophical point of view, it is one and the same vyamsayatrtika buddhih (pure Reason). That is why in the 18th Chapter of the Glta, one and the same buddluh has . been divided into the three kinds of sattviki, rajasi, and tamasi

INTUITIONIST SCHOOL & THE BODY & ATMA.N 189'

and the Blessed Lord first says to Arjuna :—

pravrtHm ca nierttim ca karyakarye bhayabhaye I bandham moksam ca ya vetti buddhih sa Partita sattoiki II

(Gl. 18. 30)

that is, "that buddhih which ( properly ) understands which- Action should he begun and which not, which is proper to be- performed and which not, what should be feared and what not H what leads to bondage and what to Release (moksa), is the- satttriki buddhih " ;

and then He goes on to say : —

ynya dharmam adharmam ca karyam cakaryam (ca ca I ayuthavat prajanati buddhih sa Partha rajasi ll

(GI. 18. 31)

that is, "that buddhih which does not make a proper discrimi- nation between the dharmam ( righteous ) and the adharmam (unrighteous), or between the doable and the not-doable, that buddhih is rajasi";

and He lastly says :—

adharmam dharmam iti ya manyate tamasavrta I saroarthan viparitams ca buddhih sa Partha tamasi ll

(GI. 18. 32)

that is, "that buddhih which looks upon that afl righteous-- (dharmam) which is unrighteous (adharmam), that is to say, whioh gives a totally perverse, that is, contrary verdict on all matters is the tamasi buddhih". From this explanation, it will be clear that the theory that there is an independent and distinct deity of which the function is sad-asad-woekah, (i. e„ discrimination between good and evil) is not accepted by the Gita. That does not mean that there can never exist a buddhih (Reason) which will always choose the right thing. What is meant is that the buddhih is one and the same, but the sattiika auality °f choosing only the right thing is acquired by it by previous impressions, or by education, or by control of the organs, or by the nature of the food which a man eats etc, and in the

190 ' GlTA-EAHASYA OE KARMA-TOGA

absence of such factors as previous impressions etc., that same ■buddhih becomes rajasl or tamasl, not only in the matter of the discrimination between the doable and the not-doable but also in all other matters. Such is the import of the above stanzas. The facts of the difference between the buddhih of a thief and that of an honest man, or of persons belonging to different countries is explained by this theory in a satisfactory way, in which it cannot be explained by looking upon the Power of -discrimination between good and evil (sad<isad-mvecam-saM) as an independent deity. "Making one's buddhih, sattviki, is what one oneself can do ; and it cannot be done without the control of the organs. So long as the vyavasayatrmlca buddhih acts only according to the dictates of the organs, without discriminating between or examining what promotes one's true benefit, it cannot be called Pure (saddha) ; therefore, one must not allow the buddhihto become the slave of the Mind and the •organs, but one must on the other hand arrange it so that the Mind and the organs are under its control, This principle has been enunciated in numerous places in the Bhagavadgita <Gl. 2.' 67, 68 ; 3. 7, 41 ; 6. 24, 36) and, on that account, the body, has been compared to a chariot in the Kathopanisad, and it is metaphorically stated that in order that the horses in the shape ■of the organs which pull that chariot should be properly guided in the path of the enjoyment of objects of pleasure, the ■charioteer in the shape of the vyamsayatmika buddhih has to •courageously keep taut and steady the reins in the shape of the Mind ( Katha. 3. 3. 9) ; and in the Mahabharata also, the same simile has been adopted in two or three places with some ■slight difference (Ma. Bha. Vana 210. 25 ; Strl. 7. 13; Asva. 51. 5). 'This simile is so proper for describing the function of the control of the organs, that the famous greek Philosopher Plato has in his book (Phoedrus. 246) made use of the same illustra- tion in describing the control of the organs. This illustration ■does not appear literally in the Bhagavadgita. Yet, the •description of the control of the organs in the above-mentioned stanzas has been made keeping this illustration in mind, as •cannot but be noticed by anybody who keeps in sight the previous and posterior context of this subject-matter. Ordinarily, that is, when it is not necessary to make subtle

INTUITIONIST SCHOOL & THE BODY*. ATMAN 191

scientific distinctions, this is known as 'manomgrahri (control of the Mind) ; but when, as mentioned above, a distinction is made between the manas (Mind) and the buddhih ( Reason), the function of control falls to the share, not of the Mind, but of "the pure (vyavasayalmika) Reason. In order this cyavasayatmilm. iuddhih should become pure, the principle that there is only one Atman in all human beings, must be deeply impressed on the mind by realising the true nature of the Paramesvara whether by the mental absorption (samadhi) taught in the Tatanjala Yoga, or by Devotion or by Knowledge ( jilti,m ) or by Meditation (dhyam). This is what is known as Self- devoted (atma-mstha) buddhih. When the vijavasayailfixka iuddhih has in this way become Self-devoted (atmaniqtha), and the Mind and the organs have learnt to act according iio its directions as a result of mental control, Desire, Intention, or other mental functions (manodharma) or the ■msawfitflv.ka buddhih (Practical Reason), naturally become pure and chaste, ■and the bodily organs naturally tend towards sattvika actions. From the Metaphysical point of view, this is the foundation of all good actions, that is to say, the esoteric* teaching •(rahasya) of the science of Proper Action (Karma-Yoga).

My readers will now have realised why our philosophers have not accepted Conscience as an independent deity, in addition to the ordinary functions of the Mind and the Reason. From, their point of view, there is no objection to looking upon 'the Mind or the Reason as deities by way of glori- fication; but they have come to the conclusion that con- sidering the matter scientifically, there is no third element like Oonscience which is distinct from and in addition to the two things which we call manas (mind), and buddhih (Reason) -and which is inherent. We now clearly seethe propriety of the word satam having been used in the phrase 'satam hi mfndeha paclesu ' etc. Those whose minds are pure and Self- deVoted (atmanistha), need not at any time be afraid of cop- suiting their Conscience (antahkarana). We may even say that they should purify their Mind as much as possible before performing any Action, and consult their Conscience, But, there is no sense in dishonest people saying : " We do the same thing ", because, the Conscience of both is not the same, and

GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

whereas the Conscience of saints is sattvilca, that of thieves is tamasa. In short, that which the Intuitionist School refers- to as ' the Deity which discerns between Good and Evil' (the* sad-asad-viveka-devata), is seen not to be an independent deity when the matter is considered from the philosophical point of view, but to be only the Self-devoted and the sattvika form of the vyawsayatmika buddhih. This is the theory of our philosophers, and when this theory is accepted, the Intuitionist point of view naturally falls to the ground.

When we have thus seen that the Materialistic aspect is one-sided and insufficient, and also that the easy device foundl out by the Intuitionist school is ineffective, it becomes necessary for us to see whether or not there is some other way for justifying the doctrine of Karma-Yoga. This way is the Metaphysical aspect of the matter; because, when we have, once come to the conclusion that there is no suoh indepen- dent and self -created (smyambhu) deity like the sad-asad-viveka- buddhih (Conscience), notwithstanding the fact that the Reason is superior to external Action, it becomes necessary to consider, even in the science of Karma-Yoga, how one can keep one's Reason pure in order that one should be able to perform pure Action, what is meant by Pure Reason, and how the Reason, can be made pure; and the consideration of these questions, cannot be complete unless one leaves aside the Material soiences which deal only with the external physical world, and enters into Metaphysics. Our philosophers have laid down the ultimate doctrine, in this matter, that the Reason, which has not fully realised the true and all-pervading nature of the Paramesvara, is not pure; and the science of the Highest Self (adhyatma) has been expounded in the Gita solaly in order to explain what this Self-devoted Reason [atmanistha buddhih)- is. But. disregarding this anterior and posterior context, some doctrinal commentators on the Gita have laid down the con- elusion that Vedanta is the principal subject-matter of exposi- tion in the Gita. It will be shown later on exhaustively that this conclusion arrived at by these commentators as to the subject-matter expoundsd in the Gita, is not correct. I have for the time being only to show how it is necessary to consider the question of the Atraan when one wishes to find out how the

INTUITIONtST-SCHOOL & THE BODY & ATMAN 193

Beason is to be purified. This question of the Atman has to be considered from two points of view : — (1) the first method of exposition is to examine one's own body,' (piydah, ksetra, or • sariram), as also the activities of one's Mind, and to explain how as a result of such examination, one has to admit the existence of the Atman in the shape of a ksetrajHa, or an owner of the Body (Gl. Chap. 13). This is known as the suriraka-vicara or the KSETRA-KSETRAJNA-VICARA (the Consideration of the Body and the Atman) ; and that is why the Vedanta-Sutras are known as sarlraka (dealing with the Body) sutras. When in this way we have examined our Body and Our Mind, we> ' have next to consider (2) whether the elementary principle which is arrived at by such examination, and the principle which is arrived at by the examination of the brahmandam or the visible world around us, are the same or are different.' The examination of the world made in this way'is known, as the KSARAKSARA-VICaRA or the VYAKTAVYaKTA-VICARA ■ (the consideration of the Mutable and the Immutable, or the consideration of the Perceptible and the Imperceptible). The 'kqara' or 'vyakta' is the name of all the mutable objects in the world, and aksara or avyakta is the name of the essential and eternal element in the mutable objects in this creation (Gi. 8. 21 ; 15. 16). The fundamental Element which we dis- cover by further examining these two elementary principles arrived at by the consideration of the Body and the Atman and of the Mutable and the Immutable, and which is the Ele- " ment from which both these elements have been evolved, and whioh is beyond ( para ) both of them, and is the Root Element ' of everything, is called the Absolute Self (Paramatman) or the Purusottamah (Gi. 8. 20): All these ideas are to be found in the Bhagavadgita, and the science of Proper Action has been expounded in it by showing how the buddhih is ultimately purified by the Realisation (jnanam) of this Element in the shape of the Paramatman, which is the Root Cause of every- thing. If, therefore, we have to understand this method of ' exposition, we must also follow the path which has been followed in the Gita. Out of these two subject-matters, the • knowledge of the brahmandam or the consideration of the ' Mutable and .the- Immutable (ksceraksara) will be dealt'with 25-26

194 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

in the next chapter. I shall now complete the science of the pinda, or the consideration of the Body and the Atman which T had ooramenced in this chapter in order to explain the true nature of the Conscience, and which has remained incomplete.

I have finished my exposition of the gross Body made up of

the five primordial elements, the five organs of Action, the five

organs of Perception, the five objects of these five organs of

Perception in the shape of sound, touch, colour, taste, and

smell, the Mind which is the conceiver of ideas {samlcalpa-

tihalpa), and the Pure Reason (vyavasayatmika buddluh). But that

does not exhaust the consideration of the Body. The Mind and

the Reason are the means or the organs for thought. If the

gross Body does not possess movement (cetana) in the form of

Vitality ( pranah ) in addition to these, it will be just the same

■whether the Mind and the Reason exist or not. Therefore, it is

necessary to include one more element in the Body in addition

to these other things, namely, Movement (cetana). The word

'cetana', is sometimes also used as meaning the same thing as

'caitanyam' ( Consciousness ). But one must bear in mind that

the word cetana has not been used in the sense of caitanyam

in the present context, 'cetana here means the movement,

activity, or the vital motion of the Life forces seen in the

gross Body. That cicchakfih ( Power of Consciousness ) by

means of which movement or activity is created even in

Gross Matter, is known as caitanyam ; and we have now

to consider what that Power is. That factor which

gives rise to the distinction between "mine", and "other's"

•which is to be seen in the Body in addition to its Vital

activity or Movement, is a different quality altogether;

Because, in as much as the Reason is only an organ which

<somes to a decision after proper consideration, Individuation

(ahamkarah), which is at the root of the distinction between

one's and another's, must be looked upon as something different

from Reason. Like and dislike, pain and happiness, and other

correlative couplets (dvaniduam) are the properties of the Mind.

But as the Nyaya school looks upon these as properties of the

Atman, Vedanta philosophy includes them among the properties

of the Mind in order to clear that misunderstanding. In the

same way, that fundamental element in the shape of Matter

INTTTITIONIST SCHOOL & THE BODY & ATMAN 195

'( prakrti ), from which the five primordial elements have sprung, is also included in the Body (Gl. 13. 5, 6). That Pow& by which all these elements are controlled or kept steady, is again a different power (Gl. 18. 33), and it is called 'dhrti' (co-hesion). ' That amalgamated product which results from the combination of all these things is scientifically called the 'savikara sarira' (activated Body), or 'ksetra' ; and this is what we, in ordinary parlance, call the aotivated {savikara) human body, or the pinda. I have defined the word ' ksetra ' in this way, consistently with the Glta. But in mentioning the qualities Desire, Hate etc., this definition is sometimes more or less departed from. For instance, in i;he conversation between Janaka and Sulabha, in the Santi. parva (San. 320), the five organs of Action have not been mentioned in the definition of the Body, but instead of them ithe six qualities of Time-feeling (Ma), Realisation of Good and Evil (sad-asad-bhavdh). Method (vidhih), Vitality (sukram), and Strength (bala) have been mentioned. According to this ■classification, the five organs of Action have to be included in the five primordial elements, whereas according to the classification adopted in the Glta, we are to include Time in the Ether (akasam), and Method, Vitality, Strength etc^ in the five primordial elements or in Matter. Whatever may be the case, the word ' ksetra ' conveys only one meaning to everybody. That collection of mental and bodily elements or qualities in the shape of pranah (Life force), which has specific activities (tisista-cetana), is known as ' ksetra '. As the word 'sarira' is also applied to dead bodies, the different word ksetra' has been used in this particular place, 'ksetra' ■originally means 'field', but in the present context, it has ■been used metaphorically as meaning the ' activated (savikara) ■and living (sajiva) human body '. That which has been referred to by me above as a great factory is this ' ksetra '. The organs of Perception, and the organs of Action, are the portals of this factory for taking in material from outside and for sending out the manufactured products respectively and, the Mind, the Reason, Individuation (ahamkara), and Activity (cetana) are the workmen in this factory; and all the functions carried ■on or caused to be carried on by these workmen, are referred

196 GlTA-RAHASYA oB KARMA-YOGA

to as the activities (vyaparah), feelings (vikarah), or properties (dJiarmah) of this Body.

When in this way, the meaning of the word ' ksetra ' has. been defined, the next question which naturally arises is, to whom does this ksetra or field belong, is there or is there not some owner for this factory ? Although the word 'Atman v is very often used in the meaning of ' Mind ' or ' Conscience ' or 'one's Self ', yet, its principal meaning is 'the owner of the Body (ksetrajna) ". "Whatever functions are performed by man, and whether they are mental or bodily, are carried on by his internal organs such as buddhih etc., his organs of Perception such as the eyes etc., and his organs of Action, such as hands,, feet, etc. In the whole of this group, the Mind and the Reason- are the most superior. But although they may, in this way, be superior to the other organs, yet they are both funda- mentally the manifestations (vikarah) of Matter (prakrti) or of the gross Body, just like the other organs. (See the next - chapter.) Therefore, although the Mind and the Reason may be the highest of all the organs, yet they cannot do anything beyond their particular functions, and it is not possible that they should be able to do anything else. It is true that the Mind thinks and the Reason decides. But, knowing this, we do not arrive at a conclusion as to for whom the Mind' and the Reason perform these functions, or as to who performs- that synthesis which is necessary for obtaining a synthetic knowledge of the diverse activities carried on by the Mind: and the Reason on various occasions, or as to how all the organs subsequently receive the directions to perform their various functions consistently with that synthesis. It cannot be said ' that all this is done by the gross Body of man. Because, when 'cetatta' or activity leaves this gross Body, this gross Body is unable to perform these functions although it remains behind; and as the component partB of the gross Body, namely, the flesh, the muscles, etc., are the result of food, and these- are continually worn out and continually re-formed, it cannot be said that the feeling of sameness by which a person realises that I ", who saw a particular thing yesterday, am the same as the ' I ' who see a different thing to-day, is the- property of the continually changing gross Body. If, however,.

INTUITIONIST SCHOOL &,the BODY & ATMAN ,497

one leaves aside the gross Body, and says that cetana (Activity) is the owner of the hody, then, in deep sleep, one does not continue to possess the 'I' feeling although such activities .or cetaria as breathing or blood-circulation are going on. ■(Br. 1. 1. 15-18). It, therefore, follows that Activity or the functioning of Life forces, is a specific quality which has been acquired by the gross Body, and is not the controlling factor, owner or power which synthesizes all the activities of the organs (Katha. 5. 5). The possessive case adjectival forms ' mine ' or ' another's ' prove to us the existence of the quality of Individuation (akamkSrah). But by knowing that, we do not come to a conclusion as to who this 'aham' or 'I' is. If you say, that this 'I' is a pure illusion, then the experience of everybody is just the contrary; and imagining something which is inconsistent with this personal experience of every- body, would place one in the position desoribed by Sri. Samartha Ramadasa as: "saying something which is in- consistent with experience is wholly tiresome ; it is as useless as opening one's mouth wide and crying" (Dasa. 9. 5. 15); and even if we do this, the fact of the synthesis of the activities of the organs is not satisfactorily explained. Some go so far as to say that there is no such individual thing as ' I ' but that the name ' I ' should be given to the conglomeration or the fusion of all those elements, such as, the Mind, Reason, Activity, gross Body etc., which are included in the word ' ksetra '. But we see by our own eyes, that by merely piling .a piece of wood on another piece of wood, we cannot make a box. ; nor is motion created in a watch by merely putting together all its various wheels. We cannot, therefore, say that activity arises by mere juxta-position. Nobody need be told that the various activities of the ksetra are not purely -foolish activities and that there is some specific intention or object in them. "Who is it that gives this direction to the various workmen, such as, buddlah etc., in the factory of the Body? Juxta-position (samghatah) means merely putting together. Although several things may be put together, it is necessary to thread them together in order that they should form one whole. Otherwise, they will become disorganised at any moment. We have now to

198 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

see what this thread is. It is not that the Glta does not accept the principle of conglomeration (samghatah) ; but that is looked upon as part of the ksefra (Gi. 13. 6). We do not thereby get an idea as to who the ksetrajna or the owner of the Body is- Some persons think, that conglomeration gives rise to some new quality. But this opinion itself is not correct; because, philosophers have after mature consideration oome to the conclusion that that which was not in existence before, in some form or other, cannot come into existenoe anew (Gi. 2. 16), But even if we keep this doctrine aside for a moment, the next question which naturally springs up is why should we not look upon the new quality which arises in the conglomeration, as. the owner of the Body ? To this, some Materialist philosophers, reply, that a substance cannot be different from its qualities, and that the qualities want some superintendence (adhisthanamj, and, therefore, instead of looking upon the property acquired by the Aggregate as the owner of the Body, we look upon the Aggre- gate itself as such owner. Very well ; then why do you not say 'wood' instead of 'fire', or 'cloud' instead of 'electricity', or 'the earth' instead of 'the gravity of the earth' in ordinary parlance 1 If it is not disputed that there must he in existence some Power which is distinct from the Mind and the Reason in order that all the activities of the Body should be carried on systematically and according to some proper arrangement, then can we, because the seat of that Power is still unknown to us, or because we cannot properly explain the full nature of that Power or of that seat, say that that Power does not exist at all ? ~&o person can sit on his own shoulders ; in the same way, it is absurd to say that an Aggregate (samghatah) gives to itself the knowledge of itself. Therefore, we come to the emphatic conclusion even from the logical point of view, that THAT THING for the enjoyment or the benefit of which, the various functions of the Aggregate of the bodily organs etc. are carried on, must be something which is quite distinct from the Aggregate itself. It is true that this Element which is distinct from the Aggregate, is an element which cannot become an object of perception (jneya) or become visible to itself like other objects in the creation, since it is self- enlightened. But, on that account, the fact of its existence

INTUITIONIST SCHOOL & THE BODY & ATMAN 19»

cannot oome into question ; because, theie is no rale that all objeots must fall into tb.9 single category of the 'perceivable (jfieya). All objects fall into two categories, namely, the* 'jftata' and the 'jneya', i. e., the Perceiver, and That which is perceived by the Perceiver, and if some thing does not fall into the second category, it can come into the first category and its existence is as fully established as the existence of the Perceivable. Nay, we may go further and say that in as much as the 5.tman, which is beyond the Aggregate (samghata) is itself a Knower, there is no wonder that it does- not become the subject-matter of the knowledge which it acquires ; and therefore, Yajnavalkya has said in the Brhadaranyakopanisad, that "wjnataram are kena vijaniy<W\ i. e„ "Oh ! how can there be some one else, who can know That which knows everything ? " (Br. 2. 4. 14). Therefore, one has to come to the ultimate conclusion, that there exists in this activated living Body some comprehensive and potent Power which is more powerful and more comprehensive than the- various dependent and and one-sided workmen in the Body who work in grades rising from OTgans like the hands and feet to Life, Activity, Mind and Reason ; that this Power remains aloof from all of them, and synthesizes the activities of all of them and fixes for them the direction in which they are to act, and is an ever-awake witness of all their activities. Thia dootrine has been accepted both by the Sarhkhya and Vedanta philosophies, and the modern German philosopher Kant has shown by minutely examining all the activities of Reason that this is the doctrine which one arrives at. The Mind, th& Reason, Individuation or Activity are all qualities or com- ponent parts of the Body, that is, of the ' ksetra '. The inspirer of these components is different from them, independent of them, and beyond them. " yo luddheh paratas tu mh " (Gi. 3. 42), i. e., " It is beyond the grasp of the Reason ". This is- what is known in the Sarhkhya philosophy as ' purusa ', and in Vedanta philosophy as 'ksetrajna', that is to say, the 5-tman which knows or controls the Body ; and the aotual experience which every one has of the feeling that ' I am ', is the most excellent proof of the existence of this Knower of the Body (Ve-Su. Sam. Bha. 3. 3. 53, 54). Not only doss nobody think

i2Q0 . GlTA-RAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA

' that ' I am not ', but even if a person by Ms moutb utters

' the words : ' I am not ', he thereby inferentially acknowledges

- the existence of the Atman or -the ' I ' which is the subject of the predicate ' am not '. The Vedanta philosophy has been propounded only in order to explain as clearly as possible the

, fundamental, pure, and qualityless form of this kselrajm or Atman, which manifests itself in this way in the body in the individuated and qualified form 'I' (Gi. 13. 4); nevertheless this conclusion is not arrived at by merely considering the Body, that is to say, the Icselra. I have stated before that we have to see what can be ascertained by considering the Cosmos (brahrmndam) that is to say, the external world, in addition to

, consideration of the Body and the Atman. This consideration of the Cosmos is known as ' ksaraksara-vkara '. B'j considering the Body and the Atman, we come to know the fundamental

. element (ksetrajila or Atman) which exists in the kselra (the Body, or the pinda) and by considering the Mutable and the Immutable ( ksaruksara ), we understand the fundamental element in the Cosmos (brahrrianda), that is, in the external creation. When in this way, the fundamental elements of the Body (pinda) and of the Cosmos (brahnianda) have been definitely and severally fixed, Vedanta philosophy, after further con-

, sideration comes.to the conclusion that both these are uniform or one and the same— or that WHATEVER IS IN THE BODY (PINDA), IS ALSO IN, THE COSMOS (BRAH- MANDAM).* This is the ultimate truth of the moveable and the

• The classification made in oar philosophy of Ajuraijaro-oicoc*

and tjelro ttsetrajna-viaira was not known to Green. T e t the expo- sition oi MetaphysicB made by him in the commencement of his book called Prolegcmem to Ethics, has been made by him in a twofold way, namely, regarding the ' Spiritual Principle in Nature ' and the ' Spiritual Principle in Man ' s and later en, he has shown the identity between the two. The lc$etra-k$elrajTia-viaira includes such, mental philosophies as Psychology etc , and the i-saraiiara-vimra includes such sciences as Physics, Metaphysics etc. and even Western philosophers have accepted the position that the nature of the Atman has to be arrived at, after taking into consideration all these things.

INTUITIONIST SCHOOL & THE BODY & ATMAN 201

ummoyeable Cosmos. When we realise that this kind of exa- mination has been made even in the Western countries, and that the doctrines advanced by Western philosophers like Kant etc. are very much akin to the doctrines of Vedanta philo- sophy, we cannot but feel a wonder about the supermanly mental powers of those persons, who laid down these doctrines of "Vedanta by mere introspection, in an age when the Material sciences were not so advanced as they are in the present day ; hut we must not stop with feeling wonder about this matter, — we must feel proud of it.

CHAPTER VII.

THE KAPILA SAMKHYA PHILOSOPHY OR THE

CONSIDERATION OF THE MUTABLE AND

THE IMMUTABLE.

(KAPILA SAMKHYA-SASTRA OR KSARAKSARA- VICARA). prakrtm'purusum caiva viddhyanadi iibhav apt *

Gita. 13. 19.

I have stated in the last chapter, that simultaneously with the consideration of the Body and the Lord or Superin- tendent of the Body — the ksetra and the ksetrajm-ot\e must also- consider the visible world and the fundamental principle in it — the 'ksara' (mutable) and the 'aksara' (immutable)— and then go on to the determination of the nature of the Atman. There are three systems of thought which scienti- fioally consider the mutable and the immutable world. The first of these is the Nyaya school and the second one is the Kapila Sarhkhya school. But the Vedanta philosophy- has expounded the form of the Brahman in a third way altogether, after proving that the propositions laid down by both of those systems of thought are incomplete. Therefore,. before considering the arguments advanced in the Vedanta phi- losophy, it is necessary for us to see what the ideas of the Nyaya school and of the Sarhkhya school are. In the Vedanta- Sutras of B adarayanacarya, the same method has been adopted, and the opinions of the Nyaya school and of the Sarhkhya. school have been refuted in the second chapter. Although the whole of this subject-matter cannot be given here, yet, I have in this and the next chapter given as much information about it as is necessary for understanding the mystic import of the Bhagavadglta. The propositions laid down by the Sarhkhya school are of greater importance than those laid down by the Nyaya school. Because, as Badarayanacarya has said (Ve. Su. 2. 1. 12 and 2. 2. 17), though no respectable and

• Know that both the prakrti (Matter) and the piirusa (Spirit)

are eternal".

SAMKHYA SYSTEM & KSAR&KSAEA-VICA.RA 203

leading Vedanta philosopher has accepted as correct the Nyaya doctrines laid down by the followers of Kanada, yet, as many of the propositions of the Kapila Samkhya-sastra are to be- found in the Smrti writings of Manu and others and also in. the Glta, my readers must first become acquainted with them. Nevertheless, it must be stated right in the beginning that though many ideas of the Samkhya philosophy are to be found in the Vedanta philosophy, yet the readers must not forget that the ultimate doctrines laid down by the Sarhkhya school and the Vedanta school are extremely different from each other. There has also been raised an important question, namely, whether the Vedantists or the Samkhya philosophers are the originators of those ideas which are common to the Vedanta and the Samkhya philosophy. But it is not possible to go so deep into that subject-matter in this book. Possibly, the Upanisads (Vedanta) and the Samkhya philosophy grew up side by side like two children, and the doctrines found in. the Upanisads, which are similar to the Sarhkhya doctrines, may have been independently arrived at by the writers of the Upanisads ; or on the other hand, the writers of the Upanisads may have borrowed some of these doctrines from the Samkhya philosophy ; or thirdly, Kapilacarya may have improved upon the doctrines laid down by the ancient Upanisads according to his own opinions, and formulated the Samkhya philosophy. All these three positions are possible. But taking into account the fact that though the Upanisads. and the Sarhkhya philosophy are both ancient, the Upanisads are the more ancient (Srauta) of the two, the last supposition seems to be the most credible of the three. Whatever may be the truth, when one has once become acquainted with the doctrines laid down by the Nyaya and the Samkhya schools of philosophy, it becomes easier to grasp the principles of Vedanta, especially of the Vedanta in the Glta. Therefore, let us first consider what the opinions of these two Smarta sastras about the formation of the universe aTe.

Some persons have a wrong idea that the only object of Nyaya (i. e,, Logic) is to decide what conclusions can subsequently be- drawn by inference from some desired or given data and which of these inferences are correct, and whioh wrong, and why.

r 204 ■ GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA.

Proving by means of inference etc. is a part of Logic. But that is not the most important part ; classifying or enumerat- ing the various things in the world, that is to say, the subject- matter of proof (apart from the question of proving them), finding out what are the fundamental classes or things under which all the substances in the world can be classified, as a result of the gradual evolution of things in the lower orders into things in the higher orders, finding out what their nature and qualities are, and how other things came into existence out of these things, and how all these things can be proved, and all such other questions are included in Logic. Nay, one may go further and say that this science has come into exist- ence only for this purpose, and not merely for considering the ■question of inference. It is in this way that the Nyaya-sfltras of Kanada are begun and worked out. The followers of Kanada are known as Kanadas. In their opinion the root cause of the world is Atoms. The definition of atoms given by Kanada and the one given by Western natural scientists is the fame. When after dividing and sub-dividing things you come to the stage when division is no more possible, you have reached the atom or 'paramanu' ( parama + anu ), that is, the ultimate entity. As these atoms coalesce, they acquire new qualities as a result of the union, and new things are created. There are also atoms of the Mind and of the Body, and when these unite, life results. The atoms of the earth, water, fire and air are fundamentally different from each other. The fundamental atomB of the earth, have four qualities, namely, form, taste, smell, and touch ; those of water have three such qualities, those of fire, two, and those of air, only one. In this way the entire cosmos is from the very beginning filled with perma- nent and subtle atoms. There is no other root cause of the world except the atoms. The commencement (aramblia) of the mutual coalition or union of the original and permanent atoms results in all the perceptible things in the world com- ing into existence. This theory propounded by the Nyaya .school regarding the creation of the perceptible universe is technically known as ' arantbha-vada ' (Theory of Commence- ment), and some followers of that school never go beyond this. There is a story about one of them, that when those who were

SAMKHYA SYSTEM & KSARAKSARA-VICARA 205

around him at the moment of his death, asked him to take the name of God, he uttered the words: "pilavahl pilaoahl pllavahl"- " atoms I atoms ! atoms 1 ". Nevertheless, other followers of the Nyaya school believe that Isvara is responsible for bringing' about the fusion or union of atoms and they in that way complete the chain of the creation of the universe; and these are known as theistic Logicians. In the second sub-division of the second chapter of the Ved&ntaSutras (2, 2. 11-17), this Atomic theory, and immediately thereafter, also the theory that the Isvara is merely the immediate cause (2. 2. 37-39) has been refuted.

Reading what is stated above regarding this Atomic theory, those of my readers who have studied English will at once think of the Atomic theory advanced by the modem chemist Dalton. But in the Western countries, the Atomic theory of Dalton has now been put into shade by the' Evolution theory of the well-known biologist Darwin. In the same way, in India in ancient times, the Samkhya philosophy has put into the background the theories of Kanada. Not only can the Kanada school not explain satisfactorily how Aotivity was first imparted to atoms, but their theories cannot also- explain how the rising gradation of living things like trees, animals, and men came into existence, nor also how that which was lifeless became living, and several other things. This expla- nation was given in the 19th Century in the Western count- ries by Lamarque and Darwin, and in our country in ancient times by Kapila. The summary of the opinions of both these- schools is that the Cosmos or universe came to be created by the bursting forth of the constituents of one original substance; and on this account, the Atomic theory lost ground in India in ancient times, and now in the Western countries. Similar- ly, modern physicists have now also proved that the atom is not indivisible. It was not possible in ancient times to prove the Atomic theory or the Evolution theory by analysing and examining various material objects in the world by means of physics and other natural sciences. Experimenting again and again on the various objects in the world, or determining their qualities by analysing them in various ways, or making a comparison between the organs of the bodies of numerous present

206 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

ind former living things in the living world, and such other present day devices of the natural sciences were not available to Kanada or to Kapila. They have deduced their propositions from whatever material was before their eyes at the time. Still it is a matter of great surprise that the philosophical propositions laid down by the Samkhya philosophers as to how the growth or formation of the universe must have come about are not much different from the scientific propositions laid down by modern natural scientists. As the knowledge of biology has grown, the material proof of these opinions can now be given more logically, and by the growth of know- ledge of the natural sciences, human beings have undoubtedly benefited to a considerable extent from the Material point of view. But in order to impress on the minds of my readers that the modern natural scientists cannot tell us muoh more than Kapila as to how diverse perceptible created things came into existence out of one impercep- tible prakrti (Matter), I have in various places later on referred shortly to the propositions laid down by Haeckel for comparison side by side with the propositions of the Kapila Sarhkhya school. These propositions were not for the first time promulgated by Haeckel, and he has himself clearly admitted in his works that he was expounding his propositions on the authority of the works of Darwin, Spencer, and other previous natural scientists. Yet Haeckel has for the first time described succinctly and in an easily intelligible way all these various propositions, after properly co-ordinating them, in lis book known as The Riddle of the Universe; and I havei therefore, for the sake of convenience, taken Haeckel as the protagonist of all these natural scientists, and referred prin- cipally to his opinions in this and the next Chapter. I need not say that this reference is only brief, because it is not possible to consider those propositions in this book in greater detail, and those who want further information about them must refer to the original works of Spencer, Darwin, Haeckel and other scholars.

Before considering the Kapila Sarhkhya philosophy, it must be mentioned that the word 'Samkhya' is used in two different meanings. The first meaning is the Samkhya

SAMKHYA SYSTEM & KSARAKSARA-VICARA 207

-philosophy expounded by Kapilacarya, and that meaning has been adopted in this Chapter and in one place in the Bhagavad- glta (Gi. 18. 13). But besides this specific meaning, it is usual to include philosophy of every kind in the general name 'Samkhya', and it also includes the Vedanta philosophy In the phrase ' Samkhya-mstha ' or ' Samkhya-yoga ' this ordinary meaning of the word ' Samkhya ' is intended; and wherever the scients who follow this nistha (doctrine) have been referred to as ' Samkhya ' in the Bhagavadgita later on (Gi. 2. 39; 3. 3; 4. 5; and 13. 34), not only the followers of the Kapila Samkhya school, but also the Vedantists who have abandoned all Actions by atmanatma-vicara (by considering what does and what does not pertain to the Self); and who are .lost in the contemplation of the Brahman, are intended. As the word ' Samkhya ' comes from the root ' Sam-khya ' (calculation), its primary meaning is ' one who counts '; and etymologists ■say that, as the fundamental elements according to the Kapila philosophy are just twenty-five, the followers of that philo- sophy originally got the specific name of 'Samkhya' (in the sense of " counters "), and later on the word 'Samkhya' acquired the comprehensive meaning of philosophy of every kind. I, therefore, think that after the practice of referring to Kapila ascetics as ' Samkhya ' had first come into vogue, Vedanta ascetics also later on came to be known by that name. Whatever may be the case, in order that confusion should not •arise as a result of this double meaning of the word ' Samkhya ', I have used the elongated heading of ' Kapila Samkhya-Sastra ' for this chapter. There are sutras (Aphorisms) in the Kapila Samkhya-Sastra just as in the Kanada Myaya philosophy. But as neither Gaudapada nor Sri Sarhkaracarya, who wrote the Sarira-bhasya, have taken these sutras as authorities in .their works, many scholars are of opinion that they could not be ancient. The Samkhya-Karika written by Isvarakrsna is considered to be older than them. Gaudapada, the chief preceptor of Sarhkaracarya, has written a bhasya (Commentary) •on that work and even in the Samkarabluisya itself, extracts have been taken from these Karikas, and the translation of that work into the Chinese language made before 570 A. D.

208 GlTA-RAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA.

is now available. * Isvarakrgna has stated at the end of these Karikas, that he has in his work given a summary in seventy couplets in the arya metre of a previous extensive- book of sixty chapters called Sasti-Tantra (omitting some chapters). The work Sasti-Tantra is now not available, and. I have, therefore, considered the fundamental propositions of the Kapila Sarhkhya-Sastra on the authority of these Karikas. In the Mahabharata, the Samkhya doctrines have been men- tioned in many chapters. But as in that work, the Vedanta doctrines have been always mixed up with the Samkhya doctrines, it becomes necessary to consider other treatises in order to decide what the pure Samkhya philosophy was ; and for that purpose, no work older than the Sarhkhya-Karikas is at present available. The pre-eminent worth of Kapila becomes clear from the following words of the Blessed Lord 1 in the Glta: " siddhariam Kapilo munih" (Gl. 10. 26 ) r that is, " from among the Siddhas, I am the Kapila muni ". Nevertheless, it is not known where and when Kapila R?I lived. There is a statement in the Santiparva of the Maha- bharata that Sanatkumara, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanatsujata, Sana, Sanatana and Kapila were the seven Mind-born sons of Brahmadeva, and that they were born with ' Knowledge (340.67); and in another place (San. 218), we find the Samkhya

• Mack information is now available about Isvarakrsna from

Buddhistic -works. The preceptor of the Buddhistic scholar Vasu- bandhu was a contemporary opponent of IsvarakiBQa and the his- tory of thiB Vasubandhu written by Paramartha (449 to 569 A. D.)r in the Chinese language has now been published. Or. Takakasu has, on the strength of thiB, come to the conclusion that Isvarakrsna must have lived about 450 A. D. (See Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1905. p. 33 to 53). But accord- ing to Dr. Vincent Smith, Vasubandhu himself must be plaoed some- where in the 4th century (about 280-369 A. D.), because a trans- lation of his works has been made in 404 A. D. into the Ohinese- language. When the date of Vasubandhu is in this way pushed back, the date of Isvarakrsna is also pushed back to the same extent, that is to say, by about 200 years; and must be taken at about 240 A. D. (See Vincent Smith's Early History of India, 3rd Edition, p. 328.).

SAMKHY A' SYSTEM & KSARaKSARA-VIGaRA 209

philosophy explained to Janaka by Asuri, the disciple of Kapila, and PaScasikha, the disciple of Asuri. Again in the Santi- parva (301. 108, 109) Bhisma also says, that the science which was once propounded by Samkhya about the formation of the universe is everywhere to be found " in the Puranas, in history and in books on political economy and other placea ". Nay, it- may even be said that: "juuna'h ca lake yad iluxsti latitat Sam- khijugatam tac ca malum mahatntan ", that is, " all the knowledge in this, world originates in the Sarhkhya philosophy "(Ma. Bha. San. 301. 109). When one considers in what way the- Evolution theory is being everywhere taxed into commission by the Western writers, one should not be surprised if every one of our writers has to some extent or other drawn upon our ancient Samkhya philosophy, which is a match for the Evolu- tion theory. Stupendous ideas like the theory of gravity of the earth, or the ulkranti-tattva * (Evolution theory) in the- scienoe of the creation, or the theory of the unity of Brahman and the Atman, come into the mind of some superman once in a way in thousands of years. Therefore, the practice of ex- pounding one's own arguments, on the authority of any universal doctrine or comprehensive theory accepted at the: time,, is seen followed in books in all countries.

This introduction has become necessary because the study of the Kapila Sarhkhya philosophy is now out of date. Let us now consider what the principal propositions of the Kapila Samkhya philosophy are. The first proposition of the- Sarhkhya philosophy is that nothing new comes into existence in this world; because, only sunya (nothing) and nothing else- can be produced by sunya (that is, which did not exist before). Therefore, it muBt always be taken for granted that all the

• I have used the word ' ulkranti-tattva ' hero as meaning 'the

Evolution theory ' because it is used in that sense now-a-days. But ' ulkranti ' means ' death ' in Sanskrit. Therefore, in my opinion it would be more proper to use the expressions ' gunavi- Vata 1 (the expansion of the constituents), ' gunoti'ir$i ' (the dif- fusion or growth of the constituents), gunipunnama ' (the develop- ment of the constituents) used in the Samkhya philosophy for denoting the 'Evolution theory 1 instead' of the term ' utkrantiJuttva '.

27-28

210 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

qualities which are to be seen in the created products {karya) must be found at least in a subtle form in the karar/a from which the products were created (Sam. Ka. 9). Accord- ing to the opinions of Buddhists and of Kanada, one- thing is destroyed and out of it another thing comes into existence; for instance, the seed is destroyed, and from that the sprout comes into existence, the sprout is destroyed, and from that the tree comes into existence, and so on. But the Samkhya and the Vedanta philosophers do not accept this proposition. They maintain that those elements which existed in the seed of the tree are not destroyed, but they have absorbed other elements into themselves from the earth and from the air, and thereby the new form or state of a sprout is taken up by the seed (Ve. Su. Sam. Bha. 2. 1. 18). Similarly, even if wood is burnt, it is only transformed into smoke, ashes etc., and not that the ele- ments in the wood are totally destroyed and a new thing in the form of smoke comes into existence. It is stated in the Chandogyopanisad that: " katham asatah. saj jayeta?", i.e., how can something which exists come out of something which never existed?" (Chan. 6. 2. 2). The fundamental , Cause of the universe is sometimes referred to as ' asat ' in the Upanisade (Chan. 3. 19. 1 ; Tai. 2. 7. 1). But Vedanta philo- sophy has laid down that that word is not to be interpreted as meaning ' aUuvm ' (non-existing) but as indicating only the non-existence of such a perceptible state as can be denoted by name or form (Ve. Su. 2. 1. 16, 17). Curds can be made only ont of milk, not from water ; oil comes out of ' til ' (sesamum), not out of sand; from these and other actual experi- ences, one must draw the same conclusion; because, if one accepts the position that those qualities which do not exist in the karana (cause) can arise independently in the karya (pro- duet), one cannot explain why it should not be possible to produce curds from water. In short, that which is now in exist- ence cannot have come into existence out of something which originally did not exist. Therefore, the Samkhya philosophers have laid down the proposition, that whatever product you may take, its present concomitants and qualities must in some form or other have been in existence in its original cause. This proposition is known as ' satkarya-vada ' (theory of some-

SAMKHYA SYSTEM & KSARAKSARA-VIOARA 311

thing being produced out of something which existed). Even modern natural scientists have laid down the proposition that the gross elements and the potential energy in all things are permanent, and whatever changes of form anything may go through, yet in the end the sum total of all material concomi- tants and of all potential energy in the world is always the same. For instance, even if we see a lamp burning and the oil disappearing, yet the atoms of oil are not totally destroyed, but continue to exist in the form of soot, smoke, or other subtle components; and, if all these subtle components are taken together and weighed, their weight will be the same as the total weight of the oil and of all those other matters from the air which were mixed with it when it was burning; and it has now been proved that the same rule applies to potential energy. But although these two propositions of modern phy- sics and of the Samkhya philosophy may be apparently similar, yet it must not be forgotten that the proposition of the Samkhya philosophy has reference only to the fact of one thing being created out of another thing, that is to say, it refers specifically to the theory of Causes and Effects, whereas the proposition of modern physics is much more comprehensive. The very important difference between these two proposi- tions which has now been proved by actual experiments and mathematics, is that no quality in any product can arise out of any quality which was not in the cause, and what is more, that the material elements and the potential energy in the ■causes are in no way destroyed by reason of their having been transformed into products, and that the sum total of the weights of the material elements and the potential energy of any product in its various states is always the same, and is neither increased nor decreased. Looking at the matter from this point of view, it will be seen that the propositions which have been given at the commencement of the second chapter Of the Bhagavadglta. (Gi. 2. 16), such as : " nasato vidyate bhavah". I e., "that which is not, will never come into existence " etc., have greater similarity with the proposition of modern physics, than with the mere satkaryamda which deals with causes and products, though they apparently look like

213 ' GlTA-RAHASYA or KARMA-YOGA

satkaryavada. The purport of the above quotation from the Chandogyopanisad is also the same. In short, the doctrine of of sattcaryavada is acceptable to the Vedanta philosophy. Nevertheless, according to the Monistic (advaita) Vedanta philosophy, this proposition does not apply to anything beyond the qualified (saguya) universe, and how the qualified universe appears to have come into exsistence out of the qualityless [mrguTta) must be explained in some other way. This theory of the Vedanta will be fully dealt with later on in the chapter on Metaphysics (adhyatma). As in this place we have to consider only how far the Sarhkhya philosophers have gone, we will take for granted the doctrine of satlcanjavada and see how the Sarhkhya philosophers have made use of it in dealing with the question of the Mutable and the Immutable.

When once this satkdryaoada is taken as proved, then, according to the Sarhkhya science, the theory that . the visible universe came into existence out of sunya, there having been, nothing whatsoever in existence before, naturally falls to the ground. Because, sunya means non-existing, and that which exists can never come into existence out of that which does j not exist. Therefore, it becomes absolutely clear that the ' universe must have come into existence out of some substance or other, and that all those constituents (gunas) which we now;- see in the universe must have also been in this original substance. Now, if you look at the universe, many objects in it, such as trees, animals, men, stones, gold, silver, diamonds* water, air etc., are perceptible to our organB, and their forms and qualities are all different. The Sarhkhya doctrine is that thiB diversity or difference is neither permanent, nor funda- mental and that the fundamental substance in all things, or Matter, is only one. Modern ohemists had analysed various objects and had originally arrived at 62 fundamental elements. But as the Western natural scientists have now proved that these 62 elements are not eternal and that there must have been some one fundamental substance from which the sun the moon, the earth, the stars, and the rest of the universe' was created, it is not neoessary to further labour this proposition. This original or fundamental substance at the root of all the things in the universe is known in Sarhkhya philosophy as-

SAMEHYA SYSTEM & ESARAKSARA-VlCARA 213

• PRAERTI '. Prakrti means 'fundamental' and all things

whioh subsequently arise out, of prakrti' are called ' vikrti ' or the vikaras (transformations) of the fundamental substance.

But though there is only one fundamental substance in all things, if this substance had also only one constituent quality, then according to the salkuryamda, other qualities could not have arisen out of this one quality ; whereas, looking at the stones, earth, water, gold, and various other things in the world, we find that they have numerous qualities. Therefore, the Samkhya philosophers have first carefully considered the ■constituents of all the various things and divided these ■constituents into three classes, namely, the sattva, the rajas and the lamas, (the placid, the active and the ignorant). Because, whatever object may be taken, it naturally has two states, namely, its pure, unadulterated, or perfect state and the ■opposite of it, its imperfect state ; and it is seen that its tendency is to move from its imperfect state to its perfect state. Out of these three states, the state of perfection is called by the Samkhya philosophers the sattviki state, the inperfect state is called the iamasi state, and the state of progression is called the rajasi state; and according to them the ihree qualities, sattva, rajas and tamas, are to be found from the very beginning in Matter (prakrti), which is the fundamental substance of all things. Nay, it may even be said, that thesB three constituents together make up Matter. In as muoh the strength of each of these qualities is the same jn the beginning, Matter is originally equable. This equability exist- ed in the beginning of the world and will come again when the world comes to an end. In this equability, there is no .activity and everything is at rest ; but, later on, when these three constituents begin to vary in intensity, various things spring out of Matter as a result of the progressive constituent, and the creation begins. Here the question arises as to how the difference arises in the intensity of the three constituents, sattva, rajas and tamas, which were originally equal in intensity. To this the reply of the Samkhya philosophers is, that that is the inherent characteristic of Matter (SSm, E8, 61). Though Matter is gross, yet it carries out all this activity ■of its own accord. Out of theBe three constituents, knowledge

21* GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YoGA

or intelligence is the sign of the sattva, and the rajas constituent, has an inspirational tendency, that is to say, it inspires a, person to do some good or evil act. [These three constituents- can never exist by themselves independently. In everything, there is a mixture of all the three constituents ; and in as much as the mutual ratio of the three constituents in this mixture always varies, the fundamental Matter, though originally one,, assumes the various forms of gold, earth, iron, water, sky, the human body etc. as a result of this diversity in constituents. As the intensity or proportion of the sattva constituent is higher than that of the rajas and tamas constituents in the object which we consider as sattvika, all that happens Sb that these constituents being kept in abeyance are not noticed by us. But strictly speaking, it must be understood that the three constituents sattva, rajas and tamas are to be found even in those objects which are sattvika by nature. There does not exist a single object which is purely sattvika, or purely rajasa^ or purely tamasa, In each object, there is an internal warfare going on between the three constituents, and we describe a. particular object as sattvika, rajasa, or tamasa according to- that one of these three constituents which becomes predominant. (Sam. Ka. 13; Ma. Bha. Asva-Anugita-36 and San. 305). For instance, when in one's own body the sattva consti- tuent assumes preponderance over the rajas and tamas consti- tuents, Knowledge comes into being in our body and we begin to realise the truth about things and our mind becomes peaceful. It is not that in this mental condi- tion, the rajas and the tamas constituents cease to exist in the body; but as they are repressed, they do not produce any effect. (Gi. 14. 10). If instead of the sattva constituent, the rajas con- stituent assumes preponderance, then avarice arises in the human heart, and the man is filled with ambition and he is- inspired to do various actions. In the same way, when the tamas constituent assumes preponderance over both the sattva and the rajas constituents, faults like sleep, idleness, confused memory etc. arise in the body. In short, the diversity which exists among the various objects in the world, such as gold,, iron, mercury etc. is the result of the mutual warfare or diversity in intensity of the three constituents, sattva, rajas

SAMKHYA SYSTEM & KSARAKSARA-VICARA 215

and Tamos. The consideration as to how this diversity arises when there is only one fundamental Matter is known as ' rijnana '; and this includes all the natural sciences. Tor example, chemistry, the science of electricity, physics etc. are all diverse kinds of j nana, that is, they are vijuana.

This fundamental Matter, which is in an equable state, is ' AVYAKTA ', that is, not perceptible to the organs ; and all the various objects which come into existence as a result of the mutual internal warfare of its satt on, rajas and tainas consti- tuents, and become perceptible to the organs, that is to say, all which we see or hear or taste or smell, or touch, goes under the name of ' vyakta ' according to the Samkhya philosophy. ' VYAKTA ' means all the objects which are definitely percept- ible to the organs, whether they become perceptible on account of their form, or colour, or smell, or any other quality. Perceptible objects are numerous, and out of them, trees, stones etc. are GROSS (sthvla); whereas others like the Mind, Reason, Ether etc., though perceptible to the organs, ara SUBTLE (suksma). The word suksma does not here have its- ordinary meaning of ' small '; because, though ether is suksma, it has enveloped the entire universe. Therefore, suksma is to be taken to mean the opposite of ' sthula ', or even thinner than air. The words 'gross' or 'subtle' give one an idea about the conformation of the body of a particular thing ; and the words 'vyakta' (perceptible) and 'avyakta '(imperceptible) show whether or not a particular thing can be perceived by us in reality. Therefore, although two different things may both be subtle, yet one of them may be perceptible and the other imperceptible. For instance, though the air is subtle, yet as it is perceptible to the sense of touch, it is considered to be wjakta ; and prakrti (Matter), the fundamental substance of all things, being much more subtle than air itself, is not percept- ible by any of the organs and is, therefore, amjakla. Here a question arises, namely : if prakrti is not perceptible to any organ, then, what evidence is there that it exists ? To this the reply of the Samkhya philosophers is, that by considering the various objects, it is proved by inference by the law of ' satkuryaoada' that the root of all of them, though not actually perceptible to the organs, must nevertheless be in

216 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA ,;

existence in a subtle form (Sam. Ka. 8); and the. Vedalita philosophers have accepted the same line of argument for proving the existence of the Brahman. (See the Samkarabhasya on Katha. 6. 12, 13). When you once in this way acknow- ledge prakrti to ba extremely subtle and imperceptible, the atomic theory of the Nyaya school naturally falls to the ground. Because, even if atoms are considered imperceptible and innumerable, yet, in as much as each atom is, according to the Nyaya theory, an independent entity or part, the question as to what matter any two atoms are composed of still remains. Therefore, the doctrine of the Saihkhya philosophy is, that in prakrti there are no different parts in the shape of atoms, that it ig consistent and homogeneous or unbroken in any part, and that it perpetually pervades everything in a form which is avyakta •{that is, not perceptible to the organs) and inorganic. In ^escribing the Parabrahman, Sri Samartha Ramadasa Svaml says in the Dusabodlia (Da. 20. 2. 3.) :-

" In whichever direction you see, it is endless; there " is no end or limit anywhere ; there is one independent "homogeneous substance; there is nothing else".'

The same description applies to the prakrli of the Saihkhya philosophy. Matter, made up of three constituents, is im- perceptible, self-created, and homogeneous, and it eternally saturates everything on all sides. The Ether, the air, and other different things came into existence afterwards ; and although they may be subtle, yet they are perceptible; and 'prakrti ' which is the fundament or origin of all these is imperceptible, though it is homogeneous and all-pervading. Nevertheless, there is a world of difference between the Parabrahman of Vedanta philosophy and the prakrti of Sarhkhya philosophy; because, whereas the Parabrahman is Vitalising and unqualified, prakrti is inactive ( gross ) and is qualified, since it possesses the sattva, rajas and tamos qualities. But this subject-matter will be more fully con- sidered later on. For the moment, we have only to consider what the doctrines of the Sarhkhya philosophy are. ; When the words auksma, Mala, wjalsia, and avyakta have been defined as above, one comes to the inevitable conclusion

SAMKHYA SYSTEM & KSARAKSARA-VICARA 217

that in the beginning of the universe, every object is in the form of subtle and imperceptible prakrti and that it after- wards becomes vyaltta ( perceptible to the organs ), whether it is subtle or gross; and that at the time of pralaya (total destruction of the universe), when this its perceptibtle form is destroyed, it again becomes merged into imperceptible Matter and becomes imperceptible. And the same opinion has been expressed in the Gita (Gi. 2. 28 and 8. 18). In the Sarhkhya philosophy, this imperceptible Matter is also known as 'aksara (Immutable) and all things which are formed out of it are known as 'ksara' (Mutable). ' ksara' is not to be understood as meaning something which is totally destroyed, but only the destruction of the perceptible form is here meant, 'prakrti ' has also other names, such as, ' pradhdna ' (fundamental), ' guria- icsobhini ' (stirrer up of the constituents), 'bahudhanalca ' (many- seeded), and ' prasam-dharmini ' (generative). It is 'pradhana (fundamental), because, it is the fundamental root of all objects in the universe; it is 'gurtaksobhiifV (stirrer up of constituents), because, it of its own accord breaks up the equable state of its three constituents (gums); it is ' bahudhanaka ' (many-seeded), because, it contains the germs of differentiation between various objscta in the shape of the three constituents; and it is ' prasaoa-dluinnini" (ganjrative), because, all things are born or come into existence out of it. That is why these different names are given to Matter. This pralcrli is known in Vedanta philosophy as 'Maya' (Illusion) or an illusory .appearance.

"When all things in the world are classified under the two •divisions of ' Perceptible ' and ' Imperceptible ' or ' Mutable ' and 'Immutable', the next question which arises is into what categories the Atman, the Mind, Intelligence, Individuation, and the organs, which have been mentioned in the last chapter ■on the ksetra-ksetrajna-mcara, are to be put according to Sarhkhya philosophy. The ksetra and the organs being gross, they will of course be included in the category of the Percepti- ble. But how is one to dispose of the Mind, Individuation, Intelligence, and especially of the Atman ? The modern eminent European biologist Haeckel says in his books that

318 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

the Mind, Intelligence, Individuation and the Atman are all faculties of the body. We see that when the brain in a. man's head is deranged, he loses memory and even becomes- mad, Similarly, even if any part of the brain is deadened on account of a blow on the head, the mental faculty of that, part is seen to come to an end. In short, mental faculties are only faculties of gross Matter and they can never be separated from gross Matter. Therefore, the mental faculties and the Atman must be classified along with the brain in the category of the Perceptible. When you have made this classification,, the imperceptible and gross Matter is ultimately the only thing which remains to be disposed of, because all perceptible- objects have sprung out of this fundamental imperceptible- There is no other creator or generator of the world except- prakrti. When the Energy of the fundamental Matter ( prakrti )■ gradually increases, it acquires the form of caitanya (conscious- ness) or of the Atman. This fundamental prakrti is governed by fixed laws or rules like the satkaryavuda, and in accordance- with those laws, the entire universe, as also man, is acting like a prisoner. Not only is the Atman not something different from Matter, but it is neither imperishable nor independent ; then, where is the room for salvation ?. The idea which a person has that he will do a particular thing- according to his own will is a total illusion ; he must go where prakrti (Matter or Nature) drags him. In short, as the late- Mr. Shankar Moro Ranade has stated in the 'Dhrupad* (stanza) at the commencement of the drama Kalahapuri--

" The world is a vast prison, all created beings are " prisoners, the inherent qualities of Matter are " shackles which nobody can break ".

Haeckel's opinion is that this is the way in which the existence of the living and the non-living world goes on. Andi because according to him the universe originates from a single, gross, and imperceptible prakrti, he has named his doctrine ' advaita' (non-dualism)*. But in as much as- this advctita-

• Haeokel's original word is 'Monism', and ho has written an,

independent work on it.

SAMKHYA SYSTEM & KSARAKSARA-VICARA 219

doctrine is based on something which is gross, and as it incorporates everything within gross Matter, I have named it 'jaMdvaita ' (Gross Non-dualism) or Non-dualism based on the Natural sciences.

But the Sarhkhya philosophy does not accept this Gross Non-dualism. They accept the position that the Mind, Reason and Individuation are qualities of Gross Matter which consists of the five primordial elements and consequently it is stated in the Samkhya philosophy that Reason, Individuation, and other qualities gradually spring out of the fundamental imperceptible Matter. But according to the Saihkhyas, it is impossible that consciousness (caitartya) should spring out of gross Matter; not only that, but the words " I know a particular thing " cannot come to be used unless the one who knows, understands, or sees Matter, is different from Matter, in the same way as no one can sit on his own shoulders; and looking at the affairs of the world, it is the experience of every one that whatever he knows or sees is different from himself. The Samkhya philosophers have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the one who knows (jnata) and that which is to he known (jneya), the one who sees and that which is to be seen, or the one who sees prakrti and Gross prakriti muet be two fundamentally different things (Sam. Ka.17). The one which has been described in the last chapter as the ksetrajna, or the Atman, is the one which sees, knows or enjoys, and it is known in the Samkhya philosophy as PTJRUSA (Spirit), or ' jfia ' (jnata). As this Knower is different from Matter, it follows that the Knower is inherently quality- less, that is, beyond the three constituents of prakrti, namely, sattva, rajas and tamas; that the Knower does not go through any change of form and does nothing else except seeing and knowing, and that all the activity which is going on in the world is only the aotivity of prakrti. In short, the doctrine of the Sarhkhya philosophers is that if MATTER f prakrti) is acetana (lifeless), SPIRIT (purum) is sacetana (vitalised); if Matter is responsible for all activity, Spirit is apathetic and non-active; if Matter has three constituents, Spirit is iuneonstituted ; if Matter is blind, Spirit is seeing; and that these two different elements in this world are eternal, inde- pendent, and self-created. And it is with reference to this-

220 GITA-KAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

.doctrine that the Bhagavadgita first says : " prakrtim purusam ■caiva viddhy anadi ubhav api ", that is, " prakrti and purusa are both without a beginning and are eternal " (Gi. 13. 19), and then goes on to say : " karj/akara?fa kartrtve hetuh prakrHr ucyate", i.e., the activities of the body and of the organs are carried on by prakrti : and that, "purustA sukhaduhkhanam bhoktrtve hetur ucyate", i. e., "the purusa is responsible for our experience of pain aud happiness ". But although the doctrine, that prakrti and purusa (Matter and Spirit) are both eternal, is acceptable to the Gita, yet it must be borne in mind that the Gita does not look upon these two elements as independent and self-oreated, as is done by Sarhkhya philosophers. Because, in the Gita itself the Blessed Lord has referred to Matter as his Illusion (Gl. 7. 14; 14. 3); and as regards the Spirit, he has said : " mamaivaviso jlvaloke " <<Gi. 15. 7), i. e., " It is a part of me ". Therefore, the Gita has gone further than the Sarhkhya philosophy. But we . will keep aside this aspect for the time bsing, and consider further what .pure Sarhkhya philosophy says.

According to Sarhkhya philosophy, all the objects in ■the world are divided into three classes :-the amjalda (the fundamental Matter or nature), the vyakta (the forms taken by it), and the purusa (j'Jia), the Spirit or the Knower. But in as much as the form of perceptible objects out of these is destroyed at the time of pralaya ( total destruction ), imperceptible Matter (prakrti) and Spirit (purusa) are the only two elements which remain in the end ; and in as much as it is a proposition of the Sarhkhya philosophers, that these two fundamental principles are eternal and self-created, ,they are called ' dvaiti ' (those who accept TWO principles). They do not accept any other fundamental principle besides Matter and Spirit, such as Isvara, Time, inherent Nature or anything else. * Because, in as much as

• Isvarkrsoa w»a a total atheist (niiiharavadi). tlu has stated

in the last three summarising arya couplets of his Samkhya-KariB, ■that tlere were 70 aryas (conpkts) in the Samkhya-Brika on the principal Bubject-matter. Bat in the hdition which has beeu printed in Bombay by Tukaram Tatya, which contains the translations of Colebrooke and Wilson, there are only 69arySsoa the principal

SAMKHYA SYSTEM & KSARAKSARA-VIOARA 321

according to that philosophy the qualified Isvara, Time, or inherent Nature are all perceptible, they are included in the perceptible objects which arise out of imperceptible Matter; and if you look upon the Isvara as qualitylass, then having, legard to the law of satktiri/ai'arlri, Matter with its three consti- tuents cannot spring out of a qualitylass fundamental element. Therefore, they have definitely laid down that there is no third fundamental element in addition to prakrti and ■purmxt as a cause of the universe; and having in this way defined only two fundamental elements, they have according to their own opinion worked out how the entire universe was created out subject. Therefore, Mr. Wilson was necessarily faced with the question which this ' <Kh unuplet was; but that couplet not having been available to him, bis difficulty has remained unsolved. In my opiniou, tilid couplet must bii after the present 6[st couplet. Because,. the commentary uf Gaudapada on the 61st couplet is not on one couplet, but on two couplets. And if the symbolical phrasts ill this commentary are taken and a verse is written, it will run as- follows :

karanam ismram eke Iruvate kalam pure swibhamia va i pryal} kathatii niryunato vyakt<ih Lal,h svabhtivub ca ||

And this verse fits in with the anterior and posterior context. I thisk that some one ba9 subsequently omitted fcr.is arya t as it supports atueisn. But as this ultra-critical man who has omitted the original couplet, forgot to delote tbe commentary on the verse which was omitted, we can now reconstruct that verse. For this, we must be grateful to this officious man. It would appear from the first hymn of tho sixth chapter of the Svetasvataropanisad, that in ancient times, people used to look upon Inherent Nature and Time as the fundamental causes of the world and the Vedantists used to go further and to look upon the

'Isvara' as such cause. That hymn is as follows : —

svabliatam eh kavnyo vadanti kalam tnthanye parimuhyamanah [ devasyai^a mahimti tut hke yenedalii bhramyate brahmacakram || And in order to Bhow that not even one of these three were accepted by the Samkhya philosophers as a fundamental Oause,- IsvarakrsBa put tbe couplet mentioned above after the 61st. couplet.

n% GITA-RAHAfcrA OB KARMA-YOGA

of these two fundamental elements. Th°y sny that though the <nialityless paruta (Spirit) is unable to do anything itself, yet,, in the same way as the cow gives milk for its calf, or iron acquires the quality of attraction by the prnximiiy of a magnet, so also immediately on the pur/iyi coming into union with prakrli, pralrti which was originally imperceptible "begins to place bef ore the punt -c the subtle, and the gross perceptible diffusion of ita own constituents ( Sam. Ea. 57 V .Although the purusu may be srirftn'm- (v~i<ilised) and. :ijfi<' !f <J, (fcnower), yet, in as much as it is h'nrla (isolated), that is, (ynalityless, it has not got the necessary perquisites for pcforming actions itself'; and although pmkrti can perform actions, yet, in as much as it is gross and acetan" (lifeless), it cannot understand what to do and what not to do. Therefor?, just as when there is a partnership between a blind man and ft lame man, the lame man sits on the siirmlders of the blind man, and both of them begin to loiiow tits road, so also when lifeless Matter becomes united with the vitalised Spirit, all the activities in the world come in m existence (Sam. Ka. ,"31 ): and just as in a drama an actress ones takes one part and' after some time again another part and performs her dance for the entertain- ment of the audience, so also prnkrli for the benefit of the puram ( for 'purusarlha' ), and though the piinisa gives nothing in return, takes up numerous parts in the drama by changing the mutual ratio ol the ■jaltiii, rajas, and lamn.s constituents, and continually performs its dance before the puruxi (Sam. Ka. 59). But so long as the Spirit, being entranced by this dance of Matter or Ky false pride (Gl. 3. 37) unjustifiably arrogates to itself this activity of Matter, and enmeshes itself in the strands of pain and happiness, it will never attain salvation. But on that day, when the Spirit realises that Matter with its three constituents is different and that it, the Spirit, is something different, the Spirit may well be said to be released, (Gl. 1.3. 29, 30 ; 14. 20). Because, strictly speaking, the Spirit is fundamentally neither a doer nor is it bound. It is independent and by its very nature isolated, that is,- it is non-active. Whatever happens is being done hy Matter. . Nay, in as much as the Mind and even Reason aTe manifestations of Matter, ■whatever knowledge is acquired by ReaBon is the result of the

riAMKllYA HYSTEM & KSAKSESARA-VICABA ?S3

activity ;ol; l! {,itvtwh;v This itno^edgb'-ioMlwefcMd.Vn.iinely, IgtU'lhll, riljiiiiiiaud tMnniia (kti. ia.':;0-:J'21 i Out of tiiase.'iwluBi Eeaftot »cipiiwfc-vtlm ; sSHti-lsa Hud' t~i~ knciuslrtlySi;-' thsn$$ifii reiiUsBSjtliati itdsditfe^r.1, fi-om TVf&tttr. 'Che snlltH,. >ajf<$'^Tul iam'Jt :PirnBtitiien't3 - .',r& tke r, inKfihmffi.! of A-I ; • tr>.- r tmf'rtf^tfUS Spirit. ThebptticfeesiUiMes^O-jifi t»v/,-W/. wKh ifr i.hifia winstil Maatfl. isite mim* (-itfu. tfli» Win. , 0) ">!') 'vVhp;. Hii,* miri'M 1 liwooi'-s clear, thai ie t.'>"<;a'h -wlifin v,h« fiteui i . u nicliies; maiitiusta.tifaiixff Miifc.r, hklBIW xoil"nl > Ihfj tha'-'iipii-it'aaes- teiithih eleat ■miccoi- ite awlitU'.flv idurrtity; linniiily, that it' ia different -from. 1 "Matter, JMWl'TjTLme' M?-ttor, bewnrhig sfianie* fasted, isti>ps' iier.'il.inc L e i "li6fiurn^ tho 1 - Hpirit,.- 'When 'ttaJ ! Statb. - «  daquirbd,.iho-itipirit. it .released f row ali' bonds a»d ettainsritB; taHereai :■ isolation. '. -Isolation- fktaix/Jx/tif iwrnis ifehfeiisfcater.iffll Igittg 'rixtriUc'- (isolatsd),.lljat: is, lteirig , VRfA$h> laud nafcjbethgr iSpithrwiifc 'Matter ; -and: it, isLt'his'rMiiralr "Kfcaliaiiof.itli'e "fcijiirite, iMktett i»_.«eilsd jno/.'si. (Belaafehoi^aalviiUoii-iby^heifcatJEhjnfci pbitetiutHwiiiSi ^.:"Bwt sbuia iMmkh.th, .philosophers r baVb -Jiisaiktfjm. deJMtrto.(ju9stioB.klietLhsr ia ttus'.Rtstlv-ffc . ; s"tbx j Spirit wibjshs ai»ad«nsi-Matitor-.oi Matter' which abuistonirtise "Burnt,. iTttffll quusMoa-is 1 - 1 lis surao type \bs fcite ."question, wirotiies:- Foe ^rifes is,_too tallfcr the "husLaud-or -the .husband ' too alinri i or jibes ■iV^e.ja-tifl; sfjjno fnay uhiidc'ii lis equaliy-viieicE, > rteeriuaa whimi, two.JiiiqgSi-are fliTOTcod iKi!fle:icb -othan- toeiM' id no rpoiutilly oojwitietjiig.iwlio.lian iH^KWlunn, a-; \ .tseeibabUiitY'ltsfiTO'eaclia oHmt;,:'Butl"if one- givtB tMis- aiiw'tian of tun h-amfcltvivpliilot*? gophers d*pi(junSMers,(i'Hvit will Ire aeen nasi' to to irapcopferit from -their? fp.ointisirf' (view, in- as jau'oh-as according tpr?4h*e tiaimkhy&iv pliilxiBOTjliy, the- Spirit being-; withcrivii'flhaiitiedy; non-active,hia:ndimptltheiic/'tli6 performance oftlwifaetiisnsiofof 'giving up; or: "iftickiog to' oanhot tecUcJ tally ~-t!ptm.yi»&;; be ascribad to the; 'Spirit (Gli / 13. > -31, -'&!).* < Therefore, jtfeif .Samkhyas 'hatfefconie to tlier,i)tn:kision tlmt it- is. Matter, (vhiclre, has got- feharquiality of activity), wliicit'maat be' said to, isavitx the Spirit, that \is-ita Bay, it in . pmkrti "* wbiohiottaiaflditaot, •own Release fromhthe ,SpirW {Sfev ■K.g.bioaad affityKAMftof In short, BiJlease iiTnot a«iindepeitdent->stai)2' inirkh rasultoitoA'- th* Spirit f rom-aomei outsidft.aKeE6y,.'UUs ttsukite atet u wtjjioh dies different from its fundamental and inherent state ; just as ths

326 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

not escape the cycle of birth and death; then he may take birth in the sphere of gods, as a result of the preponderance of the sattva constituent or in the sphere of humans, as a result of the preponderance of the rajas constituent, or in the sphere of animals, as a result of the preponderance of the tamos consti- tuent (Sarh. Ka. 44, 54). These results, in the shape of the cycle of birth and death, befall a man as a result of the preponderance or minimisation of the sattva, rajas and tamas constituents in the Matter which envelopes him, that is, in his Reason. It is stated even in the Glta (Gi. 14. 18), that :- "iirdhvam gacclumti sattvasthah", that is, " persons in whom the sattvika constituent predominates go to heaven", and tamasa parsons go to perdition. But these resulting states in the shape of heaven etc., are non-permanent. For that Spirit which wishes to become released from the cycle of birth and death, or according to the terminology of the Sarhkhya philosophy, which has to maintain its difference or isolation from Matter, there is no other way except transcending the "three constituents and becoming viralda ( desireless ). Kapila- carya had acquired this asceticism and Knowledge from his very birth. But it is not possible that every man can be in this state from the moment of his birth. Therefore, everyone must by means of the discrimination of fundamental prin- ciples realise the difference between Matter and Spirit and try to purify his Reason. When by such efforts, the Reason becomes sattvika, there arise in that Reason itself the qualities of Realisation ( jnana ), Asceticism (vairagya), and Power (aisvarya), and the man ultimately reaches isolation. The word 'aisvarya' (power) is used here in the sense of the Yogic power of acquiring whatever may be desired. According to the Saihkhya philosophy, Righteousness (dharma) is included ■in the sattvika constituent ; but Kapilacarya has ultimately made the distinction, that by mere dharma one acquires only 'heaven, whereas Knowledge and Asceticism give Release or Isolation, and effect a total annihilation of the unhappiness of a man. That man who, as a result of the preponderance of the sattvika constituent in his bodily organs and in his Reason, has realised that he is distinct from Matter with its three con- stituents, is called triguyatita (one who has transcended the sattva

SJLMKHYA SYSTEM & KSARAKSAEA-VICAEA 327

rajas and tamas constituents) by the Samkhyas. In this state of a friguifltita, neither the saitva, nor the rajas, nor the tamas constituent continues to exist ; therefore, considering the matter minutely, one has to admit that this state is different from either the saitvikl, or rajasi, or tarmsl states of mind; and following this line of argument the Bhagavata religion, after ■dividing Devotion (bliakti) into ignorant, progressive, or placid, has described the disinterested and non-differentiating de- votion of the man who has transcended the three constituents as mrgu-na, that is, unaffected-by-quality (Bhag. 3. 29. 7-14). But it is not proper to extend the principle of division beyond the three divisions of placid, progressive, and ignorant. Therefore, the Sarhkhya philosophers include the trigunatita •state of transcending the three constituents in the placid {sattvika) state on the basis that it results from the highest •expansion of the placid constituent ; and the same position has also been accepted in the Glta. For instance, the non-differen- tiating knowledge that every thing is one and the same is, according to the Glta, placid knowledge (Gl. 18. 20); and where the description of the sattvikl state of mind is given in the fourteenth chapter of the Glta, the description of the state of transcending the three constituents is given later on at the end of the same chapter. But it must he borne in mind that in as much as the Gita does not accept the duality of Matter and Spirit, the words 'prakrti ', 'purusa ', ' trigwnxiUta ', which are technical terms of Sarhkhya philosophy are always used in a ■slightly different meaning in the Gita; or in short, the Glta permanently keeps the rider of the monistic (adoaita) Para- •brahman on the Dualism (dvaita) of the Sarhkhya philosophy. For instance, the difference between Matter and Spirit according to the Sarhkhya philosophy has been described in -the 13th chapter of the Gita (Gi. 13. 19-34). But there th e words 'prakrti' and 'purusa' are synonymous with the words

• hsetra ' and ' ksetrajna '. Similarly, the description in the

14th chapter of the state of transcending the three constituents (Gi. 14. 22-27) is of the siddha or released man who, having escaped the meshes of Maya (Illusion) with its three consti- tuents, has realised the Paramatman (Supreme Spirit) which

228 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

is beyond both Matter and Spirit, and not of a Samkhya philosopher, who looks upon Matter and Spirit as two distinct principles and who looks upon the isolation of the Spirit as the state of transcending the three constituents of Matter. This difference has been made perfectly clear by me in the subsequent chapter on adhyatma (philosophy of the Highest Salf). <But as the Blessed Lord has, while supporting the adh/atma or Vedanta philosophy in the Gita, in many places made use of the Samkhya terminology and arguments, one is likely to get the wrong idea, while raiding the Gita, that it accepts as correct the pure Samkhya philosophy. Therefore, I have repeated here this difference between the Samkhya philosophy and the propositions similar to it in the Gita. Sarhkaracarya has stated in the Vfdanta Sutra-bhaiya, that he is prepared to accept all the propositions of the Samkhya philosophy but not to give up the aduaita theory of the Upanisads that there is only one fundam3ntal principle in the world, namely, the Parabrahman (Supreme Spirit), which is beyond both Matter and Spirit and from wnich the entire creation, including Matter and Spirit, has sprang (Ve. Si. Sarh. Bha. %. 1. 3); and the same line of argument applies to the arguments in the Gita.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CONSTRUCTION AND THE DESTRUCTION' OF THE COSMOS.

gui;a gunesu, jayante tatraiva nivisanti ca I *

Mahabharata, Santi. 305. 23.

I have so far dealt with the nature of the two independent ■fundamental principles of the world according to the Kapila Sarhkhya philosophy, namely. Matter and Spirit, and have described how one has to release one's Self from the network of the constituent qualities of Matter which it places before one's eyes, as a result of its union with Spirit. But the explana- tion of how this 'Sarhsara' (worldly illusion) is placed by Matter before the Spirit— this its diffusion, or its drama which Marathi poets have given the vivid name of ' samsrtica pirhga ' (the fantastic dance of worldly life), and which is called "the Mint of Matter" by Jfianesvara Maharaja— and in what way the same is destroyed, has still to be given ; and I shall deal with that subject in this chapter. This activity of Matter is known as "the Construction and Destruction of the Cosmos" , because, according to the Sarhkhya philosophy, prakrti (Matter) has created this world or creation for the benefit of in- numerable Spirits. Sri Saraartha RamadSsa has in two or three places in the Dasabodha given a beautiful description

• "Constituents ( gunas) are born ont of constituents, and are

merged in them".

230 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KAKMA-YOGA

of how the entire Cosmos is created from Matter, and I have taken the phrase "Construction and Destruction of the Cosmos " from that description. Similarly, this subject-matter has been dealt with principally in the seventh and eighth chapters of the Bhagavadgita, and from the following prayer of Arjuna to Sri Krsna in the beginning of the eleventh chapter, namely: bhavapymjau. hi bhulamm srutau vistaraso maya" (Gi. 11. 2), i. e., " I have heard (what You have said ) in detail about the creation and the destruction of created beings ; now show me actually Your Cosmic Form, and fulfill my ambition", it is clearly seen that the construction and the destruction of the Cosmos is an important part of the subject-matter of the Mutable and the Immutable. The Knowledge by which one realises that all the perceptible objects in the world, which are more than one (are numerous), contain only one fundamental imperceptible substance, is called 'jflana* (Gi. 18. 20); and the Knowledge by which one understands how the various innumerable perceptible things severally camo into existence out of one fundamental imperceptible substance is called ' vijnana '; and not only does this subject- matter include the consideration of the Mutable and the Immutable, but it also includes the knowledge of the Body and the Atman and the knowledge of the Absolute Self.

Acoording to the Bhagavadgita, Matter does not carry on its activities independently, but has to do so according to the will of the Paramesvara (Gi. 9. 10). But, as has been stated be- fore, Kapila Rsi considered Matter as independent. According to the Sarhkhya philosophy, its union with Spirit is a sufficient proximate cause for its diffusion to commence. Matter needs nothing else for this purpose. The Samkhyas say that as soon as Matter is united with Spirit, its minting starts ; and just as- in spring, trees get foliage and after that, leaves, flowers, and fruits follow one after the other (Ma. Bha. San. 231. 73; and Manu, 1. 30), so also is the fundamental equable state of Matter disrupted, and its constituents begin to spread out. On the other hand, in the Veda-Saihhitas, the Upanisads, and the Smrti texts, the Parabrahman is looked upon as fundamental instead of Matter, and different descriptions are found in those books about the creation of the Cosmos from

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 231

that Parabrahman (Highest Brahman), namely that : "luranya-- garbhah samavartatagre bhutasya jatah patir eka asit", i. e., "the Golden Egg first came into existence" (Rg. 10. 121. 1). and from this Golden Egg, or from Truth, the whole world was created (Rg. 10. 72; 10. 190); or first, water was created (Rg. 10. 83. 6; Tai. Bra. 1. 1. 3. 7; Ai. U. 1. 1. 2), and from that water, the Cosmos; or that when in this water an egg had come into existence, the Brahmadeva was born out of it, and either from this Brahmadeva, or from the original Egg, the entire world was later on created (Manu. 1. 8-13 j Chan. 3. 19); or that the same Brahmadeva (male) was turned, as to half of him, into a female (Br. 1. 4. 3 ; Manu. 1. 32); or that Brahmadeva was a male before water came into existence (Katha. 4. 6); or that from the Parabrahman only three elements, were created, namely, brilliance, water and the earth (food), and that later on, all things were created as a result of the inter- mixture of the three (Chan. 6. 2-6). Nevertheless, there is a, clear conclusion in the Vedanta-Sutras ( Ve. 85. 2. 3. 1-15 ), that the five primordial elements, namely. Ether (akasa) etc., came into existence in their respective order from the fundamental Brahman in the shape of the Atman (Tai. U. 2. 1); and there are clear references in the Upanisads to pmkrti, mahat, and Other elements, e. g., see Katha (3. 11), Maitrayani (6. 10), Svetasvatara (4. 10; 6. 16) etc. From this it can be seen that though according to Vedanta philosophy, Matter is not independent, yet after the stage when a transformation makes itB appearance in the Pure Brahman in the shape of an illusory Prakrti, there is an agreement between that philosophy and the Sarhkhya philosophy about the subsequent creation of the Cosmos; and it is, therefore, stated in the Mahabharata that: "all knowledge which there is in history or in the Puranas, or in economics has all been derived from Sarhkhya. philosophy" (San. 301. 108, 109). This does not mean that the Vedantists or the writers of the Puranas have copied this knowledge from the Kapila Sarhkhya philosophy; but only that everywhere the conception of the order in which the Cosmos was created is the same. Nay, it may even be said that the word 'Sarhkhya' has been used here in the comprehensive meaning of ' Knowledge '. Nevertheless,

332 . GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

KapilScarya has explained the order of the cieation of the Cosmos in a particularly systematic manner from the point of view of a science, and as the Samkhya theory has been principally accepted in the Bhagavadgita, I have dealt with it at length in this chapter.

Not only have modern "Western materialistic philosophers accepted the Samkhya doctrine that the entire perceptible Cosmos has come out of one avyakta (imperceptible to the oigans), subtle, homogeneous, unorganised, fundamental substance, which completely pervades everything on all sides, but they have come to the further conclusions that the energy in this fundamental substance has grown only gradually, and that nothing has come into existence suddenly and like a spout, giving the go-bye to the previous and continuous order of creation of the universe. This theory is called the Theory of Evolution. When this theory was first enunciated in the Western countries in the last century, it caused there a great commotion. In the Christian Scriptures, it is stated that the Creator of the world created the five primordial elements and every living being which fell into the category of moveables one by one at different times, and this genesis was believed in by all Christians before the advent of the Evolution Theory. Therefore, when this doctrine ran the risk of being refuted by the Theory of Evolution, that theory was attacked on all sides, and that opposition is still more or less going on in those countries. Nevertheless, in as much as the strength of a scientific truth must always prevail, the Evolution Theory of the creation of the Cosmos is now becoming more and more acceptable to all learned scholars. According to this theory, there was originally one subtle, homogeneous substance in thB Solar system, and as the original motion or heat of that substance gradually became less and less, it got more and more condensed, and the Earth and, the other planets gradually came into existence, and the Sun is the final portion of it which has now remained. The Earth was originally a very hot ball, same as the Sun, but as it gradually lost its heat, some portion of ithe original substance remained in the liquid from, while other portions became solidified, and the air and water which surround the earth and the gross, material earth under themi

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 333

'Came gradually into existence; and later on, all the living and non-living creation came into existence as the result of the union, of these three. On the line of this argument, Darwin and other philosophers have maintained that even .man has in this way gradually come into existence by evolution from micro-organisms. Yet, there is still a great deal of difference of opinion between Materialists and Meta- physicians as to whether or not the Soul (Atman) should be considered as an independent fundamental principle. Haeckel -and some others like him maintain that the Soul and Vitality have gradually come into existence out of Gross Matter, and support the jadadvaita (Gross Monistic) doctrine; on the other hand, Metaphysicians like Kant say that in as much as all ■the knowledge we get of the Cosmos is the result of the synthe- tic activity of the Sou!, the Soul must be looked upon as an independent entity. Because, saying that the Soul which perceives the external world is a part of the world which is perceived by it, or that it has come into existence out of the world, is logically as meaningless as saying that one can sit ■on one's own shoulders. For the same reason, Matter and Spirit are looked upon as two independent principles in the Sarhkhya philosophy. In short, it is even now being main- tained by many learned scholars in the Western countries that however much the Materialistic knowledge of the universe may grow, the consideration of the form of the Root Principle of the Cosmos must always be made from a different point of view. But my readers will see that as regards the question ■of the order in which all perceptible things came to be created from one Gross Matter, there is not much difference of opinion between the Western Theory of Evolution, and the Diffusion- out of Matter described in the Sarhkhya philosophy; because, the principal proposition that the heterogeneous perceptible Cosmos (both subtle and gross) came to be gradually created from one imperceptible, subtle, and homogeneous fundamental Matter, is accepted by both. But, as the knowledge of the Material sciences has now considerably increased, modern natural scientists have considered as prominent the three •qualities of motion, heat and attraction, instead of the three ■qualities of sattua, rp.jas, and tamas of the Sarhkhya philosophy.

234 GTTl-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

It is true that from the point of view of the natural sciences, it is easier to realise the diversity in the mutual strength of heat or attraction than the diversity in the mutual intensity of the three qualities of sattva, rajas, and tamos. Nevertheless,, the principle: " guya guvesu, vartante" (Gl. 3. 28), i.e., "con- stituents come out of constituents", which is the principle of the diffusion or expansion of constituent qualities, is. common to both. Samkhya philosophers say that in the same way as a folding-fan is gradually opened out, so also when the folds of Matter in its equable state (in which its sattva, rajas, and tamas constituent qualities are equal) are opened out, the whole perceptible universe begins to come into- existence; and there is no real difference between this con- ception and the Theory of Evolution. Nevertheless, the fact that. the Gita, and partly also the Upanisads and other Vedic texts have without demur accepted the theory of the growth of the gunas (constituents) side by side with the Monistic Vedanta doctrines, instead of rejecting it as is done by the Christian religion, is a difference which ought to be kept in mind from the point of view of the Philosophy of Raligion.

Let us now consider what the theory of the Samkhya phi- losophers is about the order in which the folds of Matter are un- folded. This order of unf oldment is known as ' gunotkarsa-vada ' (the theory of the unfolding of constituent qualities ), or ' guna- pmrjama-vada ' ( the theory of the development of qualities ). It need not be said that every man comes to a decision according to his own intelligence to perform an act or that he must first get the inspiration to do an act, before he commences to do the act. Nay, there are statements even in the Upanisads, that the universe came to be created after the One fundamental Paramatman was inspired with the desire to multiply, e. g., " balm syam prajayeya " ( Chan. 6. 2. 3 ; Tai. Z. 6 ). On the same line of argument, imperceptible Matter first comes to a decision to break up its own equable state and to create the perceptible universe. Deoision means 'vyavasaya', and coming to a decision is a Bign of Reason. Therefore, the Samkhya philosophers have come to the conclusion that the first quality which comes into existence in Matter is Pure (deciding) Reason ( vyavasayatmika buddhi j. In short, in the

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OP THE COSMOS 235

same way as a man has first to be inspired with the desire of doing some particular act, so also is it necessary that Matter- should first be inspired with the desire of becoming diffuse. But because man is vitalised, that is to say, because in him there has taken place a union between the Reason of Matter and the vitalised Spirit ( Atman ), he understands this deciding Reason which inspires him ; and as Matter itself is non-vital or Gross, it does not understand its owd Reason. This is the great difference between the two, and this difference is the result of the Consciousness which Matter has acquired as a result of its union with the Spirit. It is not the quality of Gross Matter. When one bears in mind that even modern Materialistic natural scientists have now begun to admit that unless one credits Matter with some Energy which, though non- self-intelligible ( asvayamvedya J, is yet of the same nature as human intelligence, one cannot reasonably explain the mutual attraction or repulsion seen in the material world in the shape of gravitation, or magnetic attraction or repulsion, or other chemical actions, * one need not be surprised about the- proposition of the Sarhkhya philosophy that Reason is the first quality which is acquired by Matter. You may, if you like, give this quality which first arises in Matter the name of Reason which is non-vitalised or non-self-perceptible

• Without the assumption of an atomic soul, the commonest

and the moat general phenomena of Chemistry are inexplicable. Pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, attraction and repulsion, must be common to al] atoms of an aggregate ; for the movements of atoms which must take place in the formation and dissolution of a chemical compound can be explained only by attributing to them Sensation and Will" — Haeckel in the Peng'sisofthe Plaslidule cited in Martineau's Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II, p. 399, 3rd Ed. Haeckel himself explains this statement as follows : " I explicitly Btated- that I conceived the elementary psychic qualities of sensation and mil which may be attributed to atoms to be unconscious— just as- unconscious as the elementary memory which I, in common witb the distinguished psychologist Ewald Hering, consider to be a common function of all organised matter, or more correctly the living. substances "—The Riddle of the Universe, Ohap. IX p. 63 ( E. P. A. Cheap. Ed. ).

236;.; GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

{ asvaydnwedya ). , But it is clear that the desire which a man gets and the desire which inspires Mattter belong originally to one and. the same class; and, therefore, both are defined in the gam© way in both the places. This Reason has also such other names as ' makat ', ' jilana ', ' mati ', ' asuri ', ' prajnu ' ' kkyati ' etc. Oat of these, the name ' mahat ' ( first person singular masculine, mahan, i. e., ' big ' ) must have been given because Matter now begins to be enlarged, or on account of the importance of this quality. In as much as this quality of ' mahan ' or Reason is the result of the admixture of the three constituent qualities of sattva, rajas, and tamas, this quality of Matter can later on take diverse formB, though apparently it is singular. Because, though the sattva, rajas and tamas con- stituents are apparently only three in number, yet, in as much as the mutual ratio of theEe three can be infinitely different in each mixture, the varieties of Reason which result from the infinitely different ratios of each constituent in each mixture can also be infinite. This Reason, which arises from imper- ceptible Matter, is also subtle like Matter. But although Reason is subtle like Matter, in the sense in which the words 'perceptible', 'imperceptible', 'gross', and 'subtle' have been explained in the last chapter, yet it is not imperceptible like Matter, and one can acquire Knowledge of it. Therefore, this Reason falls into the category of things which are ' vyakta ' ( i. e., perceptible to human beings ) ; and not only Reason, but all other subsequent evolutes (vikara) of Matter are also looked upon as perceptible in the Sarhkhya philosophy. There is no imperceptible principle other than fundamental Matter.

Although perceptible Discerning Reason thus enters imper- ceptible Matter, it (Matter) still remains homogeneous. This homogeneity being broken up and heterogeneity being acquired is known as ' Individuation ' (prthaktva) as in the case of mercury falling on the ground and being broken up into small globules. Unless this individuality or heterogeneity comes into existence, after Reason has come into existence, it is impossible that numerous different objects should be formed out of one singular Matter. This individuality which subsequently arrives as a result of Reason is known as 'Individuation' ( ahamkara), because, individuality is first

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 337

expressed by the words ' I — you ', and saying ' I — you ' means ' akamkara ', that is, saying 'aham' 'aham' ( T T ). This quality of Individuation which enters Matter may, if you like, be called a non-self-perceptible ( asvayamvedya ) Individuation, But the Individuation in man, and the Individuation by reason of which trees, stones, water, or other fundamental atoms spring out of homogeneous Matter are of the same kind; and the only difference is that as the stone is not self-conscious, it has not got the knowledge of ' aham ' ( 'I' ), and as it haB'not got a mouth, £t cannot by self -consciousness say ' I am different from you '. Otherwise, the elementary principle of remaining separate individually from others, that is, of con- sciousness or of Individuation is the same everywhere. This Individuation has also the other names of 'taijasa'/abhimSna', 'bhutadi, and 'dhatu'. As Individuation is a sub-division of Reason it cannot come into existence, unless Reason has in the first instance come into existence. Samkhya philosophers havs, therefore, laid down that Individuation is the second quality, that is, the quality whioh comes into existenoe after Reason. It need not be said that there aTe infinite varieties of Individuation as in the case of Reason, as a result of the differences of the sattva, rajas and tamas constituents. The subsequent qualities are in the same way also of three infinite varieties. Nay, every- thing which existB in the perceptible world falls in the same way into infinite categories of suttvika, rajasa and tamasa ; and consistently with this proposition, the Gita has mentioned the three categories of qualities and the three categories of Devotion ( Gi. Chap. 14 & Chap. 17 ), ' •

When Matter, which originally is in an equable state, acquires the perceptible faculties of Discerning Reason and Individuation, homogeneity is destroyed and it begins to be transformed into numerous objects. Yet, it does not lose its Bubtle nature, and we may say that the subtle Atoms of the Nyaya school now begin to come into existence. Because, before Individuation came into existence, Matter was unbroken and unorganised. Reason and Individuation by themselves are, strictly speaking, only faculties. But, on that account the above proposition is not to be understood as meaning that they exist independently of the substance of Matter. What is meant is t

238 GfTi-BABASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

iksti w's&ii these f sralfes enis» fie faafamenial, haraBgeBeang, and naorgaaisee Master, iliSJt Mafoser Itetf a>Mpixas libe fonn of psrossptlblg, tetsnogsawtts, aod dgaaisai snSsianee. Wlieh fiHBj&aiaeiitsl Msfocr 'n&s thus aci^iteBd the fa®mitj of IsesosBiBg traasfcjin&d iofo vari&os digests "by Maans of IndiTidnaiioB, its further &vfcl«pir<eni falls irAo two categories. Ona of tiiessis the creation consisting of life itavfeg organs, sac a as trees, man etc., and its other is of the world consisting of nuMganfe'i} things. In this place the word "organs* is to Ik understood as mssaiiEg only " toe faculties of the organs of ■organis&d beings '. Because, the .gross body of organised beings is included in the gross, that is, unorganised world, and their 5lman falls into the different category of ' Spirit '. Therefore, in dealing -with the organised world, Samkhya. philosophy leaves oat of consideration the Body and the Atinan, and considers only the organs. In as much as there can be no third substance in the world besides organic and inorganic substances, it goes without saying that Individuation ■cannot give rise to more than two categories. As organic faculty is more powerful than inorganic substance, the organic world is called suttwka, that is, something which comes into existence as a result of the preponderance of the aittm constituent ; and the inorganic world is called tamoso, that is something which comes into existence as a result of the preponderance of the tamos constituent. In short, when the •faculty of Individuation begins to create diverse objects, there is sometimes a preponderance of the sattuka constituent, leading to the creation of the five organs of Perception, the five organs of Action, and the Mind, making in all the eleven fundamental organs of the organic world ; and at other times, there is a preponderance of the tarnas constituent, whereby the five fundamental Fine Elements (tanmalra) of the inorganic world come into existence. But in as much as Matter still continues to remain in a Bubtle form, these sixteen elements, which are a result of Individuation, are still subtle elements*

• If I were to convey this import in the English language, I

would say :-

The Primeval matter ( Pralriti ) was at first liomogineotis. It retdvni (Budihi) to unfold itself, and by the principle of differentiation

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 239

The Pine Elements (tanmatras) of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell— that is to say, the extremely subtle fundamental forms of each of these properties which do not mix with each other— are the fundamental elements of the inorganic creation, and the remaining eleven organs, including the Mind, are the seeds of the organic creation. The explana- tion given in the Samkhya philosophy as to why there aTe -only five of the first kind and only eleven of the second kind deserves consideration. Modern natural scientists have divided •the substances in the world into solid, liquid, and gaseous. But the principle of classification of substances according to ■Sarhkhya philosophy is different. Samkhya philosophers say that man acquires the knowledge of all worldly objects by means of the five organs of Perception; and the peouliar ■construction of these organs is such that any one organ perceives only one quality. As the eyes cannot smell, the ■ears cannot see, the skin cannot distinguish between sweet and bitter, the tongue does not recognise sound, and the nose cannot distinguish between black and white. If the five organs of Perception and their five objects, namely, sound, touch, sight, taste, and smell, are in this way fixed, one cannot fix the number of the properties of matter at more than five. Because, even if we imagine that there are more than five such properties, we have no means to perceive them. Each of these five objects of sense can of course be sub-divided into many -divisions. For example, though sound is only one object of sense, yet, it is divided into numerous kinds of sound, such as small, large, harsh, hoarse, broken or sweet ; or, as described in the science of music, it may be the note B or E or C etc. ; •or according to grammar, it may be guttural, palatal, labial etc.; and similarly, though taste is in reality only one object ■of sense, yet, it is also divided into many kinds such as, sweet, pungent, saltish, hot, bitter, astringent, acid etc ; and although

(Ahajnkara) became heterogeneous. It then branched off into two sections-one organic (Sendriya) and the otter inorganic (Nirin&riya). There are eleven elements of the organic and five of the inorganio ■creation. Punish" or the observer is different from all these and ialls under none of the above categories. , w

240 GlTi-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YO&A

colour is in reality only one object of sense, it is also divided: into diverse colours such as white, black, green, blue, yellow, red etc ; similarly even if sweetness is taken as a particular kind of taste, yet. the sweet tastes of sugarcane, milk, jaggery, or sugar are all different divisions of sweetness ; and if one- makes different mixtures of different qualities, this diversity- of qualities becomes infinite in an infinite number of ways. But,, whatever happens, the fundamental properties of substance can never be more than five ; because, the organs of Perception are only five in number and each of them perceives only one object of sense. Therefore, although wa oo not come across any.'object which is an object of sound only or of touch only, that is, in. which different properties are not mixed up, yet, according to- Sarhkhya philosophy, there must be fundamentally only five distinct subtle tanmatra modifications of fundamental. Matter, namely, merely sound, merely touch, merely colour,.. merely taste, and merely smell — that is, the fine sound element fiabriarfanmatra), the fine touch element (sparsa-tanmatra), the fine colour element (rupa-tanmatra), the fine taste element {rasa-tanmatra) and the fine smell element (gandha-tcmmatra), I have further on dealt with what the writers of the Upanisads- have to say regarding the five Fine Elements or the five primordial elements springing from them.

If, after having thus considered the inorganic world and' come to the conclusion that it has only five subtle fundamental; elements, we next consider the organic world, we likewise come; to the conclusion that no one has got more than eleven- OTgans, namely, the five organs of Perception, the five organs of Action and the Mind. Although we see the organs of hands,, feet etc., only in their gross forms in the Gross Body, yet, the. diversity of the various organs cannot be explained, unless we admit the existence of some subtle element at the root of eachi of them. The western Materialistic theory of Evolution bas- gone into a considerable amount of discussion on this question. Modern biologists say that ■ the most minute fundamental' globular micro-organisms have only the organ of skin, and that from that skin other physical organs have come into' existence one by one. They say, for instance, that the eye came into existence as a result of the contact of light with the-

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 241

skin of the original micro-organism ; and that, similarly, the other gross organs came into existence by the contact of light etc. This doctrine of Materialistic philosophers is to be found even in Sarhkhya philosophy. In the Mahabharata there is a description of the growth of the organs consistent with the tenets of Sarhkhya philosophy, as follows : —

sabdaragut srotram asija jayate bhuoitutmanah. I ruparag'at tatha caksuh ghranam gandhajighrl-saya II

( Ma. Bha. San. 313. 16 ).

that is, "When the Atman in a living being gets the desire of hearing sound, the ears come into existence ; when it gets the desire of perceiving colour, the eyes are formed ; when it gets the desire of smelling, the nose is created". But the Sarhkhya philosophers say that though the skin may be the first thing- to come into existence, yet, how can any amount of contact of the Sun's rays with the skin of micro-organisms in the living world give rise to eyes— and that too in a particular portion of the body — unless fundamental Matter possesses an inherent possibility of different organs being created ? Darwin's theory only says that when one organism with eyes and another organism without eyes have been created, the former lives longer than the latter in the struggle for existence of the material world, and the latter is destroyed. But the Western Materialistic science of biology does not explain why in the first place the eyes and other physical organs at all come into existence. According to the Sarhkhya philosophy, these various organs do not grow one by one out of one fundamental organ, but when Matter begins to become heterogeneous as a result of the element of Individuation, such Individuation causes the eleven different faculties or qualities, namely, the five organs of Perception, the five organs of Action and the Mind, to come into existence in fundamental Matter, independently of each other and simultaneously (yugapaf) ; and thereby, later on, the organic world comes into existence. Out of these eleven organs, the Mind is dual, that is, it performs 31—32

342 GITA-RAHASYA oe KARMA-YOGA

two different functions, according to tie difference in the organs with which it worts, as has been explained before it the sixth chapter : that ia to say, it is discriminating and classifying {jathkalpti-iihalpfitnyika) in co-operation with the organs of Perception and arranges tie various impressions experienced by tie various organs, end after classifying them. places them before Reason for dasision; and it is executive (ryaMranatmaliaj in co-operation with tie organs of Action, tlat is to say, it executes tie decisions, arrived at by Season with the help of tie organs of Action. In tie Upanisads, the organs themselves are given the name of 'Vital Force' ( fjrana ); and the authors, of the Upankads (Mnnda S. 1 .3), like the Sarhkhya philosophers, are of the opinion tlat these vital forces are not the embodiment of tie five primordial elements, tat are individually born out of the Paramatman (Absolute Self). Tie number of these vital forces or organs is stated in the TJpanisads to be ssven in some places and to be ten, eleven, twelve, or thirteen in otter places; but Sri Samkaracarya has proved on the authority of the Vedanta- Sutras, that if an attempt is made to harmonise the various statements in the Upanisads, the number of these organs is fixed at eleven (Ve. Su. Sam. Bha. i. 4. 5, 6); and in the Gita it has been clearly stated that "indriyani dasaikam ca" (GS. 13. 5), i. e., "the organs are ten plus one, or eleven". In short, there is no difference of opinion on this point between the Samkhya and the Vedanta philosophy.

According to the Samkhya philosophy, after the eleven organic faculties or qualities, which are the basis of the organic world, and the five subtle elementary essences [fanmafras) which are the basis of the inorganic world have thus come into existence as a result of sattvilta and lamam Individuation respectively, the five gross primordial elements (which are also called 'n'seso'), as also gross inorganic substances, come into .existence out of the five fundamental subtle essences /fanmiK-Vas/; and when these inorganic substances, come into contact '-,witl the eleven subtle organs, the organic universe cames in H existence.

The M^ er in whicl1 tte T *"ous Elements come out of fundamen g^*^tter according to Sarhkhya philosophy, and

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 243

which has been so far described, will be clear from the genealogical tree given below : —

THE GENEALOGICAL TREE OF THE COSMOS.

SPIRIT -»( Both self-created and eternal )-s-MATTER. (Quality-less.) ( Imperceptible and Subtle )

(Synonyms ; jfia, (Possesses the sattea, rajas, and

Observer etc.) tamas constituents)

(Synonyms : pradhana. amjakta, inaya, praswm-dharmim etc.)

MAHAN OR REASON ( Perceptible and Subtle ) Synonyms : usuri, mati, jnuna, khyati, (etc.)

AHAMKARA (Individuation)

(Perceptible and Subtle)

( Synonyms : abhimana, taijasa, etc. )

S5.TTVTKA CREATION TAMASA CREATION (i.e., Perceptible & Subtle organs) (i.e., Inorganic world)

3« 

C3 CD

OH

• t

m ft ~3

ED q>

| | I Five TANMATRAS

Five or- Five or- MIND. (Subtle)

gans gans |

of of Five PRIMORDIAL

PERCEP- ACTION. ELEMENTS

TION. or

VISES AS (Gross).

There are thus twenty-five elementary principles, counting the five gross primordial elements and Spirit. Out of these, the twenty-three elements including and after Mahan (Reason), are the evolutes (vikaras) of fundamental Matter. But even then, the subtle Tanmatras and the five gross primordial elements are substantial {clravyatmaka ) evolutes and Reason. Individuation, and the organs are merely faculties or qualities. The further distinction is that whereas these

244 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA r

twenty-three elements aie perceptible, fundamental Matter is imperceptible. Out of these twenty-three elements, Cardinal Directions (east, west etc.,) and Time aie included by Samkhya philosophers in Ether (akaia), and instead of looking upon Vital Force ( prima ) as independent, they give the name of Vital Force to the various activities of the organs, when these activities have once started (Sam. Ka. 29). But this opinion is not accepted by Vedantists, who consider Vital Force as an independent element (Ve. Su. 2. 49). Similarly, as has been stated before, Vedantists do not look upon either Matter or Spirit as self-created and independent, but consider them to be two modifications (vibhuti) of one and the same Paramesvara. Except for this difference between the Samkhyas and the Vedantists, the other ideas about the order of creation of the Cosmos are common to both. For instance, the following description of the Brahmavrksa or Brahmavana, which has occurred twice in the Anugita in the Mahabharata (Ma. Bha. Asva. 35. 20-23 and 47. 12-15) is in accordance with the principles of Samkhya philosophy :-

avyahtdlnjapmbhai'o buddhiskmidhamayo mahan 1

mahahay'iikaravitapah indriyantarakotarah U

mahabhutaviscikhas ca visesapralisakhatxin I

sadaparvah sadupuspah subhasubhaphalodayah n

ujlnjah sitrvahhutaiium brahmairksah sanatamh I

enam chitfva ca bhittm ca tattvajhanusina budhah 11

hifhu sniigamuyan pusan mrtyujamnajarodayan 1

nirmamo mraha'iikaro maajate mtra sandayah II

that is : " the Imperceptible (Matter) is its seed, Reason ( mahan ) is its trunk, Individuation ( ahamkara ) is its principal foliage, the Mind and the ten organs are the hollows inside the trunk, the (subtle) primordial elements (the five tanmatms ) are its

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF the COSMOS 245

five large branches, and the Visssas or the five Gross primordial elements are its sub-branches, and it is always covered by leaves, flowers, and auspicious or inauspicious fruit, and is i;he fundamental support of all living things; such is the ancient gigantic Brahmavrksa. By cutting it with the phi- losophical sword and chopping it up into bits, a scient should destroy the bonds of Attachment (samga) which cause life, old age, and death, and should abandon the feeling of mine-ness and individuality; in this way alone can he be released". In short, this Brahmavrksa is nothing but the ' dance of •creation' or the 'diffusion' of Matter or of Illusion. The practice of referring to it as a ' tree ' is very ancient and dates from the time of the Rgveda, and it has been called by the name ' the ancient Pipal Tree ' (sanatana asvatthavrlcsa) in the Upanisads (Katha. 6. 1). But there, that is, in the Vedas, ■the root of this tree (Parabrahman) is stated to be above and the branches ( the development of the visible world ) to be below. That the description of the Pipal tree in the Grita has been made by harmonising the principles of Samkhya philoso- phy with the Vedic description has been made clear in my commentary on the 1st and 2nd stanzas of the 15th chapter of the Gita.

As the Samkhyas and the Vedantists classify in different ways the twenty-five elements described above in the form ■of a tree, it is necessary to give here some explanation about this classification. According to the Samkhyas, these twenty-five elements fall into the four divisions of (i) fundamental prakrti, (ii) pr-ak-rti-vilcrti, (iii) vikrti and {iv) neither prakrti nor vikrti. (1) As Prakrti is not created from anything else, it is called fundamental prakrti (Matter). (2) When you leave this fundamental Matter and come to the second stage, you come to the element Mahan. As Mahan springs from Prakrti, it is said to be a vikrti or an evolute of fundamental Matter; and as later on, Individuation comes •out of the Mahan element, this Mahan is the prakrti or root of Individuation. In this way this Mahan (Reason) becomeB tike prakrti or root of Individuation on the one hand, and the rikrti. (evolute) of the fundamental Prakrti (Matter) on the other hand. Therefore, Samkhya philosophers have classified

Glrl-BAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

it under the heading of ' prakrti-vikrti ' ; and in the same way Individuation ( ahamkara ), and the five Tanmatras are also classified under the heading of ' prakrti-vikrti '. That element which, being itself horn out of some other element, i. e., being a vikrti, is at the same time the parent ( prakrti ) of the subsequent element is called a ' prakrti-vikrti '. Ma hat (Reason} Individuation, and the five Tanmatras, in all seven, are of this kind. (3) But the five organs of Perception, the five organs of Action, the Mind, and the five Gross primordial elements, which are in all sixteen, give birth to no further elements. On the other hand, they themselves are born out of some element or other. Therefore, these sixteen elements are not called 'prakrti-vikrti', but are called 'vikrti' (evolutes). (4) The Spirit (Purusa) is neither prakrti nor vikrti; it is an independent and apathetic observer. This classification has been made by lavarakrsna, who has explained it as follows :-

mulaprakrtir avikrtih maliadaduah prakrlidkrtayah sapta I sodasakastu vikaro na prakrtir m viktrtih pumsah H

that is: "The fundamental Prakrti is ' a-vikrli ', that is, it is the vikara ( evolute ) of no other substance ; Mahat and the others, in all seven — Mahat, Ahamkara and tbe five Tanmatras are prakrti-vikrti ■ and the eleven organs, including the Mind, and the five gross primordial elements, making in all sixteen, are called merely vikrti or vikara ( evolutes ). The Purusa (Spirit) is neither a prakrti nor a vikrti" (Sam. Ka. 3). And these twenty-five elements are again classified into the three classes of Imperceptible, Perceptible and Jna. Out of these, funda- mental Matter is imperceptible, the twenty-three elements, which have sprung from Matter are perceptible, and the Spirit is'Jfia'. Such is the classification according to Sarhkhya philosophy, In the Puranas, the Smrtis, the Mahabharata and other treatises relating to Vedic philosophy, these same twenty-five elements are generally mentioned (See Maitryu. 6. 10: Manu 1, 14, 15). But in the Upanisads, it is stated that all these are created out of the Parabrahman, and there is no further discussion or classification. One comes across such

CONSTEUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 247

classification in treatises later than the Upanisads, but it is different from the Samkhya classification mentioned above* The total number of elements is twenty-five. As sixteen elements out of these are admittedly Vikrtis, that it, as they are looked upon as created from other elements, even according to Samkhya philosophy, they are not classified in these treatises- as prakrti or fundamental substances. That leaves nine elements :-(l) Spirit, (2) Matter, (3-9) Mahat, Ahamkara and the five subtle elements (Tanmatras). The Samkhyas call the last seven, after Spirit and Matter, 'prakrli-vikrW. But according to Vedanta philosophy, Matter is not looked upon. as independent. According to their doctrine, both Spirit and and Matter come out of one Paramesvara (Absolute Isvara). If this proposition is accepted, the distinction made by Samkhya philosophers between fundamental Prakrti and prakrH-vikrti comes to an end ; because, as Prakrti itself is looked upon as having sprung from the Paramesvara, it cannot be called the Root, and it falls into the category of 'prakrU^vikrli'. There- fore, in describing the creation of the Cosmos, Vedanta philoso- phers say that from the Paramesvara there spring on the one hand the Jlva (Soul), and on the other hand, eight-fold Prakrti (i. e., Prakrti and seven prakrti-vihrtis, such as Mahat etc.,) (Ma. Bha. San. 306. 29, and 310. 10). That is to say, according to Vedanta philosophers, keeping aside sixteen elements out of twenty-five, the remaining nine fall into the two classes of ' Jiva ' (Soul) and the ' eight-fold Prakrti '. This classification of Vedanta philosophers has been accepted in the Bhagavad- gita; but therein also, a small distinction is ultimately made. What the Samkhyas called ' Purusa ' is called ' Jlva ' by the Glta, and the Jlva is described as being the ' pam-prakrti' or the most sublime form of the Isvara, and that which the Samkhyas call the 'fundamental Prakrti' is referred to in. the Gita as the ' apara ' or inferior form of the Paramesvara (G-I. 7, 4, 5.). When in this way, two main divisions have been made, then, in giving the further sub-divisions or kinds of the second main division, namely, of the inferior form of the Isvara, it becomes necessary to mention the other elements which have sprung from thiH inferior form, in addition to that inferior form. Because, the inferior form (that is, the funda-

248 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

mental Prakrti of Samkhya philosophy) cannot be a kind or sub-division of itself. For instance, when you have to say how many children a father has, you cannot include the father in the counting of the children. Therefore, in enumerating the sub-divisions of the inferior form of the Paramesvara, one has to exclude the fundamental Prakrti from the eight-fold Prakrti mentioned by the Vedantists, and to say that the remaining seven, that is to say, Mahan, Aharhkara, and the five Fine Elements are the only kinds or sub-divisions of the fundamental Prakrti; but if one does this, one will have to say that the inferior form of the Paramesvara, that is, fundamental Prakrti is of seven kinds, whereas, as mentioned above, Prakrti is of eight kinds according to the Vedantists. Thus, the Vedantists will say that Prakrti is of eight kinds, and the Gita will say that Prakrti is of seven kinds, and an apparent conflict will come into existence between the two doctrines. The author of the Gita, however, considered it advisable not to create such a conflict, but to be consistent with the description of Prakrti as ' eight-fold '. Therefore, the Gita has added the eighth element, namely, Mind, to the seven, namely Mahan, Aharhkara, and the five Fine Elements, and has stated that the inferior form of the Paramesvara is of eight kinds (Gl. 7. 5). But, the ten organs are included in the Mind, and the five primordial elements are included in the five Fine Elements. Therefore, although the classification of the Gita, may seem different from both the Samkhya and the Vedantic classifi- cation, the total number of the elements is not, on that account, either increased or decreased. The elements are everywhere twenty-five. Yet, in order that confusion should not arise as a result of this' difference in classification, I have shown below these three methods of classification in the form of a tabular statement. In the thirteenth chapter of the Gita (13. 5), the twenty-five elements of the Samkhyas are enumerated one by one, just as they are, without troubling to classify them; and that shows that though the classification may be different, the total number of the elements is every- where the same :-

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 249

CLASSIFICATION

of the twenty-five

FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS.

Samkhya •classification.

1. Neither pra- krti nor vikrti.

•1. Fundam e n- td,l prakrti.

7. Prakrii-vi Hi.

16. Vikaras.

Elements.

1 SPIRIT.

1PBAK- RTI.

1 Mahan. 1 A h a m -

kara. 5 T a, n -

matras.

1 MIND 5 Org a n s of Perce- ption. Organs of Action Primor - dial Ele- ments.

K 3

Vedauta classification.

Gita classification,

(1) (1)

The superior para Prakrti, form of Para- brahman

(8) The infer i o r form of Para- brahman {eight-fold).

35

35

(16)

These sixteen Elements are not looked upon as Fun- da mental Elements by Vedantists, as they are vikaras) ( evo- lufces!

35

J 1 ' apara Prakrti.

(8)

These are eight

sub-divisions

of the

apara Prakrti.

(15) These fifteen Elements are not looked upon as Fun- d amenta 1 Elements by the Gita, as they are vikaras ( evo- lutes).

35

I have thus concluded the description of how the homo- geneous, inorganic, imperceptible, and gross Matter, which was fundamentally equable, acquires organic heterogeneity as a result of Individuation after it has become inspired by the non-self-perceptible 'Desire' (buddhi) of creating the \!;ible universe, and also how, later on, as a result of the principle of the Development of Constituents (gui\apari\mma), namely

250 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

that, "'Qualities spring out of qualities " ( gurui gunesu jayante}, the eleven sattuika subtle elements, which are the fundamental elements of the organic world come into existence on the one hand, and the five subtle Fine Elements ( tanmatras ), which are the fundamental elements of the tcimasa world come into existence on the other hand. I must now explain in what order the subsequent creation, namely, the five gross primordial elements, or the other gross material substances which spring from them, have come into existence. Saihkhya philosophy only tells us that the five gross primordial elements or Visesas have come out of the five Fine Elements, as a result of guya- ■parimma. But, as this matter has been more fully dealt with in Vedanta philosophy, I shall also, as the occasion has arisen, deal with that subject-matter, but after warning my readers that this is part of Vedanta philosophy and not of Saihkhya philosophy. Gross earth, water, brilliance, air and the ether are calhd the five primordial elements or Visesas. Their order of creation has been thus described in the Taittirtyopaaisad :-"«/(« wifc tilcasuh sambhniah\ ak'iiad vayuhy vayor ayiuh I ayner apah i adblu/ah prtldvi I prtluoyu osadhayah I " etc. (Tai. U. 2. 1). From the Paramatman, (not from the funda- mental Gross Matter as the Sarhkhyas say), ether was first created; from ether, the air; from the air, the fire; from the fire, water; and from water, later on, the earth has come into being. The Taittiriyopanisad does not give the reason for this order. But in the later Vedanta treatises, the explanation of this order of creation of the five primordial elements seems to be based on the gimapariiidnvi principle of the Samkhya system. These later Vedanta writers say that by the law of " guna guveaa mrlaiite" (qualities spring out of qualities), a substance having only one quality first conies into existence, and from that substance other substanoes having two qualities, three qualities etc., subsequently come into existence. As ether out of the five primordial elements has principally the quality of sound only, it came into existence first. Then came into existence the air, because, the air has two qualities, namely, of sound and touch. Not only do we hear the sound of air, but we feel it by means of our organ of touch. Fire comes after the air, because, besides the qualities of sound and touch, it

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 251

has also the third quality of colour. As water has, in addition to- these three qualities, the quality of taste also, water must have come into existence after fire; and as the earth possesses the additional quality of smell besides these four qualities,, we arrive at the proposition that the earth must have sprung' later on out of water. Yaska has propounded this very doctrine (Nirukta 14. 4). The Taittiriyopanisad contains the further description that when the five gross primordial elements had come into existence in this order, "prthivya osadliayah I osadkibhyo'nnam\ annat pumsah\" (Tai. 2. 1), i. e., "from the. earth have grown vegetables; from the vegetables, food; and from food, man. This subsequent creation is the result of the mixture of the Ave primordial elements, and the process of that mixture is called ' paHci-Icararia' in the Vedanta treatises. Paficl-karana means the coming into existence of a new substance by the mixture of different qualities of each of the five primordial elements. This union of five {panclkaranaY can necessarily take place in an indefinite number of ways.

In the ninth dasaka (collection of ten verses each) of the- Dasabodlw, it is stated :

By mixing black and white I we get the grey colour I By mixing black and yellow I we get the green colour II

(9. 6. 40) And in the 13th dasaka, it is stated as follows :-

In the womb of that earth I there is a collection of an infinite number of seeds m

When water gets mixed with the earth I sprouts come out II

Creepers of variegated colours I with waving leaves and flowers are next born H

After that come into existence l fruits of various tastes II

The earth and water are the root I of all oviparous, viviparous, steam-engendered, and vegetable life !!■

252 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

Such is the wonder I of the creation of the universe (I

There are four classes and four modes of voice l eighty-four lakhs * of species of living beings II

Have come into existence in the three worlds I which is the Cosmic Body " II

(Dasabodha 13. 3. 10-15).

This description in the Dasabodha given by Samartha Itamadasa is based on this idea. Bnt it must not be forgotten that by the union of five ( pandkaram ) only gross objects or gross bodies come into existence, and this gross body must become united first with subtle organs and next with the Atman or the Spirit before it becomes a living body.

I must also make it clear here that this union of five, which has been described in the later Vedanta works, is not to he found in the ancient TJpanisads. In the Chandogy opanisad, these Tanmatras or primordial elements are not considered to be five; but brilliance, water and food (earth) are the only three which are considered as subtle fundamental elements, and the ientire diverse universe is said to have come into existence by the

• This idea of 84 lakhs of births is irom the Puranas, and it

is quite dear that it is only approximate. Nevertheless, it is not totally without foundation. Western natural scientists believe, according to the Theory of Evolution, that the human being has «ome into existence by evolution from one Bubtle micro-organism in the form of a living nodule at the beginning of the universe. From this idea, it becomes quite clear how many generations of each sub.-equent specieB (yoni/ must have come into existence and passed away in Older that this subtle nodule should have become a. groBB nodule, and that this gtoss nodule should in ita tain have been transformed into a living bacillus and this bacillus been evolved into the next subsequent Jiving organism. From this an English biologist has worked out a calculation, that for the smallest fish in water to develop its qualities and ultimately assume the form of a human being, there must have been at least 53 lakhs and 75 thousand generations of intermediate species and that the number of these generations may as well be ten times as much. These are

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 253

mixture of these three, that is, by 'trivrtkarana' ; and it is stated in the Svetasvataropanisad that: "ajam ekvah lohitasuklahTsnam bahvih prajak STJanianam sarupah" ( Sveta. 4. 5 ), i. e., "this she-goat (aja) is red, or of the nature of fire ; and white, or of the nature of water; and black, or of the nature of earth ; and is thus made of three elements of three colours, and from it all creation I praju) embodied in Name and Form has been created. In the 6th chapter of the Chandogyopanisad has been given the conversation between Svetaketu and his father. In it, the father of Svetaketu clearly tells him : "O, my son I in the commencement of the world, there was nothing except 'elcam evadvitlyain sat' (single and unseconded sat), that is to say, nothing else except one homogeneous and eternal Parabrahman. How can 'sat' (something which exists) come into existence out of 'asat' (something which does not exist) ? Therefore, in the beginning sat pervaded everything. Then that sat conceived the desire of becoming multifarious, that is, heterogeneous, and from it grew one by one, brilliance ftejas) water (upa) and food (prihvi) in their subtle forms. Then, after the Parabrahman had entered these three elements in the form

the species ranging from the small aquatic animals upto the human being If, to this are added the number of minute aquatio organisms lower down in the scale of life, it is impossible to ascer- tain how many more lakhs of generations will have to be counted. Prom this it will be clear to what extent the idea of these genera- tions in the purana of Materlialistic scientists has exceeded the idea of $1 lakhs of species in our Puranas. The same law applies to the calculation of limt. Geo-biologiats say that it is impossible to form even a rough idea of the date when living micro-organisms first camo into existence on the earth, and that aquatic micro- organisms nust have come into exi»tence crores of years ago. If further concise information is required about this matter, ttie reader is referred to The Last Link by Ernst Haeckel, witb notes etc. by Dr. Id. Gadow (1^98). The above particulars have been taken from the appendices. The 84 lakhs of generations mentioned in the Puraoas are to be counted as follows: — 9 V U* for aquatic animals, 10 lakhs for birds, 11 lakhs for germs, 20 lak'is for beasts,. 30 lakhs for immoveable things and 4 lakhs for mmkiud (Pee Dasabodha 20. 6 I.

254 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-Y03A

-of Life, all the various things in the universe which are identified hy Name and Form oa me into existence as a result

■ of the union of those three f trivrtkarana). The red (lohita)

■ colour, which is to be found in the gross fire or the Sun or in electricity, is the result of the subtle fundamental element of brilliance ; the white (sukla) colour, of the fundamental subtle

■■ element of water ; and the black (krsna) colour, of the funda- mental subtle element of earth. In the same way, subtle fire,

. subtle water, and subtle food (prthvl) are the three fundamental elements which are contained even in the food which man eats. Just as butter comes to the surface when you churn curds, so

' when this food, made up of the three subtle elements enters the

■ stomach, the element of brilliance in it, creates gross, medium . and subtle products in the shape of bones, marrow and speech . respectively ; and similarly, the element of water (apaj creates

urine, blood and Vital Force ; and the element of earth (prthvi)

. creates the three susbstances, excrement, flesh and mind" (Chan.

■ 6. 2-6). This system of the Chandogyopanisad of not taking the primordial elements as five, but as only three, and of explaining the creation of all visible things by the union of these three substances ( trivrtkarana ) has been mentioned in ^the Vedanta-Sutras (2. 4. 20), and Badarayanacarya does not

even mention the word 'Pancikarana'. Nevertheless, in the 'Taittirlya (2. 1), Prasna (4._ 8), Brhadaranyaka (4. 4. 5) and other Upanisads, and in the Svetasvatara itself (2. 12) and in the Vedanta-Sutras (2. 3. 1-14) and lastly in the Gita (7. 4; 13. 5), five primordial elements are mentioned instead of three ; and in the Garbhopanisad, the human body is in the very beginning stated to be 'pancatmaka', that is, made up of five; and the Mahabharata and the _ Puranas give clear descriptions of Pancikarana (Ma. Bha. San. 184-186). From this it becomes . quite clear, that the idea of the 'union of five' (pancikaraya) becomes ultimately acceptable to all Vedanta philosophers and that although the 'union of three' ( trimtkamva ) may have been ancient, yet, after the primordial elements came to be believed to be five instead of three, the idea of Pancikarana was based on the same sample as the Trivrtkarana, and the theory of Trivrtkarana went out of vogue. Not only is the human body formed of the five primordial elements, but the meaning of the

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION of the COSMOS 255

word Pafiwkarana has been extended to imply that each one of these five is divided in five different ways in the body. For instance, the quinary of akin, flesh, bone, marrow, and muscles grows out of earth etc. etc. ( Ma. Bha. San. 186. 20-25; and Dasabodha 17. 8). This idea also seems to have been inspired by the description of Trivrtkarana in the Chardogyopanisad mentioned above. There also, there is a statement at the end that brilliance, water, and earth are each to be found in three different forms in the human body.

The explanation of how the numerous inactive (acetana), ithat is to say, lifeless or gross objacts in the world, which can ba distinguished by Name and Form, came into existence out ■of the fundamental imperceptible Matter — or according to the Vedanta theory, from the Parabrahman — is now over. I shall now consider what more the Sarhkhya philosophy tells us about the creation of the saccfain (that is, active) beings in the world, and later on, see how far that can be harmonised with the Vedanta doctrines. The body of living beings comeB into existence when the five gross primordial elements sprung from the fundamental Matter are united with the subtle organs. But though this body is organic, it is still gross. The element which activates these organs is distinct from Gross Matter rand it is known as Spirit ( purusa ). I have, in the previous 'chapter, mentioned the various doctrines of the Sarhkhya philosophy that this Spirit is fundamentally inactive, that the living world bagins to come into existence when this Spirit is united with fundamental Matter, and that 'when the Spirit acquires the knowledge that "I am -different from Matter", its union with Matter is dissolved, failing which it has to peregrinate in the cycle of birth and death. But as I have not, in that ohapter, explained how the Atman — or according to Samkhya terminology, the Purusa — of the person, who dies without having realised that the Atman is different from Matter, gets one birth .after another, it is necessary now to consider that question more in detail. It is quite clear that the Atman of the man who dies without having acquired Self-Realisation does not escape entirely from the meshes of Matter ; because, if such were the case, one will have to say with CarvSka, that every

256 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA.

man escapes from the tentacles of Matter or attains Release- immediately after death ; and Self -Realisation or the difference between sin and virtue will lose its importance. Likewise, if you say that after death, the Atman or the Spirit alone survives, and that it, of its own accord, performs the action of taking new births, then the fundamental theorem that Spirit is inactive and apathetic, and that all the activity is of Matter iB contradicted. Besides, by acknowledging that the Atman takes new births of its own accord, you admit that to be its property > and fall into the impossible position that it will never escape from the cycle of birth and death. It, therefore, follows that though a man may have died without having acquired Self- Realisation, his Atman must remain united with Matter, in order that Matter should give it new births. Nevertheless, as the Gross Body is destroyed after death, it is quite clear that this union cannot continue to be with Matter composed of the five gross primordial elements. But it is not that Matter- consists only of the five gross primordial elements. There are in all twenty-three elements which arise out of Matter, and the five gross primordial elements are the last five out of them. When these last five elements (the five primordial elements) are subtracted from the twenty-three, eighteen elements remain, It, therefore, follows as a natural conclusion that though a man, who dies without having acquired Self-Realisation escapes from the Gross Body made up of the five gross primordial elements, that is to say, from the last five elements, yet, his death does not absolve him from his union with the remaining eighteen elements arising out of Matter. Reason (Mahan) Indi- viduation, Mind, the ten organs, and the five Fine Elements are these eighteen elements. (See the Geneological tree of the Cosmos given at page 243). All these elements are subtle. Therefore, that Body which is formed as a result of the continued union of Spirit ( puruxa ) with them is called the 'Subtle Body', or the 'Linga-sarlra' as the opposite of the Gross Body or 'Sthula- sarira' (Sam. Ka. 40). If any person dies without having acquired Self -Realisation, this his Subtle Body, made up of the eighteen elements of Matter, leaves his Gross Body on his death along with the Atman, and compels him to take birth after birth. To this, an objection is raised by some persons to-

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 357

the following effect : when a man dies, one can actually see that the activities of Reason, Individuation, Mind, and the ten organs come to an end in his Gross Body along with life ; therefore, these thirteen elements may rightly be included in the Subtle Body ; but there is no reason for including the five Fine Elements in the Subtle Body along with these thirteen elements. To this the reply of the Sariikhya philosophers is, that the thirteen elements, pure Reason, pure Individuation, the Mind and the ten organs are only qualities of Matter, and in the same way as a shadow requires the support of some substance or other, or as a picture requires the support of the wall or of paper, so also must these thirteen elements, which are only qualities, have the support of some substance in order that they should stick together. Out of these, the Atman (purusa), being itself qualityless and inactive, cannot by itself become the support for any quality. When the man is alive, the five gross primordial elements in his body form the support for these thirteen elements. But after his death, that is, after the destruction of the Gross Body, this support in the shape of the five primordial elements ceases to exist. Therefore, these thirteen elements, which are qualities, have to look for some other substance as a support. If you say that they can get the support of fundamental Matter, then, that is imperceptible and in an unevolved condition, that is to say, eternal and all-perva- sive ; and therefore, it cannot become the support of qualities like Reason etc., which go to form one small Subtle Body. There- fore, the five Pine Elements, which are the bases af the five gross primordial elements, have to be included in the Subtle Body side by side with the thirteen qualities, as a support for them in the place of the five gross primordial elements which are the evolutes of fundamental Matter (Sam Ka. 41). Some writers belonging to the Sariikhya school imagine the existence of a third body, composed of the five Fine Elements, intermediate between the Subtle Body and the Gross Body, and maintain ithat this third body is the support for the Subtle Body. But that is not the correct interpretation of the forty-first couplet • of the Sariikhya Karika, and in my opinion these commentators have imagined such a third, body merely by confusion of thought. In my opinion this couplet has no use beyond

258 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

explaining why the five Fine Elements have to be included in the Subtle Body along with the thirteen other elements, namely, Reason etc *.

Anybody can see after a little thought, that there is not much of a difference between the Subtle Body made up of eighteen elements described in the Samkhya philosophy and the Subtle Body described in the Upanisads. It is stated in the Brhadaranyakopanisad that: "just as a leech (jalayuka) having reached the end of a blade of grass, places the anterior part of its body on the next blade (by its anterior feet), and then draws up the posterior part, which was placed on the former blade of grass, in the same way, the Atman leaves one body and enters the other body " (Br. 4. 4. 3). But from this single illustration, the two inferences that (i) only the Atman ■enters another body and that (ii) it does so immediately after leaving the first body, do not follow. Because, in ■the Brhadaranyakopanisad itself, there is another statement further on (Br. 4. 4. 5), that the five subtle elements, the Mind, the organs, Vital Force and a man's righteous or unrighteous record, all leave the body along with the Atman, which goes according to its mundane Actions to different spheres, where it remains for sometime. (Br. 6. 2. 14 and 15). In the same way, it becomes quite clear from the description of the course

• It can be aeen from a versa in the book of Bhatta Kumarila

known aB MlmatiisaJloka-vuHika (Atma-vada, stanza 6'2), that he interprets this couplet in the same way as myself. That verse is as follows : —

ant&rTtbhavadeho hi nesyate vindhyavasitia I tadastitve pramanam hi na Mmcid avagamyate l| 62 || that is, "Vindhyavasin did not accept the existence of an antarabhava, that IB to say, of a 'deha' or Body which is intermediate between the Subtle Body and the Gross Body. There is no authority for saying that there is such an intermediate body". Isvarakrsna, used to live in the Vindhya mountains; that is why he was known as

• Vindhyavasin'. The antarabham (intermediate) Body is also known

as ' gandharva'. (See Amarakosa 3. 3. 182, and the commentary on it by Ksirasvami, published by Mr, KrlBhnaji Govind Oak and p. 8 «f the introduction to that work. )

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 359

followed by Jiva along with the fundamental element of water <(apa) in the Chandogyopanisad (Chan. 5. 3. 3; 5. 9. 1) as also from ■fche interpretation put thereon in the Vedanta-Sutras (Ve. Su. 3. 1. 1-7) that the Chandogyopanisad included the three fundamental elements, viz., water (apa) and along with it brilliance (tejas) and food (anna) in the Subtle Body. In short, it will be seen that when one adds Vital Force and ' dharmadharma' (i. e. righteous and unrighteous actions) or Karma to .the Samkhya Subtle Body of eighteen elements, one .gets the Vedantic Subtle Body. But in as much as Vital Force ( pi-ana) is included in the inherent tendencies of the ■eleven organs, and righteous and unrighteous action (dharm- adharma) are included in the activities of Reason and Mind, one may say that this difference is merely verbal, and that there is no real dfferenee of opinion about the components of the Subtle Body between the Vedanta and the Samkhya philosophies. It is for this reason that the description of the Subtle Body According to the Sarhkhyas as "mahadadi stiksmaparyantam" !has been repeated, as it is, in the words "maliadadyavisesantam,'

in the Maitryupanisad (Mai. 6. 10). * In the Bhagavadgita,

the Subtle Body is described as consisting of "manah- ■gasthanindriyanT (Gi. 15. 7), that is, of "the mind and the five organs of Perception" ; and further on there is a description that life, in leaving the Gross Body, takes with itself this Subtle Body in the same way as the breeze carries scent from the flowers : "vai/ur gaiidhan ivasayut" (GI. 15. 8). Nevertheless in as much as the metaphysical knowledge in the Gita, has been borrowed from the Upanisads, one must say that the

• In the copy of the llaitryupanisad included in the

Auandashrama Edition of Dvatrimsadupanisad (thirty-two Upanisads), 'the reading of the hymn referred to above has been given as: " mahaiadyamvisesaniam" , and the same has been accepted by the ■commentators. If this reading is accepted then the 'Mahat' element "which is at the beginning of the list has to be included in the Subtle Body and the ' Visesas ' or five primordial elements, indicated by the words 'visesantam' t have to be left out. That is to say, you have to interpret it as meaning that the 'mahat' out of "mahadadyam" ihaB to be taken, and the ' viieja ' oat of ' vise$anlam ' has to be left out. But, where the beginning and the end are both mentioned, it is

260 GITA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

Blessed Lord has intended to include the five organs of Action,, the five Fine Elements, Vital Force, and sin and virtue, in the- words "the six organs including the mind". There is a state- ment also in the Manu-Smrti that after a man dies, he acquires a Suhtle Body made up of the five Fine Elements in. order to suffer the consequences of his virtuous or evil actions (Manu. 12. 16, 17). The words "vayur gamlhan ivasayai" in the Gita, prove only that this body must be subtle ; but they do not convey any idea as to the size of that body. But from the statement in the Savitryupakhyana in the Mahabharata (Ma. Bha. Vana. 296. 16), that Yama took out a Spirit as. large as a thumb from the (gross) body of Satyavana — - " amgiistlvimStram purusam mscakarsa yamo balat " — it is clear that this Subtle Body was in those days, at least for purposes of illustration, taken to be as big as a thumb.

I have so far considered what inferences lead one to the- conclusion that the Subtle Body exists, though it might be invisible to the eyes, as ako what the component parts of that. Subtle Body are. But it is not enough to merely say that the Subtle Body is formed by the combination of eighteen elements- excluding fundamental Matter and 14ie five gross primordial- elements. There is no doubt that wherever this Suhtle Body exists, this combination of eighteen elements will,;according to its inherent qualities, create gross parts of the body, like hands and feet or gross organs, whether out of the gros& bodies of parents, or later on, out of the food in the gross- material world ; and that it will maintain such a body. But,, it remains to be explained why this Subtle Body, made up by the combination of eighteen elements, creates different bodies,

right to take both or to omit both. Therefore, according to Prof. Deusaen, the nasal ' m ' at the end of the word ' mahadadyam ' should be omitted and tbe hymn should be read as mahidadyn vihsantam" (mahadadi+ avisefantam). If that is done, the word Wseja' comes into- existence, and the same rule becoming applicable to the ' mahnt and to the 'cmi&esa.', that is, both to the beginning and the end, both get included in the Liilga sarira. This is the peculiarity of this reading; but, it must be borne in mind, that whichever reading- is accepted, there is no difference in the meaning.

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OP THE COSMOS 361

such as, animals, birds, men etc. The elements of conscious- ness in the living world are called 'Purusa' by the Samkhyas, and according to them, though these 'Purusas' are in- numerable, yet, in as much as each Purusa is inherently apathetic and inactive, the responsibility of creating different bodies, such as, birds, beasts etc. cannot rest with the Purusa. According to Vedanta philosophy, these differences are said to arise as a result of the sinful or virtuous Actions performed during life. This subject-matter of Karma- Vipaka (the effects caused by Actions) will be dealt with later on. According to Samkhya philosophy, Karma cannot be looked upon as a third fundamental principle which is different from Spirit and Matter ; and in as much as Spirit is apathetic, one has to say that Karma (Action) is something evolved from the sattva, rajaft, and tamas constituents of Matter. Reason is the most important element out of the eighteen of which the Subtle Body is made up ; because, it is from Reason that the subsequent seventeen elements, namely, Individuation, etc. come into existence. Therefore, that which goes under the name of 'Karma' in Vedanta philosophy is referred to in Samkhya philosophy as the activity, property, or manifestation of Reason resulting from the varying intensity of the sattva, rajas and tamas constituents. This property or propensity of Reason is technically called 'Bhava', and innumerable Bhavas come into existence as a result of the varying intensity of the sattva, rajas and tamas constituents. These Bhavas adhere to the Subtle Body in the same way as scent adheres to a flower or colour to cloth (Sam. Ka. 40). The Subtle Body takes up new births according to these Bhavas, ot — in Vedantic terminology — according to Karma ; and the elements, which are drawn by the Subtle Body from the bodies of the parents in taking these various births, later on acquire various other Bhavas. The different categories of gods or men or animals or trees, are the results of the combination of these Bhavas (Sam. Ka. 43-55). When the sattvika constituent becomes absolute and pre-eminent in these Bhavas, man acquires Self-Realisation and apathy towards the world, and begins to see the difference between Matter and Spirit ; and then the Spirit reaches its original state of Isolation

262 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

(kaivalya), and the Subtle Body being disoaided, the pain of man is absolutely eradicated. But, if this difference between. Matter and Spirit has not been realised, and merely the sattvw constituent has become predominant, the Subtle Body is re-born, among gods, that is, in heaven; if the rajas quality has become- predominant, it is Te-born among men, that is, on the earth; and if the tamos quality has become predominant, it is re-born in the lower (tiryak) sphere (Gl. 14. 18). When in this way it has been re-born among men, the description of how a Imlala (state of the embryo a short time after conception), a budbuda (bubble), flesh, muscles, and other different gross organs grow out of a drop of semen has been given in Samkhya philosophy on the basis of the theory of "guna gunesu jayante". (Sam. Ka. 43 : Ma. Bha. San. 320). That description is more or less similar to the description given in the Garbhopanisad- Although the above-mentioned technical meaning given to the word 'Bhava' in Samkhya philosophy may not be found in Vedanta treatises, yet, it will be seen from what has been stated above, that the reference by the Blessed Lord to the various qualities "buddhir jiianam asammoliah ksama satyam damak samah" by the use of the word 'Bhava' in the following verse (Gl. 10. 4, 5; 7. 12) must primarily have been made keeping in mind the technical terminology of Samkhya philosophy.

When, in this way, all the living and non-living perceptible things in the universe have come into existence one after the other out of fundamental imperceptible Matter (according to the Samkhya philosophy), or out of fundamental Parabrahman in the form of Sat (according to the Vedanta philosophy), all perceptible things are, both according to the Samkhya and Vedanta philosophies, re-merged either into imperceptible Matter or into fundamental Brahman in a way which is the reverse of the order of development of constituents mentioned above, when the time for the destruction of the Cosmos comes (Ve. Su. 2. 3. 14 ; Ma. Bha. San. 232) ; that is to say, earth, out of the five primordial elements, is merged into water, water into fire, fire into air, air into ether, ether into the Fine Elements, the Fine Elements into Individuation, Individuation into Reason, and Reason or Mahan into Matter and-according to the Vedanta philosophy— Matter becomes merged into the funda-

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 363

mental Brahruau. What period of time lapses betweun the creation of the universe and its destruction or merging in nowhere mentioned in the Samkhya Karika. Yet, I think that the computation of time mentioned in the Manu-Sarhhita (1. 66-73), Bhagavadgila (8. 17), or the Mahabharata (Sftn, 231) must have been accepted by the Samkhya philosophers Our Uttarayana, that is, the period when the Sun seams, to travel towards the North is the day of the gods, and our Daksioayana, when the Sun seems to travel towards the South, is the night of the gods ; because, there are statements not only in the Smrtis, hut also in astronomical treatises that the gods live on the Mem Mountain, that is to- say, on the north pole, (Surya-Siddhanta, 1. 13 ; 12. 35. 67). Therefore, the period made up of the Uttarayana and the Daksinayana, which is one year according to our calculations, is only one day and one night of the gods, and three hundred and sixty of our years are" three hundred and sixty days and nights or one year of the gods. We have four yugas called, Krta, Treta, Dvapara and Kali. The periods of the yugas are counted as four thousand years for the Krta, three thousand years for the Treta, two thousand years for the Dvapara and one thousand years for the Kali. But one yuga does not start immediately after the close of the previous one, and there are intermediate years which are conjunctional. On either side of the Krta yuga, there are four hundred years ; on either side of the. Treta, three hundred ; on either side of the Dvapara, two hundred; and on either side of Kali there are one hundred. In all, these transitional periods of the four yugas amount to two thousand years. Adding these two thousand years to the ten thousand years over which the Krta, Treta, Dvapara and Kali yugas extend, we get twelve thousand years. Now, are these twelve thousand years of human beings or of the gods ? If these ara considered to be human years, then, as more than five thousand years have elapsed since the commencement of the Kali yuga, not only is the Kali yuga of a thousand human years over* but the following Krta yuga is also over, and we must believe that we are now in the Treta yuga. In order to get over- this difficulty, it has been stated in the Puranas that theses twelve thousand years are of the gods. Twelve thousand

264 GlTA-RAHAYSA OR KARMA-YOGA

years of the gods mean 360x12000=43,20,000, that is, forty- three lakhs and twenty thousand years. The fixing of the yuga in our present almanacs is based on that method of calculation. This period of twelve thousand years of the gods, is one mahayuga of human beings, or one cycle of four yuga^of the gods. Seventy-one such cycles of yugas of the gods make up one ' manvantara ', and there are fourteen such manvantaras. But, at the commencement and the end of the first manvantara and subsequently at the end of each manvantara, there is a conjunctional period equal to one Krta yugai that is to say, there are fifteen such conjunctional periods. These fifteen conjunctional periods and fourteen manvantaras make up one thousand yugas of the gods or one day of Brahmadeva (Surya-Siddhanta 1. 15-20); and one thousand more such yugas make up one night of Brahmadeva, as has been stited in the Manu-Smrfci and in the Mahabharata (Manu. 1. 6&-W and 79; Ma. Bha. San. 231. 18-31 and the Niiukta by Yaska 14. 9). According to this calculation, one day of Brahmadeva amounts to four hundred and thirty-two crores of human years, that is to say, 4,320,000,000 years. And this is called a ' kalpa ' *, When, this day of Brahmadeva or kalpa starts :-

avyaktad vyaktayah sarvah prabhavanty aharagame I ratryagame praliyante tatraivavyaktasamjiiake II

(Gi. 8. 18).

that is, " all the perceptible things in the universe begin to be created out of the Imperceptible; and when the night of Brahmadeva starts, the same perceptible things again begin to be merged in the Imperceptible", as has been stated in the Bhagavadglts (GI. 8. 18 and 9. 7), as also in the Smrti treatises, and elsewhere in the Mahabharata. There are besides this, other descriptions of Cosmic Destruction ( pralaya ) in the Puranas. But as in those pralayas the entire universe,

• A calculation of yugas etc. according to astrological science

has been made by the late Sbankar Balkrishna Dikshit in his work Bharatiya Jyotihsastra in various places to which the reader is referred. See pages 103 to 105 and p. 193 etc.

CONSTBUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 265

Including the Sun and the Moon, are not destroyed, they are not taken into account in the consideration of the creation and the destruction of the Cosmos. One kalpa means one day or one night of Brahmadeva and 360 such days and 360 such nights make up one of his years, and taking the life of Brahmadeva at one hundred such years, one half of his life is now over and the first day of the second half of his life, that is, of his fifty-first year, or the Svetavaraha kalpa has now- started; and there are statements in the Puranas that out of the fourteen manvantaras of this kalpa, six manvantaras are over, as also 27 mahayugas out of the seventy-one mahayugas of the seventh manvantara called Vaivasvata, and that the first coram, or quarter of the 28th mahayuga of the Vaivasvata manvantara is now going on (See Visnu-Purana 1. 3). In the Saka year 1821, exactly five thousand years of this Kaliyuga were over ; and according to this calculation, there were in the Saka year 1821, three lakhs and ninety-one thousand years still in hand for the pralaya in the Kaliyuga to take place ; therefore, the consideration of the Mahapralaya to take place ■at the end of the present kalpa is a far, far, distant thing. The day of Brahmadeva, made up of four hundred and thirty- two crores of human years, is now going on and not even the noon of that day, that is to say, seven manvantaras are yet over.

As the description which has beBn given above of the creation and the destruction of the Cosmos is consistent with Vedanta philosophy— and if you omit the Parabrahman, also •consistent with Sarhkhya philosophy — this tradition of the order of formation of the universe has been accepted as correct by our philosophers, and the same order has been mentioned in the Bhagavadglta. As has been stated in the beginning of this ■chapter, we come across other ideas regarding the creation of ■the universe in some places in the Srutis, the Smrtis, and the Puranas, namely, that the Brahmadeva or Hiranyagarbha first came into existence, or that water first came into existence and a Golden Egg was born in that water from the seed of the Paramesvara etc. But all these ideas are looked upon as inferior or merely descriptive ; and when there is any occasion 4o explain them, people say that Hiranyagarbha ox Brahma-

266 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

deva is the same as Matter. Even the Blessed Lord has in the* Bhagavadgita called this Matter of three constituents by the- name 'Brahma' in the words "mama yonir mahad brahma" (Gl. 14. 3), and He has said that from this His seed, numerous beings are created out of Matter, as a result of three constituents. Vedanta treatises say that the description found in different places tbat Daksa and other seven mind-born sons, or the seven Manus, were born from. Brahmadeva, and that they thereafter created the moveable and immobile universe (Ma. Bha. A. 65-67 ; Ma. Bha. San. 207 ; Manu. 1. 34-63), which is once referred to also in the Gita (Gl. 10. 6), can be made consistent with the above-mentioned scientific theory of the creation of the Cosmos, by interpreting Brahmadeva as meaning Matter ; and the same argument is also applicable in otber places. For instance, in the Saiva or Pasupata Darsana, Siva is looked upon as the actual creator and five things, causes, products etc. are supposed to have come into existence from him; and in the Narayamya or Bhagavata religion, Vasudeva is supposed to be the primary cause, and it is stated that Samkarsana (Jiva or Soul) was first born from Vasudeva,. Pradyumna (Mind) from Sarhkarsana, and Aniruddha (Individuation) from Pradyumna. But as, according to the Vedanta philosophy, Jiva (Soul) is not something which comes into existence anew every time, but is a permanent or eternal part of a permanent or eternal Paramesvara, the above- mentioned doctrine of the Bhagavata religion regarding the birth of Jiva has been refuted in the second portion of the second chapter of the Vedanta-Sutras (Ve. Su. 2. 2. 42-45) ; and it is stated there that this doctrine is contrary to the Vedas, and, therefore, objectionable ; and this proposition of the Vedanta-Sutras has been repeated in the Gita (Gl. 13. 4; 15. 7). In the same way, Samkhya philosophers believe that there are two independent principles, Prakrti and Purusa. But Vedanta philosophy does not accept this dualism, and says that both Prakrti and Purusa are manifestations of one eternal and qualityless Absolute Self (Paramatman) ; and this doctrine has been accepted in the Bhagavadgita (Gi. 9. 10). But, this matter will be more fully dealt with in the next ohapter. I have to state here only this, that although the Bhagavadgita

CONSTRUCTION & DESTRUCTION OF THE COSMOS 26T

accepts the principle of the devotion to Vasudeva and the theory of Action ( pravrtti ) propounded in the Narayanlya or Bhagavata religion, it does not accept the further doctrine of that religion, that Samkarsana (Jtva) was first created out of Vasudeva, and Pradyumna (Mind) out of Sarhkarsana, and Aniruddha (Individuation) out of Pradyumna ; and the words Sarhkarsana, Pradyumna, or Aniruddha are nowhere come across in the Gita. This is the important difference between the Bhagavata religion mentioned in the Pancaratra, and the Bhagavata religion mentioned in the Gita. I have expressly mentioned this fact here in order that one should not draw the mistaken conclusion that the creed of devotional schools like the Bhagavata school regarding the creation of the Cosmos or the the Jiva-Paramesvara is acceptable to the Gita, from the mere fact that the Bhagavata religion has been mentioned in the Bhagavadgita. Let us now consider whether or not there is some element or principle at the root of the perceptible and imperceptible or mutable and immutable universe, which is beyond the Prakrti and Purusa mentioned in Samkhya philosophy. This is what is known as Adhyatma (the? philosophy of the Absolute Self) or Vedanta.

CHAPTER IX.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF.

(ADHYATMA)

paras tasmat tu bhavo 'nyo 'vt/aldo '■mjaktut sanatanah I yah sa sarvesu bhutesu nasyatsu na vinasyati II *

(Gi. 8. 20).

The sum and substance of the last two chapters was that

what was referred to as the ksetrajna (Owner of the Body) in

the consideration of the Body and the Atman is known in

Samkhya philosophy as ' Purusa '; and that when one considers

the question of the construction and the destruction of the

mutable and immutable or the moveable and immoveable

■world, one arrives finally, according to the Samkhyas, at only

two independent and eternal fundamental elements, namely,

Matter and Spirit; and that it is necessary for the Spirit to

realise its difference from Matter, that is, its isolation, and

transcend the three qualities (become trigumtlta) in order to

obtain the total annihilation of its pain and attain Release ',

Modern natural scientists explain the order in which Matter

places its evolution before Spirit, after its union with Spirit,

in a way slightly different from the Sarhkhyas ; and, as the

natural sciences are further developed, this order is likely

to be improved. But the fundamental proposition that all

perceptible objects have come into existence in a gradual order

out of one imperceptible Matter as a result of the development

of the constituents, cannot possibly be altered. Nevertheless,

looking upon this as the subject-matter of other sciences, the

lion of Vedanta does not enter into any dispute about it. That

lion wants to go beyond all these sciences, and determine what

Absolute Element is at the root of the Cosmic Body, and how

a man should be merged in It ; and in this its province it will

not be out-roared by any other science. As jackals . become

• " That second imperceptible substance, which is higher than

rthe (Samkhya) Imperceptible, and which is eternal, and which is

not destroyed even when all other living things are destroyed",

is the ultimate goal.

THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE ABSOLUTE SELF Z6£

mute in the presence of the lion, so do all other sciences in the presence of Vedanta ; therefore, an ancient classical writer has- appropriately described Vedanta in the following words :-

tavat garjardi sasfrani jamtmka ripine yatha i

na garjati mahasaktih yavad vedantakesari II

that is : " other sciences howl lik ejackals in the wo ods, so long , as the jion of Ved anta, the all-powerful, does not roar l'. The '"Observer ' which lias been located after the consideration of the Body and the Atman, namely, the Purusa (Spirit) or Atman (Self), and imperceptible Matter with its sattva, rajas and tamos constituents which has been located after the- consideration of the Mutable and the Immutabie, are both independent according to the Samkhyas, who say that, on that, account, the fundamental Element of the world must be looked, upon as dual. But Vedanta goes further, and says that in as- much as the spirits of the Samkhyas are innumerable (though, they are qualityless), it would be prima facie better and more proper from the logical point of view (i) to carry to its- logical conclusion and without exception, the theory of the- unifying tendency of Knowledge, described in the words, "awbhaktam vibliaktesu", which is seen rising from lower grades to higher grades, and as a result of which tendency . all the various perceptible objects in the universe can be included in one imperceptible Matter, and (ii) to include both Matter and these innumerable Spirits finally and without division in the Absolute Element, than to believe that fundamental Matter is capable of first ascertaining in what the good of each one of these innumerable Spirits lies, and of behaving accordingly (Gl. 18. 20-22).. Diversity is the result of Individuation, and if Spirit is qualityless, these innumerable Spirits cannot possess the quality of remaining distinot from each other ; or, one has to say that they are not fundamentally innumerable, but that this innumerability has arisen in them as a result of their oontact with the quality of Individuation possessed by Matter^. There arises also another question, namely, is the union whioh takes place between independent Spirit and independent Matter real or illusory ?. If you say it is real (permanent), then, in as.

370 GITA-RAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA

much as it can never be got rid of, the Atman can never attain Release according to the Samkhya doctrines ; and if you say it is illusory, then, the statement that Matter begins to place its evolution before Spirit, as a result of its union with Spirit, falls to the ground. Even the illustration that Matter keeps up a continual dance for the benefit of Spirit, in the same way as the cow gives milk for the benefit of its calf, is inappropriate ; because, you cannot explain away the relation between Matter and Spirit in the same way as you can explain the love of the . cow for her calf on the ground that it has come out of her womb ' ("Ve. Su. Sam. Bha. 2. 2. 3). According to Samkhya philosophy, Matter and Spirit are fundamentally extremely different from

■ each other and whereas one is gross (jada), the other is

■ self-conscious (sacetana). If these two substances are extremely different and independent of each other at the commencement of the world, why should one act for the benefit of the other ? Saying that such is their inherent quality is not a satisfactory answer. If one has to rely on an inherent quality, why find fault with the Gross-Non-Dualism (jadadvaita) of Haeckel?, Does not Haeckel say that in the course of the growth of the constituents of fundamental Matter, it acquires the Self-cons-

■ oiousness of looking at itself or of thinking of itself ? But if the Samkhyas do not accept that position, and if they ■differentiate between the 'Observer' and the 'visible world', why

should one not make further use of the logic by which one arrives at this differentiation 1 Howmuchsoever one may examine the visible world, and come to the conclusion that the sensory nerves of the eye possess particular properties, yet, the

■ one who has ascertained this, remains a separate entity. When in this way the Spirit which sees the visible world is found to be different from the visible world which it sees, then, is there ■or is there not some way for us for ascertaining who this 'Observer' is, as also whether the real form of the visible universe is as we perceive it by our organs, or different from it ? Samkhya philosophers say that, as these questions can never be solved, one is driven to look upon Matter and Spirit as two fundamentally different and independent elements ; and if we consider the matter purely from the point of view of natural

rsciences, this opinion of the Samkhyas cannot be said to be

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 371

incorrect ; because, the 'Observer ', or what is known in Vedanta as the 'Atman', cannot at any time become perceptible to the

■ organs of the Observer, that is, to its own organs, as a separate entity, in the same way as we can examine the properties of the other objects in the universe as a result of their having become perceptible to our organs ; and how can human organs examine such a substance which is incapable of perception by the organs, that is, beyond the reach of the organs (indriyatita) ?

'The Blessed Lord has himself described the Atman in the Uhagavadgrta in the following words : —

naimm chindanti sastruni uainam daliati pavakah \ na cainam Medayaitty apo iia sosayati marutah n

(Gi. 2. 23).

that is, "it, that is, the Atman cannot be cut by weapons, it cannot be burnt by fire, it cannot be wetted by water or dried up by wind". Therefore, the Atman is not such a thing that it will be liquified like other objects by pouring on it a liquid ■substance like sulphuric acid, or that we will beable to see its interior by cutting it by sharp instruments in a dissecting room, or that by holding it over fire it will be turned to gas,

■ or that it will be dried up by wind 1 " In short, all the devices which natural scientists have got for examining worldly objects fall flat in this case. Then, how is the Atman to be examined? The question does appear to be difficult ; but if one ponders a little over the matter, it will be seen to be not difficult. How have even the Sarhkhyas determined that Spirit is qualityless -and independent ? Have they not done that by experience got by their own consciousness? Then, why not make use of the same method for determining the true nature of Matter and Spirit 1 Herein lies the great difference between Materialistic philoso- phy and the philosophy of the Absolute Self. The subject- matter of Materialistic philosophy is perceptible to the organs, whereas that of the philosophy of the Absolute Self is beyond the organs, that is, it is self -perceptible, or something which •one oneself alone can realise. It may be argued that if the Atman is self-perceptible, then let each person acquire such •knowledge of it as he himself can : where is the use of the

272 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

philosophy of the Absolute Sslf? This objection will be proper, if the Mind or the Conscience of each man were equally- pure. But, as we know by experience that the purity or- strength of everybody's mind is not the same, we have to- accept as authoritative in this matter the experience of only those persons whose minds are extremely pure, clean, and broad. There is no sense in carrying on a foolish argument that ' I think like this' or 'you think like that ' etc. Vedanta does not ask you to abandon logic altogether. All that it says is that since the subject-matter of the philosophy of the Absolute Self is self-perceptible, that is, as it is not capable of discernment by Materialistic methods, those arguments, which are inconsistent with the personal and direct experience which supermen, possessing an extremely pure, clean, and broad mind, have described regarding the Absolute Self, cannot be taken as correct in the consideration of that philosophy. Just as in Materialistic sciences, inferences incon- sistent with physical experience are considered useless, so in the philosophy of the Absolute Self, personal experience or some- thing which one's Atman has realised is considered of higher value than technical skill. That teaching which is consistent with such self-experience is acceptable to the Vedantists. Srtmat Sarhkaracarya has laid down this very principle in his commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras, and those who wish to study the philosophy of the Absolute Self must always bear it in mind. There is an ancient saying that :-

acintyah khalu ye bham na tarns tarhsna sadhaijet I prakriibhyah param yat tu tad acintyasya laksanam II

that is, " one should not, by mere imagination or inference,, draw conclusions about those objects on which it is impossible- to contemplate as they are beyond the reach of the organs ; that substance which is beyond Matter, ( which is the fundamental substance of the entire universe ), is. in this way, incapable of contemplation " ; and this stanza has been, adopted in the Mahabharata (Ma. Bha. Bhistna 5.12) and also in the commentary of Sri Sarhkaracarya on the Vedanta-Sutras, but with the reading ' yojayet ' instead of 'sadhayet'. (Ve. Su.' Sam. Bha. 2. 1. 27). It is similarly stated in the Mundako-

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 273

panisad and the Kathopanisad, that knowledge of the Absolute Self cannot be got merely by imagination ( Mun. 3. 2. 3 ; Katha. 2. 8. 9 and 22 ). That is why the Upanisada have an important place in the philosophy of the Absolute Self. Much attention had been paid in India in ancient times to the question of concentrating the mind, and there was developed in our country an independent science on that subject which is known as the ( Patanjah ) Yoga science. Those venerable Itsis who, being experts in that science, had besides minds which were naturally very pure and broad, have described in the Upanisads the experience gained by them by introspection about the nature of the Atman, or all that with which their pure and peaceful minds were inspired. Therefore, for drawing 1 any conclusion about any Metaphysical principle, one cannot but refer to these Sruti texts ( Katha. 4. 1 ). One may find various arguments which support and justify this self- experience according to one's own acumen ; but thereby, the authoritativeness of the original self-experience does not suffer. It is true that the Bhagavadgita is a Smrti text; but, I have explained in the very beginning of the first chapter, that it is considered to be as authoritative in the matter as the Upanisads. I have, therefore, in this chapter first explained with authorities, but simply— that is, without giving reasons — the doctrines propounded in the Gita and in the Upanisads about this unimaginable Substance which is beyond Matter, and I have considered later on in the chapter in what way those theories can be scientifically supported.

The Bhagavadgita does not accept the Samkhya dualism of Matter and Spirit, and the first doctrine of the philosophy of the Absolute Self in the Gita, as also in Vedanta, is that there is at the root of the moveable and immoveable world, a third Principle which is all-pervading, imperceptible and imperishable, and which is beyond both Matter and Spirit. Although the Samkhya Prakrti is imperceptible, it is qualityful (saguna), because, it is composed of the three constituents. But whatever is qualityful is perishable. Therefore, that something else which, being imperceptible, still survives after this qualityful imperceptible Matter has been destroyed, is the real and permanent Principle of the entire Cosmos — as has been

35—36

274 GlTA-RAHAS YA OR KARMA-YOGA ,:

stated in the Gita in the course of the discussion on Matter and Spirit in the stanza (GI. 8. 20) quoted at the beginning of this chapter ; and later on, in the fifteenth chapter, after referring to the Mutable and the Immutable — the Perceptible and the Imperceptible — as the two Sarhkhy a elements, the Gita says : —

uttamdh purusas tv anyah paramatmefy udahrtah I yo lokatrayam avisya bibharty avyaya Uvarah II

that is, "that Purusa, which is different from both these (Matter and Spirit) is the Super-Excellent, the One which is known as the Absolute Atman, the Inexhaustible and the All-Powerful ; and, pervading the three-sphered universe, It protects it." As -this Spirit is 'beyond' both the Mutable and the Immutable, •that is, beyond the Perceptible and the Imperceptible, it is properly called (See Gi. 15. 18) 'the Absolute Spirit' {purusottama). Even in the Mahabharata, Bhrgu has said to Bharadvaja as follows in defining the word 'Paramatman':

atma ksetrajna ity uktdh samyuktah prakrtair gmjaih I

fair eva tit vinirmuktah paramatmefy udahrtah II

(Ma. Bha. San. 187. 24).

that is, "when the Atman is imprisoned within the body, it is called Ksetrajna (or Jlvatman, i. e. personal Self) ; and when the same Atman is released from these 'prakrta' qualities, that is, from the qualities of Matter or of the body, it is known as the Paramatman (Absolute Self)". One is likely to think that these two definitions of the 'Paramatman' are different from each other ; but really speaking, they are not so. As there is only one Paramatman, which is beyond the Mutable and Immutable Cosmos, and also beyond the Jlva (or, beyond both imperceptible Matter and Spirit, according to the Saihkhya philosophy) a two-fold characteristic or definition of one and the same Paramatman can he given, by once saying that It is beyond the Mutable and the Immutable, and again saying that It is beyond Jiva (Soul) or the Jlvatman (i. e. Purusa). Bearing this aspect in mind, Kalidasa has described the Paramesvara in the Kumarasai'nbhava in the following words : "You are the Matter which exerts itself for the benefit of the Spirit, and You are also the Spirit which, apathetic Itself, observes that

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 275

Matter" (Kuma. 2. 13). So also, the Blessed Lord has said in -the Gita: "mama yoiur maliadbrdhma" , i.e., "Matter is My generative principle (yoni) or only one of My forms" (14. 3) and that "Jiva or Soul is a part of Ms" (15. 7); and in the seventh chapter, the Blessed Lord says : —

bhUmir apo 'nalo uayuh kltam memo buddhir eva ca I ahamkara itiyam me bhinna prakrtir astadha II

(GI. 7. 4).

that is, "the earth, water, fire, air, ether, the Mind, Reason, and Individuation is My eightfold Prakrti" ; besides this (apareyam itastv anyam), "that Jiva (Soul) which is maintaining the whole of this world is also My second Prakrti" (Gi. 7. 5). The twenty- five Samkhya elements have heen referred to in many places in "the Mahabharata. Nevertheless, it is stated in each place that there is beyond these twenty-five elements an Absolute Element (paramatattva), which is the twenty-sixth (pdvimia) Element, and that a man does not become a ' buddna ' (scient) unless he has realised It (San. 308). Our world is nothing but that knowledge which we get of all the objects in the world by means of our organs of Perception; that is why Matter or Creation is sometimes referred to as 'jriana ' (Knowledge), and from this point of view, the Spirit becomes 'the Knower'i. e. jnata (San. 306. 35-41). But the real TO BE KNOWN* (jueya) is beyond both Matter and Spirit, that is, beyond both Knowledge and Knower, and, that is what is known as the Absolute Spirit ( paramapurusa) in the Gita (Gi. 13'. 12). Not only the Gita, but also all the works on Vedanta philosophy are repeatedly exhorting us to realise that parama or para (that is, Absolute) Spirit which pervades the -entire Cosmos and eternally maintains it; and they say that It is One, that It is Imperceptible, that It is Eternal, and that It is Im- mutable. The adjectives 'ahsara' (Immutable) and 'avyakta' (Imperceptible) are used in Samkhya philosophy with reference to Prakrti (Matter), because, it is one of the Samkhya doctrines that there is no other fundamental cause of the Cosmos which is more subtle than Prakrti (Sam. Ka. 61). But— and my readers must bear this in mind— as, from 'the point of view of Vedanta, the Parabrahman alone is a-ksara, that is, something

376 GtrA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

which Ib never destroyed, and also a-wyakta, that is, im- perceptible to the oigans, the same terms ' aksara ' and ' avyakta r are UBed in the Glta for referring to the form of the Para- brahman which is beyond Matter (Gl. 8. 20; 11. 37 ; 15. 16, 17)_ It is true that when this point of view has been accepted it would be incorrect to refer to Matter as aksara (imperishable or immutable) though it may be avyakta (imperceptible) ; but as- the Glta accepts the doctrines of the Samkhya system, regarding the order of creation of the Cosmos to such extent as they can be accepted without prejudicing the omnipotence of this Third Element ( Absolute Spirit ) which is beyond both Matter and Spirit, the Perishable and the Imperishable or the Perceptible and the Imperceptible Cosmos haB been described, in the Gita without departing from the fixed terminology of the Sarhkhyas; and therefore, when there is occasion to describe the Parabrahman, it becomes necessary for the Glta to refer to. it as the Imperceptible (avyakta) beyond the (Samkhya) tar perceptible, or the Immutable (aksara) beyond the (Samkhya), immutable. See, for instance, the stanza given at the commencement of this chapter. In Bhort, in reading the Glta, one must always bear in mind that the words ' avyakta ' and. ' aksara ' are both used in the Glta, sometimes with reference to the Prakrti (Matter) of Samkhya philosophy, and at other- times with reference to the Parabrahman of Vedanta philosophy, that is, in two different ways. That further Imperceptible, which is beyond the imperceptible of the Sarhkhyas, is the Root of the Cosmos according to Vedanta.. I shall later on explain how, as a result of this difference between Samkhya and Vedanta philosophy regarding the Root Element of the world, the form of Moksa according to- the philosophy of the Highest Self is also different from that according to Samkhya philosophy.

When you once reject the Samkhya dualism of Matter and Spirit, and say that there is a Third Element which is eternal, and which is at the root of the world in the form of a Paramesvara or a Purusottama, the further questions which necessarily arise are: what is the form of this third funda- mental Element, and what is the nature of its relation to both Spirit and Matter? The three, Matter, Spirit, and!

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 277

Absolute Isvara are respectively called Cosmos, Jiva and Parabrahman in Metaphysics (i. e., the philosophy of the Absolute Self). The main object of Vedanta philosophy is to determine the exact nature of, and the mutual relationship bet- ween, these three substances; and one finds this subject-matter discussed everywhere in the TJpanisads. Nevertheless, there is no unanimity of opinion amongst Vedantists on this point ; some of them say that these three substances are funda- mentally one, while others say that the Jiva (personal Self) and the Cosmos are fundamentally different from the Para- mesvara, whether to a small or a large extent ; and on that account, the Vedantists are divided into Advaitins (Monists), Visistadvaitins (Qualified-Monists), and Dvaitins (Dualists).

All are unanimous in accepting the proposition that all >the activities of the Jiva and of the Cosmos are carried on according to the will of the Paramesvara. But some believe ithat the form of these three substances is fundamentally homo- genous and intact like ether ; whereas, other Vedantists say that since the Gross can never become homogeneous with the self-conscious, the personal Self (jura) and the Cosmos must be looked upon as fundamentally different from the Paramesvara, though they are both included in one Parame- svara, in the same way as the unity of a pomegranate is not destroyed on account of there being numerous grains in it ; and whenever there is a statement in the TJpanisads that • all the three are ' one ', that is to be understood as meaning ' one like the pomegranate '. When in this way, diversity of opinion had arisen as regards the form of the Self (jiva), •commentatore supporting different creeds have stretohed the meanings not only of the TJpanisads, but also of the words in the Glta, in their respective commentaries. Therefore, the ■subject-matter really propounded in the Glta has been neglected by these commentators, in whose opinion the principal subject-matter to be considered in the Glta has been whether the Vedanta of the Glta is Monistic or Dualistic. However, before considering this matter further, let us see what the Blessed Lord has Himself said in the Glta about the mutual relationship between the Cosmos ( praktti ), Jlva ( atman or jaunim ), and Parabrahman (Paramatman or Purusottama, i.e.,

278 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

Absolute Atman or Absolute Spirit). My readers will see- from what follows that there is unanimity on this matter between the Glta and the Upanisads, and all the ideas in the Glta are, to be found in the Upanisads, which were earlier in point of time.

In describing the Purusottama, Para-purusa, Paramatman. or Parabrahman, which is beyond both Matter and Spirit, the Bhagavadglta has first said that it has its two forms, namely the vyakta and the avijakta (that is, the one which is perceptible to the eyes, and the one which is imperceptible to the eyes). It is clear that the vyakta form out of these two, that is to say, the form which is perceptible to the organs, must be possessed of qualities (sagaria). Then remains the impercep- tible form. It is true that this form is avijakta, that is, it is not perceptible to the organs ; but from the fact that it is imperceptible to the organs, it does not follow that it must be qualityless ; because, though it might not be perceptible to the eyes, it can still possess all kinds of qualities in a subtle form. Therefore, the Imperceptible also has been further subdivided into sagmia (possessed of qualities), saguna-nirguna (qualified and qualityless) and iiirguya ( qualityless ). , The word ' gwia ' is here intended to mean and include all the qualities which can be perceived not only by the external organs, but also by the Mind. As the Blessed Lord Sri Krsna, who was a living incarnation of the Paramesvara, was personally standing in front of Arjuna to advise him, He has indicated Himself in the first person by referring to His perceptible form in the following phrases in various places in the Glta. " Prakrti is My form "(9. 8); "the Jlva (Self) is a part of Me " (15. 7) ; "I am the Atman inhabiting the heart of all created things " (10. 20) ; " all the various glorious (srimat) or magnificent (vibhutimat) beings which exist in the world have been created out of a part of Me " (10. 41);. "keep your mind fixed on Me and become My devotee " (9. 34) ;" in that way, you will come to be merged, in Me. I am telling you this confidently, because you are dear to Me" (18. 65); and after having satisfied Arjuna by showing him His Cosmic Form that all the moveable and the immoveable Cosmos was actually contained in His perceptible

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 279

form, He ias ultimately advised Arjuna, that, as it was easier to worship the perceptible form than to worship the imper- ceptible form, he should put faith in Him (Gl. 12. 8), and that He was the fundamental repository of the Brahman, of perennial Release, of eternal Religion and of beatific happiness (Gl, 14. 27). Therefore, one may safely, say that the Gita from beginning to end describes only the perceptible form of the Blessed Lord.

But one cannot, on that account, look upon as correct the opinion of some, followers of the Path of Devotion or of some commentators, that a perceptible Paramesvara is considered to be the ultimate object of attainment in the Gita ; because, side by side with the descriptions referred to above of His perceptible form, the Blessed Lord has Himself stated that it is illusory, and that His imperceptible form, which is beyond (para) that perceptible form, and which is not cognisable by the organs, is His principal form. For instance, He says :

avyaktam vyaUimapamuim mamjante mamakiddhayahi ■ nara'h bhamm ajanaiito mamawjayavi amiitamam II

that is, "whereas I am imperceptible to the' organs, ignorant people consider Me as perceptible and do not take cognisance of My superior and imperceptible form which is beyond the perceptible form" ' (7, 24) ; and farther on, in the next verse (7. 25), He has said : "as I am clothed in My YOGA-MAYA (illusory form), ignorant people do not recognise Me". In the same way, He has' given the explanation of His perceptible form in the fourth chapter (4.6) as follows: "although I ani not subject to birth and am eternal, yet I embody Myself in My own Prakrti and take, birth, that is, become perceptible by My own MAY A (gvatmanifiyaija)". He has sfrid later on in the seventh chapter that' : " "Matter made up of three constituents is my DIVINE ILLUSION, those who conquer that ILLUSION become merged in Me;' and those low-natured fools whose perception is destroyed by it, are' not merged in Me. (7. 14, 15) ,' and He has ultimately in the eighteenth chapter advised Arjuna as follows: "O Arjuna ! the Isvara resides in the hearts of all living beings in the form of Self {jiva ), and he controls the activities of all created beings 6y his ILLUSION as if they

380 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

were machines". It is stated in the Narayanlya chapter in the Santiparva in the Mahabharata that the Blessed Lord had shown to Narada also that Cosmic Form which He had shown to Arjuna (San. 339) ; and I have explained already in the first chapter that the Gita advocates the Narayaniya or the Bhagavata religion. After the Blessed Lord had thus shown to Narada His Cosmic Form with its myiiad eyes, colours and other visible qualities, He says to him :

maya hyesa raaya srsta yan mam pasyasi narada I sarvabhutagunair yuktam rtaivam tvam jnaturn arhasi n (Ma. Bha. San. 339. 44).

that is, "that My form which you see is an ILLUSION ( rriaya ) created by Me ; but do not, on that account, carry away the impression that I am possessed of the same qualities as are possessed by created things" ; and then He goes on to say : "My real form is all-pervasive, imperceptible, and eternal and that form is realised by the Released." (San. 339. 48). We must, therefore, say that the Cosmic Form, which had been shown to Arjuna as stated in the Gita, was illusory. In short, although the Blessed Lord has attached importance to His perceptible form for purposes of worship, the doctrine laid down by the Gita will, from the above statements, be clearly seen to be that (i) the excellent and superior form of the Paramesvara is His imperceptible form, that is, the form which is not cognisable by the organs; i ii I that His changing from the Imperceptible to the Perceptible is His MAYA (Illusion); and(iii) that unless a man conquers this Maya, and realises the pure and imperceptible form of the Paramesvara, which is beyond the Maya, he cannot attain Release. I will consider later on in detail what is meant by MAYA. It becomes quite clear from the statements quoted above that the theory of Maya was not an invention of Sri Samkaracarya, and that even before his time it was an accepted theory in the Bhagavadgita, the Mahabharata, and also in the Bhagavata religion. Even in the Svetasvataro- panisad, the creation of the Cosmos is described as follows : "mayam tu prakrtim vidyan mayinam tu mahesvaram" (Sveta. 4. 10), that is, "Maya is the Prakrti (the Sarhkhya Prakrti)

THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE ABSOLUTE SELF 281

and the Lord of that Maya is the Paramesvara; that Para- mesvara creates the universe by His Maya (Illusive Force)".

Although it is thus clear that the superior form of the Paramesvara is not perceptible, hut is imperceptible, yet, it is necessary to consider whether this imperceptible form has qualities or is qualityless; because, we have before ourselves the example of a qualityful imperceptible substance in the form of the Sarhkhya Prakrti which, being imperceptible, is at the same time possessed of qualities, that is, which possesses the sattva, rajas, and tamas qualities ; and according to some persons, the imperceptible and superior fomi of the Paramesvara must also be considered qualityful in the same way. These people say that in as much as the imperceptible Paramesvara ■creates the perceptible Cosmos, though He may do so by His Maya (Gi. 9. 8), and as He also resides in the htart of every- body and makes them carry on their various activities (18. 61); in as much as He is the recipient and the Lord of all sacrifices <9. 24) ; in as much as all the Bhavas (that is, rational activities) in the shape of pain and happiness of all living beings spring from Him (10, 5); in as much as He is the one who creates devotion in the hearts of living beings; and as "labhate at tatah Icaman mayaiva vihitan hi mn" (7. 22), that is, as "He is the giver of the result of the desires of living beings"; •therefore, though He may be imperceptible, that is, though He may not be perceptible to the organs, yet He must be looked upon as possessed of the qualities of mercy, potentiality etc., that is, possessed of qualities [sagwna). But on the other hand, the Blessed Lord Himself says: "na mam karmatfi limpanti", that is, "I am never polluted by Action " or, which is the same thing, by qualities (4. 14); foolish people suffer from MOHA (ignorance) as a result of the qualities of Prakrti, and look upon the Atman as the doer (3. 27 ; 14. 19) ; as this -eternal and non-active Paramesvara inhabits the hearts of living beings in the form of JIva (13. 31), people, who are overwhelmed by ignorance, become confused, though the Paramesvara is really speaking untouched by their activity or action (5. 14, 15). It is not that the forms of the Parame- svara who is imperceptible, (that is, imperceptible to the organs) have thus been described as only two, namely,

282 GITA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

qualityful (saguna) and qualityless (mrguna) \ but in some-, places both the ;forms are naked up in describing the imperceptible Parameavara. Jot instance, there are mutually contradictory saguna-nirguna descriptions of the Paramesvara in the ninth chapter of the Gita where it is stated that v " bhutabhrt na ca bhataitho" (9. 9j, that is, "I am the fundamental support of all created things, and yet, I am not in_ them ", and in the thirteenth chapter, where it is stated that : "the Parabrahman is neither sat (real) nor asat, i.e., illusory" (13. 12), "It appears to be possessed of all organs, yet, is devoid of organs, and is qualityless, and at the same time the eiperiencer of the qualities" (13. 14) ; "It is distant, and yet It is near" (13. 15) £ "It is undivided, and yet It appears to be divided" (13. 16). ^Nevertheless, in the beginning of the Gita, already in the second chapter, it is stated that "this Atman is imperceptible, unimaginable iacirdija) and immutable, i. e., arikurya" (2.25); and there is in the thirteenth chapter, a description of the superiority of the imperceptible form of the Paramesvara,. which is pure, qualityless {nirguya), unorganised (niravayava), unchanging (rdrvikam), unimaginable (atiniya) and eternal (aw/li), in the following words : — "this absolute Atman (Paramatman) is eternal, qualityless, and inexhaustible, and therefore, though It might reside in the body, It does nothing and is not effected by anything" (13. 31).

As in the Bhagavadgita, bo also in the TTpanisads is the fora of the imperceptible Paramesvara found described in three ways, that is, sometimes as being saguna (qualityful), sometimes as -sagii'.n-niryuya (qualityful and qualityless), and sometimes as nirguw: (qualityless). It is not that one must always have a visible icon before oneself for purposes of worship. It is possible to worship a form which is indefinite (nirakara), that is, which is imperceptible to the eyes and the other organs of Perception. But, unless that which is to be worshipped is perceptible to the Mind, though it might be imperceptible to the eyes and other organs of perception, its worship will be impossible. Worship means contemplation, visualising by the Mind (manaa) or meditation ; and unless the Mind perceives some other quality of the object of contemplation— even if it cannot perceive its form— how can the Mind contemplate on it? Therefore*

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 283-

wherever the contemplation, mental visualisation or meditation, of or on the imperceptible Paramesvara, that is, on the; Paramesvara who is not visible to the eyes, has been mentioned. in the Upanisads, He has been considered as possessed of qualities (sagwna). These qualities which are imagined to exist in the Paramesvara are more or less comprehensive or more or less sattvika according to the merit of the worshipper, and' everyone gets the result of his worship in the measure of his faith. It is stated in the Chandogyopanisad (3. 14. 1) that "man {purusa) is the embodiment of his determination (i.e., he is kratumaya), and he gets his meed after death, according to his- 'kratu' (determination)" ; and it is also stated in the Bhagavad- glta that : "those who worship deities are merged in the deities, and those who worship ancestors are merged in the ancestors (Glta 9. 25), or "yo yacchraddliah sa em sah", that is, "every, one obtains results according to his own faith (17. 3). Necessarily, therefore, different qualities of the imperceptible Paramesvara. to be worshipped have been, described in the Upanisads according to the difference in the spiritual merit of the wor- shipper. This portion of the Upanisads is technically called, 'VIDYS.'. Vidya means the path (in the form of worship) of reaching the Isvara, and any chapter in which such path is described has the suffix 'vidya' placed at the end of its name. Many forms of worship are described in the Upanisads* such as Sandilya-vidya (Chan. 3. 14), Purusa-vidya (Chan. S. 16, 17), Paryamka-vidya (Kausl. l),Pranopasana (Kausl. 2) eto.j etc., and all these forms have been dwelt upon in the third, section of the third chapter of the Vedanta-Sutras. In these chapters, the imperceptible Paramesvara has been described as qualityful in the following terms : e. g., ' manomaya ' (mind- embodied), ' prayasarira ' (embodiment of Vital Force), ' bharupa " (of shining .appearance), ' saiyasamkalpa' (Truth-formed), akasatma' (ether-like), 'm-tHtfazmtf' (all-capable), 'sarvakama' (fulfiller of all desires), ' sarvagandha ' (embodiment , of alL scents), and ' sarvarasa ', i.e., embodiment of all tastes (Chan., 3., 14. 2); and in the Taittfayopanisad (Tai. 2. 1-5; 3. 2-6) the; worship of the Brahman in a rising scale has been described, as the worship of food, life, mind, practical knowledge, (vijnana), and joy (amnda); and in the Brhadaranyaka, GSrgya

284 GtTi-RAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

Balaki has prescribed to Ajatasatru tie worship of the Spirit in the Sun, the Moon, ether, the air, fire, water, or the cardinal points, as being the form of the Brahman ; but Ajatasatru has told him that the true Brahman is beyond all these, and ultimately maintained that the worship of Vital Force (pravopasana) is the highest. But this list does not end here. All the forms of the Brahman mentioned above are technically called 'pratlka' (symbols), that is to say, an inferior form of the Brahman adopted for worship, or some sign indicating the Brahman ; and when this form is kept before the eyes in the shape of an idol, it becomes a 'pratima' (icon). But all the Upanisads lay down the doctrine that the real form of the Brahman is different from this (Kena 1. 2. 8). In some places, this Brahman is defined so as to include all qualities in only three qualities, as in the following expressions: "satyan jmnam ananfam brahma" (Taitti. 2. 1), or " vijnamm anandam brahma" (Br. 3. 9. 28), or that the Brahman is of the form of satya ($at),jnana (cit), ananda (joy), or is ' saccidaaanda' in form. And in other places, there are descriptions which include mutually contradictory qualities, in the same way as in the Bhagavadglta, like the following: "the Brahman is neither sat (real) nor asat, i. e., illusory" (Rg. 10. 129), or is "artor aifiyan imhato mahiyan", that is, smaller than an atom and larger than the largest (Katha 2.20), or "tadejati tannaijati tad dure, tad antike", that is, "It does not move and yet It moves, It is far away and yet It is near (Isa 5; Mun. 3. 1. 7), or "It has the appearance of possessing the qualities of all organs" ' ( sarvendriyagunabhasa ), and yet is ' sarvendriyavivarjita ', i. e., devoid of all organs (Sveta. 3. 17). Mrtyu, in advising Naciketa, has kept aside all these descriptions, and said that i the Brahman is something which is beyond righteousness, beyond that which is done and that which has not been done, and beyond that which has happened and that which is capable of happening, i. e., 'bhavya' (Katha 2. 14); and -. similar descriptions are given by Brahmadeva to Rudra in the chapter on the Narayanlya religion in the Mahabharata (Ma. Bha. San. 351. 11.); and by Narada to Suka in the chapter • on Moksa (331. 44). Even in the Brhadaranyakopanisad ■(Br. 2. 3. 2), it is stated in the beginning that there are three

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 285 •

iconical forms of the Brahman, namely, earth, water, and fire • and two non-iconical forms, namely, air and ether ; and it is then stated that the forms or colours of the ether-formed [sarabhuta) spirits into which these non-ioonioal forms are transformed, ohange; and it is ultimately stated that "neti, , neti", that is, " It is not this ", " It is not this ", that is to say, whatever has been described so far, is not the Brahman; the Parabrahman is something which is beyond (para) this non- iconical or iconical substance (which can be identified by Name and Form) , and is ^agrhya', i. e., incomprehensible, and ' avarnanlya ', i. e., indescribable (Br. 2. 3. 7 and Ve. Su. 3. 2. 22). Nay, the Brahman is that which is beyond all objects whatsoever which can ba named; and the words "neti, neti", that is, "It is not this, It is not this" have become a short symbol to show the imparceptible and qualityless form of that Brahman; and the same description has appeared four times in the Brhadaranyakopanisad (Brha. 3. 2. 29 ; 4. 2. 4 ; 4. 4. 22; and 4. 5. 15); and in the same way, there are also descriptions in other Upanisads of the qualityless and unimaginable form of the Parabrahman, such as, "yato vaco nivartante aprapya manasa saha" (Taitti. 2. 9), or "adresyam (adrsya), agrahyam" (Mun. 1. 1.6), or "na cahsusa grhyate ma 'pi vaca (Mun, 3. 1. 8), that is, "That which is not visible- to the eyes, and which cannot be described by speech", or:

aiabdam asparsam arupam avyayam

tatha 'rasa'h vityam agandhavac ca yat I anady anantam mahatah param dhruvaih

mcayya tan mrtyumukhat pramucyate II

that is, It does not possess the five qualities of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, which are possessed by the five primordial elements, and is without beginning, without end, and imperishable (See Ve. Su. 3. 2. 22-30). In the description of the Narayaniya or Bhagavata religion in the Santiparva of the Mahabharata, the Blessed Lord has described His real form to Narada as being " invisible, unsmellable, untouchable, quality- less, inorganic (niskala), unborn, eternal, permanent and inactive (niskriya); and said that such His form is known as

286 GTTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

vasudeua paramatman' ( Vasudeva, the Absolute Atmah); and that He is the Paramesvara who has transcended the three constituents, and who creates and destroys the universe (Ma. Bha. San. 339. 31-38).

Not only in the Bhagavadglta but also in the Bhagavata or Narayanlya religion described in the Mahabharata, and eyen in the Upanisads, the imperceptible form of the Parames- vara is considered to be superior to His perceptible form, and }his imperceptible form is again described in three ways F that is, as being qualityful, qualityful-qualityless and quality- less, as will appear from the quotations above. Now, how is one going to harmonise these three mutually contradictory forms with the superior and imperceptible form of the Paramesvara ? Out of these three forms, the qualityful-quality- less or dual form may be looked upon as a step between the saguya (qualityful) and the nirguna (qualityless) or the ajfieya '(unknowable) ; because, one can realise the qualityless form ■only by, in the first place, realising the qualityful form, and then omitting quality after quality ; and it is in this rising grade that the worship of the symbol of the Brahman has been described in the Upanisads. For instance, in the Bhrguvalli in the Taittirlyopanisad, Bhrgu has said to Varuna in the first place that anixa (food) is Brahman, and thereafter he has in a gradual order explained to him the other forms of the Brahman, namely, Vital Force (prams), Mind (mams), diverse 'knowledge (vijnana) and joy i. e. ananda (Taitti. 3. 2-6). Or, it may even be said that, since that which has no qualities cannot be described by adjectives showing quality, it is necessary to •describe it by mutually contradictory adjectives; because, when you use the words 'distant' or 'real {sat) our mind gets inferentially the idea that there is some other thing, which is near or illusory (asat). But, if there is only one Brahman to be found on all sides, what can be called near or illusory, if one calls the Paramesvara distant or real (sat) ? Therefore, .one cannot but use such expressions as, 'It is neither distant nor near, It is neither real nor illusory' and thereby get rid of .mutually dependent quality-couplets like distant and near, or illusory and real ; and one has to take advantage of these •mutually contradictory adjectives in ordinary conversation for

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF ' 387

showing that, that which remains, and which is qualityless, and is such as exists everywhere and at all times, in an -unrelated and independent state, is the true Brahman (Gl. 13. 12). In as much as whatever is,, is Brahman, it is distant and it is also near, it is real ot existent, and, at the same time, it is -unreal or illusory ; and looking at the matter from another point of view, the same Brahman may be defined at the same time by mutually contradictory adjectives (Gl. 11. 17 ; 13. 15). But though, in this way, one justifies the dual qualification of 'qualityful-qualityless' yet, it still remains to explain how the two mutually contradictory qualifications of 'qualityful' and ^qualityless' can be applied to the same Paramesvara. When the imperceptible Paramesvara takes up a perceptible (vyaktai form which is cognisable by the organs, that may be said to be His Maya or illusion ; but when He changes from the Qualityless to the Qualityful without becoming perceptible to or cognisable by the organs, and remains imperceptible, how is He to be called ? For instance, one and the same indefinite Paramesvara is looked upon by some as qualityless, and is described by the words "neti, neli", that is, "It is not this, It is not this"; whereas others consider him qualityful, that is, as possessing all qualities and being the doer of all things, and being kind. Then it becomes necessary to explain, what the reason for this is, and which is the more correct description, as also to explain how the entire perceptible universe and all living beings came into existence out of one qualityless and imperceptible Brahman. To say that the imperceptible Paramesvara, who brings all projects to a successful conclusion, is, as a matter of fact, qualityful, and that His description in the Upanisads and in the Gits as 'qualityless' is an exaggeration or meaningless praise, would be like cutting at the very root of the philosophy ■of the Absolute Self; because, characterising as an exaggeration 'the conscious self-experience of great Rsis, who, after concen- trating their minds and after very minute and peaceful ■meditation, have expounded the doctrine, that that is the true form of the Brahman which: "yato vaco nivartante aprapya .manam saha" (Tai. 2. 9), that is, "is unrealisable by the mind, and which cannot be described by speech" ; and saying that ithe true Brahman must be qualityful, because our minds cannot

288 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

grasp the idea of an eternal and qualityless Brahman, would 1 be as reasonable as saying that one's own candle-light is- superior to the Sun ! It would be different, of course, if this qualityless form of the Paramesvara had not been explained and justified in the Upanisads or in the Gita ; but such is not the case. The Bhagavadglta does not rest with saying that the superior and true form of the Paramesvara is imperceptible,, and that His taking up the form of the perceptible Cosmos is His MAYA (Gl. 4. 6). The Blessed Lord has said to Arjuna in clear and unmistakable terms that : "as a result of MOHA (ignorance) arising from the qualities of Prakrti, FOOLISH PEOPLE consider the (imperceptible and qualityless) Atman as the performer of Actions" (Gi. 3. 27-29) ; the Isvara does nothing, and people are deceived as a result of IGNORANCE (Gl. 5. 15) ; that is to say, though the imperceptible Atman or the Absolute Isvara is fundamentally qualityless (Gl. 13. 31), people as a result of 'confusion' or 'ignorance' foist on Him, qualities like activity etc., and make Him qualityful andi imperceptible (Gi. 7. 24). From this, it follows that the true- doctrines of the Gita about the form of the Paramesvara are- that : — (1) though there is any amount of description of the- perceptible form of the Paramesvara in the Gita, yet. His fundamental and superior form is imperceptible and qualityless and people look upon Him as qualityful by IGNORANCE or MOHA ; (2) the Samkhya Prakrti is His perceptible diffusion that is to say, the whole of this cosmos is the ILLUSION of the Paramesvara ; and (3) the Samkhya Purusa, that is, the personal Self, is fundamentally of the same form as the Paramesvara, and is qualityless and inactive -like the- Paramesvara, but people consider him as a doer (kartaj as a result of IGNORANCE. The same are the doctrines of Vedanta philosophy. But in later Vedanta treatises, some amount of distinction is made between Maya (illusion) and Avidya (ignorance) in enunciating these doctrines. For instance, in the Pancadail, it is stated in the beginning, that the Atman and the Parabrahman are originally identical, that is, are both of the form of the Brahman, and that when this Brahman, in the form of Consciousness (cit) is reflected in the form of Maya (Illusion), Prakrti oomposed of the sattva, rajas and tamas--

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 289

constituents (the Saihkhya fundamental Prakrti) comes into existence. But later on, this Maya is subdivided into 'maya' (illusion) and 'avidya' (ignorance) ; and it is stated that we have pufe'maj/S when the pure (suddha) sattva component, out of the> three components of this Maya is preponderant, and the Brahman which is reflected in this pure maya, is called the qualityful or perceptible Isvara (Hiranya-garbha); and, if this sattva component is impure (asuddhal, that Maya becomes 'avidya' (ignorance^ and the Brahman which is reflected in it is given the name of 'jlva' (Panca. 1. 15-17). From this point of view, it is necessary to make a two-fold distinction between one and the same Maya, by looking upon maya as the cause of the 'perceptible Isvara' springing out of the Parabrahman, and 'avidya' as the cauBe of the 'Jlva' springing but of the Parabrahman. But, this distinction has not been made in the Glta. The Glta says that the Jlva becomes confused (7. 4-15) as a result of the same Maya by means of which the Blessed Lord takes up his perceptible or qualityful form (7. 25), or by means of which the eight-fold Prakrti, that is, all the various objects in the world are born from Him (4. 6). The word ' avidya ' does not occur anywhere in the Glta, and where it appears in the Svetasva- taropanisad, it is used to signify the diffusion of Maya (Sveta 5. 1). I shall, therefore, disregard the subtle difference made in later Vedantic treatises between avidya and maya in relation to the Jiva and the Isvara, merely for purposes of facility of exposition, and take the words maya, avidya and ajnana as synonymous, and shortly and scientifically deal with the question as to what is ordinarily the elementary form of this Maya with its three constituents or of avidya, ajnana, or molia, and also how the doctrines of the Glta or of the Upanisads can be explained with reference to that form.

Although the words nirgum and saguva are apparently insignificant, yet, when one considers all the various things which they include, the entire Cosmos verily stands in front of one's eyes. These two small words embrace such numerous and ponderous questions as : how has the unbroken entity of that enternal Parabrahman, which is the Root of the Cosmos, been broken up by its acquiring the numerous activities or 37—38

, 590 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

-qualities which are perceptible to human organs, though it ■was originally ONE, inactive, and apathetic ?; or, how is that, which was fundamentally homogeneous, now seen to be trans- formed into distinct, heterogeneous, and perceptible objects?; how has that Parahrahman, which is mrvikara (immutable), ■and which does not possess the various qualities of sweetness, pungency, bitterness, solidity, liquidity, heat or cold, given rise to different kinds of tastes, or to more or less of solidity or liquidity, or to numerous couples of opposite qualities, such as, heat and cold, happiness and pain, light and darkness, death and immortality ?; how has that Parabrahman, which is peaceful and undisturbed, given rise to numerous kinds of voices •or sounds ?; how has that Parabrahman, which does not know the difference of inside or outside, or distant or near, acquired the qualities of being here or further away, near or distant, •or towards the East or towards the West, which are qualities -of directions or of place 1 ; how has that Parabrahman, which is immutable, unaffected by Time, permanent and immortal been changed into objects, which perish in a longer or shorter space of time ? ; or how has that Parabrahman, which is not affected by the law of causes and products, come before us in the form of a cause and a product, in the shape of earth and the earthenware pot ? Or, to expreBB the same thing in short, we "have now to consider how that which was ONE, acquired •diversity; how that which was non-dual, acquired duality; how that which was untouched by opposite doubles (dvamdm), "became affected by these opposite doubles; or,, how that which ■was unattached (asamga), acquired attachment (samga). Samkhya philosophy has got over this difficulty by imagining •a duality from the very beginning, and by saying that <jualityful Prakrti with its three constituents, is eternal and independent, in the same way as the qualityless and eternal Purusa (Spirit). But, not only is the natural tendency of the human mind, to find out the fundamental Root of the world, not satisfied by this duality, but it also does not bear the test of logic Therefore, the writers of the Upanisads have gone beyond Prakrti and Purusa, and laid down the doctrine that the qualityless (nirgwna) Brahman, which is even higher than the saccidananda Brahman, i. e., the Brahman possessed of the

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 291

qualities of eternal Existence (sat), ConsoiousneBB (at), and Joy (ananda), ie the root of the world. But, I must now explain "how the Qualityful (saguya) came out of the Qualityless iturguya); because, it is a dootrine of Vedanta, as of Samkhya philosophy, that that which is not, is not; and that that which is, can never come into existence out of that which is not. According to this doctrine, the Qualityful (saguw), that is, the qualityful objects in the world cannot come into existenoe out of the Brahman which is qualityless (nirguna). Then, whence has the Qualityful come? If one says that the Qualityful does not exist, then, one can see it before one's eyes; and, if one says that the Qualityful is Real (existing), in the same way as the Qualityless, then, in as muoh as the forms of qualities like, sound, touch, form, taste etc., which are perceptible to the organs, are one to-day and different to-morrow, that is, are ever-changing, or mother words, are perishable, mutable, and inconstant, one has to say, that the all-pervading Paramesvara is, so far at least as this qualityful -part of Him is concerned, (imagining of course, the Paramesvara to be divisible), perishable. And how can one .give the name of Paramesvara to something, which is divisible and perishable, and which always acts in a dependent way, and subject to the rules which regulate the creation ? In short, whether you imagine that all qualityful objects, which are perceptible to the organs, have sprung out of the five primordial elements, or whether you imagine with the Sarhkhyas or the material scientists, that all objects have been created from one and the same imperceptible but qualityful fundamental Matter, whichever position you take up, so long as this funda- mental Prakrti (Matter) has not been divested of perishable •qualities, one certainly cannot describe these five primordial elements or this fundamental substance in the shape of Prakrti as the imperishable, independent, or immortal element of the world. Therefore, he who wants to accept the theory of Prakrti, must either give up the position that the Paramesvara is eternal, independent and immortal, or he must try to find ■out what lies beyond the five primordial elements, or beyond the fundamental qualityful Prakrti known as ' Prakrti '; and there

is no third alternative. In the same way, as it is impossible to

292 GM-RAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA

qieach. thirst by a mirage, or to get oil out of sand, so a&o is it futile to hope that immortality can ever come out of that ■ which is palpably perishable; and, therefore, Yajnavalkya has definitely told Maitreyi that, however much of wealth one may acquire, yet, " amrtatiazya tu nasasti vittem" (Br. 2. 4. 2), i. e., "Do not entertain the hope of obtaining immortality by such wealth". Well: if you say that immortality is unreal, then, every man entertains the hope that the reward which he wishes to obtain from a king should be available for enjoyment after his death to his sons, grand-sons etc., so long as the Svui and the Moon last ; or, we even find that, if there is a chance for a man to acquire long-standing or permanent fame, he does not care even for life. 5ot only are there prayers of the ancient Bsislike: "OIndra! give us ' akdta sraixi', that is, imperi- shable fame or wealth" (Bg. 1. 9. 7) or, " Soma! make me immortal in the sphere of Vaivasvata (Yama)" (Bg. 9. 133. 8) to he found in extremely ancient works like the Rgveda, but even in modern times, pure Materialists like Spencer, Kant, and others are found maintaining that " it is the highest moral duty of mankind in this world to try to obtain the permanent happiness of the present and future generations, without being deluded by transient happiness". From where has this idea of permanent happiness, beyond the span of one 's own life, that is to say, of immortality come ? If one says that it is inherent nature, then, one is bound to admit that there is some immortal substance beyond this perishable body ; and, if one says that such an immortal substance does not exist, then, one cannot explain in any other way that mental tendency which one oneself actually experiences. In this difficulty, many Materi- alists advise that, as these questions can never be solved, we should not attempt to solve them, or allow our minds to travel beyond the qualities or objects which are to be found in the visible world. This advice seems easy to follow ; but, who is going to control the natural desire for philosophy which exists in the human mind, and how ? ; and, if this unquenchable desire for knowledge is once killed, how is knowledge to be increased? Ever since the day when the human being came into this world r he has been continually thinking of what the fundamental immortal principle at the root of this visible and perishable

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 393

world, is; and, how he will reach it; and, however much the Material sciences are developed, this inherent tendency of the. human mind towards the knowledge of the immortal principle will not be lessened. Let the material sciences be developed'as much as they can, philosophy will always packet all the know* ledge of Nature contained in them, and run beyond 1 That was' the state of things three or four thousand years ago, and the same state of things is now seen in Western countries. Nay, on that day when this ambition of a human being comes to an end, we will have to say of him " so mi mukfo 'thaw, pasuh. ", that is, " he is either a Released soul, or a brute ! "

No philosophers from any other country have yet found an explanation, which is more reasonable than the one given- in our ancient treatises, about the existence of an Element, ■which is unbounded by time or place, and is immortal, eternal, independent, homogeneous, sole, immutable, all- pervasive, and qualityless, or as to how the qualityful creation came into existence out of that qualityless Element. The modern German philosopher Kant has minutely examined the reasons why man acquires a synthetic knowledge of the heterogeneity of the external universe, and he has given the same explanation as our philosophers, but in a clearer way and according to modern scientific methods ; and although Haegel has gone beyond Kant, yet his deductions do not go beyond those of Vedanta. The same is the case with Schaupenhaur. He had read the Latin translation of the Upanisads, and he himself has admitted that he has in his works borrowed ideas from this " most valuable work in the world's literature ". But it is not possible to consider in a small book like this, these difficult problems and their pros and cons, or the similarity and dissimilarity between the doctrines of Vedanta philosophy, and the doctrines laid down by Kant and other Western philosophers, or to consider the minute differences between the Vedanta philosophy appearing in ancient treatises like the Upanisads and the Vedanta-Sutras, and that expounded in later works. Therefore, I have in this book broadly ireferred to only that portion of them to which it is necessary- to refer in order to impress on the minds of my readers the veracity, the importance, and the reasons for the Metaphysical

394 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

doctrines in the Glta, on the authority principally of the-

Upanisads, and the Vedanta-Sutras, and of the Bhasyas-

(commentaries) of Sri Samkaracarya on them. In order to-

determine what lies beyond the Samkhya Dualism of Matter

and Spirit, it is not sufficient to stop with the distinction

made by Dualists between the Observer of the world and the

visible world ; and one has to consider minutely the form of

the knowledge which the man who sees the world gets of the

external world, as also how that knowledge is acquired, and.

what that knowledge consists of. Animals Bee the objects in

the external world in the same way as they are seen by men.

But, as man has got the special power of synthesising the

experience impressed on his mind through organs of Perception

like the eyes, ears, etc., he has got the special quality that he

aoquires the knowledge of the objects in the external world.

It has already been explained by me in the chapter on the

Body and the Atman, that that power of synthesis, which is

responsible for this special feature in man, is a power which is

beyond Mind and Reason, that is to say, is a power of the

Atman. Man acquires the knowledge, not of only one object,.

but also and in the same way, of the various relations in the

shape of causes and products, between the diverse objects ia

the world — which are known aa the laws or principles of

Creation ; because, although the various objects in the world

might be visible to the eyes, yet, the relation of causes and

products between them is not a thing which is actually visible ;

and that relation is determined by the intellectual activity of

the one who sees. For instance, when a particular object has

passed before our eyes, we decide that he is a soldier by seeing

his form and his movement, and that impression remains fixed.

in our minds. When another similar object passes before our

eyes in the wake of the first object, the same intellectual

process is repeated, and our Reason decides that that object is

a second soldier ; and when, in this way, we, by our memory y

remember the various impressions, which our mind has

received one after the other, but at different moments or times,.

and synthesise them, we get the synthetical knowledge of

these various impressions that an ' army ' has been passing in

front of our eyes. When the mind has decided by looking at

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 295

the form of the object which comes after the army, that he is a 'king', the former impression about the army, and the- new- impression about the king, are once more synthesised by our mind, and we say that the procession of the king is passing. From this, it becomes necessary for us to say, that our knowledge of the world is not some gross object which is actually perceived by the organs, but that ' knowledge ' is the- result of the synthesis of the various impressions received by the mind, whioh is made by the ' Observing Atman '; and for the same reason Knowledge (Jiiana) has been defined in the Bhagavadglta by the words : " aoibhaldam vibkaktesit ",. that is, by saying that : " that is true knowledge by- means of which we realise the non-diversity or unity in that which is diverse or different" (Gl. 18. 20). T ' But if one- again minutely considers what that is of which impressions are first received on the mind through the medium of the organs* it will be seen that though by means of the eyes, ears, nose etc., we may get knowledge of the form, sound, smell or other qualities of various objects, yet, our organs cannot tell us anything about the internal form of that substance which possesses these external qualities. We see that wet earth is manufactured into a pot, but we are not able to know what the elementary fundamental form of that substance which we call 'wet earth', is. When the mind has severally perceived the- various qualities of stickiness, wetness, dirtiness of colour, or rotundity of form in the earthenware pot, the 'Observing' 5.tman synthesises all these various impressions, and says r "this is wet earth" ; and later on when the Mind perceives the qualities of a hollow and round form or appearance, or a firm sound, or dryness of this very substance (for there is no reason, to believe that the elementary form of the substance haB changed), the 'Observer' synthesises all these qualities and calls the substance a 'pot'. In short, all the change or difference- takes place only in the quality of 'rupa' or 'akara', that is, 'form', and the same fundamental substance gets different nameB

• Cf. "Knowledge is first produced by the synthesis of what i»

manifold". Kant's Critique of Pure Season, p. 64, Hax MSller'g, translation, 2nd Edition. ,

296 GlTl-BAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

after the 'Observer' has synthesised the impressions made by these various qualities on the Mind. The most simple examples of this are the sea and the waves, or gold and ornaments ; beoause> the qualities of colour, solidity or liquidity, and weight, in these various objects, remain unchanged and the 'rupa' (form) and name are the only two things which change ; and, therefore! these easy illustrations aTe always mentioned in Vedanta philosophy. The gold remains the same ; but the ' Observer 'i who synthesises the impressions received by the Mind, through the organs, of the changes which have taken place at different times in its form, gives to this fundamentally one and the same substance different names at different times, e. g., once 'necklace', at another time ' armlets '; once ' bangles ', and at another time a ' necklet '; once ' rings ', and at another time a ' ohandrahara ' etc. These various NAMES which we give to objects from time to time, and the various FORMS of those objects by reason of which those names changed, are referred to in the Upanisads as 'NAMA-RUPA' (Name and Form) and this technical term also includes all other qualities (Chan. 6. 3 , and 4; Br. 1. i. It); because, whatever quality is taken, it must have some Name or Form. But although these NAMES and FORMS change every moment, yet, there is underlying them some substanoe, which is different from that Name and Form, and which never changes; and it becomes necessary for us to say,. that numerous films in the shape of Name and Form have come on this fundamental substance, in the same way as some floating substance (taranga) comes on the surface of water. Our organs cannot perceive anything except Name and Form; therefore, it is true that our organs cannot realise that fundamental substance which is the substratum of these Names and Forms, but is different from them. But, though this Elementary Substance, which is the foundation of the entire universe, may be imperceptible, that is, un- cognisable by the organs, yet, our Reason has drawn the definite inference that it is 'sat', that is, really and eternally to be found in and under this Name and Form, and never ceases to exist; because, if you say, that there is fundamentally nothing beyond the Name and Form which is perceptible to our organs, then a ' necklace ' and

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 297

'bangles' will become different objects, and there will be no foundation for the knowledge acquired by us, that both are made of one and the same substance, gold. All that we will be able to say is : ' this is a necklace ', ' these are bangles '; but we will ■ not be able to say that ' the necklace is of gold '. It, therefore, logically follows that that gold, with which we connect the necklace or chain embodied in a Name and Form by means of the words ' is of ' in the sentences ' the necklace is of gold', ' the chain is of gold ', etc., is not non-existent like the horn of the hare ; and that the word ' gold ' gives one the idea of that substance which has become the foundation of all golden ornaments. When the same logical argument is applied to all the various objects in the world, we come to the conclusion that the various objects having Names and Forms which we come across, such as, stones, pearls, silver, iron, wood, etc., have come into existence as a result of different Names and Forms having been super-imposed on one and the same eternal substance ; that all the difference is only in the Name and Form and not in thB fundamental substance ; and that there permanently exists at the bottom of all Names and Forms only one homogeneous substance. ' Existing at all times in a permanent form in all substances ' in this way, is technically known in Sanskrit as ' satta-samanya '.

This doctrine of our Vedanta philosophy has been accepted as correct by modern Western philosophers like Kant and others ; and this invisible substance, which is different from all Names and Forms, and which is the root of the universe embodied in Name and Form, is in their books referred to as' 1 Thing-in-itself (vastu-tattmj ; and the Name and Form which becomes perceptible to the eyes and the other organs is called by them "external appearance" " But it is usual in Vedanta philosophy to refer to this everchanging external Appearance embodied in

• This subject-matter haa been considered in tlie Critique of

Pure Reason by Kant. He has named tlie fundamental substance underlying the world as Ding n» rich" (the Thing-in-itself) ; and I have translated those words by 'vastu-tattva'; the external appearance of Name and Form has been named by Kant as 'Erscheimmg' (Appearance). According to. Kant, the 'Thing-in-itself cannot be known, . - . - . •

298 GfTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

Name and Form as 'mithya ' (illusory), or 'iwsawnta' (perishable) ^ and to refer to the Fundamental Element as 'satya' (Seal) or 'amrta' (immortal). Ordinary people define the word 'satya' by- saying 'eaksur w» satyam', that is, "that which is seen by the- eyes is real"; and if one considers the ordinary course of life,, it is needless to say that there is a world of difference between seeing in a dream that one has got a lakh of rupees, or hearing, about a lakh of rupees, and actually getting a lakh of rupees. Therefore, the dictum 'caksur vai satyam' (i. e., that is Real, which is seen by the eyes) has been enunciated in the Brhadaranyakopanisad (Br. 5. 14. 4) in order to explain whether one should trust more one's eyes or one's ears, if one has merely heard something by mere hearsay, or if one has actually seen it. But, what is the use of this relative definition of 'satya (Reality) for a science by which one has to determine whether the rupee which goes under the visible Name of 'rupee' or is recognised by its Form, namely, by its round' appearance, is Real '! We also see in the course of ordinary affairs, that if theTe is no consistency in what a man says, andi if he now says one thing and shortly afterwards another thing, people call him false. Then, why should not the same argument be applied to the Name and Form called 'rupee' (not to the underlying substance) and the rupee be called false or illusory ? For, we can take away the Name and Form, 'rupee' of a rupee, which out eyes see to-day, and give it to-morrow the Name and Form of 'chain' or 'cup' ; that is to say, we see by our own eyes that Names and Forms always change, that is, are not constant. Besides, if one says that nothing else is true except what one sees by one's eyes, then, we will be landed in the position of calling that mental process of synthesis by means of which we acquire the knowledge of the t world, and which is not visible to our eyes, unreal or false; and, thereby,, we will have to say that all knowledge whatsoever which we acquire is false. Taking into account this and such other difficulties, the ordinary and relative definition of 'satya namely, "that alone is 'saiga' (Real) which can be seen by the eyes", is not accepted as correct; and the word 'satya" has been defined in the Sarvopanisad as meaning something- which is imperishable, that is, which does not cease to exist,

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 399-

Y>

hough all other things have ceased to exist : and in the same- way, satya has been defined in the Mahabharata as :

satyam mma 'vyayam nityam avikari tathaiva ca \ *

(Ma. Bha. San. 162. 10) that is, "that only is Beal which is avyaya (i.e., never destroyed), nitya (i. e., always the same), and avikari (i. e., of which the form is never changed)". This is the principle underlying the fact that a person who now says one thing and, shortly afterwards another thing is called 'false' in common parlance. When we accept this non-relative definition of the Beal (satya), one has necessarily to come to the conclusion that the Name and Form which constantly changes is false, though it is seen by the eyes ; and that the immortal Thing-in-itself (vastu4attm), which is at the bottom of and is covered by that Name and Form, and which always remains the same, is Real, though it is not seen by the eyes. The description of Brahman, which is given in the Bhagavadglta in the following words, namely, "yah so sarve&t bhutequ vasyatsu na vinasyati" (Gl. 8.. 20; 13. 27), that is, " that is the immutable (aksara) Brahman, which never ceases to exist, although all things, that is, the bodies of all things encased in Name and Form are destroyed", has been given on the basis of this principle ; and the same stanza has again appeared in the description of the NarSyanlya or Bhagavata religion in the Mahabharata with the different reading "bhutagramasariresu" instead of "yah sa narvesu bhutesu" (Ma. Bha. San. 339. 23). In the same way, the meaning of the 16th and 17th stanzas of the second chapter of the Gita is the same. "When, in Vedanta philosophy, the ornament is referred, to as 'mithya' (illusory) and the gold as 'satya' (real), one has not to understand that comparison as meaning that the ornament is useless, or invisible to the eyes, or totally false,, that is, mere earth to which gold foil has been attached, or not in existence at all. The word 'mithya' has been used there with reference to the qualities of colour, form etc., and of appearance

• In defining the word « real ' (sat or tatya), Green has said :

"whatever anything is really, it is unalterahly" (Prolegomena to Ethics r § 25.) This definition of Green and the definition in the Mahi- bliarata are fundamentally one and the same.

300 GITA.-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

of an object, that is, to its external appearance, and not to the

fundamental substance; because, as must be borne in mind, the

fundamental substance is always 'satya (Real). The Vedantist

has to ascertain what the fundamental substance underlying

the covering of Name and Form of various objects is ; and

that is the real subject-matter of philosophy. Even in ordinary

life, we see that although a large sum may have been spent by

us on labour for manufacturing a particular ornament, yet, it"

one is forced to sell that ornament to a merchant in adverse

circumstances, the merchant says to us: "I do not take into

account what expenses you have incurred per tola for

manufacturing the ornament ; if you are prepared to sell me this

ornament as gold by weight, I will buy it" I If the same idea

is to be conveyed in Vedanta terminology, we will have to say

that, "the merchant sees the ornament to be illusory, and only

the gold to be real". In the same way, if one wishes to sell a

newly built house, the purchaser pays no attention to what

amount has been spent for giving that house prettiness (rupa -

form), or convenience of arrangement (akrti= construction), and

says that the house should be sold to him by the value of the

timber and other material which has been used in constructing

the house. My readers will get a clear idea from the above

illustrations about the meaning of the reference by Vedantists

to the Name-d and Form-ed ( mmarajmtmaka ) world as illusory

and to the Brahman as real. When one says that the visible

world is 'mithya' (illusory), one is not to be understood as

meaning that it is not visible to the eyes ; the real meaning

is that the numerous appearances of various objects

in the world resulting from Time or Space and diversified

by Name and Form are perishable, that is, ' mithya '

and that that imperishable and immutable substance which

exists eternally under the cloak of this Name and Form is

permanent and real. The merchant considers bangles, anklets,

chain, armlets, and other ornaments as ' mithya ' ( illusory ) and

gold alone as safya ( real ). But in the factory of the goldsmith

of the world, various Names and Forms are given to one and

the same Fundamental Substance, and' such various ornaments

as gold, stone, timber, water, air etc. are formed out of that

Substance. Therefore, the Vedantist goes a little deeper than

THE PHILOSOPHY Off THE ABSOLUTE SELF 3(H

the ordinary merchant, and looks upon all Names and Forms,, such as, gold, silver, or stone etc. as imthya ( illusory ), and looks upon the Fundamental Substance being the substratum of all those objects, that is, the Thing- in-itself ( vastu-tattva )- as ' satya ' ( immutable or real ). As this Thing-in-itself has no- qualities of Name, Form etc., it is impossible that it should ever- become perceptible to the organs like eyes etc. But not only can one form a definite inference, by means of one's Reason, that it must exist in an imperceptible form, though it is invisible to the eyes, or unsmellable by the nose, or untouchable by the hand, but one has also to come to the conclusion that the immutable 'THAT ' in this world is the real Thing-in-itself. This is what is known as the Fundamental Real in the world. But, some foolish foreign scholars and some local soholars considered as 'philosophers ', without taking into account these technical Vedantic meanings of the words ' satya ' and ' mithya ', or taking the trouble to see whether or not it is possible for the word 'sattja' to have a meaning different from what they think, ridicule Vedanta by saying : " that world which we actually see with our own eyes is called ' mithya ' (illusory) by the Vedantists I Now, what is to be done ?" But aB Yaska has said it, a pillar is not to blame because a blind man does not see it 1 It has been stated over and over again in the Chandogya (6. 1 and 7. 1 ), Brhadaranyaka ( 1. 6. 3), Mundaka (3. 2. 8), Prasna. (6. 5 ), and other Upanisads that the ever-changing (that is, perishable) Names and Forms are not real, and that he who wishes to see the Real (that is, permanent) Element, must extend his vision beyond these Names and Forms ; and these Names and Forms have in the Eatha (2. 5} and Mundaka (1. 2. 9) been referred to as 'avidya', and ultimately in the Svetasvataropanisad as 'maya' (Sve. 4. 10). In the Bhagavadgita, the same meaning is conveyed by the words 'maya' 'moha', and 'ajnam'. That which existed in the commencement of the world was without Name and Form, that is, it was qualityless and imperceptible; and the same thing later on becomes perceptible and qualityful, as a result of its acquiring Names and Forms (Br. 1. 4. 7 ; and Chan, 6. 1. 2, 3). Therefore, the mutable and perishable Name and Form 1 is given the name 'Maya' and the visible or qualityful world is said to

GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA.

be the illuBory Mayic drama or 'lila' of the Isvara. From this

3>oint of view, the Samkhya Prakrti is nothing but Mays composed of the saitva, rajas and tamas constituents, that is to say, Maya possessing Name and Form, though it might be imperceptible ; and the creation or extension of the perceptible universe, described in the eighth chapter as having sprung from this Prakrti, is also the evolution of that Maya embodied in qualityful Names and Forms ; because, whatever quality may be taken, it is bound to be visible to the organs, that is to say, to be embodied in Name and Form. All the Material sciences fall in this way into the category of Maya. Take History, ■Geology, Electricity, Chemistry, Physics or any other science ; all the exposition to be found in it is only of Names and Forms, that is to say, only of how a particular substanoe loses one Name and Form and acquires another Name and Form. For instance, these sciences only consider how and when that which is known as 'water' acquires the name of 'steam', or how various aniline dyes, having the red, green, blue, or various other colours, which are only differences of Name and Form, are formed from one black substanoe called coal-tar, etc Therefore, by studying these sciences which are engrossed in Names and Forms, one cannot acquire the knowledge of the'Real Substance, which is beyond Names and Forms; and it is clear that he who wishes to find the form of the Real Brahman must extend his vision beyond these Material sciences, that is to say, beyond these sciences which deal only with Names and Forms. And the same meaning is conveyed by the story at the commence- ment of the seventh chapter of the Chandogyopanisad. In the beginning of the story, Narada went to Sanatkumara, that is, to Skanda, and said : "Give me knowledge of the Atman". In reply, Sanatkumara said to him: "Tell me what you have learnt, so that I will tell you what comes next ". Narada said: "I have learnt all the Vedas, namely, the Eg. and the other Vedas, in all four, as also History and Puranas (which is the fifth Veda), and also Grammar, Mathematics, Logic, Fine Arts, Ethics, subsidiary parts of the Vedas (veda&ga), Morality, Black Magic, Warfare {ksatra-vidya), Astrology, the science of .Serpents, Deities etc.; but I have not thereby acquired the knowledge of the Atman, «nd I have, therefore, come to you ".

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 303

.In reply to that, Sanatkumara said : "All that you have learnt ■deals only with Names and Forms and the true Brahman is €ar beyond this Nama-Br&hnia (the Brahman qualified by JJames)"; and he has afterwards gradually described to Narada the Immortal Element in the form of the Absolute Spirit, which is beyond Names and Forms, that is to say, beyond the .Samkhya imperceptible Prakrti, as also beyond Speech, Hope, Project, Mind, Reason (jnana) and Uie(prarta), and is superior to all of them.

All that has baen said before may be summarised by saying that though the human organs cannot actually perceive ■or know anything except Names and Forms, yet, there must be some invisible, that is, imperceptible, eternal substance which is covered by this cloak of non-permanent Names and Forms ; and that, it is on that account that we get a synthetic knowledge of the world. Whatever knowledge is acquired, is acquired by the Atman; and therefore, the Atman is called the 'Jfiata' (Knower). Whatever knowledge is acquired by this Knower, is of the Cosmos defined by Name and Form; and, therefore, this external Cosmos defined by Name and Form is called 'Jnana' (Ma. Bha. San. 306.40); and the Thing-in-it- ,ae\t(vastu4<ittva) which is at the root of this Name-d and Fora-ed (mmarupatmaka) Cosmos is called the ' Jfieya '. Accepting this classification, the Bhagavadgita says that the ' Icsdrajfia ■aima ' is the Jfiata and the eternal Parabrahman, uncognisable by the organs is the Jfieya (Gi. 13. 12-17); and dividing .Jnana (Knowledge) subsequently into three parts, the Know- ledge of the world arising on account of diversity or mani- manifoldness, is called rajasa knowledge, and the synthetic knowledge ultimately obtained from this diversity is called ■saitvika knowledge (Gtf. 18. 20, 21). To this an objection is raised by some to the effect that it iB not proper for ub to make the three-fold division of Jfiata, Jfiana, Jfieya (the Knower, Knowledge, and the To-Be-Known) ; and that there is no ■evidence before us for saying that there is anything in the world except that of which we get knowledge. The visible things, such as, cows, horses, etc., which are seen by us are nothing ' but the Knowledge which we have acquired; and although this Knowledge is Real, yet, as there is no means except

, 304 GtTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

Knowledge itself for describing that of which this Knowledge- has been acquired, we cannot say that there are any external objects besides this Knowledge which are independent sub- stances, nor that there is some other independent substance, which is at the root of all these external objects ; because, if there is no Knower, then there is no world. which can be' known. Looking at the matter from this point of view, the- third division of Jneya out of Jnata, Jnana, and JfLeya drops- out, and the Jnata and the Jnana which he acquires, are the only two things which remain; and if this logic is carried a little further, then, in as much as the 'Knower' or 'Observer is also a kind of Jnana (Knowledge), nothing- else except Jnana (Knowledge) remains. This is known as ' Vijnana-vada V •and that has been accepted as correct by the Buddhists follow- ing the Yogacara path, who have laid down the doctrine that there is nothing independent in this world except the Jnana (Knowledge) or the Jnata (Knower); nay, that even the world itseif does not exist, and that whatever is, is nothing but the- Knowledge of mankind. Even among Western writers, there are some who support this doctrine, like Hume and others; but Vedanta philosophy does not accept this doctrine, which. has been refuted by Badarayanacarya in the Vedanta-Sutras •'(Ve. Su. 2. 28-32), and by Srlmat Sarhkaracarya in bis Bhasya- (commentary) on those Sutras. It is true that a man realises ultimately only the impressions made on his Mind ; and this is- what we call ' Jnana '; but if there is nothing else except this Jnana, how can one account for the diversity which is realised- by our ReaBon in the various kinds of Jnana, e. g., between the 'cow 'being a different Jnana, the 'horse' being a different Jnana, or ' I ' being a different Jnana ? The mental process of acquiring knowledge is everywhere the same, and if there is nothing else except such Jnana, then, how have the differences between a cow, a horse etc. arisen ? If some one says that the Mind creates these different divisions of Knowledge at its sweet will like a dream-world, one cannot explain this somewhat of consistency which is to be found in the Jnana acquired in a waking state, which is different from the dream-world ( Ve. Su. ' Sam. Bha. 2. 2. 29 ; 3. 2. 4 ). Besides, if you say that there is "no other thing except Jnana, and that the Mind of the 'Observer*

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 305

creates all the various things, then each ' Observer ' must get the ego-ised knowledge that " my mind, that is, I myself, am the pillar " or " I myself am the cow ". But since buoIi is not the case, and everyone gets the experience that he himself is something different and that the pillar, the cow etc. are subst- ances which are different from himself, Sarhkaraoarya has adduced the doctrine that there must be some other independent external things, in the external world, which are the foundation of the Knowledge acquired by the Mind of the Observer (Ve. Sfl. Sara. Bha. 3. 2. 28 ). Kant is of the same opinion, and he has clearly said that although the synthetical process of human Season is necessary for acquiring the knowledge of the world, yet, this knowledge is not something self-created, that is, unfounded or new which has been spun out by human Reason, but is always dependent on the external things in the world. Here an objection may be raised that : " What ! your Sarhkaraoarya once says that the external world is MithyS (illusory); and lor refuting the Buddhistic doctrines, the same Sarhkaracarya maintains that the existence of the external world is as real as the existence of the Observer 1 How are you going to reconcile these two things?" This question has already been answered before. When the Acarya calls the external world 'mithyW (illusory) or 'asatya' (unreal), he is to be understood as saying that the visible Name and Form of the external universe is unreal, that is to say, perishable. But although the external appearance embodied in Name and Form is said to be illusory, yet, one doss not thereby prejudice the doctrine that there is some Real substance at the bottom of it, which is beyond the reach of tbe organs. In short, just as we have laid down the doctrine in the chapter on the Body and the Atman, that there is some permanent Atman- Element at the root of the perishable Names and Forms, like the bodily organs etc, so also, have we to come to the conclusion that there is some permanent substance at the root of the external universe clothed in Names and Forms. Therefore, Vedanta philosophy has laid down the doctrine that there is under the ever-varying (that is, illusory) appearance both oi the physical organs and of the external world, (nitj/a), that is, Real (satya) substance. The

306 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

•whether the two fundamental substances in these two cases are one and the same or are different. But before considering that question, I shall first consider precisely the allegation which is sometimes made as regards the modernity of that doctrine.

Some persons say that although the Vijrianavada of the Buddhists is not acceptable to Vedanta philosophy, yet, in as much as the opinion of Sri Sarhkaracarya that the Name-d and Form-ed ( ' iwmarupatmakal appearance of the external world, which is visible to the eyes, is illusory, and that the imperish- able substance underlying it is Real— which is known as the 'MAYA-VADA'— is not to be found in the ancient Upanisads, it cannot be considered as part of the original Vedanta philosophy. But, if one carefully considers the UpanisadB, he will easily see that this objection is totally without foundation. I have already stated before that the word 'satya' (Real) is applied in ordinary parlance to those things which are actually visible to the eyes; Therefore, in some places in the Upanisads, the word 'satya' has been used in this its ordinary meaning, and the Name-d and Form-ed external objects, visible to the eyes, have been called 'satya ; and the Fundamental Substance which is clothed by those Names and Forms is oalled 'amrta'. For instance, in the Brhadaranyakopanisad (1. 6. 3), it is stated that "tadetadamrtam satyenacchannam" , that is, "that amrta is covered by satya"; and the words amrta and safjw have been immediately afterwards denned as : "prana va amrtam namarupe satyam tabhyam ayam praruzschannam", that is, "prana (Vitality) is amrta (eternal) and Name and Form is satya (RealJ ; the prana is clothed by this satya in the shape of Name and Form". The word prana is here used in the meaning of the Parabrahman in the form of prana. From this it is seen that those things which are known as 'mithya' and 'satya' in the later Upanisads, were originally respectively known as 'satya' and 'amrta'. In some places, this amrta is referred to as 'satyasya satyam', that is, "the ultimate satya (Reality), which is at the core of the satya (Reality) visible to the eyes" (Br. %. 3. 6). But, the abovementioned objection does not become substantiated by reason of the fact merely that the visible universe has been leferred to as satya in some places in the Upanisads ; because,

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 307

in the Brhadaranyaka itself, the final proposition stated is that everything else except the Atman-formed Parabrahman is 'artam', that is, perishable (Br. 3. 7. 23). When the search for the Fundamental Substance underlying the world waB first started, the world which was visible to the eyes was first looked upon as satya, and the investigators began to find out what other subtle satya was at its core. Then it was found that the form of that visible world which was being oalled satya, was perishable ; and that there was at its core, some other imperishable, that is, amrta substance. As it became more and more necessary to define clearly this difference between the two, the two words 'avidya' and 'vidya' came to be used in place of the words 'saiga' and 'amrta', and ultimately, the terminology 'maya' and 'satya' or 'mithya' and 'satya' came into vogue; because, as the root meaning of the word 'satya' is, 'eternally lasting', people began latterly to consider it improper to refer to perishable and ever-changing Names and Forms as 'satya'. But, though the words 'maya' or 'mithya' may have thus come into vogue subsequently, yet, the ideas that the appearance of worldly objects which is visible to one's eyes is perishable and asalya, and that the 'Elementary Substance' whioh underlies it, is alone sat or satya, have been in vogue from ancient times ; and even in the Rg-veda, it is stated that : "ekam sad vipra BAHUDHA vadanti" (1. 164. 46 and 10. 114. 5) — "that which is fundamentally one and permanent (sat), is given different NAMES by the viprah (scients)" — -that is to say, one and the same Real and eternal thing appears in different appearances as a result of Names and Forms. The word 'maya' has also been used in the Rg-veda to mean "making one form to appear as numerous" ; and there is a statement in it that "indro mayabhih purw&pah iyate", that is, "Indra takes up various shapes by his Maya" (Rg. 6. 47. 18). 'The word 'maya' has been once used in the Taittirlya Saihhita in the Bame sense (Tai. Sam. 1. 11), and ultimately in the ■Svetasvataropanisad, the word 'maya has been applied to Names and Forms. But although the practice of applying the -word 'maya' to Names and Forms first came into vogue at the date of the Svetasvataropanisad, yet, the idea that Names and Jorms are non-permanent (amtya), and unreal (asatya), is prior

GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

in point of time ; and it is clearly not an idea, which has been invented by Samkaracarya by perverting the meaning of the word 'maj/a'. Those who have not got the moral courage to fearlessly call the appearance of the Name-d and Form-ed universe 'mithya' as has been done by Sri Samkaracarya, or those who are even afraid to use the word 'maya' in the same sense, as has been done by the Blessed Lord in the Bhagavad- glta, may, if they wish, use the Brhadaranyakopanisad terminology of 'satya and 'amrta' without any objection. Whatever may be said, the proposition that a distinction was made between Names and Forms as 'viriasV (perishable) and the Fundamental Substanoe underlying them as 'amrta' or 'avinaW (imperishable), even in the times of the ancient Vedas, does not thereby suffer,

The province of Adhyatma ( the philosophy of the Absolute Self ) does not end after deciding that in order that the Atman should acquire the Knowledge, which it acquires, of the various Name-d and Form-ed objects in the external world, there must be, in the external world, at the root of these various objectB, some ' some thing ' in the shape of a fundamental and permanent substance, which is the foundation or counterpart of such Knowledge, and that "otherwise it is impossible to acquire that Knowledge. Vedantins call this Permanent Substance, which is at the root of the external world, 'Brahman' ; and, it is necessary to determine the form of this Brahman, if it is possible to do so. As this Eternal Substance, which is at the root of all Name-d and Form-ed things is imperceptible, its form can clearly not be perceptible, or sthula (gross), like the form of objects embodied in Name and Form. But if you omit objects which are perceptible and gross, yet, 1 there are numerous other objects which are imperceptible, such ' as, the Mind, Memory, Desire, Life, Knowledge etc. ; arid it is not impossible that the Parabrahman is of the form of any one of them. Some say that the Parabrahman is of the same form as Prana (Vital Force). The German philosopher Schaupenhaur has come to the decision that the Parabrahman is the embodi- ment of Desire. As Desire is a faculty of the Mind, the Brahman may, according to this opinion, be said to be made up- of -Mind (Tai. 3. 4). But, from what has been stated so far,

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 309

one may say that : ' prajnamm brahma ' (Ai. 3. 3), or " vijnamm brahma" (Tai. 3. 5), i. e., "Brahman is the knowledge acquired by us of the diversity in the gross material world". Haegel's , doctrine is of that kind. But in the Upanisads, the form of the Brahman has been made to include sat, that is, the common quality of Existence possessed by all things in the world (or their ' sattasamanyatva ') as also Bnanda ( Joy ), along with Knowledge in the form of Consciousness (i. e.. cidrupi jnana)\ and the Brahman is said to be ' ' saetidananda in form. Another form of the Brahman is the OM-kara. The explanation of this form is as follows :-All the eternal Vedas first came out of the OM-kara; and in as much as Brahmadeva created the entile universe from the eternal words in the Vedas, after the. Vedas had come into existence (Gl. 17. 23; and Ma. Bha, San. 231. 56- -58), it is clear that there was nothing in the beginning except the OM-kara, and, therefore, the OM-kara is the true form ■of the Brahman (Mandukya. 1 : Taitti. 1. 8). But, if you •consider the matter from the purely Metaphysical. pofnt; of view, all these forms of the Parabrahman possess more or less the character of Name and Form ; because, all these " forms are perceptible to human organs, and all that men come to know in this way, falls into the category of Names and Forms. Then, how is one going to determine the true form of that eternal, all-pervasive, homogeneous, permanent, and immortal Element <Gi. 13. 12-17), which is the foundation of these Names and Forms ? Some Metaphysicians say that this Element must for ever remain uncongnisable by our organs ; and Kant has even given up the further consideration of this subject-matter. In the Upanisads also, the uncognisable form of the Parabrahman has been described by saying "neti. «eft'"-that is. It is not something about which something can be told— the Brahman is beyond that ; It is not visible to the eyes ; and "yato vaco nivartante aprapya manasa saha", that is, "It is beyond speech and also beyond the Mind". Nevertheless, the philosophy of the Absolute Self has come to the conclusion that even in this difficult position, man can, by his Reason, determine the nature of the form of Brahman. We must first find out which one is the most superior and comprehensive of the various imperceptible things mentioned above, namely, Desire, Memory

310 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

Determination, Hope, Life, Knowledge etc., and look upon the highest of them all as the form of the Parabrahman ; beoause, it is an indisputable fact that the Parabrahman is- the highest of all imperceptible substances. When one considers Desire, Memory, Hope, Determination etc. from this point of view, one sees, as has been shown in the chapter on the Body and the Atman, that these are all natural faculties of the Mind ; that the Mind is, therefore, higher than them all ; that knowledge is higher than the Mind ; that Reason is higher than Knowledge, as Knowledge is only an inherent faculty of Reason; and that ultimately that Atman of which the Reason is a servant, is the highest of all (Gl. 3. 42). If the Atman is higher than Desire, the Mind and the other imperceptible substances, it naturally follows, that the Atman must be the form of the Parabrahman. The same argument has been adopted in the seventh chapter of the Chandogyopanisad, and Sanatkumara has said to Narada, that the Mind is higher ibhuyas) than speech, Knowledge is higher than the Mind, and Strength (bala) is higher than Know- ledge; and in as much as, going up in this way, the Atman is the highest of all (bhuman), the Atman must bB the true form of the Parabrahman. From among English writers, Green has accepted this doctrine; but as his arguments are slightly different in nature, I will concisely mention them here in Vedantic terminology. Green says that there must be some substance uniformly underlying the various Names and Forms in the external universe, which (substance) is the counterpart of the Knowledge created by the Atman by synthesising the various impressions of Names and Forms made on the Mind through the organs; otherwise, the Knowledge resulting from the synthesis made by the Atman will be self-conceived and without foundation, and will fall flat like the Vijfiana-vada- We call this ' Something ', Brahman; but Green accepts the terminology of Kant, and calls it the Thing-in-itself (vastu- tattva) : this is the only difference between us and Green. In. any oase, the vastu-taltva (Brahman) and the Atman remain- ultimately the only two correlative things. Out of these,, although the Atman oannot be grasped by the Mind or by Reason, that is to say, although it is beyond the reach of the=

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 311

organs, yet, taking as correct one's self -experience, we come to the conclusion that the Atman is not Gross, but is Thought- formed (cidrupi), or of the form of Consciousness (caitanya-npl). Having in this way determined the form of the Atman, we have next to determine the form of the Brahman. That Brahman or vastu-tattva is either (1) of the same form as the Atman or (2) is different in form from the Atman; these two things alone are possible; because, there is no third thing which now remains exoept the Brahman and the Atman. But, it is our experience that if any two objects are different in form, then their effects and products must also be different. Therefore, in any science, we determine whether two things are the same or different, by considering their effects. For instance, if the roots, rootlings, bark, leaves, flowers, fruits etc. of two trees are the same, we come to the conclusion that they are the same ; and if they are different, we say that the trees are different. When the same argument is applied in the present case, we see that the Atman and the Brahman must be uniform ; because, as has been mentioned above, the synthesis o£ the impressions created on the Mind by the various objects in the world, which (synthesis) results from the activity of the Atman, must be the counterpart of the synthesis of all the objects in the world made by the Brahman or vastu-tattia (whioh is the Root of those objects) by breaking up their diversity ; if not, all Knowledge will be without foundation and will fall flat. And, it now follows as a natural conclusion that though these two Elements, which arrive at two exactly similar syntheses may be in two different places, they cannot be different from each other ; and that, the form of the Brahman must be the same as the form of the Atman. * In short, from whichever point of view one considers the matter, it now follows that not only is the Brahman-Element under- lying the Names and Forms in the external world, not gross like Matter embodied in Names and Forms, but also the various forms of the Brahman, which are embodiments respectively of Desire, Mind, Knowledge, Life, Vital Force, or the logos OM-kara, are forms of a lower order, and the true form of the Brahman is beyond all of them and superior to

• Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, §§ 26 to 36.

312 GlTl-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

all of them, that is to Bay, is of the form of the pure Atman. And it also follows from what has been stated in various places in the Glta on this subject, that the doctrine of the Glta is the same (Gl. 2. 20 ; 7. 7 ; 8. 4 ; 13. 31 ; 15. 7, 8). But, it must not be thought that this doctrine of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman was found out by our Bsis merely by some such logic ; because, as has been stated in the beginning of this chapter, no proposition can be definitely laid down in the philosophy of the Absolute Self by means of Reason alone and it must always be supported by self-experience. We also see even in the Material sciences, that we first get an expe- rience and later on come to know or find out the reasons for it. For the same reason, hundreds of years before the rational explanation for the identity of the Brahman and the Atman was found out, our ancient Rsis had first come to the conclu- sion that: "neha nanasti kimcava" (Br. 4. 4. 19; Katha. 4. 11), i. e„ "the diversity which is visible in this world is not real ", and that there is at the bottom of that diversity an Element which is one in all directions, immortal, imperishable, and permanent (Gi. 18. 20); and had, by introspection, arrived at the ultimate conclusion that the Imperishable Element clothed in Names and forms in the external world and the Atman- element to be found in our bodies, which is beyond Reason, are one and the same, that is, they are both homogeneous, immortal, and inexhaustible; or that whatever element is in the Cosmos (brahmay.da) also resides in the human body ( pfada ); and in the Brhadaranyakopanisad, Yajnavalkya says to Maitreyl, to GargI, Varum and others, and to Janaka that this is the mystic import of Vedanta (Br. 3. 5-8, 4. 24). It has been stated earlier in the same TJpanisad, that he who has understood that "aham brahmasmi", i. e., "I am the Para- brahman", has understood everything (Br. 1. 4. 10); and in the sixth chapter of the Chandogyopanisad, the father of Svetaketu has explained to him this elementary principle of the Monistic (advaita) Vedanta in various ways. In the beginning of the ohapter Svetaketu said to his father.— "In the same way as one knows all the Name-d and Form-ed transformations of mud when he once knows what there is in a ball of mud. tell me that one thing by knowledge of which I will come to know

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 313

about all things ; because, I do not know that one thing ". His father then explained to him by nine different illustra- tions, namely, of rivers, the sea, water, salt, eto. that: "that Element (tat) which is at the root of the visible world and thou (tvam), that is to say, the Atman in thy body, are one and the same thing; that is, "tat tvam asi"; and when thou hast understood what thy Atman is, thou wilt of thy own accord understand what is at the root of the Cosmos"; and

every time, the canon "tb&tvam asi" "thou art that"

is repeated (Chan. 6. 8-16). "tat tvam asi" is one of the important canons of Monistic Vedanta, and that is translated into Marathi by "jem pindim tern bi-ahmadm", i. e., "that which is in the Body, is also in the CogmofeV.

We have, in this way, proved that~the Brahman is the same in form as the Atman. But, soTg&Mfe likely to think that because the Atman is believJijgfSpfe of the form of Consciousness (tidrupi), the Brahman 4|aKpf that form (i, e., ridrupi). It is, therefore, necessary to gjffKhere some further explanation of the true nature of tha^B^ftman, and at the same time of the true nature of the^Sjiman. eit or jnana (Knowledge) is a quality acquired by Reason— which is gross in nature — by contact with the Atman jjout. in as much as it is not proper to arrogate this quality ~! of. Reason to the Atman, one must, from the philosophical pointiof view, look upon the fundamental form of the Atman^&jualityless and unknowable. Therefore, though the Brahmmft of the same nature as the Atman, it is, according to sojrqjw) gome extent improper to say that both or either of these|iSof the same nature as tit (Consciousness or Enowledge).;J>*y^is not that their objection extends only to the Brahman and 'Atman being conscious in form ; but, it naturally follows;' (jb\at it is also not proper according to them to apply the adjective sat (Real) to the Parabrahman; because, sat and asat (Reality and Illusion) are two qualities, which are contrary to eaoh other, and always mutually dependent, and which are usually mentioned with reference to two different things. He who has never seen light, can never get an idea of darkness; and what is more, he cannot even imagine the couple (dmmdva) of light and darkness. The same argument applies to the couple of

314 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

sat and asat (Real and Illusory). It is quite clear that when, we notioe that some objects are destroyed, we begin to divide all things into two classes of asat (perishable) and sat (non- perishable) ; or, in other words, in order that the human mini should conoeive the two ideas of sat and asat, it is necessary that these two opposite qualities should come before the human eyes. But, if there was only one substance i» the beginning,, how can one apply to this Fundamental Substance the two mutually dependent words sat and asat, which came into- existence by being applied to two different substances after duality had first come into existence ? Because, if you. call that fundamental substance, sat, then the question arises-- whether at that time (that is, before duality had come into- existence) there was in existence something else by the side of it. Therefore, in the Nasadlya-Sukta of the Rg-Veda, no- adjective is applied to the Parabrahman and the Fundamental Element of the universe is desoribed by saying : "in the commencement of the world, there was neither sat nor asat, but- whatever there waB, was one", and that the couples of sat and: asat came into existence afterwards (Rg. 10. 129) ; and it is- stated in the Gita that he whose Reason has become free from the doubles of sat and asat, hot and oold, etc. reaches the- nirdvamdva (beyond-doubles) sphere of the Brahman, which is beyond these doubles (Gl. 7. £8 ; Z. 45). From this it will be seen how difficult and subtle are the ideas in the phis.cwophy of the Absolute Self. If one considers the matter m:-rr]y from- the logical point of view, one is forced to admSv this un- knowability of the Parabrahman or of the Atra&n. But although the Parabrahman may, in this way, be qualityless and unknowable, that is, beyond the reach of the organs, yet,. as every man has a self-experience of his own Atman, it is- possible for us to get the self-experience that the indescribable form of this qualityless Atman which we realise by means of a visionary experience (saksatkara), is the same as of the* Parabrahman ; and therefore, the proposition that the- Brahman and the Atman are uniform does not become meaning- less. Looking at the matter from this point of view, it is impossible to Bay more about the form of the Brahman than- that : "the Brahman is the same in form as the Atman" : and

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 315

one has to depend for all other things on one's own self- experience. But, in a scientific exposition which has to appeal- to Reason, it is necessary to give as much explanation as is- possible, by the use of words. Therefore, although the- Brahman is all-pervasive, unknowable, and indescribable, yet,, in order to express the difference between the Gross World 1 and the Brahman-Element (which is the same in nature as the Atman), the philosophy of the Absolute Self considers the- quality of caitanya (Consciousness), which becomes visible to us in Gross Matter after its contact with the Atman, as the pre-eminent quality of the Atman, and says that both the Atman and the Parabrahman are cidrupi or caitanya-rupi (Conscious or Knowing, in form) ; because, if you do not do so, then, in as much as both the Atman and the Brahman are qualityless, invisible, and indescribable, one has, in describing them either tosit quiet, or, if someone else givessome description of them by means of words, one has to say : "neti neti I etasmad anyat param asti I ", i. e., "It is not this, this is not It (Brahman), (this is a Name and Form), the true Brahman is something else, which is quite beyond that", and in this way, do nothing else except restricting oneself to negatives (Br. 2. 3. 6). It is, therefore, that cit (Knowledge), sat ['sattamatratva or Existence) and ananda (Joy) are commonly mentioned as the- attributes of the Brahman. There is no doubt that these- attributes are much higher than all other attributes ; neverthe- less, these attributes have been mentioned for the only purpose of acquainting one with the form of the Brahman, as far a& it is possible to do so by words ; and it must not be forgotten that the true form of the Brahman is qualityless, and that onfr has to get a self-experience (aparoksawubhava) of it in order to- understand it. I shall now concisely explain what our philosophers have said regarding the way in whioh this self- experience oan be had, that is to say, in what way and when- this indescribable form of the Brahman is experienced by the brahma-mstha (the devotee of the Brahman).

The identification of the Brahman with the Atman is described in Marathi by saying "what is in the pinfa (Body), is also in the brahmartda (Cosmos); and it logioally follows that when once a man has experienced this identity of the

316 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

Brahman and the Atman, there can no more remain any difference between the jnata or observing Atman, and the jneya or the subject-matter to be seen. But, a doubt is likely to arise that if a man does not escape from his eyes and other organs, so long as he is alive, how can one get over the fact that these organs are different from the objects which are perceptible to the organs ? ; and, if one does not get rid of this difference, how is one to realise the identity of the Brahman and the Atman ? And, if one considers the matter only from the point ■of view of the organs, these doubts do not at first sight seem improper. But, if you consider the matter deeply, it will be seen that the organs do not perform the function of seeing external objects of their own accord, "caksuh pasyati rupani manasa m tu caksusa" (Ma. Bha. San. 311.17) — in order to see anything (and also in order to hear anything etc.), the eyes (as also the ears etc.) require the help of the Mind. It has been stated before that if the Mind is vacant, objects in front of the eyes are not seen. "When one takes into account this common experience, one sees that if the Mind is taken out of the organs, the dualities in the obje'ots of the senses become non- existent to us, though they might exist in the external world, notwithstanding that the organs of eyes etc. are perfectly in order ; and it is easy to draw the inference that the Mind ■will in this way become steeped in the Atman or in the Atman-formed BrahmaD, and one will begin to get a visionary experience {saksatkara) of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman. That man who has attained this mental state by meditation, mental isolation, worshipping in solitude, or by intense contemplation of the Brahman, will not perceive the dualities or differences in the visible world, although they may be before his eyes ; and then he realises the form of the sole (admita) Brahman of his own accord. In this beatific ultimate state, which is the result of the fullest Realisation of the Brahman, the three-fold difference, that is, tripuH of Knower, Knowable, and Knowledge, or the dual difference of worshipper and worshipped ceases to exist. Therefore, this state of the mind cannot be described by one person to another person ; because, it is dear that immediately on uttering the word 'another', this state of mind is destroyed, and the man returns

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 317

from the advaita (non-dual) into the dvaita (dual). Nay, it is even difficult for anybody to say that he himself has. experienced this state of mind 1 Because, as soon as you utter the word ' I \ there arises in the mind the idea of a difference from others, and such an idea is obstructive to the realisation of the identity between this Brahman and the Atman. It is for this reason that Yajnavalkya has described this state of beati- tude in the Brhadaranyaka as follows : — "yatra Id dvaitam iva

bhavaHtad itara itaram pasyati jighrati irnoti

vijanatH yatra tvasya sarvam atmaivabhut tat kena kam

pasyet .jighret srnuyat vijaniyat\...vijmtm , am are

kena vijamyat \ etauad are khalu, amrtatvam iti. I i. e., "so long as- the duality of the Observer and the observed existed, the one was seeing the other, smelling the other, hearing the other, and knowing the other ; but when everything assumes the form of the Atman, (that is, when there no more remains the- difference between oneself and another), then, who is to see, smell, hear or know whom ? man I how can there be another one to know him who is himself the Knower ? " (Br. 4. 5. 15 ; 4, 3. 27). When everybody is in this way merged in the Atman or in the Brahman, or becomes atmabhuta or brahmabhuta, the doubles of pain and happiness, or fear, lamentation etc. cease to exist (Isa. 7) ; because, in order that one should feel feaT, or lament, the one to be feared ot lamented must be different from oneself, and there is no room for a difference of this kind, when one has realised the identity of the Brahman and the Atman. This state of being free from pain, lamentation etc. is called the 'anandamaya' state (the beatific state) ; and, it is stated in the Taittiriya Upanisad, that this amnda (joy or beatitude) is Brahman (Tai. 2. 8 ; 3. 6). But, even this description is not perfect ; because, where does the experiencer of this beatitude now remain any more ? It is, therefore, stated in the Brhadaranyakopanisad that Self- beatitude (atmananda) is something by far stranger than ordinary joy (Br. 4. 3. 32). Having regard to this insufficiency of the word 'omanda' (beatitude), which occurs in the description of the Brahman, the person who has realised the Brahman (bralima-vetta) is, in some other places, described only as "brahma bhavati ya evaiii veda" (Br. 4. 4, 25) or "brahma veda

318 GlTA-RAHAS?A OH KARMA-YOGA

brahmaim bhavati" (Mun. 3. 2. 9) "he, who has realised the

Brahman, has become the Brahman", that is to say, omitting the word 'ananda', from the description. In the same way as, after a lump of salt has been dissolved in water, the difference that one part of the water is saltish and another of it is not saltish does not remain, so also, once a man has realised the identity of the Brahman and the Atman, everything becomes merged in the Brahman. This beatific condition of the mind has been described in the Upanisads as above ( Br. 2. 4. 12 ; Chan. 6. 13 ). But that saint Tukarama about whom was said "jayaci vade nitya vedanta vayV, ( i. e., " one whose voice always uttered Vedanta") has described his self-experience in the following words by taking the sweet illustration of jaggery instead of this other saltish illustration :—

As jaggery is sweet I so has God come to be verywhere II Now whom shall I worship i God is inside as also outside II

(Tu. Ga. 3637).

This is what is meant by saying, that though the Parabrahman is imperceptible to the organs and unrealisable by the mind, yet it is 'svanubhawgamtja', that is, it can be realised by every man by his self -experience. The unknow- ability of the Parabrahman which is spoken of, belongs to the stage in which there is a Knower and a To-Be-Known; it does not belong to the phase of the Realisation of Non-dualism. So long as one has the feeling that he is something different from the world, it is not possible for a man, whatever he may do, to fully realise the identity of the Brahman and the Atman. But, although a river cannot swallow the sea, yet, it can fall into the sea and become merged into it ; so also, may a man dive into the Parabrahman and realise it; and then he reaches the Brahm-ised (brahmamaya) state of "sarva- bhutastham atmanam sarvabhutani catmani" ( Gl. 6. 29 ), i. e. "all created beings are within himself, and he is within all created things."' In order to explain that the full Realisation of the Brahman depends on one's own self- experience, the form of the Parabrahman has been skilfully and paradoxically described as follows : "avijnataih mjanatam

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 319

■mjnaiam avijanataih" { Kena. 2. 3 ), " those who say that they have Realised the Parabrahman have not really Realised It; they alone have Realised It, who do not Realise that they have Realised It"; because, when a person says that he has Realised the Parabrahman, there is clearly in his mind the dual feeling that he ( the Jiiata ) is something different from the Brahman ( the Jneya ) which he has known, and, there- fore, his non-dual Realisation of the identity of the Stman .and the Brahman is, at this stage, to that extent, upripe or incomplete. Therefore, one who says this, admits by his own mouth that he has not really Realised the Brahman. On the other hand, when the dual feeling of T and 'Brahman' haB disappeared, and the identity of the Brahman and the Atman has been fully Realised, the words "I have understood That " ■( that is, necessarily, something which is different from me ) .cannot be used. Therefore, when a man is in this condition, ihafc is to say, when the Realissr (jntini ) is unable to say that he has Realised the Brahman, he may be said to have Realised the Brahman. That a Realiser Bhould be thus totally merged, -engrossed, totally dissolved, saturated or dead into the Parabrahman, as a result of a total annhiliation of the feeling -of duality, would commonly be looked upon as difficult. But our philosophers have after personal experience come to the conclusion that this state of 'n/ruoiio' ( dissolution ), which at first sight appears difficult, can ultimately he reached by a man by practice (ablujasa) and by renunciation (vairSgya). .Some people raise an objection that in as much as the dual feeling of egoism is destroyed or dies in this state of mind, this is a kind of self-destruction. But any one can see that ■this objection is without foundation, when one realises that .though a man cannot describe this state when he is experienc- ing it, yet, he can afterwards remember it.* But even a

• This feeling of non-duality or of non-differentiation which

results from meditation and concentration ia also experienced by smellin g a chemical gas called nitrous-oxide. This gas ia known as 'laughing gas' (Bee Will to Believe and Other Essays on Popular Philosophy by William James, pp. 234-298 ). But the great difference between the two is, that this state is artificial, whereas

330 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

stronger illustration than that is the experience of saints- Leave aside the self-experienoes of ancient siddha ( released ) souls. Even in modern times, Tukarama, that highest among the devotees of the Blessed Lord, has said :

I saw my death by my own eyes I that spectacle was incomparable I

(Ga. 3579). in describing this state of ultimate bliss in figurativa language, and with great exuberation and appreciation. By the worship of, and meditation on, the qualityful perceptible or imperceptible Brahman, the devotee gradually rises and ultimately reaches such a state that he Realises the identity of the Brahman and the Atman, which is described by the words "aham brahmasmi" (Br. 1. 4. 10), i. e., "I am the Brahman" ; and then he becomes steeped to such an extent in that state, that he does not think of what state he is in, or of what he is experiencing. In as much as he has not ceased to be awake, this his state cannot be called the dream-state or the sleeping- state ; and, it cannot be called a waking-state, as all the activities based on duality, which are carried on in the waking- state, are stopped. Therefore, this state is referred to as the- 'turiya (fourth) state, which is different from the ordinary dreaming (svapna), sleeping (susupti) or waking ( jagrti ) states ; and as the 'nirviladpa' (i. e., in which there is not the slightest feeling of duality) form of meditation has been prescribed by the Patanjala Yoga as the principal means for reaching this state, it is stated in the Gita that one should spare no pains for acquiring by practice this 'nirvikalpa-samadhi-yoga' (GJ. 6. 20-23). This feeling of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman is the most complete state of Knowledge ; because, when the world becomes Brahmified (brahmarupa), that is, One in form, one has reached the climax of the process of knowledge which is described in the Gita by the words "avibhaktam vibhaktesu" — unifying that which is diverse — and it is not possible to get the state attained by self -absorption ( samadhi) is true and natural. But, I have mentioned this here, because the existence of a state of non-dual feeling ( abhsda-bhava ) can be proved by the evidence. of this artificial state of mind.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 321

•any further knowledge about anything. In the same way, when one has experienced this immortal Element which is beyond Name and Form, one automatically escapes the oyole of birth and death, since birth and death is included in the category of Name and Form, and such a man has gone beyond Name and Form (Gi. 8. 21). Therefore, Tukarama has referred to this state as "the death of death" (Ga. 3580) ; and Yajfiav&lkya has, for the same reason, referred to this state as the limit or climax of immortality. This is indeed the 'state of being released from birth' (jivan-muktamsthfi). It is Btated in the Patarijala Yoga-Sutras, and also in other books, that ia this state of mind, a man acquires superhuman powers like levitation etc. (Patarijala Su. 3. 16-55) ; and, it is on this account that some persons take to Yoga practices. But, as has been stated by the author of the Yoga-Vasistha, the power of levitation etc. is neither an ideal, nor any part of the state of a Brahman-engrossed (brahma-wstha), and the man who is a. Birth-released (jiwnmukta ) makes no attempt to acquire these powers, which very often are not to be seen in him (Yo. 5, 89). Therefore, not only are these powers not referred to in the Yoga-Vasistha, but one does not come across them anywhere even in the Glta. Vasistha has clearly said to Rama, that these wondertul powers are only tricks of Maya, and are not the science of the Brahman. They may be true ; I do not insist that they cannot be true, but in any case, they undoubtedly do not form part of the brahma-vidya (science of the Brahman). Therefore, the Brahma-Vidya science says that whether these powers are acquired or not, a man should pay no attention to them, nor entertain any hope or desire about them, but should exert himself only in such efforts as will be sufficient to enable him to reach the ultimate beatific Brahmified state, in which he feels that there is only one Atman in all created beings. Realisation of the Brahman is the purest state of Atman ; it is neither magic nor Mayic wonders ; and therefore, not only is the worth of the science of the Brahman not increased by such wonders, but they cannot be any proof of the worth of that science. Birds, or in these days even aeronauts, fly in the sky ; but, on that account no one considers them as knowers of the Br< hman. Nay, people, who have acquired the powers of 4i— 42

322 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

levitation mayj like Aghoraghanta in the Malati-Madhava,- be cruel and treacherous persons.

The indescribable experience of the beatitude of realising the identity of the Brahman and the Atman cannot be fully related by one person to another; because, in doing so, one has to use the Dualistic phraseology of T and 'You', and one's entire experience of non-duality cannot be described in this Dualistic phraseology. Therefore, the dtscriptions of this ultimate state which are to be found in the Upanisads must also be considered incomplete or unimportant; and if these descriptions are unimportant, then the purely Dualistic descriptions, which are found given in the Upanisads for explaining the creation or the formation of the universe, must also be considered unimportant. For instance, the descrip- tions of the creation of the visible universe to be found in the Upanisads, that the qualityful Purusa, named Hiranyagar- bha, or the various perceptible objects in the world like apa ( water ) etc. gradually came into existence out of the pure, permanent, all-pervading and immutable Atman-formed Brahman; or that the Paramesvara first created these Names and Forms, and then entered them ( Tai. 2. 6; Chan. 6. 7. 3 ; Br. 1. 4. 7 ) etc., cannot be correct from the point of view of Non-Dualism; because, if the qualityless Paramesvara, realisable only by Knowledge, pervades everything, it is scientifically without foundation to say that one created the other. But, as the Dualistic phraseology is the only possible medium for explaining the formation of the universe to ordinary persons, the above mentioned descriptions of the perceptible universe, or of Names and Forms, have been given in the Upanisads. Nevertheless, even in these descriptions the substratum of Non-Dualism is, in many places, kept intact, and it is made quite clear that though the Dualistic phraseology has been used in the descriptions, Non-Dualism is the true doctrine. Just as, though we now definitely know that it is not the Sun which revolves, we still speak of the rising or the setting of the Sun, so also, although it was definitely known that one and only one Parabrahman, in the form of the Atman, pBrvades everything in all directions and without division, and that It is immutable, yet, we come

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 3Z3

across expressions like "the perceptible universe was created ■out of the PaTabrahman" in the Upanisads ; and in the same way, also in the GIta, although the Blessed Lord has said: "My true form is imperishable and unborn" ( Gl. 7. 25 ), yet, He at the same time says, "I create the whole world" ( Gi. 4. 6 ). But some scholars, neglecting the meaning underlying these descriptions, and looking upon them as literally true and important, lay down the proposition that the Upanisads support the Dvaita ( Dualistie ) or Visistadvaita ( Qualified Monistic ) theory. They say that if one believes that there is only one qualityless Brahman which pervades everything, one cannot explain how the mutable, perishable, and quality- ful objects came into existence out of this immutable Brahman ; because, although one may describe the Name-d and Form-ed universe as ' Maya ', yet, in as much as it is logically impossible for the qualityful Maya to come into existence out ■of the qualityless Brahman, the theory of Son-Dualism falls to the ground. Rather than that, it would be more proper { i ) to accept as eternal a qualityful but perceptible form of the Name-d and Form-ed ' perceptible universe like Prakrti, as is done in Sarhkhya philosophy, and ( ii ) to imagine that at the innermost core of this Prakrti, there is another permanent element in the shape of the Parabrahman ( Br. 3. 7 ), just as there is steam in an iron engine, and ( iii ) to believe that these two Elements form a Unity like the grains in a pome- granate. But. in my opinion, it is not proper to ascribe this meaning to the Upanisads. It is true that the Upanisads contain descriptions which are sometimes Dualistie, and at other times purely Non-Dualistic, and that we have to reconcile them with each other. But, we cannot reconcile the various statements in the Upanisads with each other by accepting the Dualistie point of view, as satisfactorily as can be done by accepting the .Non-dualistic point of view, and saying that when the qualityless Brahman is taking up a qualityful form an illusory Dualistie state seems, only to that extent, to have come into existence. For instance, the words in the phrase ^tat tvam asi' can never be satisfactorily explained from the Dualistie point of view. It is not that Dualists did not realise this difficulty. But these Dualists have analysed that'

334 GEFA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

phrase by saying that 'tat tvam' means 'tasya tvam', that is r "Thau art OS That, which is something different from thee ; thou art not That Itself" ; and they have, in this way, somehow or other explained away this very important canon, and satisfied themselves. But those persons who understand even a little of Sanskrit, and whose minds are not perverted as a result of obstinacy, will at once see that this forced meaning i& not correct. In the Kaivalyopanisad (Kai. 1. 16), the terms 'tat' and 'tvam' have been interchanged by analysing the phrase 'tat tvam asi' as "sa tvamem tvameva tat" (i. e., "It is thou, thou art It"), and this canon has been proved to be in support of Non-Dualism. What more shall I say ? Unless one excises away the major portion of the Upanisads, or in- tentionally closes one's eyes to them, it is impossible to show that there is any other import in the Upanisad science except a Hon-Dualistic import. But, as these arguments are endless, I shall not further discuss the matter here. Those, who are in favour of any opinion other than the Non-Dualistic theory, aie perfectly welcome to accept it. I do not think that anything except a Non-Dualistic import could have been intended to be conveyed by those noble souls, who, after describing their self-experience in unmistakable terms by saying: "neha nariasti Mmcana" (Br. 4. 4. 19 ; Katha. 4. 11), i. e., "there is no diversity of any kind in this world", and that whatever there is, is fundamentally "ekamevadvitiyam" (Chan. 6. 3. 2), i. e., "one only, without a second", have gone further and said : "mriyoh sa mrtyum apnoti ya iha rianeva pasyatC, that is, "he who sees diversity in this world, falls into the cycle of birth and death". But, though there is room for doubt whether all the Upanisads convey one and the same import, since there are different Upanisads of the different branches of the Vedas, one does not experience the same difficulty in the case of the Glta. As the Glta is a single work, it is clear that it expounds one kind of Vedanta ; and, when one considers what that Vedanta is, one has to interpret the Glta as expounding the Non-Dualistic doctrine that the only Reality is "That which remains over after all created things are destroyed" ( Gi. 8. 20), and Which pervades on all sides all the material bodies (piytfa ) as It pervades the

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 325

Oosmos ( brahmaQiJa ), ( Gi. 13. 31 ). Nay, the principle of identifying everything with oneself (atmaupamya), which has been mentioned in the Giti, cannot be fully explained by any aspect of Vedanta other than a Non-Dualistic aspect. I do not mean to suggest that all the various philosophical speculations or doctrines, which were expounded at the time of Sri Sariikaracarya, or after him, in support of the Non- Dualistio theory, have been accepted m toto in the Gita. The Gita was in existence before the Dualistic, Non-Dualistic and the Qualified-Monistic doctrines had been formulated; and I also accept the position that the Gita cannot, on that account, contain any doctrinal arguments belonging to any particular sect. But this does not prevent one from saying that the Vedanta expounded in the Gita is generally of the Non- Dualistic kind supported by the Samkara Bchool ( the school of Sri Sariikaracarya ), and not Dualistic. But, although, from the point of view of philosophy, there is some common ground between the Gita and the Samkara school, yet, from the point of view of mode of life, the Gita gives higher importance to the doctrine of Action ( Karma-Yoga ) than to the doctrine of Renunciation of Action ( Karma-Samnyasa ) which is sup- ported by Sariikaracarya. But, this subject-matter will be •considered later on. What I am dealing with at present is the question of philosophy, and all that I have to say here is that this philosophy is of the same kind in the GltS as in the

Sarhkara school, that is, it is Non-Dualistic; and that is the

reason why the Samkarabhaaya on the Gita is considered more valuable than the other doctrinal commentaries.

When one has thus come to the conclusion that there remains behind only one immutable and qualityjess Element .after all Names and Forms are eliminated, from the point of view of Knowledge, and that one has, on that account, to accept Non-Dualism after full and minute consideration, it becomes necessary to explain how the variegated peroeptible /jualityful universe came into existence out of one qualityless and imperceptible Element, from the point of view of Non- Dualistic Vedanta. It has' been stated before that the Samkhyas have got over this difficulty by looking upon Matter with its three constituents (that is, qualityful Matter) as eternal

326 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

and independent, in the same way, as the qualityless Spirit. But, if in this way one looks upon qualityful Matter as independent, the fundamental Elements of the world become two, and the theory of Non-Dualism, which has been un- conditionally accepted as correct for the various reasons mentioned above, comes into question ; and if one does not look upon qualityful Matter as independent, it becomes impossible to explain how the variegated qualityful universe came into . existence out of one fundamental qualityless substance ; because, the theory that it is not possible for the Qualityful to come into existence out of the Qualityless, that is to say, for something to come into existence out of something which does not exist — according to satkaryavada' 1 '— has also been accepted by Non-Dualists. In short, there is a difficulty on either hand. Then, how are we to get over this dilemma ? One must find out some way for explaining how the Qualityful came into existence out of the Qualityless without giving the go-bye to Non-Dualism, and that way seems to be closed to us by the theory of satkaryavada. True, the position is a difficult one. Nay ; according to some, this is the principal difficulty in the way of accepting Non-Dualism, and, on that account, they accept Dualism. But the Non- Dualists have, by their intelligence, found out a skilful and unquestionable way for getting over this difficult position. They say that the theory of satkaryavada or of the gvma- parinamavada f applies only when the cause cad the product are both of the same kind or class ; and on that account, even Non-Dualists will accept that the Real and Qualityless Brahman cannot give birth to a Real and Qualityful Maya; but, this admission is effective only when both the substances are Real ( satya ). Where one substanoe is Real, and the other one is only a reflection of it, satkaryavada does not apply. The Sarnkhyas consider Prakrti as an independent Real substance, in the same way as the Purusa. Therefore, they cannot, having regard to the theory of satkaryavada, account for the outcome of a qualityful Prakrti from a qualityless Purusa. But as the Non-Dualistic Vedanta holds that though

• See p, 210 above. — Translator, t See p. 234 above.— Trans.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 327

Maya may be eternal, it is neither Real nor independent, but is, as stated in the Gita, a 'folly' (moha), an 'ignorance' ■'( ajnana ), or an 'illusion ( rrinya ) seen by the organs', the objec- tion based on satkaryavada, does not in the least affect the Non-Dualistic doctrine. If a son is born to a father, we can say that he is the result of the guita-parinama of the father ; but when there is only one individual, namely, the father, and he is seen appearing sometimes in the guise of an infant, and sometimes of a young man, and sometimes of an old man, there does not exist, as we readily realise, the relation of cause and product, or of gum-parinama between the man and his various disguises. In the same way, when we have come to the conclusion that there is only one Sun, we say that the reflection of that Sun seen in water is a kind of illusion, 1 and that there is cot another Sun which has come into existence by guya-parinama ; and astronomy tells us that when once the true form of a planet has been defined by means of a telescope, that form of it which we see by the naked eyes, is only an appearance resulting from the weakness of our eyes and the immense distance of the planet from us. From this, it becomes clear that a particular thing cannot be looked upon as an independent, real, and existing thing, merely on account of the fact that it is actually perceptible to our eyes and other organs. Then, why should we not make use of the same argument in the philosophy of the Absolute Self, and say that the qualityless Parabrahman which has been defined by the telescope of the knowledgeful (spiritual) eyes- is the only thing which is Real, and that the Names and Forms, which are visible to the knowledgeless natural eyes, is not the product or result of, or something which has come out of, this Parabrahman, but is purely a deceptive and illusory appearance due to the incapacity of our organs 1 The objection that the Qualityful cannot come into existence out of the Qualityless can itself not be made here; because, the two substances do not belong to the same category, and whereas the one is Real, the other is merely an appearance ; and it is common experience, that, though there may be fundamentally one Real substance, the appearances of that same substance change according to the faulty vision, or the ignorance, or. the

328 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

blindness of the perBon who Bees. Take, for instance, the two

•qualities, namely, the words which can be heard by the ears, or

the colours which can be seen by the eyes. Natural sciences

Lave by minutely analysing the word or sound, which can be

heard by the ears, clearly proved that 'sound' is nothing but

waves or vibrations of the air. In the same way, it has now

been determined by minute researches that the red, yellow, blue

and other colours, which are visible to the eyes, are the evolutes

of one fundamental sunlight, and that this sunlight itself is a

kind of motion or vibration. If, although 'motion' or

vibration is fundamentally one, the ears recognise it as 'sound'

and the eyes as 'colour', then, the same argument being applied

in a more comprehensive way to all the various organs, it

follows that (i) the different human senses attribute (i. e., make

an adhyaropa of ) the different qualities of sound, colour, etc.,

which (qualities) are embodied in Name and Form, to one and

the same Fundamental Substance, and thereby various

appearances come into being ; that (ii) it is not necessary for

these appearances, qualities, or Names and Forms to exist in

the Fundamental Substance ; and that (iii) the coming into

existence of all Names and Forms can thus be logically

explained without the help of the doctrine of satkaryavada.

And in order to establish this proposition, VedSnta philosophy

gives the various illustrations of a string being taken for a

serpent, or a shell being taken for silver, or one thing

being seen as two things by poking the finger

under the eyeball, or the same substance being seen

to be of different colours by the use of spectacles of

different colours. It is true that a man will always

perceive the various Names and Forms or qualities in the

world, in as much as he can never get rid of his organs.

But, this relative appearanoe of the world, which, is seen

by the eyes of the organised human being, cannot be said

to be the fundamental, that is, the non-relative and eternal

form of the world. If human beings come to have fewer or

more organs than they have at present, they may not see the

universe in the same way as they now see it ; and, if this is

true, then, on being asked to explain the eternal and real

nature of the Element which is at the root of the world,

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 329

•without reference to the organs of the person who sees, one las to answer by saying that the Fundamental Element is •quality less, and our seeing it as qualityful is the result of the nature of our organs, and not the quality of the Fundamental •Substance. Such questions do not arise in the Material sciences, because, in those sciences only such things are to be examined as are perceptible to the organs. But, from the fact that a man or his organs come to an end, we cannot conclude that the Paramesvara also comes to an end; nor •can we conclude from the fact that a man sees Him as being of a particular kind, that His Real, non-relative form, which is uncircumscribed by Time, is what the man sees. Therefore, in that philosophy of the Absolute Self in whioh one has to determine the fundamental form of the Reality which is at the root of the universe, one must give up the relative and dependent vision of the human organs, and one has ultimately to consider the matter purely by his spiritual vision, that is to say, as far as possible, by Reason only; and when that is done, all the qualities which are perceptible to the organs automatically drop off; and one sees that the real form of the Brahman is beyond the reaoh of the organs, that is, qualityless; and that that form is a super- excellent form. But who is going to describe that which is qualityleBs and how?. Therefore, the Non-Dualist Vedanta haB laid down the proposition that the ultimate, that is to say, the non-relative and eternal form of the Parabrahman is not only qualityless but indescribable, and that, man sees a qualityful appearance, in this qualityless form, by reason of his organs. But, here again a question arises as to how the organs have acquired the power of changing the Qualityless into the Qualityful. The reply of the Non-Dualist Vedanta to this is : as human knowledge stops at this stage, one has either to say that this must be called the ignorance of the organs, and that their seeing the appearance of the •qualityful universe in the qualityless Parabrahman is due to that ignorance ; or, one has to oontent oneself with drawing the definite inference that the visible universe (Prakrti) is only a ' divine illusion ' of the qualityless Paramesvara, since the organs themselves are part of the creation of the Para-

330 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

mesvara (Gi. 7. 14). My readers will understand from this the> import of the statements in the Gita (Gi. 7. 14, 24, 25) that- though the a-pmbuddha, that is, those who see merely by the physical organs, see the Paramesvara to be perceptible and qualityful, yet, His real and excellent form is quality less ^ and that Realising that form by spiritual vision is the climax of Knowledge. But though, in this way, one arrives at the conclusion that the Paramesvara is fundamentally qualityless,. and that the human organs see in Him the variegated appearance of the qualityful universe, yet, it becomes necessary to precisely explain in what meaning the word ' qualityless * has to be taken in this proposition. It is true that though our organs attribute the qualities of sound, colour etc., to vibrations of air, or mistake a shell for silver, the vibrations of air do not possess the quality of sound or colour, nor does- the shell possess the quality of silver ; but, from the fact that the Fundamental Substance does not contain the particular attributed qualities, one cannot draw the necessary conclusion that It will not possess other qualities. Because, as we actually see, though the shell does not possess the quality of silver, yet,. it possesses some qualities other than those of silver. Tbis, therefore, gives rise to the following difficulty, namely, though one admits that the fundamental Brahman does not possess the qualities which are ascribed to it by one's organs as a 'result of one's ignorance, how can one be sure that the Parabrahman does not possess other qualities ; and if it possesses other qualities, how is it qualityless ? But, if one considers the matter a little minutely, it will be seen that even assuming the fundamental Brahman to possess qualities other than those ascribed to it by the organs, how are we going to find them out f The qualities which a man perceives are perceived by him through the medium of his organs ; and those qualities, which are not perceptible to the organs, cannot be known. In short, even if the Parabrahman possesses some qualities other than those which are ascribed to it by our organs, it is not possible for us to know them ; and saying that the Para- brahman does possess qualities is illogical, if it is impossible for us to know those qualities. Therefore, Vedantists understand the word ' guna ' as meaning 'qualities which

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 331

aie knowable by human beings 1 , and formulate the proposition that the Brahman is ' quality less ' in this sense. Non-dualistic Vedanta does not say that the fundamental Parabrahman cannot possess qualities or powers which are beyond the imagination of human beings, and no one, as a matter of fact, can say that. Nay, even the Vedantists say that the ignorance of the organs or Maya, which was mentioned above, must be an unimaginable power of that fundamental Parabrahman.

The three-constituented Maya or Prakrti is not some independent substance ; but, what happens is that the human organs, as a result of ignorance, ascribe (make an adhyaropa of) a qualityful appearance to one homogeneous, and quality- less Brahman. This theory is known as ' VIVARTA-VADA '. The explanation given by the Non-Dualistic Vedantists as to how the variegated qualityful universe first came to be seen* if the qualityless Brahman was the only Fundamental Substance, is as follows . — The Kanada Nyaya philosophy propounds the doctrine that innumerable atoms are the funda- mental cause of the universe, and the followers of Nyaya philosophy consider these atoms to be Real. They have,, therefore, come to the conclusion, that the various objects in the world begin to come into existence when these innumerable atoms begin to ooalesce. As according to this theory, the universe starts to come into existence when the union between the atoms commences to take place, it is called ' Ararhbha-vada ' (the Theory of Commencement). But Samkhya philosophy does not aooept this Nyaya theory of innumerable atoms, and says that the Fundamental Root of the Gross world is ' one, homogeneous, real, and three-constituented Prakrti '; and they say that the perceptible world comes into existence as a result of the unfurling or pariijama of the constituents of this three- constituented Prakrti. This doctrine is known as the ' Ouna- parinama-vada ' (Theory of the Development of Constituents), because, it maintains that the -entire perceptible universe is the result of the unfurling of the constituents of one fundamental qualityful Prakrti. But both these theories are negatived by the, Non-Dualistic Vedantists. As atoms are innumerable, they cannot be the Boot of the world according to Non- Dualism ; and the Dualistio theory, that though Prakrti is one,

•332 GXTA-RAHASYA. OK KARMA-YOGA

it is different from Purusa and independent, ia also incon- sistent with Non-Dualism ; but, when in this way, both these theories are negatived, it becomes necessary to explain how the qualityful universe came into existence out of one qualityless Brahman ; because, according to the satkaryavada, the Quality- ful cannot come into existence out of the Qualityless. To this, the reply of the Vedantists is, that the doctrine of satkaryavada applies only where both the Cause and the Product are Real substances ; where the fundamental substance is one, and only its forms or appearances are changed, this theory does not apply; because, as is common experience, seeing various appearances of one and the same thing is not a quality of that thing, and these various appearances can come into existence as a result of the difference in the vision of the persons who see. * When this theory is applied to the qualityless Brahman and the qualityful universe, one has to say that the Brahman is •qualityless, and that an appearance of qualityfulness comes into existence in it, as a result of the nature of the human organs. This is known as the ' Vivarta-vada. ' According to Vivarta-vada, there is believed to be only one, fundamental, Real substance, and it is said that numerous, unreal or constantly changing Appearances are ascribed to it ; •and in the Guna-parinama-v&da, two Real susbtances are taken for granted from the very commencement, and it is said that the Gunas ( constituents ) of one of these t<" become unfurled, and that all other things in the uniyss* which are possessed of various qualities come into existence in con- sequence. The impression of the existence of a serpent, where, as a matter of fact, there is only a string, is the Vivarta-vada ; and, fibres being formed into a rope, or curds out of milk, is the Guna-parinama-vada. Therefore, in the book called Vedantasdra, these two theories are described and differentiated ..between in the following words : —

yas tattviko 'nyathab/iavah parinama udiritah l

ataitviko 'nyathabhavo vivartah sa udfrifafc II ( Ve. Sa. 21 ).

^0 * To explain this meaning in English, we have to say : pTippearances are the results of subjective conditio n, viz., the . senses of the observer, and not of the Thing-in-itoeli

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 33$

that is, "when from one fundamental substance, another substance of a different nature comes into existence essentially, that is, really, that is called (guya- ) jnriyiama; but when- instead of this, the fundamental substance looks something- different I atattvika ), it is said to be vivarta". The Ararhbha- vada is the theory of the Nyaya school, the Guna-parinama- vada is the theory of the Samkhya school, and the Vivarta- vada is the theory of the Non-Dualist Vedanta school. The- Non-Dualist Vedantists do not look upon the two qualityful. substances, atoms and Prakrti, as different from or independent of the qualityless Brahman ; but by their doing so, the- objection that the Qualityful cannot spring out of the Quality- less arises on account of satkarya-vada ; and in order to get rid of that objection, the Vivarta-vada has come into existence. But, the conclusion drawn by some, that, on that account the- Vedantists will not at any time or cannot acoept the Guna-- parinama-vada is wrong. The principal object of the Vivarta- vada is to show that (i) the objection of the Sarhkhyas, or of other Dualists against Non-Dualism, namely, that the qualityful' Prakrti or Maya cannot spring out of the qualityless Brahman,, is not impossible to answer, and that (ii) it is possible for our- organs to see innumerable Mayic (illusory) appearances in one- qualityless Brahman. "When this object has been achieved, that, is to say, when it has been proved by Vivarta-vada, that it is possible to see the Appearance of the three-constituented* qualityful Prakrti in one qualityless Parabrahman, Vedanta philosophy has no objection to accept that the further develop- ment of that Prakrti has taken place according to the Guna- parinama-vada. The chief doctrine of Non-Dualistic Vedanta. is that the fundamental Prakrti is an Appearance, or an> Illusion, and that it is not Real. But once this first, Appearance of Prakrti begins to be seen, Non-Dualist Vedantists have no objection to accept that the appearances,. which are subsequently evolved from this one original Appearance, are not-independent ; and to acoept that the-, qualities of one appearance spring out of the qualities of another appearance, and that, in this way, appearances possess- ing various qualities have come into existenoe. Therefore, although the Blessed Lord has said in the Glti. that

334 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

"'Prakrti is nothing but My Maya" (Gl. 7. 14 ; 4. 6), the Gita itself also says that this Prakrti, which has become imbued with or inhabited by the Paramesvara (Gl. 9. 10), is further developed according to the rule "ffuya gunesu vartanle" (Gl. 3. 28 ; 14. 23). From this it will be clear, that when once the appearance of Maya has taken place in the fundamentally <raalityless Brahman acoording to Vivarta-vada, the principle ■of gunotkarsa (Development of Constituents) has been accepted even by the Gita for explaining this Mayic appearance, that is, this further development of Prakrti. It is not that because you say that the entire visible world is a Mayic appearance, therefore, there cannot be some such rule like gunotkarsa ■which controls the changes in form which take place in this Appearance. Vedantists do not wish to deny that the further development of this Mayic appearance iB bound by rules. All that they say is that these rules are also Mayic, like the funda- mental Prakrti, and that the Paramesvara is the Over-Lord of all these Mayic rules, and is beyond them, and that it is by His power that some sort of permanence or regularity has come into these rules. It is not possible for the qualityful, that is, perishable Prakrti, which is in the form of an Appearance, to lay down rules which are not circumscribed by Time.

From the foregoing discussion, my readers will understand the nature and the mutual relationship between the Jiva {personal self) and the Paramesvara (the Absolute Tsvara), or according to Vedantic terminology, between Maya (that is, the universe which has been brought into existence by Maya), the Atman, and the Parabrahman. From the point of view of the philosophy of the Highest Self, all the things in the universe are divided into two classes, namely, 'Names and Forms, and the Eternal Element ' ( nitya-tattm ) clothed in those Names and Forms. Out of these, ' Names and Forms ' are known as the qualityful Maya or Prakrti. But when you eliminate the Names and Forms, the Eternal Element (nitya- dravya) which remains, must be qualityless; because, no juality can exist without the support of a Name and Form. This eternal and imperceptible Element is the Parabrahman ; and- the weak organs of human beings see the qualityful

THE PHILOSOPHY OF. THE ABSOLUTE SELF 335*

Maya as a growth out of this qualityless Par.abrahman. This Maya is not a Real substance, and it is only the Patabrahman which is Real, that is, uueircumseribed by Time, and nevet-changing. These are the doctrines which relate to the nature of the Names and Forms of the visible universe and the Parabrahuian clothed by them. Now, when the human being is viewed from the same point of view, it is seen that the human body and organs are substances defined by Name and Form, like other substances in the visible world, that ia to say, that they fall into the category of the non-permanent Maya ; and that the Annan, which is clothed by this Body and organs, falls into the category of the eternal Parabrahman ; or, that the Brahman and the A-.ftman are^ona and the same. My readers must have now noticed the differsnos between these Non-Daalifitic doctrines, which do not look upon the external world as an independent substance in this sense, and the Buddhistic doctrinasv Buddhists, who believe in the v"ijaaiia-vada, gay that the external world does not exist at all, and that Jftaaa ( Knowledge ) alone is Real : and Vedantists look lipon sflly the ever-changing Names and Forms of the external universe as-unreal, and say that under these Names and Forms, as also in the human body, there is, in both cases, one and the same Mman-formBd Substance; and that this homogeneous Atman- Element is the ultimate Reality. In the same way, Samkbya philosophy has accepted xhe synthesis of the diversity of created things by the law of ' 'aribfioklam abhnlctefsu," only so' far as it applies to Gross Matter; but, as the Vedantists have got over this difficulty of the vtfkiir'jaivda. and established the doctrine that "whatever U in the Bziy, is also in the Oosmos," ■the innumerable Purusas and the Prakrti of Samkbya 1 philosophy have, in Vedanta, philosophy, been comprised in one Paramatman by the principle of Non-Dualism (admita) or Non-Division ( atibhaga ). The purely Materialistic philosopher Haeckel was, it is true, a Non-Dualist. But he includes even Consciousness ( mifw/n ) in Gross Matter, and' Vedanta philosophy doeg not give pre-eminence to the Gross, but proves that the immortal and independent' Tnougfht- tformed M<fc-BpO-Paratoahman, which is uncirfaamscribed

336 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

by Time or Space, is the Fundamental Boot of the world : this- is the most important difference between the Non-Dualism of of the philosophy of the Absolute Self and the Gross-Non- Dualism (jadddwifa) of Haeokel. The same doctrines of Non-dualistic Vedinta have been mentioned in the Glta ; and an ancient poet has summarised the Non-Dualistic Vedanta philosophy very concisely as follows : —

UoMrdhena pravaksyami yaduktam granthakolibhih I brahma gatyam jagan mithyajivo brahmaim naparah II

that is, "I will explain in half a stanza the summary of a million books— (1) the Brahman is Beal, {%) the world (jagat )' that is, all the Names and Forms in the world, are rmthya, or perishable, and (3) the Atman of a man and the Brahman are- fundamentally ONE and the same, and not two. " If anybody does nob appreciate the word 'mithya' in this stanza, he is quite welcome to read the third section of the stanza as 'brahmamriant jagat satyam\ consistently witb the Brhadaranyakopanisad;- thereby, the purport does not change at all as has beeri stated' before. Nevertheless, many Vedantists enter into a fruitless discussion as to whether the invisible but eternal Fundamental Element of the visible world, in the shape of the Brahman,, should be called sat (satya) or asat (asatya=anrta). I shall, therefore, explain here concisely what the underlying principle in this discussion, is. This discussion has come into existence- because the word sat or satya haB two different meanings ; and if one first carefully considers in what meaning the word sat has been used by any particular person, no confusion will arise ; because, everybody acoepts tho -"'jtinotion that though- the Brahman is invisible, it is Reai , and that though the Name-d and Form-ed Cosmos is visible, yet, it is ever-changing. The ordinary meaning of the word sat or satya is : (1) that whioh is, at the moment, actually visible to the eyes, that is to say, perceptible (whether this visit's appearance of it,, does or does not change to-morrow) ; and the other meaning of that word is : (2) that of which the nature always remains the same, and never changes, notwithstanding that it is invisible- to the eyes, i e., imperceptible. Those who aooBpt the first meaning say, that the Name-d and Form-ed world whioh is.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF. THE ABSOLUTE SELF 337

visible to the eyes is satya (visible) and that the Parabrahraan is just the opposite, that is, it is not visible to the eyes and therefore, asat or asatya (invisible). Fop instance, in the Taittirlyopanisad, the visible world has been called 'sat', and that which is beyond the visible world, has been oalled ' tyai ' (THAT, that is, which is beyond) or 'anrta ' (invisible to the eyes) ; and the Brahman is described by saying that that substance which was in existenca at the commancemant of the world has bacoma two-fold as follows:— "sicca tyaccfibh wat \ niruktam alniniktam ca I nilayanam canilw/anaiii ca I vijaanan cavijUanam ca\ satyani canrtam ci\" (Tai. 2 6), that is: "It became " sat (visible to the eyes) and That (which is beyond) ; describable and indescribable; dependant and independent; known and unknown (unknowable) ; and real (visible) and invisible ". But though the Brahman has in this way been described as ' anrta ', the word anrta does not mean false or unreal ; but later on, in the Taittiriyopanisad itself, it is stated that " this anrta (invisible) Brahman is the ' pratistha ' (support) of the world, that it does not depend on anything else, and that he who has realised this need not fear anything". From this it is clear, that though there is a difference in words, there is no difference in the intended meaning. In the same way, it is ultimately said that " asadva idam agra asit", that is, "this world was as 2t (Brahman) in the beginning" ; and, a3 stated in the Jjtg-Veda (10. 129. 4), the sat, that is, the Name-d and Form-ed perceptible world, is said to have subsequently grown out of it (Tai. 2. 7). From this, it becomes quite clear that the word 'asat' has been used here only in the meaning of avyakta, that is, not visible to the eyes ; and in the Vedanta-Sutras, Badarayanacarya has interpreted those words in the same meaning ( Ve. Si. 2. 1. 17). But, those who interpret the word 'sat' or 'satya, as meaning existing permanently, or ever-lasting, though not visible to the eyes (which is the second of the two meanings mentioned above), give to the invisible but immutable Parabrahman the name sat or satya and call the Name-d and Form-ed Maya, aiat or asatya, i. e., perishable. For instance, there is a description in the Chandogya that: "saddva saumyedam agra asit katham asatah sajjayeta", that is, "0 my son 1 this world was 43-44

338 GlTA-RAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

originally sat (Brahman) ; how can 'sat', that is, that which exists, come into existence out of something which is asat, that is, which never was in existence ? " (Chan. 6. 2. 1, 2). But in this Chandogyopanisad itself, the Parabrahman has in one place been called 'asat.' in the sense of avyakta, that is. imperceptible (Chan. 3. 19. 1). * This confusing method by which the same Parabrahman was at different times and in different meanings given the mutually contradictory names of once 'sat' and at another time 'asat' — which was a method promoting verbal warfare, though the intended import was the same — gradually wore out; and ultimately, ithe one terminology of calling the Brahman sat or satya, i. e., eternally lasting, and the visible world asat or perishable, has become fixed. In the Bhagavadgita, this ultimate terminology las been accepted and in the second chapter, the Parabrahman has been described as sat and imperishable, and Names and tforms are described as asat, that is, perishable, in those meanings of those words ( Gl. 2. 16-18); and the same iB the doctrine of the Vedanta-Sutras. Nevertheless, the old terminology of the Taittiriyopanisad of referring to the visible world as 'sat' and to the Parabrahman as 'asat' or as 'tyat' { THAT = that which is beyond ) has not been totally exter- minated ; and what the original meaning of the description of the Brahman in the Gita ( Gl. 17. 23 ) as 'OM-Tat-Sat' must bave been, can very clearly be seen by reference to the old terminology. 'OM' is a Vedic prayer in the form of a mystic ■word, and it has been explained in various ways in the Upanisads ( Pra. 5 ; Man. 8-12; Chan. 1. 1. ). 'tat' means 'THAT', that is, the indescribable Element which is far beyond the visible world, and 'sat' is the visible world which can be seen by the eyes ; and this canon means that these three together constitute the Brahman. And it is with this import that the

• Even among the English writers on Metaphysics, there is a

difference of opinion as to whether the word real, i. e„ sat should be applied to the appearance of the world (Miba) or to the vastu- tailva (Brahman). Eant looks upon the Appearance as sat real) and ■calls the vastu-tattm, imperishable. But, Haeckcl, Green and others call the Appearance, asat (unreal), and the vastu-tattva, sat (real).

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 339

Blessed Lord has said in the Glta ( Gl. 9. 19 ; that "sad asac- •caham arjum", that is, "sat is the Parabrahman and asat is the visible world, and I am both". Still, in as much as the Glta propounds the Earma-Yoga, it has been explained at the -end of the seventeenth chapter that by taking the word 'sat' in the canon, OM-Tat-Sat, as meaning Action, which is good -from the point of view of respectability, or which has been done with a good intention, or of which the result is good, and by taking the word 'tat' as meaning, Action, which is beyond the above-mentioned Action, that is, which has been performed by giving up the desire for fruit, as and when occasion arises to use that canon, the doctrine of Karma-Yoga can be fully supported on the basis of this description of the Brahman. As that which has been referred to as 'sat' in the canon, is nothing else but the visible world, that is to say, Karma (See the next chapter), this interpretation of the ■definition of the Brahman in terms of Karma, easily arises out of the original interpretation. There are to be found in the ■Upanisads other descriptions of the Brahman than 'om-tatsat', " neti neti ', ' saccidamnda ' and ' satyasya satyam '; but as they are not necessary for understanding the meaning of the Glta, I have not given them here.

When the mutual relationship between the Cosmos {jagat), the personal Self (jiva) and the Paramesvara (Paramatman) 'have been explained in this way, it becomes quite clear in -what sense one has to take the word ' ansa ' used by the Blessed Lord in the phrases " the Jiva is an 'amsa' of Myself " iQl. 15. 7), and "I have pervaded the whole of this world by one

• amsa'" (Gl. 10. 42) in the Bhagavadgita, and also used by

Badarayanacarya in the Vedanta-Sutras (Ve. Su. 2. 3. 43 ; 4. 4, 19), or the word ' pada ' used in the Purusa-Sukta in the line '" pado 'sya visva bhutani tripud asyamrtam divi "—'the jagadatman (the Cosmic-Self) Which has pervaded the moveable and the immoveable, and yet remained over ten fingers '. Although the Paramesvara or the Paramatman is all-pervading, yet, as It is unorganised, homogeneous, and devoid of Name and T?orm, that is to say, uncuttable ( acchedya ) and immutable iavikarya), it is impossible to break It up into individual pieces <Gi. 2. 25). Therefore, in order to distinguish between this

340 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA- YOGA

homogeneous Parabrahman which pervades everything on all sides, and the Atman within the body of a man, one has to say in common parlance that the ' sarira-atman ' (the Atman within the body) is an ' amsa ' (part) of the Parabrahman. Yet, the word ' amsa ' or ' part ' has not to he taken in the meaning of ' an independent piece which has been cut- out ', or ' one of the grains taken out of the numerous grains in a pomegranate ' ; and it must be taken in its elementary meaning to indicate that the Atman is a part of the Parabrahman in the same way as ether ( akaia ) in the house or in an earthenware pot ( matliakusa, ghatakasa ) are parts of an all-pervading ether ( See AmrtabindQpanisad 13 ). The Samkhya Prakrti, and the homogeneous element accepted by the Materialistic Gross-Non-Dualism of Haeckel, are in the same way qualityful, that is, limited, parts of the Real qualityless Paramesvara. Nay, whatever perceptible or imperceptible fundamental element is arrived at according to the Materialistic sciences, (then may it be how much soever comprehensive like ether), it is only a Name and Form broken in upon by Time and Space, that is to say,, it is perishable and limited. It is true that it has occupied the Parabrahman to the extent of its capacity, but instead of the Parabrahman being thereby in any way limited, It has fully pervaded and saturated the former and one cannot gauge to what extent It remains over. Although the words ' dasamgula ' (ten fingers), or ' tripada ' (three steps) have been used in the Purusa-Sukta in order to indicate to what extent the Paramesvara has gone beyond the visible universe, yet, they are to be taken as meaning 'ananta' (endless); because, striotly speaking, Space and Time, weights and measures, and even numbers are only kinds of Names and Forms ; and it has been shown above that the Parabrahman is beyond all these Names and Forms. Therefore, the Parabrahman has been described in the ITpanisads as, that Element which swallows up or absorbs ' kala ' (Time), which ' kula ' has swallowed up everything (Mai. 6. 15) ; and the same is the purport conveyed by the descriptions to be found in the Glta and in the Upanisads of the habitation of the Paramesvara, such as, " na tad bhasayate mryo na sasamko na pavakah ", that is, " there is no such

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 341

luminary object like the Sun or the Moon or Fire for illumi- nating the seat of the Paramesvara, who is self-illumined" (01. 15. 6 ; Katha. 5. 15 ; Sve. 6. 14). The Sun, the Moon, the stars, etc., are Name-d and Form-ed perishable objects. That self-illumined Knowledge-filled Brahman which is "jyotisam jyotih " (Gl. 13. 17 ; Br. 4. 4. 16)— that is, " brilliance of brilliance " — extends endlessly beyond all of them ; and it is stated in the Upanisads that not only does It not depend on any other luminary objects, but whatever light is possessed by the Sun, the Moon etc., is obtained by them from this self- illumined Brahman (Mun. 2. 2. 10). Take the most subtle or the most distant object, which is made perceptible to the organs by instruments invented by Material sciences; it is but the world denned by Name and Form, which is circumscribed by the limitations of Time and Space. As the true Paramesvara is in them, and yet different from and more comprehensive than all of them, and also homogeneous and uncircumscribed by the bonds of Names and Forms, that is to say, as He is independent, it is not possible for the devices or instruments of Material sciences, which consider merely Names and FormB, to find out the ' amrta-tattva ' (imperishable Element) which is the Boot of the world, though they might beoome a thousand times more subtle or comprehensive than they are at present. That imperishable, immutable and undying element must ultimately be found out by the Path of Knowledge shown in the philosophy of the Absolute Self.

From the exposition of the principal doctrines of the philosophy of the Absolute Self and their concise scientific explanation given so far, it will be clear why all the perceptible Name-d and Form-ed appearances of the Paramesvara are Mayic or perishable, why His imperceptible form is superior to them, why His qualityless form, that is, the form undefined by Name and Form, is still superior, and why it is stated in the Gita that the qualityless form seems quality- ful as a result of ignorance. But this work of setting out these doctrines in words can be easily done by anyone who has acquired a little knowledge like me; there is nothing much in that. In order that these doctrines should be impressed on the mind, engraved on the heart and ingrained in one's flesh and

342 GTTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

bone after they have been understood, and that one should thereby fully realise that there is only one Parabrahman which saturates all living things ; and in order that by reason, of such feeling, one should acquire an immutable mental frame which will enable one to behave with equability towards everybody in times of misfortune, it is necessary to have the continual additional help of impressions acquired during, numerous births, control of the organs, persevering practice, meditation, and worship. Therefore, the summary of all the above doctrines, and the highest doctrine of the philosophy of the Absolute Self is : only that man may be said to have become fully saturated with the knowledge of the Brahman in whose every action the principle, "there ie only one Atman in all created things", has become naturally and clearly visible, even in times of distress ; and such a man alone get& Release ( Gi. 5. 18-20; 6. 21, 22). The ' earthenware pot' of that man in whom such behaviour is not to be seen is to that extent imperfectly or insufficiently 'baked', in the fire of the Knowledge of the Brahman. This is the difference between real saints and mere Vedantists; and, therefore, in describing Knowledge, it is stated in the Glta that true Knowledge may be said to have been acquired, when noble emotions like "humility (amamtoa), peaceful ness (santi), self-control. (atmanigraha), equability of mind (samabuddhi)" are awakened,. whereby the total purification of the mind is continually expressed in conduct, instead of saying that 'Knowledge is the understanding by Reason of what is at the root of the external world' ( Gi. 13. 7-11 ). That man whose Discerning. Reason has become devoted to the Self, that is, has become steady in the contemplation on the Self and Non-Self, and who has Realised the identity of the Atman with all created beings, must, undoubtedly, also possess a Desiring Reason which is pure. But, as there is no other external measure except a man's conduct for finding out the- state of his Reason, the words ' jnana' ( Knowledge ) or ' stmabuddhi ' ( equable mind ) are usually made to include the pure Discerning Reason, the pure Desiring Reason, and pure Conduct; this thing must be borne in mind, especially in these days of bookish knowledge. There may be many who>

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 34?

can give long dry discourses on the Brahman, and also others who hearing those discourses will nod their heads in apprecia- tion and say 'Hear, hear', or, like courtiers in a drama, say,. "Let us hear the same thing again ■" (Gi. 2. 29 ; Ha. %. 7 1 ; but, as stated above, that man who has become internally and externally pure, that is, equable in mind, is the true devotee of the Atman, and he alone attains Release, and not mere learned men who may be how well-read or intelligent soever, [t has been plainly stated in the Upanisads that: "nnijam atma praixtctmena labhyo na medhaya na bahuna srutena" (Ka2. 22; Mun 3. 2. 3.),. ( that is, " this Atman is not reached by giving discourses, nor by intelligence, nor by great learning " — Trans.), and the Saint Tukarama has also said : — " you have become a Pandit (i.e.,. learned man), you interpret the Puranas t but you do not know who you are II " (Ga. 2599). See how narrow our minds are I' The words ' attains Release ' easily come out of our mouths, as if Release is something different from the Atman. There- would be difference between the Observer and the visible- world, before the Knowledge has been acquired that the Brahman and the Atman are identical ; but, our Vedantists- have come to the conclusion that when one has fully Realised the identity of the Brahman and the Atman, the Atman is merged into tbe Brahman, and the brahmajnanl (one who has Realised the Brahman) acquires the form of Brahman wherever he is ; and. this Metaphysical state is known as the ' brahmanir mnyt Release,' which is not given by anybody to anybody, and whioh does not come from anywhere, and for obtaining which it is not necessary to leave this world and to go to another world. Whenever and wherever the complete Realisation of the Atman comes, Release is obtained at that very moment and at that place ; because, Release is the fundamental pure, state of the Atman, and is not some independent thing or plac6. There is a stanza in the Siva-Gita that :—

moksasya na hi vaso 'sti na gramantaram eva va I ajnanahrdayagranthiriaso moksa iti smrtah »

(Siva. 13. 32)

that is, " Release is not in a particular place, nor has one to go- to some other town or country in order to obtain it: the destruc-

346 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

Towards all created beings I

lie is friendly, looking upon all as one l He is kind to all I

with a sense of equability II He does not know the word ' I ' i

he does not say of anything that it is ' mine * Experience of pain and happiness I

for him there is none

(Jna. 12. 145-149).

And Jnanesvara has thus, by giving numerous illustrations,, and in very sweet and attractive language, described ia Marathi the equability of the Biahmified man ; and we may safely say, that this description contains a summary of the description of the Brahmi state given in four different places in the Glta. This is what is to be ultimately acquired by Spiritual Knowledge.

My readers will have understood from what has been, stated above, how the tradition of Spiritual Knowledge, which is the root of the science of Release, has come to us in an unbroken line from the Upanisads right upto Tukarama. But, in order to impress on my readers that this knowledge had come into existence in our country even before the date of the Upanisads, that is to say, already in very very ancient times, and that the ideas in the Upanisads have gradually grown from those times, I shall give here, before concluding, a well-known hymn (stikta) from the Rg-Veda, which is the foundation even of the Spiritual Knowledge in the Upanisads, together with its Marathi translation. Not only do we not come across in the scriptures of any religion, critical philosophical ideas, as to what the unknowable Fundamental Element of the Cosmos must have been, and how this variegated visible universe sprang from it, which are as comprehensive, independent and root-touching as those in this hymn, but no one has yet come across any text replete with such Spiritual Knowledge, which is equal to it in "point of antiquity. Therefore, many wonder-struck Western scholars have translated this hymn into their various

THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE ABSOLUTE SELF 347

languages, looking upon it as important, from the point of view of religious history, for showing how the natural tendency of the human mind runs beyond the Name-d and Form-ed universe to reach the permanent and unimaginable Brahman-Energy which is beyond it. This hymn is the 129th hymn in the tenth mandala of the Rg-Veda, and iB known as- the 'Nasadiya-Sukta', having regard to its commencing words. And this Sukta has been adopted in the Taittiriya Brahmana ( 2. 8. 9 ), and the description given in the Narayanlya or the Bhagavata religion in the Mahabharata as to how the universe was first created by the desire of the Blessed Lord has been, based on this hymn ( Ma. Bha. San. 342. 8 ). According to- the general index ( sarvanukramardka ), the Rsi of this hymn is Paramesthi Prajapati, its deity is the Paramatman, and it consists of seven stanzas ( rca ) in the tristup metre, each stanza containing four lines of eleven words each. As the words, sat and asat, have a double meaning, the difference of opinion among the writers of the tfpanisads, as regards- describing the Fundamental Element of the world as 'sat\ which has been referred to earlier in this chapter, is also to be found in the Rg-Veda. For instance, this Fundamental. Cause of the world is in some places described by saying "ekam sad vipra bahudha. vadanti" ( Rg. 1. 164. 46 ), or " ekam santam bahudha kalpayanti" ( Rg. 10. 114. 5 )— that is, "It, being one. and sat ( i. e. lasting for erer ), has been given different names- by people "; whereas in other places, it has been desoribed by saying: "duvanam pilrvye yuge 'satah sad ajayata" (Rg. 10.72. 7), that is, "the sat, that is, the perceptible universe, came into existence out of the asat, that is, the Imperceptible, even before the gods had oome into existence." In addition to this, there are other descriptions all differing from, each other in the Rg-Veda itself as to how the entire universe came into being out of one visible Element, e. g., : — in the beginning of the world, there was the Golden Embryo (Uramja- garbha), of which both death and immortality are shadows, and. It later on created the entire world (Rg. 10. 121. 1, 2) ; or, that, a Virata-formed Purusa existed at first, and from him the entire world was created by means of a sacrifice (Rg. 10. 90): or,, that there was apa (water) at first, and in that water Prajapati

348 GtTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

came into existence (Rg. 10. 72. 6 ; 10. 82. 6) ; or, that ria and saiya first came into existence, and afterwards, darkness ; and after that, water {samudra), the year etc. came into existence <Rg. 10. 190. 1). These Fundamental Elements mentioned in the Rg-Veda have been later on referred to as follows :— (1) in the Taittiriya Brahmana, water has been referred to as the Fundamental Element as : "apo va idam agre salilam asit" (Tai. Bra. 1. 1. 3. 5), i. e., "all this was liquid water in the beginning"; (2) in the TaittirlyoDanisad, asat has been mentioned as the Fundamental Element, as : "asad va idam agra asit" (Tai. 2.7 ), i. e., "all this was asat in the beginning" ; (3) in the Chandogyopanisad, sat has been mentioned as the Fundamental Element, as : "sad eua saumyedam agra asit" (Chan. 6. 2), i. e., "all this was sal in the beginning" ; or, (4) ether is said to be such Element, as : "ukasah parayanam" (Chan. 1. 9), i. e., "ether was the root of everything" ; (5) in the Brhadaranyaka, death (mrlyu) is mentioned as the Fundamental Element, as : "naiveha kimcanugra asm mrtyuriaivedam aurtam asit" (Br. 1. 2. 1), i. e., "in the beginning, there was nothing whatsoever ; every- thing was covered by death" ; and (6) in the Maitryupanisad, darkness [tamas] has been mentioned as the Fundamental Element, as : "tamo va idam agra asid ekam" (Mai. 5. 2), i. e., "this entire universe was in the beginning tamas ( tamoguni, darkness)", and sattva and rajas afterwards came into existence out of it. In the same way, the Manu-Smrti contains the following description of the commencement of the universe, consistent with these descriptions in the Vedas: —

asid idam tumdbhutam aprajnatam alaksanam I apratarbjam avijneyam prasuptam iva saroatah II

that is, "all this was first covered up by darkness (tamas), and it was undiscernible and as if in a sleeping state, so that it would be impossible to differentiate between one thing and another ; thereafter, the imperceptible Paramatman entered it and first created water" ( Manu. 1. 5 — 8 ). Such and other different descriptions about the Fundamental Substance existing at the commencement of the universe must have been in vogue even at the time of the Nasadlya-Siikta; and the ■question as to which of these Fundamental Substances, was

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 349

the really fundamental one, must also then have arisen. Therefore, the Rsi of that hymn gives the following explana- tion, in order to explain what the truth ( bija ) about the whole

thing was in the following words :

nasadasln no sad asit tadamm, nasid rajo no vyoma paro yat I

kim avarivah kulia kasya karma-

nnambhah kim asld gahanam gabhimm II 1 II that is : (1) "then, that is, in the beginning, there was neither asat, nor sat, nor the firmament ( antariksa ), nor the ether ( okasa ) beyond it. ( In this state ) who ( can be said to have ) covered ( whom ) ? Where 1 For whose benefit 1 Was there ( even ) unfathomable and deep water ?"*

na mrtyur asid amrtam na tarhi na ratrya anha asit praketah I

anid auafam soadhaya tad ekam

tasmad dhamjan na parah kimcariasa II 2 II that is: (2) "then, death, that is, the perishable, visible, mortal universe was not existing ; and, therefore, there was not (the distinction of) also (another) amrta, i. e., imperishable, eternal substance. (Similarly) there was no means ( = praketa) for finding out the difference between day and night. (Whatever there was) That solitary thing was breathing, that is, throbbing by soadM, that is, by its own power, without there being any air. Except or beyond that, there was nothing."

tama asit tamasa gudham agre

'praketam salilam sarvama idam I

tucchenabhvapihitam yad asit

tapasas tan mahina 'jayataikam ll 3 ll that is : (3) "though there was (said to be) darkness in the beginning ; or that all this was water enveloped in darkness devoid of any differentiation ; ( or ) that abhu, that is, the all- pervading Brahman was ( from the beginning ) covered by tuccha, that is, by illusory Maya ; yet, that came into existence

• First red : — I have given the above meaning, analysing the

words 'kim asid' in the fourth line as "asit kim"; and the purport of it is, "water did not exist then" ( Tai. Bra, 2. 2. 9 ).

350 GlT£-KAHAS5rA OR KARMA-YOGA

.as a result of austerity (subsequently, by transformation), from the fundamentally one Brahman" *

kamas tad agre samavartatadhi

manaso retah prathamam yad asit l

sato bandhum asah niravindan

hrdi pratisya kavayo manisa n 4 n ■that is : (4) "the semen, that is, the seed of the Mind (of This) which first came into existence, became Kama (that is, the desire or the power to create the world). (This is) the (first) relation between sat, that is, the perishable visible world, and

• Third Tea: — Soma commentators consider the first three

lines of ttiis stanza as independent, and interpret it by saying that in the beginning of the universe, there was "darkness, or water covered by darkness, or abhu (void) covered by lueeha". But, according to me that interpretation is not correct. Because, if in the first two stanzas there i 6 a clear statement that nothing whatso- ever existed in the beginning, it is not possible that it should be stated in this rca that there was in the beginning either darkness or water — which i» something quite the opposite. Besides, accord- ing to this interpretation, the word ynt in the third part of the stanza has to be considered meaningless; therefore, it becomes necessary to refer the word l yaf, in the third part of the stanza, to the word 'fat' in the fourth part, and to interpret the stanza as has been done by me above. This Tea has been included in this hymn as an answer to those persons who maintained that there were in the beginning substances like water etc.; and what the Rsi intended to say was that there were no fundamental substances like darkness, water etc., as was said by these people, but that, all that was the further development of one and the same Brahman. As the two wordB Huccha' and 'abhu' are mutually opposite, the word abhu means opposite of tuceha, that is to say, big or powerful, and the same meaning has been given to it by Sayanacarya in the other two places where that word occurs in the Bg-Veda ( R?. 10. 27. 1, i). In the Paneadaii (Ohitra. 129, ISO ), the word tucch> has been interpreted as meaning Maya ( See Nrsim. TJtta. 9). Therefore, abhu has not to be interpreted as meaning 'void' but as Parabr hman. The word ah (fl + a») in the phrase 'sarvam 5f> 4iiW is the past tense form of the root W, and it means 'asit', that is, 'was'.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 351

the asat, that is, the fundamental Parabrahman, as has been ascertained by scients by means of their Reason, by meditating •in their minds".

firasclno utato rasmiresam

adhah svid asid upari sM asit I retodha asan mahimana asan

snadha avastat prayatih parastat II 5 II that is: (5) "(this) rasmi, that is, shred or ray, fell transversely {between) them ; and if you say it was below, it was also above; (some of these) became retodha, that is, productive of seed, and (growing) became bigger. Their self-prowess ■(svasakti) pervaded on one side, and prayati, that is, development - •(pervaded everything) on the other side". ho addha veda ka iha pra vocat

kuta ajata kuta iyam. visrstih I arvag deva asya visarjanena-

tha Ico veda yata ababhuva n 6 ll ■that is : (6) " who is there who can in greater (than this) detail •( pra ), explain how came the visarga, that is, the development .( of the sat ) and from whom it came ? Who knows this definitely ? Even the gods came after the visarga of this ■{visible sat universe). Then who is to know from where it came ?"

iyam visrstir yat ababhuva

yadi va dadhe yndi va na dadhe I t/o asyadhyaksah parame vyoman

so anga veda yadi va na veda ll 7 ll that is : (7) "The adhyalcsa ( Hiranyagarbha ) of this universe, inhabiting the highest ( parama ) firmament, may know the place from where the development of this sat came about, or, from where it was created, or was not created; or, even the Hiranyagarbha may not be knowing it 1 ( Who is in a position to say that ? )".

The sum and substance of Vedanta philosophy is, that one should not remain enmeshed in the various Name-d and Form-ed, mutable and perishable Appearances which are -perceptible to the eyes or the other organs, but should recognise by means of Knowledge that THERE IS SOME, ONE AND IMMORTAL ELEMENT, which is beyond them; and, the

353 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

fact that the Reason of the Rsi who composed this hymn unerringly grasped the crux of the whole matter at the first attempt, clearly showB the keenness of his introspection! Instead of entering into a discussion with persons, who raised the questions, whether That, which existed in the beginning of the universe and before the various things in the world came into existence, was sat or asat, death or immortality, ether or water, light or darkness etc., this Rsi speeds beyond all of them, and says that sat and asat, mortal and immortal light and darkness, the covering and the covered, the giver of happiness and the fetler of happiness, are mutually dependent opposites, which came into existence after the visible world was created; and he asks, whe was there to cover whom before these opposite couples in the world came into existence, that is- to say, when there was no such difference as this one and that one. The Rsi of this hymn, therefore, says, to start with, that it is not proper to describe the Fundamental, homogeneous, Substance as sat or asat, ether or water, light or darkness, death or immortality, or by such other mutually dependent expres- sions ; he says, that whatever there was, was stranger than all these things ; that It was one and one alone, and was throbbing in all directions by its inexhaustible energy ; and that there was nothing else which was a mate to it or which covered it. The root word ' an ' in the verb 'anit' in the second rca means to breathe or to throb ; and the word ' prana ' is derived from that root. But who can say that That, w'.ich was neither sat nor asat, was breathing like a living being ? and where was the air to breathe ? Therefore, the words avatam ( that is, without air ) and smdhaya ( by its own prowess ) have been added to the word 'anil', and the idea that the Fundamental Element of the world was not Gross Matter, which (idea> pertains to the stage of Non-Dualism, has been very skilfully described in the language of Dualism by saying that "that ONE substance was breathing or throbbing by Its own prowess without air, that is, without depending on air 1" ; and the apparent contradiction in terms, which is involved in this, is 'the result of the insufficiency of Dualistic terminology. The descriptions of the Parabrahman to be found in the Upanisads, such as, "neti, neli", or " ekamevadvitiyam" or "' sve

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 355

mahimni pratisthitah" (Chan. 7. %i. 1 ), that is, "that which subsists by Itself alone, by Its own prowess, that is, without depending on anyone else", are mere repetitions of this idea. It is clear that that indescribable Element, which has been referred to in this hymn as throbbing in all directions at the commencement of the entire universe, will survive when the entire visible universe is destroyed. Therefore, this same Parabrahman has been described in the Gita with a slight amplification, in the words: "Which is not destroyed though all other things are destroyed" (Gi. 8. 20); and it is stated later on ( GI. 13. 12 ) by clear reference to this hymn that " It is neither sat nor asat". But, if there was nothing in the beginning except the qualityless Brahman, a difficulty arises- as to how to dispose of such descriptions as, " there were in the- beginning, water, darkness, or the couple of abhu and tuecha", which are to be found even in the Vedas. Therefore, this Bsi says in the third rca, that the descriptions, which we come; across, to the effect that in the beginning of the universe there- was darkness, or water clothed in darkness, or, that abhu- ( Brahman) and the Maya ( tucclia ) which covered It, existed from the very beginning, are descriptions of the ONE and sole, fundamental Parabrahman, after It had developed into a diversified expansion by the prowess of Its austere medita- tion, and not of Its fundamental state. The word 'tapa* in this rca is intended to describe the wonderful Spiritual: power of the fundamental Brahman, and the same thing is' described in the fourth rca. ( See Mun. 1. 1. 9 ). It need not b&' said that that Fundamental Substance, the Tesult of the- prowess of Which is this entire universe, according to the- saying : etavan asya mahima 'to jyayams ca purusah" (l&g. 10. 90. > 3 ), is beyond such universe and superior to and different from everything. But, though this Rsi had, in this - way, at a stroke cast off all Dualistic couples like, the object to be seen and the observer, the enjoyer and the enjoyed, the clother and the clothed, darkness and light, mortal and immortal etc., and come to the conclusion that there was fundamentally only one unmixed wonderful Parabrahman in the form of Consciousness ( i. e., cidrupi ), yet, when he was faced with the problem of having to explain how the diverse, perishable, (malityful, 45-46

354 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA.

Name-d and Form-ed universe, consisting of the couples of water etc. or the three-constituented Prakrti from which it { the universe ) sprang, had come into existence out of this ONE and sole, indescribable, and qualityless Element, he had to take shelter under the Dualistic terminology of Mind, Desire, asat, sat etc., and he ultimately frankly admits that this question is beyond the grasp of human Reason. In the fourth k5, the fundamental Brahman has been referred to as asat; but that ward cannot be interpreted as meaning 'nothing'; because, already in the second tcU, there is a clear statement that ' It is'. Not only in this hymn, but in the Rg-Veda and the Vajasaneyi Samhita, moot questions have been asked, making use of the language of ordinary parlance, by comparing the visible world with a sacrifice ( yajna ), and asking from where the ingredients such as, clarified butter, dried sticks etc. necessary for performing the yajna were initially brought ( Rg. 10. 130. 3 ); or, by taking the illustration of a house, and asking the question as to from where the timber ( funda- mental Prakrti ) for constructing this imposing edifice of ether and the earth, which is actually visible to the eyes, out of one Fundamental qualityless Substance, was brought; such as, "Mm sdd vavam kau sa vrksa asa yalo dyavaprthwi nhtiitahsuh ( Rg. 10. 31. 7 ; 10. 81. 4 ;' Vaja. Sam. 17. 20 ). ' These questions cannot be answered further than by saying what has been said in the fourth and fifth stanzas of this hymn, that is to say, by saying that the Kama-formed Element of creating the universe, somehow or other came into existence in the Mind of that indescribablo ONE and Bole Parabrahman, and that the entire development of sat, that is, the imposing edifice of ether and earth, came into existence as a result of its branches spreading out above and below, and in all directions > like the threads in a piece of cloth or the rays of sunshine. (Vaja. Sam. 33. 74). And, therefore, the meaning conveyed in this hymn has been adopted in the Upanisads in the words : "so 'kamayata I balm syam prajayeyeti\ " (Tai 2. 6 ; Chan. 6. 2. 3), that is, " that Parabrahman acquired the Desire of becoming multifarious" (See Br. 1.1. 4); and even in the Atharva-Veda, there is a statement that ' Kama ' (Desire) came first into existence out of the Fundamental Substance at the root of the

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE SELF 355

visible world (Atharva. 9. 2. 19). But, the wonder about this hymn ia, that instead of becoming a slave to Eeaaon like the Samkhyas, and imagining the existence of another self-created and independent element like Fundamental Matter, because the question of the creation of the Qualityful from the Qualityless, or of the asat from the sat, or of the dvamdva {subject to doubles) from the rurdvamdva (beyond doubles I. or of the sanga (attached) from the asanga (unattached), is beyond the grasp of human intelligence, this B?i frankly says : "Say that you do not understand that which you do not understand ; but on that account, it is not proper to give to the Illusion in the form of the visible world, the same value as the indescribable Brahman, which has been definitely ascertained by means of an absolutely purified Mind and as a self-experience. Besides, one must also realise that even if one considers, the three- constituented Prakrti as a second independent substance, one still cannot answer the question as to how Eeason (mahan) or Individuation first entered that substance, in order that the universe should be created ; and if this difficulty cannot be •overcome, where is the point in looking upon Prakrti as independent ? All that one need say is, that it is impossible to understand how Prakrti or sat came into existence out of the fundamental Brahman. For that, it is not necessary to look upon -Prakrti as independent. It is not possible even for gods to •find out how sat came into existence; much less, then, for human intelligence; because, as even the gods came into existence after the visible world, how can they know anything about it f (G-i. 10. 2). But, some one may here raise the following doubt: it is stated in the Bg.-Veda itself that the Hiranyagarbha is prior in point of time and superior even to the gods, that He alone was in the beginning "bhutasya jatah putireka asit" (Bg. 10.121.1), that is, "the ' pati' , oi 'king', or , adhyaksa i of the entire universe "; then, how can He not be knowing this Thing?; and, if it is possible for Him to have known it, how can you say that It is unknowable ? Therefore, the Hsi gives, in the beginning, a formal answer to that question by saying: "Yes, He may be knowing the answertoit'Y but, immediately thereafter, this Bsi who seeks by his Reason ±o fathom the knowledge of even Brahmadeva, ultimately and

356 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

in a state of doubt says: "Or, Ho may even not be knowing it ' "Who can say ?; because, as He also falls within the category of sat, how can this 'adhyaksa' or king of the universe, who lives in what is in fact ether (ukasa), though you may call it ' parama ', have a definite knowledge about something which existed before sat or asal, ether or water, came into existence?" But, although he does not know how this ONE, asat, that is, imperceptible, and qualityless Substance came into contact with the variegated Name-d and Form-ed sat, that is, Prakrti, yet, he does not swerve from his Non- Dualistic conviction that this fundamental Brahman is ONE and only ONE !. This is an excellent example of how the human mind fearlessly roams about like a lion in the impregnable forests of unimaginable things, on the strength of its sattvika devotion and its pure inspiration, and defines, to whatever extent it can, the unimaginable things existing in that forest; and it is really a matter of great surprise that this hymn is to be found in the Bg-Veda. The subject-matter of this hymn has bsen very minutely examined in our country, and also by Kant and other philosophers in the Western countries, by considering the Brahmanas, the TJpanisads, and the later treatises on Vedanta philosophy (Taitti. Bra. 2. 8. 9). But, nobody has so far gone beyond giving to the opposite party convincing arguments like the Vivartavuila for making firmer, clearer, or logically more unquestionable those very doctrines which inspired the pure mind of this Rsi, as. appearing in this hymn; and we need not entertain any hopes that anybody will do so.

The chapter on the philosophy of the Absolute Self, (ladhyalim) is now over. Before I go further, I will, following the usual practice ■ of the 'kesari' (lion), and look back on the subject-matter or road which I have so far traversed; because, unless such a lion-look has been given, there is a risk of the link between this subject-matter and the next being lost, and of one'6 going astray. In the beginning of this book, after introducing my readers to the subject-matter, I have concisely explained to them the nature of Karma-jijlaga ( Desire for Action), and shown to them in the third chapter, that the science of Karma-Yoga ( Proper Action ) is the subject-matter

THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE ABSOLUTE SELF 357

of exposition in the Gita. Then, after having proved in the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters, by considering the question, of happiness and unhappiness, tli.it the Matcri'uistic exposition of this subject-mstter is one-sided and insufficient, and-that its Intuitional exposition id lam?, I haw, before entering into the Metaphysical exposition of Ksirma-Yuga. and already in the sixth chapter, dealt wilh I he ini o stion ; r the Body and the Allium in order to determine what cl e Atman is; and having in the seventh and eighth chami-vs d.plf with the subjoot- matter of the Mutable and the Immutable according to the Dualistie Samkhya philosophy, I have in this' chapter explained what the nature ol the A tin an is. and in what way ONE, sole, immortal and qnalitytess Aiman-Element saturates fully and eternally holii the Body and the Cfosmos; and TUbrfe finally drawn the conclusion that the Yoga of aoquii'in'g an eqiiB^' ble frame of Mind, which believes that there is only one 'SirhaBr in all created beings, and keeping that name of Mind ■pei-pd- 1 tually alive, is the clima.c of iSeil'-Knowh d^.'e (Utmnjriamt) and *f 3eh'-Happiness (™<7™??i/rr); and that the highest hum anndss ba- nian, that is, the fulfilment of the purpose if human birtb, l, '6r- the highest ideal of a human being, oorwfa'is in bringing one's 1 mind to this pure Self-Devoted (fitmu-mf-rlm) state. Having, iw this way. determined what the. highest .Mel a/physical ideal (if mankind is, the question as to the ba-n's on which one has to' perform all the various Actions in this world, it, as to wliatU& r the nature of that Pure Reason with which those Actions "are to be performed, which is the principal question in the science of Karma-Yoga, is ipKojuctv solved. Because, as iided not be told, all these Actions must be performed in such a way as will not be ultimately inconsistent with, but will foster, thaT equable frame of mind, which looks upon the "Brahman as- identical with the Atman. This Metaphysical philosophy of Karma-Yoga has been explained to Arfuna in the Bha^vart- gita. But, the justification of the Karma-Yoga is not thereby' finished. Some persons say that in as much as the Actions 't'o r be performed in this Wame-d and Pbrm-ed world' are^ inconsistent with Self-Knowledge, a sclent must give theriHljS? And, if that were so, all the activities in the world "WOtald/ become unpexformable, and consequently, the science of wha

360 GlTA-RAHASYA OE KABMA-YOGA

fundamentally to the Brahman-world, yet, like other

things in the visible world, it is covered by bodily organs

in the shape of Names and Forms, and these Names

and Forms in the shape of the bodily organs are perishable-

Therefore, every human being is naturally desirous of

knowing how it is possible to escape from these Names and

Forms, and to attain immortality ; and, in order to consider

what mode of life has to be adopted for satisfying that desire,

which subject belongs to the science of Karma-Yoga, we must

now enter the Dualistic territory of the non-permanent

MAYA-WORLD which is bound by the laws of Karma

(Action). If there is fundamentally only one permanent and

independent Atman, both in the Body and in the Cosmos, the

questions which necessarily arise, are, what are the difficulties

which are experienced by the Atman in the body, in Realising

the Atman in the Cosmos, and how those difficulties can be

overcome ; and, in order to solve these questions, it becomes

necessary to expound what Names and Forms are ; because,

as all objects fall into the two classes of the Atman or

Parabrahman, and the Name-d and Form-ed covering on It,

nothing else now remains for consideration except the Name-d

and Form-ed covering. As this Name-d and Form-ed covering

is dense in some cases and thin in other eases, the objects in

the visible world fall, according to Vedanta, into the two

classes of sacetana ( Activated) and acetana ( No,:- Activated ),

and even the Activated are again sub-divided into animals,

birds, men, gods, gandharvas, and demons etc. There is no

place where the Brahman in the shape of Atman does not

exist. It is in the stone, and It is in the human being. But,

as there is a difference according to whether a light is put into

an iron box, or in a lantern with more or less clean glasses,

though it may be one and the same light, so also, although the

Atman-Element is everywhere the same, the different

divisions of Activated and Non-Activated arise, as a result

of the difference in density of the clothing of Names and

Forms in each case. Nay, that is the reason why, even

among the Activated, the power of acquiring Knowledge is not

the same in the case of men and beasts. It is true that the

Atman is the same everywhere ; yet, as it is fundamentally

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 361

vqualityless and apathetic, it cannot by itself do anything, ■without some Name-d and Form-ed means like the Mind, Reason etc.; and, as these means are not fully available to the Atman except in the human birth, such birth is considered to be the most superior of all. When the Atman has got this human birth, this its Name-d and Form-ed clothing falls into the two divisions of Gross and Subtle. According to Vedanta, this gross clothing is the embodiment of the mixture of blood and semen ; and whereas, muscles, bones, and nerves grow from the semen, skin, flesh, hair etc. grow from the sonita, that is, from the blood ; and all this is referred to as the 'annamaya-kosa ( covering made up of food ). When we pass this covering and go further inside, we come across Life in the shape of breath, that is, the ' pranamaya-kosa'; the Mind, that is, the manormya- kosa; Reason, that is, the jnanamaya-lcosa; and ultimately, the ■anandamaya-kosa. The Atman is beyond all these ; and there- fore, in the Taittirlyopanisad, Varuna has acquainted Bhrgu with the various forms of the Atman by describing to him the various envelopes (lcosa) rising from the annamaya-kosa to the anandamaya-kosa ( Tai. 2. 1-5; 3. 2-6 ). Vedantists refer to these envelopes ( kosa ), except the Gross Body, such as the Prana- covering etc., together with the subtle organs and the five Fine Elements ( Tanmatras ) aa the 'linga or the 'suksma sarlra' ( the Subtle Body ). But, instead of explaining the fact •of the Atman taking births in various species of life (yonij by imagining the existence of diverse ' Bhavas ' of the Reason ( See p. 261 above — Trans. ) as is done by the Samkhyas, they say that that is the result of Karma-Vipaka, or the fruit of Action. It has been clearly stated in the Gita, the Upanisads, and the Vedanta-Sutras, that this Karma clings to the support of the Subtle Body, and when the Atman leaves the Gross Body, this Karma accompanies the Atman, embodied in the Subtle Body, and compels it to take birth after birth. Therefore, in considering the difficulty which stands in the way of the embodied Atman attaining the Parabrahman, or obtaining Release, after escaping the cycle of birth and death in the shape of Names and Forms, one has to consider both Karma and the Subtle Body. Out of these, the Subtle Body has been dealt with before, both from the point of view of the Sarhkhya

362 GtTA-RAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

philosophy, as of Vedanta ; and, therefore, I shall not repeat the same subject-matter here. In this chapter, I have considered only the nature of that Karma or Action, whereby the Atman falls into the cycle of birth and death instead of Realising the Brahman, and also how a man has to live in this world in order that the Atman should escape that cycle and acquire immortality. Those qualities of Time and Space embodied in Name and Form, as a result of which the fundamental, non- perceptible, and qualityless Parabrahman existing at the commencement of the world, appears in the form of the visible world, are known in Vedanta philosophy as ' Maya ' (Gl. 7. 24, 25), and that also includes Karma (Br. 1. 6. 1). Nay, we may even say that ' Maya ' and Karma ' are synonymous ; because, unless some Karma or Action has been performed, it is not possible for the Imperceptible to become Perceptible, or for the Qualityless to become Qualityful. Therefore, the Blessed Lord has, after first saying "I take birth in Prakrti by my Maya" (GI. 4. 6), defined Karma later on in the eighth chapter of the- Gita itself, as : "the Action, whereby the variegated Cosmos, such as, the five primordial elements etc comes into existence out of the imperishable Parabrahman is known as ' Karma " ( Gi. 8. 3 ). Karma has been here used in the comprehensive- meaning of Activity or Action-whether it is performed by a human being or by the other objects in the world, or it is the activity comprised in the Cosmos itself coming into existence. But, whatever Action is taken, its result always is that one Name and Form is changed, and another comes into existence in its place ; because, the Fundamental Substance, which is covered by this Name and Fjrm, never changes and always remains the same. For instance, by the Action of weaving, the name 'thread ' disappears, and the same substance gets instead the name of ' cloth '; and by the Action of a potter, the name 'pot' takes the place of the name 'earth'. Therefore, in defining Maya, Karma or Action is sometimes not mentioned at all, and only Name and Form are included in Maya. Yet, when one has to consider Karma by itself, one has to say that the form of Karma is the same as the form of Maya. Therefore, it is more convenient to make it clear in the very beginning that Maya, Names and

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 363

Forms, and Karma are fundamentally the same in nature- One can, it is true, make the subtle distinction that MAYA is the common word, and its Appearance has the specific name of Names and Forms, and its Activity, the specific name of KARMA. But, as ordinarily it is not neoessary to make this distinction, these three words are very often used synonymously. This clothing (or this upadhi i. e., super- imposed covering) of perishable Maya on one part of the Parabrahman, which is visible to the eyes, has been described in Samkhya philosophy as the three-constituented Prakrti. Samkhya philosophers look upon Purusa and Prakrti as two self-created, independent and eternal Elements. But, as Maya, Names and Forms, or Karma change constantly, it would be logically incorrect to look upon them as of the same standard as the permanent and immutable Parabrahman; because, as the two ideas, 'permanent ' and 'non-permanent',, are contrary to each other, both of them cannot become applicable at the same time. Therefore, Vedantists have come to the conclusion that Perishable Prakrti or Maya, in the shape of Karma, is not independent, but that the Appearance of a qualityful Maya is seen in the one, permanent, all-pervading, and qualityless Parabrahman by the feeble human organs. But, it is not enough to say, that Maya is not independent, and that one only sees this Appearance in the qualityless Parabrahman. Although, according to Vivartavada, if not according to the Gunaparinama-vada, it is possible to see this Appearance of qualityful Names and Forms, that is, of Maya in the qualityless and eternal Brahman, yet, we are faced with the further question, namely, when, in what order, and why, did this qualityful Appearance, which is seen by human organs, appear in the qualityless Parabrahman ? or, to say the game thing in ordinary language, when, and why, did the eternal and thought-formed Paramesvara create the Name-d and Form-ed,. perishable, and gross universe ? But, as this subject is unknow- able, not only to human beings, but even to gods, and to the Vedas, as stated in the Nasadlya-Sakta in the Rg-Veda (Rg. 10. 129; Tai. Bra. 2.8. 9) one cannot answer that question better than by saying: "this is an unknowable pastime (lila) of the qualityless Parabrahman, which has been realised by

364 GlTA-RAHASYA OH KARMA-YOGA

Knowledge." (Ve. S2.-2. 1. 33). One has to take it for granted that ever since the commencement of things, Name-d and Form-ed perishable Karma, or qualityful Maya, has been seen side by side with the qualityless Brahman. Therefore, Karma embodied in Maya has been called eternal in the Vedanta- Sutras ( Ve. Su. 2. 1. 35-37 ), and even in the Bhftgavadglta, the Blessed Lord has, after saying that Prakrti is not independent, but "is My Maya" ( Gi. 7. 14 ), said further on that this Prakrti, that is, Maya, and Purusa are both 'eternal { Gi. 13. 19). In the same way, in describing Maya, Sarhkaracarya has said in this Bhasya or commentary, that J ' saroajneSDarasya 'tmabhute iva 'vidyakalpite narmrupe tattvawjatvabhyam anirixicanitje samsaraprapancabijahhute sar- vajnasyesmrasija 'maya' ' sahtih' ' pmkrtir' Hi ca srutismrtyoi' abhilapyete " ( Ve. Su. Sam. Bha. 2. 1. 14. ), i. e., "the Names and Forms imagined to exist in the fundamental Brahman as a result of the ignorance ( of the organs ), which are supposed to be of the nature of the Atman of the All-Scient Paramesvara, but of which, it is not possible to say whether they are different or not-different (tattuanyaiua) from the Paramesvara, since they are Gross, and which are the root of the ( visible ) expansion of gross world, are, in the Sruti and Smrti texts, called the ' maya', 'sakli' or 'prahW of the all-knowing Para- mesvara"; and "as the subsequent universe seems to have come into existence from the Paramesvara on account of His Maya, this Maya, though perishable, is essential and extremely useful for the creation of the visible univeise, and it is seen to have been given the names of ' aoyakta ', ' akasa ' and 'aksara ' in the Upanisads" (Ve. Su. Sam. Bha,. 1. 4. 3). The Samkhyas look upon the Elements, Knowledge-formed (cinmaya) Spirit, and inactive (acefana) Maya (Prakrti) as independent and eternal ; 'but, it will be seen from the above, that, though Vedantists admit the eternity of Maya from one point of view, they do not accept the position that Maya is self-created and independent ; and on that account, in describing the Maya embodied in worldly life by comparing it to a tree, the Gita says, "narupam .asyeha tathopalabhyate ricinto m cadir nam sampratistha" (Gl. 15. 3), i. e., "the FORM, END, BEGINNING, root, or habitation of ithis tree of worldly life (saihsara vrksa) cannot be found". In

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 365

the same way, the descriptions which are come across in the third chapter, such as, "karma brahmodblmvam viddhi" (Gl. 3. 15), i. e., "Karma was created out of the Brahman" ; or, "yajnah karmasamudbhavah" (Gl. 3. 14), i. e., "even the Yajna springs out of Karma" ; or, "sahayajnah prajah sntva" (Gi. 3. 10), i. e., "the Biahmadeva created praja {srsti) and yajna (Karma) at the same time", mean that, "Karma, or Yajna in the form ■ of Karma, and the srsti, that is, praja (the creation) all came into existence at the same time". Then whether you say that this srsti came into existence out of Brahmadeva himself, or, in the words of the Mimamsa school, that it was . created by Brahmadeva from the eternal Vedic words, the meaning is the same (Ma. Bha. San. 231 ; Manu. 1. 21). In short, Karma is the activity which is to be seen in the fundamental qualityless Brahman, at the time when the visible world began to be created. This activity is known as the Name-d and Form-ad Maya, and the activities of the Sun, the Moon, and all the other objects in the world have gradually come into existence from this fundamental Karma (Br. 3. 8. 9).. Scients have determined by means of their Reason that this, Karma or Maya, performed at the time of the creation of the universe, which is the foundation of all the activities in the world, is some unknowable pastime (Ma) of the Brahman, and not something independent of the Brahman. * But, as the scients cannot go further, it is not possible f oi them to ascertain ' when ' this wonder, or these Names and Forms, or this Karma embodied in Maya first came into existence. Therefore, when it is necessary to consider only this Karma-world ( karma srsti ), it is usual in the Vedanta science (Ve. Su. 2. 1. 35) to refer to this dependent, perishable Maya and, at the same time, the Karma which is appurtenant, to it, as 'eternal' (amdi). It must be borne in mind that the word 'amdi' in this place does not mean fundamentally ' without beginning ' ( nirarambha ) and independent, like the

• "What belongs to mere appearance is necessarily sub-

ordinated by reason to the nature of the Thing-in-itself " Kant's- Metaphysics of Morals (Abbot's trans, in Kant's Theory of Ethics^. p. 81). [In one edition, this page is shown as 18-Trans. ]

366 GITA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

Paramesvara, as is maintained by the Sarhkhyas, but ' durjneyaraniblia ' that is, " something, the beginning of which cannot be known ".

But, although we are not in a position to say definitely when and why the Knowledge-formed Brahman first began to take up the Appearance of the visible world, yet, the rules by which the further activities of this Karma in the shape of Maya go on, are fixed; and many of those rules can be determined by us. The order in which the various Name-d and Form-ed objects in the world came into existence out of the fundamental Prakrti, that is, out of eternal Karma in the shape of Maya, has been described by me according to the Sarhkhya philosophy in the eighth chapter of this book ; and I have, in the same place, mentioned the doctrines of modern Material sciences for comparison. It is true that Vedanta does not look upon Prakrti as self-created like the Parabrahman; but, as the further development of Prakrti, according to Sarhkhya philosophy, is acceptable to Vedanta, I will not repeat that subject-matter here. Yet, in the order of the creation of the universe from fundamental Prakrti in the shape of Karma, whioh has been described above, I have nowhere considered the ordinary rules according to which man has to suffer the results of Karma (Action). It is, therefore, necessary to consider those rules now. This is known as 'KARMA-VIPAKA*. (effect of Karma). The first of the rules relating to Karma-Vipaka is that once the Karma is started, its activity or expansion continues without a break; and, though the day and night of Brahmadeva may be over and the universe destroyed, yet, this Karma survives in the form of a seed ; and, when the universe begins to come into exiBtenoe again, fresh sprouts grow out of that seed of Karma. It is stated in the Mahabharata that :

ypsam ye yard k irmani prak srstyam pratipedire I tany eva pratipadyante srjyrtmanah punah punah II

( Ma. Bha. San. 231, 48, 49 ; Gi. 8 18 and 19 ). that is, " those very Actions which have been committed by any "being in the previous world, find him again and again (whether lie may will it or no)". Not only is it that "gaharia karmano «7arih"(Gi. 4.17)— "the effects of Karma are unfathomable"—

EFFECT of KARMA, AND FREE WILL 367

Tni t, even the persistence of Karm a is very difficult to get rid of. Nobody has got rid of K«r ma ~ TTJa.jgiqd J _J)k)jV B by Karma. The S un an d the M oon move on ac coun t of Karma; and B rahmad eva, VJsnu Sankar, and other qualityful gods also are_alHied up in Karma. All the more so, Indra and ethers. Qualityful ( saqjina ) means, defined by Name and Form ; and being defined by Name and Form means Karma, or the result of Karma. In as much as it is not possible to say how Karma, in the shape of Maya, first came into exit-tence. it is also not possible to soy when man first got involved in the cycle of Karma. But, once he has got into that cycle, however he may have got into it, he cannot later on, that is, after his Name-d and Form-ed body has bs3n destroyed, escapa taking up different Forms in this world as a result of his Actions. Because, as Material scientists have now definitely established, the energy of Karma is never destroyed, and that energy which appears to-day under one Name and Form, reappears under another Name and Form when the former Name and Form has been destroyed-/ and, if he cannot escape taking up other Names and Forms after one Name and Form has been destroyed, one cannot definitely say that these various subsequent Names and Forms will be lifeless, and that it is not possible for them to be something different. This recurrence of Names and Forms is known as the cycle of births and deaths, or mmsara, according to the Philosophy of the Absolute Self; and that Energy, which is the foundation

• It is not that this idea of re-incarnation has been accepted

only in the Hindu religion or by theists. Although the Bu Id Lists ■do not believe in the Atman, yet, they liave wholly adopted the theory of re-incarnation into their religion; and, even in the twentieth century, the invetprately atheistic G-orman philosopher Nietzsche, who pronounced that ' Sod is dead ', has accepted the theory of re-incaination. He has said that lie was inspired with the idea or explanation that: as the perpetually recurring trans- formations of the energy of Karma are limited, and Time is eternal, a Name and F rm which has once been created, must occur again; and, therefore, the cycle of Karma is established even from the point of view of the Material sciences. (Nietzsche's Eternal Jtemrrmce, Complete works, Engl. Trans. Vol. XVI. pp. 235-256).

368 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

of these Names and Forms, is synthetically called Brahman,, and distributively, Jivatman. It is stated in the Mahabharata and in the Manu-Smrti, that, strictly speaking, this Atman. neither comes to birth nor dies; that it is eternal, that is,, perpetual; but that, as it is involved in the cycle of Karma,, one cannot escape taking up another Name and Form, when one Name and Form has been, destroyed ; one has to suffer to-morrow for what one does to-day, and day after to-morrow, for what one does to-morrow; nay, one has to suffer in the next birth for what one does in this birth, and in this way the cycle of the universe is continually going on; and that tlw results of these Actions have to be borne not only by ourselves, but even by the sons, grand-sons, and great-grand- sons, who come to birth out of our Name-d and Form-ed body (Manu. 4. 173; Ma. Bha, A. 80. 3). Bhisma says to Yudhisthira in the Santiparva that :-

U-&

papam karma krtam kiincid yadi iasmn na drsyafe l nrpate tamja putresu pautresv api ca naptrsu n

ij-j iiAvv^- U— y-f (San. 129. 21.]

that is : " King, although a particular man may not be seen to Buffer the results of his evTTacliiblisTyet, hTs^sonsTgralidsons- and great-grandsons hav"e"to~s uffer them" ~Tand we actually see thatsomelHBur abTeTiseases recur hereditarily. In the same way, the fact of one person being born a beggar, and another person being born in the family of a king, has also to be explained by the theory of Karma ; and, according to some,, this is the proof of the correctness of the theory of Karma. Once this cycle of Karma is started, the Paramesvara Himself does not interfere with it. Seeing that the entire universe is- going on by the will of the Paramesvara, who other than the Paramesvara can be the giver of the fruit of our Actions (Ve. Su. 3. 2. 38 ; Kau. 3. 8) ? And, for this reason, the Blessed Lord has said, "labhate ca tatah kaman mayaiva vihitan hi tan" (Gl. 7. 22), i. e., "the desired result, which is prescribed by Me, is acquired by man". Vedanta, therefore, comes to the ultimate doctrine that though the act of prescribing the result of an Action belongs to the Paramesvara, ye.t, in as much as- these results are fixed according to a man's good or bad Actions,.

EFFECT OF KAEMA, AND FBEE WILL 369

that is, according to the worth of his Action, Non-action, or Bad action, the Paramesvara is, strictly Bpeaking, apathetic in this matter ; and that, therefore, if there is the distinction of good or bad among men, the Paramesvara does not, on that account, beoome liable to the blame of partiality (vaisamya) or cruelty (nairghrnya), (Ve. Su, 2. 1. 34) ; and with reference to this position, it is stated in the Gifca that : "samo 'ham mrva- bMiesu" (G-I. 9. 29), i. e,, "I am equal towards all", or,

nadatte kasyacit papam na cazva sukrtam vibhuh II

(Gl. 5. 14, 15) that is : "the Paramesvara does not accept either the sin or the meritorious Action of anybody ; the cycle of the inherent effects of Karma or Maya is continually going on ; eaoh oreated being has to suffer happiness or unhappiness according to its own Actions". In short, although it is not possible for human reason to explain when Karma was first started in the world by the desire of the Paramesvara, or when man first came within the clutches of Karma, yet, in as much as the further consequences or fruits of Karma are found to result according to the laws of Karma, human reason can come to the definite conclusion, that every living being has been caught in the prison of eternal Karma in the shape of Names and Forms, from the very commencement of the world. This is what is meant by the quotation given at the commencement of this chapter, namely, "karmana badhyate jantuh"

The words 'samsara', ' prakrli', 'maya', 'visible world', or 'rules or laws of creation' ( srdi ) mean the same thing as ' the eternal oourse of Karma'; because, the laws of creation are the laws which govern the changes which take place in Names and Forms ; and, from this point of view, all Material sciences come under the denomination of Maya defined by Names and Forms. The rules or limitations of this Maya are hard and comprehensive ; and therefore, even a pure Materialist like Haeckel, who was of the opinion that there is no Funda- mental Element which is at the root of or beyond the visible world, has laid down the proposition that a man must gc where the cycle of creation drags him. According to this philosopher, the feeling which every man has, that he should 47-48

370 GTTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

obtain a release from his perishable Name-d and Form-ed Appearance, or that he will obtain immortality by doing a- particular thing, is a mere illusion. Not only are the Atman or the Paramatman not independent, and not only is immorta- lity a humbug, but, no human being in this world is a free agent to do any particular act. As whatever act a man does to-day is the result of what has been done before by him or by his ancestors, it is also never dependent on his will, whether or not to do a particular thing. For example, a desire to steal nice things belonging to others comes into existence in the hearts of particular persons against their will, as a result of previous Actions or hereditary impressions ; and they are inspired to steal that particular thing. In short, these Materialists are of the opinion that the principle mentioned in the Glta, namely, "anicchan api varsneya balad ioa niyojitah" (Gi. 3. 36), i. e., "a man commits sin, although he might not desire to do it", applies in all places in the same way, that there are no exceptions to it, and that there is no way of escaping it. From this point of view, a desire which a man gets to-day is the result of his Aciion of yesterday, and the desire he had yesterday was the result of his action of day before yesterday ; a man can never do anything by his independent volition, as this chain of causes is endless ; whatever happens is the result of former actions or of destiny, because people give the name Destiny to pre-destined Karma ; and, if a man is, in this way, not free to do or not to do a particular Action, it becomes futile to say that he should improve his conduct in a particular way, or that he should, in a particular manner, realise the identity of the Brahman and the Atman and purify his intelligence. Like a log which has fallen in the stream of a river, one must without demur go wherever Maya, Prakrti, the laws of Creation, or the Stream of Karma drags him, whether that is progress or regress. In reply to this, some other evolutionist Materialists say that in as much as the form of Prakrti is not steady, and Names and Forms continually change, man should watch and find out by what rules of creation these changes take place, and bring about such a change in the external creation as will be beneficial to him; and we see in actual life, that by following this logic,

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 371

man utilises flie or electricity for his own benefit. Similarly, it is our experience that human nature can to some extent be altered by effort. But, the question in hand is not whether or not there can be a change in the formation of the universe or in human nature, nor whether or not man should effect such a ohange; and we have, at the moment, to determine whether or not a man is in a position to control or to yield to the inspiration or desire which he has to bring about such a change. And if, from the point of view of Materialistic philosophy, the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of this desire is pre-destined by the laws of Prakrti, or of Karma, or of the ■Creation, according to the principle ' buddhih Jcarmanusarini ', then it follows, according to this philosophy, that a man is not free or independent to do or not to do a particular Action. This doctrine is known by the. name ' vasanasvatamtrya ' ( Freedom of Desire ), or ' icckasvalamtrya' ( Freedom of Wil l ), or ' pravrttisvatamtrya' ( Freedom of Inclinatio n )■ And if one considers the matter purely from the point of view of the Effects of Karma ( karma-vipaka ) or of the purely Materialistic philosophy, one has to come to the conclusion that no man has got any kind of freedom of inclination or freedom of will, and that every man is circumscribed in all directions like the unbreakable iron ring fixed on the wheel of a cart. But, if one takes the evidence of his own Conscience in this matter, it will be seen that although one may not possesB the power of making the Sun rise in the West, yet, we believe that doing or not doing, after careful consideration, whatever one intends to do by his own hands, or, where there is one course which is sinful and another whioh is meritorious, or one course which is righteous and another which is unrighteous, choosing the good or the bad course out of the two, is a thing whioh is subject to the control of a man's desire. We have now to see whether this belief is right or wrong. If one says that this belief is wrong, then those who commit thefts or murders are judged to be wrong-doBrs on the basis of this belief, and are' punished accordingly; and, if one says that it is correot, then the Theory of Karma, or the Theory of Karma- Vipaka or the laws of the visible creation fall to the ground. As in the Material sciences,' one has to consider only the actions of

'§72 GlTA-BAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

11 gross substances, this question does not arise there. But, it acquires importance in the science of Karma-Yoga, which deals with the duty and the non-duty of those who have- acquired Knowledge, and it has to be answered; because, if it is definitely proved that there is no freedom of inclination for man, then the science of right or wrong ( vidMnisedha-sastra ), which shows how to purify the mind, or explains whether a particular thing should be done or should not be done, or whether a particular thing is righteous or unrighteous, automatically loses need of consideration ( Ve. Su, 2. 3. 33 );* and the height of manhood will oonsist in remaining in the- eternal bondage of Mahamaya or Prakrti, whether personally or as a result of heredity. Or, where is there any manhood left at all ? Manhood will have to be considered if a person is fai a position to control anything at all. What can there be

"except imprisonment and serfdom where a man has not the smallest authority or will ? Like the bullocks tied to a plough, every one will have to toil under the authority of Prakrti, and as our poet Shankara says, "the shaokles of the inherent

' 'qualities of substances" must be perpetually kept by oneself on his feet ! The attention of all scholars has been fixed on the question of the Freedom of Will, as a result of Karma-Vada ( Theory of Karma ) or Daiva-Vada ( Theory of Destiny ) in our country, and of the Theory of Providence in the Christian religion in former years, and of the Theory of the Laws of Nature propounded by Materialistic philosophers in modern times ; and any amount of discussion has taken place, and is still taking place on this question. But as it is impossible to deal with the whole of that matter here, I am in this chapter dealing only with what the idea of the Bhagavadglta and of Vedanta philosophy on that question is.

• Thia portion of the Vedanta-Butma is nailed the 'jivahirtr-

tvadhihmma', and the first of these Sutras is 'iarta s'astrarthaeatvat,* that io to say, 'in order that the science of right or wrong should have aoy significance, the Jlva (Personal Self) must be considered as a doer'. When one oonsiderj the Sutra of Panlni (Pa. 1. 4.54) that: — •' mataihirah karla" (i.e., the doer is independent), the word" ' larta ' couveys the impression of Freedom of Self; and it will ba Been that this a&hiiarana deals with that question.

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 373

It is true that the course of Karma is eternal, and that even the Paramesvara does not interfere with the course or cycle of Karma which has once heen started. But according' to our philosophers, the doctrine of Adhyatma ( Philosophy of the Absolute Self ), that the visible world is not purely Karma or merely Names and Forms, that there is some imperishable independent Atman-formed Brahman-world which is clothed by thesa Names and Forms, and that the Atman within the human body is a particle of that permanent and independent Parabrahman, shows the path for getting out of this seemingly unconquerable difficulty. But, before explaining this path, it is necessary to complete the description of the process of .the. Effects of Karma, which has remained incomplete. It is not that the rule that one has to suffer according to what one does, applies only to a particular individual. . A family, a. community, a nation, or even the whole universe cannot .escape suffering the consequences of their Actions in the game way as an individual cannot do so ; and in as much as every human being is born in some family, some community, or some country, it has to soma extent to suffer on account of the Actions not only of itself, but also of the community or society, such as, the family etc. to which it belongs, But, as one has to refer ordinarily only to the Actions of a particular individual, the divisions of Karma, in the Theory of the Effects of Karma, have been made primarily by reference to a single individual. For instance, Manu has divided the eyij actions of a man into bodily ( Myika ), vocal ( mcika ) and. mental ( mamsika ) ; and of these, prostitution, murder, and theft are called bodily Actions; the four Actions, namely, speaking what is painful, speaking an untruth, speaking what is derogatory, and speaking what is incoherent, are called vocal Actions; and the three Actions, namely, desiring the wealth of another, desiring the evil of another, and false insistence, are said to be mental Actions; and having inthiB way classified evil Actions or sins into ten kinds (Manu. 12.5-7; Ma. Bha. Anu. 13.), their effects are next enumerated. Yet, this differentiation is not final; because, later on, in this very chapter, Karma has again been divided into zattvika, rajasa, and tamasa; and the characteristics of

374 GITA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

these three kiads of qualities (guna), or of Karma, which have been given there are primarily the same as those given id the Bhagavadgita (Gl. 14. 11-15 ; 18. 23-25 ; Manu. 12. 31-34) . But, the division of Karma which one commonly comes across in the subject of the Effect of Actions is different from both these divisions; and according to that division, Karaia is divided into 'mincita' (Accumulated). ' 'prarabdha (Commenced), and 'kriymnaya' (Being-suffered). Whatever Action has been performed by a man upto date, whether he has performed it in this birth or in the previous births, is his 'sa/hcita, i. e., 'Accumulated' Karma. This samcita is also known as 'adrsta (invisible), or, in the terminology of the Mimamsa school, 'aparea' (strange). The reason for this terminology is, that any particular Action is visible only during that particular time when it is being performed; and when that time has gone, it does not any more remain in its actual form, but all that remains is its subtle, that is, invisible, or apurva, that is, strange effects (Ve. Su, Sam. Bha. 3. 2. 39,40). Whatever may be said, the words 'samcita , 'adrsta, or 'apurva' undoubtedly mean the 'accumulation' of the effects of all the various Actions performed upto the moment of performing the last Action. It is not possible to suffer the effects of all these Accumulated Actions at the same time; because, the consequences of these Accumulated Actions can produce either good or bad, that is, mutually contrary effects. For instance, some Accumulated Actions lead to heaven, whereas others lead to hell ; and, the results of all of them cannot possibly be enjoyed at one and the same time, but have to be enjoyed one after the other; and therefore, those out of the 'samcita' (Accumulated) Actions, of which the results are first begun to be suffered are known as 'prarabdha' (Commenced Actions), or 'that sathcita, which has started'. In the Marathi language, the word 'prarabdha' is very often used synonymously with 'samata' ; but it will be seen that this meaning is not correct, and that scientifically speaking, 'prarabdha' is only a sub- division of 'samcita', which is the total aggregate of Actions. prarabdha is not the whole of samcita, but that portion of samcita, the effects (karya) of which, one has begun to suffer for; and, therefore, 'prarabdha is also called 'arahdha-harya

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 37&

(Commenced Action). In addition to Commenced and Accumulated Action, a third division of Karma is ordinarily made, namely, the 'kriyamava'. 'kriyamana' is a derivative participle indicating the present tense, and means 'that Aetion which is now going on, or which we are now performing'- But, whatever we are now doing is the lesult of the Commenced Karma, that is to say, of that portion of Accumulated Karma which we have commenced to suffer for. Therefore, I do not see any reason for making the third division, 'kriyamava* (Being-suffered). It is true that one can differentiate between. Commenced and Being-suffered Karma by saying that the Commenced Karma is the cause and the Being-suffered is its effect (phala), that is to say, its produot (karya). But, this distinction is of no use in the process of suffering the results of Aotions. Some word is necessary to indicate those Actions, out of the Accumulated Karma, which one has not yet commenced to suffer for, that is to say, which remain over after the Commenoed is deducted from the Accumulated. Therefore, in the Yedanta Sutras (Ve. Su. 4. 1. 15), Commenced Karma is known as 'prarabdha-karya' , and all the Actions which are not 'prarabdha' are known as 'ariarabdha-karya' (Actions, which one has not yet begun to suffer for). In my opinion, it is scientifically more accurate to divide Accumulated Action (saiiieita-karya) into prarabdha-karya and ariarabdha-karya in this way ; and therefore, instead of understanding the word 'kriyamaria (Being-suffered) as a derivative participle indicating the present tense, we oan look upon it as indicating the future tense on the strength of the Sutra of Panini: "vartamana samipye vartamanavadva" (Pa. 3. 3. 131), and interpret it as meaning "that, which is to be suffered for, soon in the future" ; in this way, kriyamana will mean anarabdha-kanja, and the words prarabdha (Commenced) and kriyamaria (To-be-SuffeTod) will respectively be synonymous with arabdha-kanja ( Commenced Karma ) and amrabdha-karya (Uncommenced Karma) of the Vedanta-Sutras. But now-a-days, afc any rate, no one interprets the word 'kriyamana' in that way; and kriyamaria is interpreted as meaning the Actions which are now being suffered for. But, if it is taken in that meaning, not only has one to call the result of prarabdha

376 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

ly the name kriyamwia, but the interpretation becomes further subject to the serious objection, that none of the words 'samcita', 'prarabdha' or 'kriyamaya' can be used for showing the anafabdha-karya. On the other hand, it is also not proper to disregard the ordinary meaning of the word 'kriyanmna'. Therefore, instead of accepting the commonly accepted divi- sions of Karma in the santcita, prarabdha, and kriyamana, in discussing the process of suffering the results of Actions, I divide Karma into arabdha-karya ( Commenced Karma ) and anarabdha-kdrya ( Uncommenced Karma ) ; and that is also scientifically more convenient. The action of 'suffering' is divided, according to the tense, into 'that which has been suffered' ( past ), 'that which is now being suffered' ( present ), and 'that which has still to be suffered' (future). But, in the science of the Effects of Karma, Karma cannot be divided into three divisions in this way. Because, that portion of Accumulated Karma ( samcita ), which is suffered for after having become Commenced Karma ( prarabdha ), produces results which go again to 6well the ranks of Accumulated Karma { samcita): and, therefore, in considering the question of the suffering for Actions, it is not necessary to divide samcita further than into prarabdha, which means that which one has begun to suffer for, and anarabdha, which meanB that which one has not yet begun to suffer for. When the effects of all Actions have, in this way, been classified into a two-fold division, the science of the effects of Karma now tells us about the suffering of those effects, that Accumulated Karma is all that has to be suffered for. Out of this, those Actions, the suffering of the effects of which has resulted in one's acquiring the present birth, that is to say, that portion of Accumulated Karma which has become Commenced Karma, cannot be escaped suffering for — "prarabdhakarmariam bhogad evaksayah". In the same way as an arrow, which has left one'B hands, cannot come back, but must go on upto its destination, or, as once the wheel of the potter starts to revolve, it will go on revolving until the force of the revolution has been exhausted, so also does prarabdha, that is, |hat Karma for the Tesults of which one has begun to suffer, go on. Whatever has been started, must come to an end; there is no esoape

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 377

from it. But, the same is not the case with the Karma, which is anarabdha-karya- One can totally annihilate all this kind of Karma by means of Knowledge. As a result of this important difference between the Commenced Karma (prarabdha .karya) and Uncommenced Karma (ariarabdha karya), the scient has got to patiently wait for a natural death, even after having acquired Knowledge, that is to say, until the Karma, which has started with his body coming to birth, comes to an end. If instead of doing so, he puts an end to his life, then, although he may have destroyed his ariarabdha Karma by means of Knowledge, yet, he will have to take another birth for suffering the effects of that prarabdha-karma, which made him take the former birth, and the suffering of which has remained incomplete as a result of his perversity in putting an end to iis life ; and both the Vedanta and the Samkhya philosophy have drawn the conclusion that on that account he will necessarily not attain Belease (Ve. Su, 4. 1. 13-15 and S&m. JJa, 67), Besides, committing suicide in defiance of these natural laws will be another Karma, which will have been started, and it will be necessary to take another birth to suffer the consequences of that Karma. From this, it will be clear, that from the point of view of the doctrine of Karma, even suicide is a madness.

I have now mentioned the divisions of Karma from the point of view of suffering the Effects of Karma. I shall now consider in what way, that is, by what device one can esoape the bonds of Karma. The first of these devices is that prescribed by the supporters of the Karma-Vada (Doctrine of Karma), 'anarabdha-karya' has been defined by me above as those Accumulated Actions, for which one has to suffer in the future — whether they can be suffered for in this life or it is necessary to take other births to suffer them. But, disregarding this meaning, some followers of the Mlmamsa school have found out a way, easy in their opinion, for obtaining Release. As has been stated before in the third chapter, Karma is •divided by the Mlmamsa school into nitya (daily), naimittika ■(occasional), kamya (desire-prompted), and nisiddha (forbidden). Out of these, if one fails to perform the daily Actions like .samdhya (worship at twilight) etc., one incurs sin; and the

378 GlTA-EAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

occasional Actions have to be performed whenever the occasion arises. Therefore, according to the Mlmarhsa school, both these- kinds of Actions have to be performed. That leaves the kamya and the nisiddha Actions. Out of these, one incurs sin by performing the msiddha (forbidden) Actions, and, therefore, they should not be performed ; and as, by performing the kamya (desire-prompted) Actions, one has to take birth after birth to suffer their effects, they too should not be performed.. When a man, in this way, mentally balances the effects of Actions, and gives up some Actions and performs others according to the prescribed rites, he must automatically obtain Release : because, ; the prarabdln-karma is exhausted by its being suffered for in this life ; and by performing the daily and the occasional Actions and eschewing the forbidden ones in this life, one escapes perdition ; and by giving up desire- prompted Actions, there does also not remain the necessity of enjoying heavenly happiness. When the suffering in thiB- world and in hell and in heaven has thus been exhausted, no other state is possible for the Atman except Release. This doctrine is known as 'karma-mukti' or 'naiskarmya-dddhi' (salvation by absistence from Action). The state in which in spite of performing an Action, one is in the same position as- if one did not perform it, that is to say, in which the doer does not suffer the bondage of the sin or the merit of the Action, is known as the 'naislcarmya' state. But, Vedanta philosophy has proved that, one does not fully succeed in miskarmya by this device of the Mlmamsa school (Ve. Su. Sarh. Bha. 4. 3. 14) ; and for the same reason, the Glta says: "naiskarmya does not result from abstinence from Actions, nor does one obtain. Release by giving up Action" (Gi. 3. 4). In the first place, it is impossible to eschew all the forbidden Actions, and Ethics itself says that by making a naimittika (occasional) prayascitta (self-imposed penance), one does not entirely get rid of the sin of having performed that forbidden Action. Yet, even taking, it for granted that such a thing is possible, the statement of the MJmamsa school that by suffering for the 'prarabdlta' Karma, and 1 performing the various perf ormable Actions in the manner men- tioned above in this life, or by not performing them, one exhausts accumulation of samcita Karma, is itself not correct ; because >•

EFFECT OF KAKMA, AND FREE-WILL 379

if the results of two accumulated Actions are contrary to- each other, e. g., if the effect of one is heavenly happiness, and that of the other, the tortures of hell, then, as it is not possible to suffer both at the same time and at the same place, it is- impossible to exhaust the suffering for the effects of the entire 'samcita' Karma by the 'prambdiia' which has been started in this life, and by the Actions which have to be performed in this life. It is stated in the PaTasaraglta in the Bharata that.,

kadacit sukrtam tola kutaslham iva tistliati I nmjjamamsya sariisare yuvad duhkhad vimucyate II

( Ma. Bha. San. 390. 17 )

that is, "s ometimes, th e meritorious _ Actions previously performed by~aTman waTtTto^iv^TuihTiheirT)enencial effects )■ until he has escaped from the pain of this worldly Tife'Vand thTsame argument~applies to the Accumulated sins. Thus,., suffering the effects of Accumulated Karma is not exhausted in one life, and some portion of the Accumulated Karma, always remains over as anarabdha-karya ( Uncommenced Karma ); and, even if all Actions in this life are performed in the manner - mentioned above, one still does not escape having to take another birth for suffering the Uncommenced Karma which is • part of the Accumulated Karma. Therefore, Vedanta philo- sophy has come to the conclusion, that this seemingly easy _ device of the Mimamsa school for obtaining Release, is false and misleading. No Upanisad has mentioned this way of escaping the bondage of Karma. This device has been erected merely on the foundation of inference, and this inference does not stand the test till the end. In short, expecting to escape the bondage of Karma merely by performing Karma, is as • foolish as expecting a blind man to save another blind man by showing him the right way. Well ; if one does not accept this device of the MlmSihsa school, and sits idle without performing any Action, expecting thereby to escape the bondage of Karma, that too is not possible ; because, not only does the suffering for the Uncommenced Karma Temain in balance, but the idea of giving up Karma, as also the act of sitting idle are both (omasa Actions in themselves, and one cannot escape having to take another birth in order to suffer the effects of

380 GM-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

4hese tamasa Actions, simultaneously with suffering for those of the TJneommenced portion of one's Accumulated Karma .{See Gl. 18. 7 and 8). Besides, so long as this body is alive, breathing, sleeping, sitting and such other Actions continue; and, therefore, the position of giving up all Actions also becomes untenable; and it has been stated in various places in the Gita, that no one can even for a single moment escape Karma in this world ( See Gl. 3. 5; 18. 11 ).

When it has thus been proved, that whether the Action be good or bad, man must always be ready to suffer the effect of it by taking some birth or other ; that Karma is eternal and that even the Paramesvara does not interfere with its unbreakable continuity ; that it is impossible to give up all Actions; and that one cannot escape the bondage of Karma by performing some Actions and not performing others as advised by the Mlmarhsa school, the next question which crops up is: — how can one satisfy the natural desire of a human being to escape the • cycle of Karma in the shape of perishable Names and Forms, and to go and be merged into the Immortal and imperishable Element, which is at the root of -.that cycle. In the Vedas as also in the Smrti texts, many devices, such as, sacrifices etc. have been prescribed for •obtaining benefit in the life after death. But, from the point ■of view of the philosophy of Release, all these are of a lower order; because, even if one attains heaven by performing meritorious acts like sacrifices etc., yet, whan the benefit of .that meritorious Action is over, one does not escape having to •come back again to the land of Action (Jcarmwthumi ) sometime •or other, though it may be after the expiry of a very long period of time ( Ma. Bha. Vans. 259 and 260; Gl. 8. 25 and 9.20) In short, it is quite clear, that this is not the correct path for being merged into the immortal substance and finally and permanently escaping from the troublesome cycle of births .and deaths by escaping the clutches of Karma. According to -the philosophy of the Absolute Self, Jnana (knowledge) is the . -only way to permanently esoape this troublesome cycle, that 1b to say, to obtain Release. 'Jfiana' does not mean the knowledge of the ordinary things of life (vyavahara-jnana), or -..the knowledge of the creation defined by Names and Forms,

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 381

but the Realisation of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman. This is also known as 'VidyS', and the word 'udya' which has been used in the line " karmaria badhyale jantuk vidyaya tu pramucyate", i. e., "a man is tied by karma and. released by vidya", which has been quoted in the beginning of this chapter, means 'Jnana' (Knowledge). In the Bhagavadglta. the Blessed Loid says to Arjuna : —

jiianiagmh sarvakarmani bhasmasat kurute 'rjuna I

(Gl. 4. 37). that is, "all Karma is reduced to ashes in the fire of Knowledge" ; and also in the Mahabharata, it has been statedi in two placeB, that :

bijany agny upadagdhani m rohanii yatha punah I jmnadagdhais tatha kleiair natma sampadyate punah II

(Ma. Bha. Vana. 199. 106, 107 : San. 311. 17). that is, "in the same way as a seed, which has been burnt, wilt not take root, so also when the suffering (of Karma) has beem burnt by Jnana, it does not have to be suffered for again by the Atman." In the Upanisads also, there are several phrases- which mention the great worth of Jnana, aB follows :—"ya evam vedaham brahmasmiti sa idam sarvam bhavati" (Br. 1. 4. 10),. i. e., "he who realises that he is the Brahman, becomes immortal Brahman" ; or, in the same way as water does not adhere to the lotus leaf, so also is that person who- has acquired the Knowledge of the Brahman not defiled- by Karma (Chan. 4. 14. 3) ; or, one who realises the Brahman obtains salvation (Tai. 2. 1); or, he, who has Realised. that everything is saturated by the Atman, is not at any time affected by sin (Br. 4. 4. 23); or " jfiatva demm mucyate sarvapasaih" ( Sve. 5. 13; 6. 13), i. e., "a man escapes- from all bonds after he has acquired the knowledge of the Paramesvara "; or " ksiyante casya karma^i tasmin drste paravare" ( Mun. 2. 2. 8 ), i. e., "when one has Realised the Parabrahman,. all his Karma is destroyed"; or, "vidyayamrtam aSnute" ( Isa. 11 ;, Maitryu. 7. 9 ), i. e„ " by vidya ( Knowledge ), immortality is attained"; or "tameva viditvati mriyum eti nanyah paMah vidyate 'yanaya" (Sve. 3. 8), i. e., "by Realising the Paramesvara^ one acquires immortality ; there is no other path for attaining

382 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

"Release." And if we consider the matter scientifically, we become more convinced of the same conclusion. Because, •although whatever there is in the visible world is an embodi- ment of Karma, yet, in as much as that is a pastime of the Parabrahman which is the foundation of the entire universe, no Kanna can affect the Parabrahman ; and, the Parabrahman though responsible for the doing of all things yet remains un- affected. As has been stated in the beginning of this chapter, all theobjeots in this world are divided into the two classes, Karma ■( Maya ) and Brahman, according to the philosophy of the Absolute Self. The only thing which he, who wishes to escape from one of these classes, that is, from Karma, can do, is to go into the other class, namely, into the Brahmani because, there being two fundamental classes of all things, there is no third •state, which is free from Karma other than the Brahman-state. But, in order to achieve this Brahman-state, it is necessary to first properly understand what it is; otherwise, one will go to do one thing and actually do another thing. It will be like "vimyakam prahurvaifo racayamasa vanaram", i. e., "I wanted to make an image of Ganapti, but ( not succeeding in it ) I "have made an image of a monkey." Therefore, it follows logioally from the philosophy of the Absolute Self, that the trrue msans of esoaping from the bonds of Karma is to aoquire a true knowledge of the form of Brahman, that is to say, of the identity of the Brahman and the At' -in, and of the ■unattachedness of the Brahman. The >,dme meaning is conveyed by the statement of the Biased Lord in the Glta that : "he who realises that Kai^a does not affect Me, because I am not attached to it, becomes free from the bonds of Karma" (Gl. 4. 14 and 13. 23). But, it must not be forgotten that the word 'Jnana' in this place does not mean merely bookish knowledge, or the mere mental process, as has been stated in the very beginning of the Samkarabhasya on the Vedanta-Sutras. 'Jnana' means 'the state of becoming brahmi-bhiita (merged in the Brahman), or the Brahml-state, which a man acquires after having acquired Spiritual Knowledge and conquered his OTgans.' The whole of this meaning is intended in each place. The' same definition of Jnana according to the philosophy of the Absolute Self has

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 383

been mentioned at the end of the last chapter; and even in the Mababharata (San. 320. 30), Janaka has said to Sulabha that :- "jfianena kurute yatnam yatnena prapyate mahat", i.e., "when a man has acquired Jiiana, which means Jfiana in the form of mental activity, he is inspired to effort; and by this path of effort, he ultimately reaches the Mahat-Element (Paramesvara)". The philosophy of the Absolute Self cannot tell one anything more than what path has to be followed, and where one has to go, in order to attain Release. When philosophy has told one these things, it is for everybody by his own efforts to remove all the thorns or obstacles which there may be in the path prescribed by it, and to clear up the load, and ultimately attain the ideal by that road. But, even this effort may be made in different ways, such as, the Patafijala-Yoga, Meditation on the Absolute Self, Devotion, or Renunciation of the fruit of Effort etc. (Gi. 12. 8-12) ; and on that account, a man is very often confused. Therefore, the Glta after first mentioning the Desireless Karma-Yoga as the most important of these means, has also described in the sixth chapter the various devices of yama (restraint) — niyama (religious observance) — asana (pose)— praTjayama (control of breath)— pralyaliara (withdrawing the organs from the objects ■of sense) — dharaw /'keeping the mind collected) — dhyana -(meditation) — samadhi (mental absorption into the object of meditation) etc. which are appurtenant to it ; and from the seventh ohapter onwards, it is stated how this Realisation of the Paramesvara is acquired, while observing the Karma- Yoga, iby means of meditation on the Absolute Self or by the easier Path of Devotion ( Gi. 18. 56 ).

Though it is thus established beyond doubt that Abstention from Action is not the way for escaping the bonds of Karma ; that ultimate Release is attained only by keeping the Mind pure, by Realising the identity of the Brahman and the Atman, and by behaving like the Paramesvara; and that the idea of giviDg up Action is an illusion, because, no one can escape Karma, yet, the fundamental question, whether it is within the control of man to make that effort which has to be made in order to acquire the Knowledge necessary for making ihis course of Action successful, or whether he must go

384 GITA.-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

wherever Name-d and Form-ed Prakrti will drag him, Btill remains unsolved. The Blessed Lord Himself has said;: "prakrtim yanti bhutani nigrahah kirn karisyati" ( Gl. 3. 33), i. e., "what will determination do ?; every living being is bound to- act according to its inherent tendencies"; and that, "mithyaisa vyavasayas te prakrtis tvam iiiyoksyati', i. e., "your efforts and determination are useless ; your Prakrti ( inherent tendencies ) will drag you even where you do not want to go" ( Gl. 18. 5ft- and 2.60) ; and even Manu has stated that "bcdavan indriyagramo vidvamsam api karsati" ( Manu. 2. 215 ), i. e., "the organs are too much even for scients"; and the sum and substance of the process of Causality ( karmarvipaka-prakriya ) is the same ; because, once one admits that all the desires in the mind of a man are the result of previous Karma, one has to come to the conclusion that man has to move perpetually from one Karma, to another Karma in the cycle of Destiny. Nay; one may even say that the inspiration to escape Karma, and Karma, itself, are mutually antagonistic. And, if this is true, then one falls into the impossible position ( apatti ) than no man is. free to acquire Jnana ( Knowledge ). To this the answer of the philosophy of the Absolute Self is that, in as much as the Element which is the support of the Name-d and Form-ed visible world also circulates in the gross human body in the form of an Atman, the Actions of a human being are to- be considered from the point of view both of the Body and of the Atman. Out of these, in as much as the. Atman-formed Brahman is fundamentally one, and only one, it can never be dependent ; because, in order that, one should be dependent on another, the distinction of 'one' and 'another' must remain. In the present place, that 'another^ is Nam-ed and Form-ed Karma. But Karma is non-perm,anent f . and is essentially the pastime (HIS) of the Parabrahman ; and,, therefore, although it acts as a covering over one part of the Parabrahman, it can undoubtedly never enslave the Parabrahman ; besides, as I have already stated before, that. Atman which synthesises all the activities in the world of Karma, and gives rise to one's knowledge of the creation, must be different from the Karma-world, that is to say, it must belong to the Brahman-world, It, therefore, follows that the;

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 385

Parabrahman and the embodied Atman {sarira- atman), which is fundamentally a part of the Parabrahman, are both fundamentally independent, that is to say, that they are both outside the province which is subject to the control of Prakrti. Oat of these two, the Paramatman is eternal and all-pervading, and is always in the pure and released state ; and that is all the knowledge which human intelligence can get of it. But, as the Jivatman (personal Atman), which is a part of the Paramatman (Supreme Atman), is caught inside the cage of the Body and Reason and the other organs, though fundamentally it is in a pure and released form, and quality less, and a non-doer, the inspiration which it gives to- the human mind, can be actually perceived by us by personal experience. Although there is no force in free vapour, yet, when it is enclosed in a vessel, it begins to exert a pressure on that vessel. In the same way, when the Gross Body burdened by previous Karma, and the organs, enclose the Jiva (personal Atman), which is a particle of the Supreme Atman (Gi. 15. 7), the bodily organs acquire the desire and inclination to do those Actions which can liberate it (the Jiva) from this enclosure, (or, which are favourable to Release) ; and, that is what is known in ordinary parlance as, 'the independent tendencies of the Atman'. The reason for my saying in 'ordinary parlance' is that, in its pure released state, or, 'from the philosophical aspect of it ', the Atman is desireless and a non-doer (akarta), and all the activity is of Prakrti (Gi. 13. 29 and Ve. Su. Sam. Bha. 2. 3. 40 ). But, Vedantins do not with the Samkhyas say that this Prakrti, of its own accord, performs Actions which favour Release ; because, if one says so, it follows that gross Prakrti can blindly release even those who have no Knowledge. And, we cannot also say that, that Atman which is fundamentally a non-doer, will, of itself, that is to say, without any provocation, and by inherent tendencies, become a doer. Therefore, Vedanta explains the independence of the Atman by saying, that although the Atman is fundamentally a non-doer, yet, on account of the provocation, of the enclosure of the body, it, to that extent, becomes apparently a provocator or inspirer ; and, when by reason of some cause or other, the Atman acquires this foreign 49—50

386 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA.

power of provocation, this provocation is distinct from the laws of Karma and independent, 'Independent' (when applied to the Atman ) does not mean 'non-provocative'; and the Atman in its fundamental, pure state is also not a doer. But, instead of everytime giving this lengthy explanation, it is usual to speak of this as the independent tendency, or the inspiration, of the Atman. This inspiration whioh is received by the organs through the Atman as a result of its being enclosed in an enclosure, and the inspiration which is received by the organs as a result of their contact with the objects in the external world, are two entirely different things. Eat, drink, and make merry are the inspirations of the organs; and the inspiration of the Atman tells us to perform actions which are favourable to Release. The first kind of inspiration belongs purely to the external world, that is, to the Karma- world ; whereas the second inspiration, namely, that of the Atman pertains to the Brahman-world; and as these two kinds «f inspiration are at the outset mutually contradictory, the greater part of a man's life is spent in the mutual warfare between them. Out of these, when a man does not accept the inspiration from the Karma-world in matters of doubt ( Bhag. 11. 10. 4 ), but begins to act according to the independent inspiration of the Atman — and that is, what is understood by true atma-jnam ( Spiritual Knowledge ), or atma-nisthu < devotion to the Atman )— all the Actions which he performs are naturally favourable to Release ; and, ultimately

visuddhadhxrma suddhem buddhem ca sa buddhiman I ■rimalatma ca bhavati sametya vimalatmand 1 soatantras ca svatanlrena svatardratvam avapnufe II

that is:— "the fundamentally INDEPENDENT embodied Atman becomes merged in the permanent, pure, knowledge- ful (buddhaj, untarnished, and INDEPENDENT Supreme Atman" (Ma. Bha. San. 308. 27-30). This is. what is meant by the statement above that Release is obtained by knowledge. But, on the other hand, when the inherent tendencies of the gross body and organs inspired by Prakrti, that is to say, the inspirations from the Karma-world become predominant, a man goes to perdition. It is with reference to this independent

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 387

power of the enclosed embodied Atman to force the body and the organs to perform Actions favourable to Release, and in that way, to obtain Release by the Realisation of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman, that the Blessed Lord has explained to Arjuna the principle of the independence of the Atman or of self-dependence, in the following words . —

uddhared atmana 'tmavarn nutmanam avasadayet I atmaiva hy atmano bandhur atmaim ripur atmanah II

( Gi. 6.5 )

that is, "man must obtain his Release himself ; he should not allow himself to be discouraged by anything; because (each one) one is one's own brother (benefactor), as also one's own enemy (destroyer)". And, it is with the same idea that the Yoga- Vasistha has deprecated Destiny, and with great detail extolled the eminence of manhood (Yo. 2. sarga. 4-8). When a man aots in this way, realising the principle that there is only one Atman in all created things, his conduct is described as sadacararia ( meritorious Action ), or Action favourable to Release; and, as it is the independent nature of the Jlvatman to inspire the body and the organs towards Action of this kind, the conscience of the evil-doer always bears testimony in favour of meritorious Action ; and, therefore, even evil-doers repent of their evil deeds. Intuitionists refer to this matter as the independent inspiration of a deity in the form of Con- science, but considering the matter from the scientific point of view, Reason cannot possibly escape the bonds of Karma, as it is an evolute of Gross Matter; and it is clear, that this inspiration must come from the Atman whioh is outside the Karma-world. In the same way, the expression 'Freedom of Will' used by Western scholars is not correct from the point of view of Vedanta philosophy ; because, as Desire or Will is an inherent tendency of the Mind, and as Reason, and along with Reason, the Mind, are, as stated in the eighth chapter, also the un-self-intelligible evolutes of Gross Matter in the shape of Karma, it ( the Mind ) cannot by itself escape the bondage of Karma. Therefore, Vedanta philosophy has laid down that true independence is not of the Mind, nor of the Reason, but of the Atman. It is not necessary for anybody

388 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

to give this independence to the Atman, nor can anyone 1 depiive the Atman of it. When the particle of the independent. Supreme Atman gets caught within an enclosure, it, of itself, and independently, gives an inspiration to the Mind and to- the Reason in manner mentioned above. If any one disregards- these inspirations of the internal organs ( antahkarana ), we must with the Saint Tukarama say :

Who has thereby lost anything ? I one has oneself done harm to oneself II

( Ga. 4448 )

The same principle has been referred to in the Gita in the- words "na Mnasty atman utmanam", i, e., "he who does not ruin himself, obtains the highest salvation"; and the same principle- has again been clearly repeated in the Dasabodha ( Gi. 13. 28 ; Dasa. 17. 7- 7-10 ). The fact that a man naturally feels that, he can do a particular thing independently, notwithstanding that he is tied down hand and foot by the laws of an apprently inpregnable Karma-world, cannot be explained in any way as satisfactorily as by concluding, as stated above, that the Brahman-world is different from the Gross Material world.. Therefore, that man who does not accept as correct the science of the Absolute Self, must either accept the position of the eternal slavery of mankind in this matter, or he must give up the question of the independence of inherent tendencies as unsolveable. I have explained the independence of inherent tendencies, or Freedom of Will, on the basis of the proposition of Non-Dualistic Vedanta, that the Jlvatman (personal Atman) and the Paramatman (Supreme Atman) are fundamentally uniform (Ve. Su. Sam. Bha, 2. 40). But for those who do not accept this Non-Dualistic doctrine, or when Dualism has to- be accepted in order to justify the Path of Devotion, it is said that this power of the Jlvatman is not its own power, but is received by it from the Paramesvara. But, in any case, it is always said that in order to acquire this power, the Jlvatman must first make the necessary effort, having regard to the- principle enunciated in the Eg-Veda, that "na rte sramtasya sakhyaya devah" (Rg. 4. 33. 11), i. e., "the gods do not help any one except the man who makes effort, until he is tired" ; and 1 -

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 389

the prinoiple of personal effort, and inferential!? the principle of the Freedom of the Atman, is left intact (Ve. Su. 2. 3. 41, 42 ; ■Gl. 10. 5 and 10). Nay, the Buddhists do not accept the theory of the Atman, or of the Parabrahman ; hut though they do not accept the theory of the Realisation of the Brahman or of the Atman, their religious treatises contain the advice that "attana (atmaiia) codayattanam" , i. e., "one must put oneself into the right path" ; and in support of that doctrine, it is said that :

atta (atrria) hi attano natho aita hi attano gati 1 fasma sanjamaya 'Itanam assafn (asvam) bhaddam va vaijijo II

(Dhammapada, 380).

that is, "one is the owner of oneself, and there is no other redeemer for oneself except one's Atman ; therefore, just as a merchant keeps under proper control his good horBe, so must one keep oneself under proper control"; and the importance and the existence of the freedom of the Atman is there shown in the same way as in the Glta. (See, Mahaparinibbana-sutta, 2. 33-35). The French Materialist Comte must also be included in this class ; because, although he does not accept the theory of the Absolute Self, yet, he has, as a matter of personal experience, that is to say, without any logical justification accepted the fact that every person can by his own efforts improve his conduct and his circumstances.

Although, it has in this way been proved that (i) the Realisation of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman is the most successful method for escaping the bonds of Karma, and acquiring the metaphysically perfect state of Realising that there is only one Atman in all created beings, and that (ii) it is within the control of everybody to acquire that Realisation, yet, we must also remember the second fact, that .even this independent Atman cannot get rid of this mill-stone ■of Prakrti round its neck in a moment. As, though an artisan is very skilful himself, he cannot do anything without imple- ments, and he has to spend sometime in repairing the imple- ments, if they are not in proper condition, so also is the case with the personal Self. It is true that the personal Self is free to give to the organs the inspiration to acquire Knowledge ; yet, scientifically, it is fundamentally quality less and isolated, or, as

390 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

stated above in the seventh chapter, it has eyes, hut is lame (Maitryu. 3. 2, 3; Gi. 13. 20) ; and therefore, it does not possess the implements which are necessary (e. g., the wheel, to a potter* etc. ) for doing a particular Action according to a particular inspiration. The Body, the Reason, and the other organs are evolutes of Matter. Therefore, the personal Self has got to bring about its own Release, through the medium of the bodily organs etc., which it has got according to its Commenced Action (prurabdlia-liarma). As the Reason is the most important organ among the bodily organs, the personal Self ( Jivatman ) has to first inspire the Reason, if it has to get anything done by any of the organs. But, having regard to one's inherent tendencies, which depend on previous Action, it is not certain that this Reason will always be pure and suttuika. And there, fore, in order that this Reason should be released from the meshes of three-constituented Matter, and become introspective- sutt'iiha, and Self -devoted ( atmanistlw, ), that is, such as will listen to the dictates inspired by the Self, and decide to perform only such Actions as are beneficial to the Self, one has to practise Renunciation (vairagya) for a considerable length of time. Even then, hunger, thirst, and other corporeal needs and those Accumulated (samcita) Actions, for the consequences of which one has begun to suffer, do not in any case leave one till death. Therefore, although the Atman is free to give to the corporeal organs the inspiration to perform Actions favourable to Release, yet, as all the subsequent Actions have to be performed through Matter, as a result of the superimposition of a corporeal body on the Atman, it (the Atman) is, to that extent, dependent, like a carpenter, a potter, or other artisans ; and, it has first to purify its implements, namely, the corporeal organs etc., and to keep them under its control (Ve. SQ. %, 3. 40). This thing cannot be achieved at once, and has to be acquired gradually and courageously ; otherwise, the organs will positively rear up on their haunches like a frightened horse. Therefore, the Blessed Lord has said that Reason needs the help of courage fdhrti) for acquiring control over the organs (Gi. 6. 25) ; and later on in the eighteenth chapter, dhrti has, in the same way as Reason, heen divided into the sattvilca, rajasa and tamaw classes (Gi. 18.

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 391

33-35). Out of these, one has to discard the rajasa and famasa stages, and to control the organs in order to make one's Reason sattvilca. Therefore, the place, method of sitting, and the food, proper for the performance of this Yoga in the form of practising control over the organs, have been described in the sixth chapter of the Glta. And, it is further stated in the Glta that when practice has been performed in this way sanaih, sanaik" (Gl. 6. 25), i. e., gradually, the Mind (titta} becomes steady, and the organs come under one's control ; and thereafter, after the lapse of a considerable length of time (not at once), one realises the identity of the Brahman and the Atman ; and by the acquisition of Knowledge, the bondage of Karma is broken : "atmavantam na karmarti rribadhnanti dlumanjaya", i. e., "such a person who has realised the Atman, cannot be bound by Karma (Gl. 4. 38-41). But, because the Blessed Lord has prescribed the practice of Yoga in solitude 1 (Gl. 6. 10), one must not understand the import of the Glta as being that one should give up all the activities in the world, and spend one's life in the practice of Yoga. Just as a merchant starts business with what little capital he has, and gradually acquires vast wealth by such business, so also is the case of the practice of Karma-Yoga prescribed in the Glta. This Karma- Yoga has got to be started by exercising as much control over the organs as is possible, and thereby, gradually, more and more of control over the organs is acquired. At tha same time, it is also not proper to always sit in a gossiping place ; because, thereby the habit of concentration, which has been acquired by the Mind, is likely to weaken. Therefore, when one is continually practising Karma- Yoga, it is necessary to spend sometime every day or at intervals in solitude (Gi. 13. 10). But, the Blessed Lord nowhere says, that for that purpose one should give up one's ordinary activities in life. On the other hand, this control of the organs has been prescribed in order that one Bhould be able to perform one's activities in life with a desireless frame of mind, and the advice of the Glta is, that while control of the organs is being practised, one must simultaneously, continually, and according to one's own abilities, practise the desireless Karma-Yoga, and not wait till one has acquired complete control over the .organs.

GlTA-RAHASYA or KARMA-YOGA

According to the Maitryupanisad and the Mahabharata, one «an acquire equability of Reason within sis months, if one is intelligent and determined (Maitryu. 6. 28 ; Ma. Bha. San. 239. 32 ; Asva. Anugita. 19.66). But, a doubt is likely to be Taised here, that this sattvika, equable, and Self -devoted frame of the Mind, which has been described by the Blessed Lord, may not be acquired by some, as a result of their inherent nature, even in six years, to say nothing of six months; and that, if this practice remains incomplete, not only will perfection or Release not be reached in this life, but the practice will have to be started from its very commencement in the next birth ; and, if the practice in this next birth also remains incomplete, as in in the previous births, such a person will never acquire perfection. And, on that account, it is also likely to be believed that one must learn to acquire the non-subjective and non-objective mental absorption ( nirvikalpa-samadhi*) by practising the Patanjala Yoga before starting the practice of the Karma-Yoga. Arjuna was beset by this very doubt, and he has in the sixth chapter of the Gita ( Gl. 6. 37-39 ) asked Sri Krsna, what a man should do in these circumstances. To this question, the Blessed Lord has replied that, as the Atman is immortal, the impressions received by it in this life through the Subtle Body, whatever they may be, are not destroyed ; and that such a 'yogabhrasta (apostate from Yoga), that is, one who has abandoned the Karma-Yoga without having completely acquired it, starts his efforts in the next birth from the point where he has left off in this birth; and that, in this way, gradually "anekajanmasamsiddhas tato yati param gatim" ( Gl. 6. 45 ), i. e., "he ultimately acquires perfection after many births, and obtains Release". The statement in the second chapter that "svalpam apj asya dharmasya trayate mahato bhayat" ( Gl. 2. 40 ), i. e., "even a little practice of this method, that is, of the Karma-Yoga, redeems a person from great danger", is with reference to this proposition. In short, although the

• 'nirmkalpa-mmadhi' U defined in Apte's San.-k.nt dictionary

as; <'an exelusiva contemplation upon the one entity without the distinction and eepaiate consciousness of the Kaover, the Known and the Knowing, and without even self-consciousness ( Apte, 3rd Edition, 1924 )— Translator.

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 393

Atman of a person is fundamentally independent, yet, as a result of the impure inherent nature of the Body, which a ..person has acquired as a result of his previous ActionB, it ia not possible for him to acquire complete Release in one life. But on that account, "nfitmanam avamanyeta purvabhirasamrddhi- ,bhih" ( Manu. 4. 137 ), i. e. "no one should despair, nor should •one waste one's whole life in practising the Patanjala-Yoga, that is, the mere gymnastic exercise of the organs, by a foolish insistence that one will acquire complete Release in one life"- The Blessed Lord has said in the Glta, that there is no haste where the Atman is concerned; that, one should acquire as much Yogic strength as can possibly be acquired in this life, and .start the praotice of Karma- Yoga; that thereby, the Mind gradually becomes more and more sattvika, and pure ; that, not ■only this small practice of the Karma-Yoga, but even the mere desire to practise it, will forcibly push forward a man as if he had been put into a grinding mill, and ultimately oause ■the complete merger of the Atman into the Brahman, if not to-day, to-morrow, and in the next birth, if not in this birth ; that, therefore, even the smallest practice of the Karma-Yoga, ■ or even the desire to practice it, is never wasted ; and that this is the most important characteristic f bature of the Karma-Yoga ( See my Commentary on Gl. 6. 15. ). One must not restrict •one's attention to this life, and give up coinage, but should continue one's practice of performing desireless Action, independently, courageously, and according to one's own abilities. This bondage of Matter which one considers to be indissoluble in this life or to-day, as a result of pre-destination •( praktana-samskara ) will become gradually and automatically loose, by the gradually increasing practice of Karma-Yoga ; and when this goes on for some time, "bahunam janmamm ante jnanavan mam prapadyate" (Gl. 7. 19 ), — sometime or otheri as a result of the complete acquisition of Knowledge, the bondage of or the dependence on Matter is broken, and the Atman at last acquires its fundamental or perfect qualityless free state, or Release. What is impossible for a man ? The well-known proverb, 'if a man performs the proper duties of 'manhood, he will become the same as the Narayana', is only a repetition of this proposition of Vedanta ; and, it is on this

394 GlTA-RAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

very account that the writer of the Yoga-Vasistha has, in the chapter dealing with those who desire Release ( mumuhsu )»■ praised the worth of Effort, and laid down the firm proposition, that by Effort everything is ultimately achieved (Yo. %. 4. 10-18)., Although it has in this way been definitely proved, that the personal Self is fundamentally free to make the effort of acquiring Knowledge, and that by ceaseless effort based on self-dependence, it, sometime or other, escapes from the clutches of pre-destined (praktana) Karma, yet, it remains to give some' further explanation as to what is meant by the annihilation of Karma (karma-hsaya), and when it takes place, 'karma- ksaya' means the total, that is, the balanceless release from the bonds of Karma. But, as has been stated before, though a man may have acquired Knowledge, yet, in as much as he does not escape Karma (Action) in the form of drinking, eating,, sleeping, sitting, etc. so long as his body lives, and, in as much as his Commenced (prarabdha) Karma is not annihilated' otherwise than by suffering, he cannot determine to destroy his body by suicide. Therefore, although all the Karma done before the acquisition of Knowledge is annihilated by the acquisition of Knowledge, yet, the soient has to perform some Karma or other, so long as he is alive, even after the acquisition of Knowledge. Then, how is he to be released from this- Karma ? ; and, if there is no such Telease, there is no- annihilation of the previous Karma, nor is there any Release (moksa) later on. The answer of Vedanta philosophy to this doubt is, that although Karma, in the shape of Names and' Forms, does not at any time leave the Name-d and Form-ei body of a scient, yet, in as much as the Atman is competent to adopt or reject such Karma, a man can, by conquering his organs and destroying the Attachment, which exists in the case of every living being towards the Karma, so to say, kill the sting of Karma, though he may be performing it. Karma is inherently blind, lifeless (acetana), and dead. It does not by itself either catch hold of or leave anybody ; inherently, it is neither good nor bad. But, a man, by allowing his Self to get entangledi in this Karma, giveB it the character of good or bad, beneficial or malefic, by his Attachment (asakti). Therefore, when this; Attachment in the shape of a feeling of mine-ness (mamatva}-

EFFECT OB 1 KARMA, AND FREE WILL 395

comes to an. end, the bondage of Karma may be said to> be broken; then let that Karma remain or not remain. On the basis of this proposition, it is stated in the Gita in several places that : true abstention from Action ( naiskarmya ) consists in this, and not in the abandonment of Action ( Gi. 3. 4 ) ; your jurisdiction extends to the performance of Action, you cannot control getting or not getting the fruit of the Action ( Gi. 2. 47 ); "karmendriyaih karmayogam asaklah" (Gi. 3. 7 ), i. e., "let the organs of Action perform their various Actions without entertaining any hope for the fruit"; tyaktm karmaphalasangam" ( Gi. 4. 20 ), i. e., "having given up the fruit of Action"; sarvabhutaimabhii'atma kuruann api na lipyate" ( Gi. 5. 7 ), i. e.» "that man, whose mind has become equable towards all created things, is not bound by Actions, though he may perform them"; "sarvakarmaphalatyagam kuru" ( Gi. 12. 11 ), i. e., "give up the fruit of all Actions"; "karyam ity eva yat karma myatam kriyate" ( Gi. 18. 9 ), i. e., "those who perform whatever Action befalls them, looking upon it as a duty, are satlmka"; "cetasa sarva- karmani mayi smhnyasya" (Gi. 18. 57), i. e., "dedicate all Actions to- Me when you act". The question whether or not the scient should perform all Actions which arise in life, is an independent question ; and the doctrine of the Gita on that point will be considered in the next chapter. We have, for the present, to ■ consider only what is the real meaning of the dictum that all Karma is reduced to ashes by Jfiana ; and from the quotations from the Gita which have been given above, the opinion of the Gita, on this question becomes quite clear. We apply this logical argument everywhere in ordinary life. For instance,, if a person unintentionally gives a push to another person, we- do not call him a rowdy; and, even under the criminal law, death caused by mere accident is not looked upon as murder. If fire burns a house, or a deluge washes away a field, does one consider the fire or the rain as criminals ? If one considers only Action by itself, there will be found in every act some or other fault, defect, or evil, from the point of view of the human being ; because, "sarvararnbha hi dosena dhumenagvir ivavrtah" (Gi. 18. 48), i. e., "just as fire is enveloped in smoke, so- also is all Action ( arambha ) enveloped in some fault or other". But the fault which the Gita advises one to

396 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

.give up, is not this fault. The Gita, has laid down that the evil or virtue, which we ascribe to any particular Action of a man, doeB not lie in the Action itself, but depends on the frame of mind of the man who does it ; and, from this point of view, eliminating the evilness from an Action, meanB the doer of the Action keeping his Reason or Mind pure (Gl. 2. 49-51); and, even in the Upanisads, importance is attached to the Reason of the person who performs the Action, aB follows :

nana eva manusyaijam karanam bandhamoksayoh l bandhaya visayasangi mokse mrvisayam smrtam II

( Maitryu. 6. 34 ; Amrtabindu. 2 )

that is: "the mind of a man is the only (eva) cause for his being bound Iby Karma) or being Released; when the mind is enslaved by objects of pleasure, it is bound; and when it goes beyond those objects (becomes niroisaya ), that is, when it becomes desireless {niskama), or unattached (nihsanga), that is Release". The Bhagavadglta has principally stated in what way one can acquire this equability of the mind by the Realisation of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman; and when this state of mind has been acquired, Action is totally destroyed, notwithstanding that it is performed. Karma is not destroyed by becoming homeless (niragm), that is, by Renunciation (samnyasa), and by giving up sacrificial ritual to fire etc; nor by remaining Actionless (akriya), that is, by remaining idle without performing any Action whatsoever (Gi. 6. 1). Whether a man desires it or no, the wheel of Matter will go on; and, therefore, man must also move round and round with it (Gi. 3. 33; 18. 60). But, that man, who does not dance as a dependent on Matter like an ignorant person, but keeps his mind steady and pure by control of the organs and performs all Action, which befalls him in the ordinary course of life, as a duty merely, and calmly, and without allowing his mind to become attached, is the true . ■ emotionless (virakta) man, the true Steady-in-Mind (sthitaprajna), and one, who may be said to be truly merged in the Brahman {GI. 3. 7; 4. 21 ; 5. 7-9; 18. 11.). A scient may perhaps renounce the world, and give up the Action of ordinary life, and go and

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 397

sit in a forest ; but it is wrong to imagine that by his having, .

in this way, abandoned the duties of ordinary life, he has

annihilated them (GT. 3. 4). One must bear in mind the

principle that whether he performs Actions or not, the

annihilation of his Karma is the result of his having attained

equability of mind, and not of his having abandoned, or of

his not performing, Action. For explaining the true nature of

the annihilation of Karma, the illustration given in the •

XIpanisads and in the Gita (Chan. 4. 14. 3 ; Gl. 5. 10), that the

scient, that is, one who performs Actions by dedicating them

to the Brahman, or without Attachment, is not touched by

Karma, in the same way as water being on the leaf of the lotus

flower does not adhere to it, is more appropriate, than the

illustration that Karma is burnt by Knowledge, in the same

way as fuel is burnt by fire. Karma is essentially never burnt, .

nor is it at all necessary to burn it. If Karma is Name and

Form, and if Name and Form means the visible world, then

how is this visible world to be burnt up?; and, assuming for

the sake of argument that it is burnt, then, according to the

theory of Satkarya-vada, the utmost that can happen, is that its

Name and Form will be changed. As Name-d and Form-ed

Karma or Maya changes eternally, man cannot totally destroy

this Name-d and Form-ed Karma, however much of a Self-

knower he may become, though he may, as he wills, bring

about a change in the Name and Form ; and such a thing can

be done only by the Paramesvara (Ve. Su, 4. 4. 17). But, the

seed of goodness or evilness, which did not exist inherently

in this gross Karma, and which a man instills into it by his

feeling of mine-ness, can be destroyed by him ; and what has ■

to he burnt up by him, is this seed. That man alone who has

burnt this seed of mine-nbss in his ordinary activities, by

maintaining an equable frame of mind towards all created

things, is the Blessed, the Accomplished (krtakrtya), and the

Released ; and his Karma is Baid to have been burnt by the

fire of Knowledge, though he may be performing all Actions

( Gl. 4. 19 ; 18. 56 ). In as much as the being burnt up of

Karma in this way is entirely dependent on the Mind being .

free from objects of pleasure, and on the Realisation of the -

identity of the Brahman and the Atman, no time is lost in .

398 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

such Realisation performing its function of destroying Karma, in the same way as fire begins to exercise its function of burning, the moment it comes into existence. The moment Realisation comes, Karma is immediately destroyed. Neverthe- less, the moment of death is considered to be mora important than all other times in this matter, because death is the las't moment in a man's life ; and, though the Ohcommenced Accumulated Karma may have been destroyed by previous Realisation, yet the Commenced (prarabdha) Karma is not destroyed. Therefore, if this Realisation of the Brahman does .not continue till the end, the good or bad Actions which may have been performed in the meantime as a result of Commenced Karma, will become desireful (sakama), and one will not be able to escape having to take a fresh birth to suffer their consequences. It is true that that man who has become really Released from birth (jhnnmukta) is not subject to this fear. But, when one is considering this subject-matter scientifically, one has also to consider the possibility that the Knowledge of the Brahman, which has been acquired before death, may not continue till the end. Therefore, philosophers consider the exact moment of death as of greater importance than the time before death ; and they say that the Realisation of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman must necessarily take place at that moment, that is, at the moment of death ; and that other- wise Release is not possible. On the basis of this theory the Gita, on the authority of the TJpanisads, states that : "by remembering Me at the moment of dpsth, and Realising that there is no other than I, the man is Released" (Gl. 8. 5). According to this proposition it follows that, any man, who has spent the whole of his life in evil deeds, will become Released by Realising the Paramesvara at the moment of death, which, according to some, is not correct; but, if one considers the matter carefully, it will be seen that there is nothing wrong in it. The man who has spent the whole of his life in evil deeds cannot acquire purity of mind, and Realise the Brahman at the moment of death. As in all other matters, it is necessary to acquire the habit of devoting the Mind to the Brahman; and, it will be very •difficult, nay impossible, for the man who has not even once

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 399

in his lifetime Realised the identity of the Brahman and the Atman, to get that experience suddenly at the moment of •death. Therefore, the second important teaching of the Glta "in this matter is, that everyone should continually carry on the practice of abstracting his mind from the objects of pleasure, so that there is no difficulty in that state of mind being present at the moment of death, and the man being thereby ultimately Released ( Gl. 8. 6,7 and 2, 72). But, for critically examining this philosophical doctrine, let us suppose that someone, as a result of the impressions of previous lives, Realises the Paramesvara suddenly only at the moment of death. No doubt, the case of such a man will be perhaps one in a hundred thousand, nay, one in a million; but, we have to disregard the fact that such a case is difficult to come across, and to consider for the present what will happen if .such a case actually takes place. As Realisation has come to such a man, though only at the moment of death, the Uncom- menced Karma of such a man is destroyed, and the Commenced Karma comes to an end at the moment of death by its having been suffered for in this life. Therefore, such a man has no Karma left which has to be suffered for; and, it then necessarily follows, that he becomes free from all Karma, that is, from the cycle of life (samsara). This proposition has been expounded in the Glta, in the stanza: "api est suduracaro bhajate mam amnyabhak" , i. e., "even a great evil-doer will be released, if he worships the Paramesvara with the idea that there is no one else to worship"; and it has been accepted even by the other religions of the world. It may be borne in mind that the word 'awmyabhava signifies the state of mind of a person, whose mind is fully merged in the Paramesvara, and the person who 6imply utters the words "Rama, Rama" by the mouth, while his mind is engaged somewhere else, is not meant. In short the importance of the Realisation of the Paramesvara is such that the moment it comes, all the Uncommenced Accumulated Karma is destroyed at a stroke. Whenever this state of Mind comes, it is welcome ; but our philosophers have concluded that it is essential that such a state should continue in existence at the moment of death, or, if one has not acquired that Realisation before death, that one

400 GlTA-RAHASSA OR KARMA-TOGA

should acquire it at least at the moment of death ; otherwise,. some desire or other will remain in balance at that moment,- and re-birth will not be averted ; and if re-birth is not averted,. Release (mokm) also becomes impossible.

We have so far dealt with the questions, what the bondage of Karma is; what is meant by the destruction of Karma ; and how that is brought about, and when. Now, I will shortly consider the state in which those persons who have not escaped the bondage of Karma, and destroyed the consequences of Karma find themselves after death, according to the Vedic religion, and close this chapter. This question has been dealt with at great length in the Upanisads (See Chan. 4. 15 ; 5. 10«- Br 6. 2. 2. 16 ; Kau. 1. 2. 3). And all these Upanisads have been harmonised in the third pada of the fourth chapter of the Vedanta-SQtras. But, it is not necessary to go into the whole of that discussion here, and we have only to consider the two courses which are mentioned in the Bhagavadglta (Gi. 8. 23-27). The Vedic religion is divided into two well-known divisions, Karma-Kanda and Jnana-Kanda. The original meaning of the Karma-Kanda out of these, is the worship of the Sun, Fire, India, Varuna, Rudra and other Vedic deities by sacrificial ritual, and obtaining children and grand-children, and cows, horses, or other wealth in this life, and a happy state after death by the grace of those deities. As at the present day, this- sacrificial ritual of the Srutis has more or less ceased to exist v people devote themselves to the worship of God, and to the meritorious Actions, like charity etc., enjoined by the Sastras, in order to achieve this object. But, it is clear from the Rg-Veda that in ancient times, people used to worship these deities by sacrificial ritual not only for personal benefit, but also for the benefit of the community ; because, the Suktas in the Rg-Veda are full of praise of the deities Indra etc., whose favour had to be acquired for these purposes; and everywhere we come across prayers like "0 God 1 give us children and wealth"; "make us live a hundred years"; "do not kill us, or our children or our warriors, or our cattle"."" As these ritualistic practices

• These prayers are to be come across in many places but instead

of mentioning all ol them, I Trill only mention the prayer which is-

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 401

are common to the three Vedas, this course of worship was known in ancient times as 'trayi dharma; and there is a detailed description in the Brahmanas as to the way in which they are to be performed. But, as the ritual prescribed for these various sacrifices was different in the different Brahmanas, doubts arose as to which one was correct. Therefore, Jaimini has made a collection of explanatory rules for bringing about harmony between these mutually contradictory ritualistic directions. The rules laid down by Jaimini are known as 'Mlmarhsa-Sutras' or the 'Purva-Miraarhsa'; and, therefore, the ancient Karma-kanda came later on to acquire the name of the 'Mlmarbsaka-marga'; and, as that name is still in vogue v I have made use of it on various occasions in this book. But, it must be remembered that though the word 'mlmamsa' came into vogue only in later timeB, this Karma-marga of sacrificial ritual has been current from very ancient times. The word 'mimamsa' occurs nowhere in the Gita, and that is why wa find in it the words 'trayi dharmi" (Gi. 9. 20-21), or, 'trayl-vidya' instead, Aranyakas and Upanisads are v artJc treatises, later in point of time than the Brahmanas, wL"c^ describe the sacrificial ritual laid down by the Srutis. As thest. treatises maintain that sacrificial ritual is inferior, and that th& Knowledge of the Brahman is superior, the religion described in these later works is known as 'Jnana-kanda'. Yet, as the different Upanisads contain different ideas, it was also necessary to harmonise them. This has been done by Badarayanacarya in his Vedanta-Sufcras, which are also known as the Brahma-Sutras, or the Sarlra-Sutras or the Uttara-Mlraarhsa. In this way, the Purva-Mlmamsa and the Uttara-Mimamsa are at present the two treatises which deal with the Karma-kanda and the Jnana- kanda respectively. Strictly speaking, both these works funda- mentally discuss the meanings of Vedic expressions, that is to say, of the Mlmamsa ; yet, it is usual to refer to the followers of the Karma-kanda as 'Mlmarhsakas', and to the followers of the Jnana-kanda as 'Vedantins'. The followers of the Karma- kanda! that is to say, the Mlmarhsakas say that the observance come ajruss in eVory day worship, nausiy, /no nasloke tcmaye ma no ai/au ma no goju ma no ahesu rWijah | vlran ma no rudra Ifiamito vadhir havifmantuh sadamittva havamah \\ ( Pg. 1. ]14. 8 )

51-52

402 GITA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

■of the four months, and of the sacrificial ritual, such as, the Jyotistoma-yajna, etc. are the important doctrines of the Sruti Teligion; and that according to the Vedas, he alone will acquire Release who performs that Karma, Whoever he may be, he must not give up this sacrificial Karma; and if he does so, he must be taken to have abandoned the Sruti religion; because, the Vedic sacrificial ritual was created at the same time as the Universe, and the virtuous circle of men performing it and pleasing the deities, and the deities in return producing rain and the other things needed by men, has been going on from times immemorial. At present, we do not attach much importance to these ideas, because the Sruti religion of sacrificial Titual is not now in vogue. But, as the state of things was ■different at the time of the Gita, the importance of this circle of sacrifice has been described as above in the Bhagavadglta ■( G5. 3. 16-25 ). Nevertheless, it becomes clear from the Gita, that as a result of the Knowledge conveyed in the Upanisads this Karma ritual had even then acquired an inferior place from the point of view of Release (2. 41-46); and this inferiority has k.irtased late, on by the growth of the doctrine of non- sacrifice "' :' .jsa). It is clearly mantioned in the Bhagavata teligion, that although sacrificial ritual is prescribed by the Vedas, the appurtenant slaughter of animals is not a proper thing, and that the ritual should be performed by offering only grain ( Ma. Bha. San. 336. 10 and 337 ). On that account, < and also to soma extent, because the Jains later on raised the same kind of objection), the ritual prescribed by the Srutis has at present reached such a state, that persons who keep burning a perpetual fire as prescribed by the Srutis ( that is. agnihotris) are rarely to be come across even in sacred places like Benares, and one hears that somebody has performed an animal sacrifice like the Jyotistoma, only sometimes in 20 or 25 years. Yet, as the Sruti religion is the root of all Vedic religion, the respect felt for it still continues, and the Sutras of Jaimini have become authoritative as a science explaining its meaning. But, although the Sruti ritual has in this way fallen into the back-ground, the other ritual mentioned in Sinrtis like the Manu-Smrti etc.— which is known as the five principal sacrifi- cial rites ( pafica mafiayajaa )— is still in vogue; and the same

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 403

argument is applied to them as to the cycle of sacrificial ritual prescribed by the Srutis mentioned above. For instance, Manu and other Smrti writers have mentioned five daily aaorifioial rites to be performed at home, which do not entail the slaughter of animals, namely, the study of the Vedas as a brahma-yajfia, oblations to the ancestors as a pitr-yajna, oblations into the fire as a deva-yajOa, offering of food as bali as a bhuta-yajfia, and entertaining guests as a maausya-yajna; and the ritual prescribed for a man in the state of a householder is, that he should partake of food after he has in this way satisfied respectively the Rsis, the ancestors, the deities, the spirits of the departed, and men, by these five sacrifices. ( Manu. 3. 68-123). The food whioh remains over after the performance of these sacrifices is known as 'amrta', and the food whioh remains over after everybody has eaten is known as 'vighasa' .(Manu. 3. 285). The 'amrta' and the 'vighasa' is the proper and beneficial food for the householder; and it is stated not only in

• he Manu-Smrti, but also in the Rg-Veda and in the Glta, that

if a person does not follow this precept, but eats food only by himself, he eats 'agha' or sin, and he is to be known as 'aghast' i Rg. 10. 117. 6; Manu. 3. 118; Gi. 3. 13). Besides, these five prinoipal sacrifices, the Upanisads and the Smrtis also consider other acts which are productive of publio benefit, such as, charity, truth, kindness, and non-slaughter as proper for the householder ■( Tai. 1. 11 ); and, in these texts we find the clear statement : "prajatantum ma vyavacehetsih", i. e., "enlarge thy family, and iperpetuate thy generation." All these Actions are looked upon as a kind of sacrifice, and the Taittiriya-Saihhita explains the reason for performing them by saying that a Brahmin comes to birth with three kinds of indebtedness, namely, to the IRsis, to the deities, and to his ancestors. Of these, the .indebtedness to the Rsis must be satisfied by the study of ithe Vedas; the indebtedness to the deities, by sacrifice ; and the indebtedness to the ancestors, by procreation ; otherwise, there is no Release for him ( Tai. Sam. 6. 3. 10. 5 ).*

• The statement in the Taittirlya Samhita is as follows :

"'jiyamcmo vai brahmanas tribhir rmm jayate brahmaearyena Tjibhyo ynjnem devshhyah prajaya pitrbhyah e}« va anrw yah putri ifljt/i hrahmadari vasiti. "

404 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

There is a story in the Adiparva of the Mahabharata thatr Jaratkaru did not follow this precept but started austere religious practices before marrying; that, as a result of his having thus destroyed his possible children, he saw bis ancestors named Yayavara dangling in the air; and that, in. performance of their injunctions, he later on married. ( Ma, Bha. A. 13). It is not that all this Karma or sacrifice is to be performed only by Brahmins; and as even women and Sudras are competent to perform all other Karma, except the Vedic sacrificial ritual, all the Karma performed according to the classification of the four castes made by the writers of the Smrtis — e. g., warfare by Ksatriyas etc. — is also a YAJNA. (sacrifice); and the word YAJNA has been used in this comprehensive meaning in these texts. Manu has said that whatever is proper for anyone, is his religious austerity. (TAPA), (11. 236); and it is stated in the Mahabharata that:

urambliayajnuh lesatras ca haviryajna visah smrtah I paricarayajiiah sUdraS ca japayajm dvijalayah II

( Ma. Bha. San. 237. 12 )'

that is "aratiibha (industry), havi (corn etc), service, and prayer- are the four Yajnas, which are proper for the Ksatriyas, the- Vaisyas, the Sudras, and the Brahmins respectively. In short,, as Brahmadeva has created all the human beings in the world and with great propriety prescribed for them their various duties (Karma) in life (Ma. Bha. Anu. 48. 3; and Gi. 3. 10 and 4. 32),. all the Kansas enjoined by the Sastras for the four classes, are Yajnas in a way; and if all these Yajnas or Sastra-enjoined 1 Karma, or trades, or duties are not kept going by everybody according to his own status, the entire community will suffer, and will ultimately run the risk of being destroyed. It, therefore, follows that Yajnas, in this comprehensive meaning, are always necessary for public benefit.

Here a question arises as follows: — as this course of life, in which predominance is given to Yajnas, and which is proper for the householder according to the Vedas and according to the arrangement of the four oastes made by the Smrtis, is nothing but the performance of Karma, will a man, who performs this household Karma properly in the manner

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FEBE WILL 405

prescribed by the SSstras, that is, morally, and according to Sastric injunction, thereby escape the cycle of birth and death? And if he escapes that cyole, then where is the importance of Jfiana? The Jfiana-kanda and the Upanisads olearly say that unless a man realises the identity of the Brahman and the Atman, and acquires apathy towards Karma, he will not escapB the cycle of birth and death, or from the Name-d and Form-ed Maya or Illusion; and if one considers the religion laid down by the Srutis and the Smrtis, it will be seen that Karma predominates the life of everybody, which (life) is nothing but a Yajfia in its comprehensive meaning. Besides, it is clearly stated in the Vedas themselves, that no Karma performed for the sake of Yajna, creates bondage, and that heaven is attained only by the performance of Yajnas. Even if the question of heaven is kept aside, Brahmadeva himself has laid down the rule that rain does not fall unless India and other deities are kept satisfied, and the deities are not satisfied except by the performance of a Yajna. Then, what esoape is there for anybody, unless he performs Yajnas or Karma ? The ■chain of creation has been described by Manu, and in the Mahabharata, the Upanisads, and even in thd Gita as follows:-

agnau prastahutih samyag adityam upatisthate l adityaj jayate vrstir vrster armam tatah prajah H

that is, "when the material sacrified in the Yajna reaohes the Sun through the medium of the fire, the Sun causes rain, rain causes food, and the food causes living beings" ( Manu. 3. 76 ; Ma. Bha. San. 262. 11; Maitryu. 6. 37; and Gi. 3. 14). And if these Yajnas are to be performed by Karma, how will it do •to give up Karma? If the Karma in the shape of Yaj&as is given up, the wheel of the world will come to a stop, and nobody will have anything to eat. The answer of the Bhagavata doctrine and of the Gita science to this objection is, that they do not ask anybody to give up the sacrificial ritual ( Yajna) prescribed by the Vedas, or any other Karma in the shape of Yajfia prescribed by the Smrtis or performed in ordinary life; that they accept the argument that if this cycle of Yajnas, which has been going on from times immemorial is ■stopped, the world will become desolate ; and that, therefore,

406 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGa

they also lay down the proposition that nobody should give up.' Yajnas which entail Karma ( Ma. Bha. San. 340; Gi. 3. 16. ). Nevertheless, it has been clearly stated in the Jnana-kanda,. that is, in the TJpanisads themselves, that unless Karma is- destroyed by Jfiana and Renunciation, there can be no Release:. and therefore, they harmonise both these propositions and come to the conclusion that all Actions or Karma must be performed,. giving up the desire for the fruit or reward, and desirelessly or with an apathetic frame of mind ( Gi. 17-19). If one performs the sacrifices, such as, the Jyotistoma etc., prescribed- by the Vedas, with a frame of mind which entertains the hope- of heaven, one will undoubtedly reach heaven; because, what is laid down in the Vedas cannot be false; yet, in as much as heaven is not permanent, the Upanisads themselves say that:

prapyantam Icarmanas tasya yat ldmceha karotyayam l tasmal lokat pumrety asmai lokaya karmaim* II that is,"when the fruit of meritorious Action in the shape of sacrifices etc. performed in this life, is exhausted by enjoyment in heaven, the orthodox performer of the Yajfia has to come back once more from heaven to this Karma-world or earth." (Br. 4.4, 6; Ve. Su. 3. 1. 8: Ma. Bha. Vana. 360. 39); and even. the way of coming down from heaven is described in the Chandogyopanisad ( 5. 10. 3-9 ). The following slightly derogatory statements in the Bhagavadgita, namely,. "kamatmajiah svargaparah" ( Gi. 2. 43), ( i. e., "desire-filled, persons running after heaven" — Trans.), or "traigunyavisaya vedah" (Gi. 2. 45), (i. e., "the Vedas, which deal with matters relating to the three constituents" — Trans.), have been made with reference to these orthodox persons; and it is again clearly stated in the ninth chapter that: "gatagatam kumakania labhante" (Gi. 9. 21), i.e., "such persons have to move backwards and forwards between the heaven and this world". This moving backwards and forwards cannot be escaped otherwise than by the acquisition of Knowledge; and unless these transi-

• In reading the second part of this stauza. ' punaretyasmai '

should be broken up as 'punanii' and 'asmai\ so that the requisite number of letters will not be found wanting. One has to do thi& very often in reading Vedic treatises.

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FEEE WILL 407 j

tions are over, the Atman does not get true bliss, perfection, or Release. Therefore, the summary of the advice given in the Glta to everybody is, that one should perform not only the sacrificial ritual etc., but also all other acts prescribed for the four different castes, realising the identity of the Brahman and the Atman, and with equability of mind, and unattachedly,. so that one will keep going the cycle of Karma and at the same time be Released ( Gi. 18. 5, 6.). It is not that a Yajna or sacrifice is performed merely by uttering the word "idamamuka. devatiiyai m mama" (i. e., "this is for such and such a deity and not for me" — Trans.) with reference to some deity, and offering' sesamum, rice, or animals into the sacrificial fire. It is more meritorious to offer up animal tendencies like, Desire, Anger etc., which are in everybody's body, by way of sacrifice into. the fire of mental control in the shape of an equable frame of mind, than to slaughter the animals themselves ( Gi. 4 33 ) > and it is in support of this proposition, that the Blessed Lord has said both in the Gita and in the Narayaniya-Dharma that ; "from among the sacrifices, I am the sacrifice in the shape of prayer", that is, the highest form of sacrifice ( Gi. 10. 25; Ma. Bha. San. 3. 37.); and the Manu-Smrti says, that by continual prayer a Brahmin attains Release, whether he does anything else or not (Manu. 2. 87). The most important element in a Yajna is the giving up of the idea of mine-ness (rnamatm) with, reference to the object thrown into the sacrificial fire, by uttering the words: 'na mama' (i. e., 'this is not for me'), at the time of the throwing; and the same is the underlying import of charity etc. Charitable gifts stand on the same footing as sacrificial Yajfias. In short, one may say that doing a particular Karma, in which there is no selfish purpose, with a pure frame of mind, is a Yajna in itself. When one accepts this definition, of a Yajfia, all acts done with a selfless and desireless frame of mind become a great Yajfia in a comprehensive meaning, and the doctrine of the MImamsa school that no act performed for the purpose of a Yajfia becomes a source of bondage, which has reference to sacrifice of wealth, applies to all desireless actions. And as, in performing these actions, the desire of fruit has also been given up, the man has not to move like a shuttle between heaven and earth, and he ultimately aoquires

408 GlTl-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

the blissful state of Release, though lie may be performing all that Karma (Gi. 3. 9). In short, although samsUra (life) entails the performance of Karma or Yajfia, the performers fall into two divisions, namely, those who go through life (samara) in the manner prescribed by the Sastras, but with the desire of reward (the orthodox ritualists), and those who go through life with a desireless frame of mind, and merely as a duty (the scients). And the doctrine of the Gita, is, that persons falling in the first of these divisions, that is to say, the pure orthodox ritualists, obtain non-permanent fruit in the shape of heaven ete., whereas the others, that is, the Jflanins who perform all Actions by Jnana or with a desireless frame of mind, obtain permanent reward in the shape of Release. The Gita nowhere asks us to give up Karma for the sake of Release. On the other hand, it is clearly stated in the commencement of the eighteenth chapter that the word 'tyaga'=givingup, has been used everywhere in the Gita as meaning not the denunciation of Action, but the Renunciation of the reward of Action.

As the fruits of Action which are obtained by the orthodox ritualists and by the scients following the Karma-Yoga, are in this way different, those persons have to go to different spheres by different paths after their death; and these paths are respectively known as 'pitryaya ' and 'devayana' (San. 17. 15, 16) ; and these two paths are described in the eighth chapter of the Gita on the basis of the Upanisads. The man who has acquired Knowledge— and he must have acquired this Know- ledge at least at the moment of death— (Gi. 2. 72) goes and reaches the sphere of the Brahman, after his body has fallen and has been burnt in fire, through that fire, passing through the flames, daylight, the bright half of the month and the six months of the ultarayaija; and as he attains Release there, he does not take birth again and come back to this mortal world ; but, that man, who has been a mere orthodox performer of ritual and has not acquired Knowledge, reaches the sphere of the Moon, through the smoke of the same fire, and through night, and the dark half of the month, and the six months of the daksirtayam ; and when he has enjoyed the reward of all the meritorious Actions, which he has performed, he again

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FEEE WILL 409

returns to this world. This is the difference between the two paths (Gl. 8. 23-27). As the Upanisads use the word'araV (flame) instead of ' jyotih ' (flame), the first path is also called ' arciradi ', and the second path is called ' dhumradi '. When one hears in mind the terminology that our uttarayaya (period during which the Sun is seen moving towards the North) is the day of the deities living on the North Pole, and our daksinayana (when the Sun is seen moving towards the South) is their night, it becomes quite clear that the first out of these two paths, namely, 'arciradi' ( jyotiradi) is lighted from beginning to end, and that the other one or the dhumradi is one of darkness throughout. In as much as Jfiana (Know- ledge) is an embodiment of light, and the Parabrahman is "jyotisam jyotih" (Gl. 13. 17), i. e., "the brilliance of all brilliance", it is only proper that the path taken by the scients (Jnanins) after death should be lighted; and the adjectives 'sukla ' (white) and 'krsna ' (black) used in the Glta with reference to these two paths, mean that they are respectively lighted and dark. The Glta. does not mention the stages sub- sequent to the uttarayaw, but the Nirukta of Yaska contains a description of the spheres of the Gods, the Sun, the lightning, and the mental Purusa, which come after the uttarayaria (Nirukta 14. 9) ; and the descriptions of the devayana given in the various Upanisads are harmonised in the Vedanta- Siitras in which all the subsequent stages after the vttarayana, namely, the year (samvatsara), the spheres of the air, the Sun, the Moon, lightning, Varuna, Indra, PrajSpati, and ultimately, the sphere of the Brahman are described (Br, 5. 10 ; 6. 2. 15 ; Chan. 5. 10 ; Kausl. 1. 3. ; Ve. Su. 4. 3. 1-6).

I have thus far given the description of the various stages in the devayana and the pitryana paths ; but as the stages of the ■day, the bright half of the month, and the uttarayana among them commonly denote Time, the questions which next arise are whether the devayana and the pitryana have or at any time had or had not, any reference to Time. Although the words, ■day, night, bright half of the month etc. denote Time, yet, the other stages which are mentioned, namely, fire, flame, sphere of air, sphere of lightning etc. do not denote Time ; and if one believes that a scient reaches different spheres after death

410 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

according as he dies during the day or during the night, the- importance of Jnanaal^o comes to an end. Therefore, in the Vedanta-Sutras, the words, fire, day, uttarayana etc. are not understood as denoting Time, but are interpreted as referring, to the deities embodied in those ideas ; and it is stated that these deities take the Atmans of the ritualists or of Jnanins to- the sphere of Moon, o? the sphere of Brahman, by different, paths (Ve. Su. 4. 2. 19-21 ; 4. 3. 4). But, there is a doubt, as to whether or not this opinion is acceptable to the Gita; because, not only does the Gita not mention the subsequent stages of the uttarayaria, which do not denote Time, but the Blessed Lord has Himself made a definite reference to Time in mentioning the two paths, in the words- "I shall mention to you that TIME, dying at which TIME the Karma-Yogin returns or does not return" (Gl. 8. 23); and, there is a statement in the Mahabharata, that when Bhisma was lying on the bed of arrows, he was waiting for the uttarayana that is, for the time when the Sun begins to move towards the North, for giving up his life (Bhl. 120 ; Ann. 167). From this,, it is clear that at some date in the past, the day, the bright half of the month, or the uttarayaria were looked upon as proper times for dying. Even in the Rg-Veda, where the devayam and the pitryam are described (Rg. 10. 88, 15 ; and Br. 6. 2. 15),. a meaning denoting Time is intended. For this and many other reasons, I have come to the conclusion that when the Vedic Rsis were living near the Meru or the North Pole, that is- to Bay, near the place in the Northern hemisphere, where the Sun is continually visible above the horizon for six months,, the lighted period of the uttarayaw, lasting for six months,, must have come to be considered an appropriate time for dying; and, I have made a detailed exposition of this theory in another work of mine. But, whatever the reason may be, there is no. doubt that this belief is a very ancient one, and this belief has become merged, at least indirectly if not directly, in the belief in the two paths of the devayana or the piiryana ; nay, according to me, one can trace the idea of these two paths to this belief. Otherwise, there is no explanation for the fact that two words having distinct meanings, namely, kala (Time), (Gi. 8. 23) in one place and 'gati' (goal), or 'stW (path), (Gl. 8. 26 and 27) in,

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 4ir

another plaoe, have been used in the Bhagayadglta with reference- to the devayana and the pitryana. In the Samkarabha9ya on the- Vedanta-Sfitras, it is stated that the Time-denoting meaning of the words devayana and pitryana is the one described in the Smrtis, which is applicable only to the Karma-Yoga , and that the true- Brahmajnanin reaches the sphere of Brahman through the light- ed path described in the Srutis which is governed by deities ; and in this way, the 'Time-denoting' and the 'deity-denoting' meanings have been disposed of (Ve. Su. Sam. Bha. 4. 2. 18-21).. But in my opinion, if one considers the original Vedanta-Sutras themselves, the meaning given by Badarayanaoarya of the word 'devayana as deity-denoting, by taking the words uttarayana etc. as referring to deities, and not to Time, must have been the one in general acceptance ; and it is not proper to believe that the path mentioned in the Gita is an independent path- different from this path of devayana mentioned in the Upanisads. But, there is no necessity to go into such deep waters here; because, although there is a difference of opinion on the question whether the words, day, night, uttarayana etc. in the devayana and pitryana were, from the historical point of view, originally Time-denoting or not, yet, there is no doubt that this Time-denoting meaning ultimately dropped out, and that these two words devayana and- pitryana have ultimately come to commonly and definitely mean, that whenever a man may die, and without any reference- to the time when he dies, the Jfianin reaches the other world by the lighted path according to his Karma, and the orthodox ritualist reaches it by the dark paths. Therefore, whether one considers the words 'day' and 'uttarayana' as indicative of deities as Badarayanaoarya says, or one considers them figura- tively as the rising stages of the lighted path, the proposition that the ordinary meaning of those words in those contexts is- indicative of the path followed, is not affected.

But, whether it is the devayana or the pitryana, these paths- are obtained only by those who perform the Karma recom- mended by the Sastras, that is, righteous Karma ; because, it ir quite clear that though the pitryana path is of a lower order- than the devayana path, yet, as it takes a person to the sphere of the Moon, which is a kind of heaven, he must have performed some righteous Action or other, prescribed by Sastras, in this-

412 GlTA-KAHASYA OS KARMA-YGGA

life in order to have deserved experiencing the happiness of that sphere ( Gi. 9. 20-21), It is, therefore, clearly stated in the Upanisads that those persons who do not perform in this life even a little of the righteous Karma prescribed by the Sastras, but are steeped in the performance of Actions which are 'kapuya', i. e., sinful, cannot obtain either of these pathsi and immediately after death, they either take birth in the 'tiryak' species, that is, in the species of birds, beasts etc., or repeatedly go to the sphere of Yama, that is, to hell. This is known as the 'Third' path ( Chan. 5. 10. 8 ; Katha. 2. 6. 7 ) ; and it is stated even in the Bhagavadglta that purely demonian > {amri) or sinful persons attain this low state (GI. 16. 19-21; 9. 12; Ve. 85. 3. 1. 12, 13; Nirukta 14. 9).

I have bo far explained the manner in which a human being reaches three different states after his death, having regard to his Karma, according to the ancient tradition of the Vedic religion. It is true that Release is attained only by the devayana path out of these three; yet, this Release is attained only ultimately, after rising step by step through the various ■ stages of the wclradi(piiryana) path. This path has also the other names of krama-mulcti' (gradual Release); and, in as much as ultimate Release is attained by going to the sphere of the Brahman after the fall of the body, that is, after death> it is also called 'videha-mukti' (body less Release); but the pure philosophy of the Absolute Self asks why it should be necessary for the man, in whose mind the Realisation of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman is continually present, to go anywhere else to reach the Brahman, or to wait for death. The Knowledge of the Brahman which is acquired by the worship of symbols like the Sun etc. taken for worship, that is to say, by the worship of the qualityful Brahman, is, in the beginning, a little incomplete; because, thereby the mind •conceives the ideas of the sphere of the Sun, or of the sphere of the Brahman, and there is a risk of these ideas remaining fixed in the mind, to a greater or less extent, even at the moment of death. It is, therefore, proper to say that in order to remove this defect and attain Release, such persons 'must go by the devayana path (Ve. Su. 4. 3. 15); because, it is a firm dootrine of the philosophy of the Absolute Self that every

EFFECT OF KARMA, AND FREE WILL 413

man reaches after death a 'gati' (goal) which is consistent with' the desire or 'krafu' present in his mind at the moment of death- ( Chan. 3. 14. 1 ). But, the man, in whose mind there does not . exist the Dualistic differentiation between the Brahman and his own Atman resulting from the worship of a qualityful Brahman, or for any other reason ( Tai. 2. 7 ), has evidently not to go anywhere else for attaining the Brahman, in as- much as he is perpetually Brahman-natured, It is for this', reason that Yajflavalkya has told Janaka in the Brhadaranyaka (Br. 4. 4. 6) that the vital airs (praifa) of the man who has become totally desireless, as a result of the pure Realisation of the Brahman, do not go anywhere else — "na tasya pram itikrarrianti brahmaiva san brahmapyeti"; — and that such a ■ person is always full of the Brahman and merged in the Brahman; and there are statements both in the Brhadaranyaka and the Katha Upanisads that such a person "ATRA brahma satnasnute" (Katha. 6.14), i. e., . "Realises the Brahman HERE"; and on the authority of these Srutis. it is stated in the Sivagita, that it is not necessary to leave one's place in order to obtain Release. The Brahman is not suoh a thing that it can be said to be in a particular place, and not to ba in a particular place (Chan. 7. 25 ; Mun. 2. 2. llj. Then, where is the necessity for the person who has acquired complete Realisation to go to the sphere of the Sun through the utlaraijana, by these gradual steps, in order to attain the Brahman? "brahma veda brahmaiva bhauati" (Mun. 3, 2. 9). i. e., "that man who has realised the Brahman, has become the Brahman in this world ", . that is, wherever he is ; because, in order that it should be necessary for somebody to go to another place, the distinction between the one place, and the other place, which depends on Time or Space, must have remained; and these differences oannot exist in the final, that is to say, the Non-Dual and Supreme Realisation of the Brahman. Therefore, why should that man, whose permanent mental state is: " yasya sarvam atmaivu 'bhuf" (Br. 2. 4. 14) or, "sarvam khalv idaih brahma" (Chan 3. 14.1), or "aham brahmasmi" (Br. 1,4. 10), i.e., "I myself am the Brahman", go to another place for attaining- the Brahman ? He is always Brahmified (brahma-bhuta). As

414 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

■stated at the end of the last chapter, there are descriptions in the Glta itself, of such supreme scients, in such words as follows: — " abhito brahma mrvayam vartate viditatmanam" i(Gi. 5. 26), — since the man, who has given up the Dualistio " feeling and Realises the nature of the Atman, has not to go anywhere else for attaining Release, though he may have to wait for death in order to exhaust his Commenced Karma, the reward of Release in the shape brahma nirvana is always in front of him; or, "iliaiva tair jitah sorgo yesam samye sthitafo mamah" (Gi. 5. 19), i. e., "those men, in whose minds the equa- lity of all created beings in the form of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman is fixed, have conquered both life and death in this world (without having to depend on the devayana .path)" ; or, "bhutaprthagbhavam ekastham anupasyati" , i. e., "that man for whom the diversity in the various created things has disappeared, and who has begun to see them unified (ekastham}, that is, as of the same nature as the Paramesvara, has 'brahma sampadyate", i. e., ' gone and joined the Brahman' " (Gi. 13. 30). In the same way, the meaning of the words "who knows ■essentially" in the sentence "the Karma-Yogin WHO KNOWS ESSENTIALLY the devayana and pitryarja paths, is not ■confused" which has been quoted above, seems to be "who has Realised the ultimate form of the Brahman" (Bhag. 7. 15. 56), This is the complete Brahmified (brahma-bhuta) state, or the most supreme Brahml-state, and Srlmat Saihkaracarya has stated in his Sarlraka-bhasya (Ve. Su. 4. 3. 14), that this is the most Supreme or the most complete state of the Realisation of the Absolute Self. Nay, in order to acquire this state, a man must be said to have become the Paramesvara in a way ; and, it need not be said further, that persons who have thus become Brahmified may be said to have gone beyond the rules of what •should be done and what should not be done in the world of Actions; because, as the Realisation of the Brahman is always awake in the case of these people, whatever they do is always inspired by a pure and desireless frame of mind, that is to say, is always free from sin or merit. As it is not necessary to go somewhere else or to die, in order to attain the Brahman after this state has been reached, such a Steady-in-Mind devotee of the Brahman {(sthitaprajna brahmanistha) is known

EFFECT OF KABMA, AND FREE WILL 415

-•as 'jivan-mukta' (birth-released), (See Yo. 3. 9). Though Buddhists do not admit the existence of the Atman or of the Brahman, yet, they have accepted the position that this ■desireless state of a. jimn-mukta is the ultimate ideal of man; and they have accepted this doctrine with nominal verbal ■ differences in their religious treatises (see the Appendices). Many persons say that as this ultimate self-lesB state is naturally antagonistic to the ordinary Actions of life, the man, who has reached this state, automatically escapes Karma and becomes an ascetic (samnyasin). But, as will be seen from the exposition in the next chapter, this position is not accepted by the Gita ; and the doctrine of the Gita is that it is more proper for the Birth-released man to go on performing all Actions, till he dies, desireless] y, and for the public benefit, as is done by the Paramesvara himself. This doctrine of the Gita has .■also been accepted in the Yoga-vasistha (Yo. 6. TJ, 199).

CHAPTER XI.

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA,

( SAMNYASA AND KARMA-YOGA ).

sanmyasah karmayogas ca nihsreyasakarauubhau I tayos hi hirmasamnyasat karmayogo visisyate II *

Glta, 5. 2,

I have, in the last chapter, considered in detail the position that there is only one way, in which one can escape the toils of eternal Karma, by Realising by personal experience the Parabrahman, which exists homogeneously in all created things ; as also the questions whether man is or is not free to< Realise that immortal Brahman, and how he should perform' the transient affairs or Actions in the Maya-world in order to- obtain that Realisation ; and I drew the conclusions, that bondage is not the characteristic feature of Action, but of the Mind; and that, therefore, by performing these Actions with a pure, that is, with a disinterested frame of mind,, after having by means of mental control gradually reduced the Attachment which one has for the result of the fruit of Action, the Realisation of the Atman, in the shape of an equable frame of mind, gradually saturates the corporeal organs, and complete Release is ultimately obtained. In this way, I have answered the question as to what is required to be done as being the means for acquiring the highest of ideals in the shape of Release, or the perfect state

• " Renunciation (samnyasa) and Energism (karma- yoga) are

both ruhbreyasakara, i. e., productive of Release ; but out of the two. Adherence to Action (liarma-yoya) is superior to the Renunciation \ot Action (karma-samnyasa)". The meaning, in "which the word ^' samnyasa' nBed in the first line iB to be taken, becomes clear from the phrase ' htrma sarhnyasa ' used in the second line. These questions and answers from the Gxta are found adopted at the beginning of the fourth chapter of the GraneSaglta, and there, the present verse has been given with a slight verbal difference as,. " kriyayogo viyogab capy ubhau moixasya sadhane | layor madkye kriyS' yogas tyagat tasya tiiiijyaie II ".

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 417

according to the philosophy of the Absolute Self. We have now to consider the most important question, whether after having thus broken the bondage of Karma and fully Realised the Brahman, as a result of the purification of his Mind arising from his having acted in this way, that is, from his having performed Desireless Actions according to his own capacity and status, a scient or Steady-in-Mind ( sthitaprujna ) should subsequently, that is, when being in the state of a Perfect {siddha), continue performing Action, or, looking upon himself as one who has performed all that was to be performed, because he has acquired all that was to be acquired, consider all Actions in the world of Illusion as useless and inconsistent with Knowledge, and totally give them up ; because, logically speaking, in such a situation, both the positions of totally abandoning Action (karma-samnyasa), and performing those Actions upto death with a desireless frame of mind {karma- yoga), are possible; and, as it is more convenient to chalk out one's course of action consistently with that mode of life which is the better of the two, from the very beginning, that is to- say, while one is training onself ( swihunamxtha ), no Metaphysical exposition on Action and Non-Action becomes complete, unless one comparatively considers both these modes of life. It would not have been sufficient to say to Arjuna that after the Realisation of the Brahman, it is just the same whether one performs or does not perform Action (Gl. 3. 18) on the ground that a man, whosB Reason has become equable towards all created beings as a result of Knowledge, is not affected by the merit or demerit of any Action (Gi. i. 2J, 21), since Reason is superior to Action in all the affairs of life. The definite injunction of the Blessed Lord to Arjuna was: "Fight"! ( yudhyasva!), (Gi. 2. 18); and it would be necessary to adduce some cogent reasons in support of this firm advice rather than placing before him the indecisive advice that it was-; just the same whether he fought or did not fight after he had acquired Realisation. Nay, the doctrine of the Gita has come into existsnce only in order to explain why a wise man must perform a particular act, notwithstanding that he sees before his eyeB the terrible consequenoes of it; and this is indeed the most important feature of the Gita. If it is true that a man is 53—54

418 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

bound by Action, whereas, he gets salvation by Knowledge, why should the person, who has acquired Knowledge, at all perform Action? Though the doctrines, that destruction of Karma [karma-ksaya) does not mean Abadonment of Action, that Action is annihilated by its being performed after one has given up the hope for the Fruit of the Action, and that it is not possible to give up every kind of Action etc., are true, yet, it does not thereby conclusively follow, that one should not give up as much of Action as one can; and logically thinking, suoh a conclusion does arise. Because, as has been stated in the Gita, in the same way as it is no more necessary to go to a well for water, when water is to be found in all directions, so also has a scient no more to depend on Action for anything, after he has acquired that Knowledge, which can he acquired by the performance of Action (Gl. 2. 46), Therefore, Arjuna has said to Sri Krsna in the commencement of the third chapter as follows: if in Your opinion the desireless or equable frame of mind is superior to Action, I shall make my Reason pure like that of a Sthitaprajua; why do You compel me to perform a terrible act like war" ? (Gl. 3. 1), In reply to this question, the Blessed Lord has Baid that no one can escape Action etc., and in that way justified the doctrine of Action. But, if philosophy has prescribed the two paths of Sarhkbya (Renunoiation) and Energism (Karma-Yoga), it follows naturally that after the acquisition of Knowledge, a man may follow whichever path he considers better. Therefore, in the commencement of the fifth chapter, Arjuna has again said to the Blegsed Lord that He should not mis up the two courses of life, but should explain to him (Arjuna) in a definite way which of the two was superior (Gl, 5. 1) ; if, after the acquisition of Knowledge, it was just the same whether Action was performed or not performed, he would perform Action or not perform it as he liked ; but, if performing Action was the better course of the two, the Blessed Lord should tell him the reason why that was so, so that, he would act according to His directions. This question of Arjuna is not something new. In the Yoga-Vasistha (5. 56. 6), Rama has asked the same question to Vasistha, and in the Ganesagita (4. 1) the king named Varenya has asked the same question to Ganesa ; and it

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 419

<even appears from the works of Aristotle that this question had been raised in very ancient times in Europe in Greece, -where philosophical ideas first originated. This same question hag been raised at the end of the book on Ethics written by •this well-known Greek philosopher (10. 7 and 8) ; and he has, in the first instance, expressed his opinion that true happiness •consists in a scient spending his life in the quiet contemplation on philosophy instead of in the ups and downs of life (sanisara) or of political activity. Yet, in the book written by him subsequently on Politics (7. %. and 3), Aristotle himself says : — some philosophers are engrossed in thoughts of philosophy and others in political activities ; and if one considers whioh of these two modes of life is better, one must say that both the paths are to a certain extent proper ; nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that Non-Action is better than Action, * because, 'happiness is nothing but Action; and one may safely say that the acquisition of true nobility consists to a considerable extent of Action founded on Knowledge and the principles of Ethics. From the fact that Aristotle has made two different statements in two different places, the importance of the clear statement in the Gita that "karma jyayo hy alcarmayah" (Gl. 3. 8)— ACTION IS SUPERIOR TO NON-ACTION-becomes clear to the reader. Augusta Comte, a well-known French philo- sopher of the last century says in his book on Material Philosophy that :— "it is misleading to say that it is better to spend one's life in the contemplation of philosophy ; and the philosopher, who adopts such a course of life, and abandons the doing of whatever public welfare it is possible for him to do, must be said to misuse the material which is at his disposal". On the other hand, the German philosopher Schopenhauer has maintained that in as much as all the activities of the world, nay, even keeping alive itself, is painful, the true duty of every human being in this world is to learn philosophy and to destroy all this Action as early as possible. Comte died in 1857 A. D. and Schopenhauer in 1860

• "And it iB equally a mistake to plaz& inactivity above action, for

happiness is activity, and the actions of the just and the wise are the realisation of much that is noble". (See Aristotle's Politics trans, by Jowett. Vol. I. p. 212. The italics are ours).

420 GIT&-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

A. D. The school of Schopenhauer has been continued in Germany by Hartmann. It need not be said that the English philosophers Spencer, Mill, and others are of the same opinion aB Comte. But the modern Materialistic philosopher Nietzsche has gone beyond all these philosophers, and he has in his works so severely criticised those who are for giving up Action, that according to him, it is not possible to refer to the supporters of Renunciation ( karma-samnyasa) by any milder terms than 'fools of fools'. *

Just as in Europe there have been two schools of thought from the time of Aristotle upto the present day, so also, have there been two modes of life according to the Vedic religion in India from ancient times upto the present day (Ma. Bha. San. 349. 72). Out of these two, one course is known as the Samnyasa-Marga or Sarhkhya-nistha or merely SAMKHYA or Jnana-nistha (because, it consists of being continually steeped in Knowledge); and the other path is known as the Karma-Yoga or shortly YOGA or Karma-nistha. I have already in the third chapter clearly explained that the words Samkhya and Yoga do not respectively indicate the Kapila-samkhya and the Patafijala-yoga. But, in as much as, the word 'samnywsa' is also rather ambiguous, it is necessary to explain its meaning here more fully. The word ' samnyasa ' does not in this place mean 'not marrying', or 'giving up wife and children and wearing saffron-coloured robes ', in case

• 8ully has in his book Pessimism given the names 'Optimism'

and 'Pessimism' respectively to Karma-Yoga and Karma-Tyaga (Samkhya or Kenunriation). But, in my opinion, these names are not correct. 'Pessimism' implies the meaning of < whiner ' or 'despondent'. But those persons who give up wordly life, looking upon it as trauBH-ntj are joyful; and though they give up Buch life, they do so joyfully Therefore, it is not correct, according to me, to refer to them as 'P. ssiraists'. Bather than that, it would be more proper to refer to Kerma-Yoga in English as 'Energism', and to the Samkhya or the Samnyasa path as 'Quietism'. As Knowledge of the Brahman is common to boih these paths according to the Vedic religion, happiness or peace is the same according to both; we do not make the difference that ons path leads to happiness and the other to unhappine?s, or that one is hopeful and the other hopeless.

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 431

one has married, or ' merely adopting the fourth stage of life '. Because, though Bhisma was a celibate, he was taking part in politics till the moment of his death ; and Srlmat Sarh- karacarya, after passing to the fourth state straight from the iirst state of celibacy, or in the Maharastra, Sri Samartha Ramadasa, remaining a celibate mendicant for life, have brought about the salvation of the world by spreading Knowledge. The crucial point in the present place is whether after having acquired Knowledge, a man should take part in all the activities of the world aa duties and for public welfare, or should entirely give them up, looking upon them as illusory. He who takes part in these activities is the Karma- Yogin, whether he has married or has not married, and whether he wears white clothes or saffron-coloured clothes. Nay, for performing these activities, it is sometimes more convenient to remain unmarried or to wear saffron-coloured robes, or to go and live outside the town ; because, by doing so, there is no obstruction in the way of applying one's whole time and energy to public welfare, as it does not entail the worry jof maintaining a family. Though such persons may be ascetics according to the dress which they wear, yet, essentially they are Karma-Yogins ; but on the other hand, such persons as look upon all worldly activities as useless, and abandon them and sit quiet, may be said to be asoetics, whether they have entered the fourth state of life or not. In short, the Glta does not attach importance to white clothing or saffron- coloured clothing or to marriage or celibacy, but considers only whether the scient takes or does not take part in worldly activities, in differentiating between Renunciation and Ener- gism. All other things are of no importance, at any rate according to the religion of the Glta. The words ' karma- smhnyasa ' or ' karma-tyaga ' would be more appropriate and unambiguous in the present plaoe than 'samnyasa' (Renun- ciation) or 'calwthasrama ' (the fourth state). But, as it is more usual to use the single word 'sanmyasa' rather than the two words mentioned above, I have here explained the -technical meaning of that word. Those, who consider worldly .activities as fruitless, give up worldly life ; and, entering the forests, take to the fourth state of life, according to the Smrti

iU GlTA-RAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA

religion ; and, therefore, this path of Abandonment of Action, is called 'Samnyasa'. But, the important factor in that procedure is the Abandonment of Action, and not the saffron- coloured robes.

Though it is thus usual either to continue the performance of Action (Karma-Yoga) or to abandon Action (Karma-Sarhnyasa), after the complete acquisition of Knowledge, doctrine- supporting commentators on the Gita have in this place raised the question whether both these paths are equally independent and in a position to give Release, or whether the Karma-Yoga, is the preliminary or first step, and one has ultimately to abandon Action, and renounce the world in order to attain Release. It is seen that these two courses of life have been mentioned as independent paths in the second and third chapters of the Gita. But those commentators, in whose opinion it is impossible to attain Release unless a man renounces the world and abandons the ordinary activities of life, — and who- have started commenting on the Gita with the preconceivei notion that that must be the doctrine propounded by the Gita— pronounce the sum and the substance of the Gita to be thafc "Kaima-Yoga, is not an independent path of obtaining Release;, that one must, in the beginning, perform Actions in order to> purify the mind, but ultimately go in for Renunciation ; and that Renunciation is the paramount and the ultimate cult." But if this meaning is adopted, then the importance of the word, 'dvividha' (two-fold) in'the statement of the Blessed Lord that the Sarhkhya (Samnyasa) and Yoga (Karma-Yoga) are two kinds of cults in this world ( Gl. 3. 3), is lost. The word 'Karma- Yoga' can be interpreted in three different ways : (l^ according to the first interpretation, Release is obtained by performing the Karma laid down by the Srutis and the Smrtis, or the duties of the four castes, such as sacrifice etc. But this interpretation of the Mlmarhsa school is not acceptable to the Gita (2. 45); (2) the second meaning is, that Action should be performed, but only for the purification of the Mind, in' aB much as the performance of Action (Karma-Yoga) is essential for the purification of the Mind. According to this interpreta- tion, Karma-Yoga becomes the anterior part or the preliminary preparation for the Renunciation (Samnyasa) state. But thfe

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA. 423

is not the Karma-Yoga mentioned in the Gita. (3) The important question in the Glta is, whether or not a scient, who has Realised in what the benefit of his Self lies, should go on performing till death the worldly Actions, prescribed for the . caste to which he belongs, such as, fighting etc.; and the Karma-Yoga described in the Glta is, that even a scient, who has acquired Knowledge, must perform the Actions prescribed for the four castes with a distinterested frame of mind (Gi. 3.55); and it can never be a preliminary preparation for Renunciation; because, in this path, a man can never abandon Action, and the only question is of obtaining Release. But, the Gita clearly says that in as much as Knowledge has already been acquired by the man, Desireless Action does not become a source of bondage; and that the Release which can be obtained by Renunciation, can also be obtained by this Karma-Yoga (Gi. 5. 5.) Therefore, the words: "ioke smin dvividha mstha" in the Gita (Gi. 3. 3) must be interpreted as indicating that the path of Karma-Yoga taught by the Gita is not a preparation for Renunciation, but that both these paths are equally good (tulyahala), from the point of view of Release, after Realisation has come (Gi. 8. 2). That is why the Blessed Lord has disting- uished between these two paths in the latter half of the stanza (Gi. 3. 3) by saying: "jnanayogem samkhyanam karma-yogena yoginam" ( i. e. "the path for Release followed by Samkhyas is the Jnana-Yoga, and that followed by Yogins is the Karma- Yoga"-Trans.); and the two words 'anye' (the one) and 'apare' (the other) in the line "anye samkhyena yogena karma-yogena capare" in the thirteenth chapter, do not become appropriate unless these two paths are considered independent ( Gi. 13. %i). Besides, if one considers the history given in the Mahabharata of the Narayaniya doctrine, from which the Activistic path (Yoga) has been adopted into the Glta, the same proposition is confirmed, The origin of these two paths has been described in the Mahabharata by saying that after the Blessed Lord had, in the beginning of the world, directed Hiranyagarbha, that is, Brahmadeva, to create the world, the seven mind-born sons, Marici and others, came into existence from him; and these seven sons adopted YOGA, that is the Activistic {pravrtti) path of Action for properly carrying out the work of creation ;

Mi <cM&-Bjm&WA <m KM»-Y©S.&

£[email protected], sail .pt'nws talk up libs &MKHTYA, itat ik„ iSa IRsjkk ■af JRBWflclialSSsWi ihbiivH'h') .feiftSJJ Mnfit; smrfl lata 'an, at, its .likasiff

1. atocl iptiai;, fr'piu siw -j»fe>t rf «ew ijjf Itefease, iktt Abbs wife

>iir:« ^Quajiy v.ssrfc'H 'tivUrAdul, Stat fe to hsj., "fiag 1 are iffiSsHalt

• j'a'.u .a&jih. lyjiuty ^j.aci jjudv^iifesS, «»3 ?»tEr&teiuSy (MzpsTilte rf

I'jSftSgitig iibpiiij, itiuf sAtsistiaskaui' w i'mv iifli! ^ie «aas JiasmiEiB- s-yaw-a fc ik? it\uv.:.' itf rtUs vssj.cWra {KLs.. "Sin Baa. $4*'. "■•&• SS. ■$?-" ?.!. :1c 5, as «i,v:.b W'ST , a distitsittttfe iass Iftfirs sa&Ss bstjraaa Hfejuyatga/Mta. as tiis fcupswlsr stf nfes Ajsjf'Afe jRsiEi and KajpEa as to :J'rt.«!i6Ki¥j- as j/ta SaanStSijS. PaSa, sad ii is WJWhwi esteiteni iiLat J&aBf.agartta !»ter -35a gaTe ag fife ij?ii'j;iBita«i»* -i>5 A'Afco.. Oe tts Miter aatai- at as ssakal (tat ifaj Jifeiwad f.i-.>r,d ensdeA ifiS» 'irysb- rf T-sjiuas in Site silisjjf; «£ Esi'-aa, if; 'j»fe to tsep giissg tiMhan a iiids all ?.h« a'Sivhlti* <.-J si 71 .:-. wssiti.'Ma, arf .SirasieQ HiraqfagscrHiia, as also te ol'aw g'/fe, iiu tew tM? cycle oaEiiij-re&Ejr JHCTiiig. < Sis, Bias, 4a;;.. 3VX *i-JS sad 339, wl 5T>. From fti, ft is f&hahtfah?L I'sy.o.'.'i dwvt ifaaA SafflHsya snd Yog's, ae two m^miMl'j ifc(fej«;jferjf, /ni«3^s of life. It *w«l tiUs d=- seen th&t fes aiiism^t .of fcwa* ivtomesiiMoTS on fee GiS to mate <*jt tiLat tS)« &a /ma- Yoga !« iofe-riw, Is fee zesali a: a,iia- 'Jitfoflary UiishUiMx; -ciA ihattte gtatemfent wearrinj; erery r»w and ton In tose oorHrrieiifcariss that the Xansa-Yoga i« tnerclf a nwdfani lor tke acqiikitiioa of Knowledge, or for R«mtKir4tk>f!, fij >;anetMflg, which these comnKntators Bay uf tbtiif own tiwjwl, and wbieb is not boine out by the &lta. In wiy opinion, tliin Ik th« greatest fault of tboge conmifentatois on the QltA who Bupport the Path of HenuEoiation ; and unless tiiln dootrifni-wippoiting point of view of the commentatore is

1. ivfifi up, the true and mystic import of the Gita can never be

Malifwsd.

It 1h not enough to say that Karma-Samnyasa and Karmar Vo^a aro individually equally productive of Release, and that olio ifi not thfe preliminary part of the other; because, if both theBe paths are equally productive of Release, it follows that one may adopt whichever path he likes ; and then, instead of arriving at the conclusion that he must fight, Arjuna would have the choice of the two paths of fighting, or renouncing

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 425

the world instead of fighting, after he had acquired Knowledge by the advice of the Blessed Lord. Therefore, Arjuna has asked the natural and straight question, namely, "tell me in a definite way which of these two pathB is more proper " (Gi. 5. 11), so that it would be easy for him to act aocording to that path. Arjuna having asked this question in the beginning of the fifth chapter, the Blessed Lord has immedia- tely in the next verse given a clear answer to it, namely, "though the Path of Renunciation, and the Path of Karma- Toga are both equally productive of Release (nihsreya&a), yet, out of these two paths THE WORTH OR IMPORTANCE OF KARMA-TOGA IS GREATER ( oisisyate)", (Gi. 5. 3); and I have designedly quoted this stanza at the beginning of this chapter. It is not that these are the only words in the Glta which support the superiority of Karma-Toga. There are several other statements in the Glta which contain that advice to Arjuna, such as, : — "tasmad yogaya yujyasm" (GI. 2. 50), i. e., "therefore, adopt the Karma-Toga" ; or, "ma te samgo 'sloakarmam" (Gi. 2. 47), i. e,, "do not insist on not perform- ing Actions"; or,

yastv indriyani manasa myamyarabhate 'rjuna I Icarmendriyaih karma-yogam asaktah so. itisisyate n

(Gi. 3.7.)

that is, instead of abandoning Action, "controlling the organs by the Mind, and using the organs of Action for performing Actions with a desireless frame of mind is VISESA (more IMPORTANT), ( visisyate )" ; because, in any casei "karma jyayo by akarmanah", i. e., "Action is SUPERIOR (sredlia) to Inaction" (Gi. 3. 8) ; "therefore, go on performing Actions" (Gi. 4. 15) ; or, "yogamatixtlwttistha" (Gi. 4. 2), i. e.» "accept the Path of (Karma-)Toga and stand up to fight" ; or "(yogi)jnanibhyo 'pimato 'dhikah",i.s., "the merit of the (Karma-) Yogin is more (adhihahj than that of the Jnana-margin (of Saiimyasa)" ; or, "tasmad yogi bliavarjima" (Gi. 4. 6), i. e„ "therefore, O Arjuna, become a (Karma-) Togin" ; or, "mam anusmara yudhya ca" (Gi.8. 7), i.e., "think of me and fight" etc, etc.; and in that advice the clear words 'JYAYAH't 'ADHIKAR', ' VISISYATE' have been used in order to show

426 GITA.-RAHA.SYA OB KARMA-YOGA

that the merit of Karma-Yoga is higher than that of Renuncia- tion or Non-Action. And even in the summing up in the 18th. chapter, the Blessed Lord has again said (Gi. 18, 6, 7) that, "it. is my DEFINITE and BETTER opinion that it is not proper to abandon those Actions which have been prescribed, and that, one must always perform Actions without being attached to them". From this, it is established beyond doubt, that accord- ing to the Gita,, Karma-Yoga is superior to Renunciation.

But how will this doctrine of the Glta be appreciated by these commentators, whose doctrinal opinion is that Renuncia- tion or Devotion is the ultimate and most superior duty, and that Karma is merely a means for the purification of the Mind, and not the principal ideal or duty? It is not that they had not seen that the Glta has clearly given a higher importance to Karma-Yoga than to Renunciation ; but, if they aocepted this opinion as correct, their doctrines would become inferior ; and, therefore, these doctrine-supporting commentators have experienced considerable difficulty in disposing of the question put by Arjuna, and the answer given to it by the Blessed Lord, in the beginning of the fifth chapter, though they are both- clear, logical, and unambiguous. Their first difficulty has been that the question ay to which one out of the two paths, namely, Action or Inaction, is superior, does not arise, unless both these paths are considered independent; because, if, as these commentators say, Karma-Yoga is only a preliminary preparation for Jnana or Knowledge, it naturally follows that the preliminary part is inferior, and that Jnana or Samnyasa is superior ; and then, there would remain no room for Arjuna to ask the question he asked ; but, if it is admitted that the question was a proper one, it becomes necessary to admit that these two paths are independent; and, if that admission is made, the position that the Path of Renunciation supported by them is the only path which leads to Release, becomes untenable ! Therefore, they have first passed judgment that the question asked by Arjuna was itself not proper ; and they have made up their minds to say the same thing about the reply of the Blessed Lord ! But, even after this struggle, the clear answer- given by the Blessed Lord to Arjuna that: "the merit or superiority of the Karma-Yoga is GREATER (visesa)",{Orl 5. %)»

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 427

cannot be satisfactorily explained ; and, therefore, these com- mentators have gone to the length of laying down, on their own hook, and contrary to the anterior and posterior context, that the statement "karm-yogo visisyate", i. e., "the superiority of Karma- Yoga is greater," is a fallow praise of the Karma- Yoga, or merely an artha-vada ( See. p. 31 above — Trans.); and that, even according to the Blessed Lord, the Path of Renuncia- tion is better ; and they have, in this way attempted to satisfy themselves (Gl. Sam. Bha. 5. % ; 6. 1, 2 ; 18. 11). Not only in the Sarhkarabhasya, but also in the Ramanujabhasya has this stanza been interpreted as being a mere praise of the Karma- Yoga and an obiter dicta (artha-vada), (Gi. Ra. Bha. 5. 1) ; because, although Ramanujacarya was not a Non-Dualist, yet, as in his opinion Devotion was the principal ideal, Karma-Yoga became merely a means for Devotion based on Knowledge (Gi. Ra. Bha; 3.1). My readers will see how the meaning in the original is stretched and mutilated, where the original work and the commentators support different doctrines, and the commentators begin to comment on the original in the firm belief that the doctrine supported by them is borne out by the original. Were not Sri Krsna or Sri Vyasa in a position to clearly say to Arjuna in plain Sanskrit : "0 Arjuna, your question is improper" ? But as, instead of doing so, it has been stated in numerous places that "Karma-Yoga is superior", one has to say that the doctrine-supporting interpretation, which has been put on the stanza by these commentators, is incorrect; and if one refers to the previous and the subsequent context, this inference is fortified. Because, it is stated in various places in the Gita, that the scient does not abandon Action, but performs all Actions with a disinterested frame of mind after attaining Realisation. (Gi. 2. 64; 3. 19 ; 3. 25; 18. 9). Srimat Sarhkaracarya has, in his Sarhkarabhasya, in the beginning raised the question whether Release is obtained by means of Knowledge, or by the combination of Knowledge and Action i and he has expounded the import of the Gita as being that Release is obtained by Knowledge alone, by the destruction of! Karma resulting from Knowledge, and that Karma is not necessary for Realisation ; and, he has from this drawn the] subsequent inference, that the Blessed Lord must be considered

428 GITA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

to have accepted the position in the Gita, that even according to the Gita, Karma becomes meaningless when once the Mind has been purified, as Karma is not necessary for obtaining Release; and that as Karma is inherently binding or inconsistent with Knowledge, a scient must give up (Action after acquiring Knowledge. That school of thought which says that even after having acquired Knowledge, a man must perform Action, is known as the Knowledge- Action (jmm- karmasamuccaya) school, and the above-mentioned argument of Sri Sarhkaracarya is the principal argument against it. The same argument has been accepted even by Madhvacarya (Gl Ma. Bha. 3. 31). But from my point of view, this argument is neither satisfactory nor unanswerable ; because (1) although Desire-prompted (kamya) Actions are binding and contra-indica- ted for Knowledge, the same reasoning does not apply to Desire- less {niskuma) Actions ; and (2) although Action may not be necessary for obtaining Release after having acquired Knowledge, that does not negative the proposition that a scient must, for other cogent reasons, perform Desireless Action, though he has obtained Realisation. It is not that Karma has come into existence only for the purpose of purifying the Mind of those who desire Release, nor that that is the sole object of Karma. Therefore, one may say, that a scient has to perform the various activities in the world of Karma, which are appropriate for him according to his status in life, for other reasons than the obtaining of Release. I have in this chapter, later on, considered in detail, what these reasons are. For the moment, I will only say that the doctrine of the Gita was expounded for the sole purpose of explaining these reasons to Arjuna, who was desirous of becoming an ascetic ; and one cannot draw the inference that the Gita supports the Path of Renunciation, by arguing that after the purification of the Mind, performance of Action is not necessary for obtaining Release. It is true that the followers of Samkaracarya hold that after the acquisition of Knowledge, one must renounoe the world and give up Action ; but on that account it does not follow, that the same is the teaching of the Gita, or that one has to interpret the Gita in a manner consistent with the doctrines laid down by Sarhkarlcarya or some other

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 4!59

doctrinaire, after first taking it for granted that the doctrine expounded by Samkaracarya or such other doctrinaire, is the only true doctrine. It has been definitely laid down in the Gita that even after the acquisition of of Knowledge, it is better to perform Action than to renounce the world ; then you may call it a different school of thought or give it some other name. Still, it must be borne in mind that, although according to the Gita, Energism (Karma-Yoga) is in this way stated to be superior, the Gita does not maintain like other schools, whioh oannot endure a different philosophy, that the Path of Renunciation is altogether objectionable; and nowhere in the Gita has any disrespect being shown for that path. On the other hand, the Blessed Lord has clearly stated that both the Path of Rsnunciation and the Path of Energism or Action (Karma- Yoga) equally lead to Release, that is to say, that they are both of the same value from the point of view of Release; and later on, the Blessed Lord has stated that "ekam samkhyam ca yogam ca yah pasyati sa pasyali" ( Gl. 5. 5), i. e., "that man who has realised that both these paths are of equal value, has realised the true principle", as also that even in the 'Karma- Yoga,' one has to make a 'Renunciation ' of the hope for the fruit of Aotion — "na hy asamnyasla samkalpo yogi bhavati has ca m" ( Gl. 6. 2), (i. e., "unless a man performs a santnyasa Ifyaga) of the saihkalpa, that is, of the hope of reward, born of a desireful mind, he does not become a (Karma-) Yogin" — Trans.) and He has in this way skilfully harmonised as far as possible these two paths. But, though from the point of view of Release, the two paths of either abandoning Karma or continuing to perform Karma after acquiring Knowledge (and not before) ■ may be of the same value, yet, from the point of view of worldly affairs, the most superior mode of life is to keep the Renunciation in the Mind itself, and to go on performing lifelong the Action whioh is beneficial to the world, through the medium of the bodily organs; because, the Blessed Lord has definitely said that in such a mode of life, both Renunciation and Action find a place ; and Arjuna has, according to thiB advice, become ready to fight. This is really the difference between the scient (jnaain) and the ignorant (ajnania). jK one considers only the sarira-karma, that is, the Actions whioh are no

©tra.-*&&&$S A « E&MMA-^g&g&

-»*».: "iisi ats igaEssad lKebcgi jpafiyssffiE itan wSih sai ssaiiifflfi fistesete., aadi flbs stasnA, waiBi sa ^isaaiaidieii Saaaaa :;:&! I , i% TKe daoaurjaas at ihi '&Tla. faas Ik™ sspanEsfeifi ibjr tSqe dri*z.sriislt

-jiiaitfe, "wfe; Atnifra* irs jsE&HEiaaS % Mas waff eess. jraie Jri fe BoiSj is tfe sacfi, fait Sue Miail is SSaeni"'..

Eccffls sasibj ssgscafcas <s£ Sb ~Ps& of BfflHmmriaiiaE ga jjmrsies se& saysu'Ms asiftet fifest: "%. isiara© il.arfe tSiia ajfefce Jjijees. s r J jjwfenm JjrfEss: imft. i&fe ates ms swan "by fes BisssaS IotS, lease® be huh! fee fast Ssa Asfnaa Bsa scJl B-"i &zqxl&A Skmsria^gia, ara3 was at cily far lpafomiiiiig Adieus issr jmsMyhas ife HEbA Tie- paih af ifflcrarB-&/aoir {AJBax.iEJEHri its Asfea) is tfc? psswar 'Metbs in the state cf a .«&i/si r'PfnssM- stisb aeairiiang to ihe Blessed Lerf*'. Eat, this imses ifei fee BlsaseS Los5 feared that it Ms tad M4 Axjssa that Is was isiKSfaaii, te i Aijasay wisuM "ha?© insisted on aoqjnfcfcg cojaplese Knowledge, as was dace % Uaeiteta in the K&iicpssfcad; aad ttea He (ihs Blsssed Lord) wonM hare to Initiate Arjtjua into lie complete luacwledge, awi -when flue ccasplsie EjHSwledg* had Wn impaired, Is (Arfffaa) would giTft up war-faie and beKsiae an asesrie, and upssi His {the Biassed Lard's) plans afcsai rhe war: and that, the Blessi&d Lord exp«j»inaed rhe Gljs to Ms most teloted derotfeg, in oraa - to deceive him. In say (pinion, oas saEoot do better tiac gire up all argnmenr with persons wao, in order to he able 10 snppcin their own doctriBB, sicop 50 low as to suggest that the Blessed Lord was guilty of Sue's 3 mean action as to deceive His own helctYed disciple. Bat ic arfer that ordinary people should not. he taken in hy this deceptive argument, I say that. Sri Kreia had not to he afraid of anyone, if He had wanted to say Arjnaa in clear terms : " you are ignorant, and therefore, you must go od performing Actions"; and if after that, Arjnna had become rebeEioas,

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA. 431

the Blessed Lord was quite capable of keeping him in ignorance, and making him fight according to his inherent tendencies [prakrti-dharma), (G-I. IS. 59 and 61); but instead of doing so, He has over and over again explained to Arjuna the meaning of !jna?ia' and ' cijnana' (Qi. 7, 2; 9. 1; 10. 1; 13. 2i 14. 1), and at the end of the fifteenth chapter, He has said to Arjuna: "by understanding this science, a man becomes a scient, and a perfect being (Gi. 15. 23) ; and having in this way made of Arjuna a complete scient, the Blessed Lord has made him fight of his own free will (Gi. 18. 63). From this, it becomes abundantly clear that the best mode of life for a scient according to the BleBsed Lord, is to continue to perform Action ■desirelessly, even after having acquired Knowledge. Besides, even if Arjuna is, for the sake of argument, looked upon as ignorant, one cannot say that Janaka and other ancient Karma- Yogins, as also the Blessed Lord Himself, whose illustrations have been given by the Blessed Lord in support of His doctrine, were all ignorant. Therefore, one has to say that this fallow argument, based on a doctrinal insistence, is totally improper and objectionable, and that the Glta has expounded nothing but the doctrine of Action combined with Knowledge.

It has become necessary for me to go in for this intro- duction, in order to show that the two paths of Abandonment •of Action (Samkhya) and Energism (Karma-Yoga) were in vogue from times immemorial, not only in our country, but in other countries ; and to show how and why doctrine- supporting commentators have perversely dealt with the the two important doctrines of the Glta on this subject, namely that, (1) these two paths are independent, that is, not inter-dependent, from the point of view of Release ; and are of equal value ; and that one is not a part of the other ; and that, (2) out of these two, Karma-Yoga is the superior path, though these doctrines are quite clear by themselves. I will now consider the subject-matter of the present chapter, namely, the reasons which have been given in the Glta for proving that even in the state of Perfection, the path of Karma- Yoga, that is, of performing Actions till death with a desireless frame of mind, is more meritorious than Abandonment of Action. Some ■of these matters have been explained by me in the chapter on

432 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

Happiness and Unhappiness (sukha-duhkha-viveka) above ; but f as the argument in that chapter was restricted to the question of happiness and unhappiness, it was not possible for me to fully deal with this subject-matter there. I have, therefore, started this independent chapter here. I have explained in th» last chapter that the Vedic religion is divided into the Karma- kanda and Jnana-kanda, and shown what the difference between the two, is. Out of them, there are directions in the Karma- kanda, that is, in the Sruti texts, such as, the Brahmanas, and partly also in the Upanisad texts, that every man, be he a Brah- min or a Ksatriya, must maintain a sacred fire, and perform the 'jyotistoma' and other sacrificial ritual according to his own status; and there also clear statements that it is the duty of every one to marry and increase his generation. See for instance, the statements: "etad vai jaramaryam satram ,jjad agnihotram", i. e„ "this sacrifice in the shape of the sacrificial Are {aynihotm) must be kept alive till death" (Sa. Bra. 12. 4. 1. 1); . or "prajutantum ma iryavatchhetsih." . i. e. "do not break the thread of thy generation" (Tai. U. 1. 11. 1); or "isaiiasyam idam sarvam", i. e., "whatever is in this world, should be located' into the Paramasvara, that is to say, one should realise that it is of the Paramesvara and not of oneself"; and, with this desireless frame of mind,

kaman neveha karmani jijlvisec chatam samah I evam tmyi namjalheto 'sti m karina lipyate nare li

(Isa. 1 and 2)

that is, "one should entertain the desire of living upto a hundred years, which is the limit of the life of man, whilst performing. Actions; and when Actions are performed 'evam', that is, with that Uovasya (god-dedicating) frame of mind, they will not- have a binding force (lepa) on you (on any human being), and there is no other way for escaping (that lepa or bondage)". But, when one leaves the Karma-kanda and moves on to the Jnana-kanda, one also comes across contradictory statements in the same Vedic treatises, such as, "brahmavidapnoti param" (Tai. 2. 1. 1), i. e., "Release is obtained by Knowledge of the Brahman" ; or, "nanyah pantha vidyate 'yanuya" (Sve. 3. 8), i. e., "there is ,no "other path, except Knowledge, for obtaining

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 433

Release" ; or "purve vidoamsah prajam na kamayante l kim prajaya karisyamo yesam no 'yam atmjii 'yam loka iti te ha sma putraisanayas ca vittaisaijayas ca lokaisartayas ca vyutthayatha bhikqacaryam caranti" (Br. 4. 4. 22 and 3. 5. 1), i. e., "the sciente of yore did not have any desire for children ; they used to- say: 'as we see that the whole world is nothing but our Atman, why should we have any (other) generation ?' and, without entertaiaing the 'esaya', that is, desire, for wealth,, children, heaven, and the other spheres, such scients used to renounce those things, and roam about the world at will begging for alms" ; or, "suoh persons, who have thus become ascetics, attain Release (Mun^ 1. 2. 11) ; or, ultimately "yad ahar eva virajet tad altar eva pravrajet" (Jaba. 4), i. e., "on such day as your mind beoomes apathetic, on that day you should renounce the world", As the directions of the Vedas are in this way two-fold (Ma. Bha. San. 240-6), it becomes necessary to see whether there is some other means of deciding which of the two paths,- namely, Activism (pramtti) or Renunciation (mvrtti), Karma-Yoga or Sarhkhya, is superior. The question could have been decided by considering the 'acara', that is, the conduct, usage, or oustom of well-behaved persons fsisia) ; but, in this matter, even tha conduct of such persons is seen to be two-fold. It is clear from history that Suka, Yajnavalkya, and others had taken to the Path of Renunciation, whereas Janaka, Sri Krsna, Jaiglsavya and other scients had adopted the Path of Action. Therefore, Badarayanacarya has said in the argument in the demonstrated conclusion {siddhanta-paksa), that both these paths are 'tuiyam tu darsanam', that is, of equal value from the point of view of oonduot (Ve. SB. 3. 4. 9); and there is even a Smrti text that :-

viveld sarvada muktah lairvaio nasti kartrta I

alepawdam asritya srlkrsnajawxkau yatlia II that is, "that person who has acquired complete Knowledge- of the Brahman, is always a non-doer (akarta), isolated (allpta), and eternally released like Sri Krsna and Janaka". *

• Anandagiri has taken this statement as being from the Smftis in his commentary on the Samkarabhasya on the Kathopaoisad (Katha. 2. 19). I have not found whure the original is. SK — Sfi

iZi &ITI-BAHA3TA GE SASlf A-YOC-A

i.i the same -ray, in the BbagaTadgira. after trientiflning'the t.-adition 3! "he ICanna-Y iga r'roni itanii :o Iksvakn etc, it is stated ".bat: "'i'im jilffl'-ii .otViot ':wma manxtir apt mumuk-vhhh" > r il i, 15), L ?-. knowing "his, sdents like Janaka and otbers performed Action, in indent times"; and in the YaaavSsiatha and the Bhseavata. there have been given other illastrariona besides "bat 31 -Janata fYo. 5. 75; Bhsaa. J. 5, 43-45'. If Mine one ioubra -.vhethar Janaka and otaers bad acquired wmpiete Inowledes at the Brahman, I say :bat. it. is sleari" statad in the Yasavasiitha that ail these Tisrsang were 'jimmnnkta' fbirth-?sIessed N ; and, nor only ia the 7 isaTsais'.ba. but also in the Maha'onarata, TySaa is 3tated to have sent bis son 3uka nlfcimacdj ta .Janaka in order ro get Miupleta Knowied^c? cf fee science :f Bslease {Ma. Bha. San. 325. and Yra. 2. 1). 3o also, a^en in "be Upanis3ds. there are traditions that tbe kins Arrraari Kaikayi bad taught the Knowledge of tbe Brahman to the i?si Uddalaka, and that A„arasarn. tbe kins if TTasi. bad taught it fc Gargya Balati f3f, I. 1 1 Y«, -here is nowhere any stat-amanr that either Aavsnati ir Janaka bad jriTan tip their kiasrdem, and bad taken to Benunciauon in tbe f:rm cr tbe Abandonment of Aition. On tbe idler band. in. tbe conversation between Jhnaka- and Sulabha, be i-Iinaka) Srat describes to bar his cwn stats by saying. I iin ittacbmentless. that ia, I am ruling without, being aTOadtied : and if one ci my bands is annointsd with aandal-w-xd pasta, and tbe other band era off, the- pain and the pleasure cf bote, wcula be the same" etc.; arid then goes ca to say: —

inrk.v 'is _~./:i*i/>ii ni.iii'nl . r -s/.;'« ' vjai/ 'nok-^C'-'iZTamai^ i

j ?i;7»3ru'-'w.'iJ"i. ■:vtlxntj ike Tic&.'KSiLsr'^'.'io: j^/iahi fo&majuttiiii.k -vjru.':J:,v]e ■'/ixiijaj. i-iik4mittitzrsiaah.n faJiiiyhhaju'ii aprj iva-'n jOcnam. ksrma cz "mimum i r i-nye>ji:':'i arma ky SorT ™.rf/ai re-ea ntiili^t'iuirtiz n

( Ma. Bha. San. 350. 38-M). that fe, * r chose who know tbs science of Release baTS prescribed ir.r% different syataES: (1/ acfjniring '"jSi-im.\ and abandoning

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA. 435

all Action; that is known by the experts in the science of Release as 'Jfiana-nistha; (2) in the same way, other subtle philosophers mention a Karma-nistha ; but besides the pure Jnana-nistha and the pure Kaima-nistha, this (3) third Nistha or path, (that is, the path of performing Aotion after having destroyed Attachment by means of Know- ledge ) has been mentioned to me by that sage (Pancasikha)". The word 'nistha' means 'that course of leading one's life by which ultimate Release is obtained' ; and ev.en in the ■Samkarabhasya on the Glta, the word 'nistha' has been interpreted as meaning 'anusthet/atatparyam', that is, the 'tatparata (being engrossed) in that which is 'anustlveya'- (to be performed in life). Out of these paths of living one's life, Jaimini and other followers of the Mlmarhsa school have not given any importance to Knowledge, but have maintained that Helease is obtained solely by performing sacrificial ritual : —

ijanu bahiibhih yajiiaih bralimana veda-paragah I sastrani cet pramayum syuh praptus te paramam gatim II

( Jai. Su. 5. 2. 23)

because, if one believes the oontrary, the injunctions of the Sastras, that is, of the Ve'das, will become futile. ( See the Sabara-bhasya on Jai. Su. 5. 2. 23) ; and the writers of the-' Upaniaads, as also Badarayanacarya have treated all saorificial ritual as inferior, and laid down the doctrine that Release is obtained by Knowledge, and that it cannot be obtained by anything other than Knowledge (Ve. Su. 3. 4. 1, 2). But Janaka says that Pancasikha (being himself a follower of •Samkhya philosophy) had taught a third system (nistha) distinct from both these systems, namely, of performing Actions, being -free from Attachment. It becomes clear from the words "distinct from both these nistha" that this third system is not a part of either of the two systems, but is a totally independent ■one. This third system of Janaka has been ultimately mentioned even in the Vedanta-Sutras (Ve. Su. 3. 4. 32-35) ; and even in the Bhagavadglta, it is this third system of Janaka — with the addition of Devotion — which has been mentioned. But the doctrine of the Gita is, that the path of .the Mlmarhsa school, that is, of Karma without Jnana, does

JMrt JfefcdiD iUu«HJ6, DK1 fflLty T» JDBBWBn >9i. £. £l-44.; i. '&);

-&M., iiiaE paih wcist ooas jot jnnmua SaJsaas can aki. not ia e&lieiis. 'nit/titi? •: iweanse. ite ttafimiiiffi of '•MSK'nt as i past w&ifli. liitimaieiT jsaxn to Bsfoass rte bbbstok: 'iw *wBjiin^ l!flewf hie, ilimangi it jfifatriiig in & EEnerbl vet it lin TuaniB Boawj* of "tfHnagnt. Jiiiaia las jefensti id tuns- ffsjhos. jb^ ait yia* Zarms-n&rgfc af ias MjesusS sbiliiiL. •wiisst. BEsflnfla £ir.iwi«Qg4, has been orniswd Tam "the abet a: 'lustiff. KmUm wsiwr TBniBjiiag tw*j bsts test fissffiriiiBC in H£ "reciimiiig if fee •acini vumms xn%i& G-DM <;&1 S. ?). TltesE ass aa SFSam nf Pure Knowledge ^mcinrai, end -fche system af inawikfeB oombiiKfli with Dwinjsss Anfem TTn^) : sue. in snurara of T/'ijfe sapojwi oca f .tf insas two systanffi. (TiamaJT, nf lis flfefl BTfisaai acDarding 15 J&nakai fes iusiarieslL SiBEsfem rf Jaaiib has besi: ■a^m.iuiaA a£ : "karmxiwuu h m,rmmSiam CartulX ;/w»'.'Ka'jjc!r.'" fGi. 3. 36 J, I. £. "Jixsks aai nifbas olnsaJiied Stleasi o-iy by perEanniDg Asians in life my". U-ren if wt 3c not t&£* irfto aconcm lie cssi 3? Jszsiia. safl other Sjsfcriys kiagE. YySsa pmtrsataS ins rwj 'twb-aya snns» Dist&nmirh and Fs.rdn_ in order to iasp Tnihriihi^ ii& ruins lias id' Ticitrsvjrya ; sua hs wrote the Mahlti&radS riy liiae years 1 ooatiaawiE isiiTur in order to raosea 1215- "aarln: tad it Ss w%]i-knwwn litai in "she Kailyngs, Sri ScrisjSis^ya, wis was i piotagaolwt r .€ tihe Samnyasa sehod fas5»5 sn ias Smrife^ je-^stafciMied tie Hindu religras iy ik sufer-iaaaaa infeHligtaefe and icchstry, TJay, iie wnrM nasli fiaais iato tzislsnoe when Ej-airmadera was isady to psrf^rzn Acnka;; aad, as I baTt stated aliOT-c, itere is a simiemiTsi in ibe ifleser^rasai flf tis SiiijiaLljii doefcrine in sie ita&aiiiarata, thai Maiaci and tbe 9ti*T eii mind-bHrn bodb csinie into Erisifince cot of Briiaaa.fe~2, sod stock to i2ae Activfetic pasi t3i d^ih, wkiiosit taking K' afcotiicis'ia, in onier to keep alrre iise cooisb f ;i Action, mrtiers=a6 ite otlbsr Kven mind-tern sons of ButhmnAevn, aurskly, Sanattanmara aad others, were iMm iiirtii foe f jt'ffi lite-It's and followers of tbe Pali of Bemificia- ticalMa Bra. Sin. 39 and MO). The e-xplanadon as 10 wiy tiioee wbo bad r-.Ab-id the Brahman, and even Braimadeva hioMelf, adopt d this Activistic i>ata fpmvrtti-tmrga} of pwformiug At-ti-ju, Eas been given in the VedlantanSitras in the

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 437

following words : "yawd adhikaram avasthitiradhikarinam" (Ve- Su. 3. 3. 32), i. e., "until that which has been prescribed for a particular person by the Paramesvara has been completely performed, he does not escape the performance of Action". This explanation will be considered later on. Whatever the explanation may be, this much becomes dear, namely, that the two Paths of Action (pravrtti), and Inaction (nivrtii), were followed by scients from the very commencement of the world ; and therefore, it is clear that one cannot decide ■as to which of the two is the better path merely from the •conduct of scients.

But, the next argument of Asceticists is that, although one cannot, merely from the consideration of conduct, decide whether Inaction is better than Action, since the traditional conduct is in this way two-fold, yet, as it is clear that there is no Release until one has broken the bondage of Karma, it follows that it is more beneficial to discard the ties of desire-creating Karma, or Aotion, as early as possible after the acquisition of Knowledge. In the Sukanusasana chapter of the Mahabharata — this chapter is also known as 'Sukanuprasna' — the Path of Renunciation has been advocated; and there, to the following question made by Suka to Vyasa, namely,

yad idam vedavacanam kuru karma tyajeti ca I ham diiam vidyaya yanli kani ca gacchanti karmana n

( San. 240. 1 ) that is, "the Vedas enjoin the performance of Aotion, as also the Abandonment of Action; therefore, tell me what results are obtained by 'vidya', that is, by Knowledge without Action, or by Action alone", Vyasa in replying has said :

karmam badhyate jantur vidyaya tu pramucyate I tasmat karnia na kuruanti yatayah paradarsinah it

(San. 240. 7) that is, "by Karma, the created being is bound, and by Knowledge he is released; therefore, the through-seeing Yatins or ascetics, do not perform Action". I have already fully dealt with the first part of this stanza in the last chapter. There is not the slightest dispute about the proposition: "karmava badhyate jantur vidyaya tu

438 GITA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

pramu/Mjate'\ And I have shown in that chapter that if one considers what is meant by the words "karmana badhyate", one sees that, gross or lifeless Karma by itself does not either hind or release anybody; that, man is bound by Karma as a result of his Hope for Fruit, or by his own Attachment; and that, when this Attachment has been got rid of, a man stands Released, notwithstanding that ha may be performing Action by his external organs. With this idea in mind, Sri Eamacandra says to Laksmana in the Adhyatma-Eamayana, that:

pravahapaliiah karyam kurvanr. api na lipyate i bahye sanatra kartrtvam amhann api rughava II

that is, "the man who has fallen in the stream of minima (worldly life), which is the embodiment of Action, remains untouched, though he may externally perform all sorts of duties". When one considers this doctrine of the philosophy of the Absolute Self, one sees that it is no more necessary to abandon Action on the ground that it is productive of unhap- pinegs, and that it is enough if one makes one's mind pure and equable, and gives up the hope of reward. In short, though theie may be an opposition between Knowledge and Desireful Action, no kind of opposition can exist between Knowledge and Desireless Action. Therefore, in the Anuglta, instead of the phrase fasmat karma na kurvanti", i. e., "therefore Actions- are not performed", it is stated that:

tasmat karmasu nihsneha ye kecit pamdarsinah ll

(Asva. 51. 33.)

that is: "therefore, through-seeing scients are not attached to Action"; and before that sentence, there is a clear defence and advocacy of the Karma-Yoga in the following words, namely,

kurvate ye ta karmani sraddadhana vipascitah I anasiryogasamyuktas te dhirah sadhudarsinah n

(Asva. 50. 6,7 )

that is, "those acients, who, having faith, adopt the (Karma-) Yoga path and perform Actions without entertaining desire, are sadhudarsin" . In the same way, in the advice given by

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 43*

Saunaka to Yudhisthira in the Vanaparva, there has been added to the following first part of the stanza,

yadidam vedavacamtii kuru karma tyajeti ca I

the following latter part, namely,

tasmad dharman iman sarvan riabhimanat sarmcaret, II

(Vana. 2, 73).

that is, "though the Vedas enjoin both the performance of and the abandonment of Action, one should perform all one's duties (Karma) without entertaining the pride (of being the doBr)" ; and in the Sukanuprasna also, Vyasa has in two plaoes clearly said to Suka that:—

esapuroalara crttir brahmanasya vidhlyate I jnanavan era Ixtrmani kurvan sarvatra sklhyati n

( Ma. Bha. San. 237. 1; 334. 39.)

that is, "obtaining Release by acquiring Knowledge and also performing Actions, is the most ancient {purvataraj method of Brahmins". It is clear that Karma combined with Jfiana, and after the acquisition of Jnana, is intended by the words jnanavan eva. When one considers dispassionately these statements which support either side of the question, it becomes clear that the argument "karm-jna badliyate jantuh", does not yield the only inference "tasmai karma na kuruanti", i. e., "there- fore, Actions are not performed", which supports Abandonment of Action, but also the equally important inference "tastnat karmasu nihsnehah", i. e., "therefore, one does not become attached to Karma "—which is in support of Desireless Action. It is also not that I alone dTaw this two-fold inference of my own accord, but even Vyasa himself has clearly expressed this meaning in the following verse from the Snkamiprssrsa , namely,

drau imai atha panthanau yasmiii vedah pratistlulah I pravrttilaksano dharmah nivrttis ca vibliasitah II *

( Ma, Bha. San. 240. 6 ).

• There are the following other readings of this part oftha

second line of the stanza, namely, ' niirltii en subtiafitah ' and

440 GITA.-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

that is, "such are the two modes of life, both of which are equally supported by the Vedas, — the one is the Activistic path, and the other is of Inaction, that is, of Renunciation". So also, as I have mentioned before, is it stated in the Narayanlya doctrine that these two paths have existed independently from the commencement of the world. Bat, as both these paths have been mentioned independently, as occasion arose, in the Maha- bbarata, we find in one and the same Mahabharata statements, which support the Path of Inaction, side by side with state- ments, which support the Path of Activism; and in the commentaries on the Glta, which support the Path of Renunciation, the statements supporting the Path of Inaction have been referred to as the only important ones, as though there could ba no other path, or as if any other path which might be possible, was either inferior, or only a preparatory step of the Path of Renunciation. But, this kind of argument is only doctrinal ; and on that account, though the meaning of the Glta is clear and plain in itself, it has now-a-days become unintelligible to many. The stanza " dvav imav atha panthamm" etc., is of the same importance as the stanza "We 'smin dvividha mstka" (Gi. 3. 3) in the Glta; that is to say, one can clearly see the intention to refer in this place to two modes of life which are of equal value, But soma persons, closing their eyes to this plain meaning, and to the previous and subsequent context, attempt to maintain that this verse indicates only one path and not two paths.

Though the Vedic religion thus falls into these two independent paths of Karma-Sarhnyasa (Sarhkhya) and Desire- less Action (Yoga), yet, as the Gita does not look upon them as equally good alternatives, but is of the firm opinion that 'the Karma- Yoga is superior to the Path of Renunciation', it further says, in support of the superiority of Karma-Yoga, that it will be impossible for us to abandon Karma, so long as the world in which we live, as also our very existence in it for even a single moment, is itself Karma ; and if one has to live in this world, that is to say, in this land of Actio n, how nivrttii at vibKaviiah'. Whichever reading iB takeo, tun words " dvav imau " appear ia the beginning in each reading 1 , and from this, it is clear that these two paths are independent.

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 441

•can one escape Action ? We see ourselves that thirst, hunger, and other desires do not leave us so long as our body lives {(31. 5. 8, 9) ; and if the Path of Renunciation gives us the liberty of performing a disgraceful Action like begging for satisfying those desires, what prevents us from performing all other worldly Actions, prescribed by the Sastras, with a ■desireless frame of mind ? If a person wishes to give up the performance of these other Actions, fearing that he will lose the happiness of the Brahman, or forget his Non-Dualistie Realisation of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman, by becoming bound up in the bonds of Karma, his mental ■oontrol must be looked upon as still imperfect; and all Abandonment of Action made when the mental control is not perfect, is, according to the Glta, the result of ignorance {moha) and is a tamasa or futile act (Gl. 18. 7; 3. 6). Not only is this so, but it naturally follows that in order to perfect such imperfect mental control by means of the purification of the mind, such a man must continue to perform the Karma prescribed by the Srutis or Smrtis for a householder, such as, sacrificial ritual, charity etc,, which promotes the desireless frame of mind. In short, such an Abandonment of Action is never meritorious. Well ; if you say that the man's mind is unaffected by objects of pleasure and is under his control, then why should he be afraid of Karma, or, why should he take up the futile attitude of not-performing Action ? Just as an umbrella made for protecting against rain, can be tested only in the rain, so also, or, by the comprehensive test of Kalidasa.:-

vikaralietau sati vikriyante I

yesam na cetamsi ta eoa dhlrah ll

(Kumara, 1. 59)

that is : " that man, whose mind does not fall a prey to mental confusion, when the objects which create the emotions are in front of the eyes, may truely be said to be brave", is the control of the mind really tested by means of Karma ; and the fact as to whether or not the mind has become perfeot is ascertained not only by others, but also by the doer of the Actions himself. It, therefore, follows, even on this basia, that vthose Actions which befall one acoording to the injunctions

ii-Z GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

of the Sastras, that is to say, those Actions which befall one in the stream of life, must be performed (Gi. 18. 6). If one says, " I am not afraid that the acquired purification of my mind will be affected by the performance of Action, because, my mind is under proper control; but I do not wish to waste my time in the performance of Action, and thereby un- necessarily tire my body, if it is not necessary to do so for obtaining Release", such an abandonment of Action, which is due to the contemptible fear of troubling the body, becomes a ' raj .na' abandonment, and the fruit or good result to be obtained by Abandonment ot" Action, is not obtained by the man who abandons Action in this way (Gi. 18. 8). Then^ why is Action to ba abandoned at all '! If some one says that it is not proper for the Self, which pertains to the perma- nent world of the Brahman, to take part in Action, which per- tains to the Maya-world and is non-permanent, even such an objecticn is not proper ; because, if the Paiamatman Itself is- covered by Maya, where is the objection for a man to be clothed in Maya in the same way ? Just as there are the two -divisions, of the wcrfd, namely, the Brahman-world and the Maya-world, so also are there the two divisions of the Self and of the corporeal organs in the case of a human being. Out of these, couple the Self with the Brahman, merge the Self in the Brahman, and,, keeping your mind unattached in this way, by realising the- identity of the Brahman and the Atman, perform all the activities in the Maya-world by the Mayic corporeal organs ; that is all When one behaves in this way, not only will there be no obstruction to one's obtaining Release, but further, the proper portions will be joined together, and one will not incur the blame of not having shown proper respect to, or having disjointed, any portion of the creation ; and one will obtain the merit of having performed one's duty both in the Maya-world and in the Brahman-world— this world and the next. This is the theory which has been supported in the Isavasyopanisad (Isa. 11). But, these statements from the Srutis will be considered in detail later on. For the time being, I will only say that the statement in the Gita, that the scients, who realise the identity of the Brahman and the Atman, perform all activities in the illusory world merely by their body or merely

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 443

by their organs (Gl. 4. 21 ; 5. 12), means the same thing ; and the propositions in the Gits (Gl. 18. 9), that "the true sattvika Abandonment of Action consists in performing Actions with an unattached frame of mind, without entertaining the hope of reward, and merely as a duty", and that "the non-performance of Action is not the true abandonment of Action", have been made to bring out this idea. Though Karma belongs to the Maya-world, the Paramesvara has created it for some- unintelligible reason ; and, it is not within the power of any human being to stop it ; it is within the power only of the Paramesvara to do so; and there is no doubt that the performance of Actions merely by the body, keeping the Reason unattached, does not prevent a person from obtaining Release. Then, where is the objection to performing the Actions prescribed by the Sastras through the medium solely of the' organs and being renounced in Mind ? It is said in the Gita that, "na hi kaicil ksanum api jalu tistliaty akarmahri" (Gi. 3. 5 » 18. 11), i. e., "in this world, no one can for a single moment remain without performing Action"; and, in the Anuglta, that "naiskarmyamnaea loke 'smin muhurtam api labhyate" (Aiva. 20. 7), i. e., "in this world, there is no escape from Karma (for anybody) even for a single moment". Not only men, but even. the Sun and the Moon are continually performing Action ! Nay: as it is definite that Karma is nothing but the creation, and that the creation is nothing but Karma, we ourselves see that the activities of the world, that is to say, Karma, does not rest for a moment. The Blessed Lord has said in the Bhagavadglta (Gi. 3. 8) that, "if one gives up Action, it will be impossible to get food to eat, and Draupadi has said to Yudhisrtiira in the Mahabharata that "akarmanam vai bhutamm vrttih sijan na hi kacana" (Vana. 32. 8 ), i. e., "living beings cannot exist without performing Action"; and accordingly, even Sri Samartha Ramadasa Svami says in the Dasabodha, after having referred to the Knowledge of the Brahman, that : "if one tries to reach the highest goal, giving up the activities of life I one will not get even food to eat" I (Da. 12. 1. 3). And, if one considers the life of the Blessed Lord Himself, He is" seen to be performing the Action of helping saints and destroying villains in this illusory world from Yuga to Yuga..

444 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

by taking up various incarnations (Gi. 4. 8. and Ma. Bha. San. 1539. 103); and the Blessed Lord has Himself said in the Glta, that if He did not perform these Actions, the world would become desolate and be destroyed ( Gi. 3. 24 ). If the Blessed Lord Himself is, in this -way, performing Actions for the -maintenance of the world, it clearly follows that there is no sense in saying that the performance of Action after the -acquisition of Knowledge is useless. Therefore, the Blessed Lord advises everybody in the name of Arjuna, according to "the rule, "yah kriyavan sa panditah" ( Ma. Bha. Vana. 312. 108 ), i. e. "that man is the truly learned man, who is a doer", that -since nobody in this world can escape Karma, one must perform all the duties which befall one according to one's own status in life, giving up the desire for fruit, that is, with one's mind in a state of renunciation, in order that one should not be affected by Karma; and that this is the only and the best way (Yoga) which is possible for man. Matter (praktti) will always go on performing its activities; but when one gives up the egotistical idea that he is the performer of the Action, one is Released (Gi. 3. 27; 13. 29; 14. 19; 18. 16). Not only is the non- perfoimance of Action, or Renunciation in the shape of the Abandonment of Action (as prescribed by the Samkhyas), not necessary to obtain Release, but it is never possible to entirely abandon Action in this world of Action.

To this, some persons raise a further objection, that though it may not be necessary to abandon Action for breaking the bondage of Karma, and it may be enough to merely give up the desire for the fruit of Karma, yet, when the mind has become desialess as a result of the acquisition of Knowledge, and all desires have been destroyed, there remains nothing which will provoke one to perform Action ; and therefore, if not ■as a result of the fear of unnecessarily taxing the body, at least as a result of the destruction of Desire, Karma comes to an rmd of itself. The highest goal of a man in this world is the obtaining of Release; and, as the man who has obtained such Release by means of Knowledge has no more any 'esana' -(desire) for children, wealth, or heaven (Br. 3. 5. 1 and 4. 4. 22), it is the natural, inherent and ultimate result of such Jnana, that Karma should leave such a person, although he may not wish

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 445

to give it up. That is why it is stated in the Uttaraglta that: jnanamrtena trptasya krtukttyasya yoginah I na casti kimcit kartavyam asti cm. na sa tattvavit II

(Uttara. 1, 23). that is, "for that man who has become Accomplished {krtakrtya),. as a result of having drunk the nectar of Knowledge, no further duty remains; and if any further duty remains, that man is not a real 'tattvavit', i. e., Jnanm".*" And if this is looked upon as a fault in a Jnanin, that is wrong. As a matter of fact, Sri. Sarhkaracarya has said that this is an ornament of the person. who has acquired the Knowledge of the Brahman — "alamkaro hy ayam asmakam yad brahmatmauagatau saiyam sarvakariavya- tahanih" (Ve. Su. Sam. Bha. 1. 1. 4). So also, are there such: statements in the Gita as, "tasya karyam na mdyate" (Gl. 3. 17),. i, e„ ,: for the Jnanin, nothing remains to be done"; or, "for him, there is no necessity of the Vedic Karma-ritual" {Gl. 2. 46).. or, "ycgariidhasya tasyaiva samah karatiam ucyate" (Gl. 6. 3),. i. e., "when once a man has become steeped in the Yoga, abandonment (sama) becomes necessary (karana) for him" ; and such adjectives as "sarmrambhaparityagi" (Gj. 12. 16), i, e. "one who has given up all activities" and "aniketah" (Gl. 12_ 19), i. e., "one who has no home" etc. hare been used in the Gita with reference to a Jnanin. Some persons, therefore, think that the Bhagavadglta accepts the position that Karma leaves a man of its own accord, after the acquisition of Knowledge,, But, in my opinion, these meanings ascribed to these words and sentences in the Gita, as also the arguments mentioned above, are not correct. I will, therefore, set out hexe in short what I have to say to the contrary.

As I have already shown above in the chapter on Happiness- 4 and Unhappiness, the Gita does not accept the position, that when a man has acquired Knowledge, all his wishes or desires.

■* The idea that this verso ia from the Sruti» is not corr«;t. It. does not appear in the Samkara-bhasy.j on the Yedanta-SStras; but it lias been taken by Samkaraeaiyain hi' BhSsya on tha Sanatsujatlya, and it is there stated to be from the LiDga-pnrana. It is dearly not. in support of Karma-Yoga, but of the Sam iyas»-m5rga. There are. similar statements in Buddhistic works (See the Appendix,!.

446 &ITA.-RAHASYA OK KAEMA-YOGA

must necessarily have come to an end. There is no unhappiness in merely having a desire or a wish, and the true root of unhappiness is the Attachment, which is part of the Desire. Therefore, the doctrine of the Gita is, that instead of killing desires of all kinds, one should only give up the Attachment to •the objects of desire, and go on performing all Actions. It is not -that when this Attachment is given up, activity must also be simultaneously given up. Nay, it is impossible that activity should come to an end, though Desire may have come to an end ; and we see that whether there is Desire or not, everyday .Actions like breathing etc. continue. But why go so far? Remaining alive, even for a single moment, is an Action by itself : and though a man may have acquired perfect Knowledge, -this living does not come to an end by his desire or by the destruction of his desires. It is a matter of everybody's experience, that no Jnanin commits suicide because he has acquired Knowledge ; and that is why the Gita says that "na hi kvitit ksanam api jalu listhaiy akarmakrt" (Gl. 3. 5), i. e., "no one, whoever he is, can remain without performing Action". 'The first doctrine of the Karma-Yoga in the Gita is, that hi this world of Action, Action is something which befalls every one naturally, and that it is not only a part of the stream of life, but also inevitable, and not dependent on the desire of man. When it has thus been proved that there is no mutual and permanent relationship between Desire and Action, the ■statement, that Karma must come to an end simultaneously with the destruction of desire, falls to the ground of itself; and then the question naturally arises as to in what way the scient (Jnanin) should perform those Actions, which befall him even after the destruction of Desire. The reply to this question is given in the third chapter of the Gita (See Gl. 3. 17-19, and my commentary on it). The Gita accepts the position that there remains no duty for the Jnanin, after the acquisition of Knowledge, as of his own. But it goes further and says that no man, whoever he may be, escapes Action. The two propositions that the Jnanin (scient) is free from duty and that he does not escape Karma, appear to some persons mutually ■contradictory. But the same is not the case with the Gita. It harmonises them by saying that in as much as Karma is

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 447

unavoidable, the scient must perform it even after the acquisition of Knowledge ; but, in as much as a Jfianin has no more any duty for his own Self, it now becomes necessary for him to perform all his duties desirelessly. In short, the word 'tasya' (that is, 'for the Jnanin') in the line "fasya karyam na vidyate", in the seventeenth stanza of the third chapter is more important than the words " karyam na vidyate" ; and the sum and substance of the stanza is, that as there is nothing more to be got by a Jnanin ' as for himself ', he must thereafter, that is, after the acquisition of Knowledge, perform his duties desirelessly ; and the same purport has been conveyed^ to Arjuna by the words, " tasmad asaktah satatam karyam karma ■samaeara" (Gi. 3. 19), i. e., "therefore, go on performing •whatever duties have befallen you, according to the injunction •of the Sastras, without becoming attached to the Karma, and ■do not give up the Karma ", by using the cause-denoting word 'tasmat' in the beginning of the stanza. When this relation of data and conclusion between the seventeenth and the nineteenth verses of the third chapter, as also the entire context of the chapter, is taken into account, it will be seen that it is not correct to take the words "tasya karyam na vidyate' ' as an independent proposition, as is done by the supporters •of the Path of Renunciation, The best proof of this position are the' following illustrations. In support of the proposition- that one has to perform all the duties which befall one as a ■result of the injunctions of the Sastras, even after the acqui- sition of Knowledge, though no duty for one's own benefit remains, the Blessed Lord says immediately afterwards that :-

na me partha 'sti kartavyam trisu, lokesu, kimcana I nanavaptam avaptavyam varta eva ca Icarmani II

(G5. 3. 22). that is : "0 Partha, there is not (remaining) for Me any duty which is Mine in this three-fold universe, nor is there (in Mo any desire to obtain) anything which has not been obtained by Me; see that I am also nevertheless performing Karma". The words, "na me kartavyam asti ", i. e., "for me, no duty has remained " in this stanza have been said with reference to the words, "tasyu karyam na vidyate.", i. e., "for him, there

448 GfTA-BAHASYA m KAMA-YOGA

j&zisSne no 4tJt5'"* , , in tfes former stemsa (Gl 8. 17); ami, ii=TcfisnE, it is {pits efeai Sat Hkees foEr tsr Sine stomas tear -j it ths jTOpaaLtien Sisi, "iSiaagfc hj Siiy assy have ramaiiBd as a rasaJi <& the acquisition of Kasowlwige, yet, amd siren for that very reason, ijas laost par-Harm all fes iiriMS pssoriW oy tie Sisssrasi, -sri& aa unattached frame ©f miiad". Other- wise, His 0wa SlustiailoB given 1st fie Biassed Lard far emphasidag the .losfcrina enunciated in ths sjania, "itas«i iarytiAi s-j ddyils ets '"., bssoaaes totally cut of pla-M; aaiti* impossiMs position of the enanciated doctrine ■hieing 'different from the ffitaferation given, will arise. la order to gel ewer this Impassible position. His commantatois, who follow tie Berraneiaffoa school, interpret the word 'funtSt*, in H» sentence "taimM asari/oi szfafew tsUr^am hi,nra samsmra." > in quite a different way. Aecarding to them, the main doctrine of the BhagaTa.djpta is feat &e seient mast give up Action, But Arjnoa was not a seient; therefore — ■' iagm&i ' — the Blessed Lord has enjuined him to perform Kanna, But as I have already explained above, tie argument that Arjsna was still ignorant, afwi haying heard the Gltl, is incorrect. Besides, even though the meaning of the word ' ia-snm ' may be thus stretched, the illustration about Himself given by the Biassed Lord, in support- of the main proposition, % the words * na me parlha. 'tti Imrtaiyam etc.", i. e., "I am per- forming Action, although no duty is left for Me for My own. benefit", cannot be properly explained in the same way. Therefore, the word ' i<i»ja ' in the sentence " i-igya Icaryam w» lidyate " must be considered important instead of the words- " liaryar/i na vidyaie " : and when that is done, the sentence ' i'lgmad asahtah satafa'tn karyani karma tamaoara " most be interpreted as meaning: "you are a seient; and, therefore, it is true that there is no Karma left for yon for your owe personal benefit ;but, for the very reason that such Karma is not necessary for your own benefit, do whatever duties befall you according to the Sastras, with the feeling ' this fc not fur me ', that is, with a desireless frame of mind ". In short, according to the Glta, the idea ' this is not for me ' does not become a reason for not performing Karma, and we have to draw the inference, that as Action is unavoidable

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 449

therefore, this unavoidable Action, which has been prescribed by the SSstras, must be performed with a self-sacrificing frame of mind; and, considering the matter from the point of view of consistency, the same meaning has to be adopted. This, is the great and important difference between Renunciation of Action (Karma-Sarhnyasa) and Energism (Karma-Yoga). Those who follow the Renunciation school say: "nothing has remained for you to do; therefore, do nothing"; and the Glta. says: "nothing has remained for you to do, for your own benefit; and, therefore, do henceforth whatever you have to do, giving up selfish desires, and with an unattaohed frame of mind". Why should two such different inferences arise from one and the same sentence 1 The only reply to this is, that as the Gits considers Karma as unavoidable, the conclusion, 'therefore, give up Action', cannot at all arise according to the philosophy of the Glta. Therefore, the Glta has drawn the conclusion that Action should be performed, giving up selfish desires, from the data 'it is not for your benefit.' The argument adopted by Vasistha in the Yoga-Vasistha, after he had preached the Knowledge of the Brahman to Rama, for inducing him to perform Desireless Action is the same; and the above-mentioned doctrine of the Bhagavadgita has been adopted literally at the end of the Yoga-Vasistha ( See Yo. 6. U. 199 and 216. 14; and my commentary on the translation of Gi. 3. 19). The teaching of the Glta has been adopted in the Buddhistic religion in the sacred books of the Mahayana sect, in the same way as it has been adopted in the Yoga-Vasistha. But, I have not dealt with that matter here, as it will be straying from the subject, and I have considered it later in the Appendix.

When a man has got the Knowledge of the Atman, the individualistic language of ' I ' and ' mine ' does not remain (Gi. 18. 16 and 26); and therefore, the Jnanin is said to be 'nir-mama. 'nir-mama means, one who does not say, 'mine', 'mine' (mama); and Jnanesvara Maharaja has conveyed the same idea in describing the Jfianin in the following stanza ( omvim ) :

He does not know the word 'I' I

he does not say of anything that it is 'mine' I 57-58

450 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

Experience of pain and happiness I for him there is none II

( Jfia. 12. 149. See p. 346 above).

But, it must not he forgotten that although the feeling of T or 'mine' may be got rid of, as a result of the Knowledge of the Brahman, their place is taken by the words 'the world' and 'for the world' — or speaking in the language of Devotion, by the words 'the Paramesvara', and 'of the Paramesvara'. Every ordinary human being in the world carries out all his activities with the feeling of 'mine', or, 'for my benefit'. But, as that man who has become a scient, has lost his 'mine-ness' {mamatm) l he begins to perform all the activities in the world created by the Isvara with the feeling (the mine-less, i. e., nirmama feeling) that they are of the Paramesvara, and that the Paramesvara has created him for performing them : this is the difference between the Jnanin and the Ajnanin (Gl. 3. 27, 28). When one takes into account this doctrine of the Glta, the plain meaning of the words, " 'sama' becomes a 'kararia' to the person who has become steeped in Yoga", becomes apparent (See. Gl. 6. 3 and my commentary on it). Some commentators on the Gita interpret this stanza as meaning that, the man, who has become steeped in Yoga, should thereafter take to 'sama' that is, 'sMi', and do nothing else. But this meaning is not correct, 'sama' means ' peace of mind ' ; and instead of describing that ' sama' as the ultimate 'result' (karya), it is said in this stanza that thiB 'sama' or 'sanli' is the 'cause' (kararia) of something else— "samah kararum ucyate". Therefore, 'soma' must be considered as a 'kararia' (cause), and we must see what the 'karya' (result) of it is. If one considers the previous and subsequent context, it becomes clear that that result (karya) is 'Karma' ; and then this stanza has to be interpreted as meaning, that the Yogin should make his mind peaceful, and perform all his further activities by means of that sama or sawti (peace); and one cannot interpret it, as has been done by the commentators, as meaning that 'the Yogin (yogarudha) should give up Karma'. In the same way, the words "sarvarambha- parityagi" and "anihetah" must be interpreted as indicating the Abandonment of the Hope of Fruit, rather than the Abandonment

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 451

of the Action itself, as has been shown by me in my commentary attached to the translations of the verses in the various places. The seoond illustration given by the Blessed Lord in addition to His own, for proving the proposition that the JnSnin must perform all the various duties prescribed for the four castes, giving up the Hope for Fruit, and according to the Sastras, is that of Janaka. Janaka was a Karma-yogin of a very high order. He had become unselfish to such a great extent that he is said to have uttered the words: "milhilayam pradiptaya/h na, me dahyati ki/hcana" (San. 275. 4 and 219. 50), i, e., "I will not feel it at all, even if the capital of my kingdom is burnt"; and in explaining why he was still carrying on the activities of ruling, though he had no selfish interest or advantage or disadvantage of his left, Janaka himself says: —

devebhyas ca pitrbhyas ca bhutebhyo 'tithibhih saha l ity artham sarva evaite aamammbha bhavanti oai II

( Ma. Bha. Asva. 32. 24 )

that is, "all these activities are going on for the benefit of the gods, of the ancestors, of all created beings Ibhuta), and of my guests, and not for myself". It need not be said that if noble souls like Janaka and Sri Krsna do not come forward for the benefit of the world, when no duty of any kind is left for their . own benefit, or when they have no desire to obtain any particular thing for themselves, this world will become desolate — "utsideyur ime lokah" ( Gl. 3. 24 ).

Some people say that there is not much of a difference between the doctrine of the Gita that the desire for the fruit must be given up, and that ifc is not necessary to give up desires of all kinds, and the doctrine of the Destruction of Desire; because, as there is no stimulus left towards Action, whether it is Desire which is destroyed, or the hope for the fruit which is destroyed, the ultimate result of Karma being given up, follows in either case. But, this objection is based on ignorance, that is to say, it is [raised because the true meaning of the words 'hope for fruit' (phalasa) has not been understood. Giving up the hope for fruit, does not mean giving up all kinds of Desire, or entertaining the desire that nobody should get the fruit of one's Action, or that if somebody gets

453 GrTA-RAHASYA OR KABMA-YOGA

it, he should not enjoy it. As has been stated by me above in the fifth chapter, the words 'phalasa\ 'sanga' or 'harm' have been used in the Glta to indicate the ATTACHMENT (asakti) or INSISTENCE (agrafia) that, ' I am doing this parti- cular Action in order that the fruit of it must accrue to ME '. But, though one does not entertain the AMBITION, or the INSISTENCE, or the vain Attachment, that the fruit should be obtained, it does not follow that the desire, and also the enthusiasm, to do a particular thing which has fallen on one's shoulders, as a duty, should also disappear with this insistence. It is true that those persons, who do not see anything in this world except their own benefit, and who are continually steeped in performing Actions merely by the ambition of reaping some fruit or other, will not believe that it is possible to perform Actions, giving up the hope for fruit. But, the same is not the case with those persons, whose mind has- become equable, and is in a state of Renunciation as a result of Knowledge. In the first place, the belief that the fruit which one obtains for a particular Action, is the fruit of that Action, is itself wrong. If there is not the assistance of the liquidity of water, or of the heat of fire, it will not he possible for man to cook anything, in spite of all his efforts; and the possessing or not possessing of these qualities by fire etc. is not something, which is within the control of man, or subject to his efforts. Therefore, a man has to make all his various efforts, after having first acquired the knowledge of these self -existent activities in the world of Action, and of the way in which these various activities will become helpful to his own efforts. Therefore, whatever fruit is obtained by a man by his own Action, is not actually the fruit of his Action, but must be said to be the fruit of the union of his Action with the self-existent forces existing in the world of Action, which are promotive of his efforts. But, it very often happens that a man has not acquired a complete knowledge of all these various natural activities, the promotiveness of which is, in this way, necessary to make his efforts successful; and in some cases, it is impossible for him to acquire this knowledge. This is known as DESTINY. If the assistance of natural activities, which are not within our control and which may not even be known

RENUNCIATION and KARMA-YOGA 453

to us, is thus necessary in order that success should crown our ■efforts, believing that ' I will do a particular thing purely by my own efforts' is naturally an extremely foolish belief (Gi. 18. 14-16); because, in as much as the fruit to be obtained by the co-operation between the known and the unknown activities of the natural world of Action and the efforts of man, is the result of the laws of Action (Karma), there will not be the slightest difference, so far as the success of the effort goesi whether one entertains the desire for fruit, or does not entertain it; and there is only the chance of one's hope for tbe fruit oausing one unhappiness. Nevertheless, the activities of Nature do not of their own accord bring about that thing which a man wants- As it is necessary to add salt to the flour, in order to make the hread palatable, so also is it necessary to add some human effort, more or less, to these self-existent activities of the Natural world of Action, in order that they should become beneficial to man. Therefore, those persons, who are scients and discriminators, do not entertain any Attachment or ambition about the fruit of their Action, and perform the small or big portion of Sastra-enjoined Action which is destined for them, consistently with their authority, in the eternal course of Karma (pravaha-patita), in order to carry on the activities of the world; and they rely on the co-operation (sunyoga) between Action (Karma) and Destiny (Dharma), so far as the question of the success of the effort goes; or, speaking in the language of Devotion, they rely on the desire of the Parame- svara, so far as that matter goes. This is what is implied in the advice: "Your authority extends only to the performance of Action; obtaining the result is not a matter which you can control" (Gl. i. 47), given by the Blessed Lord to Arjuna. When one goes on performing Action, without entertaining any hope for the fruit, one does not have any reason for feeling unhappy about the fruitlessness of the Action, if for any reason it becomes fruitless, as one has performed the duty of doing the Action, which is the only thing within one's control. For instance, the science of Medicine tells us, that unless the thread of life (that is, the inherent strength of the vital elements in the body) is strong, a patient never gets well merely hy Medicines ; and, as the strength of this thread is the result of

454 GIT5.-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

many pie-destined or hereditary causes, that is a matter whioh is outside the control of the doctor, and it is even impossible for him to definitely calculate the quantity of that strength- Yet, we actually see, that considering it his duty to give medicine to his patients, a doctor medicates thousands of patients in this way, to the extent of his abilities, and purely with the intention of doing good to others. When a doctor has thus disinterestedly performed his duty of giving medicine, not only does he not become despondent, if a particular patient is not oured, but he even draws up with a peaceful mind the statistics, that a particular percentage of patients is cured by a particular medicine. But, when the son of that same dootor falls ill, and he has to give medicine to him, he forgets the fact that there is such a thing as 'the thread of life,' and becoming confused by the selfish Hope of Fruit, in the shape of the idea that 'my son must get well', he calls in another doctor to treat his son, or at any rate for consultation. This simple illustration will explain what is meant by the selfish Attachment to the Result of Action, and how it is possible to perform some Action merely as a duty, even when there is no hope as regards the result- It is true that in order that the Hope for result may thus be destoryed, the mind has to be imbued with Renunciation, by means of Knowledge. But, just as when one is asked to take away the colour (characteristic) from a piece of cloth, it does not become necessary to destroy the cloth, so also, when it is said that one should not entertain Desire, Attachment, or Low in the matter of Action, it does not follow that Action itself should be given up. If it were to become impossible to perform Action as a result of Renunciation, that would be a different matter. But, not only is it possible to perform Action, in spite of Renunciation, but also, as we ourselves see, nobody can at any time escape Karma. Therefore, the true prinoiple of leading one's life, from the point of view of Ethics, and. from the point of view of Release, is that the scient should, after acquisition of Knowledge, perform those very Actions,, which are performed by the ignorant with a Hope for Result, but looking upon advantage or disadvantage, happiness or unhappiness as one and the same (Gi. %. 38) ; and courageously

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 455

and enthusiastically, but with a pure Reason, that is, being renounced or indifferent in the matter of the fruit (Gl. 18. 26k and -with a peaceful mind, according to his own authority, and purely as a matter of duty (Gl. 6. 3). This is the course of Aotion, which has been adopted by numerous Steady-in- minds (stltitaprajrla), by devotees of the Blessed Lord, by parsons who have acquired the highest knowledge, nay, even by the Blessed Lord Himself ; and the highest goal of man consists in this Path of Energism (Karma-Yoga); and the Bhagavadglta proclaims in unquestionable terms that ultimate Release results from this ' Yoga ' on aocount of the worship of and meditation on the Paramesvara whioh it entails (Gl. 18. 46). If in spite of this, some one intentionally mis- understands the matter, we must look upon him as unfortunate. Spencer did not accept the Metaphysical point of view. Yet f he has in his book called the Study of Sociology come to the conclusion, that since, even from the Materialistic point of view, it is not possible for a man to cause anything to happen at once in this world, and human efforts are fruitful, fruitless, or more or less fruitful in proportion to the way in which the hundreds of other causative things, which are necessary for it to happen, have happened previously, the wise man must go on performing his duties peacefully and enthusiasticallyt without entertaining any Desire for Result of Action, though the ordinary man is induced to perform the Action only by desire for the fruit— which is the same as what the Glta

Even if it is thus proved that the scient must, so long as life lasts, desirelessly perform all the duties, which befall him in the course of life, having given up the Hope for Result, the

• "thus admitting that for the fanatic, some wild anticipation

is needful as a stimulus; and recognising the usefulness of his delusion as adapted to his particular nature °nd his particular function, the man of higher type must be content with greatly moderated expectations, while he perseveres with undiminished efforts. He has to see how comparatively little can be done, and jet to find it worth while to do that little: so uniting philanthropic energy with philosophic calm" — Spenoer's Study of Sociology 8th Ed. p. 403. ( The italics are ours ;. If, in this sentence, une substitutes

456 GlTA-RAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA

subject matter of Kama- Yoga is not exhausted -unless it is explained why, and for what purpose, these Actions at all come into existence. Aud, therefore, the last and the most important direction of the Blessed Lord to Arjuna in support of the doctrine of Karma-Yoga is that: " lokasamgraliam eva 'pi sampasyan kartum arhasi" (Gi. 3. 20), i. e., " even having regard to publio benefit {lokasamgraha), you must perform these Actions". Public benefit does not mean 'making societies of men' or 'making a farce of performing Action like other people, though one has the right to abandon Action, in order that ignorant people should not give up Action, and in order to please them'; because, the object of the Glta is not that people should remain ignorant, or that scients should make a farce of performing Action, only in order to keep them ignorant. Far from any hypocrisy being advised, when Arjuna was not satisfied by arguments which would have been conclusive for ordinary people, such as, "people will sing YOUR disgrace" (Gi. 2. 34 ) etc., the Blessed Lord goes on to give more weighty and philosophically more powerful arguments. Therefore, the word 'samgraha', which has been defined in dictionaries to mean 'protecting,' 'keeping', 'regula- ting' etc., has in this placate be taken in all those meanings according to tbe context; and when that is done 'lokasamgraha' {public benefit) means "blading men together, and protecting, maintaining and regulating them in such a way that they might acquire that strength which results from mutual co-operation, thereby putting them on the path of acquiring merit while maintaining their good condition." The words 'welfare of a nation' have been v-A in the same sense in the Manu-Smrti (7. 144) and the wed 'lokasamgraha' has been defined in the

the words 'maddtnad by the qualities of Matter' (Gi. 3. 29), or, 'befooled by Individuation (ahamBra)' (Gi. 3. 27), or, tha word ' fool ' used by. tbe dramatist BLSaa (see p. 430 above — Trans.) for the word 'fanatic', and one substitutes the word 'vidvun' (scient) (Gi. 5.25) for the words 'man of higher type', and the words ' indifference towards the i rait of Action,' or 'abandonment of the fruit of Action', for the words 'greatly moderated expectations', one may almost say that Spencer has copied the doctrine of the Gita, , •

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 457

Samkarabhasya as meaning "lokasyonmargapi'avrttinivaraxiam" (i. e., "weaning men from the tendency to take to the path of wrong"); and from this it will be clear, that my interpretation of that word as meaning "making wise, those persons who behave recklessly as a result of ignorance, and keeping them together in a happy state, and putting them on the path of . self-amelioration" is neither strange nor without authority The word 'samgrahd has been explained in this way. I must now make it clear that the word 'loka' in 'lokasarugraha' does not indicate only mankind. It is true that the word 'loka- sarhgralia' ordinarily means 'the benefit of human beings', as man is superior to the other created beings in the world" Yet, in as much as the Blessed Lord also desires that the bhurloka, satyaloJca, pitrloka, devaloka, and the several other loka or worlds, which have been created by Him, should also be properly maintained and go on in a proper way, I must say that the word ' lolaxsamgraha ' has, in this place, the comprehensive meaning that the activities of all these various spheres should go on properly in the same way as those of mankind, (lokasafngraha=lokanafii samgrahdh, i. e., the main- tenance of various worlds). The description given above by Janaka of the way in which he performed his duties refers to the sphere of gods and the sphere of ancestors ; and it is stated in the description of the cycle of Yajfias (sacrifioial ritual), which has been given in the third chapter of the Bhagavadglta, and in the Narayaniyopakhyana of the MahSbharata, that Brahmadeva has created the Yajiia in order ■that the sphere of humans, as also the sphere of gods, should be maintained (Gl. 3. 10-12). From this, it becomes clear that "the word ' lolcasamgraha ' has been used in the Bhagavadglta to mean the maintenance, not only of human beings, but that the human and all the other spheres, such as of the gods etc., should be maintained, and that they should become mutually beneficial. This authority or right of the Blessed Lord of performing loka- samgraha by maintaining the entire universe in this way, is acquired by a man when he becomes a Jnanin as a result of rthe acquisition of Knowledge. Whatever is considered proper by a JfUnin, is also considered proper by other people, and Jthey behave accordingly (Gl. 3. 21); because, ordinary people

458 CHTA-RAHASYA OB KAKMA-YQGA

believe that it is the Tight of Jfianins (soients) to consider with a peaceful and equable mind, in what way the maintenance and- uplift of the entire world can best be carried on, and to lay down the rules of Ethics accordingly; and such a belief is not ill-founded. Nay, one may even say that ordinary people put faith in Jfianins in this matter, because they themselves do- not understand these things correctly. It is for expressing the same idea that Bhisma has said to Yudhisthira in the Santiparva that :-

lokasamgrakasamyuktam vidhatra vihitaih piira l suksmadharmarthaniyatam satam caritam uttamam II (Ma. Bha. San. 258. 25)

that is, "Brahmadeva himself has created the most excellent lives of saints in order to explain which path of duty should be adopted on critical occasions, as beir.g universally beneficial"- It, therefore, follows that lokasangraha does not mean some humbug or other, or, a trick for keeping people in ignorance, but means one of the import; bt duties created by Brahmadeva for saints; because, the world is likely to be destroyed if Action based on Knowledge disappears from the world. The same purport is conveyed by the following words of the Blessed Lord, namely, "if I do not perform this Action, all these 'loka that is, spheres, will be destroyed" (3. 24). The scients are the eyes of the world; and if they give up their duties, the world will become blind, and cannot but be destroyed. It is the scients who have to make people wise and ameliorate their condition. But, such a thing cannot ba done by mere oraL directions, that is, by mere advice ; because, as we always see it in the world, if some one merely preaches the Knowledge of the Brahman to those people, who are not in the habit of behaving righteously, and whose minds are not purified, they misapply the knowledge, saying, "what is yours is mine, and what iB mine is also mine". Besides, it is usual for people to test the correctness of the advice given by a particular person by reference to his own behaviour. Therefore, if the scient does not perform Action himself, that becomes an excuse for ordinary people to become idle. This is what is meant by 'buddhi-bheda' (difference of vision); and in order that such a

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 459

difference of vision should not arise, and that people should beoome really desireless, and should be alive to their duties, it is the duty (not the hypocrisy) of scients to remain in worldly life and to give a living lesson to ordinary people of moral behaviour (sadacxrana), that is, of living their lives desirelessly, by showing them their own behaviour. Therefore, the Gita says that a scient never acquires the right to give up Action, and that it is necessary for him to perform the various duties which have been enjoined for the four castes, for promoting universal benefit, if not for their own benefit. But, as the followers of the- school of Renunciation are of opinion that the Jnanin need not perform the activities enjoined on the various castes, with a desireless frame of mind, or need not even perform them at all, the commentators belonging to this school of thought, have made a mess of the doctrine of the Giti. that a scient must go on performing Actions for universal benefit ; and they seem to be prepared to indirectly, if not directly, suggest that the Blessed Lord has Himself given only hypocritical advice !' But, it beoomes clear from the previous and subsequent context that this forceless interpretation of the word ' lokasamgraba r used in the Gita, is not correct. The Gita does not in the first place admit the position that the Jnanin has got a right to- give up Action ; and lolcasamgraha is the most important- reason out of the various reasons adduced in the Gita for the Jnanin not doing so. It is, therefore, absolutely unjust to first take it for granted that a Jnanin can give up Aotion and then to interpret the word lolcasamgralta as meaning something hypocritical. Man has not come into this world merely for his own benefit. It is true that ordinary people are engrossed in selfish activities as a result of ignorance. But, if a man, to whom the whole world has- become identified with himself as " sarvabhutastham aJtrnoMxin sarvabhutani catmani", i.e., "I am in all created beings, and. all created beings are in me", says: "Release has beeni attained by ME, now why should I care if everybody else is- unhappy ? ", he will be degrading his own Knowledge by his own mouth. Is the Atman of a scient something which is independent or individual 1 So long as his Atman was covered by the cloak of ignorance, the difference between 'I' andV

460 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

'the world ' existed; but after the acquisition of Knowledge, the Atman of the world becomes bis own Atman; and therefore, Vasistha has said to Rama in the Yoga-Vasiatha that :-

yawl lohxparamarso nirudho nasti yoginah I

tavad rudkasamadhitvam na bhavaty eva nirmcdam II

(Yo. 6. Pu. 128. 9?)

that is, "so long as the duty of looking after other people (that is of lokasanigratia) remains to howsoever small an extent, it

■ cannot be said that the state of the person, who has attained Yoga, has become free from blame". For such a man to become

■ engrossed in the happiness of meditation, is to some extent like attending only to his own selfish needs. The chief fault in the argument of the supporters of the school of Renuncia- tion, is that they disregard this factor. It is not possible to

■come across any one who is more a Jnanin, more desireless, or more fully a Yogin, than the Blessed Lord. But if even the Blessed Lord Himself takes incarnations from time to time for universal benefit, e. g., for "the protection of saints, the destruction of villains, and the re-establishment of religion

•(dliarma)", ( Gi. 4. 8), it would be totally improper for a Jnanin to give up universal welfare, and say: "that Paramesvara who has created all these various spheres, will maintain them in any way He likes; that is no part of my duty"; because, after the acquisition of Knowledge, the difference of 'Paramesvara', T and "the world' does not remain; and if such a difference remains, then such a man is not a Jnanin : he is a hypocrite. If a Jnanin becomes uniform with the Paramesvara as a result of Jnana, how will he escape the necessity of performing that Action which isparformedbythe Paramesvara, in the same way as it is performed by the Paramesvara, that is, desirelessly (Gl. 3. 22 and 4. 14 and 15)? Besides, whatever the Paramesvara has to do, has to be done by Him through the medium of ■sclents. Therefore, active noble sentiments, full of sympathy to- wards all created beings, must arise in the mind of the man who has had the direct Realisation of the form of the Paramesvara in the shape of the feeling that 'there is only one Atman in all ■created beings'; and the trend of his mind must naturally be

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 461

towards universal welfare. The Saint Tukarama has with; that intention described the characteristic features of a saint- by the following words: —

Of them who are unhappy and in distress I

he who says that they are his 1 That man should be recognised as a saint I know that God is in such a man I

(Ga. 960. 1-2) Or, He who spends his energies in doing good to others I has realised the true state of the Atman I

(Ga. 4563).

And he has described Saints, that is, those noble souls who- have Realised the Paramesvara by means of Devotion in the- following terms :-

The incarnations of saints are for the public welfare I they labour their own bodies for the benefit of

others II (Ga. 929).

And Bhartrhari has said that,, " svartho yasija parartha eva sa- puimn ekah satam agranlh", i. e., "that man with whom the interests of others have become identical with his own, is really the highest of saints". Were not Manu and other law-makers, Jnanins ? But, instead of exaggerating the worth of the illusion in the shape of the pain of Desire, and destroying all natural instincts, such as, of doing good to others etc- along with Desire, they have laid down the Sastric bonds, such as the arrangement of the four castes etc., for the universal benefit ( lokasavigraha ). The laws which prescribe learning for the Brahmins; warfare, for the Ksatriyas ; agriculture, protection of oattle, and business for the Vaisyas i and service for the Sudras and which have been enjoined by the Sastras consistently with the characteristic qualities of the different castes, have not bean made for the benefit of every individual, It is stated in the Manu-Smrti, that the division .

462 GITA-RAHAYSA OB KARMA-YOGA

<rf vocations among the four castes, has been made for universal benefit, bearing in mind the fact that in the interests of the protection of society, some persons must for a consider- able length of time study warfare and be ready for war, and that others have got to meet the other needs of society by attending to agriculture, business, education, and other matters; and even the Gita supports the same division (Manu, 1. 87 ; Gl. 4 13 ; 18. 41). I have stated above that if any of these four castes ceases to perform its duties, then to that extent, society will be incapacitated, and even runs the risk -of being destroyed. Nevertheless, it is not that this vocational division is uniform everywhere. The arrangements which have been ■suggested for the maintenance of society by the ancient Greek Philosopher Plato in his book on this subject, and by the modern French Philosopher Comte in his book called Natural Philosophy, though similar to the arrangement of the four wastes, are yet, to some extant, different from the arrangement of four castes mentioned in the Vedic religion, as will be seen by any one reading those books. Many questions have arisen on this point, such as, which arrangement of society is the best of these all; or, whether this goodness of arrange- ment is relative; and whether there can be a change in it by reference to change of times ; and, the welfare of society {lokasamgraha) has become a very important science at the present day in Western countries. But, as my present object is only to elucidate the import of the Gita, it is not necessary for me to consider those questions here. It cannot be doubted that at the time of the Gita, the arrangement of the four castes was rigidly enforced, and that it had originally been given effect to for the welfare of society. Therefore, I have to mention here emphatically, that lokasamgraha according to the Gita means, giving to other people a living example ■of how one can perform desirelessly all the various activities, which are allotted to one, according to the arrangement of the four castes. Scients are not only tha eyes, but also the preceptors of society. Therafore, in order to effect lokasamgraha as mentioned above, it becomes necessary for them to engage in such activities, as will prevent the disruption of the self- maintaining and self-uplifting capacity of society, and will

RENUNCIATION and KARMA-YOGA 463

allow it to grow, after they have in the first place weeded out whatever they might find faulty in the prevalent social arrangements, having _ regard to the changed times and places, as was done by Svetaketu. In order to effect universal welfare in this way, Janaka continued to rule till the end of his life instead of renouncing the world, and Manu consented to become the first king; and it is for this reason that there is frequent advice in the Gita to Arjuna to engage in the warfare, which was the law for him in accordance with the arrangement of the four castes, by the use of such expressions as the f ollowing:- "svadharmam api caveksya m vikampitum arhasi" ( Gl. 2. 31), i. e. "it is not proper that you should bemoan having to perform that duty which is your lot according to your caste"; or, "svabhava- niyatam karma human napnoti kilbisam" (Gl. 18. 47), i, e., "by ■doing that duty which has been enjoined on you by the arrange- ment of the four castes, having regard to characteristic •natures, you will not incur any sin". No one says that one •should not, to the best of one's capacity, acquire the Knowledge of the Paramesvara. Nay, it is the doctrine also of the Gita that it is the highest duty of every human being in this world to acquire this Knowledge. But, as the benefit of one's own Atman also includes exerting oneself to the fullest extent of ■one's abilities, for the benefit of the all-pervading Atman, the Gita goes further and says that the Realisation of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman ultimately resolves itself into bringing about lokasamgralm. Nevertheless, from the fact that -a particular person has acquired Knowledge of the Brahman, it does not follow that he, on that account, becomes capable of personally taking part in all the various vocations in the world. Both Bblsma and Vyasa were great Jnanins, and great •devotees of the Blessed Lord. But no one says that Vyasa could have carried out the work of warfare as well as Bhisma; and even if one considers the gods, one does not find that the work of destroying the world has been entrusted to Visnu .instead of Sankara. The state of being birth-released ( jivan- .mukta) is the last stage of the mind 's freedom from objects of .pleasure, and of an equable and pure Reason, and of Metaphysical .excellence; it is not a test of excellence in Material vocations. Therefore, the Gita, has again preached twice in the same chapter

464 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

that the Jfianin must, after acquisition of Knowledge, continue- to perform that business or duty for the universal welfare which is consistent with his. caste, and which he had been performing during the whole of his life consistently with the arrangment of the four castes, which has been based on inherent qualities, because, it is likely that he will be an adept" in that business alone; and that if he takes to any other- business, there is a chance of harm being done to society (Gi. 3. 35; 18. 47). This diverse capacity, which exists within every person, consistently with the god-given inherent natural, characteristics, is known as 'adhikara' ( qualification or autho- rity) ; and it has been stated in the Vedanta-Siitras, that "yavad adhikaram avaslhitir adhikarinam" (Ve. Su. 3. 3. 32), i. e,, "even if a man has acquired the knowledge of the Brahman, he must go on performing those duties, which are his lot according to his qualification (adlukara), so long as he lives, for the welfare

• 3f society". Some say that this injunction of the Vedanta-

Siitras applies only to persons, who are really men of high authority; and if one considers the illustrations given in the commentaries on these Sutras, in support of the Sutra, it is seen that they are of Vyasa and other persons holding high: authority. But, the original Sutra makes no mention of the greatness or the smallness of authority. Therefore, the word ' adhikara' must be taken to mean high or low qualification of every kind; and if one considers minutely and independently what this qualification is, and how it is acquired, it is seen that in as much as the Paramesvara created man simultaneously with society, and society simultaneously with man, every human being, as a result of the arrangement of four castes, or of any other social arrangement consistent with the division, of inherent qualities, acquires, by birth, the high or low qualification of maintaining and uplifting society, according to his or her own powers, and proportionately with whatever intellectual capacity, authoritative capacity, financial capacity, or physical capacity is naturally possessed by him, or can be acquired by him having regard to his status in life. Just as extremely small wheels are necessary along with large wheels in order that any machine should work properly, so also iB it necessary that the authority of common-place persons.

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 465

should be exercised properly and fully in the same way as the- authority of superior persons like Vyasa and others, in order that the immense and ponderous aotivity or mechanism of the Cosmos should continue to work in a properly regulated manner. Bacause, if potters do not manufacture pots or weavers do not weave clothes, the maintenance of society (lokasamgraha) cannot be satisfactorily oarried out, even if the king protects society proparly ; or, if the most insignificant pointsman or cabinman in a railway administration does not properly perform his duty, it will not be possible for the- railway train to rush along with safety and with the speed of wind, both during the day and during the night, as it now does. Therefore, it follows from the above argument advanced, by the writer of the Vedanta-Siitras, that even an ordinary person, and not only superior parsons like Vyasa and others — whether such ordinary person is a king or is a poor man — must not, after acquisition of Knowledge, fail to exercise the large or small authority of carrying out public welfare, which. " has properly befallen him ; but should, so long as life lasts, execute that authority desirelessly, and as a matter of duty, to the fullest extent of his powers and his intelligence, and as far as circumstances will permit. It is not proper for him . to say that if he does not do it, somebody else will ; because, in that case, not only does one man fall short in the performance of the total work of society, and thereby society lose its aggregate power, but, as another person cannot do that particular work as well as a Jfianin, the general welfare of society suffers to that extent. Besides, as has been mentioned above, the mental frame of other people is also disturbed by the example of Abandonment of Action by a Jfianin. It is- true that the followers of the Samnyasa school sometimes say that when one's own Atrnan has obtained Release, by the Mind having been purified as a result of Karma, one should be satisfied with that ; and without caring if the whole world goes to dogs, one should neither perform lolcasamgraha, nor cause it to be performed — " lokasamgrahadharmam ca tmva Jcuryanna kdrayet" (Ma. Bha. Asva. Anugita. 46 39). But, it becomes quite clear from the justification which they advance about the life of Vyasa and others, or from the advice 59—60

466 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

given by Vasistha or Pancasikha to Rama or Janaka to go on performing their duties of maintaining and uplifting society- according to their authority till death, that the doctrine of the Sarhnyasa school is one-sided, and is not a scientific verity which will stand firm at all times. Therefore, it must be said that one should not pay attention to this one-sided advice, and that the only path which is excellent and is consistent with the Sastras is to continue Action beneficial to society, so long as life lasts, even after having acquired Realisation, and with due regard to one's own qualification, following the illustration of the Blessed Lord Himself. Nevertheless., this lokasamgraha must not be performed, entertaining any Hope foT Fruit (plialasa); because, if one entertains the Hope for r?Tuit, though it may be about lokasamgraha, one cannot but suffer un- happiness, if that hope is frustrated. Therefore, a man should not entertain the proud or desireful thought that ' I shall bring about lolmsamgraha , and a man has to bring about lokasamgraha merely as a duty. It is for the same reason that the Gita has used the rather longish phraseology of: " lokasamgraham evapi sampasyan", i. e., "you must perform Action, keeping in sight ( sampasyan ) public welfare" (Gl. 3. 20), instead of saying that ' lokasamgrahartha' means, "for obtaining fruit in the shape of public welfare ". It is true that loltasamgraha is an important duty; hut it must not be forgotten that the advice given by the Blessed Lord to Arjuna in the previous verse (Gl. 3. 19) that all acts should be performed being free from Attachment, applies equally to loltasamgraha.

If it is proved by logical argument that the opposition between Jfiana and Karma is an opposition between Jfiana and Desireful Karma, that there is no opposition between Jfiana and Dasireless Karma from the Metaphysical point of view, and that as Karma is unavoidable, and is also essential from the point of view of lokasamgraha, even a Jnanin must, so long as life lasts, continue to perform the duties of the four castes, accord- ing to his qualification, and without Attachment; and if the Gita says the same thing, a doubt naturally arises as to what becomes of the Sarhnyasa (ascetic) state, out of the four states of life, which have been described in the Smrti tests of the

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA- YOGA 467

Tedic religion. In the Manu-Smrti and other Smrtis, the four -states (asrama), namely, celibacy, householdership, living in the woods, and asceticism have been mentioned; and it is there stated that after the Mind has been gradually purified by carrying out the duties of education (adhyayana), sacrificial ritual, charitable gifts etc. which befall a person according to the arrangement of the four oastes, as prescribed by the Sastras, in the first three states of life, a man should in the end literally give up all Action and renounce the world, and attain Release (See Manu. 6. 1 and 33-37). From this it follows, that according to all the writers of the Smrtis, though sacri- ficial ritual and charitable gifts etc. are proper to the state of a householder, yet, their only purpose is the purification of the Mind, that is to say, to bring one to the stage of Realising that there is only one Atman in all created beings, by the gradual elimination of one's Attachment to objects of pleasure, and of one's self-serving Reason, which (elimination) results in the gradual increase of the desire to do good to others; and that once this mental state has been acquired, one must in the end literally abandon all Action and take to the fourth state of Samnyasa (Asceticism) in order to obtain Release. This is the Path of Samnyasa which was established by Sri Sathfcaracaiya in the present Kali-yuga, and Kalidasa, who followed the teaching of the Smrtis, has described the powerful kingB of ■the Solar Dynasty ( suryawmsi ), in the beginning of the .Raghuvamsa as follows: —

saiiave 'bhyastavidyomam yauvane visayaisiriam l

mrdliake munivrttimm yogenante tanutyajam »

(Raghu. 1. 8.)

that is, "they were such as performed abhyasa (brahmacarya) as children, took up the worldly life entailing the enjoyment of the objects of pleasure in their youth (grlmsthasrama), they lived in the woods during old age, or led the life of a mum and ultimately took their Atman into the Brahman according- ito the rules of the Samnyasa state, by practising the Pataftjala-

468 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

Toga and gave up their lives. Similarly, it is stated in the iukanuprasna in the.Mahabharata that :-

catu&padi hi mhireni brahmawyesii pratisthita I etam aruhyaiiihsrerum brahmcdoke mahiyate II

(San. 241. 15).

hat is, "this ladder with four steps (in the shape of the four tages) ultimately leads to the state of the Brahman. When. n this way, a man goes up this ladder from one state into the text higher state, he ultimately acquires greatness in the phere of the Brahman". And after that, the following order las been described, namely :-

kasayam pacayitvasu irenisthanesu ca trim I prawajea ca param sthanam parivrajyam anuttamam II

(San. 344. 3).

ihat is, " a man should, in the three steps of this ladder, destroy is early as possible his kilbisa, that is, his faults in the shape if selfish tendencies, or Attachment to objects of pleasure, md should then renounce the world ; parivrajya, that is,. Samnyasa is the most excellent state of all ". This same sourse of going from one state to another state of life has also been mentioned in the Manu-Smrti (Kami. 6. 4). But Manu had fully realised the fact that if in this way there was an inordinate increase in the desire of people to take up the fourth state, the activity in the world would be destroyed,, and society would ultimately be lamed. Therefore, after having definitely enjoined the performance of all activities which are necessary to be performed in the previous states of a householder, and which consisted of acts of valour or of universal welfare, Manu has laid down the clear limit in the- following words, namely :

grhasthastu yada pasyed mlipalitam atmanah I apuiyasyaim capo/yam tad arayyam jsamasrayet II

(Manu. 6. 2). that is, " when his body has become covered with wrinkles, and 1 he has seen his own grand-children, the householder should:

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA

become a denizen of the woods, and should take Samnyasa ". The Manu-Smrti gives the following reason why this limit has 'to be followed, namely : in coming to birth, every man brings on his back the three debts (duties) to the Rsis, to his ancestors, and to the deities. Therefore, until a man has discharged all ■these three obligations, that is, to the Rsis, by the study of Vedas ; to the ancestors, by the procreation of off-spring; and ■to the deities, by the performance of sacrificial ritual, he is not in a position to give up worldly life and take Samnyasa ; and if he does so, he will go to perdition as a result of his not having discharged the indebtedness which he has acquired as a result of his birth. (See, Manu. 6. 35-37 ; and the canon [mantra) from the Tai. Sam. quoted in the last chapter). According to ancient Hindu Law, a man 's children, and even his grand-children, had to discharge the debts of their ancestors, without pleading the law of limitation; and they used to consider it a great misfortune to have to die without having discharged the debts due to others. When this fact is brought to mind, my readers will clearly understand what the intention •of our law-givers was, in referring to the above-mentioned important social duties, as ' debts '. Kalidasa has said in the Baghuvamsa that all the kings belonging to the Solar Dynasty {suryavamsi) led their lives according to the rules laid down by the Smrtis, and that they used to leave the state of the householder after (not before) installing their sons on the ■throne, after the sons had grown up and become capable of ruling (Raghu. 7. 68). And there is statement in the Bhagavata (Bhag. 6. 5. 35-42), that because Narada advised the sons of Daksa Prajapati named Haryasva and also again his several other sons named Sabalasva to take to the Path of Samnyasa before they had married, and made Sarimyasins of them, Daksa-Prajapati reprimanded Narada for this his unlaw- ful and objectionable behaviour, and laid a curse on him. From this, the original idea of this arrangement of the four states appears to have been, that when a man has lived his worldly life according to the injunctions of the Sastras, and his ohildren have become more capable than him, he should not interfere with their enthusiasm yielding to the interfering tendency of •old age; but should become ™" aJ ™i°i™ ~j"» as. JA.« nf

470 GlTA-EAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

acquiring Release; and should of his own accord and volun- tarily give up worldly life. The same idea is conveyed in the advice given by Vidura to Dhrtarastra in the Viduraniti in the following words :-

utpadya putran anrvainsca kriva

vritim ca tebhyo 'mvidhaya kamcit I stKane kumarih pratipadya sarva

aranyasavistho 'tha munir bubhuset II

(Ma. Bha. U. 36. 39) that is, " after a man has begotten sons in the state of a house- holder, and left no debts to be discharged by them, and made- some arrangements for their maintenance, and after having got all - his daughters properly married, he should become a denizen of the woods and satisfy his desire of renouncing the world"; and the idea of ordinary people about worldly life in this country is more or less consistent with the dictates of Vidura. Nevertheless, as it was believed that giving up worldly life and taking to Samnyasa was the highest ideaL of manhood, the beneficial direction of the three previous stages of life laid down by the writers of the Smrtis for the successful carrying out of the ordinary affairs of the world, gradually lost importance ; and people came to the stage of saying, that if a man had at birth, or in comparatively young age, acquired. Knowledge, it was not wrong for him to renounce the world at once without waiting to go through the other three stages — " brahmacaryad era pravrajet grhad va variad va " ( Jaba. 4). For the same reason, Kapila has given the following advice to- Syumarasmi in the Gokapiliya catechism in the Mahabharata,. namely :-

sarirapaktih karmayi jnanam tu parama gatih I kasaye karmabhih pakve rasajnane ca tisthati II*

(San. 269 38)

• This verse has been adopted in the Samkarabhasya on the

Vedanta-Sutras, and there it runs aa follows:—

hi^ayapahtih karrnani jfianalh tu parama gatih \ ktjaye karmabhih pakve tato jnanampravartate ||

(Ve. 85. Sam. Bha. 3. 4. 26 ) I have quoted the verse hero as I found it in the Mahabharata..

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 471

that is, "the object of Karma is to eliminate the disease in the body in the shape of Attachment to objects of pleasure, and Jnana is the highest and the ultimate goal; when the disease in the shape of ignorance, or the kasaya, in the body is eliminated, as the result of Karma, desire for the Knowledge of the essence (rasa) is created". In the same way, it is stated in the ohapter on Release (moksa) in the Pingalaglta, that "nairasyani paramam sukliam", i. e., despair ia the highest happiness" or, "yo 'sau. praifintikorogastamtrsnamtyajatahsukham", i. e., "until the fatal disease, in the shape of Desire, has left the body, there can be no happiness" ( San. 174. 65 and 58 ). And in addition to the statements in the Jabala and Brhadaranyaka Upanisads, there are also statements in the Kaivalya and Narayan- opanisads that "na hxrmana na pi-ajaya dhanena tyagenaike amrtatvam anasuh", i. e„ "not by Karma, nor by progeny, or money, but by tyaga (Renunciation), is Release attained by some" (Kai. 1. 2; Nara. U. 12. 3. 3 and 78). If the doctrine of the Glta is that even a Jfianin must go on performing Action till the end, I must explain how these statements have to be disposed of. The same doubt arose in the mind of Arjuna, and he has in the beginning of the eighteenth chapter asked the Blessed Lord:— "then, explain to me what Renunciation (samnyasa) and Abandonment (tyaga) respectively are". But before considering the reply given by the Blessed Lord to this question, it is necessary to consider here shortly another equally important Vedic Path of Action, which has been mentioned in the Smrti texts in addition to this Path of Renunciation.

This path of four steps, namely, celibacy, householdership, living in the woods, and asceticism is known as the 'Siriarta' path, that is, 'the path prescribed by the writers of the Smrtis'. This arrangement of the four states has been made by the writers of the Smrtis, consistently with the growth in a man's age, in order to mutually harmonise the contradictory state- ments in the Vedas, which enjoin the Performance of Action, as also the Abandonment of Action; and if the literal Abandonment of Action is considered the highest ideal, it would not be incorrect to consider the path of four steps laid down by the writers of the Smrtis for leading one 's life, as the means

472 GlTA-RAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

or the preliminary preparation for reaching that ideal. It is true that if one accepts these rising steps of leading one's life, the activity of the world will not oome to an end, and the Karma laid down by the Vedas, can be harmonised with the Knowledge expounded in the Upanisads. Yet, in as much as the state of the householder is the state which provides the other three states with food ( Manu. 6. 89), the importance of the state of a householder has ultimately been frankly acknowledged in the Manu-Smrti, and even in the Mahahharata in the following stanza:

yatha mataram asrifya sarve jivanti jantavah I

evam garliasthyam asrilya vartanta itarasramah II

( San. 268. 6)

that is, "as all living beings {jantavah) live by the support of of the mother (earth), so also do the other three states live on "the support of the state of a householder" ( See San. 268. 6; and Manu. 3. 77 ). And Manu has referred to the other three states of life as rivers, and to the state of the householder as the sea (Manu. 6. 90; Ma. BhS. San. 295. 39). If the importance of the state of a householder is thus unquestionable, where is the sense of the advice that one must sometime give up the state of the householder, and make a Renunciation of Action ( karmasamnyasa)1 Is it impossible to perform the duties of the state of a householder even after the acquisition of Knowledge? No; then, where is the sense of saying that a Jnanin should go out of worldly life? The perfect Jnanins who lead their liveB deBireleasly, are certainly more capable and fit for performing universal welfare, than ordinary people who entertain some selfishness or other in their hearts. There- fore, if a Jnanin is given permission to leave worldly life, just when his capacity has become perfect as a result of Knowledge, that society, for the benefit of which the arrange- ment of the four castes has been made, will suffer serious loss. The oase would be different if some persons left society and went to live in the forest for want of physical strength; and that muBt have been the idea of Manu in relegating Renunciation (samnyasa) to old age. But, as has been stated

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 473

above, this beneficial limit was not observed. Therefore, although the writers of the Smrtis had created the rising ladder of the four states, in order to harmonise the two-fold .order of the Vedas, viz., to perform Action, and to give up Action, the Blessed Lord, who was undoubtedly as competent, or even more competent that the writers of the Smrtis, to harmonise •these dictates of the Vedas, has Himself revived, and fully ■supported, in the form of the Bhagavata religion, the Path -which combines Karma with Jnana, and which was followed by Janafca and others in ancient times. The difference between the two is, that in the Bhagavata doctrine, reliance is not placed only on Metaphysical ideas, but the additional easy Temedy of Devotion to Vasudeva has been added. But, a detailed discussion of this matter will be made later on in the -thirteenth chapter. Although the Bhagavata religion is Devotional, yet, as it has adopted the important principle enunciated in the Path prescribed by Janaka, namely, that after the acquisition of the Knowledge of the Paramesvara, a Jnanin should not take to Sarhnyasa in the Bhape of Abandonment of Action, but should go on desirelessly perfor- ming all his activities till death for universal welfare, giving Tip the Hope for Fruit of Action ( phalasa ), both paths are identical from the point of view of Karma, that is to say, they hoth embody the union of Jnana with Karma, or are Activistic. As the first protagonists of this Activistic religion were the two Rsis, Nara and Narayana, who were living incarnations of the Parabrahman, the ancient name of this religion is the 'Narayanlya Religion'. Though, both these Rsis had acquired the highest Knowledge, they adviBed people to perform Action ■desirelessly, and did so themselves (Ma. Bha. U. 48. 21); and therefore, this religion has been described in the Mahabharata by saying: "pravrtlilaksanas caiva dharmo narayaimtmakah" (Ma. Bha. San. 347. 81 ), or, " pravrtiilakmnavi dharmam rnr narayano 'bravit" — the religion propounded by the Rsi Narayana was life- long Activistic (Ma. Bha. San. 217. 2). This religion is the Satvata or Bhagavata religion, and it has been clearly stated in the Bhagavata, that the form of this Satvata or original Bhagavata religion was 'naiskarmya-lakmna', that is, desirelessly Activistic ( See Bhag. 1. 3. 8 and 11. 4. 6). This Activistio

474 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

path was also known as 'Yoga', as is clear from the line- "pravrttilaksano yogah jnanam samnyasalaksariam" in the; Anugita [Ma. Bha. Asva. 43. 25); and, that is why the religion propounded in the Gita by Sri Krsna, who was the incarnation, of Narayana, to Arjuna, who was the incarnation of Kara, has- been oalled 'Yoga' in the Gita itself. Some persons now-a-days believe that the Bhagavata and the Smarta paths originally came into existence as a result of a difference between the objects of worship; but according to me, this belief is wrong; because, although the objects of worship in these two paths may be different, yet the Metaphysical Knowledge contained in both is the same; and when the Metaphysical foundation of both was the same, it is not likely that these ancient Jnanins, who were steeped in this Supreme Knowledge, would have kept up differences between themselves, merely on account of a differ- ence in the objects of worship. For this reason, it is stated both in the Bhagavadglta (9. 14) and in the Sivagita (12. 4) that, whatever is worshipped, the worship ultimately reaches one and the same Paramesvara; and these two deities have been described in the NarSyaniya doctrine in the Mahabharata as being identical, by saying that Narayana. is the same as Rudra, that the worshippers of Narayana were the worshippers of Rudra, and the enemies of Narayana, the enemies of Rudra (Ma. Bha. San. 341. 20-2& and 342. 129). I do not say that the difference between Saivism and Vaisnavism did not exist in ancient times. What I mean to say is that the original reason for the difference between the Smarta and Bhagavata paths, was not the difference in the objects of worship, namely, Siva and Visnu ; and tHat these two paths must have first come into existence as a result of a difference of opinion on an important point, namely, whether Asceticism or Activism should be followed after the acqui- sition of Knowledge. After a considerable lapse of time, when this Activistic path or Karma- Yoga of the original Bhagavata religion ceased to exist, and it got its present form of the pure worship of Visnu, tnat is to say, a more or less Non-Activistic- form, and on that account, people began to fight with each other merely on the ground that the deity of one was Siva, whereas the deity of the other was Visnu, the words 'Smarta *

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 475

and 'Bhagavata' became respectively synonymous withi ' Saiva ' and 'Vaisnava '; and ultimately the Vedanta of these- present-day followers of the Bhagavata religion (Dualism or Qualified Monism), and their astrology, that is to say, the observance of the eleventh day of the month, as also the way of applying the sandal-wood paste on the forehead, became different from the Smarta way. But, it becomes quite clear- from the word ' Smarta ' that these differences were not real,, that is, original. As the Bhagavata religion was promulgated' by the Blessed Lord Himself, there is no wonder that the object of worship in it should be the Blessed Lord Sri Krsna or Visnu. But, as the root-meaning of the word ' Smarta ' is ' prescribed by the Smrfcis ', the deity worshipped according to the Smarta path- need not be Siva ; because, it is nowhere stated in the works of Manu or other ancient Smrti texts, that Siva is the only deity which should be worshipped. On the other hand, Visnu has been mentioned more often, and in some places Ganapati and other deities are also mentioned. Besides, as both the deities Siva and Visnu are Vedic, that is, as both have been, mentioned in the Vedas, it is not proper to refer to only one of them as 'Smarta'. Besides, Sri Sarhkaracarya is looked- upon as a protagonist of the Smarta religion ; yet, Sarada (goddess of learning — Trans.) is the deity worshipped in the Sarhkara monasteries ; and wherever there has been occasion- in the Sarhkarabhasya to refer to the worship of an idol, the Acarya has referred, not to the Siva-linga, but to the Saligrama that is, the image of Sri Visnu (Ve. Su. Sam. Bha. 1. 2. 7; 1. 3. 14 and 4. 1. 3; Chan. Sam. Bha. 8. 1. 1). There is also a tradition that the worship of the Pancayatana (group of five deities) was first started by Sarhkaracarya. Therefore, it follows that according to the original meaning of these words, people disregarded whether a person worshipped Siva or Visnu, and considered those as SMARTA, whose ultimate ideal; was to first go through worldly life in youth as prescribed by the Sastras, and consistently with the arrangement of the four states laid down systematically and in detail in the Smrti texts, and to take Sarhnyasa, or the fourth state, by giving up Action altogether in old age; and* considered those as BHAGAVATA, who believed that all the

476 GtTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

Actions appropriate to the state of a householder should be performed desirelessly till death, according to the advice of the Blessed Lord, simultaneously with the acquisition of Knowledge and with the possession of a passionate devotion to the Blessed Lord ; and in these meanings, these two words are respectively synonymous with Samkhya and Yoga or Samnyasa and Karma-Yoga. Samnyasa subsequently ceased to exist as a state of life, whether as a result of the incarna- tions taken by the Blessed Lord, or because the importance of the state of a householder, which included Spiritual Knowledge, began to be realised; and it has been included among the Kali- varjya, that is, those things which are prohibited in the Kali- yuga according to the Sastras * But, later on the protagonists of the Buddhist and the Jain religions accepted the opinions of the Kapila-Sarbkhya school, and brought into prominence the -doctrine that Release is impossible unless a man takes Samnyasa, and gives up worldly life. It is well-known in history that Buddha himself gave up his kingdom and his wife and children and entered the Samnyasa state in youth. Although Sri Samkaracarya refuted the Jain and Buddhistic doctrines, yet the path of Asceticism, which was principally put into vogue by the Jains and Buddhists, was allowed to remain by the Acarya as being the Samnyasa prescribed by the Srutis and the Smrtis; and he has, therefore, interpreted the Gita as supporting the Samnyasa path. But, really speaking the Gita is not a work which supports the Smarta path ; and although the earlier portions of it refer to the Samkhya or the Samnyasa path, the later portions, which contain the conclusion, support the Activistic or Bhagavata religion, as

• See the chapter of Kali-varjya in the third part (pariccheda)

■of the Nirnaya-Sindhu. Here, the Smrti texts, agnihotram gavalam- Iham samnyamm pahpailr/iam | demrac ca sulotpattih halau panca vimrjayet" u, and "samnyasai ca na iartavyo brahmanem tijanau" etc., are mentioned. The first of these two tests means that agnihcira, (perpetnal sacred fire), slaughter of cowa, Samnyasa, partaking of meat at the time of the performance of the iraddha (ancestor- ■worahip), and myoga (procreating off-spring from the wife of another —Trans.), these five are prohibited in the Kaliyuga. The prohibition against Samnyasa, out of these, was removed by Samkaracarya.

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 477

has been mentioned by me already in the first chapter to have been stated by the author of the Mahabharata itself. As both' these paths are Vedic, it is possible to harmonise them with, each other to a considerable extent, if not wholly. But harmonising them in this way, is one thing, and saying that, the Gita supports only the Path of Renunciation, and that the references in it to the Path of Energism as being productive of Release, are merely praise, is quite a different thing. As. a result of difference in taste, one man may prefer the Sraarta religion to the Bhagavata religion; or he may consider as- more convincing the reasons which are commonly givem in support of the Abandonment of Action. I will not deny that possibility. For instance, no one has any doubt that Sri Samkaracarya favoured the Smarta or Samnyasa path, and looked upon all other paths as based on ignorance. But,, on that account, one cannot conclude that that was the- purport of the Gita. If you do not accept the doctrines laid, down by the Gita, do not follow them. But, it is not proper on that account to interpret the statement, "there are, inthis- world, two independent Nisthas or paths leading to Release for living one's life," made in the commencement of the Gita, as meaning that: "the Samnyasa path is the only true and superior- path". These two paths, which have been described in the Gita, have been current in the Vedic religion, independently of each otber, even from before the days of Janaka and Yajfiavalkya; and we see that persons like Janaka, on whom the duty of the maintenance and uplift of society had befallen,, as a result of their status as Ksatriyas, or hereditarily, or as a result of their own prowess, continued their activities desirelessly, even after the acquisition of Knowledge; and were spending their lives in bringing about the benefit of the world. Bearing in mind this status of oertain persons in society, the Mahabharata contains two Buch distinct statements, according to difference in status, as, "sukham jivanti munayo bhaiksyavrt- tim sairiasntah", i. e., "ascetics living in the woods, joyfully accept the status of beggars" (San. 178. 11), and "danda em hi rajendra ksairadlwrmo na mundanam", i. e., "it is the duty of the Ksatriyas to maintain and uplift people by punishment, and not to shave off the hair on their heads" ( San. 23. 46). But,.

478 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

from this, one must not conclude that Karma-Yoga was the proper duty only for the Ksatriyas, who were responsible for the maintenance of society. The true meaning of the above ■statement from the science of Karma-Yoga is, that every man must, after the acquisition of Knowledge, go on performing -those duties, which are his according to his qualification (adhikara); and it is on this account, that it is stated inthe Bharata that, "esa purvatara vritltir brahmanasya vidhiyate" (San. 237), i. e., "even the Brahmins used, in ancient times, to continue Yajfias and Yagas, according to their qualification, after the acquisition of Knowledge"; and in the Manu-Smrti, the Vedic Karma-Yoga has been considered more proper for all classes "than the Samnyasa path ( Manu. 6. 86-96). It is also nowhere stated that the Bhagavata religion exists only for the Ksatriyas; but on the other hand, it has been praised by saying that it is accessible even to women, Sudras etc. ( Gi. 9. 32 ); and there are also definite stories in the Mahabharata that this religion was followed by the Tuladhara, or a merchant, and Vyadha, or a hunter, and that these taught it to the Brahmins (San. 261; Vana. 215); and the illustrations, which are given in the books on the Bhagavata religion, of prominent persons who followed the Desireless Karma-Yoga are not only of Ksatriyas like Janaka and Sri Krsna, but also of learned Brahmins like Vasistha, Jaiglsavya, VySsa and others.

Although the Gita supports only the Energistic Path, it must not be forgotten that it does not look upon the path of performing Aotion without Knowledge as leadiug to Release. There are also two paths of performing Knowledge-less Actions. The one is of performing Actions hypocritically '(with damblia), or with an ungodly (asuri) frame of mind; and the other, is of performing them with religious faith (sraddha). Out of these, the path of hypocrisy, or the asuri path, was considered objectionable and productive of perdition, not only by the Gita, but also by the writers of the Mimarhsa; and even in the Rg-Veda, religious faith has been extolled in many places (Rg. 10. 151; 9. 113. 2 and 2. 12. 5). But, the Mimarhsa school says, with regard to those who perform Karma without Knowledge, but putting faith in the Sastras, that if a man performs ritual throughout life merely with religious faith,

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 479

and relying on the Sastras, he will ultimately attain Release, though he may not have had a true Realisation of the form of the Paramesvara. I have stated in the last chapter that this path of the Mimarhsa school has been current from very ancient times in the shape of the Karma-kanda. Jaimini says that it is nowhere stated either in the Veda-Samhitas or in the Brahmanas that the Path of Samnyasa was essential ; and that, on the other hand, there are clear statements in the Vedas, that Release is attained by remaining in the state of a householder (Ve. Su. 3. 4. 17-20); and this statement of his is not ■without foundation. Because, this ancient path of of the Karma-kanda came to be first looked upon as inferior only in the Upanisads. Although the Upanisads are Vedic, yet, they are later in point of time than the Samhitas and the Brahmanas, as is clear from the method of dealing with the subject-matter adopted in them. It is not that people had not acquired the Knowledge of the Paramesvara before that date. But the opinion that a man should apathetically abandon lotion, after the acquisition of Knowledge, in order to attain Release, first began to be acted upon only at the time of the Upanisads ; and thereafter, the Karma-kanda described in the Samhitas and in the Brahmanas came to be looked upon as inferior. Before that date, Karma was considered superior. When the Path of Samnyasa, that is, of Knowledge coupled with apathy towards the world, thus beoame preponderant in the time of the Upanisads, Jnanins naturally began to neglect ritualistic sacrifices, as also the religious injunctions prescribed for the four castes; >and the idea that iniversal welfare (lokasamgraha) was a duty, began to lose ground. It is true that the writers of the Smrtis have stated in their works, that the sacrificial Karma enjoined in the Srutis, and the duties proper for the four castes enjoined in the Smrtis must be performed during the state of a householder ; and they have in that way praised that state. But, as even according to the writers of the Smrtis, indifference towards the world, or the state of Asceticism, was excellent, it was not possible that the inferiority placed on the Karma-kanda by the Upanisads, should be reduced by the arrangement of the four stages of life enjoined in the Smrtis. In this stati

480 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

things the Gita has come forward to harmonise the Jfiana- kanda with the Karma-kanda, without deprecating either, by- tacking on both of them to Devotion. The Gita accepts the doctrines of the writers of the Upanisads that there is no Release without Jnana, and that by sacrificial ritualistic Karma, one can at most attain heaven (Munda. 1. 2. 10; Gl. 2. 41-45). But, it is also a doctrine of the Gita, that in order that the affairs of the world should go on, the wheel of Yajnas, or of Karma, must be kept going on; and that it is foolish to give up Karma at any time; and therefore,, the Gita advises that instead of performing the sacrificial ritual and other acts prescribed by the Srutis, or the worldly activity enjoined by the arrangement of the four castes,, merely with religious faith and ignorantly, one should perform them with a frame of mind which combines Spiritual- Knowledge with indifference towards the world and merely as- a duty, so that the Karma which is performed will not obstruct Release, and at the same time, the circle of the Yajnas will- not be disrupted. It need not be said that this skill of the Gita of harmonising the Jnana-kanda with the Karma-kanda (that is, Sarhnyasa and Karma) is better than what the writers of the Smrtis have done ; because, by the path prescribed in the Gita, the benefit of the collective Atman, which pervades- the creation is achieved without at the same time in any way prejudicing the benefit of the individual Atman. The Mimamsa. school says that as Karma is eternal, and is enjoined by the Vedas, one must perform it although one may not have acquired Knowledge; many (but not all) writers of the Upanisads treat Karma as inferior, and say that it must be given up by cultivating indifference towards the world; or, at any rate, one may safely say, that they are inclined to do so; and the writers of the Smrtis harmonise these two opinions by differentiating between youth and old age, and relying on the arrangement of the four states, and by saying that Actions should be performed in the three previous states of life, and. that after the Mind has been purified by the performance of Actions, one should in old age give up Action and renounce the world. But the path prescribed by the Gita is different from all these three paths. Though there is an opposition

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 481'

between Jflana and Desire-prompted Action, there is no opposition between Jiana and Desireless Action; therefore, the Glta asks you to perform all Actions desirelessly, and never to give them up. If these four doctrines are compared with each other, it will be seen that all accept the position that Karma is necessary before Knowledge is acquired. But, the Upanisads and the Glta say that Actions performed in that state and merely with religious faith do not yieldany fruit except heaven. As to whether Karma should or should not be performed after this, that is, after the acquisition of Knowledge, there is a. difference of opinion even among the writers of the Upanisads. Some of the Upanisads say, that the man who has become fit for Release after all desire has been destroyed in his heart as a, result of Knowledge, need not perform Desire-prompted Actions, which lead only to heaven; and, other Upanisads, such as, Isavasya etc., insist that all these Actions must nevertheless be kept going on in order that the activities of the world should go on. It is quite clear that the GitS accepts the second one out of these two paths prescribed by the Upanisads (Gi. 5. 2). But, though it may be said that the Jfianin, who has become fit for Release, should go on desirelessly performing all Actions for universal welfare, a doubt naturally arises here as to why he should perform such Karma like sacrificial ritual, which leads only to heaven. Therefore, this doubt has been raised in the beginning of the eighteenth chapter, and the Blessed Lord has given His clear decision, that in as much as, "sacrificial ritual, charity, austerity" etc, always have the effect of purifying the Mind, and of making the Mind more and more desireless, "these actions also" (etany api) should be performed by the Jnanin desire- lessly, continually, and without Attachment, for social welfare (Gi, 18. 6.). When all acts are desirelessly performed in this way, that is, with the intention of dedicating them to the Paramesvara, that amounts to the performance of a stupendous Yajna in the wide sense of the term ; and then, the Karma performed for the sake of this Yajna does not become a source of bondage (Gi. 4. 23). Not only that ; but as all these Actions have been performed desirelessly, they do not produce the bondage-creating result in the shape of the attainment of K1 fi9

482 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

"heaven, whioh Bprings from sacrificial ritual, and do not stand in the way of Release. In short, although the Karma- kanda of the Mlmarhsa school has been kept intact in the Gita, yet, it has been kept intact in such a way, that it definitely leads to Release instead of making a person journey to and from heaven, since all Actions have to be performed desire- lessly. It must be borne in mind that this is the important difference between the Karma-marga prescribed by the Mlmarhsa school and the Karma-Yoga prescribed by the Gita; and that both are not the same.

I have, thus, explained that the Bhagavadgfta has advocated ■the Activistic Bhagavata religion or the Karma-Yoga, as also what the difference is, between this Karma-Yoga and the Karma-kanda of the Mlmarhsa school. I shall now consider the difference in principles between the Karma-Yoga of the Gita and the arrangement of the four states made by the writers >of the Smrtis on the authority of the Jnana-karida. This difference is very subtle; and strictly speaking, there is no need to enter into a fruitless discussion about this matter. Both accept the position that every one must perform the duties proper to the first two states of life for the purification of the Mind. The only point of difference is whether after the acquisition of Knowledge, one should continue performing Action or renounce the world. Here, some are likely to think "that as such Jfianins are necessarily few and far between, it is not necessary to trouble much about whether these few persons -perform or do not perform Action. But this position is not correct; because, as the conduct of the Jfianins is considered exemplary by other people, and also as every man directs his "behaviour from the very beginning according to what his ultimate end is, the question 'what the Jnanin should do' is a very important question from the general point of view. It is true that the Smrti texts- say that a Jnanin should finally renounce the world. But, as has been stated above, there are exceptions even to this rule according to the directions of the ■Smrtis. For instance, in the Brhadaranyakopanisad, Yajfia- Talkya has given a considerable amount of advice about the Knowledge of the Brahman to Janaka; 1 but, he has nowhere •said to Janaka: "you now give up ruling and renounce the-

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA. 483

-world". It is stated there, on the contrary, that those Jnanins who give up worldly life after the acquisition of Knowledge, •<lo so beoause they do not like ( m kamayante) worldly life ( Br. 4. 4. 22 ). From this, the opinion of the Brhadaranya- kopanisad seems clearly to be that taking or not taking Sarhnyasa, after the acquisition of Knowledge, is a matter purely within the discretion of everybody; and that there is no permanent relationship between the Knowledge of the Brahman and Sarhnyasa; and this statement in the Brhadar- anyakopanisad has been explained in the same way in the Vedanta-Sutras (Ve. Su. 3. 4. 15). Samkaracarya has definitely laid down that it is not possible to attain Release unless Action is abandoned after the acquisition of Knowledge; and he has attempted to show in his Bhasya that all the Upanisads are in favour of that proposition. Nevertheless, even Sri Samkaracarya has admitted that there is no objection to one's performing Actions till death, according to one's own qualifica- tion in life, even after the acquisition of Knowledge, as was done by Janaka and others. (See Ve. Su. Sam. Bha. 3. 3. 32; and G-i. Sam. Bha. 2. 11 and 3. 20). From this it is clear that even .the school of Sarhnyasa or the Smrtis do not look upon the •performance of Action, after the acquisition of Knowledge, as objectionable; and that this school of thought allowB some Jnanins to perform Actions according to their own qualifica- tions, though as exceptions. The G!ta widens the soope of this exception and says that every Jfianin must go on performing the duties enjoined on the four castes, even after the acquisition of Knowledge, as a matter of duty, and for universal welfare. It, therefore, follows that though the religion of the Gita is more comprehensive, the principle established by it is faultless, even from the point of view of the Samnyasa school; and if one reads the Vedanta-Sutras independently, he will notice that even in them, the Karma- Yoga combined with Knowledge has been considered acceptable as being a kind of Sarhnyasa. (Ve. • Su. 3. 4. 26; 3. 4. 32-35).* Nevertheless, it is necessary to show

• This portion of the Vedan'a-Sutraa has been interpreted in

a slightly different way in the Sarhkarabhasya, But, according to me, the words "vihitattvac casramakurmapi" (3.4. 32) mean: '< there is no objection to the JSanin doing the various acts prescribed for

484 GrTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA- YOGA

what becomes of the fourth state or Samnyasa in the shape of Abandonment of Action, which has been prescribed in the Smrti texts, if Karma has to be performed lifelong, though desirelessly. Arjuna waB thinking that the Blessed Lord would sometime or other say to him that it was not possible to attain Release unless sometime or other Sarhyasa in the shape of Abandonment of Action was taken ; and that, he would then get a chance of giving up fighting on the authority of some- thing the Blessed Lord had Himself said. But, when Arjuna saw that the Blessed Lord did not even touch the question of Samnyasa by Abandonment of Action till the end of th& seventeenth chapter, and that He over and over again advised the Abandonment of the Fruit of Action, he, in the commence- ment of the eighteenth chapter, has at last said to the Blessed- Lord : " then, tell me the difference between Samnyasa (Renunciation) and Tyaga (Abandonment) ". In replying to- this question of Arjuna, the Blessed Lord says : " O Arjuna, if you think that the path of Karma-Yoga which I have described so far, does not include Samnyasa, you are wrong. Karma-Yogins divide all Actions into ' kamya', that is, Actions performed with an Attached frame of mind, and ' niskama ', that is, Actions performed without Attachment. (These two are referred to as ' pravrtta ' and ' vivrtta ' Action respectively in the Manu-Smrti 12. 89). Out of these, the Karma-Yogin totally gives up all Actions which fall into the category of Desireful Actions, that is to say, he makes a ' Samnyasa (Renunciation) of them. That leaves the niskama (Desireless) or the nivrtta Actions. It is true that the Karma- Yogia performs these Desireless (niskama) Actions ; but in performing them he has made a ' Typ.^a ' ( Abandonment ) of the Hope for Fruit. In short, how doas one escape Samnyasa or Tyaga, even in the Path of Karma-Yoga ? "Whereas the followers of the Smrtis literally renounce Karma, the Yogins in the Path of Karma-Yoga renounce instead, the Hope for the Fruit of

the various states, because they are proper (vikita)". In short, according to me, the Vedanta-Sutras have accepted both the positions of the Jfi&nin performing Actions, and also not perform- ing them.

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 485

Action. But, in either case, Samnyasa is a common factor " i(See my commentary on Gl. 18. 1-6). Nay, that man who has started performing all Actions desirelessly and with ■the idea of dedicating them to the ParamesvaTa, must be said to be an ' eternal ascetic ' {'nitya-samnyasin'), though he may be a householder (Gl. 5. 3). This is the principal doctrine •of the Bhagavata religion; and it is this doctrine which has been preached by Narada to Yudhisthira in the Bhagavata- Purana after he had first explained to him the duties of the "four states of life. As has been stated by Vaman Pandit in his commentary on the Glta, that is, in the Yathartha Dlpika >(18. 2), it is not that there is no Samnyasa unless a man "shaves off his hair, and throws away the sacred thread"; or, •takes a staff in his hand and goes about begging; or, gives up all Action and goes and lives in the forest. Renunciation •(samnyasa) and indifference towards the world (vairagya) are properties of the Mind; they are not the properties of the staff, ■or of the hair on the head, or of the sacred thread. If one says that they are the properties of the staff etc. and not of the Mind or of Knowledge, then even the man who holds the handle of the royal umbrella or of any umbrella, must get the same Release as is obtained by a Sarimyasin. It is stated in the conversation between Janaka and Sulabha, that:

tridandadisu yady asti mokso jnanena kasyacit I chatradisu katham f na syat tulyahetau parigrahe il

(San. 320. 42). Because, in either case taking the staff in the hand is a common •factor. In short, the control of the body, of the speech, and of the mind is the true 'tridanda', (three-fold staff), (Manu. 12. 10); ^nd the true Samnyasa is the Renunciation of the Desire- prompted frame of Mind (Gl. 18. 2); and as one cannot escape that Samnyasa in the Bhagavata religion (Gl. 6. 2), so also can -one not escape the Action of keeping the mind steady or of eating etc. in Sarhkhya philosophy. Then, where is the sense ■of making childish objections that the Path of Karma-Yoga ■does not include Samnyasa in the shape of Abandonment of Action, and is, therefore, contrary to the injunctions of the ■Smrtis or unacceptable; and fighting about white clothes or

486 GlTA-EAHASYA oe KARMA-YOGA

saffron-coloured robes? The Blessed Lord has candidly and without bias said that :

ekafa safnkhyam ea yogam ca yah pasyati sapasyati i

(Gl. 5. 5.)

that is, " that man IB truly wise who has realised that Samkhya and (Kanna-) Yoga are not two from the point of view of Release, but are one and the same"; and it is stated even in the Bharata that, " samkhyayogem tulyo la dharma eka-nla- sevitah " (San. 348. 74;, that is, " the Ekantika or Bhigavata religion is equal in merit to the Samkhya religion". In short, in as much as true indifference to the world (miragya) or 1 eternal renunciation ' (Ttitya-samnya&i), (5. 3), consists in merging all selfish interests in universal interests, and in desirelessly performing all duties which befall one in worldly life according to one's own qualifications, so long as life lasts, for the welfare of all created beings, and purely as duties, those who follow the Path of Karma- Yoga never literally abandon Karma and beg. But, though there may be this seeming difference in outward action, the essential principles of Eenuciation (samityasaj and Abandonment (tyaga) continue in the Path of Karma-Yoga ; and therefore, the Gita lays down the ultimate doctrine that there is no opposition between the Desireless Karma-Yoga and the arrangement of states of life according to the Smrti texts.

Brora what has been stated above, it might be thought by some that an attempt has been made in the Gita to harmonise the Karma-Yoga with the Path of Renunciation, because, the Path of Renunciation prescribed by the Smrtis was an ancient religion ; and that the Path of Karma-Yoga was a later creation. But, anybody will see that such is not the oase, if the matter is considered from the historical point of view. I have already stated before that the most ancient form of the Vedic religion consisted of the Karma-kanda. By the Knowledge imparted in the Upanisads, the Karma-kanda gradually became inferior, and Samnyasa in the shape of Abandonment of Action gradually came into vogue. This was the seoond step in the growth of the tree of the Vedic Teligion. But even in those times, philosophers like Janaka

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 487

and others used to harmonise the Karma-kapda with thft Knowledge propounded in the Upanisads, and to go on desirelessly performing Actions till death. Therefore, this second stage of the tree of Vedic religion must be said to fall into two classes ; the one was the class to which Janaka and others belonged, and the other was the class to which Yajaavalkya and others belonged. The arrangement of stages of life made in the Smrtis was the third step. But, this third step was also two-fold like the second step. It is true that the Smrti texts praise the worth of the- fourth state of life entailing the Abandonment of Action; but at the same time, the Karma-Yoga, which included Knowledge and which was followed by Janaka and others, has also been mentioned by the Smrti texts as an alternative for the Samnyasa state. For instance, take the Manu-Smrti, which is the founda- tion of all the Smrti texts. It is stated in the sixth chapter of this Smrti, that a man should gradually rise from the state of the celibate to the states of the house-holder and of the denizen of the woods, and should ultimately take up the fourth state, which entailed the Abandonment of Action. But, when this description of the fourth state, that is, of the religion of ascetics (Yatins) is over, Manu, after saying by way of introduction that: "I have so far described the religion of Yatins, that is, of Samnyasins; I will now explain the Karma- Yoga of the Vedic Samnyasins", and explaining how the state of the householder is superior to the other states, goes on to describe the Karma-Yoga to be followed in the desireless state of the householder, as an alternative for the Samnyasa state or for the religion of Yatins (Manu. 6. 86-96); and later on in the twelvth chapter, this religion has been described as the "Vedic Karma-Yoga", and it is stated that this path is as nihsreyasalcara, that is, as productive of Release as the fourth state (Manu. 12. 86-90). The doctrine of Manu also finds a place in the Yajfiavalkya-Smrti. In the third chapter of this Smrti, after the description of the religion of Yatins is over, the conjunction 'or' {a'lvivd) is used, and then it is stated that even the householder, who is a devotee of Knowltdge, and who speaks the truth, attains Release (without taking Samnyasa), (See Yajna. 3. 204 and 205). In the same way, YaaJ^a has

488 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

stated in his Nirukta, that the ascetics, who abandon Action, as also the Karma-Yogins, who perform Action though they have acquired Knowledge, go to the next life by the devayam path (Ni. 14. 9). Another authority in support of this proposition, besides Yaska, is of the writers of the Dharma-Sutras. These Dharma-Sutras are in prose and scholars believe them to be earlier in point of time than the Smrti texts, which aTe written in verse. Wb are not concerned at the moment with considering whether this opinion is correct or not. Whether it is correct or incorrect, the only important thing we have to consider in the present chapter is that the importance of the state of a householder or of the Karma-Yoga has, in these works, been stated to be more than has been done in the statements quoted above from the Manu and the Yajiiavalkya Smrtis. Manu and Yajna- valkya have referred to the Karma- Yoga as an alternative for the fourth state ; but Baudhayana and Apastaihba have not done so ; and they have clearly stated that the state of the house-holder is the most important state, and that immortality is subsequently attained in that state only. In the Baudhayana Dharma-Sutras, after referring to the statement "jayamano vai brahmanas trihhir njava jayate" — that is, "every Brahmin in coming to birth brings with himself the burden of three debts " etc. found in the Taittiriya- Samhita, it is stated that the man who takes shelter into the state of a householder, which entails the performance of saorificial ritual etc., in order to discharge these debts, attains the sphere of the Brahman; and that those who attach importance to the state of celibacy, or of Sarhnyasa, are ruined (Bau. 2. 6. 11. 33 and 34) ; and there is a similar statement also in the Apastaihba Sutras (Apa. 2. 9. 24. 8). It is not that the fourth state of Sarhnyasa has not been described in these two Dharma-Sutras; but, even after describing that state, the importance of the state of the householder has been stated to be greater. From this fact, and especially from the fact that the adjective ' Vedic ' has been applied to the Karma- Yoga in the Manu-Smrti, the following two things become absolutely clear, namely, (i) that even in the times of the Manu-Smrti, the state of the householder, which entailed the

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 489

Desireless Karma- Yoga, was considered more ancient than the Path of Renunciation by Abandonment of Action ; and ^that (ii) from the point of view of Release, it was considered as meritorious as the fourth state. As the leaning of the commentators on the GltS was towards Samyasa, or towards Devotion coupled with Abandonment of Action, the above ■statements from the Smrtis are not found referred to in their commentaries; but, though they have disregarded those statements, the ancientness of the Karma-Yoga is not thereby in any way diminished. Nay, one may even without objeotion say that as this path of Karma- Yoga was the more ancient one, the writers of the Smrtis had to accept it as an alternative for the Path of Renunciation. This is the Vedic Karma- Yoga. This was practised by Janaka and others before the times of Sri Krsna. But, as the Blessed Lord added the creed of Devotion to that Path, and gave it further circulation, His religion came to be known as the ' Bhagavata Doctrine '. I shall later on consider historically how this Karma-Yoga -again came to be looked upon as inferior, and the Path of Renunciation acquired greater importance, although the Bhagavadglta had in this way declared Karma-Yoga to be superior to Renunciation. All that I have to say for the present is that the Karma-Yoga is not later in point of time than the Path prescribed by the Smrtis, and that it has been in vogue from the anoient Vedio times.

My readers will now appreciate the inner reason for the ■words " iti irimad bhagavadgitasu upamsatsa brahmavidyayafn yogasastre ", used at the end of each chapter of the Gita. The Upanisad which has been sung by the Blessed Lord contains the Brahmavidya like all other Upanisads. But, these words mean that it does not contain only the Brahmavidya, and that the principal object of the Bhagavadglta was to support only the Yoga or the Karma- Yoga, out of the two paths of Samkhya and Yoga (the Vedantic Sarimyasa, and the Vedantic Karma- Yoga), which are included in the Brahmavidya. Nay, one may ■even without objection say that the Bhagavadgitopanisad is the most important treatise on the science of Karma-Yoga ; because, although the Karma-Yoga has been in vogue from tHe timeB of the Vedas, yet, except for some few references

GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

like "kwrvann^ eveha Tmrmani" (Isa. 2), or "arabhya karmaivt- yuy.anvita.ru " (Sve. 6. 4), or, " simultaneously with the Vidya r ritual, such as, svadhyaya etc., should be performed " (Tai. 1. 9)> there is nowhere any detailed explanation of the Karma-Yoga in any of the Upanisads. The Bhagavadglta is the principal* authoritative treatise on that subject ; and it is also proper from the point of view of poetio literature that that Bharata;. which describes the lives of the great heroes in the Bharata- land should also explain the theory of the Karma-Yoga in its relation to Metaphysics. This also now clearly explains, why the Bhagavadglta was included in the Prasthanatrayl; Although the Upanisads are fundamental, yet, as they have- been written by various Rsis, the ideas contained in them are diverse, and in some places apparently mutually contradictory. It was, therefore, necessary to include the Upanisads in the Prasthanatrayl, along with the Vedanta-Sutras, which attempted to harmonise them. If the Glta did not contain, anything more than the Upanisads and the Vedanta-Sutras,. there would be no point in including the Glta in the Prastha- natrayl. But, the trend of the Upanisads is principally towards the Path of Renunciation, and they support chiefly the Jnana-marga (Path of Knowledge) ; and when one says- that the Bhagavadglta supports the Karma-Yoga based on Devotion simultaneously with Knowledge, the distinction of the Bhagavadglta becomes clear, and at the same time the appropriateness of the three parts of the Prasthanatrayl also becomes clear. Because, if the authoritative treatises on the Vedic religion had not dealt with both the Vedic paths of Jfiana and Karma (Samkhya and Yoga), the Prasthanatrayl. would to that extent have remained incomplete. Some people think, that as the Upanisads are ordinarily in support of Samnyasa, there will arise a mutual opposition between the three parts of the Prasthanatrayl, if the Glta. is explained as- being in support of Action ; and the authoritativeness of the three parts will be endangered. Such a doubt would be appropriate if the Samkhya or Samnyasa was the only true Vedic Path to Release ; but, I have shown above,, that in some Upanisads at any rate, such as the Isavasya- and others, the Karma- Yoga has been specifically

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 491

mentioned. Therefore, if one layB down the proposition, as has been done in the Glta, that the Vedio Religion is not to be looked upon as a one-handed man, that is, as being only in support of Sarhnyasa; and that although it has only one head, namely, Brahmavidya, yet, Sarhkhya . and' Karma- Yoga, which, from the point of view of Release,, are of equal value, are its right hand and left hand respectively, there remains no opposition between the Glta and the Upanisads. Nay, as the Upanisads support the one path, and the Gita the other path, these two parts of the Prasthanatrayl are seen to be mutually co-operative like two hands, instead of being mutually antagonistic. In the same way, the Glta does not acquire the subordinate position of merely repeating what has already been said, which it would acquire if it is said to be supporting only what the Upanisads have maintained. As the doctrine-supporting commentators on the Gita have neglected this question, I have shortly set out in the following table in two columns, opposite each other, the principal reasons which the supporters of the two independent paths of Sarhkhya and Yoga adduce in support of their respective doctrines, in order that the similarity and the difference between the two should be easily ascertained. This tabular statement will also clearly show the important differences between the arrangement of the states of life according to the Smrtis and the original Bhagavata religion: — •

After acquisition of the

BRAHMAVIDYA or the KNOWLEDGE of

the ATMAN

KARMA-SAMNYASA KARMA-YOGA

(Sarhkhya) (Yoga)

Release is obtained only by 1. Release is obtained only by

Knowledge of the Atman, Knowledge of the Atman,

and not by Karma. The and not by Karma. The

happiness of heaven, happiness of heaven, ob-

obtained by oredulously tained by credulously per-

performing saorificial ri- forming sacrificial ritual is

tual, is inconstant. inconstant.

492

GTTA-RAHASYA. OK KARMA-YOGA

2. In order to acquire the Knowledge of the Atman, the Mind must be made steady, desireless, apathe- tic, and equable by means of the control of the organs.

3. Therefore, break the bonds of the objects of pleasure, which please the organs, and be free.

4. Action, which is productive 4. of Desire, is causative of pain and bondage.

5. Therefore, though Action 5.

has to be performed until the mind is purified, it must ultimately be given up.

As Karma performed in 6, connection with sacrificial ritual does not create bond- age, there is no objection to its being performed

In order to acquire the Knowledge of the Atman, ' the Mind must be made steady, desireless, apathetic and equable by means of the control of the organs. Therefore, do not give up the objects which please the organs; but maintain your association with them apathetically, that is desi- relessly, and test the con- trol you have over the organs. Desirelessness does not mean inactivity. If you consider in what unhappiness and bondage lies, you will see that lifeless (acetana) Karma does not bind or leave anybody ; and that the cauBe of bondage and- unhappiness is the Desire ot the hope of reward exist- ing in the Mind of the doer. Therefore, even after the purification of the Mind, perform all Action courage- ously and enthusiastical- ly, giving up the Hope for Fruit. One cannot give up Karma, even if one wishes to give it up. Karma is the Creation; and it has no rest. All Actions which are per- formed with a desireless frame of mind or with the idea of dedicating them to the Brahman are a great

EENUNCIATION and KARMA-YOGA

493

during the stats of a house- holder.

As the natural needs of the Body cannot he escaped from, it Is not improper to beg, for earning one's livelihood, after haying taken Samnyaga.

After Acquisition of Know- 8. ledge, no duty remains to you for your own benefit; and there is no necessity to act for universal welfare.

9. Nevertheless, persons of high 9. authority may, till death, carry on their duties, after Acquisition of Knowledge, as was done by Janaka and

'Yajiia' (sacrifice). There- fore, all duties, which are appropriate to one's own- status in life should be per- formed desirelessly, as pure duties; and these should be performed continually.

, Begging for earning one's subsistence is also Karma, and that too, 'disgraceful'. If this Karma is to be- performed, why not perform all other Actions desireless- ly ? Besides, if the state of a householder is done away with, who is going to give you food?

After Acquisition of Know- ledge, although no duty remains to you for your own benefit, yet, you cannot escape Karma. Therefore, whatever duties are enjoin- ed by the Sastras should be performed with a selfless (nirmama) frame of mind, saying: 'I do not want it,' and with an eye to'univers- al welfare. No one can escape lokasaiugraha (uni- versal welfare). For inst- ance, see the life of the Blessed Lord Himself.

According to the arrange- ment of the four castes, which is based on the divi- sions of the qualities (gwnar vibhaga), every one acquire

494

GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

and others, but exceptions.

only as

10. But in any case, Samnyasa 10. in the shape of abandon- ment of Action is the best. The duties of the three other states are the means, or the preparatory stages, for the purification of the Mind; and there is an inherent oppsosition between Jfiana and Karma. Therefore, acquire purification of the Mind as early as possible in the earlier stages of life, and after having acquired Knowledge, take ultimately to Samnyasa in the shape of Abandonment of the Action. If you have acquired purification of the Mind with birth or in young age, there is no necessity of performing the duties pertaining to the state of a householder. The true state of Samnyasa cosists in the literal Aban- donment of Action.

11. Even _ after Abandonment 11. of Action, you must observe the rules of sama, dama, etc.

by birth great or small authority; and this authori- ty, which is acquired according to one's own state in life (dharma) must be exercised, till death, desirelessly and without exception; because, this cycle of activities has been created by the Paramesvara for the maintenance of the world.

It is true that by perform- ing the Actions pertaining to worldly life in the manner enjoined by the Sastras, one acquires the purification of the Mind. But, purification of the Mind is not the only use of Karma. Karma is necessary in order that the activities of the world should go on. In the same way, though there is an opposition between Jfiana and Desire-prompted Acti- on,there is none between Jfiana and Desireless Action; and therefore, after the purification of the Mind, continue the Actions prescribed for the various castes, abandoning the hope of the Fruit of Action, and desirelessly, till death, for the benefit of the world. This is the true Samnyasa; it is neither possible nor proper, to literally abandon Karma (Action) at any time.

After Acquisition of Know- ledge, take Samnyasa in the shape of Abandonment of the Fruit of Aotion, and observe all the rules arising

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 495

as a result of Self-identifi- cation (almaupamya), except • sama, darna etc.; and per- form by means of this sama or peaceful frame of mind, all the, duties en- joined by the Sastras, till death, for the purpose of universal welfare. Do not give up DeBireless Action,

12. This path is eternal, and 12. This path is eternal, and has the support of the haB.the support of the Srutis Srutis as also of the Smrtis. as also of the Smrtis.

13. This path was adopted by 13. Vyasa, Vasistha, Jaigi- Suka, Yajiiavalkya, and savya, and others, as also others. Janaka, Sri Krsna and

others followed this path.

ULTIMATE RELEASE. ( moksa )

Both these paths or Nisthas are based on the Knowledge of ^he Brahman, and as the desirelessness or peacefulness of the Mind is a common factor in both, both the paths ultimately lead to Release ( Gi. 5. 5. ). The important difference between the two is that in the one case Karma (Action) is abandoned after Jnana (Knowledge), and in the other, Desire-prompted •(kamya) Action is abandoned, and Desireless Action is continued.

These two paths of abandoning Action and not abandoning Action have both been adopted and followed by Jnanins after the Acquisition of Knowledge. But Action can be abandoned •or performed even when Knowledge has not been acquired. It is, therefore, also necessary to shortly consider here this Action or Abandonment of Action, which is based, not on Knowledge, but on Ignorance. That is why three varieties of Abandonment of Action have been mentioned in the eighteenth chapter of the Glta. Some persons abandon Action for fear of physical labour, though they have not acquired Knowledge. This is described in the Glta as a 'rajasa fyaga' ( GI. 18. 8). In

496 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

the same way, many persons perform sacrificial ritual only witl religious faith (sraddha), though they have not acquired Know- ledge, But the Gita says this path of performing Action leads only to heaven and not to Release (Gi. 9. 20). As the perform- ance of sacrificial ritual prescribed by the Srutis is not now in vogue, some persons think that the doctrine of the Gita relating to the pure Karma-marga supported by the Mimamsa school, is not of much use in these days. But, such a belief is not correct; because, although the sacrificial ritual enjoined by the Srutis has gone out of vogue, the ritual prescribed by the Smrtis, in the shape of the duties enjoined on the four castes, is still in existence. Therefore, the dictum of the Gita with reference to people who perform Desire-prompted Actions like sacrificial ritual, with religious faith, though ignorantly, also applies in the present day to people who perform the duties enjoined on the four castes, with religious faith, though without Knowledge. If one visualises the activities of the world, it will be seen that the majority of persons in society perform their various duties, keeping religious faith in the' Sastras, and according to the accepted moral code. But such persons have not fully acquired the Knowledge of the Paramesvara. Therefore, these credulous persons, who per- form sacrificial Karma, are in the same position as those who make calculations by mental arithmetic without understand- ing the reasons for that calculation given in Mathematics. As these persons perform the ritual in manner enjoined by the Sastras and with religious faith, it is performed correctly,, and will be productive of merit (punya) or of heaven. But, as the doctrine of the Sastras themselves is that Release cannot be obtained except by Knowledge, such persons cannot possibly obtain any result more valuable than heaven. There- fore, those persons who wish to obtain that immortality which is beyond the happiness of heaven— and this is, indeed, the true highest ideal of man — should, in the beginning, as a means, and later on, that is, in the state of perfection, for the purpose of universal welfare, (which means, so long as life exists), accept the path of performing Action desirelessly, with a frame of mind chastened by Knowledge, and with the Reali- sation that, ' in all created beings there is only one Atman '.

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 497

Of all the paths of leading one's life, this path is the best. In the tabular statement above, I have called this path, Karma- Yoga, on the authority of the Gita; and it is usually referred to by some writers aB the Path of Action (karma-marga), or the Activistic Path (pravrtti-marga). But the words Karma- marga or Pravrtti-marga ordinarily also connote the heaven- producing path of performing Action, with religious faith, but without Knowledge. It, therefore, becomes necessary to use two distinct words in order to make clear the difference between the Knowledge-less but Faith-full Karma, and the Desireless Karma performed with Knowledge; and for this reason, the Manu-Smrti, as also the Bhagavata, call Knowledge-less Karma, 'pravrtta-karma, and Desireless Karma baBed on Knowledge, 'nivrtta-karma' ( Manu. 12. 89; Bhag. 7. 15. 47). But even these words are, in my opinion, not as unambiguous as they ought to be; because, the word 'nivrtti' is ordinarily used as meaning 'recoiling (becoming paravrtta) from Karma'. In order that such a doubt should not remain, the word 'karma' is added after the word 'nivrtta', and when that is done, the adjective 'nivrtta' does not mean 'abstaining from Karma'; and we get the interpretation 'nivrtta-karma' = 'Desireless Action'. But whatever is done, so long as the word 'nivrtta' is used, the idea of the Abandonment of Action inevitably enters the mind. Therefore, in my opinion, it is better to call the path of performing Desireless Action, after the acquisition of Know- ledge, by the name 'Karma-Yoga' instead of calling it 'nivrtti' or 'nivrtta-karma'; because, when the word 'Yoga' is tacked on after the word 'Karma', it naturally means "the device of performing Action without obstructing Release," and Karma based on ignorance is also naturally eliminated. Nevertheless, if one wishes to refer to this path as 'Karma-marga' or 'Pravrtti-marga, without forgetting that the Karma-Yoga of the Gita is based on Knowledge, there is no objection to the same being done; and in some places, I myself have used the same words for indicating the Karma-Yoga of the Gita for diversity of language. I have in the following tabular statement shown the opinion of the Gita as to the two paths of Abandonment of Action and Performance of Action, which are based respectively on Knowledge and Ignorance.

498

GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

WAY OF LEADING LIFE

GRADE

! ULTIMATE SPHERE

1. Performing Actions only f oi one's own happiness, egotist- ically, with an ungodly (axuri) frame of mind, or hypocritic- ally, or being prompted by avarice— (Gi. 16. 16)— the ASURA, or UNGODLY path.

1. Although the Knowledge of the form of the Parames- vara by the Realisation that there is only one Atman in all created beings has not been acquired, performing all Desire- prompted Actions with faith, and according to moral prin- ciples, and consistently with the injunctions of the Sastras, or the Vedas (Gi. 2. 41-44 and 9. 20)— PURE KARMA, or TRAYI— DHARMA or MIMAMSAKA-MARGA.

1. After the Acquisition of the Knowledga of the Para- mesvara, by the desireless performance of,the duties en- joined by the Sastras, giving up all Action, and finding happiness only in Jnani (Gi. 5. 2)— PURE JNANA or the SAMKHYA or the SMARTA-MARGA.

1. Performing life-long Desireless Actions, in the beginning, for the purification of the Mind, and afterwards, that is, after having thereby acquired the Knowledge of the Paramesvara, for universal welfare (lolcasavigraha), in the same way as was done by the Blessed Lord (Gi. 5. 2)— tb KNOWLEDGE-ACTION path or KARMA-YOGA, ,or the BHAGAVATA-MARGA.

LOWEST

MEDIUM (.Best, accord- ing to the MImarhsa school)

SUPERIOR

BEST OF ALL

HELL

HEAVEN

(Release,

(3 according

■% to tbe £ I Munamsakas)

CO

l-> >>

RELEA- SE [mak-

RELEA- SE (moh- sa)

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 499

In short, although Action (Karma) is not necessary for obtaining Release, yet, the Glta has declared the path of •desirelessly and continuously performing Action as the best path of all, for other co-existent reasons, namely, because it is, in the first place, unavoidable, and secondly because, it is •essential for the maintenance of the world. Or, the ultimate ■•doctrine of the Glta is that the union of Action and Spirit- ual Knowledge is the best, and that mere Action or mere .Spiritual Knowledge is each one-sided, according to the state- ment of Manu that: "krtabuddhisu kartarah karlrsu brahma- vadimh" (Manu. 1". 97).

Really speaking this chapter ought to end here. But, it is necessary to say something here about the quotations given .above in various places for showing that the doctrine laid down by the Glta has the authority of the Srutis and the .Smrtis; because, many persons have come to the conclusion •that all the Upanisads support Renunciation (samnyasa or nivrtti ) by reading the doctrine-supporting commentaries on the Upanisads. I do not say that the Path of Renunciation is not supported by the Upanisads at all. It is stated in the Brhadaranyakopanisad (4. 4. 2<i), that after they have Realised that the Parabrahman is the only Reality, "some Jfianins do not any more entertain in their hearts the desire for children (pufraisana), or the desire for wealth (vittaisaw), or the desire for higher worlds (lokaisapa), and saying: 'what have we to do with •children? the whole world is our Self (Atman)', they go about the world contentedly, and earn their livelihood by begging". But it is nowhere stated in the Brhadaranyaka that all persons who have Realised the Brahman should follow this path. Nay, .there is a statement in this very Upanisad that that king Janaka, to whom this advice was given, had reached the highest peak of the Knowledge of the Brahman, and had become immortal. But, it is nowhere stated that he had, like Yajnavalkya, given up the world and taken Samnyasa. There- fore, it becomes quite clear that the Brhadaranyakopanisad accepted both the Desireless Karma-Yoga of Janaka and the Path of Abandonment of Action followed by Yajnavalkya, as alternative paths; and the author of the Vedanta-Sutras has <come to the same conclusion (Ve. Su, 3. 4. 15 ). The

500 GITA-RAKASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

Kathopanisad lias gone even further than this, and, as 1 have- stated before in the fifth chapter, it says, according to me, that the Desireless Karma- Yoga is the only proper path of life- The same conclusion is arrived at in the Chandogyopanisad (8. 15. 1), and there is a clear statement in it at the end, that "the Jnanin who first finishes his course of education at the hands of his preceptor, and thereafter lives in his family and' follows the rules of Ethics and morality, goes to the sphere of the Brahman and does not return"; and sentences from the Taittiriya and the Svetasvatara Upanisads having the san» purport have been quoted by me above ( Tai. 1. 9 and Sve. 6. 4). Besides, we do not see it stated in the Upanisads, that those who have advised the Knowledge of the Brahman to others,, or their disciples who had acquired the Knowledge of the Brahman, adopted Renunciation in the shape of Abandonment of Action, except one or two like Yajnavalkya. On the other hand, they seem to have been householders, from the descrip- tions which have been given of them. One cannot, therefore,, look upon all the Upanisads as supporting Samnyasa, and has to say that some of them mention the alternative paths of Samnyasa and Kaima-Yoga, whereas others support the union of Jnana and Karma (jnana-karma-samuccaya). But, the- doctrine-supporting commentaries on the Upanisads do not show these differences, and they usually say that all the Upanisads support only one Path — and that too principally the Samnyasa Path. In short, these doctrine-supporting commentators have dealt with both the Glta and the Upanisads in the same way; that is to say, these commentators have had to stretch and mutilate some hymns in the Upanisads, as has been done by them in the matter of some of the stanzas in the Glta. Take, for example, the case of Isavasyopanisad, Though this Upanisad is short, that is, consisting only of eighteen' stanzas, it is considered to be of greater importance than the' other Upanisads; because, this Upanisad has been mentioned in the Vajasaney i Samhita, whereas the other Upanisads have been mentioned in the Aranyakas; and it is generally accepted that the Brahmanas are of lesser importance than the Samhitas, and the Aranyakas of lesser importance than the Brahmanas. This Isavasyopanisad is from top to bottom in support of the harmonising of Jnana and Karma. It is stated in the very

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 501

first hymn (mantra) of this Upanisad that, "whatever existed in the world must be considered as 'Isavasya', that is, located in the Paramesvara; and in the second hymn, there is a clear statement that, "one should desire to live for a hundred years ■while performing Action desirelessly". This statement from the Isavasya has been quoted as an authority for the harmonis- ing of Jfiana and Karma, wherever there was occasion to deal with the Karma- Yoga in the Vedanta-Sutrag, as also in other places. But, the Isavasya Upanisad does not rest there. In order to support the statement made in the second stanza, it subsequently starts the exposition of 'avidya', that is, , Karma, and ' vidya ', that is, Jfiana ; and in the ninth stanza, it is stated that "persons who devote thmselves only to avidya or Karma enter darkness, and those who are steeped merely in vidya or the Knowledge of the Brahman enter a still darker darknesB ". Having in this way shown the inferiority of pure avidya (Karma), and pure vidya (Jfiana), this Upanisad explains in the eleventh stanza the necessity of the union of 4 vidya ' and ' avidya ' in the following words :-

vidyam ca 'vidyam ca yas tad vedobhayam saha l avidyaya mrtyum tirtva vidyaya 'mrtam asnute II

Isa. 11. The plain and clear meaning of this stanza is: "that man, who understands both vidya (Jnana) and avidya (Kaima) at the same time, goes (easily) through the affairs of the ' mrtyu ' that is, of the perishable illusory world, by means of aMya that is, Karma ; and attains immortality by means of vidya, that is, of the Realisation of the Brahman "; and the same idea is repeated in the three succeeding stanzas (Isa. 12-14), in •which vidya is referred to as ' sairibhuti ', that is^ the original ■cause of the world, and avidya, which is different from that ■vidya, as 'asaffibhuti' or 'vinasa'. From this, it bsoomes quite, clear that the Isavasyopanisad is in favour of the simultaneous, possession (vhhayam saha) of vidya and avidya. In the above •stanza, the words ' mrtyu and ' amrta ' are mutual opposites, just like ' vidya ' and ' avidya '. Out of them, amrta quite clearly means the imperishable Brahman, and it follows that mrtyft, which is the opposite of it, means the perishable mriynrhkn ^mortal world) or the lifq iji this world ; and both these, wotds

503 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

have been used in the same sense in the Nasadlya-Sukta of the Rg-veda (Rg. 10. 129. 2); When one interprets the- eleventh stanza of the Isavasyopanisad, whioh has been quoted above, taking these clear meanings of the words vidya etc.,. that is, taking vidya as meaning Jfiana, avidya as meaning Karma, amrta as meaning the Brahman, and mrtyu as meaning the mortal world, it will he clearly seen that the simultaneous possession (ekakalina-samuccaya) of vidya and avidya is men- tioned in the first line of this stanza : the separate results of both are mentioned in the second part of the stanza, in order to further emphasise that statement. Both these results are considered desirable by the Isavasyopanisad, and the simulta- neous possession of Jfiana and Karma has been advocated in this TJpanisad. Carrying on properly the affairs of the mortal world, or going through those affairs successfully is called ' loka-samgratta ' in the Gita. It is true that obtaining Release is the duty of every man ; yet, as it is also essential that he should simultaneously bring about universal welfare (loha- samgraha), the Gita has laid down the doctrine that the Jfianin should not give up this Karma, which is productive of universal welfare; and the same doctrine has been propounded. in the line, "avidyaya mrlyum tirtva vidyaya 'mrtam asnute" mentioned above, with only a verbal difference. In shorty it will be seen that not only is the Gita consistent with the- Upanisads, but that the proposition definitely propounded by the Isavasyopanisad has been accepted in toto in the Gita. The Satapatha-Brahmana is a part of that very Vajasaneyr Sarhhita, of which the Isavasyopanisad is a part; and the Brhadaranyakopanisad is to be found in the Aranyakas of the Satapatha-Brahmana; and this ninth hymn (mantra) of the Isavasyopanisad, namely, "persons who are steeped in pure Knowledge (vidya), that is, in the Realisation of the Brahman, enter a still greater darkness" has been literally adopted in it (Br. 4. 4. 10). This Brhadaranyakopanisad con- tains the story of the King Janaka, and the illustration of that Janaka has been taken by the Blessed Lord in support of the theory of Karma-Yoga (Gl. 3. 20). This establishes all the- more firmly, the relation between the Isavasyopanisad and the Karma-Yoga of the Bhagavadgita referred to by me above.

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 503

But those commentators whose sectarian doctrine is that there is only one path mentioned in each and every Upanisad for obtaining Release, and that too the Path of Indifference (vairagya) or Sarhnyasa (Renunciation), and that the Upanisads cannot prescribe two paths, are driven to somehow or other put a stretched and different meaning on this clear sacred hymn (mantra) in the Isavasyopanisad; otherwise, these hymns- negative their doctrines; and that is a thing they do not want. Therefore, in commenting on the eleventh hymn in the Samkarabhasya, the word 'vidya' is not taken to mean Jnana. (Knowledge), but upasam (worship). It is not that the word 'vidya' does not mean 'upasam' (worship). In the phrases Sand-iiyi-vidya' etc. 'vidya.' means 'upasam'. But, that is not the principal meaning of that word. It is not that Sri Sarhkaracarya did not or could not have realised this faot. Nay, it is impossible that he did not realise it; because, there are statements in the other Upanisads, Buch &B,"vidyaya vindate 'mrtam" f Kena. 2. 12); or " pranasyadhyatmam njnayamrtam asnute" (Prasna. 3. 12); and in the seventh prapathaka of the Maitryupanisad, the hymn "vidyam ca 'vidyaih ca" etc., being the eleventh hymn of the Isavasyopanisad, has been taken literally; and immediately before it, the hymn in Katha. 2. 4, and after it, the hymn in Katha. 2. 5 are to be found; that is to say, these three hymns are to be found in the same place one after the other, and the central hymn is from the Isavasyopanisad; and each of the three verses contains the word 'vidya'. From this it follows, that according to the Maitryupanisad, the word 'vidya' in the Isavasyopanisad must be taken to mean the same thiog as in the Kathopanisad, that is to say, Jnana. But, in the Samkarabhasya on the IsavSsya, it is stated that.- if the words '-vidya' and 'amrta' in the eleventh hymn of the Isavasyopanisad are taken in their ordinary meaning of 'vidya' = Knowledge of the Self, and amrta = moksa, one will have to say that the union of Jnana (vidya) and Karma (avidya} has been prescribed by this Upanisad; but, in as much as such a combination is logically incorrect, the words 'vidya and 'amrta' must be taken in their respective inferior meanings of ' worship of a deity' and ' sphere of the deities ' respectively. In short, in order that this hymn in the Isavasya should not

504 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

falsify the principal doctrine of the Samkara school that: "after the Acquisition of Knowledge, one must not perform Actions ; because, the combination of Jnana and Karma can never be logical ", the eleventh hymn of the Isavasya has been interpreted, as mentioned above, in the Sarhkarabhasya, by taking the inferior meaning of the word K vidya', with the clear intention of harmonising all the statements in the Srutis with the doctrine of the Samkara school; and from the point of view of the justification of a doctrine, this mis- interpretation was not only important but necessary. But those, who do not accept the fundamental proposition that all the Upanisads must support only one particular line of thought, and that the Srutis cannot prescribe two different modes of life, have no occasion to pervert the meanings of the words 'vidya' and 'amrta' in the above hymn. Although one accepts the principle that the Parabrahman is ' ekameoadvitlyam' (one, and one only), it does not follow that there cannot be more than one path of Realising that Para- brahman. As it is possible to have two stair-cases for going to the same floor, or two roads for going to the Bame place, so also can there be two methods or Nisthas for acquiring Release; and it has, therefore, been clearly stated in the Bhagavadgita that "loke'smin dvivldha nistha". When it is once admitted that it is possible to have two Nisthas (paths of Release), it does not become impossible that some Upanisads should ' describe the Jnana-nistha, and others describe the Jiiana- Karma-combined Nistha. Necessarily, there does not remain any ocoasion to pervert the clear, natural, and unequivocal meaning of the words used in the Isavasyo- panisad on the ground that they are inconsistent with the JfLana-nistha. There is another reason for saying that Srlmat Samkaracarya aimed rather at insisting on a homogeneity in the Upanisads on the question of the Sarhnyasa-nistha than at accepting the clear meaning of the hymn. In the Samkara- bhasya on the Taittirlya Upanisad (Tai. 2. 11), only the portion "avidyaya mrtyum tirtva vidyaya 'mrtam asnute", out of the hymn in the Isavasya, has been given; and there has been joined to it a statement from the Manu-Smrti (Manu. 12. 104) that "tapasa kalmasam hanti vidyaya. 'mrtam asnute", and the

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA- YOGA 505

■word 'vidya' in both, these lines has been taken by Sarhkaracary a in only one meaning, namely, Brahma-jnana, which is the original and primary meaning. But, here the Acarya says that the word '^"Ww^ 'swimming over' implies that the action of swimming through the mortal sphere ( mrtyu-loka) is first completed, and afterwards (not simultaneously) the action of obtaining immortality by vidya follows ; but I need not point out that such an interpretation is inconsistent with the words "ubhayam saha" in the firBt half of the hymn; and it seems that this meaning must have been left out in the Samkarabhasya on the Isavasya, possibly for this reason. Whatever may be the case, this clearly shows why a different explanation of the eleventh hymn of the Isavasya was given in the Samkarabhasya on it. This reason is merely a desire to support a doctrine, and those who do not accept the doctrinal vision of commenta- tors, may not accept this explanation. I am certainly willing that, as far as possible, one should avoid having to give up an interpretation adopted by a superman like SrlmatSarhkaracarya But, such a position is bound to arise when one gives up the doctrinal vision; and, therefore, even other commentators have, before me, interpreted the hymns in the Isavasyopanisad in a way different from that adopted in the Samkarabhasya, that is to say, in the same way as has been done by me. For instance, in the commentary by Uvatacarya on the Vajasaneyi-Sarhhita, and necessarily on the Isavasyopanisad, it is stated in expounding the canon, 'vidyant ca 'vidyam ca' that, "vidya means the Knowledge of the Atman, and avidya means Karma, and immortality or Release is obtained by the combination of both"; and Anantacarya has in his commentary on this Upanisad .accepted this interpretation, which combines Knowledge and Action; and he has ultimately clearly said that the doctrine expounded in this hymn is the same as that underlying the statement in the Glta, that : " yai sainkhyaih prapyate sfhanam tad yogavr api gamyate" ( Gl. 5. 5); and that the words 'samkhya' and 'yoga' in this stanza in the Glta respectively connote 'Jnana' and 'Karma'. *In the same way, Apararkadeva has

• All these commentaries on the Isavasyopanisad have been

given in the edition of the Isavasyopanisad printed in the Ananda- ahram Press at Poena; and the commentary of Apararka on the

506 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

given the eleventh hymn of the Isavasya in his commentary on the Yajnavalkya-Smrti (Ya. 3. 57 and 205), and interpreted it as supporting the combination of JSana and Karma, as was done by Anantacarya. From this it will be clear to my readers, that I have not been the first person to interpret this hymn from the fsavasyopanisad in a way different from that in which it has been interpreted in the Samkarabhasya.

So far we have considered the hymn in the Isavaayopanisad itself. Let us now consider shortly the statement "tapasa kalmasam hanti vidyaya 'mrtam asnute" from the Manu-Smrti which has been quoted in the Samkarabhasya. This is the- 104th stanza of the twelvth chapter of the Manu-Smrti, and that chapter deals with the Vedio Karma-Yoga, as will be seen from Manu. 12. 86. In the course of the disquisition on the Karma-Yoga, Manu says,

tapo vidya ca riprasya nihsreyasakaram param I tapasa kalmasam hanti vidyaya 'mrtam asnute n

that is. — "tapa and (ca) mdya, these (that is, necessarily both)^ are producers of excellent Release to the Brahmin"; and having stated this in the first part of the Btanza, he, in order to show the use of both these things, says in the second part of the stanza: "by tapa (religious austerity) all sin is annihilated, and by vidya, one obtains amrta, that is, Release". From tbis, it is quite clear that Manu had, in this place, implied the combina- tion of Jfiana and Karma, and that he had in this stanza adopted the doctrine enunciated in the eleventh hymn in the- Isavasya Upanisad. This meaning is further emphasised by the statements in the Harlta Smrti. This Harita-Smrti is available independently, and is also included in the Nrsimha- YajBavallsya-Smrti has also been Btparaiety priuted in the Anandashram Press. The translation of tbe Isavasyopanisad included in the translations of the TJpanisads made by Prof. Mas Muller ia not according to the Samkarabhasya, and he has stated his reasons for doing so at the end of his translation (Sacred Booh of the East Series Vol. I, p. 314-320). The commentary of Ananta- carya had not come to the hands of Prof. Mas. MUller ; and he also does not seem to have understood why different meanings are- given for the same words in different places in the Samkarabhasya.

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 507 J '

Purana (Nr. Pu. 57-61). The Nrsimha Purana (61. 9-11) and the Harlta-Smrti (7. 9-11) contain the following stanzas regarding the combination of Knowledge (Jnana) and Action (Karma) :-

yathasm rathahinas ca ratkas casvair vina yatha I evam tapas ca vidya ca ubhav api tapawinah II yathannam madhusamyukfam madhu cannena samyutam \ evam tapas ca vidya ca samyuktam bhesajam mahat II

dvabhyam eva hi paksabhyam yatha vai paksinam gatih l tathmva jnunalcarmabhyam prapyate brahma sasvatam II that is, "In the same way, as horses without a ohariot, or a chariot without horses (are of no use), the same is the case with the tapa of the tapasvin, and vidya. In the same way, as anna (food) mixed with madhu (honey), and honey mixed with food become a potent medicine, so also do ' tapa *" and ' vidya ', when combined, In the same way as birds acquire motion by means of two wings, so also is the immutable - Brahman acquired as a result of the combination of Jriana and Karma". These statements in the Harita-Smrti are- also to be found in the second chapter of the Vrddhatreya- Smrti. From these statements, and especially from the- illustrations which have been given in them, one clearly understands in what way the statements of the Manu-Smrtf are to be interpreted. I have stated before that Maim includes all the Karma (ritual or Action) ' enjoined for the four caster in the word 'tapa' (Manu. 11. 236); and it will now be seen that the observance of tapa and svadhyaya-pravacana which has been prescribed in the Taittirlyopanisad ( Tai. 1. 9), has been prescribed accepting the position of the combination of Jnana and Karma. The same is the summary of the whole of the- Yoga-Vasistha; because, in the beginning of this book, Sutlksna has asked whether Release is obtained by Jnana alone, or by Karma alone, or by the combination of both; and in replying to that question, after first stating that, "just as the movement of birds in the sky is made by two wings, so also is Release obtained by the combination of Jnana and Karma, and per- fection is not attained by only one of them", by taking the illustration of the wings of the birds from the Harita-Smrti^ the Yoga-Vasistha has been written in order to prove that

508 GlTA-RAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA

proposition in detail (Yo. 1. 1. 6-9). Similarly, in the book itself, Vasistha has again and again given to Rama the advice that, "perform all your activities in life, keeping your mind pure like a jivan-mukta" (Yo. 5. 17. 18-26); or "as it is not possible to give up Action (Karma) so long as life lasts (Yo. 6. TJ. 2. 42), psrform the duty of protecting and maintaining that kingdom which has fallen on your shoulders by virtue of your caste" (Yo. 5. 5. 54 and 6, TJ. 213. 50); and the summing up of the work, as also what Sri Ramacandra did afterwards, is consistent with that advice. But, as the commentators on the Yoga-Vasistha, belonged to the Samnyasa school, they have passed a judgment on their own hook, that Jnana and Karma are not 'yugapat', that is, 'proper at the same time,' although the illustration of the two wings of a bird is perfectly clear in itself. But, this interpretation is a stretohed, unintelligible, and doctrinal interpretation, as will be seen by any one who reads the original work by itself, without the commentary. There is a well-known treatise in the Madras Presidency known as Gurujnana-vasistha-Tattvasarayana, which is sub- divided into three parts, namely, JnSna-kanda, Upasana- kanda and Karma-kanda. I have stated before that this work is not as old as it is made out to be. But, although, it might not be ancient, yet, as it accepts the position of the combina- tion of Jnana and Karma, it is necessary to mention it in this place. As the Vedanta in this work is Non-Dualistic, and as it lays a speoial emphasis on Desireless Action, the doctrine supported by it may safely be said to be different from the doctrine supported by Sri Samkaracarya, and independent. This doctrine is known on the Madras side as 'Anubhava- dvaita ' ; and really speaking this is only an imitation of the Karma-Yoga in the Glta. Yet, it is stated in it, that this conclusion is arrived at by all the 108 Upanisads, instead of supporting it on the authority of the Gita ; and besides, it also includes two new Gitas, namely the Rama-gita and the Surya- glta. This book will correct the impression some persons have, that accepting the Monistic {adoita) theory amounts to an acceptance of the Abandonment of Action; and it will now be clear from the authorities given above, that the ■statement that the Desireless Karma- Yoga is supported only

RENUNCIATION AND KARMA-YOGA 509<

by the Saihhitas, the Brahmanas, the Upanisads, the Dharma- Sutras, the Manu and Yajnavalkya-Smrtis, the Mahabharata,. the Bhagavadglta, the Yoga-Vasistha, and lastly by the Tattvasarayana, but is not aooepfcable to the Srutis and the Smrtis, and that the Srutis and the Smrtis support only the- Path of Renunciation, is without any foundation whatsoever.

I have so far proved that in order to carry on the activities of the mortal world or for universal welfare, the simultaneous combination of Dasireless Action, according to one's own qualification, with Release-giving Knowledge, is- necessary according to the G-Ita: or, as has been stated by the Maratha Poet Sivadina-kesari : "that man who has attained' the highest ideal, attending also to his worldly activities V' such a man is good indeed, he is good indeed II " ; that this Path of Karma-Yoga has been in vogue from ancient times, and was accepted by Janaka and others ; and that it is also known as the Bhagavata religion, because, it was eitended further and revived by the Blessed Lord. It is now necessary,, from the point of view of general welfare (loka-mmgraha), to deal with the question of how the scients, who follow this ' path, carry on their worldly activities simultaneously 'with-' the acquisition of the highest ideal of man. But, as th& present chapter has been lengthened out to a considerable, extent, I shall deal with this subject in the nest chapter;

CHAPTER XII.

THE STATE AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SIDJHA (PERFECT).

(SIDDHAVASTHA AND SIDDHA-VYAVAHAEA)

sarvesam yah suhrn nityam sarvesaih ca kite ratah I karmana mamsa vaca sa dharmam veda jajale II *

Mahabharata, Santi. 361. 9.

That school of thought according to which nothing remains to be done by way of duty after a man has acquired the Knowledge of the Brahman and his mind has become extremely equable and desireless, and according to which a Jnanin should, on that account, give up entirely the painful and insipid activities of a transient worldly life with an apathetic frame of mind, can never think that the Karma-Yoga, or the mode of life appropriate to the state of a householder, is a science which deserves consideration. They admit that before a man takes Samnyasa, his Mind must have been purified and Know- ledge acquired ; and they, therefore, admit that one must iead one's worldly life in a way which will purify the Mind and make it sattvika. But, if one believes that leading the worldly life till death is foolish, and considers it to be the highest duty of everyone in this life to renounce the world (take Samnyasa) as early as possible, Karma-Yoga has no in- dependent importance; and the scholars, who belong to the School of Renunciation, do not trouble to deal with the question of the doable and the not-doable in the state of a householder, beyond, concisely and when occasion arises, considering how one should lead one's worldly life, and advising that one should go up the ladder of the four states of life (airamn) described by Manu and other philosophers and reach as quickly as possible the last step of that ladder, namely, of Samnyasa. That is why Srlmat Sarhkaracarya, who was the principal protagonist of the Path of Renuncia- tion in the Kaliyuga, has ia his commentary on the Gits

• "That man, who, by his actions, by his mind, and by bis

speech ia continually engrossed in the welfare of others, and who is always a friend of others, he alone, Jajali, may be said to have understood what Morality (dharma) is ".

STATE AND ACTIVITIES OF THE PERFECT 511

■either belittled the statements in the Glta advising Energismi or considered them to be merely laudatory, and drawn the ultimate conclusion of the Glta that the whole of it has supported the doctrine of the Abandonment of Action (karma- samnyasa) ; or why other commentators have, consistently with their own doctrines, stated the import of the Gita to be that the Blessed Lord advised Arjuna on the battle-field to follow only the renunciatory paths of Release, namely, the path of pure Devotion, or the Patafijala-Yoga. There is no doubt that the Knowledge of the Absolute Self included in the Path of Renunciation is faultless; and that the equability of Reason, or the desireless state of mind produced by it, is acceptable to and admitted by the Gita. Nevertheless, the opinion of the Samnyasa school, that one must entirely abandon Action in order to obtain Release is not acceptable to the Glta ; and I have shown in detail in the last chapter that the most important doctrine laid down by the Glta is, that the Jnanin must, even after the acquisition of Knowledge, perform all the activities of life, with the help of the feeling of indifference to the world and the equability of mind, which results from the Realisation of the Brahman. When it is admitted that (i) the deletion of Knowledge-full [jnana-yukta ) Action from the world will result in the world becoming blind and being destroyed ; and that ! ii even Jfianins must desirelessly perform all the duties of worldly life, and so give to ordinary people a living example of a good and pure life, since it is the desire of the Blessed Lord that the world should not be so destroyed and that its activities should go on without a hitch . and that (iii) this path is the most excellent and acceptable of all, it becomes necessary to consider in what way such a Jnanin performs the activities of his worldly life; because, as the life of such a Jnanin is nothing but an example set by him to other people, the consideration of that example auto- matically discloses to us the device sought by us for making a true discrimination between morality (dharma) and im- morality (artliarma), between the doable (karyai and the non- doable (akarya) and between the duty (kartavya) and the non- duty {alcartavya). This is the important difference between the Path of Renunciation and the Path of Karma-Yoga. That

513 gita-rahasya or karma-Yoga

man whose Pure Reason {vyavasayatmika buddfnh) has become capable of realising the identity, that "there is only one Atman in all created things", on account of its having become steady by means of mental control, must also possess a Desire (vasaria) which is pure. And when his Practical Reason {vasanatmika buddhih) has in this way become pure, equable,, mine-less {nirmama) and sinless, it is impossible that he should commit any sin or any Action obstructive of Release; because, (i) whatever Action is prompted by a pure desire, is bound to be pure, seeing that in the usual order of things, there is first a desire, and that suoh desire is followed by appropriate action; and (ii) whatever is pure, is promotive of Release. We have, therefore, in this way found such a preceptor as will, give to us a visible reply, in the form of his own life, to the difficult question of the discrimination between what should be done and what should not be done (karmakarma-vicikitsa) t . or, between what is a duty and what is not a duty {karyakarya- vyavastfdti), (Tai. 1. 11. i: GI. 3. 21). Such a preceptor was- standing in life before Arjuna in the form of Sri Krspa : and' . this preceptor has, after clearing the doubt in the mind of Arjuna that a Jnanin must abandon such Action as warfare etc. because it created bondage, given to Arjuna clear advice as to the device by which one can lead his life in this world, without committing sin and consistently with the- science of the Absolute Self (adhyatma), and induced him to- fight. But, it is not possible for every one to get such preceptors ; and one also ought not to entirely depend on the external activities of such saints, as has been mentioned by me towards the end of the third chapter, when I was consider- ing the proverb "rnahajanoyena gatah sa panlhah" (i, e., "follow the path which has been followed by the great"). It is,, therefore, necessary to minutely examine the course of life of those Jnanins, who are examples to the whole world, and to consider what the true fundamental element in that course- of life is. This subject is known as the Science of Karma- Yoga ; and the state and the actions of the Jnanins mentioned above, is the foundation of this science. If all men in this- worid " become Knowers of the Atman and Karma-yogins in tliis way, there would be no necessity of a Science of.

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 513

Karma-Yoga. It is stated in one place in the Narayaniya. religion, that .—

eJcantino M purusa durlabha bahavo nrpa I yady ekanfibhir aklrnam jagat syat kurumndana II ahimsakair atmavidbhih sarvabkutahite rataih l bhavet krtayugapraptih asihkarmaaivarjita II

(San. 348. 62, 63).

that is, " it is difficult to find many persons who fully and completely follow the Bhagavata doctrine, which is ' Ekantika ', that is, Activistic. If this world is filled with Self-knowing: harmless Jiianins, following the Ekanta doctrine, who continually tax themselves for general welfare, all 'aslh- karma ', that is, desire-prompted or selfish Action, will disappear from this world, and the Krta-yuga will oome again I "; because, as all persons will be Jnanins in such a state of things, no one will cause harm to no one. Not only that, but every one will always keep before Mb own mind in what the general welfare lies, and regulate his conduct accordingly, with a pure and desireless frame of mind. It is the opinion of our philosophers that such a state of society existed at some very ancient date, and that it will recur again (Ma. Boa. San. 59. 14); but Western scholars say on the authority of modern history, that though such a state of things never existed before, it is possible that such a state of things may come into existence, sometime or other in the future, as a result of the advancement of mankind. However, as I am not now conoerned with history, I may without being contra- dicted say, that according to both opinions, every person in this state, which is supposed to be the highest or the most perfect state of society, will be fully a Jnanin, and every Action of his is bound to be pure, beneficial, and moral, or the pinnacle of dutifulness. The well-known English biologist Spencer has expressed this opinion at .the end of his work on Ethics; and he says that the same doctrine had been formerly laid down by the ancient Greek philosophers. * For example,

• See Spencer's Data of Ethics, Chap. XV, pp. 215-21,8. Spencer

has called this 'Absolute Ethics'.

65-66

5M GTFA-BAHAYSA OS KARMA-YGGA

the Grak pUIssopiisr ?li w sa/i la bis work that, that Action »::■;': s.TO:iri to be- p.--,pa: tc i:..-. ptiluSGp'-_=T. met be beme- S;iil j* fist: iiit ordinary persons da n,it understand these pri; r jipl-;<i cf Ei*oIm; and thai fey mist, taeefrre. look upon fe risckijt; cf p'-.II»jpb.BTS as a'ltaoiitaim. Another Greek psiioeophsi aaaijd ArMctb says in. his fcoor on Ethics (3. 4J that tn% dichiaa. given hy a -JiUntn is always correct, because, he his nadariKod fe trjs pria-iipia: and this decision or condist of a JiSain is exemplary for cc,j.er«. A third Greek phibswpier, iiaaisdEpisaraa, in describing such anexempiary and "higlaly cultivated Jaanin, says teat ha is '" peaceful, <xria.h\i, and probably always ;' jjfnl liks ths Param&ivsra; and thai fe?a ia not t'r.i slightest harm, dans by him to other people, or by othsr people to him".* My readers will realise how si-mlar Shis dsseriplba is to the description giren in the Bhagivadgfta of tne Stsady-ia Mind l-sthifaprajaa), of the one ■who is beyond the three cjostituents Urigu,niltlta), or of the highest Dsvois% f p-irama-bhakta), or the Brahman-merged (brahma-bha/'i). In the Bhagaradglta, the characteristics of the Sthitaprajna have been mentioned in three or four places in the following words, namely: "gas/nan jtoddjate loko lokan norlvijale ca yah- " (GI. 12. 15 J, i. e., " one, of whom people do not get tired, and who is not tired of people"; or, who 13 always cheerful, and always free from the doubles of joy and sorrow, fear and dislike, happiness and unhappiness, and is always content with himself ("afmany euaimana tuttah", Gi. 2. 55); or, one whose Reason is not moved by the three constituents ("gunair yc wi vicalyale", Gi. 14. i'i); or, one for whom praise or adverse criticism, honour or dishonour is juat the same, and who, realising the identity of one Atman in all created things (Gi. 18. 54). does his duty with an equable frame of mind, without Attachment,

• Epicurus held the virtuous state to be a "tranquil, un-

disturbed, innocuous, non-competitive fruition, which approached moat nearly to the perfect happiness of the Gods", who '-neither suffered vexation in themselves, nor caused vexation to others". Spencer's Data of Ethics p. 278 ; Bain's Menial and Moral Selena, Ed. 1875, p. 530. Snch a pewon is known as the 'Ideal Wise Han '.

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 515

courageously, and enthusiastically ; or, is " samalostasma- kaHcana" (Gi. 14. 24), (i. e., one who looks upon earth, •stone, and gold as the same — Trans.); and this state is known as the State of the Perfect (siddhavastha), or the Brahml state. The Yoga-Vasistha and other works refer to this state as the state of being free from re-birth ( jivanmuktavastha ). As this state is extremely difficult of accomplishment, the ■German philosopher Kant says that the description given by Greek philosophers of such a state, is not of the state of any living being ; but that they have personified the 'Pure Desire', which is the root of all Ethics, in order to impress the elements of pure morality on the minds of people ; and have

•created this picture of a super-Jnanin and moral person out of their own imagination. But, our philosophers say that

•such a state of things is not an imaginary state, and that it can be accomplished by man in this life by mental control

.and effort ; and we have seen actual examples of such persons in our country. Nevertheless, such a thing is not a matter of ordinary occurrence, and there is possibly only one among thousands who makes any effort in this direction ; and it is clearly stated in the Glta that only one, out of the

•thousand who maka an effort in this direction, ultimately

attains this beatific ideal state, at the end of innumerable lives

,(GI.7. 3).

However difficult of accomplishment this state of a

• Sthitaprajna (sthitaprajnacastha) or this state of being free from re-birth (jivan-muktavastha) may be, it follows from the description of such a man, which has been given above, that

•the man, who has once accomplished this ultimate state, does not need to be taught any laws about what should be done or

-should not be done, i.e., of Ethics ; because, as the purest, the most

■ equable and the most sinless frama of mind is the essence of morality, laying down laws of Ethics for such a Sthitaprajna ■would be as unreasonable as imagining that the Sun is

.surrounded by darkness, and holding up a torch for it. There may be a doubt as to whether or not a particular person has reached this highest of states. But, when once it has been established by whatever means that a particular person has

.reached this state, no proposition is possible, except the

516 GITA-RAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

Metaphysical proposition mentioned above, regarding the merit- or de-merit of his actions. Just as regal authority is vested in one independent person or collection of persons, and as, according to some Western jurists, the ruler is not governed by any laws, though the ruled are so governed, so also are the' Sthitaprajfias vested with authority in the kingdom of Ethics. No Desire exists in their minds ; and, therefore, they are not induced to perform Action by any motive, except the fact that it is a duty enjoined by the Sastras ; and therefore, the words sin or meritorious action, morality or immorality, can never be applied to the conduct of such persons, who are filled by a stainless and pure desire. They have gone beyond the bounds of sin and merit. Samkaracarya has said that:

nistraigurtye pathi vicaratam ko vidhih ko nisedhah i that is, "laws dictating what is proper and what improper do not apply to persons who have gone beyond the three constituents"; and Buddhistic writers have said that: "just as- the purest diamond does not require to be polished, so are the actions of that person who has reached the state of Absolution (nirvana) not required to be limited by rules of conduct" (Milindaprasna 4. 5. 7). This is the import of the statement, made by Indra to Pratardana in the Kausitakyupanisad (Kausl. 3. 1), that the Self-knower (atmajftanin) is "untouched by the sins of matricide, patricide, or infanticide"; or of the statement in the Glta (Gl. 18. 17), that "a man who has totally lost the feeling of individuation [ahamlcara) is untouched by sin or merit, even if he kills others (See PaficadasI 14. 16 and 17); and the same principle has been repeated in the Buddhistic work called ' Dltammapada' (See Dhammapada, stanzas 294 and 295 ). * Nay, according to me, the statement of St. Paul,

• The statement from the Kausitakyupanisad is: "yo mam

vijaniyati msya hmcit karmam hk> miyate nci matrvadhena na pitrvadhma mi steyena m bhrunahatyaya \ "; and the stanzas in the Dhammapada- are as follows :-

•Btatarark pitaraih hantva rajano dve ca khattiye [ ratktham sanucaram hantva amgho yati brahmano || (294) mataram pitaraih hantva rajano dve ca sotthiye \ vtyyagdha pa/ncamam hantva anigho yati brahmano \\ (295),

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 517

the disciple of the Lord Christ, in the New Testament of the Bible that: " all things are lawful for me " ( 1. Oori. 6. 12; Romans 8. 2), or the statement of St. John that: "it is not possible that any sin is committed by those who have become the sons (perfect disciples) of the Lord" ( John. 1. 3. 9) conveys the same import. Those who have got into the habit of arriving at a decision about morality by merely ■considering the external Action, without attaching proper importance to mental purity, may consider this doctrine as strange; and some people perversely interpret ' not bound by rules of right or wrong' as meaning 'one who commits any wrong he likes,' and distort the doctrine mentioned above by me as meaning "the Sthitaprajna is at liberty to commit any sin he likes". But, just as the fact that a blind man does not .see a pillar, is not the fault of the pillar, so does the fact of these objectors, who have become blind because they support a .particular doctrine, not clearly understanding the meaning of the doctrine mentioned above, not become a fault of the doctrine. Even the Glta accepts the position that the purity of anybody's mind has fiist to be tested by his external

(that is, (294) "in killing a mother or a father, or two kings of a warrior race, or destroying a whole kingdom with its inhabitants, a Brahmin (still) remains sinless"; (295) "in killing a mother, a father, two Brahmin kings, and an eminent man, to make up five, a Brahmin (still) remains sinless"— Trans.)

This idea in the Dhammapada has evidently been borrowed from the Kausltskyupanisad. Bat the Buddhistic writers do not take those words in their literal meaning of matricide or patricide, and have understood mother (inaia ) as meaning thirst (ttffS), an ^ father ( pita ) as meaning self-respect (abhimana), Bnt, in my •opinion, these writers have adopted these figurative meanings only because they have not properly understood the principle of Ethics conveyed in this verse. In the Kausitakynpanisad, before the verse u matrvadhem pitrvadherta" etc., it is stated by Indra that; "even if I kill Vrfcra, a Brahmin, I do not thereby commit any sin"; and it is quite clear from this, that actual murder was •referred to. The commentary of Max Eialler on this verse in his English translation on the Dhammapada (S. B. E., Volume X, pp. TO and 71) is, according to me, du9 to misunderstanding.

518 GlTA-RAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA

actions; and the Metaphysical science does not wist to apply the abovementioned doctine to those imperfect persons, the purity of whose mind remains to be tested,, even a little, by that test. But the case is different with the man who has reached the state of perfection, and whose mind has undoubtedly become entirely merged in the Brahman and infinitely desireless ; and although some Action* of his might appear improper from the ordinary point of -new, yet, as it is admitted that his mind is perfectly pure and equable, it follows that such Action, however it appears to the ordinary observer, must be essentially sinless ; or, it must have been committed for some ethically correct reason, and is not likely to be founded on avarice or immorality like the actions of ordinary people. The same is the reason why Abraham in the Bible was not guilty of the sin of attempting infanticide, though he was about to kill his son ; or, why Buddha did not inour the sin of murder, when his father-in-law died as a result of his curse ; or, why Parasurama was not guilty of matricide though he killed his own mother. And the advice given in the Glta to Arjuna by the Blessed Lord that, " if your mind is pure and stainless, you will not be guilty of the sin of having killed your ancestor or your preceptor, though you may happen to kill Bhlsma and Drona in warfare, according to the duty of the Ksatriyas, and without having any hope of any benefit to- be derived thereby ; because, in such ciroumstances, you have become merely an instrument for carrying into effect the desire of the Paramesvara" (GI. 11. 33), is based on the same principle. We see in ordinary life that if a millionaire snatches away money from a beggar, the millionaire is not called a thief, but it is believed that the beggar has committed some wrong, and that on that account the millionaire has punished him. This argument applies still more appropriately, or more fully, to the conduct of the Sthitaprajna, the arhata, or the devotee of the Blessed Lord ; because, the Reason of the millionaire may on occasion falter, but it is a settled fact that such emotions cannot touch the Reason of the Sthitaprajna. Ae the Paramesvara, the Creator of the universe, is untouched by sin or merit, notwithstanding that He performs all Actions, so also is the state of these saints, who have become merged

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 519

in the Brahman, always holy and sinless. It may even be said that laws of conduct are framed on the baBis of the Actions performed by such persons on previous occasions, of their own free will ; and on that acoount, these saints become the fathers of those laws of behaviour, and are never the slaves of them. Such illustrations are come across not only in the Vedic religion, but also in the Buddhistic and Christian, religions ; and this principle was accepted even by the ancient Greek philosophers ; and in the present age, Kant * has in his book on the science of Ethics proved this by conclusive reasons. When it has thus been proved what the unpollutabla original spring or the stainless model of all rules of Morality is, such persons as want to scrutinise the fundamental principles of Ethics, or of the doctrine of Energism (karma- yoga) must mioutdly examine the lives of such holy and. stainless saints. That is why Arjuna has asked Sri Krsna the following questions in the Bhagavadgita, namely; — • " sthitadhth kim prabhassfa kim asita vrajeta kim " (Gi. 2. 54), i.e., "how does the Sthitaprajfia speak, sit, move about ?" ; or, in the fourteenth chapter, " tear lingtus tringurian elan, alito bhavati prabho, himactirah " (Gi. 14. 21), i. e., " how does a man go beyond the three constituents, (become a trigunailta), what is his behaviour, and how is such a man to be recognised ?" As an assayer tests the golden ornament, which has been taken to him for examination, by comparing it with a sample piece of hundred carat gold in his possession, so also is the behaviour of the Sthitaprajfia a test for deciding

• " A perf eetly good will would therefore be eq-ially subject to

objective laws (viz., laws of good), but could not be conceived as obliged thereby to act lawfully, because of itself from it3 subjective constitution, it can only be determined by the concep- tion of good. Therefore, w imperatives bold for the Divine will? or in general for a holy will; ought is here out of place, because the volition is already of itself necessarily in nnis .n with the law ". Kant's Metaphysic of Morals, p. 31. (Abbot's trans, in Kant's Theory of Ethics, 6th Ed). Nietzsche does not accept any Metaphysical basis; yet, in the description of a superman given by him in bis books, he has said that such a person is beyond good and evil, and one of his books is entitled Beyond Good and Evil,

520 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

between the duty and the non-duty, the just and the unjust ; and the implied meaning of these questions is that the Blessed Lord should explain to Arjuna what that test was. Some persons say that the descriptions which have been given by the Blessed Lord of the state of the Sthitaprajna or of the Trigunatlta, in reply to this question, are of Jfianins following the Path of Renunciation, and not the Karma- Yoga ; because, it is with reference to such persons that the adjective

• mrairayah' (i. e., homeless — Trans.), (Gl. 4. 20) has been used in

the Gita. ; and in the twelvth chapter, where the description of the Sthitaprajna devotees of the Blessed Lord is being given, the words "sarmrafnbhaparityagl" (i. e., "one who has abandoned all arambha or commencement of Action — Trans.), (Gi. 12. 16), and "anilketah" (i. e., "one who has no abode" — Trans.), {Gi. 12. 19), have been used clearly. But the words 'nirusrayah' or 'ardkstah' do not mean 'one who does not remain in a home, but roams about in a forest', and they must be taken as synonymous with "anasritah karmaphalam" (i. e., "not taking shelter in the Fruit of the Action"— Trans.), (GI. 6. 1), that is to say, as meaning 'one who does not take shelter in the Fruit of Action', or, 'one, the home of whose mind, is not in that Fruit', as will be clearly seen from my commentaries on the translations of those respective verses. Besides, it is stated in the description itself of the Sthitaprajna, that "he moveB about among the objects of pleasure, keeping control over his organs", that is, he performs Actions desirelessly (GI. 2. 64); and, in the stanza which contains the word 'nirasrayah' occurs also the description, "karmany abhipravrtto'pi naiva kimdt karoti sab", that is, "he is free from and untouched by all Actions, though he performs them". The same argument must be applied to the use of the word 'amketah' in the twelvth chapter ; because, in that chapter, after having praised the abandonment of the Fruit of Action (not the Abandonment of Action), the Blessed Lord has gone on to describe the characteristics of His devotees, in order to explain what peace (santi) is obtained by performing Action after abandoning the Hope for Fruit {phalasa) ; and in the same way, a description has been given in the eighteenth chapter, of a person who has been merged in the Brahman, in order to explain how peace is obtained by

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 521

performing Actions without being attached to the Fruit of Action (G-1. 18. 50). It, therefore, becomes necessary to come to the conclusion that these descriptions are not of persons who follow the Path of Renunciation, but of Karma-yogins. It is not that, the Knowledge of the Brahman, the peace of mind, the Self-identification (atmaupamya/, or the Desirelessness of Mind, of the Karma-yogin Sthitaprajna, is different from those .of the Sarhnyasin-Sthitaprajna. As both are perfect Knowers of the Brahman, the mental frame and the peace of mind are the same in either case ; but the one is merely engrossed in Peace fsanti), and does not care for anything else ; whereas, the other is continually bringing into use his peace of mind and his Self-identification in his activities of ordinary life, as occasion arises. This is the important difference between the two from the point of view of Karma. Therefore, that Sthitaprajna, whose personal conduct has to be taken as an example for determining what is right and what is wrong in ordinary life, must be one who performs Action, and not one who has abandoned Action or is a beggar (bhiksu). The sum and substance of the advice given to Arjuna in the Gita is, "it is not necessary to give up Action, nor can you give it up ; but. Realise the identity of the Brahman and the Atman and keep your pure Reason ( uyavasayatmiha buddhi) equable like that of a Karma-yogin, so that your Practical Reason '( vasanatmika buddhi ) will thereby also become pure, mine- less, and saintly, and you will not be caught in the bondage ■of Karma"; and that is why in explaining to Jajali the principle of Ethics embodied in the stanza quoted at the beginning of this chapter, namely, "that man who, by his Actions and by his speech, is continually engrossed in the ■welfare of others, and who is always a friend of others, may alone be said to have understood what morality (dharma) is", Tuladhara has mentioned Karma, side by side with Speech and Mind, and even before mentioning them.

It is not necessary to explain principles of Ethios in •detail to that man, whose mind has become equable towards all created things, like that of a Karma-yogin Sthitaprajna or a Jlvanmukta, and all whose selfish interests have been merged in the interests of others. He may be said to have

523 GlTA-RAHASYA OH KARMA-YOGA

become self-enlightened or a 'buddka'. As Arjuna had reached that stage, it was not necessary to give him any advice beyond, stating: "make your mind equable and steady, and instead of falling in the futile mistake of giving up Action, make your mind similar to that of the Sthitaprajna, and perform all. Action which has befallen you according to your status in life." Yet, as this Yoga in the shape of equability of mind,, cannot, as has been stated above, be attained by every one in- one life, the life of a Sthitaprajna must be a little more minutely examined and explained for the benefit of ordinary people. But, in making this disquisition, one must also bear in mind that the Sthitaprajna, whom we are going to consider, is not a man living in a society which has reached the perfect state of the Krta-yuga, but is one who has to live in a society in this Kali-yuga, in which almost all people are steeped in. their own selfish interests. Because, however great and. complete the Knowledge of a man may be, and whatever the state of equability of Mind which he has reached, it will not. do if he adopts the practice of harmlessness, kindness, peacefulness, forgiveness etc., which are permanent virtues of the highest order, in dealing with persons whose minds are impure, and who are caught within the toils of Desire, Anger etc. * It need not be said that the rules of Right and Wrong, applicable to a society in which the majority is of avaricious persons, must be at least somewhat. different from the rules of Right and Wrong and of Absolute-

• " In the second place, ideal conduct such as ethical theory

is concerned with, is not possible ior the ideal man in the midst- of men otherwise constituted. An absolutely just or perfectly sympathetic person could not live and act accordisg to his nature in a tribe of cannibals. Among people who are treacherous and/ utterly without scruple, entire truthfulness and openness must bring ruin ". Spencer's Data of Ethics, Chap. XV, p. 280. Spencer has called this ' Relative Ethics '; and he says lhat : " On the evolution-hypothesis, the two (Absolute and Relative Ethics) presuppose one another ; and only when they co-exist, can there exist that ideal conduct which Absolute Ethics has to formulate, and which Relative Ethics has to take as the standard by which to- Mtimate divergencies from right, or degrees of wrong".

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WOKLDLY AFFAIRS 523

Ethics applicable to a society in which every person is a. Sthitaprajna ; otherwise, saints will have to leave this world, and evil-doers will he the rulers everywhere. This does not mean that saints must give up their equable frame of mind ; but there are kinds and kinds of equability of mind. It is stated in the Glta that the hearts of saints are equal towards "brahmaye gavi hastini" (Gi. 5. 18), i. a, "Brahmins, cows, and elephants". But if, on that account, some one feeds a Brahmin with the grass which has been brought for the cow or feeds the cow with the food which has been cooked for the Brahmin, shall we call him a wise man ? If persons following the School of Renunciation do not attach any importance to- this question, the same cannot be done by people who follow the Karma-Yoga. The Sthitaprajna lives his life in this world, taking into aocount what the nature of Right and Wrong was in the perfect state of the Krfca-yuga, and deciding what changes are necessary in those rules, in this world of selfish persons, having regard to the difference of Time and Place ; and it will be clear from what has been stated in the second chapter above, that this is the most difficult question in Karma-Yoga. Saints perform their duties in this life apathetically, and only for the benefit of suoh selfish people, instead of getting angry with them, or allowing their own equability of mind to change on account of their avarici- ous tendencies. Bearing this principle in mind, Sri Samartha Ramadasa has, after having in the first part of the Dasabodha dealt with the Knowledge of the Brahman, started in the eleventh chapter a description of the activities performed by such Sthitaprajfias or saints for social welfare, with indif- ference to the world, or desirelessly, and with the intention of instilling wisdom into such people (Dasa. 11. 10; 12. 8-10; 15. 2); and he has stated later on in the eighteenth chapter, that one should thoroughly understand and grasp the traditions, stories, stratagems, devices, circumstances, intentness of pursuit, inferences, cleverness, diplomacy, forbearance, aouteness, generosity, Metaphysical Knowledge, devotion, aloofness, indifference to the world, daringness, assiduity, determination, firmness, equability, discrimination, and numerous other qualities of such Jnanins (Dasa, 18. 2). But

.524 GlTi-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

as such disinterested persons have to deal with avaricious persons, the ultimate advice of Sri Samaitha is:-

Meet baldness with boldness I impertinence by impertinence I villainy by villainy l must be met U

( Dasa. 19. 9. 30 )

Iu short, when a man descends from the state of perfection fo ordinary life, it is undoubtedly necessary to make some changes in the rules of Right or Wrong which apply to the highest state.

To this position, Materialistic philosophers raise the following objection, namely: if, when one descends from the perfect state into ordinary society, one has to deal with many things with discrimination, and modify Absolute Ethics to a certain extent, where is the permanence of Ethical principles, and what becomes of the axiom "dharmo nityah", i.e., "Morality is immutable," which has been enunciated by Vyasa in the Bharata-Savitrl ? They say that the immutability of Ethics from the point of view of Metaphysics is purely imaginary, and that those are the only true rules of Ethics, which come into existence consistently with the state of society at parti- cular periods of time, on the basis of the principle of the 'greatest good of the greatest number'. But, this argument is not correct. Just as the scientific definition of a straight line or of a perfect circle does not become faulty or purposeless, because no one can draw a straight line without breadth or a faultless circumference of a circle as defined in Geometry, so also is the case with simple and pure rules of Ethics. Besides, unless one has determined the absolutely pure form of any- thing, it is not possible to bring about improvements in the various imperfect forms of it which we come across in life, or to ascertain the relative worth of the various forms after •careful consideration; and that is why the assayer first decides what is pure hundred carat gold. Persons who live only according to the times, and without taking into account the absolute form of Ethical principles, will be in the same .-position as sailors on a ship, who guide the rudder on the boundless ocean, considering only the waves and the wind, and •without taking into account the compass, which shows the

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 525-

cardinal directions, or the Polar star. Therefore, even consider- ing everything from the Materialistic point of view, it is necessary to first fix some principle of Ethics, which is- unchangeable and permanent like the Polar star; and once this necessity has been admitted, the entire Materialistic argument falls to the ground. Because, as all enjoyment of objects of pleasure which causes pain or happiness falls into the Name-dj and Form-ed, and therefore, the non-permanent or perishable category of illusory objects, no principle of Ethics based on such enjoyment, that is, on merely external effects, can be permanent- Such Ethical principles must go on changing as the ideas of the material, external, pain and happiness on which they are based, change. Therefore, if one has to escape from, this perpetually changing state of Ethics, one must not take into account the enjoyment of objects of pleasure in this illusory world, but must stand on the sole Metaphysical foundation of the principle, "there is only one Atman in all created things"; because, as has been stated before in the ninth chapter, there is nothing in this world which is perma- nent except the Atman ; and the Bame is the meaning conveyed by the statement of Vyasa : " dlwrmo nitydh sukhaduhkhe tv anitye", i. e., "the rules of Ethics or of pure behaviour are immutable, and happiness and unhappiness are transient and mutable". It is true that in a society which is full of cruel and avaricious persons, it is not possible to fully observe- the immutable Ethical laws of harmlessneas, truth, etc.; but one cannot blame these Ethical laws for that. Just as one cannot, from the fact that the shade of an object cast by the Sun's rays is flat on a flat surface, but is undulating on an undulating surface, draw the inference that the shade must be originally undulating, so can one not, from the fact that one does not come across the purest form of Ethics in a society of unprincipled persons, draw the inference that the imperfect state of Ethics which we come accross in an imperfect society is the principal or the original form of Ethics. The fault here is not of Ethics, but of the society ; therefore, those who are wise, do not quarrel with pure and permanent laws of Ethios but apply their efforts towards elevating society, so as to- bring it to the ultimate highest state. Although our

536 GiTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

philosophers have mentioned some exceptions to the permanent laws of Ethics in dealing with avaricious persons in society, as being unavoidable, they also mention penances for acting according to such exceptions; and this will also dearly explain the difference pointed out by me in previous chapters in explaining to my readers that Western Materialistic Ethical science bare-facedly supports and propounds these exceptions as laws, and by confusion of thought, looks upon the principles of discrimination between external results, which are useful only for fixing these exceptions, as the true laws of Ethics.

I have thus explained that the true foundation of Ethics is the frame of mind and the mode of life of the Sthitaprajna Jfianin (the Steady-in-Mind scient) ; and why, although the laws of Ethics to be deduced from the same are permanent and immutable in themselves, they have got to be varied in an imperfect state of society ; and, how and why the immutability of fundamental laws of Ethics is not affected, though these laws may be varied in that way. I shall now consider the question first mentioned by me, namely, what is the hidden significance or fundamental principle underlying the behaviour of a Sthitaprajna Jfianin in an imperfect society. I have stated before in the fourth chapter that this question •can be considered in two ways: the one way is to consider the state of mind of the doer as the principal factor ; and the other way is to consider his external mode of life. If one considers the matter only from the second point of view, it will be seen that all the activities of the Sthitaprajna are prima facie for' the benefit of the world. It is stated in two places in the Glta that, saints who have acquired the highest Knowledge, are "engrossed in bringing about the welfare of all created things", that is, they are " sarvabhutahiteratah " ( Gl. 5. 25 and 12. 4 ) ; and the same statement also appears in various places in the Mahabharata. I have stated above that the laws of harmlessness etc., which are followed by Sthitaprajna Jnanins, are in fact 'dharmd, or the model of pure behaviour. In explaining the necessity of these rules of harmlessness etc., and in describing the nature of these laws of Ethics (dkarma), the Mahabharata contains various statements explaining their

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 527

■asternal usefulness, such as : — "ahimsa satyavacamfa sarva- bhutahitam param" (Vana. 206. 73), i. e,, "non-violence and truthfulness are laws of Ethics, beneficial to everybody"; or, "dharavad dharmam ity ahuh" (San. 109. 12), i. e., "it is called dharma, because it maintains the world" ; or, "dharmam hi ireya ity ahuh" (Anu. 105. 14), i. e., "that is dharma, which is beneficial" ; or, "prabhavarthaya bludarwm dharmapravacamm krtam" (San. 109. 10), i. e., "laws of Ethics have been made for the amelioration of society" ; or, "lokayalrartham eveham ■dharmasya rdyamah krtah I ubhayatra sukhodarkah" (San. 258. 4), L e., "laws of Ethics have been made in order that the activities of society should go on, and that benefit should be acquired in •this life and the next". In the same way, it is stated that, when there is a doubt between what is right and what is wrong, ■the Jnanin —

loltayatra ca drastavya dharmas catmahitani ca I

(Anu. 37. 16 ; Vana. 206. 90)

that is, "should discriminate between external factors like the usual activities of men, laws of Ethics, and one's own benefit", and decide what is to be done ; and the king Sibi has, in the Vanaparva, followed the same principle for discriminating between right and wrong (Vana. 131. 11 and 12). From these -statements, it will be clearly seen that the 'external guiding factor' of the mode of life of a Sthitaprajiia, is the advancement ■of society ; and if this is accepted as correct, the next question which faces us is : why do Metaphysicians not accept the Materialistic Ethical law of 'the greatest happiness or, (using the word 'happiness' in a more extensive meaning), benefit, or advantage of the greatest number'? I have shown above in the fourth chapter that the one great drawback of the principle of the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' is, that it does not provide for either, the happiness or amelioration resulting from Self-Realisation, or the happiness in the next world. But this drawback can to a great extent be removed by taking the word 'happiness' in a comprehensive meaning ; and the Metaphysical argument given above in support of the immutability of Ethical laws, will, therefore, not appear of importance to many. It is, therefore, necessary to again give a further elucidation

528 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA.

of the important difference between the Metaphysical and the- Materialistic aspect of Ethics.

The question whether a particular act is ethically proper or improper can be considered in two ways : (1) by considering merely its external result, that is to say, its visible effect on the world ; and (2) by considering the Reason or the Desire- of the doer. The first method of consideration is known as the MATERIALISTIC (adhsbhauHka) method. In the second method, there are again two sub-divisions, each of which has a different name. I have in the previous chapters referred, to the doctrines that (i) in order that one's Action should be pure, one's Practical Reason has got to be pure, and that (ii) in order that one's Practical Reason should be pure, one's Pure Reason, that is, the reasoning faculty, which discriminates between what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, has got to be steady, equable, and pure. According to these doctrines, one has to see whether the Practical Reason whioh prompted a particular action was or was not puro, in order- to determine whether the Action is pure; and when one wishes - to consider whether the Practical Reason was or was not pure,, one has necessarily to see whether the Deciding Reason was- or was not pure. In short, whether the Reason or the Desire of the doer was or was not pure, has ultimately to be judged by considering the purity or the impurity of the Deciding Reason (Gi. 2. 41). When this Deciding Reason is considered to be an independent deity, • embodying the power of dis- crimination between Right and Wrong (sadasadvivecana-sakti), that method of consideration is called the INTOTTIONIST' (adhidaivilta) method; but if one believes that this power is not an independent deity, but is an eternal organ of the Atman, and on that account, one looks upon the Atman, instead of the Reason, as the principal factor and determines- the pureness of Desire on that basis, that method of determin- ing principles of Ethics is known as the METAPHYSICAL (adhyatmika) method. Our philosophers say that this Meta- physical method is the best of all these methods ; and although the well-known German philosopher Kant has not clearly enunciated the doctrine of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman, he has commenced his disquisition of the principles of

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 5m

Ethics, with a consideration of Pure Reason, that is, in a way; from the Metaphysical point of view; and he has clearly stated there his reasons for doing so. * Graen is of the same opinion: but these matters cannot be dealt with in detail in a small book like this. I have, in the fourth chapter above, explained by giving a few illustrations why, in finally deciding questions of Ethics, one has to pay more special attention to the pureness of the Reason of the doer, than to the external result of his Aotions; and this subject-matter will ba further considered in the fifteenth chapter when I will compare the Western and the Eastern ethical laws. For the time being, I will only say that, in as much as it is necessary that there should be a desire- to perform any particular Action before it is actually per- formed, the consideration of the propriety or the impropriety of such Action, depends entirely on the consideration of the purity or the impurity of the Reason. If the Reason is sinful, the Action will be sinful; but, from the fact that the external Aotion is bad, one cannot draw the conclusion that the Reason, also must be bad; because, that act may have been performed by mistake, or as a result of a misunderstanding, or as a result of ignorance; and in these cases it cannot be said to be ethically sinful. The Ethical principle of 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' can apply only to the external results of Actions; and as no one has so far invented any external means for definitely measuring the external results of such Actions in the shape of pain or happiness, it is not certain that this test of Morality will always give us a oorrect result. In the same way, however wise a man may be, if his Reason is not pure, it is not certain that he will on every occasion behave in a morally correct way. And the position will be much worse if Mb own selfish interests are in any way affected in that matter; because, "svarthe sarve- vimuhyanti ye 'pi dharmavido janah" (Ma. Bha. Vi. 51. 4), i. e„ "all are blinded by selfish interests, even if they are well- varsad in Morality" — Trans.). In short, however much a man may be a Jnanin, or well-versed in Morality, or wise, if his

• Bee Kant's Theory of Ethics trans, by Abbott, 6th Ed.,

especially Metaphysics of Morals therein.

67—68

530 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

Reason has not become equable towards all created beings, it is not certain that his Actions will always be pure or morally faultless. Therefore, our philosophers have decided definitely that in dealing with ethical problems, one must consider principally the Reason of the doer, rather than the external results of his Actions ; and that equability of Reason is the true principle underlying an ethically correct mode of life. And the Blessed Lord has given to Arjuna the following advice on the same principle in the Bhagavadglta :

durena hy avaram karma buddMyogad dhananjaya l buddhau, saranam anvkcha krpanah phalahetavah H *

(Gi. 2. 49).

Some say that the word ' buddhi ' in this stanza is to be understood as meaning 'Jnana' (Knowledge), and that a higher place has been given to Jnana, as between Jnana and Karma. But, according to me, this interpretation is incorrect. Even in the Samkarabhasya on this stanza, the word 'buddhi-yoga' has been interpreted as meaning 'samatva-buddhi-yoga (the Yoga of equability of Reason) ; and further, this stanza occurs in that part of the Gita which deals with the Karma-Yoga. Therefore, this stanza must be interpreted with referenoo to Karma only ; and such an interpretation is also naturally arrived at. Those who perform Actions fall into the two categories of (i) those who keep an eye merely on the fruit — for example, on the question, how many persons will be benefited thereby, and to what extent ; and (ii) those who keep then- Reason equable and desireless, and remain unconcerned as to the Sruit of the Action, which (fruit) results from the combination of Action (knrmaj and Destiny (dharmai. Out of these, this stanza has treated the 'pludahetaval}, that is, 'those who perform Action, keeping an eye on the result of the Action', as krpana,

• The literal meaning of this veraeis :— Dhan»3jiya! (pure)

Action is very much inferior to the Toga of the (equahle) Reason ; (therefore), rely on (the equable) Eeason. Those (persons), who perform Actions keeping an eye to the Fruit of Action, are ' trpuna', that is, of an inferior order".

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 531

that is, of a lower order from theethical point of view; and those who perform Aotion with an equable Reason as superior. That is what is meant by the statement in the first two parts of the stanza, namely, " durena hy avaram karma buddhiyogad dhananjaya", i.e., "0 Dhananjaya, Aotion alone is very much inferior to the Yoga of the equable Reason"; and that is the answer given by the Blessed Lord to the question of Arjuna "How shall I kill Bhisma, Drona and others?" The implied meaning of this is, that one has to consider not merely the Aotion of dying or of killing, but the motive with which that Action has been performed; and therefore, the advice has been given in the third part of the stanza that: "Rely on your Reason (buddhi), that is, on the equable Reason (sama-buddhi)"; and later on, in the summing up in the eighteenth chapter, the Blessed Lord has again said: "Perform all your Actions, relying on the Yoga of the equable Reason". That the GltS, looks upon the consideration of the Action itself as inferior, and of the motive which inspires the particular Action as superior, will be apparent from another stanza in the Gita. In the eighteenth chapter, Karma has been classified into sattrika, rajasa, and tamasa. If the Gita had intended to consider only the result of the Action, the Blessed Lord would have said that those Actions, which produce the greatest good of the greatest number, are sattvika; but, instead of doing so, it is stated in the eighteenth ohapter that, "that Action is the most excellent, ■which has been performed desirelessly, that is, after abandoning the Hope for the Fruit of the Action" (Gi. 18. 23). Therefore,, the Gita, in discriminating between the doable and the not- doable, attaches a higher importance to tho desireless, equable, and unattached Reason of the doer, than to the external result of the Action; and if the same test is applied to the conduct of the Sthitaprajfia, it follows that the true principle involved in the mode of life of a Sthitaprajfia is the equable Reason with which he behaves towards his equals and his subordinates; and that the welfare of all created beings resulting from such a mode of life is the external or concomitant result of that equability of Reason. In the same way, it is improbable that the man whose Reason has reached the perfectly equable state, ■will pBrt'orm Action with the sole idea of giving merely

532 GlTA-RAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

Material happiness to other people. It is true that he will not causa harm to others. But, that cannot be considered to be his. principal ideal; and all the activities of a Sthitaprajna are directed towards more and more purifying the minds of all the persons forming a society, and thereby enabling such persons- to ultimately reach the Metaphysically perfect state he himself has reached. This is the highest and the most sattmka duty of mankind. We look upon all efforts directed merely towards- the increase of the Material happiness of human beings as. inferior or rajasa.

To the doctrine of the Glta that in order to decide between) the doable and the not-doable, one has to attach a higher importance to the pureness of the motive of the doer than to- the result of the Action, the following mischievous objection has been raised, namely, if one does not take into account the- result of the Action, but merely considers the pureness of the- motive, it will follow that a person with a pure Reason can commit any crime he likes; and that he will then be at liberty to perform all sorts of crimes ! This objection has not been* imagined by ma, but I have as a matter of fact seen objections- of this kind which have been advanced agaist the Glta religion by some Christian missionaries.' 5 ' But, I do not feel the slightest compunction in characterising these allegations or objections- as totally foolish and perverse. Nay, I may even go so far as' to say that these missionaries have become as incapable of even understanding the Metaphysical perfection of the= Sthitaprajna described in the Vedic religion on account of aa over-weening admiration for their own religion, or of some other nefarious or evil emotions, as a black-as-ebony Negro from Africa is unfit for or incapable of appreciating the principles o£ Ethics accepted in civilised countries. Kant, the well-knowm German philosopher of the nineteenth century, has stated in several places in hiB book on Ethics, that one must consider' only the Reason of the doer, rather than the external result.

• One missionary from Calcutta has made this statement; and

the reply given to it by Mr. Brooks appears at the end of his treatise Kurukjetra (Kuruksetra, Vyasasrama, Adyar, Madras, pp.- 48.52).

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 533

of his Action, in deciding questions of Ethics.* But, I have nowhere come across any such objection having been raised to that statement of Kant. Then how can suoh an objection apply to the principle of Ethics enunciated by the Gita ? When the Reason has become equable towards all created beings, charity becomes a matter of inherent nature; and therefore, it is as impossible that a person who has acquired this highest Knowledge, and is possessed of the purest Reason, should commit sin, as that nectar should cause death. When the Gita says that one should not consider the external result of the Action, that does not mean that one is at liberty to do what one likes. The Gita says: though a person can hypocritically or with a selfish motive, appear to be charitable, he cannot hypocritically possess that equability of Reason and stability, which can arise only by Realising that there is but one Atman in all created beings; therefore, in con- sidering the propriety or the impropriety of any Action, one has to give due consideration to the Reason of the doer, instead of considering only the external results of his Action. To express the matter in short, the doctrine of the Gita is that Morality does not consist of Material Action only, but that it wholly depends on the Reason of the doer ; and the Gita says later on (Gl. 18. 25), that if a man, not realising the true principle underlying this doctrine, starts doing whatever he likes, he must be said to be tamasa or a devil. Once the mind has become equable, it is not necessary to give the man any further advice about the propriety or the impropriety of Actions. Bearing this principle in mind, Saint Tukarama has

• "The second proposition ia : That an action done from duty-

•derives its moral worth, not from th« purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the mixLm by which it is determined". The moral worth of action "cannot lie anywhere but ia the principle of the will, without regard to the ends which can be attained by aotion". Xant's Metaphysic of Marah (trans.by Abbott in Kant's Thory of JZthics, p. 16. The italics are the author's and not our own). And again, "When the question is of moral worth, it is not with' the actions whioh we see that we are concerned, but with those inward principles of them which we do not see", p. 24. Ibid.

534 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

preached to Shivaji Maharaja the sole dootrine of Karma-Yoga, same aa the Bhagavadglta, in the ahhanga:-

"This has only one merit-producing meaning I

there is only one Atman, that is, God in all created beings it-

(Tu. Ga. 4428. 9).

But, although the essential basis of proper conduct {sadacararm) is the equable Season, I must repeat here that, one cannot from that fact draw the inference that the man who performs Action, must wait for performing Action until his Reason has- reached that stage. It is the highest ideal of everybody to make his mind like that of a Sthitaprajna. But it is stated already in the commencement of the Gita, that because this is the highest ideal, one need not wait for performing Action until that ideal has been reached; that one should in the meantime perform all Actions with as much unselfishness as possible, so that thereby the Reason will become purer and purer, and the highest state of perfection will ultimately be reached ; and that one must not waste time by insisting on not performing any Action until the perfect state of the Reason, has been reached (Gl. 2. 40).

A further objection is raised by many that, although it has in this way been proved (i) that the ethical principle of 'sarva- bhuta-hita ' or of the greatest good of the greatest number ' is a one-sided and superficial (sakhagraM) principle, as it applies, only to external Actions, and (ii) that the ' equability of Reason ' according to which ' there is only one Atman in all created beings' is a thing whioh goes- to the root of the matter (is mulagrahi), and must, therefore, be considered as of higher importance in determining questions of Morality, yet, one does not thereby get a clear idea as to how one should behave in ordinary life. These objections have suggested themselves to the objectors principally by seeing the worldly behaviour of Sthitaprajnas, who follow the Path of Renunciation. But. anybody will see after a little thought, that they cannot apply to the mode of life of the Karma-yogin Sthitaprajna. Nay; we may even say that no ethical principle can more satisfactorily justify worldly morality, than the principle of considering

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 535

that there is only one Atman in all created beings, or of Self- identification (atmaupamya). For example, let us take tha doctrine of charity, which has been given an important place in all countries and acoording to all codes of Ethics. This doctrine can be Justified by no Materialistic principle, as satisfactorily as by the Metaphysical principle that ' the Atman of the other man is the same as my Atman *. The utmost that Materialistic philosophy can tell us is, that philanthropy is an inherent quality which gradually grows, according to the Theory of Evolution (utlcranti-vada). But not only is the immutability of the principle of philanthropy not established by that philosophy, but, as has been shown by me before in the fourth chapter, when a man is faced with a conflict between his own interests and the interests of others, the ' enlightened selfish ', who would like to sit on two stools, thereby get a chance of justifying their own attitude. But even to this, an objection is raised by some, that it is no use proving the immutability of the principle of philanthropy. If every one tries to serve the interestg of others believing that there is only one Atman in all created beings, who is going to look after his interests ; and if in this way, his own interests are not looked after, how will he be in a position to do good to others 1 But these objections are neither new, not unconquerable. The Blessed Lord has answered this very question in the Bhagavadglta on the basis of the Path of Devotion, by saying ; "tesam nilyWdyu- ktUnam yogaksemam vahamy aham" ( Gl. 9. 22 ), ( i. e., "I look after the maintenance and welfare of those persons, who are permanently steeped in Yoga"— Trans.) ; and the same conclusion follows on the Metaphysical basis. That man, who. is inspired with the desire of achieving the benefit of others, has not necessarily to give up food and drink ; but he must believe that he is maintaining and keeping alive his own body for the benefit of others. Janaka has said (Ma. Bha. Asva. 32) that the organs will remain under one's control, only if one's Reason is in that state, and the doctrine of the MlmamsS school that, 'that man is said to be amrtusi, who eats the food which has remained over after the performance of the sacrificial offering', is based on the same idea (Gi. i. 31). Because, as the

536 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

Yajfta is, from their point of view, an Action for the maintenance and conduct of the world, they have come to the conclusion, that one maintains oneself and should maintain oneself, while performing that act of public benefit ; and that, it is not proper to put an end to the cycle of Yajflas for one's own selfish interest. Even according to the ordinary worldly outlook, one sees the appropriateness of the statement made by Sri Samartha Ramadasa in the Dasabodha that :

That man is continually achieving the good of others I

That man is always wanted by everybody I Then what can he need I in this world ? II

(Dasa. 19. 4. 10).

In short, it never happens that the man, who toils for public ■welfare, is found to suffer for want of being maintained. A man must only become ready to achieve the good of others •with a desireless frame of Reason. When once the idea, that all persons are in him and that he is in all persons, has been fixed in a person's mind, the question whether self-interest is distinct from the interest of others, does not arise at all, The above-mentioned foolish doubts arise only in the minds of those persons who start to achieve 'the greatest good of the greatest number', with the Materialistic dual feeling that 'I' am different from 'others'. But, the man who starts to achieve the good of others with the Monistic idea that "sarmm k!ialv idam brahma" (i. e., "all this which exists is the Brahman"— Trans.), is never assailed by any such doubts. This important difference between the Metaphysical principle of achieving the welfare of all created beings, on the basis that there is only one Atman in all created beings, and the Materialistic principle of general welfare, arising from a discrimination between the duality of self-interest and others-interest, or from the consideration of the good of the multitude, has got to be carefully borne in mind. Saints do not achieve public welfare with the idea of achieving public welfare. Just as giving light is the inherent quality of the Sun, so does aohieving the good of others become the inherent quality of these saints, as a result of the complete realisation of the unity of the Atman in all

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 537

•created things ; and when this has become the inherent quality of a saint, then, just as the Sun in giving light to others also gives light to itself, so also is the maintenance of such a saint achieved automatically by the activities directed by him towards the interests of others. When this inherent tendency of doing good to others is coupled with an unattached Reason, saints, who have realised the identity of the Atman and the Brahman, continue their beneficent activities, without caring for the opposition they come across, and without trying to discriminate between whether it is better to suffer adversity or to give up public welfare ; and if occasion arises, they are even ready to and indifferent about sacrificing their own lives. But, those who distinguish between self-interest and other's-interest, and begin to discriminate between what is right and what is wrong by seeing which way the scale turns when they weigh self-interest against other's-interest, can never experience a desire for public welfare, -which is as intense as that of such saints. Thereforei although the principle of the benefit of all created beings in acceptable to the Gita, it does not justify that principle by Vae consideration of the greatest external good of the greatest number, but looks upon the consideration of whether the numbers are large or small, or the consideration of the large -or small quantity of happiness, as short-sighted and irrelevant; and it justifies the equability of Reason, which is the root of pure conduct, on the basis of the eternal Realisation of the Brahman which is propounded by Metaphysical philo- sophy.

From this it will be seen how a logically correct justifi- cation of one's making efforts for the benefit of others or of universal welfare, or of charity, can be arrived at from the point of view of Metaphysics. I will now consider the fundamental principles, which have been enunciated in our Sastras for guiding the behaviour of one person towards another in society, from the point of view of equability of Reason. The principle that " yatra va asya sarvam atmaivabhut" ■(Br. 2. 4. 14), i. e., "the man for whom everything has been merged in the Self (Atman)", behaves towards others with a perfectly equable mind, has been enunciated in the Isavasya

538 GlTA-RAHASrA OR KARMA-TOGA

(Isa. 6) and Kaivalya (Kai. 1. 10) Upamsads, in addition to> the Brhadaranyaka, as also in the Manu-Smrti (Manu. 12. 91 and 125); and this same principle has been literally enunciated in the sixth chapter of the Glta, in the words " sarvabhutastham atmanam sarvabhutani catmcmi" (Gl. 6. 29), (i. e., "he sees himself in all created things, and all created things in himself" — Trans.). The Self-identifying (atmaupamya) outlook is only another form of this principle of believing in the unity of 5.tman in all created things, or of the equability of Reason. Because, if I am in all created things, and all created things are in me, it naturally follows that I must behave towards all created things, in the same, way as I would behave towards myself ; and, therefore,, the Blessed Lord has told Arjuna, that that man must be looked upon as the most excellent Karma-yogin Sthitaprajna, who "behaves towards all others with equability, that is, with the feeling that his Atman is the same as the Atman of others"; and he has advised Arjuna to act accordingly (GH. 6. 30-32). Ab Arjuna was duly initiated, it was not necessary to further labour this principle in the Glta. But, Vyasa has very clearly shown the deep and comprehensive meaning embodied in this principle, by enunciating it in numerous places in the Mahabharata, which has been written in order to teach Religion and Morality to ordinary people iMa. Bha. San. 238. 21; 261. 36). For example, in tha conversation between Brhaspati and Yudhisthira in the- Mahabharata, this same principle of identifying one's Atman with others, which has been succinctly mentioned in the. Upanisads and in the Glta, has at first been mentioned in the following words :-

atmopamas tu bhutesu yo vai bhavaiipunisah. I

nyastadaydo jiiakrodhah sa pretya sukham edhate II

(Ma. Bha. Anu. 113. 6)

that is, "that man, who looks upon others in the same way as ha looks upon himself, and who has conquered anger,, obtains happiness in the next world"; and then, without

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 53»

completing there the description of how one person should behave towards others, the Mahabharata goes on to say :-

na tat parasya samdadhyal pratikulam yad atmanah I esa samksepato dharmah kamad anyah prauartate ll (Ma. Bha. Ann. 113. 8)

that is, "one should not behave towards others in a way which one considers adverse or painful to oneself ; this is the essence of all religion and morality, and all other activities are based on selfish interests"; and it lastly says :-

pratyakhyane ca dans ca sukhaduhkhe priyapriye \

aimaupamyena purusah pramanam adhigacchati ll

yathaparah prakramate paresu tatha pare prakramante

'parasmin I

tathaioa tesUpama jiualoke yatha dharmo nipunenopadistah n

(Anu. 113. 9 and lO).

that is, " in the matter of pain and happiness, the palatable or the unpalatable, charity or opposition, each man should decide as to what should be done to others, by considering what his own feelings in the matter would be. Others behave towards one, as one behaves towards others ; therefore, wise persons have stated, by taking that illustration, that dliarma means behaving in the world, by placing oneself in the position of others". The line " ria tat parasya samdadhyat pratikulam yad atmanah ", (i.e., " one should not behave towards others, in a way which one oonsiders adverse or painful to oneself"— Trans.) has also appeared in the Viduraniti (Udyo. 38. 72) ; and later on, in the Santi-parva, Vidura has explained the same principle again to Yudhisthira (San. 167. 9). But, "do not cause pain to others, because that which is painful to yourself is also painful to others ", is only one part of the doctrine of Self-identification ; and some people are likely to be assailed- by the doubt that, we cannot deduce from this doctrine the definite inference that : " as that which is pleasant to yourself will also be pleasant to others, therefore, behave in such a way that pleasure will be caused to others ". Therefore, Bhisma in,

540 GlTA-RAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA

explaining the nature of dharma (Morality) to Yudhisthira has gone further and clearly indicated both the aspects of this law in the following words :-

yad anyair vihitam necched atmanah karma pumsah I na tat parem kurvlta janann apriyam atmanah H

jivitam yah svayam cecchet katham so 'nyam praghatayet I yad yad atmani cecclieta tat parasyapi cintayet il

(San. 258. 19, 21)

that is, " one should not behave towards others in that way in which one, by considering one's own happiness, desires that others should not behave towards one. How can that man, who desires to live himself, kill others? One should always desire that others should also get what one oneself wants". And in mentioning the same rule in another place, Vidura has, without using the adjectives ' anukula ' (favourable) and ' pratikida ' (unfavourable), laid down a general rule, with reference to every kind of behaviour, in the words :-

tasmad dJiarmapradhanena bhavitavyafo yat atmana I tatha ca sarvahhutesu. wrtitavyam yathattnani n

(San. 167. 9)

that is, "control your organs, and t.'have righteously; and behave towards all created beings, as if they are yourself " , because, as Vyasa says in the Sukanuprasna,

yavan atmani vedaima tavan Stma paratmani l ya eixuh satatam veda so 'mrtatvaya kalpate v

(Ma. Bha. San. 238. 22)

that is, "there is in the bodies of others, just as much of Atman' as there is in one's own body. That man who continually realises this principle, comes to attain Release". Buddha did not accept the existence of the Atman ; at any rate, he has clearly stated that one should not unnecessarily bother about the consideration of the Atman. Nevertheless, in teaching

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 541

how Buddhist mendicants should behave towards others, even> Buddha has preached the doctrine of Self-identification (almaupamya) in the following words : —

yatha akam tatha ete yatha ete tatha aham I attanam (atmanam) upamam katva (hrtva) na haneyya m ghataye \\, (Suttanipata, Nalakasutta, 27)

that is, "as I am, so are they; as they are, so am I; taking (thus) an illustration from oneself, one should not kill or cause (the) death (of anybody)". Even in another Pali treatise called Dhammapada, the seoond part of the above stanza has appeared twice verbatim ; and immediately thereafter, the stanzas occurring both in the Manu-Smrti (5.45) and Mahabharata (Ami. 113. 5) have been repeated in the Pali language in the following words :—

suhhakamani bhutani yo dandena vihimsati I attano sukliamesano (icclum) pecya so na labhate sukham II

(Dhammapada. 131)

that is, "that man, who for his own (attano) benefit, kills with- a rod other persona, who also desire happiness (like himself ),- does not obtain any happiness after death" (pecya -pretya). As we see that the principle of Self-identification is recognised in Buddhistic works, although they do not admit of the existence of the Atman, it becomes quite clear that these ideas have been taken by Buddhist writers from Vedic texts. But this matter will be further considered later on. The above quotations will clearly show that even from ancient times, we Indians have believed that that man, whose state of mind is "sarvabhUtastham atmanam saroabhutani catmani" (i. e., "all created things are in' me, and I am in all created things"— Trans.), always conducts himself in life by identifying others with himself ; and that that is the important principle underlying such conduct. Any one will admit that this principle or canon (sulra) of Self- identification used in deciding how to behave with other persons in society, is moTe logical, faultless, unambiguous,, comprehensive, and easy than the Materialistic doctrine of the 'greatest good of the greatest number' ; and is such as will easily

542 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

"be grasped by even the most ignorant of persons. * This fundamental principle or mystio import of the philosophy of Right and Wrong (esa samksepato dharmah) ia justified in a more satisfactory way from the Metaphysical point of view than from the Materialistic point of view, which takes into account only the external effects of Actions; and therefore, the works of Western philosophers, who consider the question of Karma- Yoga merely from the Materialistic point of view, do not give a prominent place to this important doctrine of the philosophy of Right and Wrong. Nay, they attempt to explain the bond of society on merely external principles like the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number ' etc., without taking into consideration this canon (sutra) of the principle of Self-identification. But, it will be seen that this easy ethical principle of Self-identification has been given the highest place not only in the Upanisads, the Manu-Smrti, ■the Glta, the other chapters of the Mahabharata, and the Buddhistic religion, but also in other countries and in other religions. Tha commandment "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (Levi. 19. 15; Matthew, 23.39), to be found in Christian and Jewish religious texts, is nothing but this rule in another form. Christians look upon this as a golden rule, that is to say, as a rule as valuable as gold; but their religion does not explain it by the principle of the unity of the Atman. The advice of Christ that, "And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise" (Matthew 7. 12; Luke 6. 31) is only a part of tho sutra of Self-identification; and the Greek philosopher Aristotle has literally enunciated this same principle of behaviour for men. Aristotle lived about 300 years before Christ, but the Chinese philosopher Khun-Phu-Tse (corrupted in English into 'Confucius') lived 200 years before

• The word 'sutra' is defined as "alpaisaram asamdigdham saravad

vtiwttomuifcim \ astobham anavadyam ca sutram sutravido mduh". Those various meaningless letters which are added in a mantra for the purpose of convenience of recitation, without adding to the meaning, are called •stohhak$ara' (complementary words). There are no such meaningless words in a sutra, and therefore, the adjective 'astobham' has been nsed in the de6nition above

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 543

Aristotle, and he has enunciated the above rule of Self-

identifieatioo by a single word according to the practice of

<the Chinese language. But, this prinoiple was enunciated in

■our country, long before Confucius, in the Upanisads ( Isa. 6;

Kena. 13); and later on in the Bharata, and the Gita; and also

an the works of Maratha saints by such words as: "like unto

oneself I one should consider others" II ( Dasa. 12. 10. 22): and

■there is also a proverb in Marathi which means, 'one should

judge thB world by one's own standard'. Not only is this so,

but it has been Metaphysically explained by our ancient

philosophers. When one realises that (i) religions other than

the Vedic religion have not logically justified this generally

accepted canon, though they have mentioned it, and (ii) that

this canon cannot be logically justified in any way except by

the Metaphysical principle of the identification of the Brahman

with the Atman, one will clearly see the importance of the

Metaphysical Ethics preached in the Gita, or the Karma-Yoga.

This easy principle of 'Self-identification', (atmaupamya)

which regulates the mutual behaviour of persons living

in a society, is so comprehensive, so easy to understand,

and so universally accepted, that when once one lays down the

■rule: "Realise the identity of the Atman in all created beings,

and behave towards others with an equable frame of

mind, as if they are yourself", it is no more necessary to lay

■down such individual commandments as: be kind to others ;

help others as much as possible ; bring about their welfare; put

them on the path of advancement; love them; do not get tired

of them; do not hurt their feelings; behave towards them with

justice and equality; do not deceive any one; do not deprive

any one of his wealth or of his life; do not tell any one an

untruth; bear always in mind the idea of bringing about the

•greatest good of the greatest number; behave towards all,

looking upon them as the children of one and the same

father, and as if they were your brothers etc. Everybody

■eoever naturally understands in what his happiness or unhap-

piness lies; and, as a result of the family system, he realises

•the truth of the rule that he must love his wife and children

in the same way as he loves himself, according to the doctrines,

~'atma vai putrariamasi" (i. e., "your son is the same as your-

544 GlTA-EAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

self" — Trans.), or "ardham bharyii sarirasya" (i. e "your wife is half of your body" — Trans.). But, the ultimate and most, comprehensive interpretation of the canon of Self -identification is, that the highest idea of manhood and the most complete fructification of the arrangement of the four states of life consists in: (i) realising that family life is but the first lesson in the science of Self-identification,, and (ii) instead of being continually engrossed in the family, making one's Self-identifying Reason more and more com- prehensive, by substituting one's friends, one's relations, or those born in the same gotra (clan) as oneself, or the inhabitants of one's own village, or the members of one's own community,, or one's co-religionists, and ultimately all human beings, or all created beings, in the place of one's family, thereby realis- ing that that Atman, which is within oneself is also withia all created beings ; and that one should regulate one's conduct accordingly. And, it then naturally follows that the sacrifi- cial ritual etc., or Karma, which enhances one's capacity to- achieve this ideal state, is a purifier of the Mind, and a moral aot, that is, such a duty as ought to be performed in the state of a householder. Because, as I have already explained before, the true meaning of the word ' atta-suddhi ' (purification of the Mind) is the total elimination of selfishness, and the- Eealisation of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman ; and the writers of the Smrtis have enjoined the performance of the various duties pertaining to the state of a householder only for that purpose. The same is the deep meaning under- lying the advice given by Yajhavalkya to Maitreyi in the words ' atma va are drastavijah ' ( ' see first who the Atman is '— - Trans.). The philosophy of Karma-Yoga, which has been, based on the foundation of the Knowledge of the Supreme Self, advises every one not to limit the extent of the Atman by saying "atma vai putranamasi"; and says that one should, realise the inherent comprehensiveness of the Atman by feeling that, "lokovai ayamatma", (i. e., "your Atman is the whole universe"— Trans.), and that every one should regulate one's activities, believing that " udaracaritariam tu vasudhaiva kutumbakam" , i. e,, "the whole universe is the family of noble-minded persons". And I am confident that, in this-

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 545

matter, our philosophy of Karma-Yoga will not only be not inferior to any other ancient philosophy of Karma-Yoga, but will even embrace all such philosophies like the Paramesvara, Who has embraced everything and has remained over to the extent of of ' ten fingers '.

But, even to this position an objection is raised by some that : when a man has by this Self-identification acquired the comprehensive Vedantic vision of "uasiidhniua kutumbakam" (i. e., 'the universe is the family' — Trans.), not only will virtues like pride of one's country, or of one's family or olan, or of one's religion etc., as a result of which some nations have now been fully advanced, he totally destroyed, but even if some one comes to kill us or to harm us, it will beoome our duty not to kill him in return with a harmful intent, having regard to the words of the Glta : "nirvairah sarvabhiitesu" (Gl. 11. 55) (i. e., non-inimical towards all created beings — Trans.), (See Dhammapada, 338) ; and as a result of evil-doers being unchecked, good persons will run the risk of being the victims of evil deeds ; and, as a result of the preponderance of evil- doers, the entire society or even a country will be destroyed. It is clearly stated in the Mahabharata itself that "na pope pratipapah syat sadhur em sada bliavet" (Ma. Bha, Vana. 206. 44), i. e., "do not become an evil-doer in dealing with evil-doers, but behave towards them like a saint"; because, "enmity is never done away with by enmity or by evil-doing"— "na capi vairam vairena kesava vyupasamyati' ; that, on the other hand, the man whom we defeat, being inherently evil-minded, becomes more evil-minded as a result of the defeat, and is only waiting for the chance of revenging himself again — "jayo vairam prasrjati' ; and that, therefore, it is proper to circumvent evil-doers by peace (Ma. Bha. Udyo. 71. 59 and 63). And these very stanzas in the Bharata have been copied in the Buddhistic treatises (See Dhammapada, 5 and 201; Mahavagga, 10. 2 and 3) ; and even Christ has repeated the same principle by saying: "Love your enemies" (Matthew, 5. 44), and, "but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also" (Matthew, 5. 39), or "And unto him that smiteth thee on the one cheek, offer also the other" (Luke, 6. 39). The same was the advice of the Chinese.

546 GlTA-RAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

philosopher La.-0-Tse, who lived before Christ, and there are even stories of this having been done by Ekanatha Maharaj and others from among our Maratha saints. I have not the slightest intention of belittling the sacred importance of these examples, which show the highest development of the principle of forgiveness or peace. There is no doubt that the religion of Forgiveness will, just like the religion of Truth, always remain permanent and without exception in the ultimate or the most perfect state of society. Nay, we even see in the imperfect condition of our present society, that results are achieved on various occasions by peace, which cannot be aohieved by anger. When, in trying to find out what warriors had come forward to help Duryodhana, Arjuna saw venerable persons like ancestors and preceptors among them, he realised that in order to circumvent the evil-doings of Duryodhana, he would lave to perform not only Action, but also the difficult action of killing by his weapons those preceptors who had sold themselves for money (Gl. %. 5) ; and he began to say, that according to the rule, "na pupe praiipapah syat", it was not proper for him to become an evil-doer because Duryodhana had become an evil-doer; and that "even if they kill me, it is proper for me to sit quiet with a 'non-inimical' mind" (Gi. 1. 46). The religion of the Gits has been propounded solely for solving this doubt of Arjuna ; and on that account, we do not anywhere come across an exposition of this subject, similar to the exposition made in the Gits. For instance, both the Christian and the Buddhistic religions adopt the principle of Non-Enmity, as is done by the Vedic religion; but it is nowhere clearly stated either in the Buddhistic or in the Christian religious treatises, — or at any rate not in so many words — that it is not possible for the conduct of a person, who gives up all Energistic Action and renounces the world, disregarding universal welfare and even self-preservation, to be in all respects the same as the conduct of the Karma-yogin, who, notwithstanding that tiis Reason has become non-inimical and unattached, takes part in all Energistic activities with that same non-inimical, and unattached Reason. On the other hand, Western moralists find it very difficult to harmonise properly the advice of Non-Enmity given by ChriBt with worldly

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 547

morality, * and Nietzsche, a modern German philosopher, has fearlessly stated his opinion in his works, that the ethioal principle of Non-Enmity is a slavish and destructive principle, and that the Christian religion, which gives a high plaoe to that principle, has emasculated Europe. But, if one considers our religious treatises, one sees that the idea, that the two ethical and religious courses of Renunciation and Energism are to be distinguished from each other in this matter, was •accepted by and was well-known not only to the Glta but even to Manu. Because, Manu has prescribed the rule, "krudhyam- torn na pratikrudhyet", i.e., "do not become angry in return towards one who has become angry towards you" (Manu. 6. 48), only for Samnyasins, and not for the householder or in regal .science. I have shown above in the fifth chapter, that the method adopted by our commentators of mixing up the ■mutually contradictory doctrines pertaining to the two paths of Renunciation and Karma-Yoga, without taking into account ■what dictum applies to which path, and how it is to be used, ■gives rise to a confusion regarding the true doctrine of Karma-Yoga. When one gives up this confusing method adopted by the commentators on the Glta, one can clearly ^understand in what sense the word Non-Enmity (nirmira) is understood by the followers of the Bhagavata religion or Karma-yogins. Because, even Prahlada, that highest of the devotees of the Blessed Lord, has himself said that, '"tasrrian nityam ksama tata panditair apavadita" (Ma. Bha. Vana. 28. 8), i. e., "therefore, my friend, wise men have every- where mentioned exceptions to the principle of forgiveness ", in order to show how the Karma-yogin householder should behave on thesB occasions. It is true that the ordinary rule

• of the doctrine of Self-identification is, that one should not

• cause harm to others by doing such Actions as, if done to oneself, would be harmful; yet the Mahabharata has made it clear, that this rule should not be followed in a society, where there do not exist persons who follow the other religious prinoiple, namely, "others should not cause harm

• See Paulsen's Systemof Ethics, Book III, Chap. X (Eng. Trails.)

.and Nietzsche's Anti-Christ.

548 QITA.-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

to us", which is a corollary from this first principle. The- word ' equability ' is bound up with two individuals, that is, it is relative. Therefore, just as the principle of Non-Violence is not violated by killing an evil-doer, so also is the principle of Self-identification or of Non-Enmity, which is observed by saints, in no way affected by giving condign punishment to evil-doers. On the other hand, they acquire the merit of protecting others by having opposed the injustice of evii-doers. That Paramesvara, than Whom nobody's Reason can be more equable, Himself takes incarnations from time to time for protecting saints and destroying evil-doers, and thereby brings about universal welfare (lokasamgraha), ( Gl. 4. 1 and 8); then? how can the case of ordinary persons be different? To say that the distinction between those who are deserving and those who are undeserving, or between what is proper and what improper, disappears, as a result of one's vision having become equable in such a way that he says: 'vasudhaiva lattumbalmm* (i.e., "the whole world is my family" — Trans) or of one's giving up the Hope for Fruit of Action, is a confusion of thought. The doctrine of the Gita is that mine-ness (mamatoa} is the predominant factor in the Hope for Fruit; and that unless that feeling is given up, one cannot escape the bondage of sin or merit. But, though I may have no object to achieve for myself, I nevertheless commit the sin of helping evil-doers or undeserving persons, and of harming deserving saints and eve u society itself to that extent, if I allow some one to take that which he ought not to get. Just as, though a multi- millionaire like Kubera goes to purchase vegetables in the market, he does not pay a lakh of rupees for a bundle of coriander leaves, so also does the man, who has reached the state of perfection, not forget the discrimination as to what is good for whom. It is true that his Season has become equable. But, 'equability' does not mean giving to a man the grass, which is fit for a cow, and to a cow, the food which is- proper for a man; and with the same intention, the Blessed Lord has said in the Gita that that sattuika charity which is to be made as datavija, that is, because it is a duty to give, must be given, considering "dese Icale ca patre ca", that is, considering the propriety of the place, the time, and the;

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 549

<deservingness of the person ( Gl. 17. 20 ). In describing ■this equable state of mind of saints, Jnanesvara has compared them to the earth. The earth is also known as "sarvasaha" (i. e., one who bears everything— Trans.). But, if this bearer-of-everything earth is given a kick, it proves its ' equability ' by giving to the kicker an equally strong ■counter-kick. This clearly shows how one can make a non- animical (nirvaira) resistance, even when there is no enmity an the heart; and that is why it is stated in the chapter on Causality of Action above (Effect of Karma) that the Blessed Lord remains free from the blame of partiality (vaisamya), cruelty {nairghrnya) etc., notwithstanding that He deals with people .as: "ye yatha mam prapadyante ta/hs tatfmva bhajamy aham" (Gl. 4. 11), i. e., " I give to them reward in the same manner -and to the same extent as they worship me". In the same ■way, in ordinary life and according to law, no one calls the Judge, who directs the execution of a criminal, the enemy ,of the criminal. According to Metaphysics, when a man's Beason has become desireless and has reached the state -of equability, he does not of his own accord do harm to anybody; and if somebody is harmed as a result of something which ie doBS, that harm is the result of the Karma of such other ,j>8Tson; or in other words, the desireless Sthitaprajfia does not, by the act which he performs in these circumstances — even if it appears as terrible as matricide, or the murder of a preceptor— incur the bondage or the taint of the good or evil ■flffects of the act.' (Gi. 4. 14; 9. 28; and 18. 17). The rules of eelf-defence included in criminal law are based on the same •principle. There is a tradition about Manu that when he was /requested by people to become a king, he at first said : ' I do not wish to become a king for punishing persons who -commit sins, and to thereby incur sin"; but when in return, "tarn ahmvan prajah ma bhlh kartrneno gamisyati (Ma. Bha. -San. 67. 23), that is, "people said to him: 'do not be afraid, tfhe sinner will incur the sin, and you will acquire the merit of having protected the people", and, when on top of it, •they further gave him a promise that : " we will give' to you toy way of taxes that amount which will have to be expended ior the protection of the people", he consented to become a

550 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

king. In short, the natural laws of a reaction being equal ii> intensity and effect to the action, which is seen in the lifeless world, is translated into the principle of 'measure for measure' in the living world. Those ordinary persons whose Mind has not reached the state of equability, add their feeling of mine- ness {mamatva) to this law of Cause and Effect, and making the counterblow stronger than the blow, take their revenge for the blow; or if the other person is weak, they are ready to take advantage of some trifling or imaginary affront, and rob him to their own advantage, under pretext of retaliation. But, if a. man, whose Mind has become free from the feelings of revenge, enmity, or pride, or free from the desire of robbing the weak as a result of anger, avarice, or hatred, or free from the desire of obstinately making an exhibition of one's greatness,, authority, or power, which inhabits the minds of ordinary people, merely turns back a stone which has been thrown at him, that does sot disturb the peacefulness, non-inimicality,. and equability of his Mind; and it is on the other hand his duty, from the point of view of universal welfare, to take such retaliatory action, for the purpose of preventing the predo- minance of wrong-doers and the consequent persecution of the weak in the world (Gl. 3. 25 ); and the summary of the entire- teaching of the Glta is that : even the most horrible warfare which may be carried on in these circumstances, with an equable state of mind, is righteous and meritorious. It is not that the Karma-yogin Sthitaprajna disregards the religious doctrines of behaving non-inimically towards everybody, not doing evil to evil-doers, or not getting angry with those who are angry with one. But, instead of accepting the doctrine of the School of Renunciation that 'Non-inimicality' (nirvuiraY means inactivity or non-retaliation, the philosophy of Karma- Yoga says, that 'rurvaira' means merely giving up 'vaira ' or 'the desire to do evil'; and that in as much as nobody can escape Karma, one should perform as much Karma as is- possible and necessary for retaliation or for social welfare, without entertaining an evil desire, and as a matter of duty,- and apathetically, and without Attachment (Gi. 3. 19 ); and therefore, instead of using the word 'mroaira' by itself, th&

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 551

Blessed Lord has placed the important adjective 'matkarmakrt* before it, in the stanza:

matkarmakrt matparamo madbhaktah sangavarjitah I mrvairah sarvabhutem yah sa mam eti paridava II

( Gl. 11, 55 )

which (word 'matkarmakrt') means 'one who performs Action for Me, that is, for the Paramesvara, and with the idea of dedicating it to the Paramesvara' ; and the Blessed Lord has thus interlocked non-inimicality with Desireless Action, from the point of view of Devotion. And it has been stated in the Samkarabhasya and also in other commentaries that this stanza contains the essential summary of the doctrine of the Glta. It is nowhere stated in the Gita that one should give up all kind of Action, in order to make one's mind non- inimical (nirvaira), or after it has become non-inimical. When a man in this way performs that amount of Action which is necessary for retaliation non-inimically and with the idea of dedicating it to the Paramesvara, he commits no sin what- soever; but what is more, when the work of retaliation is over, the desire to wish the good of the person whom he has punished, by Self -identification, does not leave his mind. For example, when Bibhisana was unwilling to attend to the obsequial ceremonies of Havana, after the sinless and non-inimical Ramacandra had killed him (Ravana) in war, on account of his (Ravana's) evil doings, Sri Ramacandra has said to Bibhisana: —

maranantani vairani nivrttam nah prayojanam I kriyatam asya samskaro mamapyesa yatha tava ll

(Valmlki Ra. 6. 109. 25)

that is; "the enmity (in the mind of Ravana) has come to an end with his death. My duty (of punishing evil-doers) has come to an end; now he is my (brother), just as he was your (brother); therefore, consecrate him into the fire". This principle mentioned in the Ramayana has also in one plaoe been, mentioned in the Bhagavata ( Bhag. 8. 19. 13); and the same

552 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

principle is conyeyed by the traditions in the Puranas that the Blessed Lord had afterwards benevolently given an excellent state to those very evil-doers whom He Himself had killed. Sri Samartha has used the words "meet impertinence by impertinence" ( see p. 524 above — Trans. ) on the basis of the same principle ; and in the Mahabhaiata, Bhisma has, on the same principle, said to Parasurama: —

yo yatha vartate yasmin tasminn evam pravartayan I nadharmavi samavcipnoti nacasreyas ca vindati il

(Ma. Bha. Udyo. 179.30)

that is, "theie is no breach of religion (immorality) in behaving towards another person in the same way as he behaves towards you; nor does one's benefit thereby suffer"; and further on in Satyanitadhyaya of the Santiparva, the same advice has again been given to Yudhisthira in the following words: —

yasmin yatha vartate yo manusyah

tasmins tatha mrtitavyam sa dharinah I mayacaro mayaya badhitavyah

sadhvacarah sUdhuna pratyupeyah II

( Ma. Bha. San. 109. 29 and Udyo. 36. 7)

that is, "Religion and Morality consist in behaving towardB others in the same way as they behave towards us; one must behave deceitfully towards deceitful persons, and in a saintly way towards saintly persons". So also in the Rg-veda, Indra has not been found fault with for his deceitfulness, but has on the other hand, been praised in the

following words: "tram mayWiir anavadya mayimm vrtram

ardayah I " ( Rg. 10. 147. 2; 1. 80. 7), i. e„ "0, sinless Indra i you have by deceit killed Vrtra, who was himself deceitful"; and ,the poet Bharavi has in his drama Kiraiarjuniyam repeated in the following words the principle enunciated in the Rg-veda:

vrajanti te mudlwdhiyah parabhavam I bhavanii mayavisu ye m mSyinah II

( Kira. 1. 30)

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS' 553

■that is, "those, who do not become deceitful in dealing with deceitful persons, are themselves destroyed". But in this place it must also be borne in mind that if it is possible to offer -retaliation to an evil-doer by a saintly act, such saintly act should in the fiist instance be attempted ; becausei from the fact that the other man has become an evil-doer, it does not follow that one should also become an evil-doer with him, nor does it follow that others should cut their noses because some one has cut' his own nose; nay, there is even no Morality in that. This is the true meaning of the •canon "na pape pratipapah syat" (i. e„ "do not beoome an evil- ■doer towards an evil-doer" — Trans.); and for the same reason, Vidura, after having first mentioned to Dhrtarastra in the Viduraniti, the ethical principle that, "na tatparazya samdadkyat pratikulam yad atmanah", i. e., "one should not behave towards ■others in a way which is undesirable from one's point of view", immediately afterwards says: — •

akrodhena jayet hrodham asadhum sadhuna jayet I jayet kadaryain danena jayet satyena canrtam II

(Ma. Bha. Udyo. 38. 73, 74 )

that is, "the anger (of othere) should be conquered, by one's peacefulness; evil-doers should be conquered by Baintlineas ; the miser should be conquered by gifts; and falsehood should be ■conquered by truth". This stanza has been copied word for word in the Buddhistio treatise on Morality in the Pali language, known as the Dhammapada, in the following stanza: —

akkodhe?ia jine kodlunh asadhum sadhuna jine l jine kadariyam danena saccen alikavadinam ll

(Dhammapada, 323)

and, in the Santiparva of the Mahabharata, Bhlsma, in counsel- ling Yudhisthira, has praised this ethical principle in the following terms: —

karma caitad asadhumm asadlm sadhuna jayet l dharmena nidhanam sreyo na jayah papakarmana II.

(Ma- Bha. San. 95. 16)

554 GlTA-RAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

that is, "the asadhu, that is, 'evil' actions of evil-doers (asadhunam) should be counteracted by saintly actions; because, even if death follows as a result of righteousness or Morality, that is better than the victory which follows from a sinful action". But, if the evilness of evil-doers is not circumvented by such saintly actions, or, if the counsel of peacefulness or propriety is not acceptable to such evil-doers,, then according to the principle "kantakenaim Imntakam (i. e., "takeout a thorn by a thorn" — Trans.), it becomes necessary to take out by a needle, that is, by an iron thorn, if not by an ordinary thorn, that thorn which will not come out by the application of poultices ( Dasa. 19.9. 12-31) ; because, under any circumstances, punishing evil-doers in the interests of general welfare, as was done by the Blessed Lord, is the first duty of saints from the point of view of Ethics. In enuncia- ting the proposition "evilness should be conquered by saintliness", the fact that the conquest of or the protection from evil is the primary duty of a saint, is first taken for granted; and the first step to be taken for attaining that result is mentioned. But, it is nowhere stated by our moral philosophers, that if protection against evil-doers cannot be obtained by saintliness, one should not give 'measure for measure', and protect oneself, but should allow oneself to- bacome a victim of the evil-doings of villains; and it must be borne in mind that, that man who has come forward to cut the throats of others by his own evil-doings, has no more any ethical right to expect that others should behave towards him like saints. Nay, it is clearly stated in our religious treatises,, that when a saint is thus compelled to perform some unsaintly Action, the responsibility of such unsaintly Action does not fall on the pure-minded saint, but that the evil-doer must be held responsible for it, as it is the result of his evil doings ( Manu. 8. 19 and 351); and the punishment, which was meted out by the Blessed Buddha himself to Devadatta, has been justified in Buddhistic treatises on the same principle (Milinda- Pra. 4. 1. 30-34). In the world of lifeless things, action and re-action always take place regularly and without a hitob. It is true that as the activities of a man are subject to his desires,, and also, as the ethical knowledge necessary for deciding when.

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 555

to use the trailokya-ci?iiamani-inatra ( infallible remedy ) in dealing with evil-doers, is very subtle, even a meritorious person is at times in doubt as to whether that which he would like to do is right or wrong, moral or immoral — "few karma Mm akarmeti Tiavayopy atra mohitah" (Gl. 4, 16), (i. e., " what should be done and what should not be done is a question which puzzles even learned persons" — -Trans.). On these occasions, the right thing to do is to take as authoritative the decision which is arrived at by the pure mind of a saint, who has reached the highest state of complete equability of Reason^ instead of depending on the wisdom of wise persons, who are always more or less subject to selfish desires, or merely on one's own powers of reasoning and discrimination; because, as arguments and oounter-argumants wax in direct ratio with the power of inferential logic, these difficult questions are never truly or satisfactorily solved by mere wisdom, and. without the help of pure Reason; and one has to seek the shelter and protection of a pure and desireless preceptor to arrive at such a solution. The Reason of those law-givers,, who are universally respected, has become purs in this way; and, therefore, the Blessed Lord has said to Arjuna in the Bhagavadgita that: — "lasmac chastram prartm^am (e karya- karyam-vyavasthitau" (G-I. 16. 24), i. e., "in discriminating between what should be done and what should not be done, you must look to the authority of the religious and moral treatises". At the same time, it must not be forgotten, that saintly law-givers like Svetaketu, who oome later in point of time, acquire the authority of effecting changes even in these religious principles.

The prevalent misconception regarding the oonduot in. life of non-inimical and peaceful saints is due to the fact that the Path of Karma-Yoga is now practically extinct, and the Path of Renunciation, whioh considers all worldly life as discardable, is on all hands being looked upon as superior The Gtta neither advises nor intends that when one becomes non-inimical, one should also beoome non-retaliatory. To that man who does not care for universal welfare, it is just the same whether or not evil-doers predominate in the world, and whether or not he oontinues to live, But, the philosophy of

356 GlTA-RAHAYSA OR KARMA-YOGA

■Karma-Yoga teaches us that though the Karma-yogins, who have leached the most perfect state, behave non-inimically .towards all created beings, recognising the identity of the Atman in all, they never fail to do that duty which has befallen them according to their own status in life, after ■ discriminating between who is worthy and who unworthy, with a frame of mind, which is unattached; and that any Action which is performed in this manner, does not in the least prejudicially affect the equability of Reason of the doer. When this principle of the Karma-Yoga in the Glta has been accepted, one can properly account for and justify the pride of one's family, the pride of one's country, or other similar duties on the basis of that principle. Although the ultimate doctrine of this philosophy is that, that is to be called Religion which )eads to the benefit of the entire human race, nay of all living beings, yet, as pride of one's family, pride of one's religion, and pride of one's country are the ascending steps which lead to that highest of all states, they never become unnecessary. Just as the worship of the qualityful (saguna) Brahman is necessary in order to attain to the quality less (nirguna) Brahman, so also is the ladder of pride of one's family, pride of one's community, pride of one's religion, pride of one's country etc. necessary in order to acquire the feeling of "vasudliaiva kutumbakam" (i. e., "the whole universe IB the family" — Trans.); and as every generation of society climbs up this ladder, it is always necessary to keep this ladder intact. In the same way, if persons around one, or the other countries around one's country, are on a lower rung of this ladder, it is not possible for a man to say that he will always remain alone on a higher rung of the ladder; because, as has been stated above, those persons who are on the higher steps of that ladder, have occasionally to follow the principle of measure for measure', in order to counteract the injustice of those who are on the lower steps. There is no doubt that the state of every human being in the world, will improve gradually and reach the stage when every one realises the identity of the Atman in every created being. At any rate, it is not improper to entertain the hope of creating such a frame of. mind in every human being. But^ it naturally

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 557

follows .that so long as every one has not reached this ultimate- state of development of the Atman, saints must, having regard to the state of other countries or other societies, preaoh the creed of pride of one's country etc., which will for the time being be beneficial to their own societies. Besides, another- thing, which must also be borne in mind is that, as it is not possible to do away with the lower floors of a building, when- the higher floors are built; or, as the pick-axe does not cease to be necessary, because one has got a sword in one's hand; or, as fire does not cease to become necessary, because one has also got the Sun, so also does patriotism, or the pride of one's family, not become unnecessary, although one has reached the topmost stage of the welfare of all created things. Because, considering the matter from the point of view of the reform of society, that specific function, which is performed by the' pride of one's family, cannot be got merely out of pride of' one's country, and the specific function, which is performed' by the pride of one's country, is not achieved by the Realisa- tion of the identity of the Atman in all created beings, In- short, even in the highest state of society, patriotism and pride- of one's family and other creeds are always necessary to the same extent as Equability of Reason. But, as one nation is prepared to cause any amount of harm to~ another nation for its own benefit, on the basis that the pride of one's own country is the only and the highest ideal, such a . state of things is not possible if the benefit of all created beings is looked upon as such ideal. If there is a conflict between the pride of one's family, the pride of one's country, and ultimately the benefit of the entire human kind, then,, according- to the important and special preaching of that Ethics, which is replete with Equability of Reason, duties of a lower order should be sacrificed for duties of a higher order. When Vidura was advising Dhrtarastra, that rather than not give a share of the kingdom to the Pandavas, at the desire of Duryodhana, and thereby run the risk of the whole clan being destroyed in the resulting war, he (Dhrtarastra) should give up the single individual. Duryodhana, though Duryodhana

CM&&M&&<f-& lit iMSMiSrfO®^

•■a ,:.i my, "?' r«- -#?,» oiwiiliwte ha-- (V-Idaia^ iiranppputofc"

! 'f, tnnfc x-" l ll."-' s - v fO f, f" i "•} iiltyrl'llA jrrMvVTil. :JJ(L>0,'\

l.fit, .ih&. -lul _'JB'. j6t ,i)aiih£. ii. Ill i.at, ia, ■'"w)K*i 1 .ti'SiS v.'wivily: tw> ■iflvson ;sav as-- ibandoned: w ayrtt«\f.tr.a! i. i,.wn, '- ■'jimliv "ilAV m- ifaandrmEa: "Dr'tke-- ii>ri-»nt.i.v.-. if ru'isuv. t. .r-w _7iay .» thauaoneri: ana .or'Ste- .j>nforttorj -if ,!■.> ,-.-t,iii;.r:. -iv-ri -.lie- larih .nay <)ft iinaniiDnefl". " : '>.ft ij'fT-;rfr,lftinfrit.innai- JioW: a wne Mt ay r ,he 3TSE :btB«  p,tI-b if '..hi* -■.iiii.t-«« I . i.ifrt '•X.er r'raifth. pare af: -.±E stanza ■ri.-ii.'i:si.t,(>o. he jpfr.i-itijtft if :,h.E jrpf.6cf.ion if ih& Annan. Ansr I..;- Torn "fulfil)' i ■>. -.'ii-n/non .wor.oiur. "Alia doctrine- afcSeif-- jrofp.-ifi.-uj %r/rjiif« '.r; j. -inft-ri -.f.rjffiv. ^ottmmnir.y (Minify; or ivnnjirf n .'.i? inn,-, ^rr-v w t, iiwk ,o in individual: .md Tjriiari -inf. u-iniiii.'-rn ,hfr 'Tsins; »rM&tion jf one man "or a ':uni1v h rarnily jir ^ iiwn. i, ,-,own for i joimtry, 95c.. me, ■,»^ ilr&r'y" .hal. '.ba vnrri ' Attnan 1 mist be sonsidered to larry ,, iij^cJifT 'rJiiB :-.Viau itil ,hf! itlier. '.hings. iSFevertheiess. soma sflfigh jfrenns- ir .jfrnfum uiawmainted ' vith ethical minaixAss. -;firnpt,inii« fnt'MTTjrfif, i .1 f is -ia.rt, of th& stanza :n. quite a ;pbt7esh&

• ay, '.lint, m fro -lay, an importing merely selfishness: it iff.

r.Vin-tvfnTO, ii«iB*«i7 ; it> munfciim here. Miat this principl& or tire- prhfofitii'i" nt l; ri8 Atman is not ilia r mme as the princiDiB af ^Iffehiwiw. rtfifiaUHfi, thesa moral pnilosophers who have- -U-tOtM'A the path advnnated by Sia self-worshippBT Carvaka ■w .-lm"1i«h 'Stifl, fit, nhap. !(i) flannot preach ~o any ana 'he ■liMi'.-ii'ii'in -if 'liB'iiiiwii-Hfl !in' ona^i own seitfah interests, The vnr.-l rr\>" -ii Mm ihmm atansla inss not indioata- mataiy a 3PlK«h iil.urfiflh 'ii il-, .liniit. 'in iiiKerprBtad aataeaninp 'for defaad- iiiti <irtf«e!f iKa'aif>. i wirunity, if it hasaome'; and thfr same mnaiiiviw in i,ii no i'lintiit in liotionaries. There k a world of rtiffimmra hfitwfifin idlflRhnass and protection of the Self (Aimruii. fldiiMiriij hi m (ip,tnment of others, being inspired hy tJto rtnaivn af rmioyiimr nhioc.ta of pieasure, or hy avarice, and for ofln's nwn ImiiRfif; j« seiflRfineas. This ia inhuman and forbiddan, and- it m dtatoH in thn first thrae pftrta of the abova 3tanza, that onn-mimt; always oonsWer the bsnaftfe of the multitude, rather

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORLDLY AFFAIRS 559

than of an individual. Yet, as there is one and the same Atman in all created things, everyone has an inherent natural light of being happy in this world; and no single individual or society in the world can ever ethically acquire the right to cause the detriment of another individual or society by ■disregarding this universal, important, and natural right, merely because the one is more than the other in numbers, or in strength, or because the one has a larger number of means ~than the other for conquering the other. If, therefore, some one seeks to justify the selfish conduct of a society, which is bigger in numbers than another society, on the ground that the benefit of a larger multitude, is of higher importance than the benefit of an individual or of a smaller multitude, such a method of reasoning must be looked upon as demonical (raksasi). Therefore, the fourth part of the stanza says, that if other people behave unjustly in this way, then the inherent ethical right of everybody of protecting himself, is of higher importance than the benefit of a larger multitude; nay, ■of even the whole world; and this has been mentioned along with the matter explained in the first three parts of the stanza, as an important exception to the principle enunciated in them. Further, it must also be realised, that one can bring about universal welfare only if one lives; therefore, even considering the matter from the point of view of universal benefit, one has to say with VisvSmitra that "jh-an dharmam avapnuyat", i. e., ■"one can think of Morality, only if one remains alive"; or, with Kalidasa that, "sariram adyam khalu dharmasadhanam" {Kuma. 5. 33 ), i. e., "the body is the fundamental means of bringing about Morality"; or, with Manu, that, "atmanam salaiarh mkset", i. e„ "one should always protect oneself". But although this right of self-protection thus becomes higher than the benefit of the world, yet, as has been mentioned above in the second chapter, saints are, of their own will, willing on ■several occasions to sacrifice their lives for their family, or country, or religion, or for the good of others; and the same principle has been enunciated in the three parts of the above ■stanza. As on these occasions, the mac of his own free will sacrifices his important right of sBlf-proteotion, the ethical "value of such an act is considerad higher than |that of all other

560 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

acts, Yet, it becomes quite clear from the story of Dhrtarastra, mentioned above, that mere learning or logic is not sufficient, to rightly determine whether such an occasion has arisen, and that in order to arrive at a correct decision on that matter, the- inner consciousness (antahJcarana) of the person, who wishes to- deoide, must first have become pure and equable. It is not. that Dhrtarastra was so feeble-minded as not to understand the advice which was given by Vidura. But, as has been stated' in the Mahabharata itself, his Reason could not become- equable as a result of his love for his son. Just as Kubera is- never in need for a lakh of rupees, so the man whose Mind has become equable, experiences no dearth of the feeling of the identity of the Atman in the members of a family, or a oountry,. or in co-religionists, or any other inferior orders of identities- All these identities are included in the identity of the- Brahman and the Atman; and saints carry on the maintenance and welfare of the world by preaching to different persons either their duty to their country, or their duty to their family f or other narrow religions, or the comprehensive religion of universal welfare, as may be meritorious for a particular- person on a particular occasion, according to the state of his- Reason, or for his own protection. It is true that in the- present state of the human race, patriotism has become the highest religion; and even civilised countries utilise their learning, skill, and money, in contemplating on and preparing for the destruction of as large a number of persons in as short a time as possible, from a neighbouring inimical country, as- soon as the occasion arises. But Spencer, Comte, and other philosophers have distinctly maintained in their works, that one cannot, on that account, look upon that as the highest, ethical ideal of the human race ; and I do not understand how that objection, which has not been raised to the doctrine preaohed by them, can become effective as against the doctrine of the identity of the- Atman in all created beings, which arises from our Metaphysical philosophy. As, when the child is young, one has to make its clothes as will fit its body— or perhaps slightly bigger, because it is growing— so also is the case with the Realisation of identity of the Atman in alL created beings. Be it a society or an individual, if the-

' STATE OF A SIDDHA & WOELDLY AFFAIRS 561

ideal placed before it, in the shape of the identity of the Atman in all created beings, is consistent with the spiritual qualification of that individual or society, or at most a little advanced, it will be beneficial to it ; but if one asks that society or individual to achieve some thing, how excellent soever, which is more than it can accomplish, it will never be benefited by it. That is why the worship of the Parabrahman has been prescribed in the Upanisads by rising gradations, though in fact the Parabrahman is not circumscribed by any grades ; and though a warrior olass is not necessary in a society in which every one has reached the state of a Sthitaprajna, yet, our religion has included that caste in the arrangement of the four castes, having regard to the contemporary state of other societies in the world, and on the> basis of the principle " atrmmm saiatam rakset " (i.e., " protect yourself at all timse"— Trans.) ; and even in that highest and ideal state of society which has been mentioned in his works by the Greek philosopher Plato, the highest importance has- been given to the class which becomes proficient in warfare by constant practice, because that class occupies the position of protectors of society. This will clearly show that though philosophers are always immersed in the contemplation of the highest and purest of ideas, they never fail to take into account the then prevailing imperfect state of sooiety.

When all things have been considered in this way, it becomes clear that the true duty of scients is (i) to keep their own Reason free from objects of pleasure, peaceful, non- inimical, and equable, by Realising the identity of the Brahman and the Atman ; and (ii) without getting disgusted with ordinary ignorant people, because they themselves have attained this high state of mind, and without perverting the Reason of such ordinary people, by themselves abandoning worldly duties and accepting the state of Abandonment of Action (karma-saAmyasa), to preach to people whatever is proper for them, having regard to prevailing conditions, and to place before their eyes the living example of a model moral life, in the shape of their own desireless adherence to duty ,* and (iii) in that way to place all on the path of betterment, as gradually and peacefully as possible, but at the same time 71-72

562 GlTA-KAKASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

enthusiastically. This is what is done by the Blessed Lord <by taking various incarnations from time to time ; and the sum and substance of the entire philosophy of the Glta is, that scients should follow the same example, and should at all times continue to do their duty in this world desirelessly, and to the best of their abilities, and with a pure mind, and without an eye to the Fruit ; that they should be willing to lay down their lives, if necessary, while they are doing so (Gl. 3. 35) ; and that they must not under any circumstances fail in their duty. This is what is known as universal welfare {lokasamgraha) ; and this is the true Karma- Yoga. It was only when the Blessed Lord had explained to Arjuna this wisdom about what should be done and what should not be done, on the basis of Vedanta, simultaneously with explaining Vedanta to him, that Arjuna, who at first was on the point of giving up warfare and taking up the life of a mendicant, was later on ready to participate in the terrible war — not only because the Blessed Lord asked him to do so, but voluntarily. This principle of the equable Reason of the Sthitaprajna (Steady- i'n-Mind), which had been preached to Arjuna, being the fundamental basis of the philosophy of Karma-Yoga, I have in this chapter taken that as a hypothesis, and after having explained how the highest principles of Ethics are justified and explained on the basis of that principle, I have afterwards shortly stated the prominent parts of the philosophy of Karma- Yoga, such as: how people should behave towards each other in society from the point of view of Self-Identification; what modifications become necessary in the principles of Absolute Ethics, as a result of the law of 'measure for measure', or as a result of the worthiness or unworthiness of the person one has to deal with; as also how saints living in morally imperfect societies have to follow principles of morality, which are exceptions to the general principles etc. If the same method of argument is applied to the questions of justice, charity, philanthropy, kindness, non-violence, truth, not-stealing and other eternal principles, and if even a separate treatise is written on each of these subjects, in order to show what modifi- cations will have to be made in the case of each of them, as occasion arises, consistently with the present morally imperfect

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORDLY AFFAIRS 563

state of society, they will not be exhausted; and that is also not the principal object of the Bhagavadgita. I have, in the second chapter of this book, touched on the questions of how a confliot arises between Non-Violence and Truth, or Truth and Self- Protection, or Self -Protection and Peacefulness etc., and how, on that account, there arises at times a doubt as to what •should be done and what should not be done. It is clear, that on such occasions, saints make a careful discrimination between 'ethical principles,' 'ordinary worldly affairs,' 'self- interest', 'benefit of all created things' etc., and then arrive at a decision as to what should be done and what should not be done; and this fact has been definitely stated by the iyem bird to king Sibi in the Mahabharata; and the English writer Sidgwick has, in his Book on Ethics, propounded the same principle in great detail, and by giving many examples; but ithe inference drawn from this fact by several Western philoso- phers, that the accurate balancing of self-interest and other's- interest, is the only basis for determining ethical laws, has never been accepted by our philosophers ; because, according ■to our philosophers, this discrimination is very often so subtle and so 'anaikantika', that is, so productive of so many conclu- sions, that unless the Equability of realising that 'the other man is the same as myself, has been thoroughly impressed on one's mind, it is impossible to arrive at an invariably correct discrimination between what should be done and what should not be done, merely by inferential reasoning; and if one does so, it will be a case of 'the pea-hen tries to dance because the •the peacock dances'. This is the main drawback in the arguments of Western Utilitarians like Mill and others. If 'because an eagle, swooping down, takes a lamb in its claws 'high up in the air, a crow also attempts to do so, he is sure to come to grief; therefore, the Glta says, that it is not sufficient -to place reliance merely on the outward devices adopted .by saints; and that one must depend on the principle of an equable Reason, which is always alive in their hearts; and that Equability of Reason is the true root of the philosophy of Karma-Yoga. Some modern Materialistic philosophers maintain that SELF-INTEREST is-.the basic foundation of Ethics; whereas others give that place to

564 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

PHILANTHROPY, that is, 'the greatest good of the greatest- number'. But I have shown above in the fourth chapter, that, these principles, which touch merely tie external results ofi Action, do not meet all situations; and that one has necessarily to consider to what extent the Reason of the dber is pure. It' is true that the discrimination between the outward effects of Action, is a sign of wisdom and far-sightedness. But, far- sightedness is not synonymous with Ethics; and, therefore, our philosophers have come to the conclusion that the true basis of Proper Action does not lie in the mere mercenary process of discriminating between different external Actions; and that' the HIGHEST IDEAL (paramartha) in the shape of Equability oft Reason, is the fundamental basis of Ethics; and one comes to- the same conclusion if one properly considers what the mosti perfect state of the Personal Self (jwatman), is ; because, though many persons are adepts in the art of robbing each other by avarice, nobody says that this cleverness, or the futile- Knowledge of the Brahman, consisting of knowing in what?- 'the greatest good of the greatest number' lies, is the highest ideal of everyone in this world. That man alone is the highest of men, whose Reason is pure. Nay; one may even say that the man, who, without having a- stainless, non-inimical, and pure mind, is only engrossed in the calculating discrimination between outward Actions, runs the risk of becoming a- hypocrite (See Gl. 3. 6). If one accepts Equability of Reason, as the basis of the philosophy of Karma-Yoga, this objection, does not arise. It is true that by taking Equability of Reason as the fundamental basis, one has to consult saints for' determining between morality and immorality, in circum- stances of exceptional difficulty; but there is no help for that. Just as when a man is down with a very serious illness, its- diagnosis or treatment is impossible without the help of a- clever doctor> so also will it be futile for an- ordinary person* to proudly imagine that he will be able to arrive at a faultless- decision between morality and immorality, without the help of saints, and merely on the basis of the principle of 'the- greatest good of the greatest number', when there is a difficult- and doubtful situation. One must always increase Equability of Reason by constant practice;, and when the minds of all

STATE OF A SIDDHA & WORDLY AFFAIRS 565

the human beings in the world gradually reach the state of perfect Equability in this way, the Krtayuga will start, and the highest ideal or the most perfect state of the human race will be reached by everyone. The philosophy of the Duty and Non-Duty has been evolved for this purpose ; and, therefore, the edifice of that philosophy must also be based on the foundation of Equability of Reason. But, even if one does not go so deep as that, but only considers Ethics from the point of view of the test of public opinion, the theory of Equability of Reason expounded in the Glta, is seen to be more valuable and more consistent with fundamental principles, than the Western Materialistic or Intuitionist philosophies, as will be apparent from the comparative examination of these different principles made by me later on in the fifteenth chapter. But, before coming to that subject, I shall deal with one important part of the explanation of the import of the Glta, •which still remainB to be dealt with.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE PATH OF DEVOTION.

( BHAKTI-MARGA ).

aarva dharman parilyajya warn ekam iarayam vmja\ aham tva sarvapapebhyo mokxcyisyami ma iucah. (I *

(Gl. 18.66).

I have so far dealt, from the Metaphysical point of view, with the question of how the Desireless Realisation of the identity of the Atman in all created beings, which is instilled into the body, is the foundation of the Karma- Yoga and of Release ; and of how this pure Reason is acquired by Realising the identity of the Atman and the Brahman ; and why every one must, so long as life lasts, perform the duties, which have befallen him according to his status in life, with his pure Reason. But, the subject-matter preached in the Bhagavadgita is not thereby exhausted ; because, although there is no doubt that the Realisation of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman is the only true Reality and the ideal, and that " there is nothing in the world which is equally holy " (Gl. i. 38), yet, in as much as the consideration of that subject-matter, which has been made so far, as also the path or manner of acquiring that Equability of Reason, is wholly dependent on the Reason itself, ordinary persons feel a doubt as to how one can acquire that keenness of Intelligence by which that path or manner oan be fully realised, and whether if somebody's Reason is not so keen, that man must be considered as lost ; and such a doubt is certainly not ill-founded. They say : if even the greatest of Jnanins have to say ' neti, neti ' ( i. e., 'It is not this, It is not that'— Trans.) in describing that your immortal highest Brahman (Parabrahman), which is clothed in the perishable Name-d and Form-ed Maya, how are ordinary persons like us to under- stand it ? Therefore, why should any one be found fault with

• " Give np all kinds of religiona (dharma)^ that is, means of

attaining the Paramesvara, and surrender yourself to Me alone. I shall redeem you from all sins, do not be afraid". See the explanation of the meaning of this stanza at the end of this- chapter.

THE "PATH OF DEVOTION 567

if he asks to be shown some easy path or manner, by following which this deep knowledge of the Brahman can come within the periphery of his limited receptiveness ? It is stated in the Glta and'in the Kathopanisad that though there are many who; being struck by astonishment, describe their experience of the- Atman (that is, of the Brahman), and though there are others who listen to that description, yet, no one understands that Atman ( Gi. 2. 29 ; Katha. 2. 7 ) ; and there is even a very instructive story about this in one place in the Sruti texts. In this story, there is a description that when Baskali asked Bahva the question: " My lord, explain to me, please, what the Brahman is", Bahva would not give any answer. Though Baskali repeated that question, Bahva was still silent. When- this had happened three or four times, Bahva said to Baskali : "I have been all this while giving an answer to your question, and yet you ' do not understand it. What more oan I do ? The form of the Brahman cannot be described in any way, and therefore, remaining quiet and not giving any description of it, is the truest description of the Brahman. Have yon now understood it ?" ( Ve. Su. Sam. Bha. 3. 2. 17 ). In short, how is a man possessing only an ordinary Reason to- realise this indescribable, unimaginable Parabrahman, which is absolutely different from the visible world ( drsyasrsti- wlaksaoa), and which can be described only by keeping quiet, which can be seen only after the eyes have ceased to see, and which can be Realised only after one has ceased to- Realise ? (Kena.2, 11) ; and how is a man to thereby acquire the. state of Equability and afterwards attain Release ? If there is no means except a keen intelligence for realising by- personal experience and in all its bearings, the form of the- Paramesvara described by the words "there is only one Atman in all created beings", and for thereby attaining the highest excellence, then, millions of people in the world must give up the hope of attaining the Brahman, and sit quiet; because, highly intelligent people are necessarily always few. If one says that it 'will be enough to place reliance on what these scients say, we come across numerous differences of opinion even among the scientB. Besides, if one says that it is enough to merely place such reliance, it necessarily follows that the

568 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

path of 'faith' or 'belief' is open for acquiring this recondite Knowledge, in addition to the path of Reason ; and really- speaking, it will be seen that Knowledge does not become complete or even fruitful without Religious Faith (sraddha). That all Knowledge is acquired merely by Intelligence, and that no other mental faculties are necessary for that purpose is an idle belief of certain philosophers, whose minds have become crude as a result of life-long contact with sciences based on inferential reasoning. For instance,, let us take the proposition that, ' to-morrow morning the Sun will rise again '. We think that the knowledge contained in this proposition is absolutely immutable. Why 1 Because, we and our ancestors have seen this occurrence going on uninterruptedly so long. But, if one considers the matter deeply enough, it will be seen that the fact that one and one's ancestors have so far seen the Sun rising daily can never become a reason for the Sun to rise to-morrow, that the Sun does not rise every day in order that one should see it rise, nor because one sees it rise ; and that the reasons for the Sun to rise are quite different. And if the fact that you see the Sun rise every day, cannot be a reason for the Sun to rise to-morrow, what guarantee is there that the Sun will rise to-morrow ? After a particular occur- rence haB been observed to take place in the case of a particular thing for a GREAT LENGTH of TIME, concluding that that occurrence will continue in future PERMANENTLY is a kind of Faith; and although we may give it the high sounding name of 'inference', yet, it must be borne in mind that this inference is not an inference based on a considera- tion of Cause and Effect, and arrived at by the Intelligence, but is fundamentally based on Faith. The inference drawn by ub that because Rama finds sugar sweet, Soma will also find it sweet, is, as a matter of fact, fundamentally of the same nature; because, though it is true that our Intelli- gence actually experiences the knowledge that sugar is sweet, yet, when we go beyond that, and say that all persons find sugar sweet, we have to combine Faith with Intelligence. In the same way, it need not be told that in order to understand the principle of Geometry, that it is possible to have two straight lines which will never touch each other, however far

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 569

•they may be extended, one has to go beyond the bounds of all

[personal experience, with the help of Faith. Besides, all the activities of the world go on with the help of inherent mental faculties like Faith, Love etc., and Intelligence does nothing beyond controlling these mental faculties. I have explained above in the chapter on the Body and the Atman, that when once the good or bad nature of any particular thing has been ascertained by the Intelligence, the further execution of that decision has to be carried out with the help of the Mind or of the mental faculties. Therefore, in order to perfect the knowledge which has been acquired by Intelligence, and in

•order that that knowledge should be translated by means of the Intelligence into behaviour and action, such knowledge has always to Tely on Faith, Kindness, Affection, Love of Duty, and other inherent mental tendencies; and that knowledge which does not rely on the help of these mental tendencies after they have been awakened and purified, must be looked upon as bare, incomplete, perversely inferential, and barren or immature. Just as the bullet in a gun oannot be fired without the help of gunpowder, so also can the knowledge acquired merely by Intelligence not redeem any one without the help of mental qualities like Love, Faith, etc.; and this principle was fully known to our ancient Bsis. For example, it is stated in the Chandogya that in order to prove to Svetaketu that , the imperceptible and subtle Parabrahman is the fundamental cause of the visible world, his father, asked him to bring the •fruit of a banian tree (vata-vrksa), and to see what was inside. When Svetaketu had cut open that fruit and seen inside, he

said : "there are innumerable minute seeds or grains inside."

When his father again said to him : " take one of those seeds, and tell me what is inside it ", Svetaketu replied : " I see nothing inside the seed ". To that his father replied : "0 my

•son, this tremendous banian tree (vata-vrksa) has sprung from that nothing which you see inside" ; and his father has

lultimately said to him, " iraddJiasva ", i. e., "put faith in this", that is, "do not merely keep this idea in your Mind, and say 'yes' to my face, but go beyond it ; in short, let this principle be impressed on your heart, and let it be translated into your

■actions" (Chan. 6. 12). If Faith is ultimately necessary in

570 GlTA-EAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

order to obtain the definite knowledge that the Sun is going to rise to-morrow morning, then it undoubtedly follows that after having gone by the cart-road of Intelligence as far as possible for completely Realising the eternal, unending, all-causing, all-knowing, independent, and vital Principle, Which is the root of the entire universe, one has to go further, at least to some extent, by the foot-path of Faith and Affection. That woman whom a man looks upon as venerable and worshipful, because she is his mother, is looked upon by others as an ordinary woman, or according to the scientific camouflage of words of Logicians, she is "garbhadharanaprasawdi stritva- samajiyamcchedakavaechinriavyaktivisesah. Prom this simple example, one can easily understand the difference brought about. by pouring the Knowledge acquired by mere inference, into' the mould of Faith and Affection ; and for this very reason, it is stated in the Glta that "the most excellent Karma-Yogin from among all, is the one who has Faith" (Gi 6.47); and, as has been stated above, there is also a theorem of the Philosophy of the Absolute Self that, " acinlyah khalu ye bliaw-h na tarns tarkeria dntayet ", i. e., "the form of those objects which,. being beyond the organs, cannot be imagined, should not be determined merely by the help of inference ".

If the only difficulty were that the qualityless Parabrah- man is difficult to Realise for ordinary persons, then, that difficulty could be overcome by Faith or confidence, though there- might be a difference of opinion among the intelligent persons ; because, in that case we could judge for ourselves which of these intelligent persons was more reliable, and put faith in bis statements (Gi. 13. 25). In logic, this course is known as. ' upta-vacana-pramaria ' (i. e., "belief in the statements of a credible person" — Trans.), 'apta' means a reliable person. If we look at the affairs of the world, we see that hundreds of persons carry on their activities, relying on the statements of trustworthy persons. There will be very few persons who will be in a position to explain scientifically why two into five is equal to ten and not seven, or why when a second figure one is placed after the first figure one, we get eleven, and not two. Nevertheless, the affairs of the world are going on in the belief by Faith that these statements-

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 571

are true. We will oome aoroas very few persona who will have an actual personal knowledge of the fact whether the height of the Himalayas is five miles or ten miles ; yet, if some one asks us what the height of the Himalayas is, the figure of " 23000 feet ", learnt by heart by us in school from books on Geography at once escapes from our lips I Then, if some one says to us : ' describe the nature of the Brahman \ what is the objection to our saying : ' it is qualityless '? Although the ordinary man in the street may not have sufficient intelligence to investigate into whether or not it is really qualityless, and to discuss the pros and cons, yet, Faith is not such a quality that it is possessed only by persona of the highest intelligence. Even the most ignorant man has no dearth of faith, and if he carries on all his numerous affairs with the help of Faith, there is not the slightest difficulty in the way of his believing by Faith that the Brahman is qualityless. Even if one considers the history of the doctrine of Release, it will be seen that even before Jnanins had come to the conclusion that the Brahman is qualityless, after having analysed its nature and form, man had by Faith come to the conclusion that there was, at the bottom of the created universe, some Principle far different from and stranger than the perishable and mutable things in the world, Which was eternal, immortal, independent, omnipo- tent, omniscient, and all-pervasive ; and he had been worship- ping it in some form or other. It is true that he could not at that time explain or justify this Knowledge ; but even in the Material sciences, the rule is that the experience comes first, and the explanation or justification of it comes afterwards. For instance, before Bhaskaracarya discovered the principle of gravity of the earth, and ultimately Newton discovered the principle of gravity of the entire universe, the fact that the fruit from a tree falls down to the earth, was known to every one from times immemorial. The same argument applies to Metaphysics. It is true that the purpose of Intelligence is to analyse the Knowledge which has been acquired by Faith, and to give an explanation of it ; but though a proper explanation of that Realisation is not forthcoming, it cannot, on that account, he said that the Knowledge which haa been acquired by Faith is a mere illusion.

572 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

If it were enough, merely to believe that the Brahman is qualityless, there is no doubt that that could be done merely by Faith as stated above (GI. 13. 25). But, as has been stated at the end of the ninth chapter, the bare Realisation that the Brahman is qualityless, is not enough to enable a person to reach his highest ideal in this world, namely, the Brahnu state or the state of the Siddha (Perfect). That Knowledge must be made to permeate the heart and the bodily organs by means of intense practice and continual habit, and the Realisation of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman must become an inherent nature, by means of constant behaviour consistent with that idea ; and the only way for achieving that result is to imbibe the nature and form of the Paramesvara by Love, and to make one's mind uniform with the Paramesvara. This measure or method has been in vogue in our country from times immemorial, and it is known as "Worship {upasaim) or Devotion ibhakti). The Sandilya-SStra defines ' Bhakti ' as : "sa (bhaktih) paranuraktir Iivare", i.e., ' Kiakti ' is the ' para,' that is, the most intense love towards the Isvara " ( San. Su. 2 ). ' para ' does not mean only ' most intense '; but it must also be purposeless (wirhetuka), that is, it must not be for this or that purpose, but unselfish and immutable. It is stated in the Bhagavata-Purana that it must be " ahetukya. vyavahita ya bhaktih purusottame " (Ma. Bha. 3. 29. 12) ; becausei when the Devotion is purposeful (sdhetuka), and the man says : ■" 0, God ! give me a particular thing," it, to some extent, acquires a mercenary appearance like the Desireful Vedic sacrificial ritual. When Devotion thus becomes mercenary or rajasa, one does not thereby acquire purification of the Mind ; and if the purification of the Mind is not complete, Metaphysic- al excellence or the obtaining of Release is to that extent prejudiced. As the principle of total desirelessness, which is part of the philosophy of the Highest Self (adhyatma-sastra), thus also finds a place in the Path of Devotion, the Gita has divided the devotees of the Blessed Lord into four classes, and has stated that the Devotee, who worships the Paramesvara, ' artharthV, that is, ' with some particular motive', is of a lower order, and the Jiianin, who like Narada and otherg, worships the Blessed Lord merely as a matter of duty, like other desireless

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 57?

Actions, though he has Realised the Paramesvara and has, therefore, nothing more to obtain (Gi. 3. 18) is the most excellent of all (Gi. 7. 16-18). This Devotion is of nine kinds according to the Bhagavata-Purana as follows t-

smvanam kirtanam visrioh smaranam padasevamm I arcanath vandanani dasyam sakhyant atmanivedanam U

(Bhag. 7. 5. 23).

(that is : " listening to the praise of Visnu, praising' Him, thinking of Him, serving at His feet, worshipping Him, bowing down hefore Him, being His slave, loving Him, and dedicating oneself to Him " — Trans.) ; and in the Bhakti-Sutra by Harada, it is divided into eleven classes. But, as all these kinds of Devotion have been described in detail in the Dasabodha and other Marathi books,, I will not further discuss them here. Whatever may be the nature of the Devotion, it is clear that the ordinary purpose of Devotion, namely, of cultivating an intense and Desireless love for the Paramesvara, and forming one's mental tendencies accordingly, must be carried out by every man with the help of his Mind ; because, as has been explained by me above in the sixth chapter, the internal organ of Intelligence does nothing beyond deciding between what is good or bad, righteous or unrighteous, and performable or unperformable ;. and all the other mental functions have to be carried out by the Mind itself. Therefore, we now arrive at the Dual 1 division, (i) the Mind, and (ii) the object of worship, that is to say, the object which is to be loved ; but that most excellent form of the Brahman, which has been advocated in the Upanisads, is beyond the organs, imperceptible, eternal, qualityless, and ' ehimevadvitiyam. ' (i. e., ' one alone, without a second' — Trans.) ; and'therefore, one cannot start one's worship with the Brahman. Because, when one Bealises this excellent form of the Brahman, the Mind does not any more remain a separate entity, and, as has been stated before in the chapter on the Philosophy of the Absolute Self, the worshipper and the worshipped, or the Knower I jnata) and the Knowable (jaeya) both become uniform. The qualityless Brahman is the ultimate ■ goal, it is not the means to be employed for reaching the goal ;.

574 GITA- RA r TA STA OB KARMA-YOGA

and unless the mind acquires, by some means or other, the capacity of becoming unified with the qualityless Brahman, one cannot personally get a vision of this excellent form of the Brahman. Therefore, the Form of the Brahman which has to be taken for the Devotion or Worship to be performed, as a means of Realising the Brahman, is of the second order, that is to say, it is the qnalityful (sagum/ form, which can be Realised by the Mind, on account of the difference between the worshipper and the worshipped ; and therefore, wherever the worship of the Brahman has been prescribed in the Upanisads, the Brahman to be worshipped has been described as qnalityful, notwithstanding that it is imperceptible. For example, although that Brahman, of which the worship has been prescribed in the Saniflya-Vidya, is imperceptible, that is, formless, yet, it is stated in the Chandogyopanisad, that it must possess existence (salya-samkalpaj, and also all such faculties as smelling (gandha), tasting (ram), and acting (karma), which are perceptible to the Mind (Chan. 3. 14). Although the Brahman to be worshipped is in this case qnalityful, yet, it is impercept- ible (avtjdkta), that is, formless (rtirakara). But, the natural formation of the human Mind is such that man finds it extremely difficult, or almost impossible, to love or to make his mind uniform, by meditation and concentration, with an object from even among the qnalityful objects, which is imperceptible, that is, which, having no definite form, smell, etc., is, on that account, not cognisable by the organs. Because, as the Mind is naturally restless, it cannot understand on what to con- centrate itself, unless it has before itself, by way of support, some steady object, which is perceptible to the organs. If this mental act of concentration is found difficult even by Jfianins. how much more so then by ordinary people ? There- fore, just as in teaching Geometry one has to draw on a slate or on a board, by way of sample, a small portion of a line, in order to impress on the Mind the nature of a straight line, which, though in itself eternal, endless, and hreadthless. that is to say. imperceptible, is yet qualityful, because it possesses the quality of length, so also, ordinary people at least have got to keep before the mind, some perceptible object, which has a 1 pratyaksa ' (visible) Name and Form, in order that they

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 575

■should acquire affection for and make their minds uniform with the Paramesvara, Who is the cause of everything, omnipotent, and omniscient, that is to say, qualityful, but who is yet formless, that is to say, imperceptible ( avyakta ). * Nay, unless some perceptible thing has been seen, the human mind cannot conceive the idea of the Imperceptible, For instance, it is only after one has seen by one's own eyes the perceptible colours red, green etc., that the common and dmperceptible idea of 'colour' comes into existence in the human mind, and not otherwise. You may call this the natural quality or the defect of the human mind. Whatever may be the case, so long as the embodied human being cannot <get rid of this mental quality, there is no other way except to descend from the Qualityless into the Qualityful, and into the ^Perceptible Qualityful rather than the Imperceptible Quality- ful, for purposes of Worship (upasana) or Devotion (bhakti). Therefore, the path of worshipping the Perceptible, has been •in vogue since times immemorial, and ultimately in Upanisads like the Bama-tapanlya and others, the worship of the percep- tible form of the Brahman, in the shape of human beings, is mentioned ; and in the Bhagavadgita also, this doctrine has heen reiterated in the following logical form : —

kleso 'dhikataras tesam avyaktasaktacetasam | avyakta hi gatir duhkltan dehavadbhir avapyaie It

( GI. IS. 5 ). "that is, " that man who wishes to concentrate his Mind ( Oitta) on the Imperceptible {avyakta), suffers much; because, to the

• In this matter, the following stanza is mentioned as being

from the Yoga-Va9istha :

ah;aravagamalabdhaye yatha sthulavartula-

dffatparigrahah \ suddhabuddhaparilabdhaye tatha daru-

mrnmayaiilamayarcanam II that is, "as pieces of stonB are arranged (before a child), in order to acquaint it with letters, so are idols of wood, or earth, or stone "taken, in order to acquire knowledge of the pure and knowledgeful Parabrahman ". This stanza, however, is not to be found in the Toga-Vaaistha.

576 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

human being, clothed in a body and organs, it is inherently difficult to reach this state of the Imperceptible ". This- path of ' visible experience ' is known as the " Path of Devotion ". When onoe the form of the Parabrahman has been, defined by means of the Intelligence, concentrating the mind on Its imperceptible form by means of thought, will be possible- for an intelligent person ; not that it is impossible; but in as much as this act of attaching the 'Mind' on the Imperceptible, has to be accomplished by the help of Faith or Affection, one does not escape the necessity of Faith and Affection 1 in this path. Therefore, from the philosophical point of view, even- the worship of the saccidananda Brahman (the Brahman which: is eternal, conscious, and joyful), must be included in the Path of Devotion, which is founded on Love. Nevertheless, as the- form of the Brahman, which is taken for purposes of medita- tion in this path, is essentially imperceptible, and is accessible- only to the Reason, that is, only to Jfiana, and is the most important factor, it is usual not to refer to this path as the Path of Devotion, but as Contemplation of the Absolute Self, (adhyatma-vicam), the Worship of the Imperceptible {avyaktopa- sana) or simply Worship (upamna), or the PATH OF KNOW- LEDGE ; and although the Brahman which is worshipped is- Tequired to be qualityful, yet, if one takes a perceptible,, instead of an imperceptible form, and especially a human form, for worship, that makes it the PATH OF DEVOTION. But, it will be clearly seen, that (i) though the paths may be two, yet since one attains the same Paramesvara, and ultimately acquires Equability of Reason by either path, these two paths are eternal stair-cases for rising to the same floor, which are used by different persons according to their respective qualifications; and that (ii) the ideals do not become different because the paths are different. Out of these, the first step of the one staircase is Intelligence, whereas the first step of the other staircase is Faith and Love ; and whichever path is followed, the man acquires the same kind of Realisation of the same Paramesvara, and attains the same Release, Therefore, the doctrine that, "there is no salvation unless it is based on actually experienced Knowledge", is common to both the paths. Then, where is the sense of entering into the futile discussioa

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 577

as to whether the Path of Knowledge is superior or the Path of Devotion is superior ? Though these two paths are at first different having regard to the qualification of the man, they are ultimately of the same value in effeot, and are both called ' Adhyatma ' (the Philosophy of the Absolute Self) in the GIta (Gi. 11. 1). But although Knowledge and Devotion are of the same value as means ( sadhana ), yet, there is this important difference between .the two, that whereas Devotion can never become a Nistha, Knowledge can become a Nistha, that is, the highest stage in the State of Perfection (siddhavastha). It is true that one can get the same Knowledge of the ParameSvara. by means of Devotion, as by means of the Contemplation of the Absolute Self, or the Worship of the Imperceptible (Gi. 18. 55) ; but if, after having acquired this Knowledge,. the man gives up worldly life and remains steeped in the Knowledge, the GIta calls him a ' Jnana-nistha ' and not a ' Bhakti-nistha.' As the process of Devotion is based on the duality of the worshipper and the worshipped, no Devotion or any other kind of worship survives in the ultimate state of the merger of the Atman into Brahman. The ultimate resolu- tion of Devotion is into Knowledge ; Devotion is a means for acquiring Knowledge, it is not a goal in itself. In short, Knowledge becomes a means, as meaning the worship of the Imperceptible ; whereas, it becomes a Nistha, that is, an ultimate state, as meaning the direct Realisation of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman ; and when it is necessary to make this difference clear, the two words ' Jnana- marga ' and ' Jnana-nistha ' are not used synonymously, but the word ' Jnana-marga ' is used to indicate the worship of the Imperceptible in its preparatory stages, and the word ' Jnana-nistha ' is used to indioate the State of Perfection {siddhavastha), which consists of ^giving up all Aotion after Acquisition of Knowledge, and becoming 'engrossed in Knowledge. That is to say, Jnana once becomes a 'means (Jfiana-marga), in the sense of the Worship of the Imperceptible (avyaktopasana), or the Meditation on th& Absolute Self (adhyatma-vicara) ; and it becomes a Nistha, that is to say, the ultimate state of Abandonment of Action, in the sense of a Direct Realisation (aparoksanubhava) ; andthe 73 — 74.

578 GlTA-BAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

same is the case with Karma. That Karma (Action) which has to be initially performed according to the limits laid down by the Sastras for the purification of the Mind is a means (sadhana). By this Karma, the Mind becomes purified and Knowledge and Peace are ultimately acquired; but when, instead of remaining Bteeped in this Knowledge, the man continues to perform Desireless Action peacefully, so long as life laBts, this Desireless Action combined with Knowledge is a Karma which becomss a Nistha, (Gl. 3. 3). But, the same is not the case with Devotion. Devotion is only a path, tliat is to say, it is a means of acquiring Knowledge ; it is not a Nistha. Therefore, in the beginning of the Glta, only the two NisthSs of Jnana (Samkhya) and Yoga (Karma) have been dealt with ; and in mentioning the various means, ways, ritual, or paths of acquiring the Karma-Yoga-Nistha, out of the two (Gl. 7, 1), the Glta has described the two sister paths of the Worship of the Imperceptible (Jfiana-marga) and the Worship of the Perceptible (Bhakti-marga), which have been in vogue from times immemorial, and states that the Worship of the i Imperceptible out of the two is fraught with difficulty, whereas the Worship of the Perceptible, or Devotion, is a path which is easier, that is, is such as can be followed by every body ; or as Tukarama has said : " if you want to reach the Paramesvara 1 then this is the easier path II " (Ga. 3002). The ancient Upanisads deal with the Jfiana-marga (the Path of Knowledge) and the Sandilya-Sutra and other Sutras or the Bhagavata, and other works, praise the Path of Devotion ; but no ancient religious treatise is seen to have differentiated between the Jfiana-marga and the Bhakti-marga as two paths, according to the qualification of the person, and to have ultimately harmonised both of them with the Path of Desireless Action, as has been impartially done in the Glta.

If one considers, as mentioned above, what should be done by man, who is embodied in a Body and organs, in order to acquire the true and self -experienced Knowledge of the .form of the Isvara, to the effect that there is only one Paramesvara in all created beings, one comes to the conclusions that, (i) although the eternal, inexpressible, and unimaginable form of the Paramesvara, which can be described only by the

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 579

■words " It is not this, It is not this " (' neti, neti '), is the most superior form, yet, as it is QUALITYLESS, UNKNOWABLE, AND IMPERCEPTIBLE, the Dualistio difference of the worshipper and the worshipped does not remain any more when it has been Realised ; that, (ii) therefore, worship (upasaria) •cannot start with that form ; that, (iii) that form is something which is to be reached, and not the means of reaching it ; and 'that, (iv) worship (upasana) is a means for acquiring the Non- Dualistic state of becoming uniform with that form. There- fore, that object which has to be taken for this worship, has necessarily to be a qualityful object. The all-knowing, omni- potent, all-pervading, and uncircumscribed form of the Brahman is such a form, that is, a QUALITYFUL form. But, as such a form is ACCESSIBLE ONLY TO THE INTELLIGENCE, AND IMPERCEPTIBLE, that is, not perceptible to the organs, it is a difficult form for purposes of worship. Therefore, in all religions, man is seen to naturally adopt for purposes of ' Devotion ', in preference to both these forms, that sympathetic and easily accessible QUALITYFUL, LOVE-EARNED, PERCEPTIBLE, and VISIBLE Parame- svara, Who, notwithstanding that He is the unimaginable, omnipresent, all-pervading, and all-powerful Self of the whole world, will yet speak with us, love us, place us on the path of righteousness, and lead us to a happy state ; Whom we oan call our own ; Who will be sympathetic towards our pain and .happiness, and forgive our sins ; with referenoe to Whom we can establish the direct relation that He is ours, and we are His ; Who will protect us like a father ; Who will be a mother to us; or Who will be " gatir bharta prabhuh salcsi nivasah saravwh mhrt" (Gl, 9. 17 and 18), i.e., "our goal, our maintainor, our owner, our companion, our home of protection and rest, our ultimate support and hope, our friend and our protector"; and Whom we can, on that account, realise by love and caressingly ; and Who is truthful, endowed with all glory, the ocean of kindness, the lover of His devotees, tb.B holy of holies, the height of magnanimity, the height of kind- ness, the most revered, the height of beauty, and the home of all qualities. These two last kinds of the form of the fundamentally unimaginable and ' one only, without a second '

580 GlTi-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

Parabrahman, which aie visible to man by means of the mental spectacles of Love, Devotion, etc., are, in Vedanta philosophy, given the technical name of 'Isvara.' If the Paramesvara is all-peivading, why has Pandurahga or Vithoba. a dimitautive form ? To this question, the answer given by; Tukarama is :-

Tuka says that although the Hari is

all-pervading and only one i He has become small for purposes of Devotion Hi

(GS. 38.7); and the same doctrine has been expounded in the Vedanta- Sutras (1. 2. 7). Even the Upanisads, in describing the worship of the Brahman, do not mention only, Life, Mind, and other qualityful, but purely imperceptible things, but they at the same time mention the worship of qualityful, perceptible objects like the Sun (adityd) or the food, etc. (Tai. 3.26 ; Chan. 7); and in the Svetasvataropanisad, after describing the ' Isvara ' as: " rriayam tu prakrtim vidyat mayinam tu malmvaram" (Sve. 4. 10), that is, " Maya is the name given to Matter fprakrti), and the Lord of this Maya is the highest Tsvara {mahesvara)" , the qualityful Isvara is further described as: "jftatoa detain mucyate sarvapasaih", that is, " by knowing this god (dew), one becomes free from all.bonds" (Sve. 4. 16) — which is more or less the same as in the Glta. The Name-d and Form-ed object necessary for purposes of worship as the symbol, sign, incarnation, particle, or representation of the worshipped Parabrahman, is known in Vedanta philosophy as a ' pratilca '. The etymological meaning of ' praiika ', is prati+~ ika, that is, ' one, who is turned, towards (prati) ourselves '; and that side or portion of any particular object, which first becomes perceptible to us, and whereby we subsequently obtain a knowledge of it, is called 'pratika'. Accordingto this meaning, any perceptible side, part, or particular incarnation of the all-pervading Paramesvara can become a ' prutika' for acquiring His Knowledge. For instance, in the conversation between the Brahmin and the VySdha (hunter), the Vyadha, after explaining the Knowledge of the Absolute Self to the Brahmin, says in the end: "pratyaksam mamayo dharmas tarn ca pasya dvijottama" (Vana. 213. 3), i. e„ "Omost

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 581

-excellent among Brahmins, now see my visible religion" ; and he then takes the Brahmin to his aged parents and says, "these are my 'visible deities', and serving them with all my heart and soul, as if they are the Paramesvara, is my 'visible' (pratyakaa) religion " ; and even in the Glta, the Blessed Lord has, before mentioning the worship of His perceptible form, said with the same object, that this Path of Devotion is :

rajavidya rajaguhyam pavitram idam uttamam I pratyaksavagamam dharmyam susukham kartutn avyayam II

(GI. 9. 2), '

'that is, "the most superior among all Vidyag and all mysticisms, (raja-vidya and raja-guhya), excellent, sacred, literally VISIBLE, consistent with Religion, easily observable, and inexhaustible". The two compound words 'raja-vidya,' and 'raja-guhya' are analysed as : 'vidyanam raja' (sovereign of all cults) and 'guhyanam raja' (the sovereign among ail mysticisms) ; and in forming the compound, the word 'raja' tb placed first according to the rules of Sanskrit grammar. But instead of this, some people analyse the word 'raja-vidya' as 'rajfiam vidya' (the cult of kings), and say that, when in ancient times Rsis (ascetics) used to explain the Brahma- Vidya to icings, as stated in the Yoga-Vasistha (Yo. 2. 11. J.6-18), this Brahma-Vidya or Knowledge of the Absolute Self came to acquire the names of 'raja-mdya' and 'raja-guhya' ; and that therefore, the Glta must be taken to have used these two words in the same meaning, that is, as meaning not Devotion, but the Knowledge of the Absolute Self. As the path mentioned in the Gita was traditionally followed by kings, such -as, Manu, Iksvaku etc, (Gi. 4.1), one cannot definitely say that .^he words 'raja-vidya' and 'raja-guhya' have not been used in "the Gits in the meaning of 'the cult of kings' or the 'mysticism of kings', that is to say, the cult or the mysticism, which was accepted by kings (raja-manya). But, if these meanings are accepted, it has still to be borne in mind that they have not been used in the present context with reference to the Path of Knowledge; beoause this chapter of the Glta in which this stanza appears is, on the whole, in support of the Path of Devotion (See GI. 9. 22-31) ; and although the Brahman to be

GlTA-RAHABYA OB KABMA-YOGA

reached may be the game, yet, in as much as it is clearly stated in the GltS itself (Gl. 12. 5), that the Jnana-mirga to be f ollowedt as a means, in the philosophy of the Absolute Self, is 'accessible only to the Intelligence' (buddhigamya), and therefore 'imper- ceptible' {avyokta) and 'difficult' {duKkharkaraka}, it is not likely that the Blessed Lord can now refer to that same path as 'pratyakwvagamam', that is, 'perceptible', and 'kartum smukharrf (easy to follow). It, therefore, follows, on the ground of consis- tency in the subject-matter of the chapter, as also on the ground of the appropriateness of the words 'pratyaksamgantnM and 'kartum susukhatn', which can apply wholly and on all fours to the Path of Devotion, that the word 'raja-widya' in this context indicates only the Path of Devotion. The word 'vidya' does not indicate only 'the Knowledge of the Brahman' ; and. it has been used in the Upanisads to indicate 'the means or oaths by which that Knowledge can be acquired', e. g., Sandilya-Vidya, Prana-Vidya, Harda- Vidya, etc.; and all such various Vidyas, or paths, which have been mentioned in the- Upanisads, have been considered in the third section of the third chapter of the Vedanta-SQtras. It also appears from the Upanisads, that these Vidyas were kept secret, and that in ancient times they used to be taught to no one except one's disciples. Therefore, whatever the Vidya was, it was bound' to be mystic (guhya). But, although these various mystie Vidyas or paths, which were a means for the Acquisition of the Brahman, were many, yet, among all of these means, the Vidya in the shape of the Path of Devotion men- tioned in the Glta, was the highest ('guhyanam vidyanam cct raja', i. e., the king of mysticisms and Vidyas— Trans.); because, this path is not 'avyakta' (imperceptible) like the Vidya in the Jnana-marga, but is actually visible to the eyes,. and, on that account, easy to follow. This is how I read that stanza. If the Glta had supported only the Path of Knowledge, which is accessible only to the Intelligence, it is doubtful, whether all the sects of the Vedic Religion would have clung, to this treatise, as has been done by them during the last hundreds of years. The sweetness, affectionateness, and. charm, which permeates the Glta is due to its having propounded the Path of Devotion. The Blessed Lord Sri Krsna,

THE PATH OP DEVOTION 58$,

who was the living incarnation of the Parameavara, was, in the first place, the person who sung the Glta ; and further, instead of preaching the barren Knowledge of the unknowable Parabrahman, the Blessed Lord has given advice in the Glta to Arjuna in different places like : " every thing is invested in ME " (7. 7) ; " all this is MY Maya " (7. 14) ; "there is nothing which is different from ME" (7. 7); "to ME friends and enemies are alike" (9. 29); "I have created this universe " (9. 4) ; and ultimately, " I am the root of the Brahman and of Release * (14. 27) ; or " I am the Purusottama " (15, 18) ; and therefore, " give up all other religions and worship only ME, I will redeem you from all sins, do not be afraid " (18. 66) which is advice, which refers in the first person to His qualityful and perceptible form. On this account, the hearer gets the feeling that he is actually standing before a living, equal-visioned, extremely affectionate, and most reverential Purusottama ; and his Nlstha becomes fired on the Knowledge of the Atman. But this is not all ; for, instead of dividing the chapters severally between Jnana on the one hand, and Devotion on the other, Jnana is amalgamated with Devotion, and Devotion is amalgamated with Jnana, so that there is no- mutual conflict between Knowledge and Devotion, or between Intelligence and Love ; and one experiences the sweetness of the Knowledge of the Paramesvara, while at the same time acquiring that Knowledge ; and the feeling of Self-Identifica- tion with all living beings being aroused in the Mind, it acquires the most wonderful peaoe and the bliss of content, The Karma-Yoga is further tacked on to this, like adding sugar to milk ; then, what is the wonder that our philosophers have laid down the proposition that the Knowledge expounded in the Gila is, as is said in the Isavasyopanisad, beneficial both in 'mrtyu' and 'amrta', that is, both in this world and the. next ?

Prom what has been stated above, my readers will have understood what is meant by the Path of Devotion, what is the* similarity and the dissimilarity between the Path of Know- ledge and the Path of Devotion, why the Path of Devotion is called the royal path (the royal Vidya) or the easy ladder, and also why, the Path of Devotion has not been referred to as an

584 GlTi-BAHASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

independent Nistha in the Glta. But, it is now necessary to point out a position of danger, which exists in this easy, long- standing, and visible path of acquiring Knowledge ; otherwise, there is a chance that an anwary wayfarer along the roadi may fall into that pit. This pit-fall has been clearly defined in the Bhagavadgltl, and that is the important point of difference between the Vedic Path of Devotion and other paths of Devotion, Although it is generally accepted that, in order that the human Mind should become attached to the Para- brahman, and that a man should acquire an equable 'Reason by means of the purification of the Mind, there must be seme oualityM and perceptible object as a symbol (pratlkti of the Parabrahman in front of the Devotee, and that otherwise, the Mind cannot become steady, yet, as will be clear from history, there are grave disputes about what that symbol should be. From the Metaphysical point of view, there is no place in the world where the Paramesvara does not exsist ; and even in the Bhagavadgita, after Arjuna had asked Sri Krsna the following ■question, namely, "tell me which various objects I should meditate on, as being Your Manifestations" (Gl. 10. 18), the Blessed Lord has, in the tenth chapter, mentioned the Mind out of all organs, the Himalayas out of all immoveables, the Yajfia by way of repetition of prayers out of all Yajnas, Visuki among the serpents, Prahlada among the demons> Aryama among the ancestors, Citraratha among the Gandharvas, the pipal-tree out of all trees, the eagle among the birds, Bhrgu out of the great Rsis, the letter ' A ' out of all letters, and Vianu out of all the various Suns, as being the numerous forms of Himself, which fill the moveable and the immoveable world on all sides ; and He has ultimately said - yad yad vtbhutimat satlvarn inrmd urjitam em va l tat tad evavagaecha tvam mum tejomsasambhawm II

(Gl. 10. 41). that is, "O, Arjuna understand that all things which are possessed of excellence, wealth, or prowess, are created from a part of My effulgence; what more shall I say? I have pervaded the whole of this universe by only a part of Myself ">' and He has given to Arjuna an actual experience of this

• THEJPATH OF DEVOTION 585

.proposition, by showing to him His Cosmic Form in the next chapter. If all the things or qualities to be seen in the world are only forms or symbols of the Paramesvara, how can one gay ' ■that the Blessed Lord is in one of them and not in another ; and who is going to say it ? It becomes logically neoessary to say that He is near and yet afar ; existent and yet non- existent, also beyond both ; the eagle, as also the serpent ; the • death, as also the one who dies ; the one who creates obstacles, and the one who removes them ; the one who creates fear, and . one who removes it ; the terrible and yet the not-terrible ; the pleasant and yet the unpleasant ; the one who causes the rain, and the one who prevents rain from falling (Gi. 9. 19 and 10. 32) ; and Tukarama Buva, a devotee of the Blessed Lord, has with the same import said :-

Tuka says whatever name you give I such jiame is proper for this Viththala II

(Tu. Ga. 3065.4).

ilf everything in this world is in the same way in part a form ■of the Paramesvara, why should not such persons as cannot at a stroke grasp this all-pervasive form of the Paramesvara, take for worship, in the beginning, any one of these numerous things, as a means or a symbol for Realising this .imperceptible and pure form ? Some may worship the Mind, •others may perform the Yajna of wealth, others again the Yajna of prayer, some may worship the eagle, others may worship only the Sacred symbol ' OM ', some may worship Visnu and others Siva, some may worship Ganapati, and -others Bhavani, some again may look upon their parents as

the Paramesvara and serve them, whereas others might choose

for worship a form which is much more comprehensive, such as rthe Virata form made up of all created beings. One may prescribe the worship of the Sun, whereas others may say that Sri Krsna or Sri Ramaoandra is better than the Sun. But, as the idea that all these Forms are fundamentally one and the same, has been lost sight of, as a result of Ignorance or Delusion, or as it is not to be found at all in some religions, a false arrogance sometimes arises as to the relative merits of rthese objects of, worship, and matters i come to physioal

586 GIM.-R4HASYA OB KARMA.-YOGA

violence. If one for the moment keeps out of consideration! the mutual conflicts between the Vedic, Buddhistic, Jain, Christian, or Mahomedan religions, the history of Europe- shows us that matters had come to the point of the worshippers of one and the same qualityful and perceptible Christ, murdering each other, as a result of difference in ritualistic practices ; and quarrels are even now going on among the worshippers of the Qualityful, on the ground that the deity worshipped by one is better than the deity worshipped by another, because the former is Formless, and the latter has- a Form. Unless one explains whether there is a way for bringing these quarrels arising in the Path of Devotion to a close, and if so, which that way is, the Path of devotion does, not become free from danger; and we shall, therefore,, consider what the reply of the Glta to that question is. I needi not say that in the present state of India, it is of special importance to give a proper answer to this-question.

The methods of contemplating in the first place, or placing before one's eyes as a symbol, the form of any one of the numerous qualityful Manifestations of the Paramesvara, in OTder to acquire Equability of Reason by steadying the Mind,, have been described in the ancient Upanisads ; and ultimately in the later Upanisads like the Rama-Tapani, or the Glta, the unlimited and concentrated worship of a human-formed,, qualityful Paramesvara has been considered as the principal means of reaching the Paramesvara. But, although the worship of Vasudeva has been given an important position in the Glta, in so far as it is a means to an end, yetr considering the matter from the Metaphysical point of view, it has been stated in the Vedanta-Sutras (Ve. Su. 4. 1. 4), as also further on in the Glta itself, that a symbol (pratika) is only a kind of means, and that the true all-pervading and permanent Paramesvara cannot be limited to any one of these symbols. What more shall I say ? Whatever qualityful, that is, Name-d and Form-ed perceptible object is taken, it is nothing but Maya, and he who wishes to see the true Paramesvara, must ultimately extend his vision beyond such qualityful forms. It is clear that no manifestation, out of the many manifestations of the Paramesvara, carl be more*

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 587

comprehensive than the Cosmic Form which was shown by the- Blessed Lord to Aijuna ; yet, after this same Cosmic Form had been shown by the Blessed Lord to Marada, He has said, " this form which you see is not My true form, this is only a Mays ; and in order to see My real form, you must go beyond this May& " (see Narayanlyadharma, San. 339. 44) ; and even in the Glta, the Blessed Lord has clearly given to Arjuna the advice that :-

aoyaktam vyaktimapannam munsyanie mam abuddhayah I param bhavam ajananto mamavyayam auuttamam ii

(Gl. 7. 34), that is, " although I am imperceptible, ignorant people call Me perceptible, or endowed with a human form (Gl. 9. 11) ; but that is not My true form ; My imperceptible form is My true form". Also, although the Upanisads prescribe the Mind» the Speech, the Sun, Ether, and numerous other perceptible and imperceptible symbols of the Brahman for purposes of worship* yet, it is ultimately clearly stated, that that which is accessible to the eyes, or the speech, or the ears, is not the true Brahman, but :

yan manasa na manute yend 'hur mano matam I

lad eva brahma tvam viddhi nedafn yad idam upasate II

(Kena. 1. 5-8). that is " That, which cannot be meditated on by the Mind, but on the contrary, the power of meditation of Which includes- the Mind, is the true Brahman ; that which is worshipped (as a ' pratika ', i.e., symbol) is not the (true) Brahman " ; and the same meaning is conveyed by the canon (sutra) " neti, neti ". Take the Mind, or Ether (akaha), or according to the path of the worship of the Perceptible, take the Salagrama, or the Sivalinga, or the tangible form of Sri Krsna, or of some Saint, or take a temple which contains a stone or a metal idol of a god, or a musjid or a temple which contains no idol ; all these are mere means for steadying the Mind, that is, for fixing the Mind on the Paramesvara, like the go-carts of little children. However much these symbolB, taken by different persons according to their own liking or according to their respective spiritual qualifications, may be loved by them, like the go-carts

588 GlTA-RAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

of children, which are simple or coloured, or of sandal-wood, or to which a tambourine or a jingling bell is attached, yet, one must realise that the true Paramesvara is ' not in these symbols ' — ' na pratike na hi sah ' (Ve. Su. 4. 1. 4)-but is beyond them; and for the same reason, is the proposition laid down in the Bhagavadglta that: " those ignorant persons, who do not understand My Maya, do not Realise Me " (Gl. 7. 13-15). The .power of redemption which is contained in the Path of Devotion is not a power possessed by some living or lifeless image, or by a building of brick and mortar ; but that belief, whioh every worshipper for his own convenience holds with reference to such image, to the effect that it is the Isvara, is the thing which really redeems. LBt the symbol be of stone, or of metal, or of anything else, it can never be worth more than what it really is. Whatever may be your faith with reference to the symbol, it is the fruit of your Devotion, which the Paramesvara — not the symbol — gives you. Then, where is the sense of fighting that the symbol chosen by oneself is better ■than the one chosen by another 1 If your faith is not .pure, then, however good the symbol may be, what is the use of it 1 If the whole day you are engaged in deceiving others, .then, it will be impossible for you to attain the Paramesvara, notwithstanding that you go to worship an idol in a temple, or go for worship in some temple which does not contain any .image, and whether every morning and evening, or on feast days. Sri Samartha has described persons who go into temples for listening to sermons (purava) in the following terms t Sensual persons go to the temple for listening to the sermons I

but their eyes are fixed on the ladies who are present I At the same time, those who have come with the intention

of stealing I steal your shoes and go away -apadyale l vasudevah sarvam iti sa mahatma sudurlabhah it

(GI. 7. 19).

"that is, "bnce a man has started on the Path of Devotion, then in the next birth, if not in this birth, he will acquire the true Knowledge df the form of the Paramesvara, to the effect that 'everything is pervaded by Vasudeva'; and by the Acquisition of such Knowledge, he will ultimately attain Release". In the sixth chapter also, the Blessed Lord has said with reference to those who practise the Karma-Yoga that "anekajanma- samsiddhas tato yati paraih gatim" (6. 45) — (i. e., "acquiring success, after many births, he reaches the most superior state" — Trans.); and the same rule applies to the Path of Devotion. One should start by imagining as pure a form as it is possible for one to imagine, having regard to one's bodily nature, of that deity which one wishes to invest in the symbol. For sometime, the Paramesvara (not the idol), gives you the reward of this conviction (7. 22); but later on, there does not remain ithe necessity of any other means of purifying the mind, and

this continued Devotion to the Paramesvara, which is kept

■going according to one's spiritual qualification, results in this Faith being purified; and gradually the Realisation of the Paramesvara also goes on increasing, and ultimately the Mind acquires the belief that "vasudevah sarvam" (i. a "Vasudeva is everything" — Trans.); and there no more remains any differ- ence between the worshipper and the worshipped, and the Self ultimately becomes merged in the pure joy of the Brahman. All that is required is that the man should not give up his •efforts ; in short, the doctrine of the Glta is, that in the same way as, the moment the man acquires the desire of practising the Karma-Yoga he is drawn towards complete perfection, as though he had been put into a grinding-mill ( GI. 6. 44), so also, in the Path of Devotion, when once the Devotee has

596 GITA-RAHAYSA OR KARMA-YOGA

consigned himself to the Paramesvara, the Blessed Lord Himself gradually inoreases his Nistha, and makes him. ultimately fully realise His own form ( Gl, 7. 21; 10. 10); and that by this Knowledge (not by barren or blind Faith) the Devotee of the Blessed Lord ultimately attains Release. This state, which is ultimately acquired by gradually rising in the Path of Devotion, being the same as the ultimate state acquired by the Path of Knowledge, the description which is given in the twelvth chapter of the Gita of the ultimate state of the Devotee, is absolutely the same as the description, given, in the second chapter, of the Sthitaprajna, as will be noticed by anybody who reads those descriptions. It follows from this, that though the Path of Knowledge and the Path of Devotion are different from each other in the beginning, and though some follow the one path, and others follow the other path according to their own qualifications, yet, both these paths ultimately come together, and the Devotee acquires the same state as is acquired by the Jfianin. The difference between these two paths is that in the Path of Knowledge, Knowledge is acquired from the very beginning by Reason ; whereas, in the Path of Davotion, that same Knowledge is acquired by means of Faith. But, the Blessed Lord says that this initial difference disappears later on, and—

sraddhavan labhate jnanam tat parah samyatendriyah I jfianavi labdhva param santim aciremdhigacchati II

(Gl. 4. 39).

that is, "if the man who is filled with Devotion pursues Knowledge by controlling the organs, he gets the practical personal experience of the Knowledge of the identity of the Atman and the Brahman, and he soon thereafter acquires, complete Peace by means of such Knowledge " ; or—

bhaktya mam abhijanati yavan yas casmi tatvatah l tato mam tatvato jnatva visate tad anantaram II

(Gl. 18. 55).

that is, " by means of Davotion, one acquires the philosophical knowledge of who ' I ', the Paramesvara, am, and how much I am ; and after this Knowledge has been acquired (not bef ore),.

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 597

"the Devotee comes to be merged in Me" (See Gl, 11. 54).

• There is no third way except these two ways for acquring

the fullest knowledge of the Paramesvara. Therefore, that man who does not possess in himself either Intelligence or Devotion, may, as has been stated further on in the Gita itself, ■be considered as totally lost: "ajflas cairaddadhanas ca samsayatma vinasyati" (Gl. 4. 40).

To the doctrine that, by Faith and Devotion a man ■ultimatejy acquires a complete Realisation of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman, some logicians have raised an objection to the following effect, namely : if the Path of Devotion starts with the Duality that the worshipper is different from the worshipped, how will the person ultimately realise the Non-Dualistic Knowledge of the identity of the Atman and the Brahman ? But this doubt is based on con- fusion of thought. If all that these objectors want to say, is that when once the Knowledge of that identity has been acquired, Devotion will, to that extent, come to an end, there is nothing wrong in that position ; because, even Metaphysics accepts the position that when the trinity of the worshipper, the worshipped, and the worship, is at an end, that which we ordinarily oall Devotion comes to an end. But, if this objection means that the Path of Devotion, which is based on Duality, can never lead to Non-Dualistic Knowledge, then this objection ■will be proved to be groundless, not only by logic, but also by the experience of well-known Devotees of the Blessed Lord There is no objection, from the point of view of logic, to the ■position that the feeling of difference gradually disappears, as the Devotion towards the Paramesvara becomes more and more steady in the heart of the Devotee ; because, even in the Brahman-world, there is no difficulty in the way of globules

• An attempt has been made in the Sandilya-Sutra to show

that Devotion is not a means of acquiring Knowledge, by emphasis- ing the word 'alhi' in this stanza, and to show that it is an independent goal' to be acquired by itself (Su. 15). But this meaning is a distorted meaning, like other doctrine-supporting interpretations; and is not a correct and straight-forward Interpretation,

598 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

of mercury becoming unified later on, though they appear as- separate entities in the beginning ; and we Bee ourselves person- ally that the process of unification, in other matters also, starts with diversity ; and it is a well-known illustration, that a worm becomes a hornet by continually contem- plating on a hornet. But, the actual experience of saints is a more convincing answer to this objection than mere logic; and among all these, I consider the practical' experience of that king among Devotees, the saint Tukarama, as of the utmost importance. No one need be told that the Knowledge of the Absolute Self (adhyatma), which had been acquired by^ the saint Tukarama, had not been acquired by him by reading treatises like the TJpanisads. Nevertheless,. in his Gatha, about 300 to 350 abhahga stanzas are devoted to the description of the state of Non-Duality ; and in those stanzas, the doctrine of "vasudevah sarvam" (Gl. 7. 19), (i.e., "Vasudeva is every thing"— Trans.), or, asstatedby Yajfiavalkya in the Brhadaranyakopanisad, "sarvam atmaivabhut" (i.e., everything has become identified with the Self "—Trans.), has been propounded, as being based on personal experience. For instance : —

As every part of jaggery is sweet I

so has God come to be everywhere I Now whom shall I worship I God is inside as also outside n

The film on the water 1 is not separate from the water l Just as gold gets a name by being made into an ornament I . Tuka says, so are we "

(Gatha. 3627)

The two first lines have been quoted by me in the chapter on the Philosophy of the Absolute Self (see p. 318 above— Trans.);. and I have shown there the complete similarity between the meaning conveyed by them and the Knowledge of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman expounded in the TJpanisads. When the saint Tukarama himself describes in this way the supreme state which is reached by the Devotee, as a matter of his own personal experience, it is strange that argumentative-

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 599

people should dare to make such foolish assertions as: "it is not possible to acquire the Knowledge of Non-Dualism by the Path of Devotion ", or, "one can attain Release by putting blind faith in the Paramesvara ; Knowledge is not necessary for that purpose".

Not only do the propositions that, ' the ultimate ideal in the Path of Devotion and in the Path of Knowledge is the same ' and that ' one ultimately attains Release by the experienced Realisation of the Paramesvara ', remain unchanged in both these Paths, but all the other doctrines, which have been mentioned either in the chapter on the Absolute Self, or in the chapter on Cause and Effect, have been left untouched in the Path of Devotion mentioned in the Gita. For example, some persons maintain that according to the Bhagavata religion, the universe was created in the following four-stepped way, namely, that Jlva in the form of the Sarhkarsana first came into being out of the Paramesvara in the form of Vasudeva ; Pradyumna, that is, the Mind, sprang from Sarhkarsana; and Aniruddha, that is, Individuation, sprang from Pradyumna, thus making a ' caturvyuha' (i. e., four steps — Trans.) ; whereas, there are others who believe that the true 'vyulia ' of the creation was of only three, or two, out of these four steps, or of Vasudeva alone. It has been proved in the Vedanta-Sutras on the authority of the Upanisads, that these ideas about the coming into existence of the Personal Self (jlva) are not correct, and that from the Metaphysical point of view, the Personal Self is an eternal portion of an eternal Paramesvara (Ve. Su. 2. 3. 17 ; and 2. 2. 42-45). Therefore, the Bhagavadglta has not accepted this idea of a four-stepped (caturvyuha) evolution as pertaining to the pure Path of Devotion, and has accepted the above-mentioned doctrine of the writers of the Vedanta-Sutras with reference to the Personal Self ( Gi. 2. 24; 8. 20; 13. 22; and 15. 7). In short, although the principles of the worship of Vasudeva and of Karma- Yoga have been adopted into the Gita from the Bhagavata religion, yet, it can be clearly seen that the Gita has not countenanced any blind or foolish ideas about the form of the Personal Self in the shape of the Atman (ksetrajna) and of the Paramatman, which are inconsistent with the Philosophy of

600 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

the Absolute Self. But, it must not be forgotten that, though the Glta is so strong on establishing a complete harmony between Devotion and the Philosophy of the Absolute Self, or between Faith and Knowledge, yet, it becomes necessary to make minor verbal changes in the doctrines of the Philosophy of the Absolute Self in adopting them into the Path of Devotion; and that, that has been done in the Glta. Some persons seem to have conceived the misunderstanding that as a result of these verbal differences between the Path of Knowledge and the Path of Devotion, there is a* mutual conflict between the various doctrines, which are enunciated in the Gita, once from the point of view of Devotion, and again from the point of view of Knowledge ; and that there are inconsistencies, to that extent, in the Glta, But, I am of opinion that these conflicts are not substantial, and that these doubts arise as a result of the doubters not having clearly understood the harmony which has been brought about by our philosophers between the Philosophy of the Absolute Self and Devotion. It is, therefore, necessary to deal in some detail with that matter heTe. As it is a doctrine of the Philosophy of the Absolute Self, that there is only Atman in the Body and in the Cosmos, which (Atman) has become clothed in a Name and Form, we say from the Metaphysical point of view that "sarvabhTdastham atmanam sarvabhutani catmani (Gl. 6. 29), i. e., "that Atman which is in Me, is also in all other created beings", or again, "idam sarvam atmaiva," i. e., "all this is the Atman"; and the saint Tukarama has with the same idea said: "Tuka says, whatever I come across 1 1 think that it is myself" II (Ga. 4444. 4). But, in the Path of Devotion, the imperceptible Paramatman takes up the form of the perceptible Paramesvara ; and therefore, we find in the chapter on Devotion in the Gita, the following propositions, instead of the above-mentioned propositions, namely, such propositions as " yo rtiam pasyaii sarmtra sarvam ca mayipasyati' (Gi. 6. 29), i. e., "I (the Blessed Lord) am in all created beings, and all created beings are in Me"; or, "vasudevah sarvam iti" (Gl. 7. 19), i. e., "Whatever is, is full of Vasudeva;" or, " sarmbhutany asesena draksasy atmanyathe mayi" (Gl. 4. 35. ), i. e., "When you have acquired Knowledge, you will see all created beings in Me, as also in

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 601

.-yourself"; and for the same reason, the Devotee of the Blessed lord has been described as follows in the Bhagavata-Purana:-

sarvabhutesu yah pasyed bhagavadbhavam atmanah l bhutani bhagavaty atmany esa bhagavatotlamah II

(Bhag. 11. 2. 45; and 3. 24. 46),

that is, "that Devotee, who does not entertain in his mind any •such differentiation that I am something different, the Blessed Lord is something different, and all other people are something ' -different, but who keeps in his mind the belief, with reference to all created beings, that he and the Blessed Lord are one .and the same, and who believes that all created beings subsist in the Blessed Lord as also in himself, is the most excellent amongst the Devotees of the Blessed Lord". Nevertheless, it will be seen that the only change which has been made is,

• that we have substituted the words 'the perceptible Parame-

svara' for the words 'the imperceptible Paramatman' from the Philosophy of the Absolute Self. As the Paramatman in the "Philosophy of the Absolute Self is imperceptible, the fact that "the entire universe is pervaded by the Atman, has been proved in that philosophy by means of logic; but as the Path of Devotion is based on personal experience, the Blessed Lord has ■now described the numerous perceptible manifestations of the Paramesvara, and He has, by endowing Arjuna with super- natural sight, now given him a visible proof of the fact that the entire universe is pervaded by the Paramesvara, (pervaded by the Atman), (Gi. chapters X and XI). In the Philosophy of the Absolute Self, He has stated that Karma is destroyed by Knowledge; but, as it is a doctrine of the Path of Devotion, •that there is nothing else in the world except the qualityful Paramesvara, and that He is Himself Knowledge as also Action, the Knower as also the Doer, and the One who causes Action as also the one who gives the Fruit of Action, there is now made no differentiation between different Actions (karma) such as, 'samcita', 'prarabdha', 'kriyamana' etc.; and it is stated "that the One "Who gives the desire to perform the Action, as also the Fruit, and the One Who destroys the bondage of the Action, is the Paramesvara alone. For instance, the saint Tukarama,

602 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

imagining himself in solitude with the Paramesvara, lovingly but fearlessly asks Him'_:

0, Pandurahga, listen to what I say I

I have to say something to You in solitude I

If I can be redeemed by my 'samcita' I then what is the use of You ? n

(Gatha, 499);

and he conveys the same meaning in another place in the- following words, namely,

Neither 'prarabdha,' nor 'Icriyamaria, I nor 'samcila' exists for the Devotee I If he sees that the Paramesvara alone has become everything I and has pervaded everything in and out II

( Gatha, 1023);

and it has been stated by the Blessed Lord even in the Bhagavadgita that "Uvarah sarvabhutamm hrddese 'rjuna Usthati" (18. 61), i. e., "the Blessed Lord Himself has His abode in the heart of all persons, and makes them do all Actions mechanically". It has been proved in the chapter on Cause and Effect, that the Atman is absolutely free to acquire Knowledge; but instead of that, there now occur statements in the chapter on Devotion, to the effect that the Eeason itself is guided by the Paramesvara, such as, "tasya tasyacalain sraddham tarn em vidadhamy aham" (Gl. 7. 21), (i. e., "Whatever form of deity any Devotee may desire to worship with Devotion, I steady his devotion thereon"— Trans.) or "dadami buddhiyogam tarn yena mam upayanli te" (GH. 10. 10), (i. e., "to them, I give' the Yoga of the (equable) Reason, to enable them to come and reach me"— Trans.);, and in as much as all the Action, which, is performed in the universe, is carried on by the authority of the Paramesvara, it is stated in the Philosophy of Devotioni that the wind blows out of dread of His anger, and that the Sun and the Moon rotate as a result of His strength (Katha. 6. 3, Br. 3. 8. 9); nay, that even the leaf of a tree does not move unless He desires it ; and on that account, we come across statements in the Philosophy of Devotion, that man is only a tool which is put forward (Gi. 11. 33); and that the Parame-

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 603

-svara inhabits his heart, and makes him meohanically perform all his various actions like a machine. Tukarama Buva says:- The created being is only a nominal doer l his life is wasted in saying 'this is mine', 'this is mine' II

( Ga. 2310. 4).

In order to carry on properly the various activities of the world and to maintain its beneficial condition, it is necessary that everybody must continue performing Action; and the summary of the advice given above is, that instead of perform- ing these Actions with the feeling that they are 'mine', as is done by ignorant people, the Jnanin should perform all Actions till death with the idea of dedicating them to the Brahman, consistently with the principle enunciated in the Tsavasy- opanisad; and the same advice has been preached to Arjuna by the Blessed Lord in the following words: —

yat karosi yad asnasi yaj juhosi dadasi yat l

yat tapasyasi kaunteya tat Iturusva mad arpaiiam II

( Gl. 9. 27 )

that is, "whatever you do, or eat, or offer by way of sacrifice,. or give, or perform by way of austerity, dedicate all that to Me," so that you will not be caught in the bondage of the Karma. This very stanza from the Bhagavadgita has been taken into the Siva-gita; and the same meaning has been conveyed in thB following stanza in the Bh&gavata: —

Wyena vaca manasendriyair va

buddhyatmanil va 'misrtasvabhdvat I karoti yad yat sakalaih parasmai

narayariayeti samarpayet tat H

( BhSg. 11. 2- 26),

that is, "all that we do, as a result of the inspiration of the Body or Speech, ot Mind, or of the organs, or of the Intelligence, or of the Atman, or according to our inherent nature, should be dedicated by us to the highest of the highest (paratpara) NSrayapa". In short, that which is known as the combination of Knowledge and Action, or the Abandonment of the Hope of Fruit, or as Action performed with the idea of dedicating it to the BTahman (Gi. 4. 24 ; 5.10 ; 12. 12) in the Philosophy of

604 GlTA-RAKASYA OS KARMA-YOGA

the Absolute Self, is now known as "Action performed with the idea of dedicating it to Sri Krsna". At the root of the fact that persons who follow the Path of Devotion utter the words 'Govinda', 'Govinda' each time they partake of food, is the idea of dedicating everything to Sri Krsna. The Jfianin Janaka said that all his activities were carried on by him desirelessly, for public welfare ; and the Devotees of the Blessed Lord perform even the Action of partaking of food or drink, with the sole idea of dedicating it to Sri Krsna. The prevalent practice of uttering the words, 'idarn krsndrpanam astu" (i. e. "this is dedicated to Sri Krsna" — Trans.) uttered at the end of feasts given to Brahmins, or other religious performances, or of making an oblation of water with the words, "harir data harir bhokta" (i. e., "the Blessed Lord is the Giver, the Blessed Lord is the Enjoyer" — Trans.) owes its origin to the above stanza from the Bhagavadglta. It is true that the same thing has now happened to these utterances, as happens •when the ear-ornaments disappear and the holes in the ear, which held those ornaments, remain ; and the officiating priest .now utters these words like a panot, without understanding .the true deep import conveyed by them ; and the person who gives the feast, performs the physical exercise of making an oblation of water, like a deaf person ; but, if we go to the root of the matter, this is nothing but a way of performing all Actions, after having given up the Hope of Fruit ; and if one makes fun of this practice, the practice does not come into disrepute, but the person who makes fun, only makes an exhibition of his own ignorance. If every one performs all his Actions in this life— and even the Action of remaining alive — with the idea of dedicating them to Sri Krsna, and abandoning the Hope of Fruit, where is the room for a sinful desire, and how can any person perform any sinful Action ? And also, where is the necessity of separately giving the advice that one should perform Action for the benefit of others, or even sacrifice one's life for the benefit of others ? As both one's self, and every one else, has been included in the Paramesvara, and as the Paramesvara is included in one 's self and every one else, both one's-interest and others-interest are merged in the highest goal in the shape of the dedication

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 605

to Sri Krsna; and then, the following words of the saint Tukarama, namely, " the incarnations of saints are for the benefit of the world I they labour their own bodies by philanthropy ", applies everywhere. I have proved logically in the last chapter, that there is no difficulty about the personal maintenance of that person, who performs all Actions with the idea of dedicating them to Sri Krsna ; and it is with the same purport that the Blessed Lord has now conveyed the assurance in the Philosophy of Devotion in the Glta that : " tesam nityabhiyuktanam yogaksemam vahamy aliam " (Gl. 9 22), (i. e., "I look after the maintenance and welfare of those persons who are continually steeped in the Yoga " — Trans.) It is, therefore, not necessary to mention specifically that the highest of the Devotees of the Blessed Lord have to gradually raise Devotees of the lower orders to higher stages, without upsetting their devotion, and according to their respec- tive competence, in the same way as the Jfianins, who have reached the highest state, must place ordinary persons on the Path of Righteousness, without upsetting their Intelligence (making a 'buddlri-bheda'), (Gi. 3. 26). In short, all the dootrines which have been propounded in the Philosophy of the Absoluts Self, or in the Philosophy of Cause and Effect, have in this way been left untouched in the Philosophy of Devotion, with only verbal differences; and it will be seen, that this method of harmonising Knowledge with Devotion, had come into vogue in India in very ancient times.

But, if a totally different meaning results from a verbal change, such a verbal change is not made ; because, under any circumstances, the meaning of the words is the most important, factor. For instance, if we make a verbal change in the doctrine from the Philosophy of Cause and Effect that every- body must personally make an effort for the Acquisition of Knowledge, and for thereby bringing about his own Eelease, and say, that even this Action is to be performed by the Parame- svaia, the ignorant will become idle. Therefore, the doctrine "aimaiva hy atmano bandhuh atmaiva ripur atmanah" (Gl. 6. 5.) i. e., "one is one's own friend and also one's own enemy", is also enunciated in the Philosophy of Devotion as it is, that is to say, without any verbal alteration. I have quoted above the

«06 GlTA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

stanza of Tukarama, " Who has thereby lost anything ? I one has oneself done harm to oneself" (Ga. 4448), (See p. 388 above— Trans). But the saint Tukarama has in a still more explicit way said:

"There is not with God, the bundle of Release l that He can come and give it to you, as an object by itself l One must conquer one's organs and liberate one's mind I from the objects of pleasure u t

( Ga. 4297 ).

I have quoted above in the tenth chapter a similar stanza from the Upanisads, namely, 'mana era rnanusyanam karanam bandha- moksayoh," ( i. e., "the Mind alone is the reason for the Bondage, or the Release of man" — Trans). It is true that the Parame- svara is the performer of, and the One who causes to be per- formed, all the various makes and breaks in the world; yet, the doctrine of the Philosophy of Cause and Effect, that He gives a reward to every human being according to his own deeds, which has been formulated in order that He should not remain open to the charge of cruelty or partiality, has, for the same reason, been adopted without any verbal alteration in the Philosophy of Devotion. In the same way, although the Isvara is looked upon as perceptible for purposes of worship, yet, the doctrine of the Philosophy of the Absolute Self, that 'whatever is perceptible, is only Maya, and that the true Paramesvara is beyond that Maya', is not given up in the Philosophy of Devotion; and I have stated above that the form of the Jlva, according to the Vedanta-Sutras, has been retained unchanged in the Glta for the same reason. This skill of our Vedic religion of harmonising the natural inclination of the human mind towards the Visible or the Perceptible, with the recondite doctrines of philosophy, is not to be seen in the Philosophy of Devotion of any other people, in any other country. When these people once attach themselves to some qualityful form of the Paramesvara, and thus come into the sphere of the Percept- ible, they remain entangled in that sphere ; and, not being able to see anything else besides that form, a vain gloTy about

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 607

their own qualityful symbol, takes hold of their minds ; and when this happens, they wrongly begin to differentiate between Philosophy on the one hand, and the Path of Devotion on the other hand. But, as the dawn of philosophy had taken place in our country from extremely ancient times, there is seen no conflict between Devotion and Spiritual Knowledge in the religion of the Glta; and, whereas the Vedic Path of Knowledge is chastened by Devotion, the Vedic Path of Devotion is likewise ■chastened by Knowledge ; and therefore, whichever Path is taken by* man, he ultimately attains the same excellent state. The importance of this harmony between imperceptible Knowledge and perceptible Devotion, was not fully appreciated % the philosophers pertaining to the religion which adhered ■merely to the perceptible Christ ; and it is not a matter of ■surprise, that from their one-sided and philosophically short- sighted point of view, there should appear to them an inconsist- ency in the philosophy of the Glta. But, the most surprising part of it all is, that instead of appreciating this valuable •quality of our Vedio religion, some imitative persons .among us have come forward to find fault with that very Teligion ! This is an excellent example of the saying in the Maghakavya that :

athava 'bhinivistabuddhisu 1 vrajati vyarthalmtam subhasitam ll ,

i. e., "when once the Mind is engrossed by a false idea, even that which is true, is not appreciated by it" (Maghakavya 16. 43). -

The importance, which is attached to the fourth stage of life in the Path of Renunciation mentioned in the Smrtis, is not attached to it in the Philosophy of Devotion, or in the Bhagavata religion. It is true that the religious arrangement of the four castes and the four stages of life, is also mentioned in the Bhagavata religion; but, as the principal emphasis of that religion is on Devotion, that man whose Devotion is the most intense, is the best of all, according to the Bhagavata •religion, whether he is a householder, or a denizen of the woods or a Samnyasin; and that religion does not attach much importance to these modes of life (Bhag. 11. 18. 13, 14). The state of a Samnyasin is a very important part of the religion

608 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

of the Smrtis, but not of the Bhagavata religion. Nevertheless,- there is no rule that those who follow the Bhagavata religion,, should never become Sarhnyasins ; and it is stated in the Glta itself that Asceticism and Energism (Karma- Yoga) are both of equal value, from the point of view of Release. It is not impossible to come across people following the Path of Devotion, who have given up all their worldly activities, and become indifferent to the world, without having actually taken up the state of a Samnyasin. Nay, we even come across such persons from early times; but I have clearly 1 shown above in the eleventh chapter, that such persons did not carry any weight at that time ; and that in the Bhagavadgita, Energism (Karma-Yoga) has been considered superior to Abandonment of Action ( Karma- ' TySga). This importance of the philosophy of Karma- Yoga gradually lost ground as time went, and in modern times it is the common belief of even persons following the Bhagavata religion, that the Devotee of the Blessed Lord is a person who- pays no attention to worldly affairs, but is steeped in Devotion, with total indifference to the world. It is, therefore, necessary to again explain here at some length what the chief doctrine and the true advice of the Glta on this matter is, from the point of view of Devotion. The Brahman, according to the Philosophy of Devotion or the Bhagavata religion, is the qualityful Bhagavan (Blessed Lord) Himself. If this Blessed Lord Himself carries on the activities of the world, and maintains the world by taking up various incarnations for the protection of saints and the punishment of evil-doers, it need not be said that the Devotees of the Blessed Lord must them- selves follow the same example for the benefit of the world. Sri Hanuman was the greatest devotee of Sri Ramacandra; but he did not give up the task of punishing evil-doers like Ravana and others by his own prowess. Even Bhlsma is considered to be one of the greatest of the devotees of the Blessed Lord, but though he was himself a celibate throughout life he still carried on the work of protecting his kingdom and those on his side, according to his own status in life, so long as he was alive. It is true that when a man has Realised the Parame- svara by means of Devotion, he has no more anything left to-

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 609

acquire for his own benefit; but the Path of Devotion, which is founded on Love, does not eradicate noble sentiments like kindness, generosity, love of duty, etc.; and these emotions become on the contrary extremely purified; and then, instead of falling into the logical dilemma of whether to perform Action or not to perform Action, the Devotees of the Blessed Lord necessarily and naturally acquire a tendency, which promotes universal welfare and according to which, "the incarnations of saints are for the welfare of the wotH I they labour their own bodies by philanthropy II " (Ga. 929. 3) ; because, they ' acquire a non-differentiating frame of mind, as described above in the eleventh chapter, according to which :

He who takes to his bosom I such as are helpless ll And he who shows to his male and female servants l the same kindness which he shows to his son ii

(Ga. 960).

If one says that it is the Paramesvara Who creates the world and carries on all the activities in it, it becomes clear that the arrangements of the four castes, which exist in order to satisfactorily carry on the activities of that creation, have come into existence by His will ; and even in the Glfca, the Blessed Lord has clearly said that : " caturvarnyam maya srstam gurtahtrmavibliagasah" (G5. 4. 13), (i. e„ "I myself have created the four castes, according to the divisions of the qualities and of Karma" — Trans.). In short, it is the desire of the Paramesvara that every one should perform his social duties according to his own qualifications, and thereby bring about universal welfare (lokasamgraha) ; and it then logically follows that the Paramesvara causes a human being to be born in order to make him a tool for getting performed by his hands, a particular portion of these worldly activities, which are going on by His will ; and if a man does not perform that duty which the Paramesvara has intended that he should perform, he incurs the sin of not having carried out the behests of the Paramesvara Himself. If a man entertains the egotistical idea that "these Actions are Mine or that I perform them for my self-interest", then he will have to suffer the good or evil consequences of those Actions. But the Glta says, that when 77-78

610 GITA-RAHASYA OR KARMA-YOGA

a man performs those Actions merely as duties, and with the idea of dedicating them to the Paramesvara, in the belief that He is causing to be performed those Actions, which He intends to perforin, by making him the man a tool for performing them (Gi. 11. 33), there is nothing wrong or improper about them ; and, on the contrary, carrying out one's own duties in this way amounts to a kind of sattvika worship of the Paramesvara Who lives in all created beings. The Blessed Lord has explained, biy way of summary, the full sum and substance of His advice in the following words: "the Paramesvara remains in the hearts of all created beings, and makes them dance about like mechanical toys ; therefore, the ideas that ' I give up a particular Action ' or that ' I perform it ' are both false ; give up the Hope of Fruit, and continue performing all Actions with the idea of dedicating them to Sri Krsna ; even if you determine that you will not perform those Actions, you will be forced to perform them as a result of your inherent nature (prakrli-dkirma) ; therefore, you must merge all selfish interests in the Blessed Lord, and perform all Actions which have befallen you, according to your status in life, for universal welfare, with an eye to the highest ideal {paramartlia), and with perfect indifference to the world; I am doing the same thing ; see My example, and act accordingly ". As there is no conflict between Jfiana and Desireless Karma, so also does there arise no conflict between Devotion, and Actions performed with tha idea of dedicating them to Krsna. Saint Tukarama, the king of Devotees in the Maharashtra, has explained his merger into the form of the Paramesvara, Who is " anoranliMn maiiato mahiyan" (Katha. 2. 20; Gi. 8. 9), i. e., " smaller than the atom, and bigger than the biggest ', as a result of Devotion ; and he has clearly said that he was living in the world only for the purpose of doing good to others, in the following ablwtiga stanzas :-

I (Tuka) am more minute than the minutest atom I

I am as big as the firmament I I have annihilated by swallowing that body 1

which is only a form of the Cosmic Illusion ll I have gone beyond the trinity I

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 611

a light has heen lighted in this Body I Tuka says that : " now I I survive only for philanthropy"!!

(Ga. 3587). He has nowhere stated that there is no more anything left for him to do, as is said by those who follow the Path of Samnyasa; in the same way, the opinion of the saint Tukarama on this matter becomes quite clear from the following other abltailga stanzas, namely, Taking up the beggar's bowl i

fie on such a disgraceful life ! I Such persons will by NarSyana l be always abandoned II

(Ga. 2595^ or, The Real-worshipper {salyavadi) performs all the activities •

of worldly life 1 in the same way as the lotus remains in the water,

untouched by the water I Tie 'who ib philanthiopical, he who is kindly towards

all created beings I he is in the state of being merged in the Atman 1

(Ga. 3780. 2. 3). But, although the saint Tukarama was a householder, his inclination was towards Abandonment of Action; and therefore, if one wants a full explanation of the doctrine of the Gita, or of the characteristic of the Bhagavata religion, namely, ' intense Devotion combined with Desireless Action, performed with the idea of dedicating it to the Paramesvara ', he mast turn to the work Dasabodha, written by Sri Samarfcha Ramadasa Svami, who was the ' venerable preceptor ' to whom saint Tukarama himself directed Sivaji Maharaja to 'surrender himself '. He (Ramadasa) has said, that ordinary people should learn to perform their own Actions, by seeing how the Siddhas, who have become perfect by realising the pure form of the Paramesvara, keep performing their own Actions, desirelessly, according to their own qualifications, and in order to " make many persons wise " (Dasa. 19. 10. 14) ; and after repeating several times that "unless a man does something, nothing happens" (Dasa. 19. 10. 25 ; 12. 9. 6 ; 18. 7. 3), he has said as follows in the last diiaine, in order to establish a complete

612 GlTA-RAHASYA OE KARMA-YOGA

harmony between the power of Karma and the redeeming power of Devotion :

Strength lies in activity i the strength will be his who is

active I But in such a man there must be I the seat of the Blessed! Lord ii

( Dasa. 20. 4. 36 ) The same meaning is conveyed by the words: "mam anusmara yudhya ca " ( Gl. S. 7 ), i. e., "always remember me and fight"; or, by the statement at the end of the sixth chapter that, "even among the Karma-yogins, the Devotee is the most excellent"; and, there is also a statement in the eighteenth chapter that: yatah pravrttir bhutanam yena saroam idam tatam I svakarmam tarn abhyarcya siddhim vindati manavah II

(Gl. 18. 46) that is, "man attains perfection (siddhi) by worshipping by Desire- less Actions, proper to his status in life (and not by flowers, or by words merely) that Paramesvara, Who has created the whole of this world". Nay; the meaning of this stanza and even of the entire Gita, is that by performing Actions desirelessly, according to one 's own status in life, a man performs a sort of worship, devotion, or prayer of that Virata-formed Paramesvara. Who is inside all created beings. When the Gita asks a person to perform the worship of the Paramesvara by Actions proper to his status in life, it is not to be understood as saying that the nine kinds of Devotion, such as, "sravanam kirtanam visrioh", ( i. e., "saying or hearing the praise of the Lord Visnu" — Trans.) are not acceptable to it. But the Gita says, that (i) it is not proper to abandon Action as being inferior, and to remain steeped only in this nine-fold form of Devotion; (ii) that one must perform all the various Actions, which have befallen one, according to the injunctions of the Sastras, and that (iii) "these Actions should not be performed, as pertaining to oneself, but with the idea of the Paramesvara in the Mind, and with a mine-less (nirmama) frame of mind, believing that they are the Actions of the Paramesvara, and for the benefit of the world created by Him; so that, the Karma is not wasted, but on the other hand, these Actions amount to the service or worship of, or the Devotion to the Paramesvara : and instead

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 613

•of one's acquiring the sin or merit of the Action, one attains a blissful state". Those commentators on the Gita, who follow the Path of Devotion, disregard this doctrine ; and in their works, they explain the purport of the Gita to be, that Karma or Action is inferior and Devotion is paramount. But, this summary drawn by commentators pertaining to the School of Devotion, is as one-sided as that drawn by the followers of the School of Eenunoiation. The Path of Devotion mentioned in the Gita is based on Action, and the most important principle in it is, tHat the worship of the Paramesvara is made not only by speech or by flowers, but also by Desireless Actions, pertinent to one's own status in life ; and that such a worship must necessarily be performed by everybody. And, as this prinoiple of Devotion cum Action has not been enunciated anywhere else in the same way as in the Gita, this must be ■considered to be the characteristic of the Philosophy of Devotion mentioned in the Gita.

Although in this way, I have established a complete consonnance between the Path of Knowledge and the Path of Devotion from the point of view of Karma-Yoga, yet, I must, before concluding, clearly mention the one important factor which is to be found in the Philosophy of Devotion in addition to those found in the Philosophy of Knowledge. As the Path of Knowledge is based entirely on Intelligence, it becomes difficult to follow for ordinary persons of poor intelligence ; and, as has been stated above, it is easy for everybody to follow the Path of Devotion, as it is based on Faith, and is accessible by love, and visible. But, there is another difficulty in the Path of Knowledge besides its being difficult to follow. If one considers the Mimarhsa of Jaimini, or the Upanisads, or the Vedanta-Sutras, they are full of discussions about sacrificial ritual prescribed by the Srutis, or about the Parabrahman in the form of "neti, wti" (i. e., "It is not this, It is not that " —Trans.), which are based on Abandon- ment of Action ; and they have ultimately laid down that the right of performing sacrificial ritual prescribed by the Srutis as a means of acquiring heaven, as also of reciting the Vedas and the Upanisads, which was necessary for obtaining Release, belonged only to the three upper classes (Ve. Su.

614 Gffii-BABASYA OB KARMA-YOGA

1. 'i. 2&-'iB). How tie women belonging to these three classes, or the ordinary men and women engaged in agriculture, and other occupations, for the benefit of society, according to the arrangement of the four castes, are to obtain Release, is a Question wMdi has not been considered in these hooks. "Well ; if one says that women and Sudras can never attain Release because the Vedas are thus inaccessible to them, then, there are statements in the TJpanisada that Gargi and other women obtained Perfection by acquiring Knowledge; and there are statements in the Purarias that Vidura and other Sudras did likewise ( Ve. Sfi. 3, 4. 36-39 ). Therefore, one cannot lay down the proposition, that it is only the men folk belonging to the three upper classes, who obtain Release ; and if one accepts the position that even women and Scdras can obtain Release, then, one must explain by what means they can obtain Knowledge. Badarayanacarya mentions the means : "visesmm- yrahas ai" (Ve. bu. 3. 4. 38), i. e., "the special favour of the Paramesvara" ; and it is stated in the Bhagavata (Bhag. 1. 4. 25) that this means, in the shape of Devotion cum Action, has been. mentioned as a special favour (visemnugraha), "in the Bharata and naturally also in the Gita, because the Srutis cannot be heard by women, Sudras, or nominal Brahmins (of the Kali-yuga)". Although the Knowledge which is acquired by this path, and the Knowledge of the Brahman mentioned in the TFpanisads, are one and the same, yet, the difference between men and women or between Brahmins, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sudras does not any more remain in this path, and the special quality of this path has been mentioned in the Gita in the following stanza : —

iniim hi partita vyapairitya ye 'pi syiih papayonayah I striyo vaisyas tatha sudras te 'pi ydnti param gatim II

( Gl. 9. 32) that is, "0, Partha, by taking shelter in Me, women, Vaisyas and Sudras and other lower classes, in which birth has been taken as a result of sin, attain the highest perfection"; and! this same stanza has appeared again in the Anugita in the Mahabharata (Ma. Bha. Aava. 19. 61) ; and, it is stated in the conversation, between the Brahmin and the hunter (vyadha) in the Vanapaiva, that the desh-selling hunter has explained how

THE PATH OF DEVOTION" 61.5

Bdease can be attained by acting according to Line's cwu duties dssiraleasly: and the- same explanation litis boon given in the Santi-parva by Tuladhara, who was » merchant, to l.lip Brahmin ascetic Jajali (Ma. Bhs. Vaua, ^06-21.4; Sau. 260463). From this it follows that, that; man whoso Reason \\u.f become equable towards all, is the highest of mm, whether he ia a carpenter, or a merchaut, or a butcher, hy profession. It ip clear that, according to the Blessed Lord, the spiritiiul worth of a man does not depend on the profession followed by him, or on the casta to which ha belongs, hut entirely on the purity of his conscience. Wheu in this way, the gateway of Bvleam has been opened to all people in society, there arises in the hearts of all such persons, a strange solf-eonHeiousiioxs, of which the nature can be ganged from tlio history of the Bhagavata religion in Maharashtra. To the Paramesvara, women, or the lowest of mixed tribes, or Brahmins are the same. "The Paramesvara craves (only) for your Faith". He does not care for symbols, or for the black or white colour of the skin, nor does He care for the difference between men and women, or castes like the Brahmins or the Candalas (tribes bom of the mixture of Brahmins and Sudras). The saint Tukirima says that: —

Brahmins, Ksatriyas. Vaisyas, and Sudras I and the Candalas, all have the right I

As also children, women, men, I and oven prostitutes II

Tuka says that he has I found by experience I

That even others, who are devout I experience happiness by their good fortune il

(Ga. 2382. 5, 6) Way ; it is a doctrine of the Glta, that " however sinful a man may be, if he surrenders himself to the Blessed Lord, wholly and solely, even at the moment of his death, the Paramesvara does not cast him off" (Gi. 9. 30; and S. 5-8). Seeing the word ' prostitutes ' in the above stanza, some learned persons, who parade their purity, might feel offended ; but it must ho said that such persons do not understand the true principle of Religion. This doctrine has been adopted not only in the Hindu religion, but also in the Buddhist religion fMilinda- Prasna 3. 7. 2); and theia are stories in Buddhistic religious

616 GlTA-RAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

treatises, that Buddha initiated a prostitute by name Amrapali, as also a thief by name Agullmala ; and there is a statement even in the Christian scriptures that because one of the two thieves, who were crucified at the same time as the Lord Christ, surrendered himself to the Lord at the moment of his ■death, he was saved by the Christ on that account (Luke. 23. 42 and 4:J) ; and the Lord Christ has Himself said in one place that even prostitutes, who put faith in His religion would obtain, salvation (Matthew. 21. 31 ; Luke. 7. 50). And I'have .shown above in the tenth chapter that the same conclusion is arrived at even from the point of view of the Philosophy of the Absolute Self (adhyulmu). But, although this religious doctrine is logically unquestionable, yet, a man, the whole of whose life has been spent in doing evil actions, will, in all probability, not get the inspiration of surrendering himself wholly and solely to the Blessed Lord at the moment of his death ; and then nothing more results beyond mechanically opening the mouth in the throes of death to utter the letter ' Ba ', and then closing it for ever by uttering the next letter ' ma '. Therefore, the definite assurance of the Blessed Lord to everybody is that, if a man throughout his life, and not only at the moment of death, keeps the thought of the Blessed LoTd continually in his mind, and performs all Actions pertaining to his status in life, solely with the idea of dedicating them to Him, then, whatever may be the ■caste to which he belongs, he is as good as Released, notwith- standing that he has been performing Actions (Gl. 9. 26-28 and 30-34).

When one considers and takes into account the sense of Equality appearing in the Philosophy of Devotion taught by the Gita, and its capacity to enable all equally, to easily grasp the Knowledge of the identity of the Brahman and the Atman mentioned in the Upanisads, without sacrificing the ordinary activities of worldly life, and without establishing any difference between the four castes or the four stages of life, or the communities, or even between men and women, one "understands the true import of the summing up of the Religion of the Glta made by the Blessed Lord in the last chapter of the Glta, by way of a definite assurance, in the following terms :

THE PATH OF DEVOTION 617

" give up all other religions (dliarma), and surrender yourself solely to Me ; I shall redeem you from all sins, do not be afraid". The word ' dharma ' has here been used in the comprehensive meaning that, all the practical paths or means, which have been shown for acquiring the highest excellence of the Self, in the shape of reaching the Paramesvara, by remaining free from sin, while following the ordinary activities of life, are ' dliarma ' (duty). In the Anuglta, in the conversation between the preceptor and the disciple, the Rsis are said to have questioned Brahmadeva as to which of the various paths, such as, Non-Violence, Veracity, Penances, Spiritual Knowledge, Sacrificial ritual, Charity, Karma, Renunciation etc., mentioned by different people, was the most correct one (Asva. 49); and even in the Santi-parva, a question has been asked in the Uhccha-vrtyupakhyana as to which of the various paths, such as, the duties enjoined on the householder, or on the denizens of the woods, or on kings, or the service of one's parents, or death on a battle-field for the Ksatriya, or religious contemplation for the Brahmin, etc., was the most acceptable path, as all these had been mentioned in the Sastras as the means of acquiring heaven. These various paths of dliarma or Dharmas may appear to be mutually inconsistent; but, in as much as the ultimate ideal of ' equality of affection towards all created beings ' is reached by means of the concen- tration of the Mind by Faith, arising from one's taking to any- one of these paths, the writers of the Sastras consider all these practical paths as of equal value. Nevertheless, as there is a likelihood of the Mind becoming confused as a result of. its being caught in the various paths of the worship of different symbols, the final and definite assurance of the Blessed Lord, not only to Arjuna, but to everybody in the name of Arjuna, is that, one should give up all the various paths of Purification of the Mind, and should "surrender yourself solely to ME ; I shall redeem you from all sins, do not be afraid". Even the Saint Tukarama makes his ultimate prayer to God, which entails the annihilation of diverse kinds of ■dliarma, in the following words. —

Burn that knowledge, burn that wisdom I may my Faith remain on the feet of the Viththala II

618 GITA-RAHASYA OK KARMA-YOGA

Burn those religious practices, burn that contemplation I may my Mind remain fixed on the feet of the Viththala II .

(Ga.'3464) This is the pinnacle of definite advice, or of prayer.

'Devotion ' is the last sweet mouthful out of the golden dish; of Srlmad Bhagavadgita. We have taken this mouthful of Love ; now let us take the final sip of water ( aposni ) '"' and; prepare to rise from the feast.

• This is a religions practice followed by Brahmins in India

who take a final sip of water, known as 'apomti,', from the hollow o£ palm, uttering a mantra ( sacred words ), just before finishing the dinner and rising — Trans.

END OF VOLUMll, I

ip^i!tlip!r||p*riii||^i]ifi|

• i=;=fji*.| [ |l- E is-|«ij?|fIr = s||i*|

LfllPl^l1»4lfllS:Hh|||i({||

- r ?»i"*WHi I ft i

III if ill fill |J.j|j|!jI

ti l rti!pl

Il« I Fl ' r » bEI

- C * ' B til f£

ftfi

III tr£i£f«t

UhHmm f::-t!ilEt;"

lit tiyM&ltl

iUm-frtti

fill

MP

HI

M

Hi H j !it! i I ! i ? [

■ Willi's f 1 : : il.1i i sh s P f ? .■ kI-s » b rii

?lu.illUjfl5«1iilhT<iJ»gp:iii;i-tHi)

^rni'tliH*!! S If til ! sill In ^ ifil I 1 i Lii Ji ■jllflMHkrtSlli^iFlliiiMlfrti IP- ! r

BjliffHer&B&liIlp^lrlliilMlir^.l! 1 -!

lykilllhiifiiilliiiiililiiillifniifl

»***-i5iliU!wlj:;«if]g?!ilJifphf||[Ji!s

«•:-£: islet's eefttsl I* fe l «= si »£«-,- » „Ji£ fo itr e&

If sl«iiffif

t! ^!y||{;ifii jlfill fif#fi!*

niiffrlEfifli-fil^iiUt

?R1j nifliHllflHilltjl fill h : if|i!!!»

«:iii*EllHII|i|'. iiiiuUHi" -iZ$ SiP fits

I hiif I hiliiA -A l *w i, Mi* -JHl^l I : liil fjiiflfljillfhiHKiHrtlhHtfirilTififl

it'll .

eI 5 foil

Effflf :e El 111

{jlllililllli

5111 e fi'"l-S* g iflill & SI

i!f!ili!illfiiiiilki;l!

5MllllIiPf!-iH

$f|f- Ifff l^fW

!-|i^ Sift Sl«lK

illUUfoUiUilll

^%%k El si^i*E - ill,. fiir^:iiliiiii!lii;iii1iii!Iiilti,tiiiiil!

IP*: Hi*

'Is:;!!**

«!H!RlhU!

1 14 1 • l*»* tl* M* If' e •fIPl«=!llt^ilfIrP:

iiiililillui i i«ii!i sitlftif Hi Ihif 5 rfi*

?-=-r;li*M--lS!!i^ l '":- 5 lii.!fi=Slh(s

it fit t l£ *s e - still &Irf?*J-:i*fJ E i si jU *!£•"£

Ipfi if li* lUii {Hill! f 11 J "If 1 IliilllltJ^iltililliillilfifllillliltllill

Ill If I Il^#ilfl¥ "rl Pfrfl

«iilllll^lrllliiBilll!ll!iI^UHfliIlil

iff:

ml

f::f:i|li?|811j[f|ir|liifi:s|. itniiUWi

M Mm i'll Pifll? P lilHK

Hjl iHifflii! P lifflfl if I {illji,

iiiiiiiiillBi'irfliflllill^liirfilililii

•:lN||||if'-

||fl!f iMiMlj

-lllflllirilflf

■min mm [n \\\\h

lidfh: sf ?!iilillllbl|{iJl^-rl!i!L"li5:*

fit, it In f : fi n

If hll=fii^i*rs ilflt^ eP^I-Pr-Pl!--^

l1l!f!i!ifilbr E illilliiK';iifiif

ihHJ

^--illlPllllf^ili-iMMi'iiiviIIil.:^--*] eII 1^1 1 1 II ::SH*ii«;Ii !-:?-: 1 1 ^l-i = 1. till

UfKniililtldi'HllitlrbrliSlitliril-

IHhi liil ill 5 i!Ii illy ililf II l kA* iiU

tit 'ill f 1 1 & till fMftll'i'lliiJ IP Kit

litl-llUlirtKtiglflSellil'ggigtl-iicIilli

? h?l list iinil if IMltlfA \m ir p hilt[H|i|fihfifii{*Ef*n|||iilhrH|li-r

'iEsilili , l S; l'E»ltii'*?. rl'ti E,IJ » » fl*f - £ I -lull

if if II! Hit i f ill I il eI I *l nil i lUhUmn

fliiillllll^HlliliiiiirHnilfllliiliM

iliSffiS*!!!*! ill •lilt'll If 6 -**'*ll*f s ^rf 1

Iftf 1 in |!ii{S«n{m! |f,: ^- ,r

UUHlunf Hill

hi sp litis 1 InliljfitiJ

I! ! ft i!i K | ri mi If! il

niHrtlitillutlllt

l tr ' , i;ljtl&li If * 'l&S'Nfflli'"!" UU Hil- *

• • . irt ftli I'l'ni H'l ; -*»^t illfli Hiifi

i f tl T iI | f ^ll-llfilill ill I

mf *i

FefcVI

i{^f!piHft!P!iiiiHiitiii*?ifti«iiii

li*1flf , rfr*l»l ,, l»i" , E'IJ»flI»^*iS l; JfIl-«'l

Hiifi? S:ililiHt!*rt?i!ii flJ^mf^f

fpiji!

!

luff; r«f**l

llliiil!

|ii!ii|||!iHIH||||fP^||r|4ti|i|!|l|fi*

f fmMifHffiliiit ipp ¥ifi i» !|i h] ■"'Mtrfmirfffi It & f \m mmm

i!fiiill!ilii!ililll!flllillliirfll!i

iiiMiiiiiliiiiflifi! HiUlmmim

U ill' 8

2 IN "'

! tilil!

"*i lH;i*;II«ii*fiiih|i*U s t*5f"it»|?l-« 

tL, t I|^r|||P{|||IiS|^iff|||i<ii':

1 4 in if iiiuiltti in % if -*i i "i i 1 * i III - 6,1 1

|tlti|itlllllif {?*r;ii i k §

l||[{!'Hi!i|iiqil^PtlHf|j||||fjB|lli'

II Hlfi i| ii{;{ t hi I | hi:

!lh

'^E!:

fi;|l!l

ilfi!

• 4ll^ii*Ii r Ms fill - £ 6 £* BE' '* p-g E'£ *-&S'F &- E E^-n I

ills H till °I*'*6-E*ilf6; - ! iiiB ii! in * -ft

lii I ?4«m{fPi pi jii! IF

tsf Jillif r= nliliE iuiiIlf-iJt* ill! itilil

\%\Vt\

MumltWMlkrAm

iiibli*^sH:iMiiIi B Jit!i«li*'i!*iftM^

ir^Illliilllll lifllljfiiJfllfl^f

\w4 W if K B « Nil * ft «i

l *US*It'1Ulll**- : -li'Ui««*iil« , |t!H'"

yMSlLsliOlyiliiilliiilliiilifiiii:.

These blank pages have been included in this volume for the convenience of the reader, if he wishes to make anv notes.