Karma Yoga Sastra Vol-1

SRI GANESAYA NAMAH OM TAT SAT

SRIMAD BHAGAVADGITA RAHASYA.

OR

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ENERGISM (PROPER ACTION)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

Narayanam namaskratya narain caiva narottamam I
devim Sarasvatim Vyasam tato jayam udirayet II

Mahabharata (opening verse)

The Srimad Bhagavadglita is one of the most brilliant and pure gems of our ancient sacred books. It would be difficult to find a simpler work in Sanskrit literature or even in all the literature of the world than the Gita, which explains to us in an unambiguous and succinct manner the deep and sacred principles of the sacred science of the SELF (Atman), after imparting to us the knowledge of the human body and the cosmos, and on the authority of those principles acquaints every human being with the most perfect and complete condition of the Self, that is to say, with what the highest- manhood is, and which further establishes a logical and admirable harmony between Devotion (bhakti) and Spiritual Knowledge (jnana), and ultimately between both these and the duties of ordinary life enjoined by the Sastras, thereby inspiring the mind, bewildered by the vicissitudes of life to calmly and, what is more, desirelessly adhere to the path of duty. Even

if one examines the work looking upon it as a poem, this work, which simplifies to every reader, young or old, the numerous abstruse doctrines of Self-Knowledge in inspired language and is replete with the sweetness of Devotion plus Self-Realisation, will certainly he looked upon as an excellent poem. The pre-eminent worth, therefore, of a book which contains the quintessence of Vedic religion, uttered by the voice of the Blessed Lord can best only be imagined. It is stated at the commencement of the Anugita, that after the Bharata war was over, and Sri Krsna and Arjuna were one day chatting together, Arjuna conceiving the desire of hearing the Gita. again from the lips of the Blessed Lord, said to Sri Krsna : — " I have forgotten the advice you gave me when the war commenced ; so, please repeat it to me. " In reply the Blessed Lord said to him that even He could not repeat that advice in the same way, because on the previous occasion the advice had been given, when His mind was in the highest Yogic state (Ma. Bh.5. Asvamedha. 16, stanzas 10-13). Really speaking, nothing was impossible for the Blessed Lord, but His answer that it would be impossible for Him to repeat the Gita, clearly reveals the excellent worth of the Gita. The fact that the Gits is considered by all the different traditionary schools of the Vedic religion for over twenty-five centuries to be as venerable and authoritative as the Vedas themselves is due to the same

cause ; and on the same account, this work, which is as old as the Smrtis, has been appropriately, though figuratively described in the Gita-dhyana as follows ;—

sarvopanisado gavo dogdha Gopalanandanah I

Partho vatsah sudhir bhokta ducjdham Gltamrtafh muhat II

that is :— " All the Upanisads are, so to say, cows, the Blessed Lord Sri Krsna is Himself the drawer of the milk (milk-man), the intelligent Arjuna is the drinker, the calf (which causes the flow of the milk in the cows), and (when these unprecedented circumstances have come about) the milk which has been drawn, is the Gita-nectar of the highest order. " It cannot, therefore, be a matter of surprise that any number of translations, commentaries, or expositions of this work have appeared in all the vernacular languages of India ; but, after the Westerners have got acquainted with Sanskrit, there have been made any number of translations of the Gita into Greek, Latin, German, French, English etc., and this wonderful work has now come to be known throughout the world.

Not only does this work contain the quintessence of all the Upanisads, but the full name of this work is "Srimad Bhagavad- gita Upanisat ". The enunciative words, convoying that the chapter is closed, which are used at the end of each chapter of the Gita contain the words "iti srimad Bhagavadgitasu- Upanisatsu Brahmavidyayam. yogasastre sri-Krsnarjuna-samvade" etc. i.e., " thus the conversation between Sri-Krsna and Arjuna on the Karma-yoga science, (that is to say, on the science of the yoga based on the knowledge of the Brahman) in the Upanisad sung by the Blessed Lord. " Although these enunciative words are not to be found in the original Bharata, yet as we find them in all the editions of the Gita, one may draw the inference that, that mode of enunciation must have come into vogue, when the Gita was for the first time separated from the Mahabharata for daily recital, that is to say, before any commentary was written on it ; and I shall explain later on the importance of these words in determining the import of the Gita from this point of view. For the present, it is necessary for us to consider only the words " Bhagavadgitasu Upanisatsu. " Although the word " Upanisat " is of the neuter

gender in the Marathi language, yet as it is of the feminine gender in Sanskrit, so the idea " the Upanisad sung, that is, told by the Blessed Lord " is conveyed, in Sanskrit, by the expression " Srimad Bhagavadgita Upanisat ", a compound of an adjective and a noun in the feminine gender ; and although the work is singular in number, yet as it has become customary to refer to it in the plural number by way of respect, one comes across the plural seventh-case-ended form of " Srimad Bhagavadgitasupanisatsu". Even in the commentary (bhasya) written by Samkaracarya, we come across the expression " iti gitasu ' ' in the plural number with reference to this work. But in contracting the expression, the affixes or words used for indicating respect and also the common- noun " Upanisat " at the end, indicative of a class being dropped, the two first-case-ended singular words " Srimad Bhagavadgita " and " Upanisat " have at first been changed into " Bhagavadgita " and later on merely " Gita ", which is a feminine and extensively contracted form,— as has been the case with the names Kena, Katha, chandogya etc., If the word " Upanisat " had not occurred in the original name, then the name of this work would have been contracted into the neuter form " Bhagavadgitam " or merely " Gitam " as has been the case with " Bhagavatam " or " Bharatam " or " Gopigitam ", but as, instead of that, the word has remained in the feminine form as " Bhagavadgita, " or " Gita, " we must always take the word " Upanisat " as implied after it. The word " Anugita " has been interpreted in the same way in the commentary of Arjunamisra on the Anugita.

But we find that the word " Gita " is applied not only to the Bhagavadgita of 700 verses but also in an ordinary meaning to many other works dealing with Spiritual Knowledge. For instance, in certain sundry chapters of the Moksaparva, included in the Santiparva of the Mahabharata, we find that the names Pingalagita, Sampakagita, Mankigita, Bodhyagita^ Vicakkhyu-gita, Haritagita, Vrtragita, Parasaragita, and" Hamsagita have been used and one part of the Anuglta in the Asvamedhaparva has been called by the separate and special name of " Brahmana Gita ". Besides these, there are also- numerous other gitas which are well-known, such as the-

Avadhutagita, Astavakragita, Isvaragita, Uttaragita, Kapilagita, Ganesagita, Devigita, Pandavagita, Brahmagita, Bhiksugita, Yamagita, Ramagita, Vyasagita, Sivagita, Sutagita, Suryagita, etc. Some of these exist independently, whereas the others are to be found in different Puranas. For instance, the Ganesagita, is to be found at the end of the Ganesapurana in the Krida- khanda in the 138th to 148th chapters and one may say that it is a faithful copy of the Bhagavadgita, with slight verbal differences. The Isvaragita is to be found in the first eleven chapters in the Uttaravibhaga of the Kurmapurana, and the Vyasagita starts in the next chapter. The Brahmagita is to be found in the first twelve chapters of the latter portion of the fourth i. e., the Yajna-vaibhava khanda of the Suta-Samhita included in the Skandapurana and the Sutagita is in the subsequent eight chapters. There is to be found a Brahmagita different from this Brahmagita of the Skandapurana, in the 173rd to 181st stanzas of the latter half of the chapter on " Nirvana ", in the Yogavasistha. The Yamagita is of three kinds. The first is to be found in the seventh chapter of the 3rd part ( amsa ) of the visnupurana, the second one in the 381st chapter of the 3rd division ( khanda ) of the Agnipurana and the third one in the 8th chapter of Nrsimhapurana. The same is the case with the Ramagita. The Ramagita which is in common acceptance in this part of the country is to be found in the fifth sarga of the Uttarakanda of the Adhyatma Ramayapa and this Adhyatma Ramayana is looked upon as a part of the Brahmandapurana. But there is also another Ramagita to be found in the work known as " Gurujana- vasistha-tattvasarayana " which is well-known on the Madras side. This book deals with Vedanta philosophy and is divided into three divisions ( kandas ) called the Jnana, Upasana, and Karma. In the first eighteen chapters of the second part {pada called the Upasanakanda, we find the Ramagita and in the first five chapters of the third part ( pada ) of the third kanda, called the Karmakanda, we find the Suryagita. The Sivagita is said to be in the Patalakhanda of the Padmapurana. But, in the edition of this purana which .has been printed in the Anandashrama Press in Poona, we do not find the Sivagita. Pandit Jwalaprasad has stated in his book called Astadasa-

puranadarsana ( Survey of the eighteen Puranas ) that it is to be found in the Gaudiya Padmottarapurana, and in the table of contents of the Padmapurana which is given along with those of other Puranas in the Naradapurana, we find a reference to the Sivagita. Besides these, the Hamsagita is to be found in the 13th chapter of the 11th skandha of the Sri Bhagavatapurana and the Bhiksugita is to he found in the 23rd chapter of the same skandha, ; and the Kapiley opakhyana contained in the chapters 23 to 33 of the third skandha, is also known as Kapilagita. But I have seen an independent printed book by the name Kapilagita. This Kapilagita deals principally with the Hathayoga, and one finds it stated in it that it has been taken from the Padmapurana ; however, not only do we not find it in the Padmapurana, but as we find in it in one place (4. 7) such words as " Jaina " " Jangama " (lingaita), and "Sophi" (a Mahommedan saint), we have.to say that it must hare been written after the Mahommedan rule commenced. As in the Bhagavatapurana, so also in the Devibhagavata, we find a Gita from the 31st to the 40th chapters of the seventh skandha, and as that gita is supposed to have come out of the mouth of the Devi, it is called the " Devigita ". Besides {these, a summary of the Bhagavadgita itself is to be found in the 380th chapter of the third khanda, of the Agnipurana as also in the 247th chapter of the purvakhanda of the Garudapurana. In the same way, although it is stated that the work " Yogava- sistha " was recited by Vasistha to Rama in the Rama incarnation, yet we find a summary of the Bhagavadgita which was preached to Arjuna by the Blessed Lord in the subsequent Krsna incarnation, reproduced in the last, that is in the Nirvana chapter, in which many verses are taken as they are from Bhagavadgita, and it is given the name "Arjunopakhyana" (Cf. Yoga. 6, Pu.Sarga. 52-58). I have stated above that the Sivagita is not to be found in the Padmapurana printed at Poona, but though that is so, yet a Bhagavadgita-mahatmya is described from the 171st to the 188th chapters of the Uttarakhanda of this edition (of the Padmapurana), and one chapter of this mahatmya is dedicated to each chapter of the Bhagavadgita and it also contains traditionary stories about the same. There is besides one

Gita-mahatmya in the Varahapurana and it is said that there is also a third Gita-mahatmya in the Saiva or Vayupurana. But I do not come across it in the Vayupurana printed in Calcutta* A small chapter of nine verses called " Gita-dhyana " is to be found printed in the beginning of the printed editions of the Bhagavadgita, but I cannot say from where it has been taken. Nevertheless, the verse " Bhismadrona-tatha Jayadratha-jala " (from these nine verses) is to be found, with slight verbal differences, at the very commencement of the recently published drama of Bhasa called " Urubhanga ". There- fore, it would seem that this Gita-dhyana must have come into vogue probably after the date of the dramatist Bhasa. Because, it would be more proper to say that the Gita-dhyana has been prepared by borrowing different verses from different texts and writing some new verses, rather than to say that a well-known dramatist like Bhasa has taken that verse from the Gita-dhyana. As the dramatist Bhasa lived before Kalidasa, his date cannot at most be later than Saka 300.

From what has been stated above, one can understand which and how many copies, and good or bad imitations; summaries and mahatmyas of the Gita are to be found in the puranas. One cannot definitely say to what puranas some gitas like the Avadhutagita, the Astavakragita, etc., belong, and if they do not form part of any puranas, then by whom and when they were independently written. Yet, if one considers the arrangement or the disposition of subject matters, in all these gitas, one will see that all these works must have been written after the Bhagavadgita had come into, prominence and acquired general acceptance. Nay, one may even go further and say that these various gitas have been, brought into existence with the idea that the sacred literature of a particular sect or a purana does not become- complete unless it contains a gita similar to the Bhagavadgita. As in the Bhagavadgita, the Blessed Lord first showed to Arjuna his. Cosmic Form and then preached to him the Divine Knowledge,

-so also is the case with the Sivagita and Devigita, or the -Ganesagita; and in the Sivagita, Isvaragita, etc., we find many verses taken literally from the Bhagavadgita. Considering the matter .from the point of view of Spiritual Knowledge, these various gitas do not contain anything more than the Bhagavadgita; but, what is more, the wonderful skill of establishing a harmony between the Realisation .of the Highest Self (adhyatma) and Action (karma) which is seen in the Bhagavadgita, is not to be found in any- one of these gitas. Somebody has subsequently written the Uttaragita as a supplement to the Bhagavadgita in the form of a conversation between Krsna and Arjuna, in the belief that the Patanjala-yoga or the Hatha-yoga or the Philosophy of Renunciation (samnyasa) by Abandonment of Action (karma) has not been sufficiently well described in the Bhagavadgita, and the Avadhuta, the Astavakra and some other gitas are purely one-sided, that is to say, they are only in support of the

path of Renunciation ; and the Yamagita, Pacdavaglta, and

some other gitas are very small and purely devotional, like eulogistic hymns. It is true that the same is not the case 'with the Sivagita, the Ganesagita and the Suryagita and they contain a skilful harmonising of Action and Spiritual Knowledge ; yet, as that exposition in them has been more or less adopted from the Bhagavadgita there is no novelty about them. Therefore, these pauranic stale gitas which have come into existence later on, fall into the shade before the profound and comprehensive brilliance of the Bhagavadgita and the excellence of the Bhagavadgita has been all the more established and enhanced by these imitation gitas ; and the word " gita " has come to mean Bhagavadgita principally. Although the works Adhyatma Ramayana and Yogavasistha are more exhaustive, yet from their construction, they are evidently of a later date. The (Jurujnanavasistha-tattvasarayana of the Madras Presidency is a very ancient work according to some, but I am not of that opinion, because it contains a reference to 108 Upanisads and it cannot be said that all of them are ancient ; and if one considers the Suryagita, we find in it a reference (see 3. 30) to Qualified-Monism (visistadvaita), and in some places the arguments too seem to have been adopted from

the Bhagavadgita (1. 68), and therefore, one has to come to the conclusion that even this work was written much later on, possibly even after the date of Sri Samkaracarya.

Although there were many gitas, yet inasmuch as the Bhagavadgita was of unquestionable excellence, as shown above, later philosophers, following the Vedic cult, thought it proper not to take much notice of the other gitas and to examine only the Bhagavadglta and explain its import to their co-religionists. The examination of a work is of two kinds ; there is the internal examination and the external examination. If one considers the book as a whole and extracts the inner meaning, the import, the implied meaning, or conclusions Bought to be proved by it, that is called the " internal examination ". Considering where a particular work was written, who wrote it, what kind of language is used in it, to what extent good sense or sweetness of sound are to be found in it from the poetical point of view, whether the diction of it is grammatically correct, or it contains any old archaic constructions, what opinions, places or personages are mentioned in it, and whether or not such references enable you to determine the date of the work or the social conditions availing at the time when the work was written, whether the ideas in the book are original or are borrowed from some one else, and if borrowed, then which they are, and from whom they are borrowed, etc. — which is an exposition of the purely external aspects of the book, — is called the " external examination " of the work. Those ancient commentators who have written -commentaries ( bhasya ) or criticisms ( tlka ) on the Glta have not given much attention to these external aspects. Because, -considering these matters, while examining a supernatural work like the Bhagavadglta, would, in their opinion, be like wasting time in merely counting the petals of an excellent flower, instead of admiring its scent, colour or beauty or in criticising the combs of a honey-comb full of honey ; but following the example of Western critics, modern scholars are now devoting much attention to the external examination of the Gita. One of these has counted the archaic constructions in the Gita and come to the conclusion that this work must have been written at least a few centuries before the birth of

Christ ; and that, the doubt that the path of Devotion described, in the Gita may have been adopted from the Christian religion ( which was promulgated at a later date ) is absolutely without foundation. Another scholar has taken it for granted that the atheistic opinions which have been mentioned in the 16th chapter of the Gita, must, most probably, be Buddhistic, and come to the conclusion that the Gita must have come into- existence after the date of Buddha. Another scholar says that as in the verse " brahma-sutra padais-caiva " in the 13th chapter, the Brahma-Sutras have been mentioned, the Gita must have been written after the date of Brahma-Sutras; on the other hand, several others say that as the Gita has undoubtedly been taken as an authority in some places at least in the Brahma- Sutras, one cannot imagine that the Gita was later than the Brahma-Sutras. Still other scholars say that there could have been no time for Sri Krsna to recite the Bhagavadgita of 700 stanzas to Arjuna on the battle-field during the Bharata war. In the hurry and scurry of the war, the most that Sri Krsna could have told Arjuna would be about 40 or 50 very important and crucial verses or the import of them and that the expansion of these verses must have been made later on when the story of the war was recited by Samjaya to Dhrtarastra or by Vyasa to Suka or by Vaisampayana to Janamejaya, or by Suta to Saunaka, or at least when the original Bharata was expanded by some one into the ' Mahabharata '. When such an idea has taken root in the mind regarding the construction of the Gita, scholars have taken to diving into the ocean of the Gita and some scholars have declared seven

and others twenty-eight or thirty-six or one hundred verses to be the original verses of the Gita ! Some have even gone to the length of saying that there was no occasion whatsoever for explaining to Arjuna the philosophy of the Brahman on the battle-field and that this excellent treatise on the Vedanta philosophy has been interpolated by some one later on into the Mahabharata. It is not that these questions of external examination are totally useless. For instance, let us take the illustration of the petals of the flower or of the honey-comb which was mentioned above. In classifying vegetables, it is very necessary to consider the petals of their flowers ; and it has now been proved mathematically that there are to be found combs for storage of honey in a honeycomb which are made with the idea of economising as far as possible the quantity of wax and thereby reducing as far as possible the surface area of the external envelopes or combs without in any way reducing the cubic contents of the comb in weight of honey, and that thereby the inherent skill and intelligence of the bees can be proved. Therefore, taking into account these uses of such examination, I too have in the appendix at the end of this book, considered some important points arising in the external examination of the Gita. But those who want to understand the esoteric import of any book, should not waste time in these external examinations. In order to show the difference between those who understand the hidden message of Vakdevi and those who formally worship her, the poet Murari has given a very excellent illustration. He says : —

abdhir langhita eva vanarabhataih kim tvasya gambhiratam I apatalanimagnapivaratanur-janati manthacalah II

If one wants to know of the immense depth of the ocean, whom should he ask of it ? It is true that on the occasion of the war between Rama and Ravana, powerful and agile monkey warriors crossed the ocean without difficulty and reached Ceylon (Lanka); but how could these poor fellows have gained any knowledge of the immense depth of the ocean ? The only one who can know truly of this depth is the great Mandaracala (Mandara mountain) rooted in patala, which was placed by the gods at the bottom of the ocean, in order to make of it a "mantha" or churner at the time of the churning of the ocean.

According to this logic of the poet Murari, we must now take into account only the words of those scholarS and learned pereons who have churned the ocean of the Gita in order to draw out its moral. The foremost of these writers is the writer of the Mahabharata. One may even say that he is in a way the author of the present-day Gita. I will, therefore, in the first place shortly explain what is the moral involved in the Gita according to the writer of the Mahabharata.

From the fact that the Gita is called " Bhagavadgita " or " the Upanisad sung by the Blessed Lord " one sees that the advice given in the Gita to Arjuna is principally of the Bhagavata religion, that is to say, of the religion promulgated by the Bhagavan, because, Sri Krsna is known by the name " Sri Bhagavan " usually in the Bhagavata religion. It is stated in the commencement of the fourth chapter of the Gita (4. 1-3) that this religion was nothing new, but was something which had been preached by the Bhagavan to Vivasvan and by Vivasvan to Manu and by Manu to Iksvaku. And in the Exposition of the Narayaniya or Bhagavata religion at the end of the Santiparva of the Mahabharata, after the tradition of the Bhagavata religion in the various incarnations of Brahmadeva, that is, during the various kalpas has been described, it is stated in the description of the Tretayuga out of the present life of Brahmadeva, that : —

Tretayugadau, ca tato Vivasvan Manave dadau I Manus ca lokabhrtyartham sutayeksvakave dadau I Iksrakuna ca kathito vyapya lokanavasthitah II

(Ma. Bha. San. 348. 51-52).

i.e., "the Bhagavata religion has been traditionally handed down by Vivasvan to Manu and by Manu to Iksvaku ". These two traditions are consistent with each other (see my commentary on Gi. 4. 1). And in as much as the traditions of two different religions cannot be the same, one comes to the necessary conclusion, on seeing this unity of traditions, that the Gita religion and Bhagavata religion must be one and the same. But this matter does not depend on inference alone. Because, in the exposition of the Narayaniya or Bhagavata religion which is to be found in the Mahabharata itself, Vaisampayana has described the summary of the Gita to Janamejaya in the following words ;-

evam esa mahan dharmah sa te purvam nrpottama I kathito Harigitasu samasavidhikalpitah ||

(Ma. Bha. San. 346. 10). that is ; "Oh excellent king, Janamejaya ! this magnificent Bhagavata religion together with its ritual was described by me to you concisely on a former occasion namely, in the Harigita, that is, in the Bhagavadgita. ' ' And in the second foilowing chapter, it is clearly stated that this exposition of the Narayaniya religion :-

samupodhesvanikesu Kurupandavay or mrdhe I Arjune vimanaske ca gita Bhagavata srayam II

(Ma. Bha. San. 348. 8). that is ; " was made by the Blessed Lord when during the fight between the Kauravas and the Pandavas both the armies had become ready for war and Arjuna had become dejected i.e. 'vimanaska.' " From this it follows beyond doubt that the word " Harigita " in this place means the Bhagavadgita and nothing else. Thus, the preceptorial tradition of these two religions is the same. This " Bhagavata " or " Narayaniya " religion which has been twice mentioned in the Gita as being the subject matter of exposition, has the other names of " Satvata " or " Ekantika " religion, and where that religion is being expounded in the Mahabharata, its two-fold quality is described thus :-

Narayanaparo dharmah punaravrttidurlabhah I pravrttilaksanas caiva dharmo Narayanatmakah II

(Ma. Bha. San. 347. 80-81) that is ; " this Narayaniya religion is such as obviates re-birth (punar-janma) i. e. gives complete Release (moksa) and is also Energistic ( pravrttipara)" and then it is clearly explained how this religion is Energistic.

The word Energism " (pravrtti) is understood in popular acceptance as meaning, performing desirelessly the duties which pertain to one's status in life, according to the arrangement of the four castes, without taking up Asceticism {samnyasa). It, therefore, follows that the sermon given in

the Gita to Arjuna is of the Bhagavata religion and, in as much as that religion is Energistic, it also follows that the -writer of the Mahabharata looked upon that advice also as Energistic. Nevertheless, it is not that the Gita. contains only the Energistic Bhagavata religion. Vaisampayana has further said to Janamejaya :

yatlnam capi yo dharmah m te purmm nrpottama I

kathito Harigilasu samasavidhikalpitah II

(Ma. Bha. San. 348. 53). that is : — " this Bhagavata religion and side hy side with it ( capi I the renunciatory religion of ascetics (samnyasi) together with the relative ritual has, excellent King, been explained hy me to you before in the Bhagavadgita ". Still, although the renunciatory religion has in this way been mentioned in the Gita side hy side with the energistic religion of Action, yet the tradition of the Gita religion of Manu, Iksvaku etc. which has been mentioned in the Gita does not at all apply to the renunciatory religion ; it is consistent only with the tradition of the Bhagavata religion. It, therefore, follows Irom the statements referred to above that according to the writeT of the Mahabharata, the advice which has been given to Arjuna in the Glta relates principally to the Energistic Bhaga- vata religion traditionally handed down from Manu to Iksvaku etc., and that it contains a'reference to the renunciatory path of ascetics only as a side reference. That this progressive or Ener- gistic Naray amy a religion in the Mahabharata and the Bhagavata religion of the Bhagavata-Purana are fundamentally one and the same, will he seen to be quite clear from the statements made by Prthu, Priyavrata, Prahlada and other devotees of the Blessed Lord or from the other descriptions of the path of Desireless Action which are to be found elsewhere in the Bhagavata ( Bhagavata. 4. 22. 51-52 ; 7. 10. 23 and 11. 4. 6 ). But the true purpose of the Bhagavata-Purana is not to justify the Energistic principles in favour of Action contained in Bhagavata religion. This justification is to be found in the Mahabharata or principally in the Gita. But, it is stated in the earlier chapters of the Bhagavata, that while justifying these principles, Sri Vyasa forgot to define the moral value of

the devotional aspect of the Bhagavata religion, and as Desireless Action ( miskarmya ) by itself is useless without Devotion ( Bhagavata. 1. 5. 12 ), the Bhagavata-Purana had to be subsequently written to make up for this deficit. From this, the real import of the Bhagavata-Purana becomes quite clear ;' and on that account, the Euergistic aspect of the Bhagavata religion has not been as forcefully emphasised in the Bhagavata as the devotional aspect of devotion to the Blessed Lord, which has been explained by the recitation of numerous stories. Nay, the writer of the Bhagavata says that all yoga of Energism ( Karma-Yoga ) is useless in the absence of Devotion ( Bhag 1. 5. 34 ). Therefore, the Bhagavata-Purana which lays stress on Devotion is not — although it relates to the Bhagavata religion — as useful for determining the moral laid down in the Gita, as the Narayaniya Upakhyana of the Bharata itself which contains the Glta ; and if the Bhagvata-Purana is made use of for that purpose, then one must do so, bearing clearly in mind, that both the object and the time of the Bharata and the Bhagavata are quite different. The various questions as to -what were the original forms of the renunciatory religion of monks and of the Energistic Bhagavata religion, what the reasons were for this difference, in what respects the form of ithe original Bhagavata religion has changed in present times etc. will be considered later on in detail.

I have so far dealt with what the moral of the Gita is according to the writer of the Mahabharata himself. Let us now see what the purport of the Gita is according to those persons who have written commentaries [bhasya) and criticisms on the Gita. Among these commentaries and criticisms, the bhasya on the Gita, of Sri Samkaracarya is considered to be the most ancient. But there is no doubt that there had been numerous other commentaries or criticisms on the Gita before that date. These commentaries, however, are not now available and therefore, there are now no means for determining in what way the Gita was interpreted in the interval between the date of the Mahabharata and the birth of Samkaracarya. Nevertheless, - it is quite clear from the references to the opinions of these earlier critics which are to be found in the Samkarabhasya itself ( Gi. Sam. Bha. Introductions to Chap. 1 and 3 ) that the

commentators who had come before Samkaracarya had placed, an Energistic interpretation on the Gita, as combining Actiotu with Spiritual Realisation, that is to say, to the effect that every man who had acquired spiritual knowledge had never- theless to continue performing the duties pertaining to his- particular status in life so long as he lived— as had been done by the writer of the Mahabharata. But as this doctrine of the Vedic Karma-Yoga was not palatable to Samkaracarya, he has- in the commencement of the Bhasya, in the introduction, clearly stated that he had written the Bhasya with the sole intention, of refuting that opinion and of explaining what the esoteric moral of the Gita was according to himself. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what the word " bhasya " means. The two* words "' commentary " ( bhasya ) and " criticism " ( t'ika, ) are, it is true, often used as being synonymous. But ordinarily " tlka " means explaining the plain meaning of the original work and making the understanding of the words in it easy ; but the writer of the "bhasya" does not remain satisfied with that ; he critically and logically examines the entire work and: explains what its purport is according to his opinion and how that work has to be interpreted consistently with that purport. That is the nature of the Samkarabhasya on the Gita. But th& different way in which the Acarya has interpreted the moral of the Gita requires the previous history to be shortly mentioned before one understands the underlying reason for it, The Vedic religion was not purely ritualistic (tanfrilca) and the Upanisads had minutely considered even in very ancient times, the deep underlying import of it. But as these Upanisads have been written by different rsis at different times, they contain various kinds of thought and some of them are apparently mutually contradictory. Badarayanacarya has reconciled these inconsistencies and he has in his Brahma-Sutras harmonised all the Upanisads ; and on that account, the Vedanta-Sutras are considered to he as authoritative on this matter as the Upanisads themselves. These Vedanta-Sutras are also known by the other names of " Brahma-Sutras " or " Sariraka-Sutras ". Yet the consideration of the philosophy of the Vedic religion does not end here. Because, as the spiritual knowledge in the Upanisads is primarily ascetical, that is

renunciatory, and as the Vedanta-Sutras fcaire beam wrattiasc only with the intention of harmonising the Upaoisatk, nowhere even in the Upanisads any detailed sad fegial exposition of the Energistio Vedic religion. Therefore, when as stated above, the Energistic Bhagavadgita for the first time supplemented the philosophy of the Vedic religion it became, as a supplement to the religious philosophy in the vedas and in. the Upanisads, a work as authoritative and acceptable as both; and later on, the Upanisads, the Vedanta-Sutras and the Bhagavadgita acquired the colbctive name of "Prasthana- trayi " (the Trinity of Systems). " Prasthana-trayl " means the three principal authoritative works or pillars of the Vedic religion which systematically and scientifically expounded the two paths of Renunciation (mvrfti) and Energism (pravrtti). When once the Bhagavadgita came in this way to be included in the " Prasthana-trayl " and tha sovereignty of this "Prasthana-trayl" came to be firmly established, all religious opinions or cults which were, inconsistent with these three works or which could not find a place in them, came to be considered as inferior and unaccept- able by the followers of the Vedic religion. The net result of this was that the protagonist Acaryas of each of the various- cults which came into existence in India after the extinction of the Buddhistic religion, such as, the Monistic (advaita), the Qualified-Monistic ( visistadvaita ), the Dualistic (dvaita) and and the Purely Monistic (suddhadvaita) cults with the super- added principles of Devotion ( bhakti ) or Renunciation ( samnyasa ) had to write commentaries on all the three parts of the Prasthana-trayl ( and, necessarily on the Bhagavadgita. also ), and had somehow or other to prove that according to these three works, which had become authoritative and acceptable as Scriptures long before those cults came into- existence, the particular cult promulgated by them was the correct cult, and that the other cults were inconsistent with those Soriptures. Because, if they had admitted that these authoritative religious treatises would support other cults besides those propounded by themselves, the value of their particular cult would to that extent suffer and that was not desirable for any of these protagonists. When once this rule

of writing sectarian ( sampradayika ) commentaries on the Prasthana-trayi supporting a particular doctrine came into vogue, different learned writers began to propound in their criticisms their own interpretations of the moral of the Gita on the authority of the commentaries pertaining to their particular doctrine and such criticisms began to gain authority in those particular sects. The commentaries or criticisms which are now available on the Gita, are more or less all of this kind, that is to say, they are written by Acaryas pertaining to diverse sects ; and on that account, although the original Bhagavadgita propounds only one theme, yet it has come to be believed that the same Gita supports all the various cults. The first, that is the most ancient of these cults is that of Sri Samkaracarya, and from the point of view of philosophy, that cult has become the one most accepted in India. The first Samkaracarya was born in the year 710 of the Salivahana era (788 A. D.) and in the 32nd year of his age, he entered the caves (Saka. 710 to 742.) i. e. 788-820 A.D. The Acarya was a superman and a great sage and he had by his brilliant intellec- tual power refuted the Jain and the Buddhistic doctrines which had then gained ground on all sides and established his own Non-Dualistic (advaita) doctrine; and, as is well-known, he established four monasteries (matha) in the four directions of India for the protection of the Vedic religion contained in the Srutis and Smrtis and for the second time in the Kali-Yuga gave currency to the Vedic renunciatory doctrine or cult of Asceticism

(samnyasa ). Whatever religious doctrine is taken, it 

naturally falls into two divisions ; one is the philosophical aspect of it and the other, the actual mode of life prescribed by it. In the first part, the meaning of Release (moksa) is usually explained in a scientific and logical way after explaining what conclusions must be drawn as to the nature of the Paramesvara after a proper consideration of the material body pinda) in its relation of the Cosmos (brahmanda) ; in the other part, there is an explanation of how a man has to lead his life in this world, so that such mode of life should become a means for obtaining

that Release (moksa). According to the first of these, that is to say, according to the philosophical aspects of the doctrine, Samkaracarya says that (1) the multiplicity of the various objects in the world, such as, " I ", " You ", or all the other things which are visible to the eye, is not a true multiplicity, hut that there is in all of them a single, pure, and eternal Highest Self ( Parabrahman ), and various human organs experience a sense of multiplicity as a result of the Illusion (maya) of that Parabrahman ; (2) the Self (Atman) of a man is also fundamentally of the same nature as the Parabrahman- and (3) that it is not possible for any one to obtain Release (moksa) except after the complete Realisation (jnana) or personal experience of this identity of the Atman and the Parabrahman. This is known as Non-Dualism ( advaita-vada ), because, the sum and substance of this doctrine is, that there is no other independent and real substance except one pure self-enlightened, eternal, and Released Parabrahman ; that the multiplicity which is visible to the eyes is an optical illusion or an imaginary experience resulting from the effect of Illusion (maya) ; and that Maya is not some distinct, real, or indepen- dent substance, but is unreal (mithya) ; and, when one has to consider only the philosophical aspect of the doctrine, it is not necessary to go deeper into this opinion of Sri Samkaracarya. But that does not end there. Coupled with the Non-Dualistic philosphy there is another proposition of the Samkara doctrine relating to the mode of life, that, although it is necessary to perform the Actions pertaining to the state of a householder in order to acquire the capacity of realising the identity of the Brahman and the Atman by the purification of the mind, yet it will be impossible to obtain Release unless one discontinues those actions later on and ultimately gives them up and takes up samnyasa (asceticism); because, in as much as Action (karma) and Knowledge (jnana) are mutually antogonistic like light and darkness, the knowledge of the Brahman does not become perfect unless a man has entirely conquered all root tendencies (vasana) and given up all Actions. This second proposition is known as the Path of Renunciation ( nivrtti-marga ), or because in this path one ultimately gives up all Actions and remains rsteeped in Knowledge or Realisation it- is also called

" sai'unyasa-ni&tha" (the Path of Renunciation) or "jrlana-nidha' ( the Path of Realisation ). It is stated in the SarhkarabMsy: on the Upanisads and on the Brahmasutras that not only th Non-Dualistic philosophy hut also the Path of Rtnunciatioi that is to say, both the aspects of the cult of Samkara hav been preached in those books ; and in the Bhasya on the Glta, . definite conclusion has been drawn that the teaching of th Bhagavadgita is the same ( GI. Sam. Bha. Introduction; ai> Brahnia-Su. Sam. Bha. 2. 1. 14 ) ; and as authority for that. 1 has quoted such sentences from the Git a a,s " jPanatjiah san karmuni Ihisma-sut kurute " i. e., " all Action {karma) is redue to ashes in the fire of jnana " (Gi. 4. 37) and "sarm hirnuikML Partita jiiaiie jxjrisantapyaie " i.e., " all Actions culminate i Realisation (jiianaj " ( Gi 4. 33 ). In short, the Siir±arabhL=y has been written in order to show that the teaching of the GM is consistent with that particular Yedie path which — aftt proving it to he the most excellent one — was recommended "nj Sarhkaraearya, after he had refuted the Buddhistic .doctrines : and further, to show that the Glta is net in favour of the combination of Knowledge with Action, which was prescribed by the previous commentators: and to show that the Blesssd Lord has in the Glta preached to Arjuna the dc-etrine of the Samkara cult, that Action is only a means of aocjalring Knowledge and is inferior and that Release is ultimately obtained only by Knowledge combined with Renunciation of Action. If there had been any commentary on the Gita before the date of Samkaracarya, interpreting it as favouring Asceticism, such a commentary is not now available. Therefore, we must any that the first attempt to deprive the Gita of its Energistic form and to give it a Renunciatory doctrinal form was made by the Samkarabhasya. Those commentators on the Gita who came after Sri Samkaracarya and who followed his doctrines, such as, Madhusudana and others, have in this matter principally adopted the procedure of the Acarya. Yet, later on, there came into existence another queer idea, namely that the principal sacred canon enunciated in the Chandogyopanisad, namely, " TAT TVAM ASI " ie., "THAT ( Parabrahman ) ART THOU ( Svetaketu ) ", which is one of the sacred canons of the Non-Dualistic cult, is the canon which has.

been expatiated upon in the eighteen chapters of the Gita, but that the Blessed Lord has changed the order of the three parts of that sacred canon and taken " tvam " first and " tat " after that and " asi " last, and He has in this new order impartially allotted six chapters of the Gita to each of these parts' equally The Paisaca-bhasya on the Gita does not pertain to any particular doctrine but is independent and it is believed to have been written by Hanuman i. e., by Maruti. But such is not the case. This Bhasya has been written by the philosopher Hanuman, who has also written a criticism on the Bhagavata and it supports the path of Renunciation and in it, in some places, interpretations have been copied verbatim from the Samkarabhasya, In the same way, the older or modern Marathi translations of or commentaries on the Gita principally follow the Samkarabhasya ; and the English translation of the Bhagavadgita by the late Kashinath Trimbak Telang, published in the Sacred Books of East Series brought out by Professor Max Muller, is stated by him at the end at the introduction to that translation, to be as far as possible consistent with Sri Samkaracarya and the commentators of his school.

When once in this way, doctrinal commentaries on the Gita and on the other two works out of the Prasthana-trayl began to be written, the same course was later on followed by persons holding other doctrinal views. About 250 years after the coming to existence of the Samkara tradition which maintained the theory of Illusion (maya). Non-Dualism (advata) and Renunciation ( samnyasa ) Sri Ramanujacarya (both Saka 938 i. e, 1016 A. D ) founded the Qualified-Monism ( visistadvaita) tradition ; and in order to substantiate that cult he also, like Sri Samkaracarya has written independent commentaries (bhasya) on the Prasthana-trayl. including, of course, the Gita, This school is of the opinion that the doctrines of the Unreality of Illusion (maya} and Non-Dualism laid down by Samkaracarya were not correct and that although the three principles of Consciousness (jiva), Cosmos ( jagat) and Isvara were independent, yet in as much as jiva, i.e., consciousness ( cit ) and the cosmos (which is acit i.e., unconscious ) were both the body of one and the same Isvara, therefore, the cit-acit-bodied Isvara was one and alone and that out of this subtle' cit' and 'acit' in the

body of the Isvara, the gross cit and the gross acit or the numerous forms of Life and the Cosmos came into existence later on ; and Ramanujacarya says that from the philosophical point of view, this is the doctrine which has been enunciated by the Upanisads and the Brahma-Sutras (Gl. Rama. 2. 12 ; 13. 2). One may even say that the works of Ramanujacarya were responsible for the Qualified-Monism doctrine finding its way into the Bhagavata religion; because, the previous exposition of the Bhagavata religion to be found in the Mahabharata and in the Glta is seen to be on the basis of the Non-Dualistic cult. As Ramanujacarya belonged to the Bhagavata religion, he ought to have naturally realised that the Gita enunciated the Energistic path of Karma-Yoga. But as at the date of Jlainauujacarya, the Karma-Yoga of the original Bhagavata religion had practically come to an end it had acquired a Qualified-Monistic ( visistadvaita ) form in its philosophical aspect, and principally a Devotional form from the point of view of the mode of life, Ramanujacarya drew the further conclusions that although jnana, karma and bhakti (Devotion) are all three referred to in the Gita, yet the doctrine enunciated in the Gita is in essence Qualified-Monistic from the point of view of philosophy, and of Devotion to the Vasudeva from the point of view of mode of life; and that the Path of Action ( karma-nistha ) was something which led to Path of knowledge (jnana-nistha) and was not something indepen- dent ( Gi. Ra. Bha. 18. 1. and-3.1 ). But although Ramanuja- carya had effected a change in the cult of Samkara by substituting the Qualified-Monism for Non-Duality and Devotion for Renunciation, yet if Devotion is looked upon as the highest duty of man from the point of view of mode of life,, then the lifelong performance of the worldly duties pertaining to one's particular status, becomes an inferior mode of life ; and on that account the interpretation put on the Gita by Ramanujacarya must also be looked upon as in a way in favour of Renunciation of Action. Because, when once the mind has become purified as a result of an Energistic mode of life, and man has attained Realisation ( jnana), whether he, thereafter, adopts the fourth stage of life and remains steeped in the contemplation of the Brahman or he is steeped in the.

unbounded loving worship of the Vasudeva is just the same- from the point of view of Action (karma) ; that is to say, both are Renunciatory. And the same objection applies to the other cults which came into existence after the date of Ramanuja- carya. Although Ramanujacarya may have been right in. saying that the theory of the Non-Reality of Illusion is wrong and that one ultimately attains Release only by devotion to the Vasudeva, yet looking upon the Parabrahman and the Conscious Ego (jiva ) as ONE in one way, and different in other ways is a contradiction in terms and an inconsistency. Therefore, a third school which came into existence after the date of Sri Ramanujacarya, is of the opinion, that both must be looked upon as eternally different from each other and that there never can be any unity between them, whether partial or total, and therefore, this school is known as the Dualistc school. The protagonist of this school was Sri Madhvacarya, alias Srimadanandatirtha. He died in Saka 1120 ( 1198 A.D. ) and according to the Madhva school, he was then 79 years old. But Dr. Bhandarkar has in the English Book "Vaisnavism, Saivism, and other sects" recently published by him, established on the authority of stone inscriptions and other books ( see page 59 ) that Madhvacarya must ha taken to have lived from Saka 1119 to 1198 ( 1197 to 1276 A. D. ). Madhvacarya has shown in his commentaries on the Prasthana-trayl (which includes the Gita) that all these sacred books are in favour of the theory of Duality. In his commentary on the Gita, he says that although Desireless Action has been extolled in the Gita, yet Desireless Action is only a means and Devotion is the true and ultimate cult, and that when once one has become perfect by following the Path of Devotion, whether one thereafter performs or does not perform Action is just the same. It is true that there are some statements in the Gita such as, " dhyanat karmaphalatyagah '" ...i. e., " the abandonment of the fruit of the action ( i. e., Desireless Action ) is superior to the meditation on the Paramesvara ( i. e., Devotion ) " etc. which are inconsistent with this doctrine ; but, says the Madhvabhasya on the Gita, such sentences are not to be understood literally but as mere expletives and unimportant ( Gl. Mabha. 12. 30). The fourth school is the

school of Sri Vallabhacarya (born in Saka 1401 i. e. 1479 A. D.) This is also a Vaisnava School like those of Ramanuja and Madhvacarya. However, the opinions of this school Regarding the Conscious Ego (jiva) Cosmos (jagat ), and Isvara are different from the opinions of the Qualified-Monism or the Dualistic Schools. This school accepts the doctrine that the Conscious Ego (jlva) when pure and unblinded by Illusion (maya) and the Parabrahman are one, and are not two distinct things ; and that is why, this school is known as the pure Non-Dualistic (suddhadvaita), school. Nevertheless this School differs from the Samkara school on account of the other doctrines pertaining to it, namely that, the Conscious Ego (jiva) and the Brahman cannot be looked upon as one and the same in the same sense as is done by Sri Samkaracarya but that the varioup Souls are particles of the Isvara, like sparks of fire ; that the Cosmos, which is composed of Illusion, M not unreal ( mithya ) but Illusion is a Force which has separated itself from the Isvara at the desire of the Para- mesvara, that the Conscious Ego (jiva) which has become dependent on Illusion, cannot acquire the knowledge necessary for obtaining Release except by divine pleasure ; and that, therefore, Devotion to the Blessed Lord is the most important means of obtaining Release. This pleasure of the Paramesvara is also known by the other names of ' pusti ' ' posana ' etc. and, therefore, this cult is also known as ' pusti-marga '. In the books of this school on the Gita, such as the Tattvadipika and others, it is laid down that in at; much as the Blessed Lord has, after first preaching to Arjuna the Samkhya philosophy and the Karma-Yoga, ultimately made him perfect by treating him with the nectar of the philosophy of Devotion, Devotion but above all, the Devotion included in 'pusti-marga' — which entails the abandonment of home and domestic ties — is the most concentrated moral of the Gita and that on that account the Blesssd Lord has in the end given the advice : — " sarra- dharman parityajya mamekrm saranam vraja " — i.e.," give up all other religions and surrender yourself to Me alone " ( Gi. 18. 66 ). Besides these, there is .another Vaisnava cult, entailing the worship of Radhakrsna, which was promulgated by Nimbarka. Dr. Bhandarkar has established that this Acarya

lived after the date of Ramanujacarya and before the date of Madhvacarya ; that is to say about Saka. 1084 (1162 A. D.) The opinion of Nimbarkacarya regarding the Conscious Ego (Jiva) the Cosmos (jagat) and the Isvara is, that although these three an different from each other, yet the existence and activity of the Conscious Ego (jiva) and of the Cosmos are not independent but depend upon the desire of the Isvara; and that the subtle elements of the Conscious Ego (jiva) and of the Cosmos are contained ir the fundamental Isvara. In order to prove this doctrine Nimbarka has written an independent bhasya on the Vedanta- sutras, and Kesava Kasmiri Bhattacarya, who belongs to this school has written a commentary on the Bhagavadgita called " Tattvaprakasika ' and has shown in it that the moral laid down by the Gita is consistent with the doctrines of this school. In order to differentiate this school from the Qualified-Monism school of Ramanujacarya, one may refer to it as the Daal-Non- Dual (dvaitadvaita) school. It is quite clear that these different Devotional sub-cults of Duality and Qualified- Monism which discard the Samkara doctrine of Maya have come into existence because of the belief that Devotion, that is, the worship of a tangible thing, loses foundation and to a certain extent becomes forceless, unless one looks upon the visible objects in the world as real. But one cannot say that in order to justify Devotion, the theories of Non-duality or of Illusion have to be discarded. The saints in the Maharastra have substantiated the doctrine of Devotion without discarding the doctrines of Illusion and Non-Duality ; and this course seems to have been followed from before the time of Sri Samkaracarya. In this cult, the doctrines of Non-Duality, the illusory nature of things, and the necessity of abandonment of Action which are the concomittant doctrines of the Samkara cult are taken for granted. But the advice of the followers of this school, such as the Saint Tukarama is that Devotion is the easiest of the means by which Release in the shape of realising the identity of the Brahman and the Atman, can be obtained : " if you want to reach the Isvara, then this is the easiest way " ( Tuka. Ga. 3002. 2 ) ; and they say that the path of Devotion based on Non-Duality is the principal moral of the Gita in as much as the Blessed Lord himself has first told Arjuna that

klesodhikatarastesam avyaktasaktacetasam " ( Gl.12. 5 )...i. e., " con- centrating the mind on the Intangible Brahman is more difficult " and subsequently told him that : " bhaktasteliva me priyah " i. e., " my devotees are most beloved of me " ( Gi. 12. 20 ). The summing up of the Gita. which has been made by Sridhar Svami in his commentary on the Glta. ( Gl.18.78 ) is of this kind. But, the most valuable work relating to this school, though in the Marathi language, is the Jnanesvari. In this work it is stated that the Doctrine of Karma is dealt with in the first four out of the 18 chapters of the Gita, the Doctrine of Devotion in the next seven and the Doctrine of Jnana in the subsequent chapters and Jnanesvara himself has at the end of his book said that he has written his commentary " after consulting the Bhasyakaras (Samkaracarya)." But, as Jnanesvara. Maharaja had the wonderful skill of expounding the meaning "of the Gita, by numerous beautiful illustrations and com- parisons and also, as he has propounded the doctrines of Desireless Action and principally the doctrine of Devotion in a much better way than Sri Samkaracarya, the Jnanesvari must be looked upon as an independent treatise on the Gita. Jnanesvara Maharaja himself was a yogi. Therefore, he has written a very detailed commentary on that verse in the sixth chapter of the Gita which deals with the practice of the Patanjala Yoga, and in it he has said that the words of the Blessed Lord at the end of the chapter namely : " tasmadyogi bhavarjuna "...i. e., "therefore, Oh Arjuna, become a Yogi, that is, become proficient in the practice of the Yoga " show that the Blessed Lord has declared the Patanjala Yoga to be the

'pantharaja ' i. e., the most excellent of all paths. In short, 

different commentators have interpreted the Glta in their own ways by first declaring the Energistic path of Action ( Karma-Yoga ) preached by the Gita to be inferior, that is to say, merely a means for Realisation (jnana), and then going on to say that the Gita has preached the various philosophical doctrines, as also the highest duties from the point of view of Release, which are prescribed, by their respective schools, such as: Non-Dualism based on the doctrine of Illusion, coupled with Renunciation of Action; or Qualified-Monism based on the- reality of Illusion, coupled with Devotion to the Vasudeva; or

Dualism, coupled with worship of the Visnu; or pure Non-dualism,, coupled with Devotion; or the Non-Dualism of the Samkara cult, coupled with Devotion; or Patanjala yoga, coupled with Devotion; or Devotion pure and simple; or Yoga pure and simple; or Realisation of the Brahman pure and simple,*The several commentaries on the Gita by the Acarya of the various cults and the important criticisms pertaining to those cults in all fifteen, have been recently published at the Guzrathi Printing Press. This book is very useful for studying the opinions advanced by the various commentators side by side. — all of which are paths of Release, based on Renunciation. No one says that the Bhagavadgita looks upon the Karma-Yoga as the most excellent path of life. It is not that I alone say so. Even the well-known Marathi poet Vaman Pandit is of the same opinion. In his exhaustive commentary on the Gita, in the Marathi language known as Yathartha-dipika, he first says : — " But Oh, Blessed Lord, in this Kali-yuga each one interpretes the Gita according to his own opinion ", and he goes on to say : " Everyone on some pretext or other gives a different meaning- to the Gita but I do not like this their doing, though they are great ; what shall I do, Oh, Blessed Lord? " This is his complaint to the Blessed Lord. Seeing this confusion of the diverse opinions of the commentators, some scholars say that in as much as these various traditionary doctrines of Release are mutually contradictory and one cannot definitely say that any particular one of them has been recommended by the Gita, one has to come to the conclusion that the Blessed Lord has on the battle-field at the commencement of the war described individually, precisely, and skilfully all those various means of attaining Release — and specially, the three paths of Action (karma), Devotion (bhakti), and Realisation (jnana) and satisfied Arjuna in whose mind there had arisen a confusion about these diverse means of attaining Release. It is true that- some commentators do maintain that these descriptions of the various means of Release are not several or unconnected with each other, but the Gita has harmonised them with each other ; and finally, there are also to be found others who say that although the teaching of the Brahman in the Gita is apparently easy, yet the true import of it is very deep and no one can

understand it except from the mouth of a preceptor (Gi. 4. 34.), and that though there may be numerous criticisms on the Gita, yet, there is no other way to realise the true meaning of it, except from the mouth of a preceptor. These numerous interpretations of the Bhagavadgita, namely, the Energistic interpretation consistent with the Bhagavata religion made by the writer of the Mahabharata and the other purely Renunciatory ones made by several later Acaryas, poets, yogis, or devotees of the Blessed Lord, consistently with the different traditionary schools to which they respectively belonged, are likely to cause confusion and one will naturally ask whether it is possible that all these mutually contradictory interpretations can be put on one and the same work ; and if it is not only possible but even desirable, then why so ? !No one can entertain any doubt that these-various Acaryas who wrote the commentaries were learned, religious and extremely pure-minded. Nay, one may even say that the world has not to this day produced a philosopher of the calibre of Sri Samkaracarya. Then why should there have been such a difference between him and the later Acaryas ? The Gita is not such a pot of jugglery, that any one can extract any meaning he likes out of it. The Gita had been written long before these various schools of thought came into existence, and it was preached by Sri Krsna to Arjuna not to increase his confusion but to remove it ; and it contains a preaching of one definite creed to Arjuna( Gi. 5. 1, 2), and the effect of that advice on Arjuna has also been what it ought to have been. Then, why should there be so much confusion about the teaching of the Gita ? This question seems a really difficult one. But the answer of it is not as difficult as would appear, at first sight. Suppose, looking at a sweet and nice food-preparation, one says that it is made of wheat, and another one says it is made of ghee and a third one says, it is made of sugar, according to his own taste ; then, which one of them will you call wrong ? Each one is correct in his own way and ultimately the question what that food-preparation is, remains unsolved. Because, as it is possible to mix wheat, clarified butter, and sugar and to prepare from them various kinds of eatables such as 'ladus,' 'jilebi', 'ghiwar' etc. the particular eatable

cannot be sufficiently defined by saying that ghee or wheat or sugar is the principle element in it. Just as when the ocean was churned, though one person got nectar, another one got poison, and others got Laksmi, Airavata, Kaustubha, Parijata, and other articles, yet the real nature of the ocean was not thereby fixed, so also is the case of the commentators who have churned the ocean of the Gita on a doctrinal basis, or one may even say that just as, the same Sri, Krsna Bhagavan who had entered the Durbar at the time of the assassination of Kamsa, appeared to various persons in different forms, that is, he appeared to athletes-like adamant and to women like the God of Beauty ( Madana ) and to parents like their own son etc. (Bhag. 10. Pu. 43. 17,), so also although the Bhagavadgita is one and the same, people following different cults see it in a different light. Whatever religious cult may be taken, it is quite clear that ordinarily it must be based on some authoritative religious text or other ; otherwise that cult will be considered to be totally without authority and will not be acceptable to people. Therefore, however numerous the different cults of the Vedic religion may be, yet with the exception of a few specified things, such as, the Isvara, the Conscious Ego and the Cosmos and their mutual interrelations, all other things are common to all the various cults; and therefore, in the various doctrinal commentaries or criticisms which have been written on our authoritative religious texts, ninety per cent of the statements or stanzas in the original work are interpreted in more or less the same way. The only difference is as regards the remaining statements or doctrines. If these statements are taken in their, literal meaning, they cannot possibly be equally appropriate to all the cults. Therefore, different commentators, who have propounded different doctrines, usually accept as important only such of these statements as are consistent with their own particular cult, and either say that the others are unimportant, or skilfully twist the meanings of such statements as might be totally inconsistent with their cults, or wherever possible, they draw hidden meanings or inferences favourable to them- selves from easy and plain statements, and say that the particular work is an authority for their particular cult. For instance, see my commentary on Gita 2. 12 and 16;3. 19;6.3

and 18. 2. But it will be easily seen that laying down in this way that a book has a particular purport, and examining in the first place, without prejudice, the whole of the work, and drawing its implied purport without insisting that one's own cult is propounded by the Gita, or on any such other thing, are two totally different things.

If one gives up the doctrinal method of determining the purport of a book as faulty, one must show what other means there are for determining the import of the Gita. There is an old and more or less generally accepted rule on this matter in the form of a verse of the Mlmamsa writers, who were extremely skilful in determining the meanings of a particular book, chapter, or sentence. That verse is as follows ;—

   upakramopasamharav abhyaso 'purvatu phalam I 
     arthavadopapatti ca lingam tatparyamrnaye || 

The Mimamsa writers say that if one has to find out the purport of any particular writing, chapter, or book, then the seven things mentioned in the above verse are necessary ( i. e.,linga ), and all these seven things have got to be considered. The first two out of these are ' upakramopasamharau ', which mean the beginning and the end of the book. Every writer starts writing a book with some motive or other in his mind ; and when that particular object has been achieved, he completes his book. Therefore, the commencement and the end of the work have first to be taken into account in determining the purport of the book. Geometry has defined a straight line as a line which goes from the point of commencement straight to the last point without swerving above or below or to the right or to the left. The same rule applies to the purport of a book. That purport which is properly fixed between the beginning and the end of the book and does not leave or divert from either of them, is the proper purport of it. If there are other roads for going from the beginning to the end, all those roads must be considered as crooked roads or bye-paths. When the direction of the purport of a work has in this way been fixed with due consideration for the commencement and the end, one should ssa what things are told repeatedly in it, that is to say, of what things an ' abhyasa ' has been made. Because, whatever thing is intended by the writer of a book to be proved, he shows

numerous reasons in support of it on numerous occasions and refers to it as a definite proposition over and over again, saying each time : " therefore, this thing is proved ", or, " therefore, this particular thing has got to he done ", The fourth and the fifth means for determining the purport of the work are the new-ness ( apurvata ) and the effect (phala ) of it. ' Apurvata ' means something new. Unless the writer has something new to tell, he is usually not induced to write a new book ; at any rate, that used to be so when there were no printing-presses. Therefore, before determining the purport of a book one has in the first instance to see what it contains which is new, particular, or not previously known. In the same way. if some particular result has been achieved by that writing or by that book, that is to say, if it has had some definite effect, then one must also take into account that result or effect. Because, in as much as the book has been written with the express intention that that particular result or effect should be achieved, the object of the writer becomes clearer from the effect which has been achieved. The sixth and the seventh means are ' arthavada ' and ' upapatti '. ' Arthavada is a technical term of the Mimamsa school (Jai.-Su. 1. 2. 1-18 ). Although the thing about which a statement is to be made or the fact which is to be proved is fixed, the writer nevertheless, deals with many other things as occasion arises, whether by way of illustration or by way of comparison in the course of the argument, and whether for showing consistency or for showing the similarity or the difference, or in order to support his own side by showing the faults of the opposite side, or for the sake of grace or as an exaggeration, or by way of stating the previous history of the question, or for some other reason, with the idea of supplementing the argument, and sometimes without any reason whatsoever. The statements, which are made by the writer on such occasions, are given by way of glorification merely or of further elucidation or are only supplemental, though they might not be totally irrelevant to the subject-matter to be proved ; and therefore, it is not certain that such statements are always true.*

One may even say that the writer is not particularly careful to see whether or not the statements made in the- arthavada, are literally true ; and therefore, one is not justified in looking upon the statements made in an arthavada, as authoritative, that is to say, as indicating the conclusions arrived at by the writer with reference to the various subject- matters in it. Looking upon them as pure glorifications, that is to say, as hollow, irrelevant, or mere praise, the Mimamsa writers call them ' arthavada ', and they do not take into account these statements in determining the final conclusion to be drawn from the work. Even after all this, one has still to sea ultimately the upapatti. ' Upapatti ' or ' upapadana ' is the name given to the refuting of all things which would prove the contrary case and the subsequent logical and systematic martialling of things, which support one's own case,, when you are proving a particular point. When the two ends,, being the upakrama and the upasamhara, have once been fixed, the intervening line can be defined by the consideration of the arthavada and the upapatti. As the arthavada shows you what subject matter is irrelevant or merely auxilliary, the man who attempts to determine the conclusion of the book, does not touch the several bye-paths when once the arthavada has been determined ; and when once all the bye- paths have been abandoned and the reader or the critic takes to the correct path, the ladder of upapatti like the wave of the sea pushes him forward from stage to stage further and further from the beginning until at last he reaches the con- clusion. As these rules of determining the purport of a book laid down by our ancient Mimamsa writers are equally accepted by learned persons in all countries, it is not necessary to further labour their usefulness or necessity. * on it; and if the judgment contains any statements which are not necessary for determining the point at issue, these statements are not taken as authorities for the purpose of later cases. Such statements are known as "obiter dicta" or " useless statements ", and strictly speaking this is one kind of " arthavada ". G. R._3

Here some one may ask : Did not the various Acaryas, who founded the various cults, know these rules of Mimamsa ? And, if one finds these rules in their own works, then what reason is there for saying that the purport of the Gita drawn by the Mimamsa school is one-sided ? To that, the only answer is, that once a man's vision has become doctrinal, he naturally adopts that method by which he can prove that the cult which he follows is the cult established by authoritative religious treatises. Because, doctrinal commentators start with this fixed pre-conceived notion regarding the purport of a book, that if it yields some purport, inconsistent with their own doctrine, that purport is wrong, and that some other meaning is intended ; and though some rule of the Mimamsa logic is violated when they attempt to prove that the meaning, which in their opinion is the proved correct meaning has been accepted everywhere, these commentators, as a result of this fixed pre-conviction are not in the least perturbed thereby. The works Mitaksara and Dayabhaga etc. which deal with the Hindu Law, attempt to harmonise the Smrti texts on this principle. But the books of Hindu Law are not unique in this respect. Even, the numerous sectarian writers belonging to the numerous subsequent sects, of Christian and Mahommedan religions, twist in the same way the original works on those religions namely the Bible and Quran, and it is on the same principle that the followers of Christ have ascribed meanings to some of the sentences in the Old Testament of the Bible, which are different from those given to them by the Jews. Nay, wherever the number of the authoritative treatises or writings on any subject is fixed in advance and one has to subsequently justify one's own position on the basis of these limited authoritative books, the same method of determining the meaning of any book is seen to be followed. This also accounts for the way in which present-day legislators, pleaders or judges, very often twist

one way or the other, former authoritative or legal treatises. If such be the case with purely worldly matters, what wonder is there that divergent commentaries based on different traditions have been written on the Upanisads and the Vedanta- Sutras and side by side with them, on the third book out of the Prasthanatrayl, namely, the Bhagavadgita? But if one leaves aside this doctrinal method, and pays a little attention to the upakrama, upasamhara etc., of the Bhagavadgita, it will be seen that the Blessed Lord preached the Gita to Arjuna at the critical moment before the Bharata war was actually started, when the armies of both sides had formed themselves into ranks on the Kuruksetra and were on the point of opening the fight, and that He has done so with the idea of inducing Arjuna, — who had become dejected and was on the point of renouncing the world, — to perform his duties as a warrior by preaching to him the gospel of the Brahman. When Arjuna began to see who had come to fight with him taking the part of the unjust Duryodhana, he saw the old ancestor Bhisma, the preceptor Dronacarya, the preceptor's son Asvatthaman, the Kauravas ( who though antagonistic were yet his cousins ), and his next-of-kin, relations, friends, maternal uncles, paternal uncles, brothers-in-law, kings, princes, etc. ; and realising that in order to win the kingdom of Hastinapura, he would have to kill these people and thereby incur the greatest of sins like the destruction of one's own clan, his mind suddenly became dejected. On the one hand, the religion of the warrior was saying to him: "Fight!", and on the "other hand, devotion to his ancestors, devotion to his preceptors, love for his brethren, affection for his relatives, and other natural laws were pulling him backwards. If he fought, it would be a fight with his own people, and thereby he would incur the terrible sin of killing his ancestors, preceptors, relatives etc. ; and if he did not fight, he would be failing in his duty as a warrior ; and when in this way he was between the frying-pant and the Are, he was in the same position as a person caught between two fighting rams ! He was indeed a great warrior, but when he was suddenly caught in the moral net of righteousness and unrighteousness, he felt faint, his hair rose on end, the bow in his hand fell down and he suddenly flopped

down in his chariot, crying : "I shall not fight ! ", and ultimately the distant feeling of his duty as a warrior was overcome by the naturally more proximate feeling of love for his brethren and he in self-deception began to think to himself : — "It would be better to beg in order to fill the pit of the stomach, rather than that I should win the kingdom by committing such terrible sins as killing ancestors or preceptors or brethren or relatives or ex- terminating even the whole clan. It does not matter one whit if my enemies, seeing me unarmed at this moment, come and cut my throat, but I do not wish to enjoy that happiness which is steeped in the blood of my own relatives killed in warfare, and burdened with their curses. It is true the warrior-religion is there, but if on that account I have to incur such terrible sins as killing my own ancestors, brethren, or preceptors, then, may that warrior- religion and warrior-morality go to perdition. If the other side, not realising this, have become cruel in heart, I ought not do the same thing ; I must see in what consists the true salvation of my Self, and if my conscience does not consider it proper to commit such terrible sins, then, however sacred the warrior-religion may be, of what use is it to me in these circumstances ? " When in this way his conscience began to prick him and he became uncertain as to his duty ( dharma- sammudha ) and did not know which path of duty to follow, he surrendered himself to Sri Krsna, who preached the Gita, to him and put him on the right path ; and when Arjuna, wanted to back out of the fight, fearing that it would entail the death of Bhisma and others— though it was his duty to fight — Sri Krsna made him take up the fight of his own accord. If we have to extract the true purport of the teaching of the Gita, such purport must be consistent with this ' upakrama ' ( beginning ) and 'upasamhara' (conclusion). It would have been out of place here for Sri Krsna to explain how Release could be obtained by Devotion or by the Knowledge of the Brahman or by the Patanjala-yoga, which were purely renunciatory paths or paths entailing asceticism and abandon- ment of Action. Sri Krsna did not intend to send Arjuna to the woods as a mendicant by making a samnyasin of him, filling his mind with apathy (vairagya), nor to induce him to go to the Himalayas as a yogin wearing a loin cloth (kaupina)

and eating the leaves of the nim-tree. Nor did the Blessed Lord intend to place in his hands cymbals and a drum and a harp instead of bow and arrows and to make him dance again like Brhannala before the entire warrior community of India, on the sacred field of the Kura, steeped in the beatific happiness of loudly reciting the name of the Blessed Lord with supreme devotion, to the tune of those musical instruments. The dance which Arjuna had t-o make on the battle-field of Kura, after having finished his period of remaining incongnito (ajnata-vasa) was of quite a different nature. When the Blessed Lord was preaching the Gita, He has in numerous places, and showing reasons at every step and using the conjunction 'tasmat' i.e., 1 for this reason ' — which is an important conjunction showing the reason — said: — "tasmadyudhyasva Bharata" — i.e., " there- fore,O Arjuna, fight " (Gl. 2.18), or "tasmad uttistha Kaunteya yuddhaya krtaniscayah" — i.e., "therefore, determine to fight and rise ( Gi. 2.37 ), or " tasmad asaktah satatam karyam karma samacaya " — i. e., " therefore, give up attachment, and do your duty" ( Gi.3.19 ), or, "~kuru karmaiva tasmat tvam " — i.e. " therefore, perform Action " ( Gi. 4.15 ), or " tasmat..... mam anusmara yudhya ca " — i.e., "therefore, think of me and fight " ( Gi. 8. 7 ) ; " the doer and the causer of everything is I myself, and you are only the tool ; and therefore, fight and conquer your enemies " ( Gi. 11. 33 ) ; " it is proper that you should perform all Actions, which are your duties according to the Sastras *' ( Gi. 16. 24 ) — all which is a preaching definitely Energistic ; and in the eighteenth chapter of the upasamhara (conclusion), He says again : " you must do all these duties " (Gi. 18. 6), as His definite and best advice ; and ultimately asking Arjuna the question : — " Oh, Arjuna, has your self- deception, due to ignorance, yet been removed or not ? " ( Gi. 18. 72 ), He has taken an acknowledgment from him in the following words : —

  nastomohah smrtir labdha tvatprasadan mayacyuta I 
  sthito'smi gatasamdehah karisye vacanam tava II 

i. e., " my doubts and my ignorance about my duties, have now been removed ; I shall now do as You say ". And it is not that this acknowledgment was merely orally given by Arjuna, but thereafter, he did really fight and in the course of the fight

arising on that occasion, he has actually killed Bhisma, Karna, Jayadratha, and others as occasion arose. The objection taken to this by some is that : the advice given by the Blessed Lord preached Realisation (jnana) based on Renunciation (samnyasa), or Yoga or Devotion, and that that was the principal subject- matter of proof ; but that as the war had already started, the Blessed Lord has here and there briefly praised in His preaching the worth of Action and allowed Arjuna to complete the war which had been started ; that is to say, the completion of the war must not be looked upon as the central or the most important factor hut something which was auxilliary or merely an arthavada. But by such a spineless argument, the upakrama, upasamhara and phala of the Gita is not satisfactorily accounted for. The Blessed Lord had to show the importance and necessity of performing at all costs the duties enjoined by one's dharma while life lasts, and the Gita has nowhere advanced any such hollow argument as the one mentioned above for doing so ; and if such an argument had been advanced, that would never have appealed to such an intelligent and critical person like Arjuna. When the prospect of a terrible clan- destruction was staring him in the face, whether to fight or not, and, if fighting was the proper course, then how that could be done without incurring sin, was the principal question before him ; and however much one tries to do so, it will be impossi- ble to dismiss, as an arthavada, the definite answer given to this principal question in the following words, namely : — " Fight with a disinterested frame of mind," or " Perform Action ". Doing so would amount to treating the owner of the house as a guest. I do not say that the Gita has not preached Vedanta, or Devotion or the Patanjala Yoga at all. But the combination of these three subjects which has been made by the Gita must be such that thereby Arjuna, who was on the horns of a terrible dilemma of conflicting principles of morality, and who had on that account become so confused about his proper duty as to say : " Shall I do this, or shall I do that ? ", could find a sinless path of duty and feel inclined to perform the duties enjoined on him by his status as a warrior. In short, it is perfectly clear that the proper preaching in this place would be of Energism (pravrttij and that, as all other

things are only supporting Energism, that is, as they are all auxilliary, the purport of the Gita religion must also be to support Energism, that is, to support Action. But no com- mentator has properly explained what this Energistic purport is and how that implied moral can be authoritatively based on Vedanta philosophy. Whichever commentator is taken, he totally neglects the upakrama of the Gita, that is, its first, chapter and the concluding upasamhara, and the phala, and becomes engrossed in discussing from a Renunciatory point of view how the preaching in the Gita about the Realisation of the Brahman or about Devotion support their respective cults: as though it would be a great sin to link together a permanent union between Knowledge and Devotion on the one hand and Action (karma) on the other ! The doubt mentioned by me was experienced by one of these commentators who said that the Bhagavadgita must be interpreted keeping before one's eyes the life of Sri Krsna himself ;*

and the Non-Dualistic philosopher Paramahamsa Sri Krsnananda Svami, who has recently died at Kasi (Benares) has in the short Sanskrit monograph written by him on the Gita entitled Gitartha-paramarsa made the definite statement that : "tasmat gita nama Brahmavidyamulam nitisastram" — i. e., " therefore, the Gita is the philosophy of Duty, that is, the philosophy of Ethics based on the science of the Brahman (brahmavidya) " t The German philosopher Prof. Deussen, in his work called The Philosophy of the Upanisads has given expression to the same thoughts in one place with reference to the Bhagavadgita, and several other

Eastern and Western critics of the Gita have expressed the same opinion. Nevertheless, none of these persons have thoroughly examined the Gita or attempted to clearly and in detail show how all the statements, deductions,' or chapters in it can be explained as being connected together on the basis of the philosophy of Energism (karma). On the other hand. Prof. Deussen has said in his book that such a conclusion would be very difficult to justify. * Therefore, the principal object of this book is to critically examine the Gita, in that light and to show the complete consistency which is to be found in it. But before I do so, it is necessary to deal in greater detail with the nature of the difficulty experienced by Arjuna as a result of his having been caught on the horns of the dilemma of mutually contradictory ethical principles, for other- wise, the readers will not realise the true bearing of the subject- matter of the Gita. Therefore, in order to understand tha nature of these difficulties in the shape of having to decide between Action and Inaction and to explain how a man on many occasions becomes non-plussed by being caught in the dilemma of " Shall I do this, or shall I do that ? ", we shall now first consider the numerous illustrations of such occasions, which are come across in our sacred books and especially in the Mahabharata.

CHAPTER II.

THE DESiRE TO KNOW THE RIGHT ACTION

(KARMA-JIJNASA.)

kim karma kim akarmeti kavayo'py atra mohitah I *

Gita. 4. 16.

The critical position in which Arjuna had found himself in the commencement of the Bhagavadgita, as a result of being caught between two mutually contradictory paths of duty and become doubtful about bis proper duty is not something unique. The cases of persons who, taking up Asceticism (samnyasa), give up the world and live in the woods, or of self-centered weaklings who meekly submit to all kinds of injustice in the world without a murmer, are different. But those great and responsible persons, who have to live in society and to do their duties consistently with righteousness and morality often find themselves in such circumstances. Whereas Arjuna got confused and was filled with this desire to know his proper duty in the commencement of the war, Yudhisthira, was in the same position when he was later on faced with the duty of performing the sraddha ceremonies of the various relatives who had been killed in the war ; and the Santiparva has come to be written in order to pacify the doubts by which he was then puzzled. Nay, great writers have written charming poems or excellent dramas based on such puzzling situations of duty and non-duty which they have either found in history or imagined. For instance, take the drama Hamlet of the well-known English dramatist Shakespeare. The uncle of the Prince of Denmark, named Hamlet had murdered his ruling brother, that is, the father of Hamlet, and married his widow and seized the throne. This drama has portrayed in an excellent manner the state of mind of the young and tender-hearted Hamlet, who on this

• " What is doable (right action), and what it is not-doable

(wrong action or inaction) is a question which puzzles even sages". In this place, the word "akarma" (not-doable) must be interpreted as meaning 'absence of action' or 'wrong action' according to the context. See my commentary on the verse.

KARMA-JIJNASA

Occasion was faced with the puzzle as to whether he should put to death his sinful uncle and discharge his filial obligations towards his father, or pardon him, because he was his own uncle, his step-father, as also the ruling king ; and how he later on became, insane because he did not find any proper path- shower and guardian like Sri Krsna ; and how ultimately the poor fellow met his end while vacillating between " to be " and " not to be ". Shakespeare has described another similar occasion in a drama of his called Coriolanus. Coriolanus was a brave Roman potentate, who had boon driven out of Rome by the citizens of Rome and on that account had gone and joined hands with the enemies of Rome, whom he promised never to forsake. After sometime, the camp of the hostile army under his command came to be placed outside the gates of Rome itself, he having attacked and defeated the Romans and conquered teiritory after territory. Then, the women of Rome put forward the wife and the mother of Coriolanus and advised him as to his duty to his motherland, and made him break the promise given by him to the enemies of Rome. There are numerous other similar examples of persons being puzzled as to duty and non-duty in the ancient or the modern history of the world. But it is not necessary for us to go so far. We may say that our epic Mahabharata is a mine of such critical occasions. In the beginning of the book (A. 2), while describing the Bharata, Vyasa himself has qualified it by the adjectives " suksmartha-nyayayuktam " (i. e., filled with the discrimination between subtle positions ) and " aneka samayanvitam " (i.e., replete with numerous critical occasions ), and he has further praised it by saying that, not only does it contain the philosophy of Ethics ( dharma-sastra), the philosophy of wealth {artha-sastra) and the philosophy of Release ( moksa-sastra ) but that in this matter, "yad ihasti tad anyatra yan nehasti na tat kvacit", i.e., "what is to be found here, is to be found everywhere and what cannot be found here can be found nowhere else". (A. 62. 53). It may even be said that the Bharata has been expanded into the ' Mahabharata ' for the sole purpose of explaining to ordinary persons in the simple form of stories how our great ancient personages have behaved in numerous difficult circumstances of life; for,

otherwise, it would not be necessary to writs 18 parvas (cantos) for describing merely the Bharata war or the history known as 'jaya' .

   Some persons may say : " Keep aside the case of Sri 

Krsna and Arjuua ; why is it necessary for you or us to enter into such deep questions ? Have not Manu and the other writers of the Smrtis laid down in their own books, clear rules as to how persons should behave in worldly life ? If one follows the ordinary commandments prescribed for everybody in all religions, such as : 'Do not commit murder ', ' Do not hurt others', ' Act according to moral principles', ' Speak the truth ', ' Respect your elders and your preceptors', ' Do not commit theft or adultery', etc., where is the necessity of enter- ing into these puzzling questions ?" But I will in reply ask them : "So long as every human being in this world has not started living according to these rules, should virtuous people, by their virtuous conduct, allow themselves to be caught in the nets spread by rascals or should they give measure for measure by way of retaliation and protect themselves ?" Besides, even if these ordinary commandments are considered as unchanging, and authoritative, yet responsible persons are very often faced with such situations, that two or more of these commandments become applicable simultaneously ; and then, the man is puzzled as to whether he should follow this commandment or that commandment, and loses his reason. The situation into which Arjuna had found himself was such a situation ; and the Mahabharata contains in several places critical descriptions of similar circumstances having engulfed other illustrious persons besides Arjuna. For instance, let us take the precept of "Harmlessness" (ahimsa) which is one of the five eternal moral principles enjoined by Manu (Manu. 10. 63) as binding on all the four castes namely, "ahimsa satyam asteyam saucam indriya- nigrahah " i. e., Harmlessness (ahimsa), Truth (satya), Not- stealing (asteya) Purity of the body, the mind, and of speech (sauca) and Control of the organs (indriya-nigraha). "Ahimsa paramo dharmah" i. e., "Harmlessness is the highest religion"' (Ma. Bha. A. 11. 13.), is a principle which has been accepted as pre-eminent not only in our Vedic religion but in all other- religions. The religious commandments given in the Buddhistic.

and Christian sacred books have given the first place to the commandment 'Thou shalt not kill' as has been done by Manu. 'Himsa' does not mean only destroying life but also includes, harming the minds or the bodies of others. Therefore, 'ahimsa' means 'not harming in any way any living being'. Patricide, matricide, homicide, etc. are the most terrible forms of himsa and this religion of Harmlessness is looked upon as the highest, religion according to all people in the world. But, assuming for the sake of argument that some villain has come, with a weapon in his hands to kill you, or to commit rape on your wife or daughter, or to set fire to your house, or to steal all your wealth, or to deprive you of your immoveable property ; and, there is nobody there who can protect you ; then should you close your eyes and treat with unconcern such a villain (atataym) saying : " ahimsa paramo dharmah ?" or should you, as much as possible, punish him if he does not listen to reason ? Manu says : —

    gurum va balavrddhau va brahmanam va bahusrutam 1 
        atatayinam ayantam hanyad evavicarayan II 

i.e., " such an atatayin that is, villain, should be killed without the slightest compunction and without considering whether he is a preceptor (guru) or an old man or a child or learned Brahmin ". For the Sastras say : on such an occasion, the killer does not incur the sin of killing, but the villain is killed by his own unrighteousness (Manu. 8. 350). Not only Manu, but also modern criminal law has accepted the right of self-defence with some limitations. On these occasions, self-protection is considered to be of higher importance than Harmlessness. The killing of tender infants (bhruna-hatya) is considered to be the most objectionable of murders; but, if the child is being born by transverse presentation, is it not necessary to cut the child and deliver the mother? The slaughter of animals for the purposes of ritualistic sacrifice (yajna) is considered blameless even by the Vedas (Manu. 5. 31) ; yet, that at least can be avoided by making an animal of flour for purposes of sacrifice (Ma. Bha. San. 337 ; Anu. 115. 56). But how are you going to stop the killing of the numerous micro-organisms with which the air, water, fruit

etc., and all other places are filled ? Arjuna in the Maha- bharata says:-

   suksmayomni bhutani tarkagamyani kanicit I 
   paksmano 'pi nipatena yesam syat skandha-paryayah II 

(Ma. Bha. San. 15. 26). i.e., " there are in this world so many micro-organisms invisible to the naked eye, of which the existence can, however, he imagined, that merely by the moving of one's eye-lids, their limbs will be destroyed " ! Then, where is the sense of repeat- ing orally : ' Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not kill " ? It is on the basis of this discrimination, that hunting has been justified in the Anusasanaparva (Anu. 116). In the Vana-parva, there is a story that a Brahmin, being urged by anger to destroy a virtuous woman, and heing unsuccessful, surrendered himself to that woman ; then, that woman sent him to a hunter in order to learn from him the true import of one's duties. This hunter earned his living by selling flesh and he was extremely devoted to his parents. Seeing the way in which the hunter was earning his living, this Brahmin was filled with intense surprise and sorrow. Then the hunter explained to him the true principle of Harmlessness and opened his eyes ! Does not everybody eat everybody else in this world ? " Jivo jivasya jivanam ' (Bhaga. 1. 13, 46) i.e., " life is the life of life ", is an eternal truth; and it is stated not only in the Smrtis (Manu. 5. 28 : Ma. Bha. 15. 21) but also in the Upanisads (Ve. Su. 3. 4. 28; Chan. 5. 2. 1 ; Br, 6. 1. 14) that in times of distress " pranasyan- nam idain sarvam", i.e., " all this is the food for life ". If every one becomes harmless, how is warriorship to continue ? And when once warriorship has come to an end, subject-people will have no protectors and anybody will he in a position to destroy anybody else. In short, the ordinary rules of morality are not always sufficient, and even the most principle maxim of Ethics, namely that of Harmlessness, does not escape the necessity of discrimination between the duty and the non-duty.

  The Sastras have recommended the qualities of forgiveness, 

peace and kindness 'consistently with Harmlessness, but how will it be possible to practise peace on all occasions? Prahlada in the Mahabharata first points out to his grandson Bali, that people will not stop at openly running away with even the

wife and children of an always peaceful man and he advises Bali as follows :-

  na sreyah satatam tejo na nityam sreyasi ksama I 
  ..................................................................................
  tasman nityam ksama tata panditair apavadita II 

i. e. " Forgiveness in all cases or warlikeness in all cases ia not the proper thing. Therefore, 0, my son ! the wise have mentioned exceptions to the law of forgiveness" (Vana. 28. 6, 8). Prahlada has then described some of the occasions which would be proper occasions for forgiveness, but Prahlada does not explain the principle by which these occasions are to be recognised ; and if some one takes advantage of the prescribed exceptions, without knowing the occasions when they apply, he will be guilty of misbehaviour ; therefore, it is extremely important to understand the principle by which these occasions are to be recognised.

There is another law which has become wholly authori- tative and acceptable to everybody in the world, whether old or young, and male or female, in all countries, and among all religions, and that is the law of Truth. Who can sufficiently praise the worth of Truth ? ' Rtam' and ' satyam- ' came into existence before the world. The Vedas extol the worth of Truth by saying that it is satya which controls the firmament, the earth, the air and the other primordial elements. See the incantations : " rtam ca satyam cabhiddhat tapaso 'dhyajayata " (R. 10. 190. 1) i. e. " Law (rtam) and Truth (satyam) have been brought into existence after tho performance of effulgent penance ", and " satyenottabhita bhumih." (R. 10. 85. 1) i.e." the Earth has become dignified on account of Truth ". The root meaning of the word ' satya ' is ' which exists, ' that is, ' which never ceases to exist, ' or ' which is not touched by the past, present or the future ' ; and therefore, the value of salya has been properly described by saying : " there is no religion like Truth, Truth is Parabrahma ". The statement : " nasti satyat paro dharmah " (San. 162. 24) i. e. " there is no religion higher than Truth ", is found in many places in the Mahabharata. which also says :-

 asvamedha-sahasram ca satyam ca tulaya dhrtam I 
 asvamedha-sahasrad dhi satyam eva -visisyate II 

i. e. " when the respective merits of a thousand asvamedha yajnas and of Truth were weighed in the scale, it was found that Truth weighed more " (A. 74. 102). This refers to the ordinary rule of Truth. Manu in addition says about speaking the truth that :-

   vacyartha niyatah sarve vanmula vagvinihsrtah I 
   tain tu yah stenayed vacam sa sarvasteya-krnnarah II 

(Manu. 4. 256). i. e. " all the activities of mankind are carried on by speech; there is no other means like speech for the communication of thoughts ; then, that man who sullies this fountain-head of speech, which is the basic foundation of all these activities, that is to say, the man who is false to his own speech must be said to be despoiling everything at one stroke". Therefore, says Manu: " satyaputam vaded vecam " (Manu, 6. 46) that is, "Speak only that which has been purified by Truth. " In the Upanisads also, the law of Truth has been given a higher place than all other laws, in the following words: "satyam, vada | dharmam, cara I" (Tai. 1.11.1) that is : "Speak the truth, do what is right " ; and Bhisma, who was lying on the bed of arrows, after having in the Santiparva and the Anusasanaparva taught to Yudhisthira all the various laws, has before yielding up his breath preached to every one the law of Truth as being the sum and substance of all laws, in the following words : "satyesu yatitavyam vah satyam, hi paramam balam" i.e. "You should strive for Truth, in as much as Truth is the highest power." (Ma. Bha. Anu. 167. 50). "We find that the very same laws have been adopted into the Buddhistic and Christian religions.

 Can any one dream that there can be exceptions to this 

eternally-lasting law of Truth, which is thus established on all hands? But life in this world, which is full of villains, is difficult. Suppose, you have seen some persons escaping from the hands of marauders and hiding in a thick forest; and the marauders, who follow them with naked swords in their hands, stand before you and ask you, where those people are ! What answer will you give ? Will you, speak the truth or will you save the lives of unoffending and innocent people ? I ask this

"question because, preventing the murder of innocent people is -according to the Sutras a religion, as highly important as 'Truth itself. Manu says:—"naprsth(ah kasyacid bruyan na canyayena prcchatah" (Manu. 2. 110; Ma. Bha. San. 287. 34) — that is, "Do not speak to anyone unless he questions you, and if some one asks you a question unjustly, then, do not give a reply, even if you are questioned"; and, "junann api hi medhavi jadaval loka acaret ' ' — i.e. "even if you know the answer simply say : 'hm ! hm !' like an ignorant person", and save the situation. Very well ; but, is not saying merely : 'Hm ! hm !' in effect speaking the untruth ? It is stated in many places in the Bharata itself that : na vyajena cared dharmam", i.e. "do not somehow satisfy yourselves by being false to morality; morality is not deceived, it is you who are deceived" (Ma. Bha. A. 215. 34). But if you cannot save the situation even by saying : ' Hm ! hm ! ', what is to be done ? What will you do if a thief is sitting on your chest with a dagger in his hand and asking you where the money is, and you are sure to lose your life if you do not give a proper reply ? Tho Blessed Lord Sri Krsna who understood the inner meaning of all laws says to Arjuna in the Karnaparva (Ka. 69. 61), after giving him the illustration of highway robbers mentioned above, and later on in the Satyanrtadhyaya, of the Santiparva, Bhisma also says to Yudhisthira : — "

akujenena cen mokso nuvakujet kathamcana I avasyam kujitavye va sankeran vapy akujanat I sreyas tatranrtam vaktum satyad iti vicaritam II (San. 109. 15, 16.)

i.e. "if you can escape without speaking, then do not speak under any circumstances: hut if it is necessary to speak, or if by not speaking you may rouse suspicion in the mind (of another), then, telling a He has been found, after mature deliberation, to be much better than speaking the truth." Because, the law of Truth is not confined to speech, and that conduct which leads to the benefit of all, cannot be looked upon as objectionable merely on the ground that the vocal expression is untruthful. That by which everybody will be

harmed is neither Truth nor Harmlessness. Narada says to Suka in the Santiparva on the authority of Sanatkumara :-

  satyasya vacanam sreyah satyad api hitam vadet | 
  yad bhuta-hitam atyantam etat satyam matam mama II 

(Ma. BhS. San. 329.13; 287. 19). i. e., "speaking the truth is the proper thing ; but rather than truth, speak that which will lead to the welfare of all ; because, that in which the highest welfare of all consists is in my opinion the real Truth ". Seeing the words ' yad bhuta-hitam ', one will certainly think of the modern western Utilitarians, and these words may be looked upon as an interpolation. I, therefore, say that these words have appeared more than twice in the Vanaparva of the Bharata in the conversation between the Brahmin and the hunter ; and in one of those places, there is a verbal change as : " ahimsa satya-vacanam sarva-bhuta- hitam param " (Vana. 206. 73), and in another place, there is another verbal difference as : "yad bhuta-hitam atyantam tat satyam iti dharana " (Vana. 208. 4). There is no other reason for the fact that the truthful Yudhisthira confused Drona by the ambiguous answer : " naro va kunjaro va " i. e., "either the man (named Asvatthama) or the elephant ", and the same rule applies to other similar things. Our religion does not ask us to save the life of a murderer by telling a lie. Because, as the Sastras themselves have prescribed the punishment of death for a murderer, such a person is certainly punishable or fit for death, All the Sastras say that one who bears false witness on such or similar occasions, goes to hell personally, and also sends to ths" same place seven or more of his ancestors (Manu. 8.89-99 ; Ma. Bha. A. 7. 3). But what are you going to do ""when, as in the illustration of the highway robbers given above from the Karna-parva, speaking the truth will lead to innocent persons being unnecessarily killed ? The English writer Green has in his book named Prolegomena to Ethics said that books on moral philosophy are silent on this question. It is true that Manu and Yajnavalkya look upon such situations as excep- tions to the law of Truth. But as even according to them,

untruthfulness is the less praiseworthy conduct, they have prescribed a penance for it in the following words :-

   tat pavanaya nirvapyas caruh sarasvato dvijaih II 

( Yajna. 2. 83 ; Manu. 8. 104-6 ). i. e., "Brahmins should expiate that sin by offering the 'Saras- vata' oblation".

Those learned Western philosophers who have not been surprised by the exceptions to the law of Harmlessness, have attempted to blame our law-givers on account of the exceptions to the law of Truth ! I will, therefore, explain here what, authoritative Christian preachers and Western writers on. Ethics have said on this subject. The following words of St. Paul who was a disciple of Christ namely : for, if the truth of" God hath more abounded through my lie unto His glory ; why yet am I also judged as a sinner ? " ( The Romans 3. 7 ) are to- be found in the New Testament of the Bible ; and Millman, who has written a history of the Christian religion says that ancient Christian preachers very often followed the same principle. Moralists will not in the present times, as a rule,, consider it justifiable to delude people or to cheat them and convert them. Nevertheless, even they do not say that the law of Truth is without exception. Take, for instance, the book on. Ethics written by the scholar Sidgwick, which is being taught in our colleges. Sidgwick decides questions of morality, where there are doubts as to what is doable and what not-doable, by the rule of the ' greatest happiness of the greatest number' ; and by the test of that principle he has ultimately laid down that : "We do not think that truth ought always to be told to children, or madmen, or invalids, or by advocates ; and we are not sure that we are bound to tell it to enemies or robbers, or even to persons who ask question which they know they have no right to ask (if a mere refusal to answer would practically reveal an important secret)". (Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics Book III Chapter XI, Paragraph 6, p. 355, 7th Edition. Also see pp. 315-317). Mill has included this exception to the law of Truth in his book on Ethics. * Besides these exceptions, Mill's Utilitarianism, Chapter II, pp. 33-34 ( 15th Ed. Longman's 1907 ).

Sidgwick also says in his book that : "Again, though we esteem candour and scrupulous sincerity in most persons, we scarcely look for them in a diplomatist who has to conceal secrets, or in a tradesman describing his goods, (for purchasers can find out the defects of what they buy)". * In a third place, he says that similar exceptions are made in favour of Christian missionaries and soldiers. Leslie Stephen, another Western writer, who discusses Ethics from the material point of view, gives other similar illustrations and says ultimately that : " It seems to me that the known consequences of an action must always be relevant to its morality. If I were absolutely certain that a lie would do good, I should certainly hesitate before speaking the truth, and the certainty might be of such a kind as to make me think it a duty to lie ". Green, who has considered the subject of Ethics from the metaphysical (adhyatma) point of view, definitely says with reference to such occasions, that in these cases the principles of Ethics do not satisfy the doubts of men ; and ultimately comes to the conclusion that : " A true Moral Philosophy does not recognise any value in conformity to the universal rule, simply as such, but only in that which ordinarily issues in such conformity, viz., the readiness to sacrifice every lower inclination in the desire to do right for the sake of doing it ". The same is the opinion of other Western writers on Ethics, such as, Bain, Whewell, and others. §

If you compare the rules laid down by the Western philosophers mentioned above, with the rules laid down by our

• Sidgwick Methods of Ethics, Book IV Chap. Ill, Para. 7.

P. 454, 7th Ed. and Book II Chap. V Para. 3, P. 169.

  Leslie Stephen's, Science of Ethics Cha. IX. Para 29, p.369

(2nd Ed.) " And the certainty might be of such a kind as to make me think it a duty to lie ".

Green's Prolegomena to Ethics Para 315 p. 379, 5th Cheaper 

Edition. ,

  § Bain's Menial and Moral Science, p. 445 (Ed. 1875); Whewell's 

Elements of Morality, Bk. II, Oh. XIII and XIV, (4th Ed. 1864).

lawgivers, you will clearly see who had greater respect for Truth. It is true that our religions texts (Sastras) say :-

na narmayuktain vacanam hinasti na strisu rajan na vivahakale I pranatyaye sarvadhanapahare pancanrtuny ahur apatakani II

(Ma. Bha. A. 82. 16).

i.e., " There is no sin in speaking the untruth on the following five occasions, namely, if in joke or while speaking with women or at the time of marriage, or if your life is in danger, or for protecting your own property. " (See alson San. 109 and Manu._ 8. 110). But that does not mean that one must always speak the untruth in speaking with women, and these exceptions are to be understood in the same way in the Mahabharata, as those mentioned by Prof. Sidgwick with reference to " children, or madmen or invalids ". But Western philosophers, who have shelved the metaphysical as also the next-world view of the matter, have gone further and have barefacedly permitted even merchants to tell any lies they like for their own benefit, which is a thing our lawgivers have not done! It is true that where there is a conflict between Verbal Truth, that is to Bay, truthful speech, and Practical Truth, that is to say, the benefit of humanity, they have permitted that the situation may be saved by telling a lie, if, from the practical point of view, that is unavoidable. Nevertheless, as they look upon the moral laws of Truth etc. as permanent, that is to say, immutable under all circumstances, they have considered this speaking of untruth as a sin to a certain extent, from the next- world point of view, and have prescribed relative penances. Purely materialistic philosophers will say, that these penances are mere bug-bears. But as those who prescribed these penances or those for whom these penances were prescribed, were not of the same opinion, one has got to say that both these classes look upon these exceptions to the law of Truth as the less proper course of conduct ; and the same moral has been conveyed by the relative traditional stories on this point. For instance, Yudhisthira, on a difficult occasion, half- heartedly and only once, uttered the words " naro va

kunjaro va." But on that account his chariot, which till then used to move in the air about four inches above- the surface of the earth began to move in contact with the earth like the chariots of other people, and he had also to spend a few hours in hell, as has been stated in the Maha- bharata itself (Drona. 191. 57, 58 and Svarga. 3.15). In the same way, as Arjuna killed Bhisma, taking shelter behind Sikhandi, though according to the laws of warfare, he had to suffer defeat later on at the hands of his son Babhruvahana,, as has been stated in the Asvamedhaparva (Ma. Bha. Asva. 81. 10). From this it will be seen that these exceptions, which have been contigently permitted, are not to he treated as the rule or as authority, and that our religious writers have drawn, the following ultimate philosophical proposition, namely :-

atmahetoh pararthe va narmahasyasrayat tatha I 
ye mrsa na vadantiha te narah svargagaminah II 

that is : " those persons alone attain heaven, who never speak the untruth in this world, whether for their own benefit, or for the benefit of others, or in joke ; " as was explained by Mahadeva to Parvati. (Ma. Bha. Anu. 144. 19).

The law of Truth consists in performing one's promises or vows. Sri Krsna and Bhisma both said, that the Himalaya might move from its site, or fire itself would become cold, but what they had said would not be otherwise (Ma. Bha. A 103 and U. 81. 48) ; and even Bhartrhari has described righteous- persons in the following terms :~

tejasvinah sukham asun api samtyajanti I satyavratavysanino na punah pratijnam II

(Nitisataka.110)

that is : " illustrious i.e. high-principled persons will willingly sacrifice their lives, but will not break a vow ". In the same way, the vows of Dasarathi Ramacandra of being true to his speech and shooting only one arrow have become as famous as his- vow of monogamy, as appears from : " dvih saram nabhisamdhatte Ramo dvir nabhibhasate " i.e., " Sri Rama had not to draw an arrow twice nor did lie prevaricate " — (Subhasita) ; and there are tales in the Puranas ; that Hariscandra served as a domestic for drawing water in the home of a burner of dead.

bodies in order to carry out a promise which he had given in a dream. But, on the other hand, it is stated in the Vedas that even the gods themselves broke the pledges made by them with Vrtra or found out some loop-holes in them and killed Vrtra; and the murder of Hiranyakasipu is justified in the Puranas on the same basis. Besides, some agreements made in ordinary life are such as are considered unlawful or unfit for observance according to law. A similar story is related in the Maha- bharata with reference to Arjuna. Arjuna had made a vow that he would immediately behead any person who asked him to surrender his Gandiva bow to another. Later on, when Karna had defeated Yudhisthira in the war, and Yudhisthira naturally said to him (Arjuna) in despair : " What has been the use of your Gandiva bow to us ? Throw it away from your hands ", Arjuna rose, sword in hand, to behead Yudhisthira. But as Sri Krsna was near him at the time, he critically expounded to him the religion of Truth from the philosophical point of view, and said to him : " You are a fool, you do not understand the subtle points of morality, and you must learn them from your elders; you have not learnt at the feet of elders — ' na vrddhah sevitas tvaya '. If you wish only to be true to your vow, then deprecate Yudhisthira, because for respectable persons, deprecation is as painful as death, etc."; and he thus saved him from the sin of murder of an elder brother which he would have thoughtlessly committed, as has been stated in the Karnaparva. ( Ma. Bha. Karna. 69 ). The discrimination between Truth and Falsehood which was made by Sri Krsna on this occasion, has been subsequently preached by Bhisma to Yudhisthira in the Satyanrtadhyaya of the Santiparva ( San. 109 ) ; and all must bear it in mind in relation to the affairs of ordinary life. Yet, it is difficult to explain how to recognise these subtle excep- tions, and my readers will readily notice that although the law of fraternity was in this particular case looked upon as superior to the law of veracity, yet, the occasion mentioned in the Gita was just the oppposite, and there the warrior-religion has been pronounced to be superior to the law of fraternity.

If there is so much difference of opinion with reference to Harmlessness (ahimsa) and Veracity (satya), then why should

one be surprised if the game line of reasoning is applied to the third common law, namely of. Not-Stealing (asteya)'? If stealing or taking away by force that wealth which a man has lawfully acquired is permitted, then people will stop accumula- ting wealth, and all will suffer ; and chaos will reign as a result of the arrangement of society being broken up. But, there are exceptions to this rule. When such a calamity (apatti) arises that food cannot be had, whether for money or by labour or for charity on account of a general famine, shall we look upon as a sinner, some person who thinks of saving his life by committing theft ? There is a story in the Mahabharata that when such a difficult contingency befell Visvamitra, as a result of famine for twelve consecutive years, he was on the point of saving his life by stealing a leg of dog's flesh hung up in the home of a butcher (San. 141), and by eating that uneatable food ; thereupon, this butcher gave him. much advice based on the Sastras, not to commit the sin of eating such uneatable food, and that too by theft, and quoted : " panca pancanakha bhaksyah " ( Manu 5. 18 ). * But Visva- mitra rejected that advice, saying :-

pibanty evodakam gavo mandukesu ruvatsu api I na te dhikaro dharme 'sti ma bhur atmaprasamsakah II

• Out of the animals who have five toes, such as, the dog, the

monkey etc. Maim and Yajnavalkya have prescribed the porcupine (which has arrow-like hair), sallaka, (this is a kind of a porcupine), the iguana, the tortoise, and the hare as edible (Manu 5. 18 . Yajna. 1. 177). Manu has included in the list also the 'khadga' that is, the rhinoceros ; but commentators say that there is a doubt about that animal. If this doubtful case is omitted, only five animals remain, of which the flesh is edible, and this is what is meant by the words :- panca pancanakha bhaksyah " i. e., "it ia only five five-toed animals which are edible". Still, the Mimamsa writers interprete this as meaning that, those who are allowed to eat flesh should not eat the flesh of any five-toed animals except these ; and not that one must necessarily eat the flesh of these animals. This technical interpretation is known as 'parisamkhya' . The rule panca pancanakha bhaksyah " is an illustration of this 'parisamkhya'. "Where flesh-eating is itself unlawful, the eating of the flesh of these animala is also unlawful.

that is :-" butcher !, cows do not stop drinking water, although frogs remonstrate. Keep quiet ! you have no right to explain principles of morality to me, do not boast un- necessarily ". Visvamitra has on this occasion also said: " jivitam maranat sreyo jivan dharmam avapnuyat " i. e., "if one- remains alive, then he can think of religion ; and therefore, even from the point of view of religion, keeping alive is better than dying " ; and Manu has given the illustration not only of Visvamitra but also of Ajlgarta, Vamadeva, and other rsis who have, in similar circumstances, behaved similarly ( Manu. 10. 105-108 ). The English writer Hobbes says in his book that : "If in a great famine, he takes the food by force or stealth, which he cannot obtain for money nor charity ; or, in defence of his life, snatch away another man's sword, he is totally excused for the reason next before alleged " ; * and Mill has said that in such circumstances, it is the duty of every human being to save his own life even by commiting theft.*</ref> Hobbes' Leviathan, Part II Chap. XXVII P 139, ( Morley's Universal Library Edition) ; Mills', Utilitarianism, Chap. V., P. 95 (15th Ed.). — " Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty to steal etc. "

But are there no exceptions to this theory of Visvamitra. that : ' Keeping alive is better than dying ' ? Keeping alive is not the only thing worth doing in this world ! Even crows keep alive, for many years, by eating the pinda offerings. Therefore, Virapatni Vidula says to her son that : "Rather than that you should rot in the bed or remain coped up in the house for a hundred years, it is better that you show warrior- like prowess even for a few hours and then die " — " muhurtam jvalitam sreyo na ca dhumayitam ciram " ( Ma. Bha, U. 132. 15). If one is bound to die either to-day or to-morrow or at any rate after a hundred years ( Bhag. 10. 1. 38 ; Gi. 2. 27), then why be afraid of it or cry or dread it or lament ? From the metaphysical point of view, the Self (Atman) is eternal and never dies. Therefore, in considering the question of death, all that one has to consider is the body which has fallen to one's lot according to one's destiny ( prarabdha ). This body is perisha- ble in any case. But in as much as this perishable human body is the only means by which one can perform whatever is

to be performed in this world for the benefit of the Atman, even Mamu says : " atmanam satatam rakset darair api dhanair api "— i.e. " it is better first to protect one's Self (atman) before protect- ing one's wife, children or property (7. 513). Yet, noble souls have willingly sacrificed their lives in the fire of duty, in order to obtain something much more permanent than this peri- shable human body, e.g. for their God or religion, or for the sake of truth, or for acting according to their avowed purpose or sacred vow, or their professed course of conduct, or for protecting their reputation, or for the sake of success, or for the benefit of the entire world ! There is a story in the Raghuvamsa tha Dilipa, while offering his body to a lion in order to protect the cow of Vasistha from him, said to him : " People like me are indifferent towards the human body which is made up of the five elements; therefore, look at my virtuous body rather than at my physical body " (Raghu, 2. 57) and the story of Jimutavahana having sacrificed his own body to an eagle in order to protect the lives of serpents, is to be found in the Kathasaritsagara, as also in the Nagananda drama. In the Mrcchakatika (10. 27) Carudatta says :-

na bhito maranad asmi kevalam dusitam yasah | visuddhasya hi me mrtyuh putrajanmasamah kila II

that is : " I am not afraid of death; I am unhappy only because my reputation will be tarnished. If my reputation remains untarnished, then even if I have to suffer death, I will be as happy about it as if a son were born to me"; and on this same principle, the king Sibi, in order to protect a kapota bird, which had surrendered itself to him, took the form of a syena bird and cut off pieces of flesh from his own body and offered them to the Dharma who was hunting the kapota bird; and when a sword made out of the bones of a rsi named Dadhici was needed for killing Vrtra, the enemy of the gods, all the gods went to that rsi and said to him : " sariratyagam loka- hitartham bhavan kartum arhati " i. e. "O Rsi, be pleased to give up your life for the sake of the benefit of all ", and thereupon, that rsi most willingly gave up his life and allowed the gods to take his bones. These stories are to be found

respectively in the Vanaparva and the Santiparva of the Bharata (Vana. 100 and 131 ; San. 342). When the god Surya (Sun) came to know that India was going to the most generous Karna in the form of a Brahmin for begging from him the shield and ear-ornaments (kavaca-kundala) with which he had come to birth, he (Surya), warned Karna not to part with the same by gift to anybody and said to him that though he (Karna) was known as a most magnanimous person, yet he should not part-with the shield and ear-ornaments to anybody, as his life would be in danger if he did so ; and " mrtasya kirtya kim karyam " i. e. " once he was dead, fame would be of no use to him. " Hearing this message of the Sun-god, Karna gave him the fearless reply that: " jivitenapi me raksya kirtis tad -vidhi me vratam " i. e. " I do not care, if I lose my life, but protecting my reputation is my avowed purpose " (Ma. Bha. Vana. 299. 38). I may even say that such warlike doctrines as : " If you die you will go to heaven and if you win, you will enjoy the wealth of the earth" (Gi. 2. 37) or "svadharme nidhanam sreyah " (Gl. 3. 35), i. e. " Even if you meet your death, in acting according to your own religion, yet there is virtue in that", are based on the same principle ; and consistently with that principle Sri Samartha Ramadasa Svami has preached that : " If you think of your reputation , you will have no happiness and if you_pursue happiness, _you will have to sacrifice your reputation " (Dasa. 12. 10. 19; 19. 10. 25) ; and that therefore : " When you have shed your body, your renown should survive you ; my mind ! righteous persons should act in this way ". Nevertheless the questions : " What is the use of renown after you are dead, though it may be true that by doing good to others you obtain renown ?" or, " Why should a righteous man prefer death to disgrace ? (GI. 2. 34), or prefer doing good to others to saving his own life ?" will not be satisfactorily answered unless one enters into the considera- -tion of the Self and the Non-self (atmanatma) ; and even if these questions are answered otherwise, yet in order to under- stand on what occasions it is proper to sacrifice one's life and when it is not proper to do so, one has also to consider the question of the philosophy of Action and Non-Action (karmakarma) ; otherwise, far from acquiring the glory of

having sacrificed one's life, one will have incurred the sin of having foolishly committed suicide.

The religion of worshipping and serving one's mother, father, preceptor, etc., who are worshipful persons, as if they were deities, is looked upon as an important religion out of the several general and generally accepted religions, Because, if such were not the case, the family, the gurukula and even society itself will not ho properly arranged. Therefore, not only in the Smrti treatises but also in the Upanisads, it is stated that each preceptor after first preaching " salaam vada I dharmam cava I ", i.e., " speak the truth, live righteously " to the disciple who left him to go home after finishing his instruction, used next to preach to him : " matrdevo bhava I pitrdevo bhava ' acaryadevo bhava I " i.e. " treat your mother, your father, and your preceptor as if they were gods " (Tai. 1. 11. 1. and 2); and that is the sum and substance of the chapter on the coversation between the Brahmin and the hunter in the Mahabharata (Vana. 213). But even in this religion, unexpected difficulties arise. Manu has said :

upadhyayan dasacaryah acaryanam satam pita I sahasram tu pitrn mata gauravenatiricyate II

(Manu. 2. 145).

i. e. " the preceptor is more in worth than ten lecturers, the father is worth more than a hundred preceptors ! _and the mother is worth more than a thousand fathers '. Yet, it is a well-known story that because his mother had committed a grievous sin, Parasurama, at the instance of his father, cut her throat (Vana. 116. 14); and in the Cirakarikopakhyana of the Santi- parva (San. 265) the question of the relative propriety of killing one's mother at the behest of one's father or of disobeying one's father, has been considered in all its bearings with arguments pro and con in a separate chapter by itself. From this it will be seen that the practice of discussing such subtle positions in life from the ethical point of view was fully in vogue at the date of the Mahabharata. Every one is conversant with the story of Sri Ramacandra having at the behest of his father willingly accepted banishment into the forests for 14 years in order to give effect to the promise made by his father. But the

principle which has been enunciated above with reference to- the mother, has occasionally to be applied to the case of the father. For instance, if after a son has become a king by his own prowess, he has occasion to try some crime committed by his father, should he in his capacity as a king, punish his- father or let him off because he is his father ? Manu says :-

pitacaryah suhrn mata bharya putrah purohitah I nadandyo nama rajno 'sti yah svadharme na tisthati II

i. e. "May he be a father or a preceptor or a friend or a son or a priest, may she be a mother, or a wife, if he or she have not behaved according to their own duties, they are not unpuni- shable for the king; that is, the king must give them condign punishment" (Manu. 8. 335; Ma. Bha. San. 121. 60). Because, in this situation, the religion of sonhood is inferior to the religion of kinghood. And it is stated both in the Bharata and the Ramayana, that the most illustrious King Sagara, belonging to the Suryavamsa banished his son, acting on this principle, because he found that his son was unreasonable and ill- behaved and was harassing his subjects. (Ma. Bha. 107; Rama. 1. 38). Even in the Mami-Smrti, there is a story that a rsi named Angirasa, having acquired excellent knowledge already at a tender age, his uncles (paternal and maternal) and other elders began to learn at his feet; on one such occasion Angirasa, . in addressing them, naturally used the words : 'my children' which are used by a teacher in addressing his pupils-'putraka iti hovaca jnanena parigrhya tan" i.e. "having imparted know- ledge to them, he addressed them as 'my children' !" — Then what an uproar arose ! All the old people became livid with anger, and were convinced that the boy had become arrogant; and they made a complaint to the gods that he should be properly puni- shed. The gods listened to the pleadings on either side, and ultimately gave the decision that the words which Angirasa had used in addressing them were perfectly proper; because :-

na tena vrddho bhavati yenasya palitam sirah I

yo vai yuvapy adhiyanas tan devah sthaoirain viduh II

that is :-" if his hair have become white, a man does not on that account alone, become old ; although a man may be young,

yet if he is learned, the gods look upon him as old " (Manu. 2. 156 ; and also Ma. Bha. Vana. 133. 11 ; Salya, 51. 47). This principle has been accepted not only by Manu and Vyasa but also by the Lord Buddha. Because, the first line of the above verse from the Smrti has been adopted varbatim into the well-known Buddhistic treatise on Ethics, in the Pali language, known as the ' Dhammapada ' * (Dhammapada, 260) ; and later on it is said in the same book that the man who has become mature only by age, has lived in vain ; and that in order that a person should become truly religious and old, he must have acquired the virtues of veracity, harmlessness etc. ; and in another treatise named ' Cullavagga ', the Lord Buddha has himself permitted that even if the bhiksu, ( mendicant ) who may be preaching may be young, yet he should sit on a high pedestal and preach the religion to other bhiksus who had been previously invested into the creed and may be older than him (Cullavagga, 6. 13. 1). The story of Prahlada having disobeyed his father Hiranyakasipu, and won the Blessed Lord mentioned in the Puranas is well-known; and from these stories it will be seen that as a result of other important considerations coming into existence, one has unavoidably to temporarily forget not only the relationship between the older and the younger in age, but also the universally accepted relationship between father and son. But if, when such an occasion has not arisen, an arrogant son begins to abuse his father, will he not be looked upon as a brute ? Bhisma has

• The work ' Dhammapada ' has been translated into

English in the Sacred Books of the East Series Vol X and the Cullavagga has also been translated into English in the Volumes XVII and XX of the same series. Mr. Yadavarao Varvikar, has also translated the Dhammapada into Marathi, and that was first published in the Kolhapur Granthamala and later on as an independent book. The verse in Pali in the Dhammapada is as follows :-

na tena thero hoti yenassa palitam siro | paripakko vayo tassa mogha-jinno ti vuccati ||

The word 'thera' is applied to Bnddhist mendicants. It is a corruption from the Sanskrit word " sthavira".

said to Yudhisthira : " gurur gariyan pitrto matrtas ceti me matih " (San. 108. 17), i. e. " the preceptor is superior even to the mother ot the father. "' But it is stated in the Mahabharata itself, that when the preceptor of the king Marutta had abandoned him for his selfish interests, Marutta said :-

guror apy avaliptasya karyakaryam ajantah I utpathapratipannasya nyayyam bhavati sasanam ||

(Ma. Bha. A, 142. 52-53).

i. e. " Even a preceptor, who, disregarding what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, takes up arrogantly the wrong path, deserves punishment ". This verse has appeared four times in the Mahabharata. (Ma. Bha. A. 142. 52-53 ; U. 179. 24; San. 57. 7 ; 140. 48). Out of these, the reading in the first reference is as above and in the other references, the fourth part of the verse reads: " tando bhavali sasvatah " or " parityago vidhiyate . But where this verse has appeared in the Valmiki Ramayana (Rama. 2. 21. 13), the reading mentioned above is the only reading which has appeared; and. therefore, I have adopted it in this book. The fights between Bhisma and Parsurama and between Arjuna and Drona were justified on the same principle and when the preceptors of Prahlada appointed by Hiranya- kasipu began to advise him against worshipping the Blessed Lord, he has disregarded their advice on the same principle. In the Santiparva, Bhisma himself says to Sri Krsna that, although a preceptor may be venerable yet he also must be bound by rules of Ethics ; otherwise .-

samayatyagino Iubdhan gurun api ca Kesava I nihanti samare papan ksatriyah sa hi dharmavit II

(San. 55. 16).

that is : " Oh Kesava, that ksatriya is truly law-abiding, who kills such persons as break laws, ethical principles, or rules of proper conduct, or is greedy or sinful, notwithstanding that they occupy the position of preceptors." So also, in the Taittiriyo- panisad, after first stating : " acaryadevo bhava, ", i.e., " Treat your preceptor, as a deity ", it is immediately afterwards stated that : " yany asmakam sucaritani tani tvayopasyani I no itarani II" (Tai, 1. 11. 2), i.e., " Imitate only such of our actions as are

good, and disregard the others ". From this, it is quite clear that the net advice of the Upanisads is that, even if the elders are god-like, because they are preceptors, or parents, yet, do not become addicted to drink, because they were addicted to drink ; because, the position of ethical principles or of laws is even higher than that of the mother or the father or the preceptor, etc. The statement of Manu that : " Follow your religion ; if any one destroys his religion, that is to say, disregards it, that religion will, without fail, destroy him." (Manu. 8. 14-16), has been made on the same principles. The king is a deity who is even more worshipful than the preceptor (Manu. 7. 8, and Ma. Bha. San, 68. 40). But, the Manu-Smrti says that even he does not escape the binding force of laws, and that if he breaks them, he will be destroyed ; and the same idea is conveyed by the histories of the two kings Vena and Khaninetra mentioned in the Mahabharata (Manu. 7. 41 and 8. 128 ; Ma. Bha. San. 59. 92-100 and Asva. 4).

Control of the organs is placed on the same level with Harmlessness (ahimsa), Veracity (satya), and Not-stealing (asteya), in the ordinary general religions (Manu. 10. 63). All the Sastras contain the advice that Desire (kama ), Anger (krodha) and Avarice (lobha) are the enemies of man, and that unless they are fully conquered, neither he nor society will in any way be benefitted ; and it is stated in the Viduraniti, as also in the Bhagavadgita, that :-

trividham narakasyedam dvaram nasanam atmanah I kamah krodhas tatha lobhas tasmad etat trayam tyajet II

i.e., " Ka ma, krodha and lobha are the three gateways of hell ; and as they are destructive agents, they must be eschewed " (GI. 16. 21 ; Ma. Bha. U. 32. 70). But the Blessed Lord has in the Gita itself described his own form in the following words : " dharmaviruddho bhutesu kamo smi Bharatarsabha " (GI. 7. 11), i.e "O _Arjuna i am that kama (desire) which exists in the hearts of living things, Being consistent with law (dharma)". Therefore, that kama (desire) which is inconsistent with dharma is the gateway of hell and other kinds of kama are not proscribed by the Blessed Lord ; and even Manu has said : "parityajed arthakamau yau syatam dharmavarjitau", i.e.,

"' that wealth (artha) and desire (kama) which are inconsistent with justice (dharma) should be eschewed" (Manu. 4. 176). If to-morrow all living beings decide to say good-bye to the Lord Kama, and to observe celibacy the whole of their lives, the entire living creation will come to an end within fifty or at most one hundred years, and the silence of death will reign everywhere ; and that creation, in order to save which from destruction, the Blessed Lord takes incarnations every now and then, will within a short time, be destroyed. Kama and krodha are enemies, it is true, but, when ? : if you allow them to become uncontrolled. Even Maun and the other writers of the Sastras have accepted the position that kama and krodha are extremely essential, within proper limits, in order that the world should go on ( Manu. 5. 56 ). The highest civilisation consists in putting a. proper restraint on these powerful mental impulses, and not in totally destroying them. It is stated in the Bhagavata that :-

loke vyavayamisamadyaseva nityasti jantor na hi tatra condana l vyavasthitis tesu vivahayajna- suragrahairasu nivrttir ista II

(Bhag. 11. 5. 11).

i. e. " In this_ world, it is not necessary to tell any one to indulge in the enjoyment of sexual intercourse or in eating flesh or drinking wine. These are things which human Beings want naturally.And it is in order to systematise these three impulses, that is to say, in order to give them a systematic basis by subjecting them to limitations or restraint, that the writers of the Sastras have ordained marriage, and the Soma- yaga and the Sautramani-yajna respectively for them ; but even with reference to these matters, the most excellent course is Renunciation (nivrtti), that is to say, Desireless Action". Although the word ' (nivrtti) ', when used in relation to fifth- case-ended nouns, means, ' renunciation of a particular thing ' or 'giving up a particular Action altogether'; yet, as the adjective ' nivrtta ' is in the Karma-Yoga applied to the noun 'karma', the word 'nivrtta-karma', it must be borne in mind, means 'Action which is to be performed desirelesely'; and the

word has been used clearly in those meanings in the Manu- Smrti and in the Bhagavata-purana ( Manu. 12. 89; Bhag. 11. 10. 1 and 7. 15. 47 ). In speaking about anger (krodha) Bharavi. says in the Kirata-kavya (1. 33) that :-

amarsasunyena janasya jantuna na jatahardena na -vidvisadarah II

i. e., "if a man does not get angry or annoyed when he has been insulted, it is just the same whether he is your friend or whether he hates you !" Vidula has said, that from the point of view of the warrior (ksatriya) religion :-

etavan eva puru so yad amarsi yad aksami I ksamavan niramarsas ca naiva stri na punah puman II

( Ma. Bha. U. 132. 33 ).

i. e., "he who gets angry ( on account of injustice ) and who does not submit (to insult), is truly a man. He who does not get angry or annoyed is neither a woman nor a man". It has already been stated above that in order that the world should go on, there must not be either anger or valour at all times, or forgiveness at all times. The same law applies to avarice (lobha) ; because, even if a man is a samnyasi (ascetic) yet he wants Release (moksa).

Vyasa has stated in various stories in the Mahabharata,. that the various virtues of valour, courage, kindness, probity,, friendship, impartiality etc., are, in addition to their mutual oppositions, also limited by considerations of time and place. 'Whatever the virtue may be, it is not equally appropriate in all circumstances. Bhartrhari says that :-

vipadi dhairyam athabhyudaye ksama sadasi vakpatuta yudhi vikramah I

( Niti. 63 ). that is : "Courage is a virtue in days of misfortune, forgiveness- in days of power (that is, notwithstanding that you are in a. position to punish), oratory in an assembly, and valour in warfare". In times of peace, there are not wanting mere talkers like Uttara; but although there may be many Hambira- raos who are courageous enough to shoot arrows through the nose-rings of their wives, it is only one of them who acquits

himself with credit as an archer on the battle-field ! Not only- are courage and the other abovementioned virtues really- appropriate in the respective circumstances mentioned, but they cannot even be properly tested except in such circumstances. There are not wanting shoals of school-friends; but, "nikasagrava tu tesam vipat", i.e. "adversity is their touchstone". Misfortune is the true test for trying them. The word ' circumstances ' above includes considerations of worthiness and unworthiness, in addition to considerations of time and place. No virtue is greater than impartiality. The Bhagavadgita itself clearly says that being: " samah sarvesu bhutesu", i.e., "impartial towards all created things", is a characteristic feature of a perfect being (siddha). But, what does this impartiality mean ? If somebody showers charity on each and every one alike, that is to say, without considering their respective merits, shall we call him a wise man or a fool ? This question has been answered in the Gita itself in the following words : "dese kale ca patre ca tad danam sattvikam viduh", i.e., "that charity which. is made with proper regard for the place, the time, and the worthiness (of the party) is the pure (sattvika) charity" (Gi. 17. 20). Considerations of time, are not limited to the present time. As times change, so also changes take place in the laws relating to worldly life; and therefore, if one has to consider the propriety or otherwise of any thing pertaining to ancient times, one has necessarily to consider also the ideas of righteousness or unrighteousness prevailing at that time. Manu (1. 85) and Vyasa (Ma. Bha. San. 259. 8) say :-

anye krtayuge dharmas tretayam dvapare 'pare I anye kaliyuge nrnam yugahrasanurupatah II

i. e., "the laws relating to the Krta, Treta, Dvapara and the- Kali-yuga are all different according as the yugas (eras) change". And it is stated in the Mahabharata itself that in ancient times, women were not restricted by marriage, and they were entirely independent and unchecked in that matter ; but, when the evil effects of this kind of life manifested themselves later on, Svetaketu laid down the limitation of marriage ( Ma. Bha. A. 122 ) ; and Sukracarya was the first one to promulgate the prohibition against drink (Ma. Bha, A. 76). Needless to say, G. R. _5

there must be different standards for considering the laws pertaining to the times when these restrictions were not in vogue, than those relating to the times when they came into vogue ; and in the same way, if the laws which are in force in the present age are changed in the future, then the considera- tion of the righteousness or unrighteousness of actions in the future will also be on a different basis. As there are considera- tions of time, so also are there considerations of the customs of the country, the customs of the family, as also the customs of the community ; for, custom is the root of all religion. Never- theless, there are inconsistencies even among customs. Bhisma has described the differences between customs in the following words :

na hi sarvahitah kascid acarah sampravartate I tenaivanyah prabhavati so 'param badhate punah II

( San. 259. 17. 18 ).

"that is : "One cannot find any custom, which is "beneficial to everybody, at all times. If you take one custom, another one is better, and if you accept the second custom, it is again contrary to a third one " ; and he has said that we have to discriminate between customs and customs.

If I go on solving in this way all the riddles about what should be done and what should not be done (karmakarma) and what is righteous and what unrighteous (dharmadharma), I shall have to write a second Mahabharata myself. I have laboured on this subject so long only with the idea of impressing on the mind of my readers how the circumstances in which Arjuna found himself in the beginning of the Gita as a result of a conflict between fraternal affection and a warrior's duties were not something out of the common ; and how similar circum- stances very often befall great and responsible persons in life, giving rise sometimes to a conflict between the principles of Harmlessness and Self-protection, or of Veracity and general welfare, or between the protection of one's person and one's reputation, or again between different duties arising out of different aspects of the same situation ; and how, many excep- tions thus arise, which are not provided for by ordinary and generally accepted moral laws; and lastly, how on such

occasions, not only ordinary, but even very clever and learned persons, naturally feel the desire of finding out whether or not there is some definite formula or basis for determining what should be done and what not, or, what is one's duty and what is not one's duty. It is true that some concessions have been made in the Sastras to meet calamities like a famine which are technically known as ' apaddharma '. For instance, the writers of the Smrtis say that in such calamities ( apatkala ) a Brahmin incurs no sin, if he takes food in any place; and in the Chandogyo- panisad, there is even a story of Usasticakrayana having done so. (Yajna. 3. 41; Chan. 1. 10). But there is a world of differ- ence between those circumstances and the circumstance men- tioned above. In the case of famine, there is a conflict between religious principles on the one hand and hunger, thirst, and other bodily needs on the other, and the bodily organs drag you in one direction and religious principles in the opposite_direc- tion. But in many of the circumstances mentioned above, the conflict is not between bodily impulses and religious principles but there is an inter-conflict between two principles laid down in the Sastras themselves and it becomes necessary to consider minutely whether to follow this religious preoept or that; and though it may be possible for person? of ordinary intelligence to arrive at a decision on a few such occasions by considering what pure-minded persons have done in the past in similar cir- cumstances, yet on other occasions, even sages are puzzled; because, the more one thinks about a particular matter, more and more of doubts and counter-arguments come into existence, and it becomes very difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion; and if a proper decision is not arrived at, there is a risk of one's committing an unlawful thing or even a crime. Consi- dering the matter from this point of view, it will be seen that the discrimination between the lawful and the unlawful or between the doable and the not-doable becomes an independent science by itself, which is even more difficult than the sciences of logic or grammar. In old Sanskrit treatises, the word ' niti-sastra ' ( Ethics ) used to be applied principally to regal jurisprudence (raja-niti) and the doable and the not- doable used to be technically called ' dharmasastra '. But as

the word ' niti ' includes both duty are good conduct, I have in this book referred to the discussion of the questions of righteousness and unrighteousness or of what ought to be done and what ought not be done, by the name ' niti-sastra '. In order to show that this science, which expounds Ethics, or shows what is doable and what is not-doable, or what is righteous and what unrighteous, is indeed a very difficult science, the sentence " suksma gatir hi dharmasya ", i.e. " the true nature of righteousness, that is to say, of the Ethics of worldly life, is very subtle ", occurs several times in the Mahabharata. It is extremely difficult to satisfactorily answer such questions as : — How did five Pandavas marry one Draupadi? or, Why did Bhisma, Drona and others sit quiet, as if with a dead heart, when attempts were made to denude Draupadi ?, or, Whether the principle ; "arthasya puruso dasah dasas to artho na kasyacit" i.e., " man is the servant o f wealth (artha), wealth is the servant of nobody " (Ma. Bha. Bhi. 43. 35), enunciated by Bhisma and Drona, in justification of their having sided with the wicked Duryodhana in the civil war is or is not correct ? or, if service is looked upon as dog-like, as is shown by the words : " seva svavrttir akhyata ", i.e., " servitude is said to be the tendency of a dog " (Manu. 406) and is accordingly considered eschewable, then why did Bhisma and others not give up the service of Duryodhana, rather than becoming the slaves of wealth ? Because, on such occasions different persons arrive at different inferences or decisions according to different circumstances. Not only are the principles of justice extremely subtle (" suksma gatir hi dharmasya ", Ma. Bha. Anu. 10. 70 ), but, as is stated later on in the Mahabharata itself, there are numerous branches to those principles and the inferences which can be drawn from them are numerous ( " bahusakha hy anantika ", Ma. Bha. Vana. 208. 2). Tuladhara also, where he is discoursing on questions of morality,. in the Tuladhara-Jajali conversation, says': " suksmatvan na sa vijnatum sakyate bahunihnavah ", i. e., " as morality is subtle and complicated, one very often does not know what it is " (San. 261. 37). The writer of the Mahabharata was fully conversant with these subtle occasions, and he has.

collected together different traditionary stories in the Mahabharata in order to explain how great men behaved in the past in those circumstances. But it was necessary to scientifically examine all these subjects and to enunciate the universal principle underlying them, in a religious work like the Mahabharata. Vyasa has explained this underlying principle in the Bhagavadgita, taking his stand on the advice given in the past by Sri Krsna to Arjuna on the pretext of removing his doubts about his duty ; and, therefore, the Gita has become the mystic Upanisad and the crown jewel of the Mahabharata, and the Mahabharata has become an illustrated and detailed lecture on the fundamental principles of Right Action (Karma-Yoga) which have been enunciated in the Gita. I have to suggest to those who imagine that the Gita has been subsequently interpolated into the Mahabharata that they should pay close attention to this fact. Nay, the uniqueness and special feature of the Gita consists in this very thing. Because, although there are numerous treatises like the Upanisads etc. which deal with the pure science of Release (moksa) that is, with Vedanta, or like the Smrtis which merely enunciate rules of righteous conduct such as Harmlessness etc., yet there is not to be found, at least in these days, another ancient work in the Sanskrit literature like the Gita which, discriminates between the doable and the not-doable (karya- karya-vyavasthiti) on the authority of the extremely recondite philosophy of the Vedanta. Devotees of the Gita need not be told that the word ' karyakarya-vyavasthiti ' has not been coined by me, but is from the Gita itself (Gita. 16. 24). In the Yoga- vasistha, Vasistha has ultimately preached to Sri Rama, the path of Energism (Karma-Yoga) based on Self-Realisation ( jnana ), as has been done in the Gita; but such works, which have been written after the date of the Gita, and which are only imitations of it, do not in any way detract from the uniqueness of the Gita, to which I have referred above.

CHAPTER III

THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT ACTION

( KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA )

tasmad yogaya yujyasra yogah karmasu kausalam I *

Gita 2. 50

If a man is not actuated by the desire of acquiring the- knowledge of a particular science, he is unfit to study that science, and explaining such a science to such an unfit person is like pouring water on an obverse vessel. Not only is the disciple not benefited by it, but even the preceptor wastes his labour, and both waste their time. Therefore, the aphorisms "athato dharmajijnasa, " and "athato brahmajijnasa " appear at the beginning of both the Jaimini and the Badarayana- Sutras. Just as the teaching of the Brahman is best imparted to a 'mumuksu' (one who is desirous of Release) or as the teaching of Law or justice is best imparted to one who seeks that knowledge, so also is the teaching of the Science of Right Action (Karma) most properly given to the person who has been inspired with the ' jijnasa ' ( desire of knowing ) how to rightly perform Action while leading a worldly life ; and that is why I have disposed of the ' athato ' in the first chapter and have outlined the nature of ' karmajijnasa ' and the importance of the science of Karma-Yoga in the second chapter. Unless a man has by experience found where his difficulty lies, he does not realise the importance of the science of getting over that difficulty ; and if this importance is not realised, a science which has been learnt merely by rote, is later on found difficult to remember. Therefore, good teachers first ascertain whether or not the disciple has been inspired with, desire for the knowledge, and if there is no such inspira- tion, they attempt to rouse the desire. The Science of Right Action (Karma-Yoga) has been expounded in the Gita on this

• "Therefore, take shelter in the Yoga; ! 'Yoga ' is the name

given to the skill, the wisdom or the gracefulness of performing Action (Karma)" : such is the definition or connotation of the term 'Yoga', which has been more fully dealt with later on in this chapter.

basis. When, being beset with the doubt whether or not he should take part in a war in which he would be responsible for the slaughter of ancestors and preceptors 'and also of all kings and brethren, Arjuna was inspired by the desire to give up the- war and renounce the world, and when he was not satisfied by the ordinary arguments that abandoning a duty which had befallen him was a foolish and weak act and that by doing so, far from obtaining heaven he would on the other hand, suffer disgrace, Sri Krsna preached to him the science of Karma- Yoga, after in the first instance seeming to ridicule him by saying : " asocyan anvasocas tvam prajnavadams ca bhasase" i. e., '" you lament those for whom you ought not to lament and at the same time, tell me big tales about the know- ledge of the Brahman ". I have shown in the last chapter that the doubt by which Arjuna had been beset, was not groundless, and that even great sages are in certain circum- stances, puzzled as to 'what to do and what not to do '. But the starting advice of Sri Krsna to Arjuna is : that it is not. proper to give up Action (karma) on the ground that numerous difficulties arise in the consideration of what should be done and what should not be done; that, a wise man should practise such a 'yoga' or device whereby instead of Actions being done away with in the world, one will only escape their evil effects or binding force, and that: " tasmad yogaya yujyasva" i.e., " therefore, you, should do the same ". This 'Yoga' is the science of 'KARMA-YOGA' ; and in as much as, the circum- stances in which Arjuna found himself were not unique, but every one of us comes across small or big difficulties of the same nature in worldly life, it is necessary that we should all profit by the exposition of this Karma-Yoga science which has been made in the Bhagavadgita. But whichever science is taken, it is necessary to properly define the important words occurring in its exposition so that their meanings are properly understood, and to first precisely explain the fundamental outline of the exposition of that science; otherwise, many misunderstandings or difficulties subsequently arise. Therefore, following this usual practice, I shall first examine and explain the meanings of some of the important words which occur in this science.

The first of these words is 'KARMA'. The word ' karma ' comes from the root ' kr ', and means ' doing ', ' affairs ', or 'activity' ; and that same ordinary meaning is intended in the Bhagavadgita. My only reason for explaining this is, that the reader should not he confused by the limited and restricted meanings in which this word has been used in the Mimamsa philosophy or in other places. Whichever religion is taken, it prescribes some Action or other for reaching the Isvara. According to the ancient Vedic religion, this Action was sacrificial ritual ; and the Purva-Mimamsa of Jaimini has been written with the sole purpose of showing how the various different and sometimes apparently contradictory statements which are to be found in the Vedic treatises regarding the performance of this sacrificial ritual can be reconciled with each other. According to Jaimini, the performance of this Vedic or Srauta ( prescribed by the Srutis ) sacrificial ritual was the principal and the ancient religion. Whatever a man does, must be taken to have been done by him for the purpose of the 'yajna' (sacrifice). If he earns money, he must earn it for the sake of the yajna ; and if he collects grain, that also must be understood to have been done for the yajna ( Ma. Bha. San. 26. 25 ). In as much as the Vedas themselves have enjoined the performance of the yajnas, any Action done for the purpose of the yajna cannot of itself be a source of bondage to man ; it is a means for the yajna and not an independent object; and therefore, the effect of that Action is included in the result to be achieved by the yajna ; it has no independent effect. But although these Actions, which are performed for the purpose of the yajna, may not have an independent effect, yet the yajna itself leads to heaven (which, according to the Mimamsa school, is a kind of happiness), and the performer of the yajna performs it willingly, only in order to attain heaven. Therefore, the performance (karma) of the yajna itself falls into the category of ' purusartha ' (something which a man desires). Any parti- cular thing which a man likes and which he desires to attain, is called ' purusartha' (Jai. Su. 4 .1. 1 and 2). ' Kratu' is a synonym for ' yajna ' and therefore, the word ' kratvartha ' is also used in place of the word ' yajnartha ' and therefore, all Actions fall into the two divisions of 'yajnartha' ('kratvartha' )

that is, Actions which do not give any independent fruit or benefit and are, therefore, non-binding, and 'purusartha' that is, Actions performed for the benefit of the doer and, therefore, binding. The Sarmhitas and the Brahmanas contain nothing else but a description of sacrificial ritual. It is true that in the Rg-Veda-samhita there are verses (sukta) in praise of Indra and the other gods ; but as these are to be used only at the time of the yajna, the Mimamsa writers say that all Sruti treatises preach only the yajna and other sacrificial ritual. These orthodox ritual-masters, and pure karma-vadins say that heaven can be attained only by performing the sacrificial ritual prescribed by the Vedas and not otherwise ; and that, that is so, whether you perform the yajnas ignorantly or after Realising the Brahman. Although this sacrificial ritual is accepted by the Upanisads, yet their worth is declared to be lower than that of the Knowledge of the Brahman, and the Upanisads say that though heaven may be attained by the yajnas, Realisation of the Brahman (brahma-jnana) is necessary for attaining the true Release. The desire-prompted Actions in the shape of sacrificial ritual, described in the second chapter of the Bhagavadgita by the words " vedavadaratah Partha nanyadastiti vadinah " ( Gl. 2. 42 ) are the above-mentioned sacrificial ritual, performed without having realised the Brahman. In the same way, the sentence yajnarthat karmano 'nyatra loko 'yam karmabandhanah" i.e., " Actions performed for the purpose of the yajna, do not create bondage ; all other Actions have a binding force " ( Gl. 3. 9 ) is only a repetition of the opinion of the Mimamsa school. Besides this sacrificial ritual, (being the Actions prescribed by the Vedas and the Srutis), there are other Actions, necessary from the point of view of religion, which have been prescribed by the Manu-Smrti and other religious treatises, having regard to the division of society into the four castes. For instance, fighting has been prescribed for the warrior (ksatriya), trade for the merchant (vaisya) etc. ; and, as these have been for the first time systematically prescribed in the Smrti writings, they are referred to as 'Smarta' (prescribed by the Smrtis) Actions or yajnas. There are besides these Actions prescribed by the Srutis and the Smrtis, other religious Actions, e.g., fasting, austerities etc., which have

for the first time been described in detail in the Puranas and these may, therefore, be described as ' pauranika, karma ( Actions ). All these Actions are again sub-divided into- everyday (nitya), occasional (naimittika), and for-a-particular- purpose (kamya) Actions. Such Actions as must be performed every day, such as bathing and offering prayers at twilight, are called nitya-karma. By performing these, no special purpose- (artha-siddhi) is achieved; but if they are not performed, one. incurs sin. Naimittika (occasional) Actions are such as have to be performed because some occasion necessitating them has. arisen, such as, the pacification of unauspicious stars, penances etc. If that occasion for which we perform this pacification or penance had not come into existence, there would be no necessity for performing this Action. In addition to these, there are certain other Actions which we very often perform because we desire a particular thing and for acquiring that thing, as enjoined by the Sastras. These Actions are kamya (desire-prompted) actions; e.g., sacrificial ritual for causing rain or for obtaining a son. In addition to these everyday, occasional, and desire-prompted Actions, there are other Actions such as, drinking etc. which have been pronounced to be totally objectionable by the Sastras and therefore, they are- named nisiddha (objectionable) actions. Which Actions are. everyday Actions, which occasional, which desire-prompted and which objectionable has been laid down by our religious treatises ; and if any person versed in religion is asked whether a particular act performed by a particular person is sinful or virtuous, he will consider whether that particular Action is yajnartha or purusartha or nitya or naimittika or kamya or nisiddha according to the directions of the Sastras and give his opinion accordingly. The view-point of the Bhagavadgita is. more exhaustive than this or may even be said to be beyond this. It may be that a particular Action has not been pro- nounced as objectionable by the Sastras ; nay, it may even have been prescribed as proper, e.g., in the case in point, the warrior- religion was the 'prescribed ' (vihita) thing for Arjuna; but on that account, it does not follow that one should always perform that Action, nor also that it will always be certainly beneficial; and the injunctions of the Sastras are very often mutually

contradictory, as has been shown in the previous chapter. The subject-matter of the Gita is to show whether or not there are any means for ascertaining what course should be followed by a person on such an occasion and if so, what those means are. It is not necessary for the purpose of this exposition to pay any special attention to the divisions of 'karma' mentioned above. In order to explain to what extent the doctrines laid down by the Mimamsa school regarding the sacrificial ritual etc. prescribed by the Vedas or the other duties prescribed for the four castes are consistent with the Karma-Yoga advocated in the Gita, their theories have been examined in the Gita as occasion arose ; and in the last chapter, the question whether or not a Self -Realised (jnanin) man should perform sacri- ficial ritual has been precisely answered (Gl. 18. 6). But in as much as the principal subject-matter of the Gita is more exhaustive than this, the word ' Karma ' as used in the exposi- tion made in the Gita must not be taken in the restricted meaning of Actions prescribed by the Srutis or the Smrtis, but in a more comprehensive meaning. In short, all the Actions which a man performs, e.g., eating, drinking, playing, sitting, rising, residing, breathing, smiling, weeping, smelling, seeing, speaking, hearing, walking, giving, taking, sleeping, waking, killing, fighting, meditating or contemplating, commanding, or objecting, giving, performing sacrificial ritual, agriculture or commerce, desiring, deciding, keeping quiet, etc., etc., etc., are all included in the word ' Karma ' as used in the Bhagavadgita, whether those Actions are bodily (kayika) or vocal (vacika) or mental (manasika) (Gita 5. 8-9). In short, even the remaining alive or the dying of the body itself, are Actions, and as occasion arises, it becomes necessary to consider which of the two actions of 'remaining alive ' or ' dying ' is to be chosen. - When this consideration arises, the word ' karma ' (Action) can also be understood in the meaning of Duty (kartavya-karma) or proper action (vihita-karma) (Gl. 4. 16). We have so far considered the actions of human beings. Going beyond this, the word ' karma ' is also applied to the activities of the moveable and immoveable world, 'that is to say, even of life- less things. But that matter will be considered in the- subsequent chapter on Cause and Effect (karma-vipaka-prakriya).

The word " YOGA " is even more complicated in its meaning than the word ' karma '. The present-day ordinary meaning of this word is ' controlling the mental impulses of the organs by means of pranayama, i.e., 'control of the breath' or ' the Yoga of mental absorption or meditation prescribed by the Patanjala-Sutras ', and the word has been used in the same meanings also in the Upanisads (Katha. 6. 11). But it must first be borne in mind that this restricted meaning is not the meaning in which it has been used in the Bhagavadgita. The word ' Yoga ' comes from the root ' yuj ' which means ' to join ', and its root meaning is 'the state of union', 'combination', ' addition ' or ' co-existence ' or ' staying together ', and later on, it has also come to mean the ' mean ', ' device ' or ' method ' or ' thing to be done ', that is, the ' Karma ' (Action) which is necessary for acquiring that state, and the Amarakosa has given all these meanings of the word in the following sentence: "yogah sannahanopaya-dhyana-samgati-yuktisu ( 3. 3. 22 ). In practical astrology, if some planets have become propitious or unpropitious, we say that they are forming a propitious or unpropitious 'yoga', and the word 'yoga in the phrase 'yoga-ksema' means 'acquiring such things as one has not got' (Gi. 9. 22). On seeing that Dronacarya would not be vanquished in the Bharati war, Sri Krsna has, in the following words said that: " there was only one ' yoga ' (means or ' trick ') for vanquishing him " .— "eko hi yogo 'sya bhaved vadhaya", i.e., "he can be killed only by one trick " (Ma. Bha. Dro. 181. 31) and later on He has narrated how He had killed Jarasamdha and other kings for the protection of the Religion by means of ' yoga '. It is stated in the Udyoga parva that after Bhisma had taken away the damsels Amba, Ambika and Ambalika, the other kings pursued him crying : " Yoga, Yoga " (U. 172), and the word ' yoga ' has been used in the same meaning in numerous other places in the Mahabharata. In the Gita, the words ' yoga ', ' yogi ' or other compounds from the word ' yoga ' have occured about 80 times. But nowhere except in at most four or five places has it been used in the meaning of ' Patanjala-yoga ' (Gi. 6. 12 and 23). We find almost everywhere the word used more or less in the meaning of ' means ', 'skilful device,' 'method', ' the thing to be done', ' union ', etc., and it must be said that this is one of the

comprehensive words used in the Gita-science. Still, it is not enough even to say in a general way that 'yoga' means 'means' 'skilful device' or 'method'. Because, according as the speaker may wish, it may be a means of Renunciation (samnyasa) or Action (karma.) or mental control (citta-nirodha) or of Release (Moksa) or of something else. For instance, the word 'yoga' has been used in the Gita itself, in three or four places, to signify the divine skill or wonderful power of the Blessed Lord in creating the variegated perceptible creation (Gi. 7. 25 ; 9. 5 ; 10. 7 ;11. 8) and on that account, the Blessed Lord has been referred to as ' Yogesvara (Gi. 18. 75). But this is not the principal meaning of the word 'yoga' in the Gita. Therefore, in order to explain what particular skill, means, method or process is principally signified in the Gita by the use of the word 'yoga', this word has intentionally been clearly defined in the Gita itself as : "yogah karmasu kausalam" (Gi. 2. 50) i.e. " 'yoga' means some special skill, device, intelligent method, or graceful way of performing Actions"; and in the Samkara- bhasya on this phrase, the phrase 'karmasu kausalam' has been interpreted as meaning : "the device of eliminating the natural tendency of karma to create a bondage". Normally, there are numerous 'yoga or means of performing one and the same action, but the best of all these methods is specially referred to as 'yoga'. For instance, the earning of money can be achieved by theft or deceit or by begging or by service or by borrowing or by physical labour, and many other such ways ; and although the word ' yoga ' can be applied to each of these ways, according to the root meaning of the word, yet, 'earning money by one's own labour without sacrificing one's independence ' is principally referred to as " the yoga of acquiring wealth " ( dravya-prapti-yoga ).

If the Blessed Lord Himself has intentionally and specifically defined the word ' yoga ' in the Gita itself as : " yogah karmam kausalam " i. e., "'Yoga' means a special device of performing Actions", then, there should strictly speaking remain no doubt whatsoever about the primary meaning of this word in the Gita. But, as several commentators have extracted various hidden meanings from the Gita by twisting the meaning of this word, disregarding this definition of the

word given by the Blessed Lord Himself, it is necessary here to go deeper into the meaning of the word 'yoga' in order to clear that mis-interpretation. The word 'yoga' appears for the first time in the second chapter of the Gita and at that very place the meaning of that word is explained. After having justified the war on the authority of the Samkhya philosophy, the Blessed Lord goes on to say that He will next give Arjuna the justification of the war on the authority of the Yoga ( Gl. 2. 39 ), and He, to begin with, describes how the minds of persons . continually engrossed in desire-prompted Action like sacrificial ritual, become disintegrated on account of the desire for the reward ( Gi. 2, 41-46 ). He then goes on to say that Arjuna should not allow his mind to be disintegrated in this way, and should " give up all attachments ( asakti ), but not think of giving up Action ", and He has further said to him : "become steeped in the yoga ( yogastha ) and perform Actions " (Gi. 2. 48) and in the same place the word ' yoga ' has been to begin with clearly defined as meaning : " ' Yoga ' means equability of mind towards success or failure ". Then, He goes on to say : " this ' yoga ' of equability of mind is better than performing Actions with the desire for the fruit " (Gi, 2. 49) and that " when the mind is equable, the doer is not affected by the sin or the virtue of the Action, and, therefore, acquire this Yoga". Immediately thereafter, He again defines the nature of Yoga ' by the words : " yogah karmam kausalam " (Gi. 2. 50). From this, it becomes clear that the special device mentioned to start with by the Blessed Lord for the sinless performance of Actions, namely an equable mind, is what is known as kausala ' (skilful device) and that performing Actions by this ' kausala ' or device is, in the Gita, known as ' yoga ' ; and this very meaning of that word has further been made perfectly clear by Arjuna who says: " yo 'yam yogas tvaya proktah samyena Madhusudana" (Gi. 6. 33), i.e., "this yoga of equality, that is, of an equable frame of mind which has been prescribed by you to me". There are two ways in which the Self-Realised man should live in this world which have been prescribed by the Vedic religion in existence long before the date of Sri Samkaracarya. One of these ways is the literal abandonment (samnyasa) or giving up (tyaga) of all Action after Self -Realisation, and the

other way is of not giving up Actions even after Self-Realisa- tion, but going on performing them while life lasts, in such a way that one does not thereby incur either sin or merit. It is with reference to these two paths that the words 'samnyasa' and 'karma-yoga ' have been used later on in the Gita (Gl. 5. 2). samnyasa ' means ' give up ' and ' yoga ' means ' stick to '; therefore, these are two independent paths of the giving up or the sticking to Action. The two words ' samkya ' and ' yoga ' (Samkhya-yogau) are two abbreviated terms, which are used later on with reference to these two paths (Gl. 5. 4). It is true that the sixth chapter of the Gita contains a description of the postures (asanas) of the Patanjala-yoga necessary for steadying the mind; but for whom has that description been given ? Not for the ascetic, but for the Karma- Yogi, i. e,, for the person who continues skilfully performing Actions, and, in order that he might thereby acquire an equable frame of mind. Otherwise, the sentence '" tapasvibhyo 'dhiko yogi", i.e., "the yogi is superior to the ascetic" is meaningless. Also, the advice given to Arjuna at the end of this chapter in the terms "tasmad yogi bhavarjuna" (Gi. 6. 46), i.e., "therefore, O Arjuna, become a yogi", does not mean "take to the practice of Patanjala-Yoga" but has to be taken as meaning "become a yogi, who performs Actions skilfully or a Karma-Yogi", in which meaning that word has been used in the phrases : "yogasthah kuru karmam" (Gi.2. 48) i.e., perform Action, having become a yogi", or after that : "tasmad. yogaya yujyasva yogah karmasu kausalam (Gi. 2. 50), i.e., "therefore, take shelter in yoga; 'yoga' means the skill of per- forming Action", or at the end of the fourth chapter, "yogam atisthottistha Bharat" (Gi.4.42), i.e., "take shelter in the yoga, O, Bharata, and stand up". Because, His saying "follow the Patanjala-yoga and stand up and fight" would be impossible and even improbable. It has been clearly stated previously that : karmayogena yoginam" (Gi. 3. 3) i.e., "yogis are persons who perform Actions"; and in the exposition of the Narayaniya or the Bhagavata religion in the Mahabharata, it is stated that persons belonging to that religion 'do not abandon worldly- affairs but perform them skilfully ( "suprayuktena karmana" ) and attain the Paramesvara ( Ma. Bhs. San. 348. 56 ). From

that it follows, that the words ' yogi ' and ' karma-yogi ' have been used synonymously in the Gita, and that they mean : " a- person who performs Action according to a particular device. "' Yet, instead of using the long word ' karma-yoga ', its abbrevia- ted form ' yoga ' has been more frequently used both in the Gita and in the Mahabharata. The word ' yoga ', which has been used by the Blessed Lord three times in succession in the stanza : " this yoga which I have explained to you had been taught by me before to Vivasvan ( Gi. 4. 1 ) ; Vivasvan taught it to Manu, but as this yoga subsequently ceased to exist, I had once more to-day to explain that yoga to you ", has not been intended to mean the Patanjala-yoga ; and one has to under- stand it as meaning " a particular kind of device, method, or process of performing Action ". In the same way, the reference- by Sanjaya to the conversation between Sri Krsna and Arjuna as ' yoga ' ( Gi. 18. 75 ) means the same thing. Although Sri Samkaracarya himself followed the path of Renunciation, yet he has in the beginning of his Gita-bhasya pointed out the two divisions of the Vedic Religion into ' pravrtti ' and ' nivrtti ' and the word ' yoga ' has been interpreted by him in some places. according to the definition given by the Blessed Lord as; " samyag darsanopaya karmanusthanam " ( Gi. Bha.. 4. 42 ) and in. other places as " yogah yuktih " ( Gi. Bha. 17. 7 ). In the same way also in the Mahabharata, these two words have been clearly defined in the Anugita in the phrase "pravrtti laksano yogah jnanam samnyasa laksanam " i. e., " yoga means the path of Energism (pravrtti-marga) and jnana means the path of Renunciation ( samnyasa or nivrtti-marga ) (Ma. Bha. Asva. 43. 25 ) and even in the Narayaniyopakhyana at the end of the Santiparva the words ' samkhya ' and ' yoga ' have occurred on numerous occasions in these two senses, and it is explained how and why these two paths were created by the Blessed Lord in the beginning of the creation itself (Ma. Bha. San. 240 and 348). That this Narayaniya or Bhagavata religion has been pro- pounded in the Bhagavadgita will become perfectly clear from the quotation from the Mahabharata which has been given at the beginning of the first chapter. Therefore, one has to say that the meanings of ' samkhya ' as ' nivrtti ' and of ' yoga ' as- 'pravrtti ', which are their ancient technical meanings accord-

ing to the Narayaniya religion, are also their meanings in the Gita ; and, if anybody has any doubts about this, these doubts, ought to be fully cleared by the definition of that word given in the Gita as : "samatvam yoga uccyate", i.e., " 'yoga' is the name given to equability" or " yogah karmasu kausalam ", i. e., " 'yoga' means skill in Action, " as also by such phrases used in the Gita as " karma-yogena yoginam " etc. ; and, it is established beyond argument that the word ' yoga ' has been used in the Gita in the sense of only the path of Energism (pravrtti-marga) i. e., the " KARMA- YOGA ". Not only in the Vedic religious treatises, but also in the Buddhistic religious treatises in Pali and in Sanskrit, the word Yoga is found to have been used in this meaning. For instance, in the Pali work, named Milinda- prasna written about Sake 200, we come across the word. "Pubba-yoga (purva-yoga ) " where its meaning has been defined, as "pubbakamma" (parva-karma) (Mi. Pra. 1.4); and in the 50th. verse of the first canto (sarga) of the Sanskrit poem Buddha- carita written by the poet Asvaghosa in the beginning of the- Salivahana era, we find the following statement :— " acaryakam yogavidhau dvijanam-aptam-anyair-Janako jagama " i. e. "The king Janaka had become an acarya (preacher) for teach- ing the Yoga methods 'yoga-vidhi' to Brahmins, and such a, preceptorship had not been acquired by any one before him. '" In this place, the word ' yoga-vidhi ' has to be interpreted as meaning "the method (vidhi) of the Desire-less Karma- Yoga". Because, the Gita, and all the other works emphatically say that that was the true bearing of the mode of life of Janaka and Asvaghosa has in the Buddha-carita (9. 19-20) given the illustration of Janaka himself in order to show " how Release can be obtained notwithstanding that one leads the life of a. house-holder ". When it has been in this way proved that even according to the Buddhistic treatises, this path of Action, prescribed by Janaka was known as 'yoga', one has to under- stand the word ' yoga ' used in the Gita also in the same meaning ; because, the Gita itself says that the path prescribed by Janaka is the very path it advocates (Gi. 3. 20). We will later on consider in greater detail the two paths of 'Samkhya ' and 'Yoga'. The matter under consideration at present is in what meaning the word 'yoga' has been used in the Gita. G. R._6

When the principal meanings of the words 'yoga' namely' " Karma- Yoga', and ' yogi ', namely ' Karma-Yogi ', have in this way been established, it is not necessary to say in so many words what the subject-matter of the Bhagavadgita. is. The Blessed Lord Himself refers to the advice given by Him as ' yoga ' ( Gi. 4. 1-3 ). Not only that, but as I have already stated above, Arjuna in the sixth chapter ( GI. 6. 33 ), and Sanjaya in the conclusion ( upasamhara ) at the end of the Gita ( Gi. 18. 75 ) have characterised the preaching of the Gita as ' yoga '. In the same way, in the enunciatory words used at the end of each chapter of the Gita signify- ing the conclusion of the chapter ( which is technically called samkalpa ), it is clearly stated that the Science of Yoga ( yoga-sastra ) is the subject-matter of the Gita; but none of the commentators on the Gita, seem to have paid any attention to this meaning of the word in the samkalpa. After the the two opening words "Srimad-Bhagavadgitasu upanisatsu"in this samkalpa, come the two words "brahma- vidyayam yoga-sastre" '. Out of these, the first two words mean "in the Upanisat sung by the Blessed Lord" and it is quite clear from the following two words that "the Yoga-Sastra which is one of the Brahma-Vidyas" that is, the KARMA-YOGA- SASTRA, is the subject matter of the Gita. ' Brahma-vidya ' means 'Knowledge of the Brahman' (Brahmajnana); and when that has been acquired, the Self-Released man has two cults or paths open before him (Gi. 3.3). One is the Samkhya path or the samnyasa (Renunciation) path, that is, the path of abandoning all wordly affairs or Actions after Self-Realisation, and living like an apathetic (virakta) person ; and the other path is the path of Yoga or of Karm-Yoga, that is to say, of not giving up wordly affairs but continuing to perform them in such a way that they do not create any difficulty in the matter of obtaining Release. Out of these two paths, the first one is also known as the 'path of Self -Realisation' (jnana-nistha ) and an exposition of that will be found to have been made by many rsis in the Upanisads and other writers. But there is no scientific exposition anywhere, except in the Gita, of the Karma-Yoga, which is included in the Brahma-vidya. There- fore, it now becomes quite clear that those persons who first

prepared that samkalpa — and, as I have stated above, it must have been there before any of the commentaries on the Gita were written, since it is to be found in all the editions of the Gita — must have added the words "brahma-vidyayam yoga-sastre" in this samkalpa. on proper authority, and intentionally, for emphasising the uniqueness of the subject-matter of the Gita- sastra, and not uselessly or frivolously ; and at the same time, we also easily understand what the import of the Gita was understood to be before any commentaries in support of particular cults came to be written on it. It is our great fortune that this work of preaching the Karma- Yoga was taken on his. own shoulders by Sri Krsna Bhagavan, who was the promulgator of this path of Yoga and who was the personified 'Isvara of all yogas' ( ' Yogesvara ' is 'yoga' plus 'Isvara'), and who has explained the esoteric import of it to Arjuna for the benefit of the whole world. It is true that the words 'karma- yoga' and ' karma-yoga-sastra' are longer than the words 'yoga' and 'yoga-sastra' used in the Gita; but in order that there should no more be any doubts as to what the Gita preaches, I have intentionally given the name "Karma-Yoga-Sastra" to this work and to this chapter.

That science by means of which we can decide such ques- tions as : Which is the best and purest of the several 'yogas', means, or processes in which a -particular Action can be perfor- med; whether it can be always followed; if not, what are the exceptions to it, and how they arise ; why is that path which we call good, really good, or that which we call bad, really bad, and on the strength of what, is this goodness or badness to be decided and who is to do so or what is the underlying principle in it etc. is known as the ' KARMA-YOGA-SASTRA ' (science of Karma- Yoga) or, as expressed briefly in the Gita 'YOGA-SASTRA ' (the science of Yoga). 'Good' or 'bad' are words in ordinary use and the following other words : propitious and unpropitious, or bene- ficial and harmful, or meritorious and non-meritorious, or sin and virtue, or righteous and unrighteous, are used in the same sense. The same is the meaning conveyed by the word-couples doable and not-doable (karya and akarya), duty and non-duty (kartavya asd akartavya), just and unjust (nyayya and anyayya). Nevertheless, as the various persons who have used these

words have different ideas about the formation of the universe, there have also come into existence, different ways in which the ' Karma-Yoga ' science has been expounded. Whatever science is taken, the subject-matter of it can be discussed ordinarily in three ways :— (1) considering the various objects- in the physical world from the point of view that they really are as they are perceived by our organs, and that there is nothing- beyond, is the first of these methods, which is known as- "ADHI-BHAUTIKA" (positive or materialistic) way of considering them. For instance, when you look upon the Sun not as a deity, but as a round-mass of gross matter made up of the five primordial elements, and examine its various properties, such as its heat, or light, or weight, or distance, or power of attraction, etc., that becomes the positive or material- examination of the Sun. Take the tree as another illustration. If we do not consider the internal force in the tree which is responsible for its getting leaves etc., but consider the tree purely externally, that is, consider only the facts that when the seed is put into the earth, it takes root and becomes a sprout,, which grows later on and goes through the visible changes of leaves, flowers, fruits etc., that is a purely material examina- tion of the tree. The examination of the subject-matter in Chemistry or Physics or the science of electricity or other- modern sciences is of this kind. Nay, materialists imagine, that when they have examined in this way the visible properties of any object, that is all they need to do and that it is useless to further examine the objects in the world. (2) When we discard this point of view, and examine what there is at the root of the object in the material world and whether the activities of these objects are due to some inherent properties in them or there is some other power or principle behind those activities, then one has to transcend the material, examination of the object. For instance, if we believe that in the gross or lifeless globe of the Sun, made up of the five primordial elements, there exists a deity called the ' Sun ' which dwells within it, and that this deity carries on the activities of the material Sun, such examination is called an ADHI-DAIVIKA (Theological) examination of the object. According to this point of view, there are in the tree, water,

air, etc., innumerable deities, which are distinct from those objects, and which activate those objects. (3) But, when instead of believing in this way that there are millions and millions of independent deities in all the various objects in the gross world, we believe that there exists in this world.some Spiritual Force, i.e., factor of consciousness (cicchakti) imperceptible to the organs, which carries on all the activities of the external world ; and that this Spiritual Force exists in the human body in the shape of an Atman and acquaints the human being with the entire creation ; and that this cosmos is kept going by that force, such consideration of the object is called an ADHYATMIKA (metaphysical) examination of the object. For instance, metaphysicians believe that the movements of the Sun and the Moon or even of the leaves of the tree are inspired by this unimaginable Power and that there are not different and independent deities in the Sun or in other objects. These three ways of examining any subject-matter have been in existence from times immemorial and they seem to have been followed even in the Upanisads- For instance, in the Brhadaranyaka and other Upanisads, while considering whether the organs of perception (Jnanendriya) or the vital force ( prana ) is superior, their respective strengths are considered, once from the point of view that they have deities like Agni etc., and again by considering their subtle ( metaphysical i. e., adhyatmika ) forms ( Br. 1. 5. 21 and 22 ; Chan. 1. 2 and 3 ; Kausi 2. 8 ) ; and the consideration of the form of the Isvara at the end of the seventh chapter and in the beginning of the eight chapter of the Gita is also from this point of view. Out of these three methods, our religious writers attach a higher importance to the metaphysical ( adhyatmika ) method of consideration than to others, relying on the authority " adhyatma-vidya vidyanam " (Gi. 10. 32) i. e. " the metaphysical science is the highest of all sciences ". But in modern times, the meanings of these three words are to a certain extent changed and the well-known French Materialist Comte* has given the highest importance

to the Positive ( material ) exposition. He says that there is no sense in trying to find out the fundamental element, if any, which exists at the root of the world ; and in as much as this element is always unknowable (agamya) it is neither possible nor proper to found on it the edifice of a science. When the aboriginal man for the first time, saw trees, clouds, volcanoes and other moving objects, he credulously began to believe that they were all deities. According to Comte, this was the Theological consideration of the universe. But man very soon gave-up this idea and began to think that there must be some element in the shape of an Atman in all these objects- According to Comte, this is the second stage of the progress of human knowledge; and this stage is called by him the Metaphysical stage. But when even after considering the universe in this way, actual practical scientific knowledge did not grow, man ultimately began to examine deeper and deeper only the visible properties of the objects in this world ; and on that account, man has now begun to exercise greater control over the external world, as a result of his having been able to invent steam-engines, telegraphs etc. Comte calls this the Positive (adhibhautika ) consideration and he has come to the conclusion that this method of consideration of any science or object is the most profitable one. According to Comte, we must adopt this method for scientifically considering Sociology or the science of Karma-Yoga ; and after a careful consideration of the history of the world, this philosopher has drawn the following conclusion regarding the science of wordly life, from that point of view, namely that: the highest religion of

every human being is to love the whole human race and to continually strive for the benefit of everybody. Mill, Spencer, and other English philosophers may be said to- support this opinion. On the other hand, Kant, Haegel, Schaupenhaur and other German philosophers, have proved, that this positive method of considering Ethics is inefficient and they have recently revived in Europe the method of basing. Ethics on Metaphysics adopted by our Vedanta philosophers. This matter, however, will be dealt with in greater detail later on.

The reason why different writers have used the different, words ' karya ' and ' akarya ' (doable and not-doable), ' dharmya " and ' adharmya ' (moral and immoral) in the meaning of ' good ' and ' bad ' although they all convey the same meaning, is that every one has his own different way or view of dealing; with a particular subject-matter. The question of Arjuna was- whether or not that war in which he would have to kill Bhisma, Drona, etc., was meritorious (Gi. 2. 7); and if a. Materialist had to answer this question, he would have, critically considered the palpable profit or loss of it to Arjuna personally, as also the results of it on the entire society and would have declared whether the fight was just ( nyayya ) or unjust ( anyayya ) ; because, these Materialists do not admit of any other test for determining the goodness or badness of any particular Action except the material, that is, the actual, external results of that Action on the world. But such an answer would not have satisfied Arjuna ; his vision was more comprehensive ; what he wanted was to know whether that war would in the end benefit his Self (atman), not in this world alone, but from the next-world point of view. He had no doubt as to whether or not he would acquire the kingdom or material happiness as a result of the death of Bhisma and Drona or whether his rule would be more beneficial to people than the rule of Duryodhana. In short, he had to see whether or not what he did was 'dharmya' (moral) or 'adharmya' (immoral), ' punya ' (non-sin) or ' papa ' (sin); and the exposition in the Gita has been made from that point of view. Not only in the Gita but also in other places in the Mahabharata has the examination of karma (Action) and akarma (non-Action) been

made from this next-world and Metaphysical point of view and in it, the two words 'dharma' and 'adharma' have been primarily used in order to show the goodness or badness of any particular act. But as the word 'dharma' and its opposite correlative 'adharma' are likely to create confusion on account of their very comprehensive meaning, it is necessary to discuss here in greater detail the meanings in which those words have been principally used in the science of Karma-Yoga.

The word 'DHARMA' is in ordinary practice very often used to imply only the path leading to next-world happiness. When we ask some one "What is your dharma (religion)"? our intention is to ask him by what path he goes — whether "Vedic, Buddhist, Jain, Christian, Mahomedan or Parsi — for acquiring happiness in the next world ; and the reply which he gives is also from the same point of view. In the same way, where the subject-matter of the Vedic yajnas and yagas instru- mental to the acquisition of heaven is being considered, the word 'dharma' is used in the same meaning, as in the canon "athato dharmajijnasa" etc. but the word 'dharma' is not to be understood in such a restricted meaning, and it is very often used for indicating the limitations of worldly morality, as in the phrases, 'rajadharma' (the duty of kings), 'prajadharma' (the duty of subjects), 'desadharma (the duty of a country), ' jnatidharma (the duty pertaining to a caste), ' kuladlmrma' (the duty pertaining to clan or family), 'mitradharma' (one's duty as a friend) etc. If these two meanings of the word 'dharma are to be individually explained, the dharma relating to the life after death may be called ' moksadharma ' or simply ' moksa ' and the dharma relating to this worldly life, i. e., Ethics may be given the name of ' dharma ' simply. For instance, in enumerating the four ideals of manhood (purusartha), we say 'dharma' (morality), 'artha' (wealth), 'kama' (desire), 'moksa' (Release). If 'moksa' is meant to be included in the first word 'dharma', then it would not be necessary to mention 'moksa' as an independent ideal at the end. Therefore, we must say that the writers of our scriptures use the word 'dharma in this place as meaning the numerous ethical duties -which form part of our worldly life. The same meaning is conveyed by the words 'kartavya- karma' ( duty ), 'niti' ( Ethics ), ' nitidharma ' ( morality ) or

"sadacarana' (good conduct) used now-a-days. But in ancient Sanskrit treatises, the words ' niti ' or 'nitisastra' were used principally with reference to regal jurisprudence (rajaniti) and therefore, the ordinary exposition of duty (kartavya-karma) or good conduct (sad-vartana) used to be called the 'exposition of dharma (dharma-pravacana) instead of the ' exposition of niti ' ( niti-pravacana' ). But this technical distinction between the two words niti. ' and ' dharma ' has not been adopted in all Sanskrit treatises; and, therefore, I too, have used the terms 'niti', 'kartavya' or simply 'dharma' as synonymous ; and, where the subject of Release (moksa) has to be considered, I have used the independent terms ' adhyatmi ' (Metaphysics) or ' bhakti- marga (Path of Devotion). The word 'dharma' has appeared on numerous occasions in the Mahabharata, and whenever it has been said there that a particular person is bound to do a particular thing according to his 'dharma', the word 'dharma' means ethical science ( kartavya-sastra ) or the then sociology (samaja-vyavastha-sastra) ; and wherever there has been occasion to refer to the paths leading to next- world happiness, in the latter half of the Santi-parva, the specific word 'moksa-dharma ' has been used. So also in the Manu-Smrti and other Smrti texts, in mentioning the specific duties of the four castes, Brahmin, ksatriya, vaisya, and sudra, the word 'dharma ' has been used on many occasions and in many places ; and even in the Bhagavadgita the word 'dharma' has been used as meaning ' the duties of the four castes in this world ' in the expression " svadharmamapi caveksya" (Gl. 2. 31 ) where the Blessed Lord is telling Arjuna to fight, having regard to what his 'dharma' is, and also later on in the expres- sion :" svadharme nidhanam sreyah paradharmo bhayavahah" (Gl. 3. 35), i.e., "it is better to die performing one's caste duties ; following the duties enjoined on another caste is dangerous ". The ancient this had created the institution of the four castes — which was in the nature of a division of labour — in order that all the affairs of society should go on without a hitch, and that society should be protected and maintained on all sides, without any particular person or group of persons having to bear the whole burden. Later on, people belonging to this society became 'jatimatropajivi' that is "persons, who forgetting their

respective caste duties, belonged to a particular caste merely by- reason of birth." and became mere nominal Brahmins, ksatriyas, vaisyas, or sudras ; but let us keep that thing aside for a time. Originally, this institution had been made for the maintenance- of society and it is quite clear that if any one of the four castes. had given up the 'dharma' i. e., duties allocated to it, or if any particular caste had totally ceased to exist and its place had not been taken by some other persons, the entire society would to that extent have been disabled and would later on have either been gradually destroyed or at least have sunk to a very low stage. There are numerous societies in the Western hemisphere,- which have come to prominence notwithstanding that they do- not have the institution of the four castes. But we must not forget that although the institution of the four castes may not be in existence among them, yet all the duties of the four castes are seen being performed in those societies, if not in the shape of castes, at any rate by some other arrangement in the shape of professional divisions or classes. In short, when we use the word ' dharma ' from the worldly point of view, we- consider in what way society will be maintained (dharma) and benefited. Manu has said that that ' dharma ' which is- 'asukhodarka', that is to say, 'from which unhappiness ulti- mately results' should be given up (Manu. 4. 176) ; and Bhisma says in the Satyanrtodhyaya of the Santiparva (San. 109. 12), where the exposition of 'dharma' and 'adharma' is made, and before that, Sri Krsna also says in the Karnaparva ( Ma. Bha- Karna. 69. 59 ), that_

dharanad dharmamityahur dharmo dharayate prajah I yat syad dharana sanyuktam sa dharma iti niscayah II;

that is, " the word Dharma comes from the root dhr, i. e.,. to hold or uphold, and all human beings are held together by dharma. That by which the holding together (of all human beings) takes place is dharma". Therefore, when this dharma ceases to be observed, the binding-ropes of society may be said to have become loose, and when these binding ropes are loosened, society will be in the same position as the planetary system consisting of the Sun and the planets would be in the sky without the binding force of gravitation or as a ship

would be on the ocean without a rudder. Therefore, Vyasa in the Bharata gives the advice that, in order that society should not come to an end by reaching such a lamentable state, money (artha) if it has to be acquired, must be acquired by 'dharma', that is, without disturbing the arrangement of society ; and if the desires, such as the sex impulses (kama) etc. have to be satisfied, that should also be done consistently with 'dharma ' ; . and he says at the end of the Bharata that :-

Urdhvabahur viraumyesah na ca kascic chrnoti mam I dharmad arthasca kamasca sa dharmah kim na sevyate II

i. e,, "Oh people I am haranguing you with raised hands, (but) ' no one listens to me ! if both wealth (artha) and desires (kama) can be acquired by dharma, (then) why do you not follow such a dhanna? " My readers will from this understand the chief meaning in which the word ' dharma ' has been used in the expression dharma-samhita, when the Mahabharata, from the point of view of 'dharma', is looked upon as the fifth Veda or- dharma-samhita ; and for the same reason, namely, on the ground that it is a dharma-grantha, has the Mahabharata been included among the religious texts prescribed for daily recital in the Brahma-yajna (ritual for Brahmins) — as is shown by the use of the symbolical words : " Narayanam namaskrtya " — along with the two treatises Purva-Mimamsa and Uttara-Mimamsa (which deal with the question of next- world happiness).

   Reading the exposition made by me above of what is . 

dharma and what is adharma, some one may object : if you accept these principles of 'the maintenance of society' (samaja- dharana) and 'general welfare' (sarva-bhuta-hitam), as mentioned in the second chapter when discussing the question of Truth and Falsehood (satyanrta), then there is no difference between your point of view and the Materialistic point of view ; because, both these principles are outwardly real, that is Materialistic. This question has been dealt with by me in detail in the next chapter. For the present, I will only say that although we accept maintenance of society as being the chief outward use of dhanna, yet we never lose sight of the Redemption of the Atman (atma-kalyana) or Release (moksa) which is the highest ideal according to the Vedic or all other religions and which is the special feature of our view-point. Whether it is mainten—

ance of society or the general material welfare of everybody, if these externally useful principles obstruct the Redemption of the Atman, we do not want them. If even our works on medicine maintain that the medical science is a useful science, because it serves as a means for obtaining Release (moksa), by protecting the body, then it is absolutely impossible that our religious writers would divorce the Karnia-Yoga-Sastra, which considers the most important subject of the performance of various worldly Actions, from the Metaphysical philosophy of Release. And therefore, we look upon that Action which is favourable to our Metaphysical betterment as 'punya' (reli- giously meritorious), 'dharma' (moral), or 'subha (good) and that which is unfavourable to it, as ' papa ' (sinful), 'adharma (immoral), or 'asubha' (bad). It is for this very reason that we use the words ' dharma ' and ' adharma ' (notwithstanding that they have a double meaning and are to a certain extent ambi- guous) in place of the words ' kartavya ' (duty) ' akartavya ' (non-duty) and ' karya ' (doable) and ' akarya ' (non-doable). Even when the worldly affairs or activities in the external world are primarily to be considered, we consider whether or not these activities are conducive to Atmic benefit, simul- taneously with considering their external effects. If a Mate- rialist is asked why I should sacrifice my own benefit for the benefit of others, what answer can he give except by saying : "That is ordinary human nature " ? The writers of our Sastras have seen further than this and the science of Karma-Yoga has been considered in the Mahabharata from this comprehensive Metaphysical standpoint, and Vedanta has for the same reason been dealt with in the Bhagavadgita. Even the ancient Greek philosophers were of the opinion that one has to take 'the greatest benefit' or 'the climax of virtue' as the highest ideal of mankind and dealt with the question of the doable and the not-doable from that point of view ; and Aristotle has in his book on Ethics said that all these things are included in the Atmic benefit (1. 7, 8). Yet, Aristotle has not given due importance to Atmic benefit. That is not the case with our philosophers. They have laid down, that Atmic benefit or [*This word 'Atmic' (i. e., of the 'Atman') has been coined by me on the analogy 'Vedic'_ Trans.]

Metaphysical perfection is the first and the highest duty of every man ; that the question of the doable and the not-doable must be considered on the basis that Atmic benefit is more- important than any other benefit; and that, it is not proper to consider that question without reference to Metaphysical philosophy. The same position seems to have been accepted in modern times by some Western philosophers, in dealing with the question of the doable and the not-doable. For instance, the German philosopher Kant first wrote the metaphysical book Critique of Pure Reason, that is, of ' vyavasayatmika ', (i.e., pure) ' buddhi ' (i.e., Reason), and subsequently the book Critique of Practical Reason, that is, of ' vasanatmaka ' (i.e. practical) 'buddhi' (i.e., Reason).* And even in England,. Green has started his book entitled Prolegomena to Ethics with the consideration of the Atman, which is the bed-rock of the entire universe. But, as the works of purely materialistic philosophers on Ethics are principally taught in our colleges the fundamental principles of the Karma-Yoga mentioned in the Gita, are not well understood even by learned persons among us, who have had an English education.

It will be clear from the exposition made by me above why we apply the common word ' DHARMA ' chiefly to wordly morality or to systems laid down for the maintenance of society. Not only in the Sanskrit treatises, Mahabharata and Bhagavadgita, but also in vernacular works is the word ' dharma ' always used as meaning worldly duties or laws. We understand the words ku-adhaema and kalacara as synonymous. The Marathi poet, Moropant, has used the word ' dharma ' in this sense, in describing the incident in the Bharata war when Karna had got out of his chariot for raising the wheel of his chariot which had sunk into the earth, and Arjuna was on the point of killing him. Karna then said : " It is not the ethics of warfare (yuddhadharma) to kill an enemy when he is unarmed," and Sri Krsna retaliated by reminding him of the previous incidents of the attempted

denuding of Draupadi, or the murder of Abhimanyu, when alone, by a number of persons, and asking him : "Where was then your dharma, Oh, Radhasuta ?' ' with reference to all those incidents ; and even in the Mahabharata the word ' dharma' has been used in relating this incident in the expression " kva te dharmas tada gatah ", i.e., " where did your ' dharma ' (morality) go then?", and it is shown that it is morally right to give measure for measure to such immoral persons. In short, as it has become usual, whether in Sanskrit or in Prakrit literature, to use -the word 'dharma' as indicating the rules of morality which have been laid down by high and reverend persons, with reference to various matters, for the maintenance of society, I have adopted the same word in this book. These rules, which have been laid down by reverend people (sista) and which have become acceptable on all hands and are known as ' respectable behaviour ' (sistacara), are, from this point of view, the root of morality (dharma) ; and therefore, in the Mahabharata (Anu. 104. 157) and also in the Smrti treatises there are such statements as : ' acaraprabhavo dharmah ", i.e., '" morality springs from custom " or : " acarah paramo dharmah", i.e., " rules of custom are the highest morality " (Manu. 1. 108), or (where the origin of morality is mentioned), "vedah smrtih sadacarah svasya ca priyamatmamah ", (Manu. 2. 12), i.e., 'the Vedas, the Smrtis, good conduct and that which we ourselves desire." But that is not enough for the science of Karma. Yoga, and, as has been stated by me before in the second chapter, it is necessary to fully and critically consider what causes led to a particular acura or code of conduct being fixed.

We must also here consider another definition of the word dharma ' which is come across in ancient treatises. This is the definition given by the Mimamsa school. That school says : " codanalaksano rtho dharmah " ( Jai. Su. 1.1. 2 ) Codana ' means ' inspiring,' that is, some authoritative person saying or ordering : " Do this " or " Do not do this ".So long as no one has laid down such a limitation or such a limitation has not come into existence, One is at liberty to do what he likes. This means that dharma originally came into existence as a result of such limitations, and this definition of morality

is to a certain extent similar to the opinions of the well-known English writer Hobbes. The human being, in the aboriginal condition behaved according to the particular frame of mind ruling at the time. But when he later on found out that such unrestricted behaviour was not beneficial on the whole, he came to the definite conclusion that it was in the best interests of everybody to lay down and observe certain restrictions on the self -inspired actions of the organs, and every human being began to observe these limitations, which have gained ground on account of general acceptance ( sistacara ), or for some other reason, as if they were laws ; and when such limitations grew in number, they formed themselves into a code. I have mentioned in the previous chapter that the institution of marriage was not at first in vogue, but was brought into existence by Svetaketu, and also that the prohibition against drink was first laid down by Sukracarya. In defining the word dharma as : " codanlaksano' rtho dharmah " only the fact of such restrictions having been dictated by these law-givers has been taken into account and the motives of Svetaketu or of Sukracarya in laying down these limitations has been lost sight of. Even in the case of a rule of morality ( dharma ), some one first realises its importance and then it is promulgated. It is not necessary to ask anyone to eat, drink, and make merry, because, those are the inherent tendencies of the physical organs. That is what is meant by Manu when he says : " na mamsabhaksane doso na madye na ca maithune " ( Manu. 5. 56 ), i. e., "Eating flesh or drinking wine or enjoying sexual intercourse, is not sinful. ", that is, there is nothing in them which is contrary to the rules of nature. All these things are the inherent desires, not only of ,'men but of every living being_ _ "pravrttir esa bhutanam", i. e., " these are the tendencies of created beings ". Morality consists in putting proper limitations on an unrestricted course of life resulting from passions in the interest of the maintenance of society or of general welfare. Because : —

aharanidra bhayamaithunam ca samanyam etat pasubhir naranam I dharmo hi tesam adhiko viseso dharmena hinah pasubhih samanah II

i. e. " eating, sleeping, fear, and sexual relations are the? heritage of men, same as of animals ; dharma, ( that is, restrain- ing them by rules of morality ), is the difference between man and beast ; and those who are not governed by this code of morality may be looked upon as beasts. " There is in the Santiparva of the Mahabharata, a similar verse ( San. 294. 29 ) and the verse in the Bhagavata, which prescribes limitations on the desires of hunger etc. has been quoted in the previous chapter. In the same way what the Blessed Lord is referring to, is the nature of morality to lay down limitations on unrestricted mental impulses, where in the Bhagavadgita, He says to Arjuna : —

indriyasyendriyasyarthe ragadvesau vyavasthitau I tayor na vasam agacchet tau hyasya paripanthinau II

i.e. "the attractions and repulsions between the organs of sense on the one hand and the various objects which are pleasurable or repulsive to them on the other are unchangingly inherent. One should not become their slaves, because, both love and hate are enemies". The organs of a man urge him to behave like a beast, and his intelligence pulls him in the opposite direction. 'Those persons who redeem themselves by sacrificing the animal tendencies rampant in their bodies into the fire of this warfare are the true sacrificers, and are indeed blessed.

Call dharma, 'acara-prabhava' (born of custom), or call it 'dharanat' (something which upholds or keeps together), or call it 'codanalaksana' (some precept which has been dictated), which- ever definition of dharma (worldly morality) is accepted, none of them is much, useful for coming to a definite conclusion, when one has to decide between what is moral and what immoral. The first definition only tells us what the funda- mental form of dharma is! The second definition tells us what its external use is, and the third definition tells us that moral restrictions were laid down in the beginning by some persons or other. Not only is there much difference between customs and customs but, as there are numerous consequences of one and the same act, and also as the 'codana' i.e., precepts of different rsis are also different, we have to look out for some other way of determining what the dharma is, when there are doubts in the.

matter.When Yaksa asked Yudhisthira what this other way was, Yudhisthira replied :-

tarko 'pratisthah srutayo vibhinnah naiko rsir yasya vacah pramanam I dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhayam mahajano yena gatah sa panthah II (Ma.Bha. vana. 312. 115).

that is : " inferential logic is uncertain, i. e., it is such that if will give birth to various inferences according to different degrees of keenness of intelligence in men ; the Srutis, that is the precepts of the Vedas, are all mutually conflicting ; and, as regards the Smrtis, there is not a single rsi (sage) whose precept we can look upon as more authoritative than that of others Well, if we seek the fundamental principle of this (worldly) dharma, it is lost in darkness, that is to say, it is such as cannot be understood by a man of ordinary intelligence. Therefore, the path which have been followed by venerable persons is the path of dharma". very well! but who are the venerable persons (mahajanah)? That word 'mahajanah' cannot be interpreted to mean ' a large (maha) collection of persons (janah)'. Because, following the path which has been laid down by ordinary persons (or collection of persons),whose minds are never troubled by and what is right and what is wrong will be like playing a blind man's buff or like " andhenaiva niyamana yathandhah", i.e., "the blind being led by the blind", as stated in the Kathopanised.If you interprete the word ' mahajanah 'as meaning conveyed in the above verse-then, where is there, any uniformity in their behaviour?: The sinless RamaCandra discarded his wife though she had passed through the ordeal of fire, merely on the ground of public criticism; and the same Ramacandra, in order that Sugriva should be on his side, entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with him, by making him 'tulyarimitra', i. e., ' with common friends and enemies ', and killed Vali who had in no way wronged him ! Parasurama murdered his own mother at the behest of his father !, and as regards the pandavas, five of them had only one wife ! If G.R._7

you consider the gods in the heavens, then some of them are the jours of Ahilya, whereas others are seen lying in the sky mutilated bodies, being wounded by the arrows of Rudra, i Brahmadeva because he ran after his own daughter in form of a stag (Ai. Bra. 3. 33). With these things e his mind's eye, Bhavabhuti has put the words : idhas te na vicaramyacaritah", i.e., "one must not attach too Auch importance to the doings of these old people " in the iiouth of Lava in the Uttararamaearitra. A writer, who "has written in English the history of the Devil, has said in his book that if one considers the history of the warfare between the supporters of the gods and of the Devil, we see that very often the gods (dews) have cheated the non-gods (daityas) ; and in the same way, in the IJausitakl-Brahmanopanisad (See, Kausi. 3. 1 as also Ai. Bra. 7. 28), Indra says to Pratardana : "I have killed Vrtra (although he was a Brahmin) ; I have aces the ascetic Arunmukha, and thrown the lives ; and, breaking all the various treaties which Be by me, I have killed the friends and clansmen find also killed the demons named Pauloma and yet on that account, " tasya me tatra na loma ca I e., " not a hair of my head has been touched ". pays : "You have no occasion to consider the evil these venerable persons, but, as stated in the Taittiriyopanisad ( Taitti. 1. 11. % ), imitate only their good actions, and neglect the rest ; for instance, obey your father, as was done by Parasurama, but do not kill your mother ", then, the primary question of how good actions are to be differentiated from bad actions again arises. Therefore, after laving described his various deeds as mentioned above, Indra says to Pratardana : "Bearing in mind that that man who has fully Realised his Self is not prejudicially affected by patricide, matricide, infanticide, theft, or any other sinful actions, try and realise in the first instance what the Atnian is, so that all your doubts will be answered" ; and he has thereafter explained to Pratardana the science of the Atnian. In short, although the precept "nmhajano yena yatah sa panthah" may be easy to allow for ordinary persons; yet it does not meet all possible ontingencies ; and thoughtful persons have ultimately to enter

into the Philosophy of the -Atman (atma-jnava) and ascertain the true principle underlying the actions of the venerable persons (maliajanah), however deep that principle may be. It is for this reason that the advice : "m devacaritam caret ".i.e., "one must not follow only the external actions of gods", is given, Some persons have hit upon an easier way for determining the doable and the not-doable. They Bay that whatever virtue is taken, we must always take care against excess of it, foT such excess turns a virtue into a vice. Charity is a virtue; but, " atidanad balir baddkah ", i. e., " because of too much charity, Bali was undone ". The well-known Greek philosopher Aristotle has in his book on Ethics prescribed the same test for distinguishing between the doable and the not- doable ; and he has clearly shown how every virtue, in excess, is the cause of one's undoing. Even Kalidasa has come to the conclusion ( see Raghuvarhsa 17. 47 ) that courage, pure and simple, is like the cruel behaviour of an animal like a tiger ; and morality, pure and simple, is nothing else but cowardice ; and that the king Atithi, used to rule by a judicious admixture of the sword and regal jurisprudence. If a man speaks too much, he is talkative, if he speaks too little, he is reserved ; if he spends too much, he is a spendthrift, if he spends too little, he is a miser ; if he is too advanced, he is wayward, and if he lags behind, he is a laggard ; if he insists on anything too much, he is obstinate, and if he insists too little, he is fickle ; if he is too accommodating, he makes himself cheap, and if he remains stiff, then he is proud : this is how Bhartrhari and •others have described some good and bad qualities. However, such a rule of the thumb does not overcome all difficulties, because, who is to decide what is 'too much', and what is ^moderate' ? What may be 'too much' for one or on any parti- cular occasion, may be too little for another person or on another occasion. Jumping into the firmament at the moment of his birth in order to catch hold of the Sun was as nothing to Maruti (VS. Rama. 7. 35). Therefore, as the syena bird advised the King Sibi, every man, when faced with the discernment between the duty (dharmal and the non-duty (adharrna) should on every occasion consider the relative merits and the importance or unimportance of mutually conflicting duties,

and intelligently arrive at a conclusion as to the true duty or proper Action :—

avirodhat tu yo dharmah sa dharmah satyavikrama I virodhisu mahipala niscitya gurulaghavam I na badha vidyate yatra tam dharmam samupacaret II (Ma. Bha. Vana. 131. 11. 12 and Manu. 9. 299)

i. e., "Oh, Satyavikrama 1 that is dharma (duty) in which there is no contradiction ; Oh, King !, if there is such a contradiction,, then come to a decision as to the relative worth of the act and the opposition, and follow that path of duty in which, there is no opposition-". But one cannot, on that account only, say that the true test of determining the proper conduct on a doubtful occasion is to discriminate between the duty and the non-duty. Because, as we often see in ordinary life, different learned people discriminate in different ways. j,o their own lights, and arrive at several different. ! regards the morality of a particular act ; and this, meant by the words, "tarko 'pratisthah " in the. Ibove. We must, therefore, now see whether or not py other means for arriving at a correct solution of Iful points about the duty and the non-duty ; and if |ose means are ; and if there are more than one ways,, i is the best way of all. This is what science has to determine for us. The true characteristic feature of a science- is : " anehasamsayocchedi paroksarthasya darsakam ", i. e., " it must remove confusion regarding matters which the mind cannot at first grasp on account of numerous doubts which spring up, and make their meaning free from doubt and easy,, and, even give a proper insight into matters which might not. be actually before the eyes or which may be matters of the future " ; and the fact that by learning astronomy, one can. predict the occurrence and the time of future eclipses justifies. the words "paroksarthasya darsakam" used in the latter part of the above definition. But in order that all these various, difficulties should be solved, one has first to see what these, difficulties are. And, therefore, ancient as also modern writers, before dealing with the subject-matter to ba proved by a science' first enumerate all the other existing aspects of the same-

subject-matter, and show the faults or insufficiency in them. Following this method, I shall, before mentioning the YOGA or device established or preached in the Gits for determining the doability or non-doability. of any . particular Action, first consider the more well-known of the other devices which are prescribed by philosophers for the same purpose.It is true that these other devices were not very much in vogue in India but were promulgated principally by Western philosophers. But it cannot, on that account, be said that I should not consider them in the book ; because, it is necessary to be acquainted- with these other devices, if even to a small extent, not only for the purpose of comparison, but also in order to understand the true importance of the Metaphysical ( adhyat- mika) Karma-Yoga expounded in the Gita.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MATERIALISTIC THEORY OF HAPPINESS

(ADHIBHAUTIKA SUKHAVADA)

duhkhad uddvij te sarvasya sukham Ipsitam I * Mahabharata. Santi. 139. 61.

As we have seen that stock precepts like: 'mahajano yena gatah sa panthah', i. e. 'follow the path which has been followed by venerable persons', or, 'ati sarvatra varjayet', i. e., 'do too much of nothing', do not satisfactorily explain : (i)' why Manu and the other legislators laid down the rules of 'ahimsa satyamasteya' (Non-Violence, Veracity, Not-stealing) etc., (ii) whether those rules are mutable or immutable, (iii) what their extent or the fundamental principle underlying them is, and (iv) which precept should be followed when two or more of them are equally in point and yit conflict with each other, it is now necessary for us to see whether or not there are any definite means for properly determining these questions, and deciding which is the most beneficial or meritorious path of duty, as also, in what way and from what point of view we can determine the relative importance or the greater or less worth of mutually conflicting principles of morality. I have in the last chapter explained that there are three ways of considering the questions involved in the exposition of Action and Non-Action, namely, the Positive, (adhibhautika), the Theological (adhidaivika), and the Metaphysical (adhyatmika), just as in the case of the scientific exposition of other matters. According to our philosophers the most excellent of these ways is the Metaphysical way. But, as it is necessary to carefully consider the other two methods in order to fully understand the importance of the Metaphysical method, I have in this chapter first considered the fundamental Materialistic principles under- lying the examination of the question of Aotion and Non- Action. The positive physical sciences, which have had an immense growth in modern times have to deal principally with the external or visible properties of tangible objects.

• that is :— Every one is unwilling to suffer pain and every-

one wants happiness".

ADHIBHAUTIKA SUKHAVADA

Therefore, those persons who have spent their lives in studying' the physical sciences, or who attach much importance to the critical methods particular to these sciences, get into the habit, of always considering only the external effects of things ; and their philosophical vision being thereby to a certain extent, narrowed, they do not, in discussing any particular thing, attach much importance to causes which are Metaphysical, or intangible, or invisible, or which have reference to the next, world. But, although on that account, they leave out of consideration the Metaphysical or the next-world point of view, yet, as codes of morality are necessary for the satisfactory regulation of the mutual relations of human beings and for public welfare, even these philosophers, who are indifferent, about life after death or who have no faith in intangible or' Metaphysical knowledge, ( and also necesssarily no faith in. God ), look upon the science of Proper Action (Karma-Yoga) as. a most important science ; and, therefore, there has been in the. past and there is still going on, a considerable amount of discussion in the West, as to whether the science of Proper and Improper Action can be satisfactorily dealt with in the same way as the physical sciences, that is to say, by means of arguments based on purely worldly and visible, effects. As a result of this discussion, modern Western- philosophers have made up their minds that the science of Metaphysics is of no use whatsoever for the consideration of Ethics, that the goodness or badness of any particular Action, must be determined by considering only those of its external effects which are actually visible to us, and that we can do so. Any act which a man performs, is performed by him either for obtaining happiness, or for warding off unhappiness. One may even say that ' the happiness of all human beings ' is the- highest worldly goal, and if the ultimate visible resultant of all Action is thus definite, the correct method of deciding Ethical, problems, is to dstermine the moral value of all Actions by weighing the greater or lesser possibilities of each Action producing happiness or preventing unhappiness. If one judges, the goodness or badness of any particular object in ordinary life by considering its external usefulness, e. g., if we decide- that that cow which has short horns and which is docile, and

at the same time gives a large quantity of milk is the best flow, then on the sams principle, we must also consider that Action as the most meritorious one, from the ethical point of view, of which the external result of producing happiness or preventing unhappiness is the highest. If it is possible to decade the ethical value of any particular act in such an easy and scientific way, namely, by considering the greater or less value of its purely external and visible effects, one should not trouble about entering into the discussion of the Self and Non- Self (atmanatma) ; "arke cen madhu vindeta kimartham parvatam vrajet " "if one can get honey near at hand where he sits, then where is the sense of going into the hills to look for honey-combs ? " I call this method of determining the morality of any particular Action by considering merely its external results the ' adhibhautika sukhavada ' (the Materialistic Theory of Happiness), because, the happiness to be considered for determining the morality of any Action is, according to this theory, actually visible and is external — that is, is such as arises from the contact of the organs with external objects, and consequently Materialistic (adhibhautika) — and this school has likewise been brought into existence by those philosophers who consider the world from the purely positive or Materialistic point of view. But, it is not possible to fully discuss this theory in this book. It would be necessary to write an independent book to even merely summarise the opinions of the different writers. I have, therefore, in this chapter collected together and given as precisely as possible as much general information about this Materialistic school of Ethics as is absolutely necessary for fully understanding the nature and importance of the science of Proper Action expounded in the Bhagavadgita. If any one wants to go deeper into the matter, he must study the original works of the Western philo-

sophers. From my statement above, that Materialistic philo- sophers are apathetic about the science of the Atman or about the next world, one must not draw the conclusion that all the learned persons who subscribe to this path, are selfish, self- centered or immoral. There belong to this school high-minded philosophers like Comte, Spencer, Mill, and others, who most earnestly and enthusiastically preached that striving for the benefit of the whole world by making at least one's worldly outlook as comprehensive as possible (if one does not believe in the next world), is the highest duty of every man; and as their works are replete with the most noble and deep thoughts, they ought to be read by every one. Although the paths of the science of Proper Action are many, yet, so long as one has not given the go-bye to the external ideal of 'the benefit of the world', one must not ridicule a philosopher on the ground that his method of dealing with the philosophy of Ethics is different from one's own. I shall now precisely and in their proper order, consider the various divi- sions into which the modern or ancient Materialistic philoso- phers fall, as a result of differences of opinion between them as to whether the external material happiness which has to be considered for determining the ethical propriety or impropriety of an action is one's own happiness or the happiness of another, and whether of one person or of several persons; and I shall also consider to what extent these opinions are proper or faultless. The first of these classes is of those who maintain the theory of pure selfish happiness. This school of thought says that there is no such thing as life after death or as philan- thropy; that all Metaphysical sciences have been written by dishonest people to serve their own ends; that the only thing which is real in this world is one's own interest; and that, that act by which this self-interest can be achieved or whereby one can promote one's own material happiness is the most just, the most proper, and the most meritorious act. This opinion was, at a very early date, vociforously proclaimed in India by Carvaka. and the mischievous advice given by Jabali to Sri Rama at the end of the Ayodhyakanda of the Ramayana, as also the Kanikaniti in the Mahabharata (Ma,

Bha. A. 142), pertains to this school of thought. The opiniom of the illustrious Carvaka was that when the five primordial elements are fused together, they acquire the quality of an. Atman, and when the body is burnt, the Atman is burnt with. it; therefore, a wise man should not bother about the Atman,. but should enjoy himself so long as life lasts, even borrowing. money for the purpose, if necessary; one should rnam krtva ghrtam pibet ", i. e., "borrow money and drink clarified butter",. because there is nothing after death. As Carvaka was born in India, he satisfied himself with prescribing the drinking: of clarified butter (ghrtam pibet) otherwise, this canon would have been transformed into ' rnam krtva suram pibet ', i. e., 'borrow money and drink wine'. This school says: "What is this dharma and this charity ? All the objects which have. been created in this world by the Paramesvara, — what did I say ? I have made a mistake ! Of course, there is no- Paramesvara— all the things which I see in this world have come into existence only for my enjoyment, and as I can see no other purpose for them, there is, of course, no such purpose. When I am dead, the world is over; and therefore, so long as- I am alive, I shall acquire all the various things which can, be acquired, acquiring this to-day and that to-morrow, and thereby I shall satisfy all my desires. If at all I go in for any religious austerity or charity, that will be only to increase my reputation and worth; and if I make a rajasuya. yajna or an asvamedha yajna, that too will be for the sole purpose of establishing that my power is unchallenged in all directions. In short, the EGO, the 'I' is the only focus of this world, and this 'I' is the sum and substance of all morality; all the rest is false ". The description of godless. endowment (asuri sampatti) given in the 16th chapter of the Gita in the words: "isvaro 'ham aham bhogi siddho'ham balavan sukhi " (Gi. 16. 14), i. e., " I am the Isvara, I am the one who enjoys, and I am the siddha (perfect), the all-powerful,and the happy", applies quite appropriately to the opinions of persons- who follow this philosophy. If instead of Sri Krsna, there had been some person like Jabali belonging to this sect for advising Arjuna, he would, in the first place, have slapped Arjuna on the- face, and then said to him : "What a fool are you ! When you

have without effort got this golden opportunity of fighting and conquering everybody and enjoying all kinds of royal enjoy- ment and happiness, you are uttering the most foolish things, being lost in the futile confusion of 'shall I do this, or shall I do- that' ! You will not get such a chance again. What a fool are you to think of the Atman and of relatives ! Strike ! and enjoy the empire of Hastinapura after having removed all the thorns from your path ! In this lies your truest happiness. Is there anything in this world except one's visible material happiness ?" But, Arjuna was not anxious to hear such a disgustingly selfish, purely self-centered, and ungodlike advice ; and he had, already in advance, said to Sri Krsna :

etam na, hantum icchami ghnato 'pi Madhusudana l api trailokyarajyasya hetoh kim nu mahikrte II (Gi. 1. 36).

that is, "If I had to acquire for myself (by this war), the- kingdom even of the three worlds — to say nothing of the- kingdom of this world — (that is, such physical pleasures), I do not desire for that purpose to kill the Kauravas. I do not mind if they slit open my throat". Even a mere reference to- this ungodlike self-centered and entirely selfish doctrine of material happiness, which Arjuna had, in this way, denounced in advance, would amount to a refutation of it. This extremely low stage reached by the school of Material Happiness, which looks upon one's own physical pleasures as the highest ideal of man, and throws religion and morality to the winds, and totally disregards what happens to other people, has been treated by all writers on the science of Proper Action, and even by ordinary people, as extremely immoral, objectionable and disdainable. Nay ! , this theory does not even deserve the name of Ethics or of an ex- position of morality ; and therefore, instead of wasting more time in considering this subject, we will now turn to the next class of Materialistic philosophers. Pure and naked selfishness or self-centeredness never suc- ceeds in the world; because, although physical and material pleasures may be desirable to every one, yet, as is a matter of actual experience, if our happiness interferes with the happi-

ness of others, those others will certainly do us harm. Therefore other Materialistic philosophers maintain that although one's happiness or. selfish purposes may be one's goal, yet, in as much as it is not possible for one to acquire such happiness, unless one makes some sacrifices for other people similar to those one oneself wants from them, one must long-sightedly take into account the happiness of others in order to obtain one's own happiness. I put these Materialistic philosophers in the second class. It may be said that the Materialistic exposi- tion of Ethics truly begins at this point. Because, instead of saying like Carvaka, that no ethical limitations are necessary for the maintenance of society, persons belonging to this school have made an attempt to explain their own view as to why these limitations must be observed by everybody. These people say that, if one minutely consid ers how the theory of Harmlessness came into this _world, and why people follow that doctrine, there is no other reason at the root "of it except the fear based on selfish considerations that, ' if i kill others , others will kill me, and then I will lose my happiness', and that all other moral precepts have come into existence as a result of his selfish fear in the same way as this la w of Harmless- ness, If we suffer pain, we cry, and if others suffer pain, we feel pity for them . But why ? Because the fear that we in our turn may have to suffer the same pain, that is, of course, the thought of our possible future unhappiness comes to our minds. Charity, generosity, pity, love, gratefulness, humble- ness, friendship, and other qualities which at first sight appear to be for the benefit of others are, if we trace them to their origin, nothing but means of acquiring our own happiness or warding off our own unhappiness in another form. Every body- soever helps others or gives in charity with the internal motive that -if he found himself in the same position, other people should help him; and we love others, only in order that others should love us. At any rate, the selfish idea that other people should call us good is at the back of our minds, The expressions ' doing good to others ' and ' the welfare of others' are words based on confusion of thought. What is real, is one's own selfish purpose; and one's own selfish purpose means obtaining one's own happiness or warding off one's own

unhappiness. This amount s to saying that a mother suckles her baby not on account of love, but she does this selfish act' in order to ease herself (as her breasts are full of milk and' she feels the inconvenience of the pressure), or in order that the child, after growing up, should love her and" give her happiness.The fact that people of this school of thought , admit that it is necessary to long-sightedly observe such moral; principles as will permit of the happiness of others — though that may be for obtaining one's own happiness — is the im- portant difference between this school of thought and the school of Carvaka. Nevertheless, the idea that a human, being is nothing but a statue cast into the mould of selfish physical desires, which is the opinion of the Carvaka sohool, has been left untouched by this school. This opinion has been supported in England by Hobbes and in France by Helvetius. But there are not to be found many followers of this school in' England or anywhere else. After the exposition of Ethics by Hobbes had been published, it was refuted by philosophers like- Butler, who proved that human nature as a whole is not absolutely selfish, and that there exist in a human being from birth such other qualities as humanity, love, gratitude etc., to a greater or less extent, side by side with selfishness ; and', therefore, in considering any act or any dealing from the ethical point of view, one should instead of considering only the qualities of selfishness or even of long-sighted selfishness, always consider the two inherent distinct tendencies of human beings, namely, 'selfishness', (svartha) and the 'unselfishness', (parartha). If even a cruel animal like a tigress is prepared to- sacrifice her life for the sake of her cubs, it follows that saying that the emotions of love and philanthrophy come into- existence in the human mind merely out of selfishness is futile, and that weighing between the duty and the non-duty merely from the point of view of long-sighted selfishness is

scientifically incorrect. Our ancient writers had not lost sight of the fact that persons, whose intelligence has remained "unpurified on account of their having remained wholly engrossed in family life, very often do whatever they do in this world for others, only with an eye to their own benefit. The saint Tukaram has said : "the daughter-in-law weeps for the mother-in-law, but the motive in her heart is quite different " ( Ga. 2583. 2. ) ; and some of our philosophers have gone even beyond Helvetius. For instance, in commenting on the proposition laid down by Sri Samkaracarya in -his Brahma-Sutrabhasya (Ve. Su.Sam. Bha. 2. 2. 3) on the authority of the Gautama-Nyayasutra (1. 1. 18) 'pravartana laksana dosah', i. e., 'all human activity, whether selfish or unselfish, is faulty', Anandagiri is says that : " We practise kindness or benevolence towards others only in order to remove that pain" which results from the emotion of pity awakening our hearts."This arguments of Anandagiri is "to be found in almost all our books on the Path of Renunciation, and all that is principally attempted to be proved from it is, that all Actions are selfish, and, therefore, noa-performable. But in the conver- sation betwean Yajnavalkya and his wife Maitreyi, which appears twice in the Brhadarariyakopanisad (Br. 2. 4 ; 4. 5), this very argument has been made use of in another and a strange way. In answering the question of Maitreyi: "How can one acquire immortality ? ", Yajnavalkya says to her : "0 Maitreyi, the husband is loved by the wife, not for the sake of the husband, but for the sake of her own atman; in the same way, the son is not loved by us for his own sake; we love him for our own sake! The same law applies to wealth, animals, and all other objects. 'atmanastu kamaya sarvam priyam bhavati', i, e., 'We like all things for the sake of our Self (atmam)", and if all love is in

this way based on Self, must we not, in the first place, find out what our atman (Self) is ? " And, therefore, the concluding advice of Yajnavalkya is; "atma va are drastavyah srotavyo mantavyo nididhyositavyah" , i. e., "See (first) what the atman (Self) is, hear the -utman, and meditate and contemplate on the atman ". When the true form of the Atman has in this way baen realised by following this advice, the whole world becomes Self-ised (atma-maya), and the distinction between selfishness (svartha) and unselfishness (parartha) in the mind ceases to exist. Although this argument of Yajnavalkya is apparently the same as that of Hobbes, yet, as can be easily seen, the inferences drawn by them respectively from that advice are contrary to each other. Hobbes attaches higher importance to selfishness, and, looking upon all philanthrophy as long-sighted selfishness, says that there is nothing in this world except selfishness; whereas Yajnavalkya, relying on the word 'sva' (one's own) in the phrase ' svartha' (selfishness), shows, on the authority of that word, that from the Meta- physical point of view, all created beings are harmoniously comprised in our Atman and our Atman is likewise harmo- niously comprised in all created beings; and he, in that way, gets rid of the apparently dualistic (dvaita) conflict between the interest of oneself and the interest of others. These opinions of Yajnavalkya and of the school of Renun- ciation will be considered in greater detail later on. I have referred here to the opinions of Yajnavalkya and others only for the purpose of showing how our ancient writers have more or less praised or accepted as correct the principle that 'the ordinary tendency of human beings is selfish, that' is, is con- cerned with their own happiness ', and drawn from it inferences which are quite contrary to those drawn by Hobbes.

Having thus proved that human nature is not purely selfish and is not governed wholly by the tanas quality, nor totally ungodly (as has been maintained by the English writer Hobbes and the French writer Helvetius), and that a benevolent (sattvika) mental impulse forms part of human nature from birth along with the selfish impulse, and that doing good to others is not long-sighted selfishness, one has to give equal importance to the two principles of svartha, i. e..

one's own happiness and parartha, i. e., the happiness of others,, in building up the science of the doable and the not-doable (karyakarya-vyavasthiti). This is the third division of Materialistic philosophers. Nevertheless, the Materialistic view- that both svartha and parartha deal only with worldly happi- ness, and that there is nothing beyond worldly happiness, is also held by this school. The only difference is that people who belong to this school consider it their duty to take into- account both self-interest (svartha) and other's-interest (parartha) in determining questions of morality, because they look upon the impulse of doing good to others as, as much an inherent impulse, as the selfish impulse. As normally there is no conflict between self-interest and other's-interest, all the Actions which a man performs are primarily also beneficial- to society. If one man accumulates wealth, that ultimately benefits the whole society; because, society being a collection-' of numerous individuals, if each individual in it benefits himself without harming others, that is bound to benefit the whole society. Therefore, this school of philosophers has laid' down that if one can do good to others without neglecting one's own happiness, it is one's duty to do so. But, as this school does not admit the superiority of other's-interest and advises that one should each time, according to one's own lights,, consider whether one's own interests or the interests of others- are superior, it is difficult to decide to what extent one should- sacrifice one's own happiness for the happiness of others when there is a conflict between self-interest and other's-interest,. and there is very often a chance of a man falling a prey to considerations of his own interests. For instance, if self- interest is considered to be as important as other's-interest, it is difficult to decide by reference to the doctrines of this school of thought, whether or not one should, for the sake of truth,, suffer considerable financial loss— to say nothing of the much more serious question whether or not one should, for the sake- of truth, 'sacrifice one's life or lose one's kingdom. Persons belonging to this school may possibly praise a benevolent man who sacrifices his life for the advantage of another, but if they are themselves faced with a similar situation, these philoso- phers, who habitually sit on the two stools of self-interest and

other's-interest, will certainly be dragged towards self-interest. This school believes that they do not look upon other's-interest as a long-sighted variety of selfishness (as was done by Hobbes), but that they minutely weigh self-interest and other's-interest in a scale, and very skilfully decide in what self-interest lies; and, on that account, they glorify their doctrine by calling it the path of ' enlightened ' (udatta) or 'wise' self-interest (but self- interest in any case ! ) * But see what Bhartrhari says :—

eke satpurusah pararthaghatakah svarthan parityajya ye I samanyastu parartham udyamabhrtah svartha 'virodhena ye II temi manavaraksasah parahitam svarthaya nighnanti ye I yetu ghnanti nirarthakam parahitam te ke na janimahe II (Ni. Sa. 74)

that is, "those who do good to others, sacrificing their own interests are the truly good persons ; those who strive for the good of others, without sacrificing self-interest, are ordinary persons; those who harm others, for their self-interest, must be looked upon not as human beings but as godless beings (raksasah) ; ' but I do not know how to describe those who are- worse than these, that is, those who needlessly harm the interests of others". In the same way in describing the most excellent form of regal morality, Kalidasa says : —

svasukhanirabhilasah khidyase lokahetoh I pratidinam athava te vrttir evam vidhaiva II (Sakuntala 5. 7).

that is, "you strive every day for the welfare of others without considering your own happiness, or it may be said that such is your natural instinct or vocation". Neither Bhartrhari nor Kalidasa had to see how to discriminate between Right Action or Wrong Action (karmakarma) or righteousness and unrighte- ousness (dkarmadharma) by adopting both the principles of self-interest and other's-interest into a science of Right Action (Karma-Yoga), and judiciously weighing them. Nevertheless,

the highest place which has been given by them to persons who sacrifice self-interest for other's-interest is justifiable even from the point of view of Ethics. Persons belonging to this school of thought say, that although other 's-interest may be superior to self-interest from the philosophical point of view, yet, in as much as we have not to consider what ideally pure morality is, but only how 'ordinary' persons should act in the ordinary affairs of the world, the prominence given by us to 'enlightened self-interest' is proper from the worldly point of view. * But in my opinion, there is no sense in this argument. The weights and measures used in commerce are as a rule more or less inaccurate ; but if, taking advantage of that fact, the greatest possible accuracy is not maintained in the standard weights and measures kept in public offices, shall we not blame the persons in authority ? The same rule applies to the philosophy of Karma-Yoga. Ethics has been formulated only in order to scientifically define the pure, complete, and constant form of morality ; and, if any science of Ethics does not do this, it must be said to be useless. Sidgwick is not wrong in saying that 'enlightened self-interest' is the path of ordinary people. Bhartrhari says the game thing. But if one examines what the opinion of these ordinary people about the highest morality is, it will be seen that, even in their opinion, the importance given by Sidgwick to en- lightened self-interest is wrong, and the path of spotless morality or the path followed by saints, is looked upon by them as something much better than the ordinary selfish path; and, that is what is intended to be conveyed by the stanzas of Bhartrhari quoted above.

I have so far dealt with the three divisions of the School of Material happiness, namely, the purely selfish, the long- sighted selfish, and the enlightened selfish (which is both the former ones combined), and I have pointed out what the

principal short-comings of their respective systems are. But this does not exhaust all the divisions of the Material happi- ness school. The next division, that is to say, the best division of this school is the one of the benevolent (sattvita) Materialis- tic philosophers, who maintain that: one should decide the ethical doability or non-doability of all Actions by judiciously weighing the Material happiness of not only one human being, but of the entire human race. It is not possible that one and the same act will cause happiness to all persons in the world or in a society at one and the same time. If one person looks upon a particular thing as productive of happiness, it produces unhappiness to another person. But, just as light is not considered objectionable on the ground that the owl does not like it, so also if a particular thing is not profitable to some persons, it cannot be said, even according to the Karma- Yoga science, that it is not beneficial to all; and on that account, the words 'the happiness of all persons' (sarvabhulahita) have to be understood as meaning the 'greatest happiness (good) of the greatest number'. In short, the opinion of this school is that, "we must consider only such acts as ethically just and fit to be performed, as are conducive to the greatest good of the greatest number ; and that, acting in that way is the true duty of every human being in this world." This doctrine of the school of Material happiness is acceptable to the Metaphysical school. Nay, I may even say that this principle was propounded by the Metaphysicians in very ancient times, and the Materialistic philosophers have now turned it to use in a particular way. It is a well-known fact, as has been said by the Saint Tukaram that, " saintly persons_come to life only for the_benefit of the world; they suffer in body in order to do good to others". Needless to say, there is no dispute about the correctness or the propriety of this principle, Even in the Bhagavadgita, in describing the characteristic features of saints (jnanin) who practise the perfect Yoga— of course, the Karma- Yoga— the words " sarvabhutahite ratah " i. e., " they are engrossed in doing good to all created beings "

have been clearly used twice (Gl. 5. 25 ; 12. 4) ; and it becomes-- quite clear from the statement from the Mahabharata quoted in the second chapter above: "yad bhutahitam atyantam tat satyam iti dharana". (Vana 208. 4), i. e., "that is Truth according to dharma in which the highest benefit of all lies, "' that our ancient writers used to take into account this principle in deciding what is just (dharma) and what unjust (adharma). But, looking upon the promotion of the welfare- of all created beings as the external characteristic feature of the conduct of jnanins, and occasionally making use of that principle in a broad way for determining what is just and what unjust, is something absolutely different from taking, for granted that that is the substance of Ethics, and dis- regarding everything else, and erecting an immense structure of the science of Ethics on that foundation alone. Materialis- tic philosophers accept the latter course and maintain that Ethics has nothing to do with Metaphysics. It is, therefore, necessary for us to see now to what extent they are correct. There is a great deal of difference between the meanings of the two words ' happiness '(sukha) and 'benefit'- (hita); but, although' for the moment that difference is not taken into coneideration and the word ' sarvabhutahita ' is taken as meaning 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number ', yet it will be seen, that numerous important difficulties arise, if we rely only on this prinoiple for distinguishing the doable from the not-doable. Suppose, a Materialist follower of this principle was advising. Arjuna: what would he have told him ? Would he not have said: If as a result of your becoming victorious in the Bharatiya war, you bring about the greatest happiness of the greatest number, then it is your duty to fight, even if you might kill Bhisma. Apparently, this advice seems very easy But, if we go a little deeper, we realise its insufficiency and the difficulties involved in it. 'Greatest number' means how much? The Pandava army was of seven aksauUnis (a unit for measuring the numbers of soldiers). But, the Kaurava army was of eleven aksauhinis. Can one, therefore argue that the Pandavas were in the wrong, on the ground that if the Pandavas had been defeated these eleven Kaurava. aksauhinis would have become happy? To decide questions of

morality merely on the basis of numbers would be wrong.on any number of occasions, to say nothing of the Bharatiya war. Even in ordinary life everyone believes, that that act whioh ipleases even one good man is more truly a good act than the act which gives happiness to a hundred thousand evil-doers. In order to justify this belief, the happiness of one saint has to be given a higher value than the happiness of a hundred thousand evil-doors, and if one does that, the fundamental principle that ' the greatest external happiness of the greatest number is the only test of morality' becomes, to that extent, weak. One has, therefore, to say that numbers have no fixed bearing on morality. It must also be borne in mind that some thing which is ordinarily considered as productive of happiness by all persons is, by a far-sighted person, seen to be disadvantageous to all. Take for example the cases of Socrates and Jesus Christ. Both of them were preaching to their countrymen what, in their respective opinions, was ultimately beneficial. But their countrymen denounced them as 'enemies of society', and put them to death. The people, as also their leaders, were acting on the principle of the 'greatest good of the greatest number' ; but, we do not now say that what the ordinary people then did was just. In short, even if we for a moment admit that 'greatest good of the greatest number' is the only fundamental principle of Ethics, yet, we do not thereby solve to any extent the questions, in what lies the happiness of millions of persons, how that has to be ascertained, and by whom. On ordinary occasions, the task of finding this out may be left to those persons whose happiness or unhappiness is under consideration. But, as it is not necessary to go so deep into the matter on ordinary occasions, and, as ordinary persons do not possess the mental grasp to understand and decide fault- lessly in what their happiness lies on extraordinary and difficult occasions, putting into the hands of such uneducated persons the solitary ethical principle of 'the greatest good of the greatest number' is like placing a fire-brand into the hands of an evil spirit, as is apparent from the illustrations of the two leaders given above. There is no sense in the repartee : "Our ethical principle is correct ; what can we do if ignorant persons have wrongly applied it ? " Because, although the

principle may be correct, one must at the same time explain who are the proper persons to give effect to it, and when and how these persons do so, and other similar limitations of the principle. Otherwise, ordinary people will needlessly indulge in the fond belief that they are as capable of determining questions of morality as Socrates, and serious consequences are likely to follow. This theory is open to other objections which are more serious than the two objections : (i) questions of morality cannot be properly decided by reference to numbers alone and (ii) there is no definite external measure for logically proving in what lies the greatest good of the greatest number, which I have mentioned above. For instance, only a little considera- tion will show that it is very often impossible to fully and satisfactorily decide whether a particular Action is just or unjust by considering merely its external effects. It is true- that we decide whether a particular watch is good or bad, by seeing whether or not it shows correct time ; but before applying this rule to human actions, one must bear in mind, that man is not merely a watch or a machine. It is true that all saints strive for the benefit of the world. But we cannot draw the definite converse conclusion that every person who strives for the benefit of the world must be a saint. One must also see what that man's frame of mind is. This is the great difference between a man and a machine ; and therefore, if some one commits a crime unintentionally or by mistake, it is legally considered a pardonable offence. In short, we cannot arrive at a correot decision as to whether a particular act is good or bad,, just or unjust, or moral or immoral by considering merely its external result or effect, that is, by considering whether or not that act will produce the greatest good of the greatest number. One has also necessarily to consider at the same time, the reason, the desire, or the motive of the doer of the act. There was once an occasion to construct a tramway for the benefit and happiness of all the citizens of a big city in America. But there were delays in obtaining the requisite sanction from the proper authorities. Thereupon, the direotors of the tramway company gave a bribe to the persons in authority, and the necessary sanction was immediately obtained ; and, the

construction of the tramway being complete soon afterwards,, all the people in the city were in consequence considerably convenienced and benefited. Some time after that, the bribery- was found out, and the manager of the tramway was criminally prosecuted. There was no unanimity in the first jury, so a second, jury was empanelled and the second jury having found the manager guilty, he was convicted. In such a case, the prin- ciple of the greatest good of the greatest number is useless by itself. The external effect of the bribery, namely, that, the tramway came to be constructed because the bribe was given, was the greatest good of the greatest number ; yet, on that account, the fact that the bribe was given does not become legalThough the external effects of the two several acts of giving in charity desirelessly in the belief, that it is one's duty to do so (datavyam), and of giving in charity for the sake of reputation or for some other purpose- are the same, yet, even the Bhagavadgita distinguishes between, the two by saying, that the first gift is sattvika (benevolent) and that the second gift is rajasa (desire-prompted) (Gi. 17, 20-23); and the same gift, if made to an unworthy person is said to be tamasa and objectionable. Even ordinary people consider a poor man's giving a few pies for a charitable: purpose as of the same moral value, as the gift of a hundred rupees by a rich man. But, if the matter be considered by an. external test like ' the greatest good of the greatest number ', we will have to say that these two gifts are not of the same moral value. The great drawback of the Materialistic ethical principle of the ' greatest good of the greatest number ' is, that, it does not attach any importance to the motive or the reason, of the doer, and if one says that the inner motive has to be taken into account, then the fundamental condition of the greatest external good of the greatest number being the only test of morality is not satisfied. As the Legislative Council or Assembly is a collection of many individuals, it is not necessary to ascertain what the state of their conscience was, when we consider whether or not the laws made by them are- proper; and it is enough if one considers only the external

aspect of the laws, namely, whether or not the greatest good of the greatest number will result from them. But, as will be clear from the illustrations given above, the same test does not apply to other cases. I do not say that the principle of 'the greatest good or happiness of tha greatest number' is utterly useless. One cannot have a more excellent principle for con- sidering external matters; but in considering whether a parti- cular thing is morally just or unjust, it is very often necessary to consider several other things besides this external principle ; and therefore, one cannot safely depend on this principle alone for determining questions of morality ; and all that I say is, that it is necessary to ascertain and fix upon some principle, more definite and faultless than this. The same moral is conveyed by the statement : "The Reason (buddhi) is of greater importance than the Action" (Gl. 2. 49), made in the very beginning of the Gita. If one considers only the external Action, it is often misleading. It is not impossible for a man to be subject to excessive anger, notwithstanding that he continues to perform his external Actions of religious austeri- ties. But on the other hand, if the heart is pure, the external act becomes immaterial, and the religious or moral value of an insignificant external act like the giving of dried boiled rice by Sudama to Sri Krsna is considered by people to be as great as the public distribution of tons of food, which will give great happiness to a great number. Therefore, the well-known German philosopher Kant has treated the weighing of the external and visible effects of an act as of minor importance and has started his exposition of Ethics witn a consideration of the jurity of mind of the doer. It is not that this shortcoming of the Materialistic theory of happiness was not noticed by the principal supporters of that theory. Hume has clearly said that in as much as the acts of a person are considered a test of his morality as being the index of his disposition, it is impossible to decide that they are praiseworthy or unworthy merely from their external effects ; and even Mill

accepts the position that 'the morality of any act depends entirely upon the motive of the doer, that is to say, upon the reasoning on which he bases that act. ' But, in order to support his own point of view, Mill has added a rider to this principle that, ' so long as the external act is the same, its moral value remains the same, whatever may have been the desire which prompted it '. This argument of Mill is only doctrinal. Because, if the Reason (buddhi) is different, then, though two acts may be the same in appearance, yet they can never have the same value essentially. And Green, therefore, objects that the limitation : ' so long as there is no difference in the (external) act ' etc. laid down by Mill, itself falls to the ground. The same is the opinion expressed in the Gita. Because, the Gita says that even if two persons have given the same amounts for the same charitable purpose — that is, even when their external act is just the same — it is possible that one gift will be sattvika, and the other one will be rajasa or even tamasa if the two persons have different reasons for the gift. But I shall deal in greater detail with this question later on, when I compare the Eastern and the Western opinions in the matter. All that I have to prove at the moment is, that even this refined form of the Materialistic theory of happiness, — which depends only on the external results of an Action — falls short on the mark in determining questions of morality; and Mill's admission quoted above is, in my opinion, the best possible proof of that fact.

The greatest drawback of the theory of 'the greatest good of the greatest number' is that it does not take into consideration the Reason (buddhi) of the doer. Because, the writings of Mill himself show that, even if his arguments- are accepted, this principle of determining questions of: morality merely by external results, is applicable only within- specified limits, that is, is one-sided, and cannot be equally applied to all cases. But, there is a further objection to this theory, namely that, as the entire argument of the theory has been developed on the basis that other 's-interest is superior to self-interest, without explaining why or how it is- so, the theory of 'enlightened self-interest' gets a chance of pushing itself forward. If both self-interest and other's- interest have come into existence with man, why should one look upon the good of the greatest number as more important than one's own interest ? The answer, that other's interest should be protected because it involves the greatest good of the greatest number is not satisfactory ; because the question itself is why I should bring about the greatest good of the greatest number. It is true that this question does not always arise, since one's interest, as a general rule, lies in promoting the interests of others. But, the difference between this last and fourth stage of the Materialistic theory of happiness and its- third stage is, that the followers of this last school believe that where there is a conflict between self-interest and other 's- interest, the duty of everybody is to sacrifice self-interest and to strive for other's-interest, instead of following the path of 'enlightened self-interest.' Is not some explanation due in support of this particular feature of this Materialistic theory of happiness ? As "one learned Materialistic philosopher belonging to this school realised this difficulty, he has examined the activities of all living beings, from the minutest organisms to the human race, and come to the conclusion that in as much as the quality of maintaining one's own progeny or community just as one maintains oneself, and of helping one's fellows as much as possible without harming any one, is to be seen being gradually more and more developed from the stage of minute organisms to the human race, we must say that that is. the principle feature of the mode of life of the living world-

This feature is firstly noticed in the living world in the pro- duction of progeny and protecting it. In those minute organisms in which the difference of the sexes has not been developed, the body of one organism is seen to grow until it breaks into two organisms ; or, it may even be said, that this minute organism sacrifices its own life for the sake of its progeny, that is to say, for the sake of another. In the same way, animals of both sexes in grades of life higher than that of these organisms, are seen to willingly sacrifice their own interests in the living world for the maintenance of their progeny; and this quality is seen to be always growing; so- that, even in the most aboriginal societies, man is seen willingly helping, not only his own progeny, but also his tribe; and therefore, the highest duty in this world of man, who is the crown jewel of the living world, is to attempt to perma- nently do away with the present apparent conflict between self-interest and other's-interest by further developing this ten- dency of created beings of finding happiness in other's-interest as if it was self-interest, which is observed to become stronger and stronger in the rising grades of creation.This argument is correct. There is nothing new in the principle that, as the virtue of philanthrophy is to be seen even in the dumb world, in the shape of protection of progeny, it is the highest duty of enlightened man to carry that virtue to its perfection. Only,. as the knowledge of the material sciences has now considerably increased, it is now possible to develops more systematically the Materialistic demonstration of this principle. Although the point of view of our philosophers was Metaphysical,, yet, it has been stated in our ancient treatises that :

astadasa purananam saram saram samuddhrtam l paropakarah punyaya papaya parapidanam II

that is, "doing good to others is meritorious, and doing harm, to others, sinful ; this is the sum and substance of the eighteen

Puranas" ; and, even Bhartrhari says that : "svartho yasya parartha eva sa puman ekah satam agranih", i. e., "that man with whom other's-interest has become self-interest is the best of good men". But, when we consider the scale of life gradually rising from the minutest organisms to the human race, another question also arises, namely : is the virtue of philanthrophy the only virtue which has been fully developed in the human race, or have other benevolent (sattvika) virtues, such as justice, kindness, wisdom, far-sightedness, logic, courage, perseverance, forgiveness, control of the organs, etc., also been developed in man ? When one thinks of this, one has to say that all virtues have been more fully developed in the human race than in any other living being. We will for the present refer to this aggregate of sattvika qualities as 'humanness'. When in this way 'humanness' is seen to be superior to philanthrophy, one has, in determining the propriety or impropriety or the morality of any particular Action, to examine that Action from the point of view of its 'humanness' — that is, from the point of view of all those various qualities which are seen to be more developed in the human race than in other living beings— rather than from the point of view of its philanthropi- calness. We must, therefore, come to the conclusion, that it is better to call that Action alone virtuous, or to say that that alone is morality, which will enhance the state of being human or the 'humanness', of all human beings, or which will be consistent with the dignity of such 'humanness', instead of merely relying on the virtue of philanthrophy, and somehow or other getting rid of the matter. And when one accepts this comprehensive view-point, the consideration of 'the greatest good of the greatest number', becomes only an insignificant part of such view-point, and the doctrine that the righteousness or unrighteousness of all Actions has to be tested only by that test falls to the ground, and we see that we have also to take 'humanness' into account. And when one considers minutely in what 'humanness', or 'the state of being human' consists, the question "atma va are drastavyah" naturally crops up, as stated by Yajnavalkya. An American writer, who has written an exposition of Ethics, has given this comprehensive quality of 'humanness' the name of 'Atma'.

From what has been stated above, one will see how even "the upholders of the theory of Material happiness have to rise from the lowest stage of pure selfishness or pure physical happiness of one's self to the higher stage of philanthrophy, and ultimately to that of humanness. But, as even in the idea of humanness, the upholders of the Material happiness theory attach importance solely to the external physical happiness of all human beings, even this final stage of Materialism, which disregards internal purity and internal happiness, is not flawless in the eyes of our Metaphysicians. Although we may accept in a general way that the whole struggle of mankind is directed towards obtaining happiness or preventing unhappiness, yet, until one has in the first place satisfactorily solved the question as to whether true and permanent happiness is material, that is, lies in the enjoyment of worldly physical pleasure or in something else, one cannot accept as correct any Materialistic theory. Even Materialistic philosophers admit that mental happiness stands on a higher footing than physical happiness. If one promises to a human being all the happiness which it is possible for a beast to enjoy, and asks him whether he is prepared to become a beast, not a single human being will say yes. In the same way, an intelligent person need not be told that that particular peace of mind which results from deep meditation on philosophical problems is a thousand times better than material wealth, or the enjoyment of external pleasures. And even considering the general opinion on the matter, it will be seen that people do not accept as wholly correct the doctrines that morality depends on numbers, that whatever a human being does is for Material happiness, and that Material happiness is the highest ideal of a human being. We believe that the humanness of a human being lies in possessing such an amount of mental control as to be able to sacrifice external happiness and even one's own life in order to act up to such moral principles as Veracity etc., which are of greater importance than life or external happiness from the Metaphysical point of View; and also- Arjuna had not asked Sri Krsna how much happiness would' result to how many persons by his taking part in the war,.

but he had said: "Tell me in what lies my highest benefit, that is the highest benefit of my Atman" (Gi. 2. 7; 3. 2). This constant benefit or happiness of the Atman lies in the peace (santi) of the Atman; and it is stated in the Brhadaranya- kopanisad (Br. 2. 4. 2) that however much of material happi- ness or wealth one might obtain, there is no hope of obtaining by that alone the happiness or peace of the Atman — "amrtatvasya tu na sasti vittena"; and in the Kathopanisad, it is stated that although Death (Mrtyu) was ready to bestow on Naciketa, sons, grand-sons, animals, grain, . money and other kinds of material wealth, he gave to Mrtyu the definite reply : " I want the knowledge of the Atman, I do not want wealth"; and after differentiating between 'preya', i, e., that worldly happiness which is pleasing to the organs, and 4 sreya ', i. e. the true benefit of the Atman, it is stated : —

sreyas ca preyas ca manusyam etas tau samparitya vivinakti dhirah I sreyo hi dhiro 'bhipreyaso vrnite sreyo mando yogaksemad vrnite II (Katha. 1. 2. 2)

that is, " when man is faced with 'preya' ( transient external pleasure of the organs) and 'sreya' (true and permanent benefit), he elects between the two. He who is wise prefers sreya to preya, and the weak-minded man prefers preya, that is external happiness to the benefit of the Atman " It i s, therefore, not correct to believe that the highest goal of man in this world is the physical happiness 'obtainable through theorgans in worldly life, and that whatever a man does is done by him merely for the sake of obtaining' external, that is, Material happiness or for preventing unhappiness.

Not only is the internal happiness obtainable through Reason, or Metaphysical happiness of greater worth than the external happiness obtained through the medium of the organs, but the physical pleasure which exists to-day comes to an end to-morrow, i. e., is trainsient. The same is not the case with rules of Ethics. Non-violence, Veracity and other moral principles are looked upon by people as independent of external

circumstances, that is, of external happiness or unhappiness and as being constant in their application at all times and in all circumstances, that is to say, they are looked upon as permanent by everybody. Materialism cannot satisfactorily explain the reason why moral principles have this permanence which does not depend on external matters, nor how it comes into existence. For, whatever general doctrine is laid down by reference to happiness or unhappiness in the external world, yet, in as much as all happiness or unhappiness is inherently transient, all doctrines of morality founded on such a transient foundation are equally weak, i.e., non-permanent; and, on that account, the ever-lasting permanence of the law of Truth seen in one's being ready to sacrifice one's life in the interests of Truth, irrespective of considerations of happiness or unhappi- ness, cannot be based on the doctrine of the ' greatest happi- ness of the greatest number'. Some persons advance the argument, that if in ordinary life even responsible persons are seen taking shelter behind falsehood when faced with the problem of sacrificing their lives, and if we see, that in such circumstances even philosophers are not punctillious, then it is not necessary to look upon the religion of Truth etc, as eternal; but this argument is not correct. Because, even those people who have not got the moral courage or do not find it convenient to sacrifice their lives for the sake of Truth, admit by their own mouths the eternal nature of this principle of morality. On this account, in the Mahabharata, after all she rules of ordinary life which lead to the acquisition of wealth (artha), desires (kama) etc have been dealt with, Vyasa ultimately in the Bharata-Savitri, (and also in the Viduraniti), has given to everybody the following advice namely :—

na jatu kaman na bhayan na lobhad dharmam tyajed jivitasyapihetoh I dharmo nityah sukhaduhkhe tv anitye jivo nityoh hetur asya tv anityah " II (Ma. Bha. Sva. 5. 6; U. 39.12, 13),

that is : " although happiness and unhappiness is transient, yet morality is constant: therefore, one should not abandon moral

principles, whether for desire of happiness or out of fear, or avarice, or even if life itself is threatened. Life is funda- mentally eternal and its objects, such as, happiness, or un. happiness, etc, are transient. " And that, therefore, instead of wasting time in thinking of transient happiness or un, happiness, one should link eternal life with eternal religion. In order to see how far this advice of Vyasa is correct, we have now to consider the true nature of happiness and un- happiness and to see what permanent happiness is.

CHAPTER V

THE CONSIDERATION OF HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS

( SUKHA-DUHKHA-VIVEKA. )

sukham atyantikam yat tat buddhigrahyam atindriyam I Gita. 6. 21.

Our philosophers have accepted the position that every human being in this world is continually struggling in order to obtain happiness, or to increase the amount of happiness which he has obtained, or to obviate or reduce his unhappiness. In the Santiparva, Bhrgu says the Bharadvaja (Ma. Bha. San. 190. 9) that :-"iha khalu amusmims ca loke vastupravrttayah sukhartham abhidhiyante na hy atahparam visistataram asti", i. e., "in this world or elsewhere, all activity is for obtaining: happiness, there is no other goal except this for dharma, artha, or kama." But, our philosophers say, though a man is suddenly seized by the hand of death, while he is grabbing a false coin in the belief that it is true because he does not understand in what true happiness lies, or while he is spending his life in the hope that happiness will come sometime or other, his neighbour does, not become any the wiser on that account, and follows the same mode of life ; and the cycle of life goes on in this way, nobody troubling to think in what true and permanent happiness lies. There is a great deal of difference between the opinions of Eastern and Western philosophers as to whether life consists only of unhappiness, or is principally happy or principally unhappy. Nevertheless, there is no difference of opinion about the fact that whichever position is accepted, the advantage of a man lies in obtaining the highest measure of happiness by preventing unhappiness to the greatest possible extent. The words 'hitam' (advantage), or 'sreyas' (merit), or 'kalyanam' (benefit) are ordinarily more often used than the word 'sukham' (happiness) ; and I shall later on explain what the difference between them is. Yet, if one takes for granted that the word ' happiness ' includes all kinds of benefits, then the G.R. _9

GITA_RAHASYA OR KARMA_YOGA

proposition that ordinarily every human being strives to obtain happiness may be said to be generally accepted. But, on that account, the definitions of pain and happiness given in the Parasaragita included in the Mahabharata, (Ma. Bha. San. 295. 27) namely : "yad istam tat sukham prahuh dvesyam duhkham ithesyate", i. e., "that which is desired by us is happiness, and that which we dislike, or which we do not desire is unhappi- ness", do not become entirely faultless from the philosophical point of view. Because, the word 'ista' in this definition car. also be interpreted to mean 'a desirable thing or object'; and. jf that meaning is accepted, one will have to refer to a desirable object as 'happiness'. For example, although we might desire water when we are thirsty, yet water, which is an external object, cannot be called 'happiness'. If that were so, one will have to say that a person who is drowned in the waters of a river, has been drowned in happiness I That organic satis- faction which results from the drinking of water is happiness. It is true that men desire this satisfaction of the organs or this happiness, but we cannot, on that account, lay down the broad proposition, that all that is desirable must be happiness. Therefore, the Nyaya school has given the two definitions: "anukulavedaniyam sukham", i. e., "desirable suffering is "happiness ", and "pratikulavedaniyam duhkham' ', i.e., "undesirable suffering is unhappiness", and it has treated both pain and "happiness as some kind of suffering. As these sufferings are fundamental, that is to say, as they start from the moment of birth, and as they can be realised only by experience, it is not possible to give better definitions of pain or happiness than these given by the Nyaya school. It is not that these sufferings in the shape of pain and happiness result only from human activity; but, sometimes the anger of deities gives rise to intractable diseases, and men have to suffer the resulting unhappiness ; therefore, in treatises on Vedanta, this pain and "happiness is usually divided into 'adhidaivika' (god-given), 'adhibhautika' (physical), and ' adhyatmika' (metaphysical). Out of these, that pain or happiness which we suffer as a result of the blessings or the anger of deities is known as ' adhidaivika ', and that pain or happiness, in the shape of warmth or cold, which results from the contact of the human organs with the

external objects in the world composed of the five primordial elements (such as the earth etc.), is :called ' adhibhautika'; and all pain and happiness which arises without any such external contact, is called 'adhyatmika'. When this classification of pain and happiness is accepted, pain, like fever etc., when it results from the disturbance of the internal ratio of wind, bile etc. in the body, and the peaceful health, which results from that inter- nal ratio being correct, fall into the category of Metaphysical (adhyatmika,) pain and happiness. Because, although this pain and happiness is bodily, that is to say, although it pertains to the gross body made up of the five primordial elements, yet, we cannot always say that it is due to the contact of the body with external objects. And therefore, even Metaphysical pain and happiness have, according to Vedanta philosophy, to be further sub-divided into bodily-metaphysical, and mental-metaphysical pain and happiness. But, if pain and happiness is, in this way further divided into bodily and mental divisions, it is no more necessary to recognise the adhidaivika pain and happiness as a distinct class. Because, as is clear, the pain or happiness which arises as a result of the blessings or the anger of deities, has ultimately to be borne by man through his body or through his mind. I have, therefore, not followed the three-fold division of pain and happiness made in Vedanta terminology, but have adopted only the two divisions, external or bodily (bahya or sarir), and internal or mental (abhyantara or minasika); and I have in this book called all bodily pain and happiness 'adhibhautika' (physical) and all mental pain and happiness ' adhyatmika ' (Metaphysical). I have not made a third division of adhidaivika ( god-given ) pain and happiness, as has been done in books on Vedanta philosophy, because, in my opinion, this two-fold classification is more convenient for dealing scientifically with the question of pain and happi- ness; and this difference between the Vedanta terminology and my terminology must be continually borne in mind in reading the following pages.

Whether we look upon pain and happiness as of two kinds or of three kinds, nobody wants pain; therefore, it is stated both in the Vedanta and the Samkhya philosophies (Sam. Ka. 1: Gl. 6. 21, 22), that preventing every kind of pain to the greatest possible extent, and obtaining the utter-

most and. the permanent happines is the highest goal' of man When in this way, the uttermost happiness has become to highest goal of man, we have naturally to consider the questions: what is to be called the uttermost, the real, and' the permanent happiness, whether or not it is possible to obtain it, and if so, when and how it can be obtained etc.; and when you begin to consider these questions, the nest question which arises is, whether pain and happiness are two independent and different kinds of sufferings, experiences, or things, as defined by the Nyaya School, or whether the. absence of the one can be referred to as the other, on the principle that ' that which is not light, is darkness '. After "saying that : " When our mouth becomes dry on account of thirst, we drink sweet water in order to remove that un- happiness; when we suffer on account of hunger, we eat nice food in order to alleviate that suffering ; and, when the sexual desire is roused and becomes unbearable, we satisfy it by sexual intercourse with a woman ", Bhartrhari in the last line of the stanza saysr-

pratikaro vyadheh sukham iti viparya yati janah I

that is, " when any disease or unhappiness has befallen, you, the_ removal of it is, by confusion thought, referred- to as happiness """! There is no such independent thing as- happiness which goes beyond the removal of unhappiness. It is not that this rule applies only to the selfish activities of men. I have in the last chapter referred to the opinion of Anandagiri, that even in the matter of doing good to others, the feeling of pity invoked in our hearts on seeing the un- happiness of another becomes unbearable to us, and we do- the good to others only in order to remove this our suffering in the shape of our being unable to bear it. If we accept this position, we will have to accept as correct the definitions of pain and happiness given in Mahabharata in one place,, namely : —

trsnartiprabhavam duhkham duhkhartiprabhavam sukham I (San. 25. 22; 174. 19) that is, "some Thirst first comes into existence; on account Of the suffering caused by that Thirst, unhappiness comes

into existence; and from the suffering caused by that un- happiness, happiness subsequently follows". In short, according to these philosophers, when some Hope, Desire, or, Thirst has first entered the human mind, man thereby begins to suffer pain, and the removal of that pain is called happiness,; happiness is not some independent thing. Nay, this school has even gone further and drawn further inferences that all, the tendencies of human life are Desire-impelled or Thirst- prompted; that Thirst cannot be entirely uprooted, unless all the activities of worldly life are abandoned ; and that, unless Thirst is entirely uprooted, true and permanent happiness, cannot be obtained. This path has been advocated as an alternative path in the Brhadaranyaka (Br. 4. 4. 22; Ve. Su. 3. 4. 15); and in the Jabala, Samnyasa and other Upanisads, it has been advocated as the principal path. This idea has also been adopted in the Astavakragiti (9. 8 ; 10. 3-8) and in the Avadhutagita (3. 46). The ultimate doctrine of this school is that the man who desires to obtain the highest happiness or Release, must give up worldly life as early as possible, and follow the path of Renunciation (samnyasa); and the path of the Abandonment of the Actions which have been prescribed by the Srutis and the Smrtis ( srauta-smarta- karma-samnyasa), described in the Smrti treatises, and which was established in the Kali era by Sri Samkaracarya is based on this principle. If there is no such real thing as happiness, and, if whatever is, is unhappiness, and that too based on Thirst, then it is clear, that all the bother of self-interest or ether's-interest will be obviated and the fundamental equable frame of mind ( santi) will be the only thing to remain, when these diseases in the shape of Thirst etc. are in the first place entirely uprooted; and for this reason, it is stated in the pingalagita in the Santiparva of the Mahabharata, as also in the Mankigita, that .—

yac ca kamsukham loke yac ca divyam mahat sukham I trsnaksayasukhasyaite narhatah sodasim kalam II (San. 174. 48 ; 177. 49)

i. e., "that happiness which is experienced in this world, by the satisfaction of desires (kama), as also the greater happiness

which is to be found in heaven, are neither worth even one- sixteenth of the happiness which results from the destruction of Thirst". The Jain and the Buddhistic religions have later on copied the Vedic path of Renunciation ; and therefore. in the religious treatises of both these religions, the evil effects and discardability of Thirst have been described as above, or possibly in even more forcible terms. (For example, see the Trsnavagga in the Dhammapada). In the treatises of the Buddhistic religion to be found in Tibet, it is even stated that the above-mentioned stanza from the Mahabharata was uttered by Gautama Buddha when he attained the Buddha-hood.

It is not that the above-mentioned evil effects of Thirst have not been acknowledged by the Bhagavadgita. But, as the doctrine of the Gita is that the total abandonment of Action is not the proper course for obviating those evil effects, it is necessary to consider here somewhat minutely the above explanation of the nature of pain and happiness. We cannot, in the first place, accept as totally correct the dictum of the Samnyasa school, that all happiness arises from the preventing of pain, such as Thirst etc. Wishing to experience again something, which one has once experienced (seen, heard, etc.) is known as Desire (kama, vasana, or iccha). When this desire becomes stronger as a result of the pain due to one's not obtaining soon enough the desired object, or when the obtained happiness being felt to be insufficient, one wants more and more of it, this desire becomes a Thirst (trsna). But if Desire is satisfied before it has grown into Thirst, we cannot say that the resulting happiness arises from the removal of the un- happiness of Thirst. For instance, if we take the case of the food which we get every day at a stated time, it is not our experience that we feel unhappiness every day before taking food. If we do not get food at the proper time, we will suffer unhappiness as a result of hunger, but not otherwise. But

even if we do not in this way distinguish between Thirst and Desire, and say that both are synonymous, the doctrine that the root of all happiness is Thirst is seen to be incorrect. For instance, if we suddenly put a piece of sugar-candy into the mouth of a child, the happiness which it experiences cannot be said to have resulted from the destruction of a previous Thirst- Similarly, if while walking along the road, one comes across a beautiful garden and hears the melodious notes of a cuckoo, or coming across a temple on the way, one sees in it the beautiful image of the deity, one thereby experiences happiness, though there had been no previous desire of obtaining those particular objects. If we think over these illustrations, we have to- abandon the above-mentioned definition of happiness of the Samnyasa school, and say that our organs have an inherent, capacity for feeding on good or bad objects, and that when they are in that way carrying on their various activities, they come into contact sometimes with a desirable and sometimes, an undesirable object, and we, thereupon, experience either pain or happiness, without having had any previous Desire or Thirst for it. With this purport in mind, it is stated in the Gita (Gi. 2. 14), that pain and happiness arises as a result of 'matrasparsa', that is, of contact with cold or warm objects etc. The external objects in the world are technically known as ' matra ', and the above statement in the Gita means- that the contact (sparsa), i. e., the union of these external objects with our organs results in the suffering (vedana) of pain or happiness. That is also the doctrine of the science of Karma- Yoga. Nobody can satisfactorily explain why a harsh sound is undesirable to the ear, or why a sweet drink is pleasurable to the tongue, or why the light of the full moon is pleasing to the eyes. All that we know is that when the tongue gets a sweet liquid to taste, it is satisfied. As Material Happiness is, by its very nature, wholly dependent on the organs, happiness is very often experienced by merely carrying on the particular activities of the organs, whatever the ultimate result of our doing so may be. For instance, the words which sometimes naturally escape our lips when some idea enters our mind, are- not uttered by us with the idea of acquainting someone else-

with our thoughts. On the other hand, there is sometimes even a risk of some hidden design or scheme in our minds being divulged by these automatic activities of the organs, and of our being thereby harmed. When little children first learn to walk, they aimlessly walk about the whole day, because they then experience happiness by the mere act of walking. Therefore, the Blessed Lord, instead of saying that all happiness consists of the absence of unhappiness, says that -.-"indriyasyen- driyasyarthe raga dvesau vyavasthitau" (Gl. 3. 34), i. e,, the attrac- tion and repulsion which exists between the organs of the sense on the one hand, and their relative objects, such as, sound, touch, etc., on the other hand, are both 'vyavasthi', i.e., funda- mentally self-existing ; and His advice is that all that we have to see is how these activities will become beneficial or can be made by us beneficial to our Atman; and that therefore, instead of attempting to destroy the natural impulses of the mind, or of the organs, we should keep our mind and organs under control in order that those impulses should be beneficial to us, and not let the impulses get out of control. This advice, and saying that one should destroy Thirst and along with Thirst all other mental impulses, are two diametrically opposite things. The message of the Gita is not that one should do away with all activity or prowess in the world; but, on the other hand, it is stated in the 18th Chapter of the Gita (18. 26) that the doer must, side by side with equability of mind, possess the qualities of perseverance and enthusiasm. But we will deal with this matter in greater detail later on. All that we have to see for the present is whether pain and happiness are two independent states of mind or whether one of them is merely the absence of the other; .and what the opinion of the Bhagavadgita on this matter is will be easily understood by my readers from what has been stated above. Not only have 'sukham' (happiness) and ' duhkham ' (pain) been independently dealt with in des- cribing what the 'ksetra' (field) is (Gl. 13.6), but (Gl. 14.6,7), Happiness is said to be the sign of sattvam (purity) and Thirst of rajas ( passion ), and sattvam and rajas are considered two independent qualities. From this also it is clear, that pain and happiness have, in the Bhagavadgita, been considered as

two mutually opposite and distinct frames of mind. The fact that the Gita looks upon rujasa-tyaga (abandonment based on passion) as inferior , as is shown by the words : "One does not derive the result of Abandonment by abandoning some Action on the ground that it leads to unhappiness; for such an abandonment is rajasa " (Gi. 18. 1), also refutes the doctrine that all happiness is based on the destruction of Thirst.

Even if we believe that happiness does not consist of the destruction of Thirst or of the absence of unhappiness, and that happiness and unhappiness are two independent things yet, in as much as both these sufferings are mutually opposite or contrary to each other, we are next faced with the question whether it is possible for a man to experience the pleasure of happiness, if he has never suffered unhappiness. Some philosophers say that unless unhappiness has in the first instance been experienced, it is impossible to realise the pleasure of happiness. Others, on the other hand, pointing at the perpetual happiness enjoyed by deities in heaven, say that previous experience of unhappiness is not at all necessary for realising the pleasure of happiness. One can experience the sweetness of honey, jaugery, sugar, the mango-fruit or the plantain before having previously tasted any saltish object. In the same way, since happiness also is of various kinds, one can, without any previous experience of unhappiness, experience perpetual happiness without getting tired of it, by enjoying in succession diverse kinds of happiness, e. g., by moving from a mattress of cotton on to a mattress of feathers, or from a fixed palanquin to the more comfortable swinging palanquin. But, if one considers the ordinary course of life in this world, it will be seen that all this argument is useless. As the Puranas show cases of even gods coming into difficulties, and as even heavenly happiness comes to an end after one's acquired merit has been exhausted in due course of time, the illustration of heavenly happiness is not appropriate ; and even if it were appropriate, what use is the illustration of heavenly happiness to us ? Although we may believe that : "nityam eva sukham svarge", i. e., "in heaven there is permanent happiness", yet, it is stated immediately afterwards that .—

" sukham duhkham ihobhayam " (Ma. Bha. San. 190. 14), i. e., " in this world, pain is mixed with happiness " ; and consistently with that position even Ramdasa Svami has described his own personal experience as follows : " Who is there in this world who is wholly happy ? Consult your mind, search and see ". And, as is actually experienced by us in this life, we have also to admit the correctness of the following advice given by Draupadi to Satyabhama, namely : —

sukham sukheneha na jatu labhyam duhkhena sadhvi labhate sukhani | (Ma. Bha. Vana. 233. 4)

that is, " happiness never comes out of happiness ; in order that a saintly woman should experience happiness, she must suffer- unhappiness or trouble". Because, though" a fruit may be placed on your lips, you have still to take the trouble of pushing it into the mouth, and if it falls into your mouth, you have still to take the trouble of chewing it. At any rate, this much is unquestionable, that there is a world of difference between the sweetness of the happiness which comes after unhappiness, and the sweetness of the happiness which is experienced by a man who is always engrossed in the enjoyment of the objects of pleasure. Because, by continually enjoying happiness, the keenness of the appreciative power of the organs which enjoy the happiness is dulled, and as is well-known :—

prayena srimatam loke bhoktum saktir na vidyate I kasthany api hi jiryante daridranam ca sarvasah II

(Ma. Bha.. San. 28.59)

that is, " rich people do very often not have even the power of enjoying tasteful food, and poor people can appreciate and digest even uncooked wood ". Therefore, in considering worldly life, it is uselss to consider further whether it is possible to enjoy continual happiness without unhappiness, "sukhasyanantaram duhkham duhkhasyanantaram sukham" (Vana, 260. 40 ; San. 25.23), i. e., " unhappiness follows on the steps of happiness, and similarly happiness comes in the wake of

unhappiness ", or as has been described by Kalidasa in the- Meghaduta :-

kasyaikantam sukham upanatam duhkham ekantato va I nicair gacchaty upari ca dasa cakranemikramena II

that is, " no one experiences continual happiness or continual- unhappiness; pain_and happiness always move alternately up and down like the points on the circumference of a wheel". such is the case,whether because this unhappiness has been created in order to increase the sweetness of happiness or because it has some other purpose in the scheme of activity of Matter (prakrti). It may-not be quite impossible to continually obtain one object of pleasure after another, without getting tired of enjoyment ; but it is absolutely impossible, at any rate in this karma-bhumi, i. e., world of Action (destiny ?) to totally abolish unhappiness and continually experience nothing but happiness.

If worldly life does not consist only of happiness, but is always a mixture of pain and happiness, the third question which naturally arises in due course is, whether there is more of happiness or of unhappiness in life. Many Western philosophers, who look upon Material Happiness as the highest, goal of life say, that if there were more of pain than of happiness in life, many, if not all, persons would not have troubled to live worldly life, but would have committed suicide. But, in as much as man does not seem to be tired of living, he must be experiencing more of happiness than of unhappiness- in life, and therefore, happiness must be looked upon as the highest goal of man, and the question of morality and immorality must also be solved by that standard. But, making suicide depend in this way on worldly happiness in not, really speaking, correct. It is true that sometimes a man, getting tired of life, commits suicide; but people look upon him as an exception, that is, as a lunatic. From this it is seen that ordinarily people do not connect committing or not committing suicide with worldly happiness, but look upon it as an independent thing by itself ; and, the same inference follows if one considers the life of an aboriginy, which would be looked upon as extremely arduous by civilised persons. The well- known biologist Charles Darwin, while describing in his

Travels the aboriginies he came across in the extreme south of South America says, that these aboriginies, men and women, remain without clothes all the year round, even in their extremely cold country ; and, as they do not store food, they have for days together to remain without food; yet, their numbers are continually increasing But, from the fact that these aboriginies do not commit suicide, no one draws the inference that their mode of life is full of happiness. It is true that they do not commit suicide ; but if one minutely considers why that is so, one will see that each one of these persons is filled with extreme happiness by the idea that "_I_am a hum an being and not a beast " ; and he considers the happiness of being a human being so much greater than all other happiness, that he is never prepared to lose this superior happines of being a man, however arduous his life may be. Not only does man not commit suicide, but even birds or beasts do not do so. But can one, on that account, say that their life is full of happiness ? Therefore, our philosophers say, that instead of drawing the mistaken inference that the life of a man or of a bird or beast is full of happiness from the fact that they do not commit suicide, the only true inference which can be drawn from that fact is that: what- ever the nature of a man's life, he does not set much store by it, but believes that an incomparable happiness lies in having become a living being (sacetana) from a lifeless being (acetana), and more than anything else, in having become a man. It is on that basis that the following rising grades have been described in the Sastras : —

bhutanam pramnah sresthah pramnam buddhijivinah I buddhimatsu narah srestha naresu brahmanah smrtah II brahmanesu ca vidvamsah vidvatsu krtabuddhayah I krtabuddhisu kartarah kartrsu brahmavadinah II

(Manu. 1. 96. 97; Ma. Bha. Udyo. 5. 1 and 2). that is, "the living being is superior to the dead; the intelli- gents are superior among the living; men are superior among the intelligent; Brahmins, among men; learned Brahmins among Brahmins; doers, among the enligtened-minded, and

brahmavadin (those who belong to the cult of the Brahman), among the doers "; and on the same basis, it is stated in verna- cular treatises, that out of the 84 lakhs of forms of life (yoni) the human life is the most superior; that among men, he who desires Release (mumuksu) is most superior; and, that among mumuksus, the perfect (siddha) is the most superior. That- is also the purport of the proverb " life is dearer than anything, else", (sabase jiva pyara); and for this very reason, if someone commits suicide, finding life full of unhappiness, people look upon him as insane, and the religious treatises count him as a sinner (Ma. Bha. Karna. 70. 28); and an attempt to commit, suicide is looked upon as a crime by law. When in this way it has been proved that one cannot, from the fact that a man does not commit suicide, properly draw the conclusion that, life is full of happiness, we must, in deciding the question, whether life is full of happiness or unhappiness, keep aside for the time being the natural blessing of having been born a human being oil account of previous destiny, and consider only the events of the post-natal worldly life. The fact that man does not commit suicide or continues to live is accounted: for by the Energistic principle of life; it is not any proof of the preponderance of happiness in worldly life as stated by Materialistic philosophers. Or, saying the same thing in other words, we must say that the desire not to commit suicide is a natural desire; that this desire does not arise as a result of the weighing of the happiness and unhappiness in life; and that therefore, one cannot from that fact draw the conclusion that life is full of happiness.

When in this way we do not, by confusion of thought,. mix up the blessing of being born a human being with the nature of his subsequent life, and recognise ' being a human, being ' and ' the ordinary life or the usual activities of men ' as two distinct things, there remain no other means for deciding, the question whether there is more of happiness or of un- happiness in worldly life for the being which has taken the superior human form, than considering low many of the ' present ' desires of every man are satisfied and how many disappointed. The reason for saying 'present ' desires is that,, those things which have become available to all persons in.

civilised life, become every-day happenings, and we forget the happiness they produce; and we decide the question of the happi- ness or unhappiness of worldly life by considering only how many of the things, which have newly become necessities, are obtained by us. There is a world of difference between (i) com- paring the means of happiness which are available to us to-day with how many of them were available to us a hundred years ago, and (ii) considering whether or not I am happy to-day. For instance, anybody will admit that the present-day travelling by train is much more comfortable than travelling "by bullock-cart, which was in vogue a hundred years ago. But we have now forgotten this happiness of train-travel, and we are unhappy only if some day a train gets late, and we receive our mail late. And therefore, the ' present ' happi- ness or unhappiness of man is usually considered by thinking of his present needs and disregarding all the means of happiness which have already become available; and, if we try to con- sider what these needs are, we see that there is no end of them. If one desire is satisfied to-day, another new desire takes its place to-morrow, and we want to satisfy this new desire; and as human desire is thus always one step ahead of life, man is never free from unhappiness. In this place, we must bear carefully in mind the difference between the two positions that 'all happiness is the destruction of desire' and that 'however much of happiness is obtained, man is still un- satisfied'. Saying that 'all happiness is not the absence of unhappiness, but pain and happiness are two independent kinds of organic sufferings' is one thing, and that 'one is dissatisfied, because new kinds of happiness are wanted, without taking into account the happiness which may at any time already be part of one's life', is another thing. The first of these two dicta deals with the actual nature of happiness; and the second, with whether or not a man is fully satisfied by the happiness he has obtained. As the desire for objects of pleasure is a continually increasing desire, a man wants to enjoy over and over again the same happiness which he has already enjoyed, though he may not get new kinds of happiness everyday, and thus human desire is never controlled. There is a story told of a Roman Emperor named Vitalius that in order

to experience over and over again the pleasure of eating tasteful food, he used to take medicines for vomitting the food which he had already eaten, and dine several times every day ' But the story of ,the repentant king Yayati is even more instructive than this. After the king Yayati had become old as a result of the cursa of Sukracarya, the latter, by a pang of kindness, gave him the option of giving his old age to another person and taking in exchange his youth. Thereupon, he took the youth of his son Puru in exchange for his own oldness, and, "having enjoyed all objects of pleasure for a thousand years, he found by experience that all the objects in the world were incapable of satisfying the desire for happiness of even one human being; and Vyasa has stated in the Adiparva of the Mahabharata that Yayati then said :

na jatu, kamah kamanam upabhogena samyati l havisa krsnavartmeva bhuya evabhivardhate II (Ma. Bha. A. 75.49)

that is, " by enjoying objects of pleasure, the desire for the objects of pleasure is not satisfied, but on the other hand this desire grows more and more, just as fire burns more and more by sacrificial offerings being thrown into it " ; and the same stanza is to be found in the Manu-Smrti (Manu. 2. 94). The inner reason for this is that, notwithstanding the abundance of means of pleasure, the desire for happiness is never quenched only by enjoying happiness, in as much as the hunger of the organs is always on a rising scale, and it has to be restrained in some other way; and this principle has been fully accepted by our religious writers who have in the first place prescribed that every one must put a restraint on the enjoyment of pleasure. If those who say that enjoyment of objects of pleasure is the highest goal in this world apply their mind to this doctrine which is based on experience, they will easily realise the absurdity of their beliefs. This doctrine of the Vedic religion has also been accepted in the Buddhistic religion and there is a statement in the Buddhistic treatises that the following words came out of the mouth of the king

named Mandhata mentioned in the Puranas (instead of Yayati) at the moment of his death : —

na kahapanavassena titti kamesu vijjati I api dibbesu kamesu, ratim so nadhigacchati II (Dhammapada, 186-187). that is, "although coins called 'karsapana' fall as a shower of rain, there is no satisfaction (titti means trpti) of Desire, and the desires of a desirer are not satisfied even by getting- the happiness of heaven ". As it is thus impossible that the happiness of enjoying objects of pleasure can ever be con- sidered sufficient, every man thinks that 'I am unhappy', and when this mental frame of mankind is taken into account then, as stated in the Mahabharata :-—

sukhad bahutaram duhkham jivite nasti samsayah l (San. 305. 6; 330. 16). that is , " in this life (samsara), unhappiness is more than happiness "; or as stated by the Saint Tukaram : " if you consider happiness, it is as small as a grain; and if you con- sider unhappiness, it is as big as a mountain (Tuka. Ga. 2986). The same is the doctrine laid down by the writers of the' Upanisads (Maitryu 1. 2-4), and it is stated also in the Gita that the life of man is inconstant and the 'home of unhappiness',. and that life in the world is not lasting and is ' devoid of happiness ' (Gi. 8. 15 and 9. 3). The same is the opinion of the German philosopher Schopenhauer, and he has made use of a. very curious illustration for proving it. He says that we measure the happiness of a man by considering how many of his desires for happiness, out of the total possible desires for happiness, are satisfied; and if the enjoyment of happiness- falls short of the desire for happiness, we say that the man is- to that extent unhappy. If this ratio- is to be explained mathematically we have to divide the enjoyment of happiness by the desire for happiness and show it in the form of a. fraction, thus : enjoyment of happiness/desire for happiness. But this is such a queer fraction that its denominator, namely, the desire for happiness,.is always increasing in a greater measure than its 'numerator,, is always increasing in a greater namely, the enjoyment of happiness; so that, if this fraction is

in the beginning it becomes later on 3/10, that is to say, if the numerator increases three times, the denominator increases, five times, and the fraction becomes more and more incomplete. Thus, it is futile to entertain the hope of a man becoming fully happy. In considering how much there was of happiness in ancient times, we consider only the numerator of this fraction by itself and do not pay any attention to the fact that the denominator has now increased much more than the numerator. But when we have to consider only whether a human being is happy or unhappy without reference to time, we must consider both the numerator and the denominator ; and we see that this fraction will never become complete. That is the sum and substance of the words of Manu: "na jatu kamah kamanam" etc. (2. 94). As there is no definite instrument like a thermometer for measuring happiness and unhappiness, this mathematical exposition of the mutual ratio of pain and happiness might not be acceptable to some; but if this argument is rejected, there remains no measure for proving that there is a preponderance of happiness in life for man. Therefore, this objection, which applies as much to the question of happiness as of unhappiness, leaves un- touched the general proposition in the above discussion, namely, the theorem proved by the uncontrollable growth of the desire for happiness beyond the actual enjoyment of happiness. It is stated in Mahommedan history, that during the Mahomedan rule in Spain, a just and powerful ruler named Abdul Rahiman the third had kept a diary of how he spent his days and from that diary he ultimately found that in a rule of 50 years he had experienced unalloyed happiness only for 14 days; and another writer has stated that if one compares the opinions of ancient and modern philosophers in the world and especially in Europe, the number of those who say that life is full of happiness is seen to be about the same as of those who say that life is full of unhappiness. If to these numbers we add the numbers of the Indian philosophers, I need not say which way the scale will turn. G. R. 10

Reading the exposition made above regarding the happi- ness and unhappiness of worldly life, some follower of the Samnyasa school will retaliate : " although you do not accept the doctrine that there can be no peace unless one gives up all Thirst-prompted Actions on the ground that happiness is not some actual entity, yet, if even according to yourselves, dissatisfaction arises from Thirst and unhappiness later on springs from dissatisfaction, why do you not say that man should give up Thirst and, along with Thirst, all wordly Actions — whether those Actions are for his own good or for the good of others — at any rate for removing this dissatisfaction, and then remain perpetually satisfied ?". In the Mahabharata itself, we find statements like: " asamtosasya nasty antas tustis tu paramam sukham", i. e, " there is no end to dissatisfaction, and contentment is the soul of bliss." (Ma. Bha Vana., 215. 22); and both the Jain and Buddhistic religions are based on the same foundation ; and in the Western countries, Schopenhauer has maintained the same opinion. But on the other hand, one may ask whether one should cut off the tongue altogether because it sometimes utters obscene words, and whether people have discontinued the use of fire and given up cooking food on the ground that houses sometimes catch fire. If we make use of electricity, to say nothing of fire, in daily life, by keeping them under proper control, it is not impossible for us to dispose of Thirst or dissatisfaction in the same way. It would be a different matter, if this dissatisfaction was wholly and on all occasions disadvantageous ; but on proper consideration we see that such is not the case. Dissatisfaction does not mean merely craving or weak-kneedness. Such a kind of dissatisfaction has been discountenanced even by philosophers. But the dissatis- faction which is at the root of the desire not to remain stagnant in the position which has fallen to one's lot, but to bring it to as excellent a condition as possible by gradually improving it more and more, with as peaceable and equable a frame of mind

As possible, is not a dissatisfaction which ought to he discoun- tenanced. It need not be said that a society divided into four castes will soon go to rack and ruin if the Brahmins give up the desire for knowledge, the Ksatriyas for worldly prosperity, and the Vaisyas for property. With this purport in view, Vyasa has said to Yudhisthira: — " yajno vidya samutthanam asamtosah sriyam prati " ( San. 23. 9 ), i. e., "sacrifice, learning, effort, and dissatisfaction in the matter of worldly acquisitions", are virtues in the case of Ksatriyas. In the same way, Vidula in advising her son says: " samtoso vai sriyam hanti " " ( Ma. Bha. U. 132. 33 ), i. e.," by contentment, worldly prosperity is destroyed "; and there is also a statement on another occasion that: " asamtosah sriyo mulam" (Ma. Bha. Sabha. 55.11) i. e., " dissatisfaction is the root of prosperity". Although contentment is referred to as a virtue in the case of Brahmins, it only means contentment with reference to wealth or worldly prosperity, according to the four-caste arrangement. If a Brahmin says that the knowledge which he has acquired is enough for him, he will bring about his own undoing, and the same will be the case with the Vaisyas or the Sudras, if they always remain satisfied with what they have acquired accord- ing to their own status in life. In short, discontent is the seed of all future prosperity, effort, opulence and even of Release ; and, it must always be borne in mind by everybody, that if this discontent is totally annihilated, we will be nowhere, whether in this world or in the next. In the Bhagavadgita itself, in listening to the advice of Sri Krsna, Arjuna has said: "" bhuyah kathaya trptir hi srnvato nasti me 'mrtam " (Gi. 10, 18), i. e., "I am not satisfied with what I have heard of your nectar- like speech, therefore, describe to me more and more of your manifestations" ; and then the Blessed Lord has again started enumerating his manifestations. He did not say to him : " -restrain your desire, dissatisfaction or discontent is improper". From this it follows that even the Blessed Lord Himself considered it proper that One should entertain disoontent about a good or beneficial matter, and there is a

stanza of Bhartrhari that : "yasasi cabhirucir vyasamm srutau " etc., i. e., "there ought to be liking or desire, but that should be for success ; and one must also have a vice, but that should be of learning ; that vice is not prohibited". Still, we must control discontent, in the same way as Desire, Anger etc., because if it becomes uncontrolled, it will clearly end in our undoing ; and therefore, the endowment (sampatti) of those persons who continually run after worldly happiness piling thirst on thirst, and hope on hope with the sole object of enjoying objects of pleasure is referred to as " ungodly endowment " ( asura sampat ) in the 16th Chapter of the Gita. Not only are the pure (sattvika) tendencies in the human mind destroyed by such greediness and the man undone, but, in as much as it is impossible that Thirst should ever be quenched, the desire for enjoyment of objects of pleasure grows continually, and man's- life is ended in the greed. But on the other hand, giving up all kinds of Thirst, and with it, all Actions, in order to escape this evil effect of Thirst or discontent is also not the pure- ( sattvika) path. As has been stated above, Thirst or discontent is the seed of future prosperity : and therefore, instead of attempting to kill an innocent man out of fear for a thief, one has to carefully consider what Thirst "or discontent causes- unhappiness, and adopt the skilful middle path of giving up only that particular hope, thirst or discontent which produces- unhappiness, and it is not necessary for that purpose to give up all kinds of Action whatsoever. This device or skill (kausalam) of giving up only that hope which causes unhappiness and performing one's duties according to one's status in life is known as Yoga or Karma-yoga ( Gi. 2. 50.); and, as that is the Yoga which has been principally dealt with in the Gita, I shall consider here in a little more detail what kind of hope has been looked upon by the Gita as productive of unhappiness.

In describing above the, actual nature, of human pain and unhappiness, I have stated that a man hears by his ears, feels by his skin, sees by his eyes, tastes by his tongue, and smells by his nose ; and that a man is happy or unhappy according as these activities of his organs are consistent with their natural tendencies. But, the question of pain and happiness is not completely exhausted by making this definition. Although it

is necessary that the organs should, in the first instance, come into contact with external objects in order that Material pain or happiness should arise, yet, if one considers in what way this pain or happiness is subsequently experienced by man, it will be seen that a man has ultimately to perform the function of realising, that is, of taking on himself, this pain or happi- ness, which results from the activities of the organs, by means of his Mind (manas). ' caksuh pasyati rupam mamsa na tu caksusa", i. e., " the function of seeing is not performed solely by the eyes : the assistance of the mind is absolutely necessary for it" (Ma. Bha. San. 311. 17) ; and it is stated in the Mahabhara- ta that if that mind is in pain, then even having seen is as if you have not seen, and even in the Brhadaranyakopanisad, there are such statements as : " anyatramana abhuvam nadarsam ", i. e., "my mind was elsewhere, and therefore, I did not see ", or, '"anyatramana abhuvam nasrausam", i. e., "my mind was else- where, and therefore, I did not hear " ( Br. 1. 5. 3 ). From this it becomes clear, that in order to experience Material pain or happiness, the organs are not sufficient by themselves, but require the assistance of the Mind ; and as regards Metaphysical pain or happiness, it is purely mental. It, therefore, follows that all experience of pain or happiness ultimately depends on the Mind ; and if this is true, it naturally follows that it is not impossible to control the experience of pain or happiness if one controls the mind. With regard to these facts, Manu has described the characteristics of pain and happiness in a different way than the Nyaya school. He says :

sarvam paravasam duhkham sarvam atmavasam sukham I etad vidyat samasena laksanam sukhaduhkhayoh II

( Manu. 4. 160 ). that is, " all that which is subject to the control of others (external objects) is unhappiness, and all that which is subject to the control of oneself (of one's mind) is happiness ; these are in brief the characteristic features of pain and happiness". The word 'suffering' (vedana) used in the connotation of pain and happiness given by the Nyaya school, includes both physical and mental suffering, and it also shows the actual external nature of pain and happiness ; and when one bears in

mind that Manu is referring principally to the internal experience of pain and happiness, there remains no incon- sistency between these two definitions. When in this way, we do not make the experience of pain or happiness depend on. the organs :

bhaisajyam etad duhkhasya yad etan nanucintayet ;

that is, " not brooding on one's unhappiness, becomes the most potent medicine for doing away with unhappiness" (Ma. Bha. San. 205. 2 ) ; and we find numerous illustrations in history, of people having hardened their minds, and willingly sacrificed their lives for the sake of their Religion or of Truth. There- fore, says the Gita, when one does what one has to do with- perfect mental control and after giving up the DESIRE FOR THE RESULT (phalasa) and with a frame of mind which is equal towards pain and happiness, there remains no fear or possibility of experiencing the unhappiness of Actions, and it does not become necessary to give them up. Giving up the desire for the result does not mean giving up the resulting benefit, if it has been acquired, nor entertaining a desire that no one should ever get that benefit. In the same way, there is a world for difference between the desire for the result and the Desire, Hope, or Motive for performing Action, or employing a particular means for obtaining a particular result. There is a difference between merely desiring to move one's hands and feet and desiring to move one's hands for catching or one 's feet for kicking some one else. The first desire extends merely to the doing of the act and there is no other motive behind it ; and if we give up this desire, all Action will come to an end. Besides having this desire, a man must also have the knowledge that every act is sure to have some result or consequence; and not only must he have that knowledge, but he must entertain the desire of doing a. particular act with the intention of thereby producing some particular result; otherwise, all his Actions will be as pointless as those of a madman. All of these desires, motives, or arrangements do not ultimately produce pain ; nor does the Gita ask you to give them up. But if one goes much further than that, and allows his mind to be afflicted by the.

ATTACHMENT (asakti), ambition, pride, self-identification, or insistence of MINE-NESS (mamatva ), which exists in the.- mind of the doer with reference to the result of the Action in the shape of the feeling that : "whatever action is performed by ME is performed by ME with the intention that ' I ' should: necessarily get a particular benefit from a particular act of MINE "; and if thereafter there is any obstruction in the- matter of getting the desired result or benefit, the chain of misery starts. If this obstruction is inevitable and is an act of Pate, man only suffers from despair ; but, if it is the handi- work of another person, it gives rise later on to anger or even- hate, and this hate leads to evil action, and evil action leads to- self-destruction. This attachment, in the shape of MINE- NESS, for the result of the Action, is also known as 'phatasa " ( hope of benefit ), ' samga ' ( fondness ), ' ahamkara-buddhi' ( egoism ), and ' kama ' ( desire ) ; and in order to show that the- chain of unhappiness in life really starts at this point, it is: stated in the second chapter of the Gita, that Desire springs, from Attachment for objects of pleasure, Anger ( krodha ) from. Desire, Mental Confusion (moha) from Anger, and ultimately,, the man himself is destroyed ( Gl. 2. 62, 63 ). When I have thus established that Actions in the gross material world, which are lifeless in themselves, are not themselves the root of unhappi- ness, but that the true root of unhappiness is the Hope for result, Desire, or Attachment with which man performs those Actions,, it naturally follows that in order to prevent this unhappiness, it is quite enough if a person, by controlling his mind, gives up. the Attachment, Desire or Hope of result entertained by him towards the objects of pleasure ; and it follows logically that it is not necessary to give up all objects of pleasure, or Actions, or Desires as prescribed by the Samnyasa school. Therefore, it is next stated in the Gita ( Gi. 2. 64 ), that that man who- partakes of the objects of pleasure he comes across in the world,, with a desireless and unattached frame of mind, without entertaining any hope of result, is the true ' sthitaprajna ', ( steady-in-mind ). The activity of Action in the world never comes to an end. Even if man ceases to exist in this world. Matter (prakrti) will carry on its activities according to its constituent qualities ( guna-dharma ). Gross Matter would not

in any way be happy or unhappy on that account. Man arrogates to himself an undue importance, and becomes attached to the activities of Matter, and in that way suffers pain and happiness. But if he gives up this attachment, and performs all his Actions in the belief that 'guna gunesu vartante', i. e., " all activities are going on according to the constituent qualities of Matter " ( Gi. 3. 28 ), there will remain no unhappi- ness in the shape of discontent. Therefore, Vyasa has advised Yudhisthira that instead of lamenting that worldly life is principally unhappy, and attempting to give up such life, one should believe that Matter is carrying on its own activities, and that.—

sukham va yadi va duhkham priyam va yadi vapriyam I praptam praptam upasita hrdayenaparajitah II

(Ma, Bha. San. 25. 26).

"that is, "one should put up with whatever takes place, whenever it takes place, without being disheartened, ( that is to say, without becoming dejected, and giving up one's duty ), whether it causes happiness or unhappiness, and whether it is pleasurable or unpleasant." The full importance of this advice will be appreciated when one bears in mind that one has to perform some duties in life, even suffering the pain which they cause. In the Bhagavadgita itself, the characteristic features of the sthitaprajna are described in the words: "yah sarvatranabhisnehas tat tat prapya subhasubham" 2 57), i. e., "that man who, when anything favourable or unfavourable happens, always remains unattached, and neither welcomes it nor dislikes it, is the true sthitaprajna" ; and in the fifth chapter it is stated that, "na prahrsyet priyam prapya nodvijet prapya capriyam " ( 5.20), i. e„ "when you experience happiness, you should not on that account become excited ; and when you experience unhappiness, you should also not on that account become dejected " ; and it is stated in the second chapter, that this pain and happiness must be borne with a desireless frame of mind (2. 14, 15) ; and the same advice has been repeatedly given in various other places ( Gi. 5. 9; 13. 9 ). In the terminology of Vedanta Philosophy, doing this is called .

"dedicating all Actions to the Brahman' (Brahmarpana), and in the Path of Devotion, the word ' Krsnarpana' (dedication to Krsna) is used instead of ' Brahmarpana ' (dedication to the Brahman) ; and this is the sum and substance of the whole of ihe preaching of the Gita.

Whatever the nature of the Action, when one does not give up the Desire to do it, nor also one's activity, but goes on performing whatever one wants to do, being equally prepared "for the resulting pain or happiness, with an aloof frame of mind, and without entertaining the hope for the result, not only does one eseape the evil effects due to non-control of Thirst or discontent, but also the danger of the world becoming desolate as a result of Action being destroyed in the attempt to destroy Thirst; and all our mental impulses remain pure and become beneficial to all created beings. It is clear beyond doubt that , in order in this way to be able to give up the hope for the result, one must obtain perfect control over the mind and over the organs by means of Apathy (vairagya). But, there is a world of difference between (i) keeping one's organs under control and allowing them to perform their various activities, not for a sel- fish purpose, but apathetically and desirelessly and for the wel- -fare of others, on the one hand, and (ii) deliberately destroying all Actions, that is to say, all the activities of the various organs in order to kill Thirst, as prescribed by the Path of Renunciation, on the other hand. The Apathy and Control, of the organs prescribed by the Gita is of the first kind and not of the second kind ; and in the same way, in the conversation between Janaka and the Brahmin in the Anugita ( Ma. Bha. Asva. 32, 17-23 ) the king Janaka says to Dharma, who had appeared to him in the form of a Brahmin that :

srnu buddhim ca yam jna va sarvatra visayo mama II naham atmartham icchami gandhan ghranagatan apt, I

naham atmartham icchami mano nityam manontare I mano me nirjitam tasmad vase tisthat sarvada ll

that is, "I will describe to you that apathetic frame of mind (vairagya) with which I enjoy all objects of pleasure. I do not

'for myself smell any scent, nor do I not 'for myself see any- thing with my eyes etc ; and I do not also put to use my mini for my Self (atmartha), that is, for my own benefit ; therefore,. I have conquered my nose (eyes etc.) and my mind, and they are all under my control ". This is what is meant by the' statement in the Gita ( Gi. 3. 6, 7 ) that he who merely chokes up the impulses of the organs but contemplates objects of pleasure by his mind is a hypocrite, and he who conquers the desiring frame of mind by means of mental control, and allows all his mental impulses to carry on their various activities for the benefit of the world is the real superman. The external world, or the activities of the organs are not something which- we have brought into existence, but they are self-created ; and' however self -controlled a samnyasi may be, yet, when his hunger becomes uncontrollable, he goes out to beg for food (Gi. 3. 33) ; or when he has sat for a considerable length of time in one place, he gets up and stands for some time. If we see that however much there is of mental control, one cannot, escape the inherent activities of the organs, then the wisest course is seen to be not to perversely attempt to destroy the- impulses of the organs, and at the same time all Actions and all kinds of Desire or Discontent (Gi. 2. 47 ; 18. 59), but to give up the hope for the result by controlling the mind, and to look upon pain and happiness as a like (Gi. 2. 38), and to perform all Actions desirelessly and for the benefit of the world as prescribed by the Sastras. Therefore, the Blessed Lord first tells Arjuna in the following stanza :

karmany evadhikaras te ma phalesu kadacana I ma karmaphalahetur bhuh ma te sango 'stvakarmam II

( Gi. 2. 47 ). that, in as much as you have been born in this world of Action, therefore, " your authority extends only to the per- formance of Actions' ' ; but bear in mind that this your authority extends only to the performance of Action which ought to be- performed (that is, to kartavya). The word 'eva' which means 'only', clearly shows that the authority of man does not extend to anything other than karma, that is, to the result of the karma. But the Blessed Lord does not leave this important matter to be

understood merely by inference, and He again, and in per- fectly clear words, says in the second quarter of the stanza, that, "your authority never extends to the result of the Action", be- cause, getting or not getting the result of the Action is not a. matter which is within your control, but is always in the gift . of the Paramesvara or is dependent on the entire Effect of Causes (karma-vipaka) in the world. Hoping that a particular- thing which is not within one's control should take place in a particular way, is a sign of madness. But the Blessed Lord has not left even this third thing for inference, and has in the. third quarter of the stanza said : " therefore, do not perform any Action, keeping in mind the hope for the result of the Action";, whatever may be the result of your Action according to the- general law of Cause and Effect, will be its effect ; it is not pos- sible that such result should be more or less, or take place earlier or later, aocording to your desires, and by entertaining any such, desire, it is only you who suffer unnecessary pain and trouble. But here some persons — especially those who follow the Path of" Renunciation — will object : " Is it not better to give up Action ( karma ) altogether rather than engaging in the useless procedure, of performing Actions and giving up the hope of the result ?" And therefore, the Blessed Lord has in the last quarter of the. stanza made the definite statement that " do not insist upon not performing Action," but perform Action according to the- authority which you possess, though without entertaining any hope for the result. These doctrines are so important from the. point of view of Karma-Yoga, that the four quarters of the above stanza may be said to be the four aphorisms (catuh-sutri) of the science of Karma-Yoga or of the Gita religion.

If worldly activity is not to be given up, although happi- ness and unhappiness always befall you alternatively in life, and although it is an established fact that the sum total of unhappiness is greater than that of happiness, then some persons- are likely to think, that all human efforts towards the total eli- mination of unhappiness and the acquisition of total happiness- are futile ; and if one considers only Material Happiness, that, is to say, happiness in the shape of the enjoyment of external objects of pleasure through the medium of the organs, this- their objection will have to be admitted to be substantial. Just.

as the Moon never comes within the grasp of the little children who spread out their little hands towards the heavens in order to catch hold of it, bo also those persons, who run after Material Happiness in the hope of reaching the highest form of happi- ness, will in any case And it very difficult to reach the highest form of happiness. But as Material Happiness is not the only kind of happiness, it is possible to find out the way of acquiring the highest and the constant form of happiness, even in this difficult position. As has been stated above, when happiness is divided into the two divisions of physical and mental happiness, one has to attach a higher importance to the activities of the mind than to the activities of the body or of the organs. Even the well-known Materialist philosopher Mill has admitted in his book on Utilitarianism, that the theorem that the merit of Mental happiness is higher than that of bodily (i. e., Material) happiness, which has been laid down by scients (jnanin), is not made by them as a result of any arrogance about their own knowledge but because the true greatness or appropriateness of the superior human birth consists in Knowledge. Dogs, pigs, oxen etc. also like the happiness of the organs in the same way as human beings ; and if the human race was of the opinion that enjoyment of objects of pleasure is the only true happiness in the world, then man would be ready to become a beast. But in as much as nobody is willing to become a beast, notwithstanding that he can thereby obtain all the physical happiness which can be got by beasts, it is clear that there is something more in a human being than in a beast. When one begins to consider what this something is, one has to investigate into the nature of that Atman which acquires the knowledge of one's Self and of the external world by means of the Mind and of the Reason (buddhi ); and when one has once begun to think of this matter, one naturally comes to the conclusion that, that happiness

which is to be found in the extremely noble activities and in the purest state of the Mind and of the Reason is the highest, or the most ideal happiness of mankind, as compared with the happiness of the enjoyment of objects of pleasure, which is common to man and beast. This kind of happiness is self- controlled, that is, it can be acquired without depending on external objects, and without reducing the happiness of others, and by one's own exertions; and as a man becomes better and better, the nature of this happiness becomes more and more pure and unalloyed. Bhartrhari has said that " manasi ca parituste ko'rthavan ko daridrah ", i. e., " when the mind is satisfied, the begger is the same as the rich man ", and the well-known Greek philospher Plato has main- tained that Mental Happiness is superior to bodily ( that is, external or Material ) happiness, and that, that happiness which can be realised only by means of the Reason, (which is the highest Metaphysical Happiness), is superior even to Mental Happiness. Therefore, even if we for the time being keep aside the question of Release, the fact that that Reason, alone can obtain the highest happiness, which is engrossed in the contemplation of the Atman, is definitely proved; and therefore, after happiness has been divided in the Bhagavad- gita into the three divisions of sattvika, rajasa and tamasa, it is first stated that " tat sukham sattvikam proktam atmabuddhi- prasadajam ", i. e., " that Metaphysical Happiness which is the result of the contentedness of the Self-engrossed Reason (that is, of the Reason which having realised the true nature of the Atman, namely, that there is only one Atman in all created beings, is engrossed in that idea) is the sattvika (placid), that is, the most superior kind of happiness (Gi. 18. 37); and the Gita goes on to say that the Material Happiness arising from the organs and the objects of the organs is of a lower grade, that is, is rajasa (Gi. 18. 38.); and that the happi- ness which arises from sleep, or idleness or which confuses the mind is the most inferior form, that is, is tamasa. That is the meaning which is conveyed by the stanza from the Gita which has been quoted at the commencement of this chapter, and the Gita itself says (Gi. 6. 25) that when a man has once

experienced this beatific happiness, he is not shaken from this peaceful mental frame, whatever the magnitude of the misfortune which subsequently befalls him. This beatific happi- ness is not to be found even in the enjoyment of heavenly objects of pleasure, and the Reason of a man has in the first instance to become absolutely contented before he can experience it. He who is always engrossed in the enjoyment of the objects of pleasure, without seeing how he can keep his frame of mind contented, experiences happiness, which is temporary and inconstant Because, that organic happiness which exists to-day, ceases to exist tomorrow ; and what is more, that thing which our organs look upon as productive of happiness to day, becomes for some reason or other, productive of unhappiness tomorrow. For instance, the same cold water which is desirable in summer, becomes undesirable in winter ; and even if one acquires the happiness, the desire for happiness, as has been mentioned above, is never fully quenched. Therefore, although the world 'happiness' can be applied comprehen- sively to all kinds of happiness, yet, one has to differentiate between happiness and happiness. In ordinary practice, the word ' happiness ' means principally ' organic happiness'. But when it becomes necessary to differentiate between the happiness of the enjoyment of objects of pleasure from that happiness which is beyond the organs, that is, which is beyond organic happiness, and which can be realised only by the self- engrossed Reason, the Material Happiness which consists of the enjoyment of objects of pleasure, is called simply ' happiness ' (suhkam or preyas), and the Metaphysical Happiness which is born of Self -Realisation (atma-buddhi-prasadaja) is called " beatific happiness ' ( sreyas, blessing ( kalyanam), amelioration (hitam ), beatitude (ananda), or peace ( santi). The distinction made between 'preyas' and 'sreyas' by Naciketa in the sentence from the Kathopanisad quoted at the end of the last chapter, has been made on this basis. Mrtyu ( Death ) had already in the beginning explained to him the esoteric secrets of Fire (agni). But, when after having acquired that happiness, Naciketa asked for the blessing of being explained what was meant by the Knowledge or -Realisation of the Atman ( atmajnana), Mrtyu tempted him

with many other kinds of worldly happiness instead. But Naciketa was not tempted by these transient Material kinds of happiness, or things which appeared pleasing (preyas) on the face of them, and extending his vision, he insisted on having, and ultimately succeeded in acquiring, that philosophy of the, Atman which led to the blessing ( sreyas ) of his Atman ( Self ) and was ultimately beneficial. In short, our philoso- phers have been looking upon that Reason-born happiness or Metaphysical beatitude, which results from the Realisation of the Atman, as the most superior happiness and their advice is that this happiness is such as can be obtained by everybody, in as much as it is self-controlled, and that everybody should try to acquire it. That wonderful and special happiness which belongs to mankind in addition to its beastly qualities is this happiness; and this happiness of the Atman (atma- nanda) is the most constant, the most independent and the most excellent of all happiness, in as much as it is independent of external circumstances. This peace is called in the Gita (Gi. 6. 15 ) by the name of the Peace ( santi ) of Emancipation (nirvana) ; and it is also the climax of happiness which pertains to the Brahmi state of the sthitaprajna ( steady-in- mind ) described in the Glta ( Gi. 2. 71 ; 6. 28 ; 12. 12 ; 18. 62 ).

In this way, we have proved that the peace or happiness of the Atman is the most excellent of all happiness, and that as it is self-controlled, it is such as can be acquired by every- body. But by proving that gold is the most valuable of all metals, iron and other metals do not cease to be useful ; and though sugar is sweet, one cannot do without salt ; and the same is the case with the happiness of the Atman or of Peace (santi). At any rate, it cannot be disputed that Material objects are necessary for the protection of the body, along with this Peace; and therefore, in the phrases used for blessing, one does not say simply : " santirastu " (May- there be santi ! , i. e., Peace ), but say : " santih pustis tustis castu", that is, 'May there also be pusti ( Material Happi- ness ), and tusti (contentedness) along with santi (peace)'. If our philosohpers had been of the opinion that one ought to acquire contentedness (tusti) by haviug merely Peace ( santi ), there would have been no occasion to add

to this phrase, the word l pusti'. Nevertheless, it is also not proper to have an inordinate desire for increase of Material Happiness (that is, pusti). Therefore, this phrase means: " May you have Peace, Material happiness and also Contentedness- in proper proportions, and that you must obtain them ". The- same is the moral of the Kathopanisad. The only matter which has been described in detail in this Upanisad is that after Naciketa had gone to the sphere of Yama, that is, of Death, Yama asked him to ask for three blessings, and that. Yama accordingly gave him the three blessings which he had asked for. But after Mrtyu had asked Naciketa to ask for blessings, Naciketa did not in the first place ask for the blessing: of Brahman-Realisation (Brahmajnana), but first said : " My father has got angry with me; may he become propitious to me "; and then, "teach me the science of Fire (agni), that is, of all sacrificial ritual which will give me material opulence " ; and, when he had acquired these blessings, he asked for the third blessing saying: "teach me the Knowledge of the Atman". But when Mrtyu began to say to him that he would give him! (Naciketa) additional happiness instead of this third blessing, Naciketa has insisted: "now explain to me that Brahma- jnana which will lead to sreyas", instead of aspiring for possessing more of the knowledge of sacriflcal ritual than was necessary for obtaining preyas. In short, as stated in the last mantra of this Upanisad, Naciketu obtained both the ' Brakma-vidya ' (knowledge of the Brahman), and'yoga-vidhi" (sacrifical ritual ), and he was emancipated (Katha 6. 18).. From this it follows, that the combination of jnana and karma is the summary of the preaching of this Upanisad. There is also a similar story about Indra. Not only had Indra himself acquired fully the Knowledge of the Brahman, (Brahmajnana) but he had taught the science of the Atman (atmavidya) to. Pratardana, as has been stated in the Kausitakyupanisad. Yet, after Indra had lost his kingdom and Prahlada had become the king of the three spheres, Indra went to Brhaspati,. the preceptor of the gods, and asked him to explain to him in what sreyas lay. Then Brhaspati taught the dethroned Indra the Brahmavidya, that is, the Knowledge of the Atman,. (atmajnana) and said to him that that was all which was

sreyas (etavac chreya iti). But Indra was not satisfied audi again asked the question: "ko viseso bhavet?",i.e., " Is" there. anything more ? "; thereupon Brhaspati sent him to Sukracarya. There, there was a repetition of the same process, and Sukracarya said to him : ' " That something , more is known to Prahlad. " Then at last Indra went to Prahlada in the. form of a Brahmin and became his disciple, and after same time had passed, Prahlada explained to him that silam ' (the habit of behaving consistently with Truth and Morality ) was the master-key for gaining the kingdom of the three spheres, and that that was also known as sreyas. Then, when Prahlada. said to him : " I am very much pleased by your service, I shall- give you whatever blessing you may ask ", Indra, in the form of the Brahmin, said to him: " Give me your ' silam ' ". When Pra- hlada consented, the deity 'silam', and after it Morality (dharm- am), Veracity (satyam), good conduct (vrtta), and ultimately opulence (sri) and other deities left the body of Prahlada and entered the body of Indra, and in this way Indra regained his kingdom : such is the ancient story which has been told by Bhisma to Yudhisthira in the Santiparva ( San. 124 ). Although the Knowledge of the Brahman by itself may be worth more than prosperity (aisvaryam) by itself, yet, in as much as who- ever has to live in this world is under the obligation and has also the moral right to acquire material prosperity for himself or for his own country in the same way as it is possessed by others or by other countries, the highest ideal of man in this world, as is apparent from this beautiful story, is seen to be the combin- nation of Peace (santi), and Material Happiness (pusti), or of desired things (preyas) and true and lasting benefit (sreyas), or of Knowledge (jnanam) and prosperity (aisvaryam), according to our Karma-Yoga science. Has that Bhagavan than Whom there is) none higher in this world, and Whose path is followed ,by. others ( Gi. 3. 33 ), Himself given up prosperity and wealth? The word 'bhaga' has been defined in the Sastras as :

aisvaryasya samagrasya dharmasya yasasah sriyah I

jnanavairagyayos caiva sannam bhaga itirana I I

(Visnu. 6. 5. 74) G. R._11

that is, "the word ' bhaga ' includes the followings six things, namely, complete Yogic prosperity, righteousness, success property, knowledge, and apathy". The word 'aisvaryam' in this stanza is usually taken to mean ' Yogaisvaryam' (Yogic prosperity ), because the word ' sri ', that is, wealth, appears later on. But as ordinarily, the word ' aisvaryam ' is used to mean and include authority, success, and wealth, and the word jnanam ' includes apathy and righteousness, we may say that in ordinary parlance, the entire meaning conveyed by the above stanza is included in the two words 'jnanam' and 'aisvaryam, and in as much as the Blessed Lord has Himself accepted the combination of jnanam and aisvaryam, other persons should consider that as proper and act accordingly ( Gl. 3. 21 ; Ma. Bha. San. 341. 25). The doctrine that the knowledge of the Atman is the only ideal of man in this world is a doctrine of the school of Renunciation, which says that, as worldly life is full of unhappiness, it should be given up ; it is not a doctrine of the Karma-Yoga science, and it is not proper to mix up these doctrines of different schools of thought and pervert the meaning of the Gita. And as the Gita itself says that mere prosperity without Knowledge is a godless prosperity (asura sampatti), it follows that we must always maintain the union of jnanam with aisvaryam, or of aisvaryam with jnanam, or of santi with pusti. When it is admitted that aisvaryam is necessary, though along with jnanam, it necessarily follows that Action must be performed. Manu has said that: " karmany arabhamanam hi purusam srir nisevate " ( Manu. 9. 300 ), i. e., " in this world, only those persons who perform Action, acquire sri (prosperity)". The same thing is established by our personal experience, and the same is the advice given in the Gita to Arjuna (Gi, 3. 8 ). Some persons take the objection to this position that in as much as Action is not necessary for Release, all Action must be given up ultimately, that is, after the acquisition of Knowledge. But, as I am at present considering the question only of pain and happiness, and also as I have not yet gone into the examination of the natures of Action ( karma) and Release ( moksa ), I shall not here answer that exception.

shall explain in detail in the ninth and tenth chapters what 

Metaphysics, and the Theory of Cause and Effect are, and then

in the eleventh chapter, I will prove that even this objection is groundless.

I have so far shown that pain and happiness are two independent and different sufferings ; that, as it is impossible to satisfy the desire for happiness by the enjoyment of happiness, we find that in ordinary life the sum total of unhappiness is always greater ; that, in order to escape this unhappiness, the most meritorious thing to do is not to totally destroy Thirst or Discontent and at the same time Action itself, but to continue the performance of all Actions without entertaining any hope or the result; that, the happiness of enjoying objects of pleasure is in itself a happiness, which is always insufficient, inconstant, and beastly, and that the true ideal of man, who is endowed with Reason, must be higher than such happiness; "that, this true ideal is the happiness of the peace (santi) which results from . Self-Realisation ; but that, although Metaphysical Happiness is, in this way, superior to Material Happiness, yet, one must possess with it also a proper quantity of worldly objects; and that therefore, we must also make Effort, that is, perform Action, desirelessly. When these conclusions have been firmly established by the Karma- Yoga science, I need not further say that it is wrong to decide questions of Morality by the consideration of the external effects of Actions in the shape of pain and happiness on the basis that Material Happiness is the highest ideal of man — even looking at the question from the point of view of Happi- ness merely. Because, looking upon a thing which can never by itself reach the state of perfection, as the 'highest' ideal, is misusing the word 'highest' ( parama ), and is as unreasonable as believing that water exists, where there is only a mirage. If one 's highest ideal is itself inconstant and incomplete, then, what else, except something inconstant can one acquire, by keeping that ideal before one's eyes ? This is what is meant by the words : "dharmo nityah sukhaduhkhe to anitye ' ', i. e„ "morality is immutable; pain and happiness are mutable". There is much difference of opinion among Materialistic philosophers themselves as to how the word 'happiness', in the phrase 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', is to be understood. Some of these philosophers are of opinion that, in

as much as man is very often willing to sacrifice his life for the sake of Veracity, or of his Religion, casting aside all Material Happiness, it is not proper to say that his desire is always to acquire Material Happiness; and they have, therefore, maintained that we must use the word 'benefit' (hitam), or the word 'good' (kalyanam) instead of the word 'happiness' (sukham), and change the phrase 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' into the phrase 'greatest good or benefit of the greatest number'. But, even doing so, the objection that the Reason (buddhi) of the doer has not been taken into account, as also several other objections apply to this point of view. If one says that Mental Happiness must be taken into account, along with Material Happiness, then, the fundamental theorem that the morality of any particular Action must be decided by its external effects, is falsified, and one, to a certain extent, accepts the Metaphysical aspect of the matter. But, if in this way, you cannot escape accepting the Metaphysical aspect of the matter, then where is the sense of accepting it only half way ? Therefore, our philosophy of ' Karma-Yoga has ultimately come to the conclusion that the doctrines of 'the benefit of everybody', or 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', or the highest development of humanness' or other such external tests or Materialistic methods of determining questions of Morality are inferior tests, and that what is Right Action, and what Wrong Action or Non-Action must be determined by the Metaphysical tests of beatific happiness in the shape of Self -Realisation, and the attendant Pure Reason of the doer. The case is different, of course, of those persons who have sworn not to enter into the philosophy of things beyond the external world, under any circumstances. Other- wise, it only logically follows that one has got to go beyond Mind and Reason, and look upon the permanent benefit of the- permanent Atman as the most predominant factor, even in the Karma-Yoga science. The belief of some persons that when one enters into Vedanta, everything becomes Brahmised (Brahma-maya), and the necessity of worldly life' cannot satisfactorily be accounted for, is wrong. As the various works on Vedanta, which can ordinarily be read now-a-days have been written principally by followers of the Path of

Renunciation, and as in the Path of Renunciation, worldly life in the shape of Thirst is looked upon as totally insipid, it is true that the science of Karma-Yoga has not been properly expounded in their works. Nay, these writers, who are intolerant of rival cults, have foisted the arguments of the Path of Renunciation on the Karma- Yoga, and attempted to create the belief that Samnyasa (Renunciation) and Karma- Yoga, are not two independent paths for obtaining Release (moksa), but that Samnyasa is the only correct Path according to the Sastras. But such a view is incorrect. The Path of Karma-Yoga has- been independently followed from times immemorial, side by side with the Path of Renunciation, aocording to the Vedic religion; and the promulgators of this path have very satisfactorily expounded the science of Karma-Yoga, without departing from the elementary principles of Vedanta. The Bhagavadgoita is a work pertaining to this Path of Karma- Yoga. But, leaving aside the Gita for the moment, it will be seen that the system of expounding the science of the doable and the not-doable from the Metaphysical point of view was started, even in England itself, by writers like Green, and long before him, in Germany. However much one may consider the visible world, so long as one has not properly understood who is the HE who sees this visible world, or who performs these Actions, the consideration of the highest duty of man in this world will always remain incomplete from the philosophical point of view. Therefore, the advice of Yajnavalkya: "atma va are drastavyah srotavyo mantavyo nididhyasitavyah ", is literally applicable to the present case. If even after the examination of the external world, one ultimately comes to basic principles like philanthropy, then, "we must say that by such examination, the importance of the science of the Highest Self (adhyatma) is not in any way belittled, but that this is one more proof of there being only one Atman in all created things. If Materialistic philosophers cannot transcend the limitations which they have placed on themselves, there is no help for it. Our philosophers have

extended their sight far beyond that, and have fully justified the science of Karma- Yoga on the basis of Metaphysics. But, in as much as it is necessary to consider another contrary view (purva-paksa), which deals with the subject of Right Action and Wrong Action or Non-Action, I shall deal with that view before explaining how that justification has been made.

CHAPTER VI.

THE INTUITIONIST SCHOOL AND THE CONSIDERATION OF THE BODY AND THE ATMAN.

(ADHIDAIVATA-PAKSA AND KSETRA-KSETRAJNA- VICARA).

satyaputam vaded vacam manahputam samacaret *

Manu. 6. 46.

There is another method of the consideration of the- question of Action, Non-Action, and Wrong Action, besides the Positive or Material method, namely, the Intuitionist (adhidaivata) method. Those who belong to this school say that, when a man decides as to what is Action, Non-Action, or Wrong Action, or as to the doability or non-doability of any particular Action, he never troubles to find out how pain or happiness will result from any particular Action, and whether the sum total of happiness caused by it is greater than that of unhappiness, nor does he enter into the con- sideration of the Atman and the Non-Atman; and many- persons do not understand these intricate questions. Nor even- does everybody do every particular act for his own happiness. Whatever arguments may be advanced by Materialist philoso- phers, if one considers minutely for a moment what the state of mind of a person is in determining the righteousness or unrighteousness of any particular Action, it will be seen that inherent and noble mental impulses like pity, kindness, philanthropy etc. impel him to do any particular act on the- spot. For instance, when a man sees a beggar, his mind is inspired by the feeling of pity before the thought as to what benefit will be acquired by his Self or by his giving the beggar something in charity entere it, and he gets rid of the matter by giving the beggar whatever he can; in the same way, when her child begins to cry, the mother does not stop to consider

GITA RAHASYA OR KARMA_YOGA

how much how many people will be benefitted by her feeding it, but she at once begins to feed it. Therefore, the true foundations' of the science of Karma-Yoga are- these noble mental impulses. These "mental impulses have not been given to us by anybody, but they are Nature-born or inherent, or, in a sense, self -created deities. When a judge is seated in his judicial chair, he is inspired by the deity of Justice when he administers justice, and if he defies this inspiration, he administers injustice. The inherent mental impulses of kind- ness, pity) philanthropy, gratitude, love for one's duty, courage and other virtues, are deities just like the deity of Justice. Every one by nature knows what the true forms of these deities are. If he defies the inspirations of these deities on account of avarice, hate, or jealousy, or for some such other reason, what can these deities do ? ,Now, it is true that there is sometimes a conflict between these deities themselves; then, we are in doubt as to the inspiration of which deity we should consider as predominant in doing a particular Action ; and then it becomes necessary for us to consider some .other power besides the deities, of Justice, Kindness, etc. in order to satisfy this doubt. But even if, on these occasions, we do not enter into the intricacies of Metaphysical considerations, or of the weighing of pain or happiness, but only consult our Mental Deity (manodevata), that is, our Conscience, that deity immediately shows us which path is the more meritorious one; and therefore, Conscience is superior to all deities. The word " Conscience ' (manodevata) is not to be understood as meaning and including desire anger,;, avarice, or the other emotions which inhabit the mind, but as meaning, in the present context, the God-given or., inherent power which every one possesses of choosing between good and bad. This very power has got the high-sounding name of, " Power of discriminating between the good and the bad" (sad-asad-viveka-buddhi), and if a person, on any occasion of doubt, thinks for a moment quietly and with a peaceful mind, this deity which, discriminates between the right and the wrong (sad-asad-vivecana-devata)

will never fail him. Nay", on such occasions, we say to other persons: "Consult your own mind". What importance to attach to what virtue is ready listed with this sovereign deity which immediately gives you her decision on any matter in accordance with this list, as occasion arises. Suppose, there is an occasion when there is a conflict between the prin- ciples of Self-protection and Harmlessness, such as a famine, when we are in doubt as to whether Or not to eat uneatable food; then, we should consult- our Conscience, and immediately it will come out with the decision : " Eat the uneatable food ". Similarly, if there is a conflict between Self-interest, and philan- thropy, that situation too must he -solved by the help of this Mental Deity. One writer has after peaceful thought stumbled on 'this list of the relative values' of righteous and unrighteous actions prepared by" the deity of Conscience, and he has published it in his book. In this list, the highest place has been given to the feeling of Reverence combined with Humi- lity; and Kindness, Gratitude, Generosity, Affection etc. are given the consecutive lower grades. This writer is of the opinion that when there is a conflict between a virtue of a lower order, and a virtue of a higher order, one must attach higher importance to the virtue of the higher order. According to this writer, there is ho other proper way of determining the doability or non-doabillty or the righteousness or unrighteous- ness of any Action; because, even if we extend our vision as fax as possible, and decide in what the greatest good of the greatest number ' lies, yet in as much as our discriminating Reason does not possess the power or authority to order "us to do that in which the good ' of the greatest number lies, the question whether or not one should do that which is beneficial to 'the greatest number ultimately remains unsolved, and again the whole matter remains in abeyance. The decision of the doability or non-doability of an Action arrived at after a far-sighted consideration of pain and happiness

will meet the same fate as that of a decision which may- have heen given by a judge who has not received proper authority from the king. Mere far-sightedness cannot tell a person to do something, or that he must do some particular thing ; because, far-sightedness being a human product, it cannot control human beings. On such occasions, there must be some one else having a higher authority than ourselves who gives the command ; and this function can be satisfactorily discharged only by this God-given Conscience, which is superior to man, and therefore, in a position to- exercise authority over man. As this deity is self-created it is also usual, in ordinary parlance to say : "My Conscience- (manodevata) tells me a particular thing". The fact that when, a man has committed a sinful action, he is subsequently ashamed of it, and that his inner consciousness bites him, is- nothing else but the punishment of this Mental Deity ; and that proves the existence of this independent Mental Deity. For otherwise, we cannot, according to this school of thought,, explain why our Conscience pricks only ourselves.

The summary given above is of the opinions of the Intuitionist School in the Western countries. In these- countries, this body of thought has been principally promulgated by Christian preachers ; and in their opinion, this- God-given method is superior to, and easier to follow than the purely Materialistic methods for determining the righteousness- ot unrighteousness of an Action, and is, therefore, the method which should be acted upon. Although in India there was no such independent section of the science of Karma-Yoga in. ancient times, yet we oome across similar opinions in many places in our ancient treatises. We find in many places in the Mahabharata that the various mental impulses have been given the forms of deities. I have referred in the foregoing pages to the story of the deities of Morality (dharmam), Prosperity (sri) etc. having left the body of Prahlada and entered the body of Indra. This deity who discriminates between doability and: non-doability, or righteousness and unrighteousness is called: 'Dharmam', and there are stories that this deity had manifested himself in the form of a syena bird for testing the truthfulness- of the King Sibi, and first in the form of a yaksa and later on

in the form of a dog for testing Yudhisthira. Even in the Bhagavadgita (10.34), Fame (kirti), Opulence (sri), Speech(vak), Memory (smrti), Acumen (medha), Perseverance (dhrti), and Forgiveness (ksama) are called deities; and out of these, memory, acumen, perseverance, and forgiveness are qualities of the mind. The Mind itself is a deity, and the worship of it has been prescribed in the Upanisads, as being a symbol of the Parabrahman (Taj. 3. 4; Chan. 3. 18). When Manu says: "manahputam samacaret" (6. 46), i. e., "Do what the Mind believes to be pure", he may be said to have intended the Mental Deity by the word 'manas' (Mind). In ordinary affairs, we say instead : "Do as the Mental Deity (manodevata) pleases. In the Marathi language, the word 'manahputa' has acquired quite the contrary meaning ; and on many occasions, when a person does whatever he likes, he is said to behave 'manahputa ' . But the true meaning of this phrase is that : 'One should do only that which the Mind considers as sacred or pure'. In the fourth chapter of the Manu-Samhita, Manu himself has made the meaning clearer by saying :

yat karma kurvato 'sya syat paritoso'n taratmanah I tat prayatnena kurvita viparitam tu, varjayet II

(Manu-Samh. 4. 161).

that is, "One should perform by efforts that Action by which i one's innermost Atman is satisfied ; and one should give up whatever is disliked by it", So also, Manu, Yajnavalkya, and the other Smrti-writers, in mentioning the fundamental rules of practical morality such as the rules of Morality applicable to the four castes, etc. have said :

vedah smrtih sadacarah svasya ca priyam atmanah I etac caturvidham prahuh saksad dharmasya laksanam II

(Manu. 2. 12).

that is, "the Vedas, the Smrtis, good behaviour, and the satisfaction of one's Atman, are the four fundamental elements of righteousness (dharmam). The meaning of the words 'the satisfaction of the Atman' is, 'that which one's Mind looks upon as pure' ; and it is quite clear that where the righteous-

ness or unrighteousness of any particular Action could not be decided by consulting the Srutis, the Smrtis, and the principles of good behaviour (sadacara), the fourth means of deciding the matter was considered to be its 'manah-putata', i. e., its 'being considered as pure by the Mind'. In the Mahabharata, Dhrtarastra, after relating the stories of Prahlada and Indra mentioned in the last Chapter, has said in describing 'silam', that :

yad anysam hitam na syad atmanah karma paurusam I apatrapeta va yena na tat kuryat kathamcana II

(Ma. Bha. San. 124. 66).

that is, "That Action of ours which is not beneficial to others, or of which we ourselves would feel ashamed, should not be performed in any case. My readers will notice that by using the expressions 'is not beneficial to others' and 'feel ashamed this verse has included in the same place both the doctrines of 'the greatest good of the greatest number' and the 'Mental Deity'. Even in the Manu-Smrti, that Action for having done which or when doing which one feels ashamed, is referred to as tamasa', and that Action of doing which one does not feel ashamed, and whereby our innermost self (antaratman) remains happy, is referred to as 'sattvika' (Manu. 12. 35. 37) ; and these ideas are to be found also in the Buddhistic treatise Dhammapada (See Dhammapada, 67 and 68). Kalidasa says that when there is a doubt as to the doability or non-doability of any Action : satam hi samdehapadesu vastusu pramanam antahkaranapravrttayah I

(Sakun. 1. 20). that is, "saintly persons always consider as authoritative the dictates of their own Conscience". Controlling the mental impulses by concentrating the mind on a single object is the province of the Patanjala Yoga, and as this Yoga-Sastra has been in vogue in India from very ancient times, it was at no time necessary to teach our people the method of making the mind peaceful and quiet, and doing that which the Mind considered as proper, whenever there was any doubt about

any matter. It is stated in the various Smrtis at the very commencement, that the Rsis who wrote them, used always to define righteousness and unrighteousness after first completely concentrating their minds (Manu. 11) ; and the method of thus consulting the dictates of Conscience on any matter also seems at first sight extremely easy. But when one minutely considers what is meant by a ' pure mind ' from the philoso- phical point of view, this facility of the matter disappears ; and on that account, our philosophers have not based the edifice of Karma-Yoga on it. We must now consider what this philosophical point of view is; but before I do so, I will here explain briefly how the Western Materialistic philosophers have refuted this Intuitionist theory. Because, although the reasons adduced by the Materialists and the Metaphysicians may be different, yet as the result arrived at by both is the same, I shall first deal with the arguments of the Materialists,- in order that the importance and the propriety of the argu- ments of the Metaphysicians should be the better understood by my readers.

As the Intuitionist School has, as mentioned above, given, the highest place to Conscience Pure, it is clear that the objection against the Materialistic philosophy or morals,, namely, that they do not attach any importance to the Reason of the doer, does not apply to the Intuitionist theory. But when one minutely considers what is to be called the ' Pure Conscience' in the shape of a Mental Deity which dis- criminates between the Right and the Wrong (sad-asad-viveka- buddhih), it will be seen that other unconquerable difficulties arise with reference to this theory also. Nobody need be told that whatever thing is taken considering it in all its bearings, and finding out whether or not it is performable or unperformable, doable or not-doable, or whether or not it will be advantageous or pleasant, is a thing which is not done by the nose or the eyes or any other organs, and that there is an independent organ, namely, the Mind, which serves that purpose. Therefore, doability or non-doability, righteousness or unrighteousness are things which must be determined by the Mind, whether you call it an organ or a deity. If that were all that the Intuitionist school said, nobody

would find any fault with it. But, Western Intuitionists have gone far beyond that. They say that deciding whether a thing is good or bad (sat or asat), just or unjust, righteous or un- righteous, is quite different from deciding whether a particular object is heavy or light, white or black, or whether a cal- culation is correct or incorrect. The Mind can, by logical methods, decide matters which fall within the second category; but the Mind itself is incapable of deciding on the matters mentioned in the first category, and that is a thing which can be done only by the Mental Deity in the shape of the Power of discrimination between good and bad. They explain this by saying that in determining whether a particular calculation is correct or incorrect, we first examine the additions or multi- plications involved in it, and then arrive at a decision, that is to say, before determining this question, the Mind has to go through some other actions or activities ; but the same is not the case in the matter of the discrimination between good and bad. As -soon as we hear that somebody has murdered somebody else, we immediately utter the words: "What a bad thing has been done by him I ", and we have not to think about the matter at all. As the decision whioh we arrive at without any consideration, and the one which we arrive at after con- sideration, cannot both be said to be the functions of one and the same mental capacity, we must say that Conscience is an independent Mental Deity. As this power or deity is equally awake in the hearts of all human beings, every one looks upon murder as a crime, and nobody has to Ibe taught anything about the matter.' This Intuitionist argument is answered by Materialistic philosophers by saying, that from the fact that we can spontaneously arrive at a decision on any matter, we cannot draw the conclusion that such matter must be different from another matter as to which we come to a decision after proper consideration. Doing a thing quickly or slowly is a matter of practice. Take the case of calculations. Merchants quote the rate for the seer immediately on being given the rate for the khandy, by mental calculation. But on that account, their deity of calculation does not become different from the same deity of the best mathematicians. By habit, something

becomes so much part and parcel of oneself, that one does it easily and without the slightest consideration. An excellent marksman easily shoots and kills birds on the wing; but mo one, on that account, says that there is soma independent deity of marksmanship. Not only that, but no one, on that account, considers the science of marksmanship or of cal- culating the speed of flying birds or other scientific calculations as unnecessary. There is a story told of Napoleon Buonaparte, that as soon as he stood on the battle-field and cast only one glance all round, he could immediately find out the weakest point of the enemy. But, on that account, nobody said that the science of warfare is an independent deity, and that it is in no way connected with other mental faculties. It may be that one man has a greater aptitude for a particular thing than another. But on that account, we do not say that the two have two different kinds of intelligence. Besides, it is not that the decision on questions of doability or non-doability, or of righteousness or unrighteousness is made instantaneously on all occasions. Because, if such were the case, there would never have been any doubt as to whether ' a parti- cular thing ought to be done or ought not to be done '.Not only is such doubt occasionally experienced by every one, but, what is more, the decisions given by different persons as to the doability or non-doability of the same Action are different. If there is only one self -created deity in the form of 'Conscience', why should there be this difference ? Therefore, we have to say ,- that a man comes to a decision on any particular matter, . according as his mind is evolved or educated. There are many : aboriginal tribes who do not consider murder a crime, but even ' eat human flesh with pleasure ! But if we for a moment leave aside the case of uncivilised human beings, yet, according to the customs of different countries, something which is considered objectionable in one country is wholly acceptable in another country. Marrying a second wife when the first one is alive, is considered a crime in England ; but nobody thinks much of it in India. Indians would feel ashamed of sitting in an assembly without their turbans on ; but in England people consider taking off one's hat as a sign of respect ! If it were true that one feels ashamed of a wrong act as a result only of

God-given or inherent Conscience, should not every one feel equally ashamed of the same act ? Even marauders consider it disgraceful to draw a sword against a, person whose food they have eaten ; but, even powerful civilised nations in the West consider it a sign of patriotism to murder people who are subjects of a neighbouring nation ! !. If there is only one deity in the shape of Conscience, why should there be this difference ? And if one admits different kinds of Conscience, according to- civilization or according to the customs of countries, then the self-created immutability of Conscience itself suffers. As man leaves the uncivilised state and is gradually more and more civilised, so also are his Mind and Reason developed;, and when in this way, the Reason has developed, man becomes capable of spontaneously conceiving such ideas as he would have been incapable of conceiving in his former uncivilised condition. We may even say that the Reason being developed in this way is a sign of civilisation, Just as a civilised or educated person's not asking for everything which he casts his. eyes on is a sign of the control over the organs which has become ingrained in him, so also has the mental faculty of choosing between good and evil gradually grown in mankinds and it has now become so much part of human nature that we give our decision as to the morality of a thing spontaneously and without consideration. If we have to see things which are near or which are far, we have to contract the muscles and tendons of the eyes to a greater or lesser extent, and this is done so quickly that we never realise it ; but has any one, on that account, looked upon the consideration of the reasons for this process as useless ? In short, the Mind or the Reason of man are the same at all times and with reference to all matters. It is not that we decide between black and white by one kind of Reason and between good and evil by another kind of Reason. The only difference is that the Reason of a particular person may be more developed, whereas the Reason of another person may be uneducated or incompletely developed. Western Materialistic philosophers have' thus drawn the conclusion that when we bear in mind this difference, and also take into aocount our experience that being able to do any particular thing quickly is only a matter of habit or practice, we have no

reason for imagining that there is an independent and wonder- ful power like Conscience in addition to the natural faculties of the Mind.

The ultimate decision of our ancient philosophers on this matter is similar to that of the Western Materialistic philosophers. They admit the principle that it is necessary to- consider any particular matter quietly and with a peaceful mind. But they do not accept the position that there is one kind of Reason which decides the question of righteousness and unrighteousness and another kind of Reason which decides whether a particular thing is black or white. The Mind arrives at a correct or incorrect decision according as it has been educated. They, therefore, say that everybody must make an effort to develop his Mind ; and they have also given rules explaining what this development is and how it is to be made. But they do not accept the position that the power of discrimination between good and bad (sad-asad-vivecana-sakti) is some independent heavenly gift which is different from the ordinary Reason of a man. The question as to how a man acquires knowledge and how the activities of his Mind and Reason are carried on, have been very minutely examined in ancient times. This examination is technically known as "the consideration of the Body and the Atman" (ksetra-ksetrajna- vicara). 'ksetra' means the body and 'ksetrajna' means the Atman. This ksetra-ksetrajna-vicara is the foundation of Metaphysics; and as it is impossible to look upon the Power of discrimination between good and bad or any other Mental Deity as higher than the Atman when once one has properly understood this science of the Body and the Atman, it becomes perfectly clear how the Intuitionist arguments are insufficient. I shall, therefore, in this place briefly considar the science of the Body (ksetra or Field) and the Atman (ksetrajna). Thereby, my readers will be able to properly understand the correct meanings of many of the doctrines of the Bhagavadgita.

The body of man ( pinda, ksetra, or sarira ) may be said to be a great factory. As in any factory raw material is first taken in from outside, and then all the material is selected or arranged, and having determined which of the material is useful for the factory and which not, the raw material taken G. R._12

In is manufactured into different articles and sent out, so also are there numerous activities going on, every moment in the human body. The first of the means man has for acquiring the knowledge of the various objects in the world, made up of the five primordial elements, are his organs. The, true or fundamental form of the objects in the world cannot be realised by any one by means of his organs. Materialists say that such form is the same as it appears to oul organs; but if tomorrow a human being acquires another new organ, then, from his point of view the qualities of the different objects in the world will be different. Human organs are of two kinds, namely, organs of Action ( karmenndriya ) and organs of perception (jnanendriya). The hands, the feet, the voice, the anus and the generative organs are the five organs of Action. All the Actions which we perform by means of our body are performed through these five organs. Besides these, there are the five organs of perception, namely, the nose, the eyes, the ears, the tongue and the skin. "We perceive colour by the eyes, taste by the tongue, sound by the ears, smell by the nose, and touch by the skin. All the knowledge that we acquire of any external object, is the effect of its _ colour, taste, sound, smell or touch, and nothing else. For instance, take a piece of gold. It looks yellow, it seems heavy to the touch, and it is elongated on being hammered. These and its other qualities which we perceive by means of our organs, is what is 'gold ' in our eyes; and when these qualities are seen to recur in any particular object, then such object becomes an independent physical object named 'gold' in our opinion. Just as there are doors in a factory for taking material in from outside and for sending out the material which is inside, so also, the organs of perception and the doors of the human body for taking material inside and the organs are the doors for sending that material out. When the rays of the Sun fall on any object and enter our eyes on being ref- lected, our Atman perceives the colour of that object ; and when the minute atoms of scent, emanating from that object come and strike our olfactory nerves, we smell it. The functions of the other organs of perception are carried on in the same way ; and when the organs perception are functioning in

this way, we become aware of the external objects in the world through their medium. But the organs of perception do not themselves acquire the knowledge of the activities which they carry on ; and therefore, these organs of perception are not called 'jnata ' (Knower), but they have been referred to as the portals for taking in material from outside. When external material has come inside through these doors, the dealing with it afterwards is the function of the Mind. For instance, when at noon the clock strikes twelve, it is not the ears which understand what o'clock it is. Just as each stroke falls, aerial vibrations come and strike the ears, and when each of these strokes has in the first place created a distinct effect on the mind, we mentally calculate the sum of all these phenomena and decide what o'clock it is. Even the beasts have got the organs of perception, and as each stroke of the clock falls, it causes an effect on their mind through their ears. But their mind is not sufficiently developed to be able to total up the number of strokes and to understand that it is twelve o'clock. Explaining this in technical language, it is said that although a beast is capable of perceiving individual phenomena by themselves, yet, it is not able to perceive the unity which results from that diversity. In the Bhagavadgita, this is explained by saying : "indriyani parany ahuh indriyebhyah param manah", (Gi. 3. 42), i.e., "the organs are superior to the external objects, and the Mind is superior to all the organs". As has been stated above, if the Mind is not in its proper place, we do not see anything although the eyes may be open, nor do we hear anything though the ears may be open. In short, the external material comes into the factory of the Body through the organs of perception to the clerk called 'Mind', and this clerk subsequently examines that material. We will now consider how this examination is done, and how it becomes necessary to further sub-divide that which we have so far been broadly referring to as the 'Mind', or how one and the same Mind acquires different names according to difference in its functions. All the impressions which are created on the mind through the organs of perception have first to be placed together in one place and by comparing them with each other, one has first to

decide which of them are good and which bad, which acceptable- and which objectionable, which harmful and which beneficial and when this examination has been made, we are induced to- do that thing which is good, beneficial, proper, or doable. This- is the ordinary course. For instance, when we go into a, garden, impressions of the various trees and flowers in it are made on our minds through our organs of perception. But unless our Atman has acquired the knowledge of which of these flowers have a good smell and which a bad one, we do- not get the desire of possessing a particular flower, and consequently perform the Action of plucking it. Therefore,, all mental activity falls into the following three broad divisions, namely : (1) having acquired the knowledge of external objects by means of the organs of perception,, arranging all these impressions, or carefully classifying them for purposes of comparison, (2) after this classification has- been made, critically examining the good or bad qualities of the different objects and deciding which object is acceptable and which not; and (3) when the decision has been made,, feeling the desire to acquire the acceptable and reject the unacceptable, and getting ready for appropriate action. It is not that these three functions must take place immediately one after the other, and without there being any interval of time between them. We may in the present feel the desire of acquiring some object which we may have seen in the past ;. nevertheless we cannot, on that account, say that any one of these three functions is unnecessary. Just as though the Court of Justice is one and the same, the work in it is divided in the following way, namely, the two parties or their respective pleaders first place their respective evidence and witnesses before the Judge, and the Judge gives his decision after considering the evidence on either side, and the Sheriff ultimately carries out the decision which has been given by the Judge, so also are the acti- vities of that clerk whom we have so far broadly referred to as the Mind', divided. Out of these activities, the function of considering discriminatingly all the various objects which are perceived, and deciding that a particular thing is of a particular kind (evameva) and not of another kind (nanyatha), that is to say, the function of a Judge, belongs to the organ.

called 'Reason' (buddhih); and all the mental functions referred to above, except the functions of this faculty of discriminating between good and evil, are carried out by the organ called ' Mind ' (manas), according to the terminology of both the Vedanta and the Samkhya philosophies (Sam. Ka. 23 and 27). This (minor) Mind, like a pleader, places before the Reason the various ideas that a particular thing is like this (samkalpam) or is like that (vikalpam) etc., for decision; and therefore, it is called an organ which is 'samkalpa- vikalpatmakam', that is, which merely forms ideas without arriving at any decision. The word 'samkalpam' is sometimes made to include also the factor of decision (Chandogya. 7. 4. 1.). But in this particular place, the word ' samkalpam ', has been used to mean and include merely realising, or believing, or taking for granted, or understanding that a particular thing as of a particular kind, or such activities as planning some Action, desiring, thinking, or conceiving, without arriving at any decision (niscayah). But the function of the Mind is not exhausted after placing various ideas for decision before the Reason in this way like a pleader. When the Reason has decided on the goodness or badness of any particular act, and has decided what is acceptable, the Mind has also to perform the Registrar's function of bringing about, through the organs of Action, that thing which has been found acceptable, that Is to say, of carrying into execution the decisions of Reason; and therefore, the Mind can also be defined in another way. It is true that considering how to carry into execution the decision which has been arrived at by the Reason is in a sense samkalpa-vikalpatmaka; nevertheless that process has been given the independent name ' vyakaranam', that is, 'development', In the Sanskrit language; all the other mental activities except these are the functions of Reason. The Mind does not discriminate between the various ideas in the mind. Dis- criminating between them and giving to the Atman the accurate knowledge of any particular object, or deciding that a particular thing is only of a particular kind after proper classification, or arriving at a definite inference, and deciding as to the doability or non-doability of any particular Action after inferentially determining the relation of Cause and

Effect between two things, are all functions of the Reason and are known in Sanskrit as ' vyavasayah' or 'adhyavasayah'. Therefore, these two words have been defined in the Maha- bharata in the following way in order to show the difference between the Reason and the (minor) Mind, namely : —

" vyavasayatmika buddhih mano vyakaranatmakam "

(Ma. Bha. San. 251. 11). that is, "the 'buddhih' (Reason) is an organ which does the vyavasayah, that is, which discriminates and arrives at a decision, and the Mind (minor) is an organ which does the vyakaranam, that is, carries out the development or the further arrangements. In short, the Reason "is vyavasayatmika and the mind is vyakaranatmakam ". Even the Bhagavadgita. contains the words "vyavasayatmika buddhih" (Gi. 2. 44); and in that place, the word buddhih means the organ which dis- criminates and decides. The buddhih is like a sword. Its. function is only to cut whatever comes before it or is brought before it. It has no other quality or function (Ma. Bha. Vana. 181. 26). Planning, desiring, wanting, memory, perse- verance, faith, enthusiasm, kindness, interestedness, affection, pity, gratitude, sexual impulses, shame, joy, fear, love, attachment, hate, avarice, arrogance, . jealousy, anger etc., are all qualities or faculties of the Mind (Br. 1. 5. 3; Maitryu. 6, 30), and man is prompted to perform any particular act, according to the particular mental impulse which has sprung into the Mind. . However reasonable a man may be, and even if he fully " understands how poor people suffer, yet, if the feeling of pity is not aroused in his heart,, he will never be inspired by the desire to help the poor ; or, though he might feel the desire to fight,' he will not fight if "he is wanting in. courage. The Reason only tells us what the result will be- at those things which we want to do. But as desire, courage etc., are not the faculties of the Reason, Reason by it-self, that is , without the help of the Mind, never inspires the organs to do- anything. On- the other hand, though, -the Mind can inspire the organs when under the sway of Anger "etc., yet an Action- which may have been performed without the discrimination of the Reason and merely by the inspiration of the mental

impulses, will not necessarily be morally pure. For instance, if something is given in charity without exercising the Reason and merely under the impulse of the feeling of pity, there is a chance of its having evil effects if the charity is given to an. undeserving person. In short, the mental impulses by them- selves are blind without the help of Reason. Therefore, in order that any good Action should be performed by a man, there must be a combination of a Reason which is pure, that is to' say, such as will arrive at a correct decision between good and bad, a Mind which will act according to the dictates of the Reason, and organs which are subject to the control of Mind. Besides the words 'buddhih' and 'manas', the other words 'antahkaranam' and 'cittam' are also in vogue. As the word antahkaranam out of these means the internal (i. e., antah) organ (i. e., karanam or indriyam),' it usually includes the means (Mind), buddih (Reason), cittam. (Consciousness) and afta«fraram(Egoism) etc; and when the Mind first contemplates external objects, it becomes cittam, (i. e,, (Consciousness), (Ma. Bha. San. 274. 17). But, as in ordinary parlance these words are used as being synonymous, there is very often a confusion as to what meaning is intended in which place. In order that such a confusion should not arise, only the two words Mind and Reason, out of the various words mentioned above, are used in scientific terminology in the specific meanings mentioned above. When in this way a differentiation has been made between the Mind and the Reason, the Reason in its capacity of a judge, necessarily becomes superior to the Mind, and the Mind becomes the clerk of the Reason. This is the purport of the following words, used in the Gita, namely, "manasas tu para budahih", i. e„ ' the Reason is superior to or beyond the Mind" (Gi. 3. 42). Never- theless, even this clerk has, as mentioned above, to perform two. different functions ; the first of these is to properly arrange all the impressions which have come from outside, through the medium of the- organs of perception, and to place those impressions' before the Reason for decision; and the second one is to carry "the order Or the message of the Reason to the organs of Action after the Reason has arrived at a decision and make these organs perform those external Actions which

are necessary to be performed for carrying out the decision of the Reason. Just as very often in a shop, the duty of purchasing merchandise for the shop and also the duty of sitting in the shop and selling the goods are both carried out by one and the same clerk, so also is the case with the Mind. Suppose, you see a friend of yours and being inspired with the desire of calling him, you say to him 'hullo !' ; then, let us see what are the various functions which are carried out in your antahkaranam. First, your eyes, that is, the organ of perception, have sent a message to the Reason through the medium of the Mind that your friend is near you, and that knowledge is conveyed through the Reason to your Atman. Here, the first function, namely, of the acquisition of knowledge, is over. Then the Atman, through the medium of the Reason decides to call the friend ; next, the desire to speak springs into the Mind in order to execute the decision of the Reason, and the Mind causes the word 'hullo !' to be uttered by the organ of Action. In the Siksa-grantha of Panini, the function of the utterance of words has been described on that basis as follows :—

atma buddhya sametyarthan mano yunkte vivaksaya I manah kayagnim ahanti sa prerayati marutam I marutas turasi caran mandram janayati svaram II

that is, "the Atman in the first place grasps all things through the medium of the Reason, and creates in the Mind the desire to speak ; then the Mind sets in action the bodily heat (kayagni) which in turn Bets the breath in motion ; then this breath entering the chest, creates the lowest sound ; and this sound ultimately comes out of the mouth in the shape of labial, guttural, or other sounds." The last two lines of the above stanza are also to be found in the Maitryupanisad (Maitryu. 7. 11.) ; and from this it is clear, that this stanza must be older than Panini. 'kayagni' is known in present-day medical

science as 'nerves'. But according to that science, the nerves which bring in the perception of external objects are different from those which carry the message of the Reason to the organs of Action through the medium of the Mind; and therefore, according to Western medical scientists, we must have two kinds of Mind. Our philosophers have not thought that there are two kinds of Mind; they have differentiated between the Reason and the Mind, and have said that the Mind is dual, that is to say, where the organs of Action are coacerned it acts according to the organs of Action, and where the organs of perception are concerned, it acts according to those organs. Both these ideas are essentially the same. According to the points of view of both, the Reason is the judge who decides, and the Mind becomes samkalpa-vikalpatmakam, that is, performs the function of conceiving ideas in relation to the organs of perception, and becomes vyakaranatmakam. that is, executive, in relation to the organs of Action, that is to say, it becomes the actual provocator of the organs of Action. Nevertheless, in developing (i. e., making the vyakaranam of) anything, the Mind has very often to conceive ideas (that is, make samkalpam and vikalpam) in order to see in what way the dictates of the Reason can be carried out. Therefore, in defining the Mind, it is usual to say simply "samkalpa-'vikalpatmakam manah" ; but, it must not be forgotten, that even according to that definition, both kinds of functions of the Mind are included.

The definition of Reason given by me above, namely, that it is the organ which discerns, is intended only for the purpose of minute scientific discussions. But, these scientific meanings of words are always fixed subsequently. It is, therefore, necessary to consider here also the practical meanings which the word 'buddhih' had acquired before this scientific meaning had been fixed. We cannot acquire the knowledge of anything unless it has been identified by the Pure Reason (vyavasaya- tmika buddhih); and unless we have acquired the knowledge of that object, we do not conceive the intention or the desire of obtaining it. Therefore, just as in ordinary parlance, the word 'mango' is applied both to the mango-tree and the mango-fruit, so also ordinary people very often use the single word 'buddhih' (Reason) for signifying the Pure Reason

(vyavasayatmika buddhih), as also the fruits of- that Reason in the shape of Desire etc. For instance, when we say that the buddhih of a particular person is evil, we intend to say- that his ' Desire ' is evil. As ' Intention ' or ' Desire ' are both faculties of the Mind from the scientific point of view, it is not correct to refer to them by the word ' buddhih '. But, before the word 'buddhih' had been scientifically analysed, the word! 'buddhih' had begun to be used in ordinary parlance in the two meanings of (i) the organ which discerns and (ii) the Intention or Desire which subsequently arises in the human mind as a result of the functioning of that organ. Therefore just as the additional word ' tree ' or ' fruit ' is used when it is: intended to show the two different meanings of the word 'mango', so also, when it is necessary to differentiate between the two meanings of the word ' buddhih ', the ' buddhih ' which discriminates, that is to say, the technical 'buddhih' is referred to by qualifying it by the adjective ' vyavasayatmika ' and Desire is referred to as simply 'buddhih' or at most as ' vasanatmika buddhih'. In the Gita the word 'buddhih' has been used in both the above meanings (Gi. 2. 41, 44, 49 and 3.; 42); and in order to properly understand the exposition of the Karma-Yoga, both these meanings of the word 'buddhih ' have to be continually kept before the mind. When man begins to do any particular act, he first considers whether it is good, or bad, doable or not-doable etc., by means of his Pure Reason. (vyavasayatmika buddhih), and when the Desire or Intention (that is, the vasanatmika buddhih) of doing that act enters his- mind, he becomes ready to perform the act. This is the order of the mental functions. When that buddhih out of the two- ( namely the vyavasayatmika ) which has to decide between the- doability and the non-doability of any particular Action is functioning properly, the Mind is not palluted by improper- Desires (buddhih) entering it. Therefore, the first theorem of the Karma-Yoga preached in the Gita is that the vyavasa- yatmika buddhih (Pure Reason) must be made pure and steady (Gi. 2. 41). Not only the Gita, but also Kant has- differen- tiated between two kinds of buddhih and he has described the functions of the vyavasayatmika buddhih (Pure Reason) and of the vyavaharika or vasanatmika buddhih (Practical Reason) in

two different books. Really speaking, steadying the Pure- Reason is the subject-matter of the Patanjala Yoga-Sastra, and not of the Karma- Yoga Sastra. But in considering any particular act, one must, according to the doctrine of the' Gita, first consider the desire or the vasanatmika buddhih of the doer of the act, before one looks at the effect of the act ( Gi. 2. 49 ); and in the same way when one considers- the question of Desires it will be seen that the man whose pure Reason has not become steady and pure, conceives different shades of desire in his mind, and therefore), it is not certain that these desires will be always pure or holy (GI. 2. 41). And if the desires themselves are not pure, how will the resulting Action be pure ? Therefore, one has to consider in detail, even in the science of Karma-Yoga, the methods or means which have to be employed to keep the vyavasayatmika buddhih pure, and therefore, the Patanjala Yoga has been, described in the sixth chapter of the Bhagvadgita as one of the means by which the vyavasayatmika buddhih can be made pure. But some doctrinal commentators have disregarded this fact and drawn the inference that the Gita supports and" preaches the Patanjala Yoga ! From this it will be clear- to my readers how necessary it is to bear in mind the above- mentioned two meanings of the word ' buddhih ' and their mutual relation.

I have in this way explained what the respective functions- of the Mind and the Reason are, after explaining the internal working of the human mind, and I have also mentioned the- other meanings of the word 'buddhih.'. Having in this way differentiated between the Mind and the ' vyavasayatmika buddhih' (Pure Reason), let us see how this aspect affects the question of the deity which discerns between good and evil (Sad-asad-viv-ka-devata). As the only purpose which this deity serves is to choose between good and evil, it cannot be included in the (minor) Mind; and as there is only one

'vyavasayatmika buddhih' (Pure Reason) which considers all matters and comes to a decision on them, we cannot give an independent place for the sad-asad-vivecana sakti (power of discriminating between good and evil). There may be numerous matters about which one has to think, discriminate, and come to a conclusion. In commerce, war, civil or criminal legal proceedings, money-lending, agriculture, and other trades, there arise any number of occasions on which one has to discriminate. But, on that account, the vyavasayot- mika buddhih in each case does not become different. The function of discrimination is common to all these cases; and therefore, the buddhih (Reason) which makes that dis- crimination or decision must also be one only. But in as much as the buddhih is a bodily faculty (sarira-dharma) just like the Mind, it can be sattviki, rajasi, or tamasi according to previous Actions, hereditary impressions, or education or for other reasons; and therefore, a thing which might be acceptable to the buddhih of one person may be looked upon as unacceptable to the buddhih of another person. But on that account, we cannot say that the organ of buddhih is different in each case. Take for instance, the case of the eye. Some people have squint eyes, while others have half -closed eyes, and others one eye only, and some have dim vision, while others have a clear vision. But, on that account, we do not Say that the eye is a different organ in each case, but say that the organ is one and the same. The same argument must be applied to the case of the buddhih. That same buddhih which differentiates between rice and wheat, or between a stone and a diamond, or which distinguishes between black and white, or sweet and bitter, also discriminates between what is to be feared and what not, what is good and what evil, what is profitable and what disadvantageous, what is righteous and what unrighteous, or what doable and what not-doable, and comes to a final decision in the matter. However much we may glorify it in ordinary parlance by calling it a 'Mental Deity' yet from the philosophical point of view, it is one and the same vyavasayatmika buddhih (pure Reason). That is why in the 18th Chapter of the Gita, one and the same buddhih has been divided into the three kinds of sattviki, rajasi, and tamasi

and the Blessed Lord first says to Arjuna :—

pravrttim ca nivrttim ca karyakarye bhayabhaye I bandham moksam ca ya vetti buddhih sa Partha sattviki II

(GiI. 18. 30)

that is, "that buddhih which ( properly ) understands which- Action should he begun and which not, which is proper to be performed and which not, what should be feared and. what not what leads to bondage and what to Release (moksa), is the- sattviki buddhih " ;

and then He goes on to say : —

yaya dharmam adharmam ca karyam cakaryam eva ca I ayathavat prajanati buddhih sa Partha rajasi ll

(GI. 18. 31)

that is, "that buddhih which does not make a proper discrimi- nation between the dharmam ( righteous ) and the adharmam (unrighteous), or between the doable and the not-doable, that buddhih is rajasi";

and He lastly says :—

adharmam dharmam iti ya manyate tamasavrta I sarvarthan viparitams ca buddhih sa Partha tamasi ll

(GI. 18. 32)

that is, "that buddhih which looks upon that as righteous-- (dharmam) which is unrighteous (adharmam), that is to say, which gives a totally perverse, that is, contrary verdict on all matters is the tamasi buddhih". From this explanation, it will be clear that the theory that there is an independent and distinct deity of which the function is sad-asad-vivekah, (i. e„ discrimination between good and evil) is not accepted by the Gita. That does not mean that there can never exist a buddhih (Reason) which will always choose the right thing. What is meant is that the buddhih is one and the same, but the sattvika quality of choosing only the right thing is acquired by it by previous impressions, or by education, or by control of the organs, or by the nature of the food which a man eats etc, and in the

absence of such factors as previous impressions etc., that same buddhih becomes rajasi or tamasi, not only in the matter of the discrimination between the doable and the not-doable but also in all other matters. Such is the import of the above stanzas. The facts of the difference between the buddhih of a thief and that of an honest man, or of persons belonging to different countries is explained by this theory in a satisfactory way, in which it cannot be explained by looking upon the Power of -discrimination between good and evil (sad-asad-vivecana-sakti) as an independent deity. "Making one's buddhih, sattviki, is what one oneself can do ; and it cannot be done without the control of the organs. So long as the vyavasayatmika buddhih acts only according to the dictates of the organs, without discriminating between or examining what promotes one's true benefit, it cannot be called Pure (suddha) ; therefore, one must not allow the buddhih to become the slave of the Mind and the organs, but one must on the other hand arrange it so that the Mind and the organs are under its control, This principle has been enunciated in numerous places in the Bhagavadgita (Gl. 2. 67, 68 ; 3. 7, 41 ; 6. 24, 26) and, on that account, the body, has been compared to a chariot in the Kathopanisad, and it is metaphorically stated that in order that the horses in the shape of the organs which pull that chariot should be properly guided in the path of the enjoyment of objects of pleasure, the charioteer in the shape of the vyavasayatmika buddhih has to courageously keep taut and steady the reins in the shape of the Mind ( Katha. 3. 3. 9) ; and in the Mahabharata also, the same simile has been adopted in two or three places with some slight difference (Ma. Bha. Vana 210. 25 ; Stri. 7. 13; Asva. 51. 5). 'This simile is so proper for describing the function of the control of the organs, that the famous greek Philosopher Plato has in his book (Phoedrus. 246) made use of the same illustra- tion in describing the control of the organs. This illustration does not appear literally in the Bhagavadgita. Yet, the description of the control of the organs in the above-mentioned stanzas has been made keeping this illustration in mind, as cannot but be noticed by anybody who keeps in sight the previous and posterior context of this subject-matter. Ordinarily, that is, when it is not necessary to make subtle

scientific distinctions, this is known as 'manonigraha (control of the Mind) ; but when, as mentioned above, a distinction is made between the manas (Mind) and the buddhih ( Reason), the function of control falls to the share, not of the Mind, but of "the pure (vyavasayatmika) Reason. In order this vyavasayatmika. buddhih should become pure, the principle that there is only one Atman in all human beings, must be deeply impressed on the mind by realising the true nature of the Paramesvara whether by the mental absorption (samadhi) taught in the Patanjala Yoga, or by Devotion or by Knowledge ( jnana ) or by Meditation (dhyana). This is what is known as Self- devoted (atma-nistha) buddhih. When the vayvasayatmika buddhih has in this way become Self-devoted (atmanistha), and the Mind and the organs have learnt to act according to its directions as a result of mental control, Desire, Intention, or other mental functions (manodharma) or the vasanatmika buddhih (Practical Reason), naturally become pure and chaste, and the bodily organs naturally tend towards sattvika actions. From the Metaphysical point of view, this is the foundation of all good actions, that is to say, the esoteric teaching (rahasya) of the science of Proper Action (Karma-Yoga).

My readers will now have realised why our philosophers have not accepted Conscience as an independent deity, in addition to the ordinary functions of the Mind and the Reason. From, their point of view, there is no objection to looking upon 'the Mind or the Reason as deities by way of glori- fication; but they have come to the conclusion that con- sidering the matter scientifically, there is no third element like Conscience which is distinct from and in addition to the two things which we call manas (mind), and buddhih (Reason) and which is inherent. We now clearly see the propriety of the word satam having been used in the phrase 'satam hi srimdeha padesu ' etc. Those whose minds are pure and Self- devoted (atmanistha), need not at any time be afraid of con- sulting their Conscience (antahkarana). We may even say that they should purify their Mind as much as possible before performing any Action, and consult their Conscience, But, there is no sense in dishonest people saying : " We do the same thing ", because, the Conscience of both is not the same, and

whereas the Conscience of saints is sattvika, that of thieves is tamasa. In short, that which the Intuitionist School refers- to as ' the Deity which discerns between Good and Evil' (the sad-asad-viveka-devata), is seen not to be an independent deity when the matter is considered from the philosophical point of view, but to be only the Self-devoted and the sattvika form of the vyavasayatmika buddhih. This is the theory of our philosophers, and when this theory is accepted, the Intuitionist point of view naturally falls to the ground.

When we have thus seen that the Materialistic aspect is one-sided and insufficient, and also that the easy device found out by the Intuitionist school is ineffective, it becomes necessary for us to see whether or not there is some other way for justifying the doctrine of Karma-Yoga. This way is the Metaphysical aspect of the matter; because, when we have, once come to the conclusion that there is no such indepen- dent and self -created (svayambhu) deity like the sad-asad-viveka- buddhih (Conscience), notwithstanding the fact that the Reason is superior to external Action, it becomes necessary to consider, even in the science of Karma-Yoga, how one can keep one's Reason pure in order that one should be able to perform pure Action, what is meant by Pure Reason, and how the Reason, can be made pure; and the consideration of these questions, cannot be complete unless one leaves aside the Material sciences which deal only with the external physical world, and enters into Metaphysics. Our philosophers have laid down the ultimate doctrine, in this matter, that the Reason, which has not fully realised the true and all-pervading nature of the Paramesvara, is not pure; and the science of the Highest Self (adhyatma) has been expounded in the Gita solely in order to explain what this Self-devoted Reason (atmanistha buddhih) is. But, disregarding this anterior and posterior context, some doctrinal commentators on the Gita have laid down the con- clusion that Vedanta is the principal subject-matter of exposi- tion in the Gita. It will be shown later on exhaustively that this conclusion arrived at by these commentators as to the subject-matter expoundsd in the Gita, is not correct. I have for the time being only to show how it is necessary to consider the question of the Atman when one wishes to find out how the

Reason is to be purified. This question of the Atman has to be considered from two points of view : — (1) the first method of exposition is to examine one's own body,' (pindah, ksetra, or sariram), as also the activities of one's Mind, and to explain how as a result of such examination, one has to admit the existence of the Atman in the shape of a ksetrajna, or an owner of the Body (Gl. Chap. 13). This is known as the sariraka-vicara or the KSETRA-KSETRAJNA-VICARA (the Consideration of the Body and the Atman) ; and that is why the Vedanta-Sutras are known as sariraka (dealing with the Body) sutras. When in this way we have examined our Body and Our Mind, we have next to consider (2) whether the elementary principle which is arrived at by such examination, and the principle which is arrived at by the examination of the brahmandam or the visible world around us, are the same or are different.' The examination of the world made in this way is known, as the KSARAKSARA-VICARA or the VYAKTAVYAKTA-VICARA (the consideration of the Mutable and the Immutable, or the consideration of the Perceptible and the Imperceptible). The 'ksara' or 'vyakta' is the name of all the mutable objects in the world, and aksara or avyakta is the name of the essential and eternal element in the mutable objects in this creation (Gi. 8. 21 ; 15. 16). The fundamental Element which we dis- cover by further examining these two elementary principles arrived at by the consideration of the Body and the Atman and of the Mutable and the Immutable, and which is the Ele- " ment from which both these elements have been evolved, and whioh is beyond ( para ) both of them, and is the Root Element ' of everything, is called the Absolute Self (Paramatman) or the Purusottamah (Gi. 8. 20): All these ideas are to be found in the Bhagavadgita, and the science of Proper Action has been expounded in it by showing how the buddhih is ultimately purified by the Realisation (jnanam) of this Element in the shape of the Paramatman, which is the Root Cause of every- thing. If, therefore, we have to understand this method of exposition, we must also follow the path which has been followed in the Gita. Out of these two subject-matters, the knowledge of the brahmandam or the consideration of the ' Mutable and the Immutable (ksaraksara) will be dealt with G. R._ 13

in the next chapter. I shall now complete the science of the pinda, or the consideration of the Body and the Atman which I had commenced in this chapter in order to explain the true nature of the Conscience, and which has remained incomplete. I have finished my exposition of the gross Body made up of the five primordial elements, the five organs of Action, the five organs of Perception, the five objects of these five organs of Perception in the shape of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, the Mind which is the conceiver of ideas (samkalpa- vikalpa), and the Pure Reason (vyavasayatmika buddhih). But that does not exhaust the consideration of the Body. The Mind and the Reason are the means or the organs for thought. If the gross Body does not possess movement (cetana), in the form of Vitality ( pranah ) in addition to these, it will be just the same whether the Mind and the Reason exist or not. Therefore, it is necessary to include one more element in the Body in addition to these other things, namely, Movement (cetana). The word 'cetana', is sometimes also used as meaning the same thing as 'caitanyam' ( Consciousness ). But one must bear in mind that the word cetana has not been used in the sense of caitanyam in the present context, 'cetana here means the movement, activity, or the vital motion of the Life forces seen in the gross Body. That cicchaktih ( Power of Consciousness ) by means of which movement or activity is created even in Gross Matter, is known as caitanyam ; and we have now to consider what that Power is. That factor which gives rise to the distinction between "mine", and "other's" which is to be seen in the Body in addition to its Vital activity or Movement, is a different quality altogether; Because, in as much as the Reason is only an organ which comes to a decision after proper consideration, Individuation (ahamkarah), which is at the root of the distinction between one's and another's, must be looked upon as something different from Reason. Like and dislike, pain and happiness, and other correlative couplets (dvamdvam) are the properties of the Mind. But as the Nyaya school looks upon these as properties of the Atman, Vedanta philosophy includes them among the properties of the Mind in order to clear that misunderstanding. In the same way, that fundamental element in the shape of Matter

( prakrti ), from which the five primordial elements have sprung, is also included in the Body (Gl. 13. 5, 6). That Power by which all these elements are controlled or kept steady, is again a different power (Gl. 18. 33), and it is called 'dhrti' (co-hesion). That amalgamated product which results from the combination of all these things is scientifically called the 'savikara sarira' (activated Body), or 'ksetra' ; and this is what we, in ordinary parlance, call the activated (savikara) human body, or the pinda. I have defined the word ' ksetra ' in this way, consistently with the Gita. But in mentioning the qualities Desire, Hate etc., this definition is sometimes more or less departed from. For instance, in the conversation between Janaka and Sulabha, in the Santi parva (San. 320), the five organs of Action have not been mentioned in the definition of the Body, but instead of them the six qualities of Time-feeling (kala), Realisation of Good and Evil (sad-asad-bhavah). Method (vidhih), Vitality (sukram), and Strength (bala) have been mentioned. According to this classification, the five organs of Action have to be included in the five primordial elements, whereas according to the classification adopted in the Gita, we are to include Time in the Ether (akasam), and Method, Vitality, Strength etc., in the five primordial elements or in Matter. Whatever may be the case, the word ' ksetra ' conveys only one meaning to everybody. That collection of mental and bodily elements or qualities in the shape of pranah (Life force), which has specific activities (visista-cetana), is known as ' ksetra '. As the word 'sarira' is also applied to dead bodies, the different word ksetra' has been used in this particular place, 'ksetra' originally means 'field', but in the present context, it has been used metaphorically as meaning the ' activated (savikara) and living (sajiva) human body '. That which has been referred to by me above as a great factory is this ' ksetra '. The organs of Perception, and the organs of Action, are the portals of this factory for taking in material from outside and for sending out the manufactured products respectively and, the Mind, the Reason, Individuation (ahamkara), and Activity (cetana) are the workmen in this factory; and all the functions carried on or caused to be carried on by these workmen, are referred

to as the activities (vyaparah), feelings (vikarah), or properties (dharmah) of this Body.

When in this way, the meaning of the word ' ksetra ' has. been defined, the next question which naturally arises is, to whom does this ksetra or field belong, is there or is there not some owner for this factory ? Although the word 'Atman' is very often used in the meaning of ' Mind ' or ' Conscience ' or 'one's Self ', yet, its principal meaning is 'the owner of the Body (ksetrajna) ". "Whatever functions are performed by man, and whether they are mental or bodily, are carried on by his internal organs such as buddhih etc., his organs of Perception such as the eyes etc., and his organs of Action, such as hands,, feet, etc. In the whole of this group, the Mind and the Reason- are the most superior. But although they may, in this way, be superior to the other organs, yet they are both funda- mentally the manifestations (vikarah) of Matter (prakrti) or of the gross Body, just like the other organs. (See the next - chapter.) Therefore, although the Mind and the Reason may be the highest of all the organs, yet they cannot do anything beyond their particular functions, and it is not possible that they should be able to do anything else. It is true that the Mind thinks and the Reason decides. But, knowing this, we do not arrive at a conclusion as to for whom the Mind' and the Reason perform these functions, or as to who performs- that synthesis which is necessary for obtaining a synthetic knowledge of the diverse activities carried on by the Mind: and the Reason on various occasions, or as to how all the organs subsequently receive the directions to perform their various functions consistently with that synthesis. It cannot be said ' that all this is done by the gross Body of man. Because, when 'cetana' or activity leaves this gross Body, this gross Body is unable to perform these functions although it remains behind; and as the component parts of the gross Body, namely, the flesh, the muscles, etc., are the result of food, and these- are continually worn out and continually re-formed, it cannot be said that the feeling of sameness by which a person realises that I ", who saw a particular thing yesterday, am the same as the ' I ' who see a different thing to-day, is the- property of the continually changing gross Body. If, however,

one leaves aside the gross Body, and says that cetana (Activity) is the owner of the body, then, in deep sleep, one does not continue to possess the 'I' feeling although such activities or cetana as breathing or blood-circulation are going on. (Br. 1. 1. 15-18). It, therefore, follows that Activity or the functioning of Life forces, is a specific quality which has been acquired by the gross Body, and is not the controlling factor, owner or power which synthesizes all the activities of the organs (Katha. 5. 5). The possessive case adjectival forms ' mine ' or ' another's ' prove to us the existence of the quality of Individuation (ahamkarah). But by knowing that, we do not come to a conclusion as to who this 'aham' or 'I' is If you say, that this 'I' is a pure illusion, then the experience of everybody is just the contrary; and imagining something which is inconsistent with this personal experience of every- body, would place one in the position described by Sri Samartha Ramadasa as: "saying something which is in- consistent with experience is wholly tiresome ; it is as useless as opening one's mouth wide and crying" (Dasa. 9. 5. 15) and even if we do this, the fact of the synthesis of the activities of the organs is not satisfactorily explained. Some go so far as to say that there is no such individual thing as ' I ' but that the name ' I ' should be given to the conglomeration or the fusion of all those elements, such as, the Mind, Reason, Activity, gross Body etc., which are included in the word ' ksetra '. But we see by our own eyes, that by merely piling a piece of wood on another piece of wood, we cannot make a box. ; nor is motion created in a watch by merely putting together all its various wheels. We cannot, therefore, say that activity arises by mere juxta-position. Nobody need be told that the various activities of the ksetra are not purely foolish activities and that there is some specific intention or object in them. "Who is it that gives this direction to the various workmen, such as, buddhih etc., in the factory of the Body? Juxta-position (samghatah) means merely putting together. Although several things may be put together, it is necessary to thread them together in order that they should form one whole. Otherwise, they will become disorganised at any moment. We have now to

see what this thread is. It is not that the Gita does not accept the principle of conglomeration (samghatah) ; but that is looked upon as part of the ksetra (Gi. 13. 6). We do not thereby get an idea as to who the ksetrajna or the owner of the Body is- Some persons think, that conglomeration gives rise to some new quality. But this opinion itself is not correct; because, philosophers have after mature consideration come to the conclusion that that which was not in existence before, in some form or other, cannot come into existence anew (Gi. 2. 16), But even if we keep this doctrine aside for a moment, the next question which naturally springs up is why should we not look upon the new quality which arises in the conglomeration, as. the owner of the Body ? To this, some Materialist philosophers, reply, that a substance cannot be different from its qualities, and that the qualities want some superintendence (adhisthanam), and therefore, instead of looking upon the property acquired by the Aggregate as the owner of the Body, we look upon the Aggre- gate itself as such owner. Very well ; then why do you not say 'wood' instead of 'fire', or 'cloud' instead of 'electricity', or 'the earth' instead of 'the gravity of the earth' in ordinary parlance ? If it is not disputed that there must he in existence some Power which is distinct from the Mind and the Reason in order that all the activities of the Body should be carried on systematically and according to some proper arrangement, then can we, because the seat of that Power is still unknown to us, or because we cannot properly explain the full nature of that Power or of that seat, say that that Power does not exist at all ? No person can sit on his own shoulders ; in the same way, it is absurd to say that an Aggregate (samghatah) gives to itself the knowledge of itself. Therefore, we come to the emphatic conclusion even from the logical point of view, that THAT THING for the enjoyment or the benefit of which, the various functions of the Aggregate of the bodily organs etc. are carried on, must be something which is quite distinct from the Aggregate itself. It is true that this Element which is distinct from the Aggregate, is an element which cannot become an object of perception (jneya) or become visible to itself like other objects in the creation, since it is self- enlightened. But, on that account, the fact of its existence

cannot come into question ; because, there is no rule that all objects must fall into the single category of the 'perceivable (jneya). All objects fall into two categories, namely, the 'jnata' and the 'jneya', i. e., the Perceiver, and That which is perceived by the Perceiver, and if some thing does not fall into the second category, it can come into the first category and its existence is as fully established as the existence of the Perceivable. Nay, we may go further and say that in as much as the Atman, which is beyond the Aggregate (samghata) is itself a Knower, there is no wonder that it does- not become the subject-matter of the knowledge which it acquires ; and therefore, Yajnavalkya has said in the Brhadaranyakopanisad, that "vijnataram are kena vijaniyat", i. e„ "Oh ! how can there be some one else, who can know That which knows everything ? " (Br. 2. 4. 14). Therefore, one has to come to the ultimate conclusion, that there exists in this activated living Body some comprehensive and potent Power which is more powerful and more comprehensive than the various dependent and and one-sided workmen in the Body who work in grades rising from organs like the hands and feet to Life, Activity, Mind and Reason ; that this Power remains aloof from all of them, and synthesizes the activities of all of them and fixes for them the direction in which they are to act, and is an ever-awake witness of all their activities. Thia doctrine has been accepted both by the Samkhya and Vedanta philosophies, and the modern German philosopher Kant has shown by minutely examining all the activities of Reason that this is the doctrine which one arrives at. The Mind, the Reason, Individuation or Activity are all qualities or com- ponent parts of the Body, that is, of the ' ksetra '. The inspirer of these components is different from them, independent of them, and beyond them. " yo buddheh paratas tu sah " (Gi. 3. 42), i. e., " It is beyond the grasp of the Reason ". This is- what is known in the Samkhya philosophy as ' purusa ', and in Vedanta philosophy as 'ksetrajna', that is to say, the Atman which knows or controls the Body ; and the actual experience which every one has of the feeling that ' I am ', is the most excellent proof of the existence of this Knower of the Body (Ve-Su. Sam. Bha. 3. 3. 53, 54). Not only does nobody think

that ' I am not ', but even if a person by his mouth utters the words : ' I am not ' he thereby inferentially acknowledges the existence of the Atman or the ' I ' which is the subject of the predicate ' am not '. The Vedanta philosophy has been propounded only in order to explain as clearly as possible the fundamental, pure, and qualityless form of this ksetrajna or Atman, which manifests itself in this way in the body in the individuated and qualified form 'I' (Gi. 13. 4); nevertheless this conclusion is not arrived at by merely considering the Body, that is to say, the ksetra. I have stated before that we have to see what can be ascertained by considering the Cosmos (brahmandam) that is to say, the external world, in addition to consideration of the Body and the Atman. This consideration of the Cosmos is known as ' ksaraksara-vicara '. By considering the Body and the Atman, we come to know the fundamental element (ksetrajna or Atman) which exists in the ksetra (the Body, or the pinda) and by considering the Mutable and the Immutable ( ksaraksara ), we understand the fundamental element in the Cosmos (brahmanda), that is, in the external creation. When in this way, the fundamental elements of the Body (pinda) and of the Cosmos (brahmanda) have been definitely and severally fixed, Vedanta philosophy, after further con- sideration comes.to the conclusion that both these are uniform or one and the same— or that WHATEVER IS IN THE BODY (PINDA), IS ALSO IN THE COSMOS (BRAH- MANDAM).This is the ultimate truth of the moveable and the

immoveable Cosmos. When we realise that this kind of exa- mination has been made even in the Western countries, and that the doctrines advanced by Western philosophers like Kant etc. are very much akin to the doctrines of Vedanta philo- sophy, we cannot but feel a wonder about the supermanly mental powers of those persons, who laid down these doctrines of Vedanta by mere introspection, in an age when the Material sciences were not so advanced as they are in the present day ; but we must not stop with feeling wonder about this matter,_ — we must feel proud of it.

CHAPTER VII.

THE KAPILA SAMKHYA PHILOSOPHY OR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE MUTABLE AND THE IMMUTABLE.

(KAPILA SAMKHYA-SASTRA OR KSARAKSARA- VICARA). prakrtim purusam caiva viddhyanadi ubhav api*

Gita. 13. 19.

I have stated in the last chapter, that simultaneously with the consideration of the Body and the Lord or Superin- tendent of the Body — the ksetra and the ksetrajna-one must also- consider the visible world and the fundamental principle in it — the 'ksara' (mutable) and the 'aksara' (immutable)— and then go on to the determination of the nature of the Atman. There are three systems of thought which scienti- fically consider the mutable and the immutable world. The first of these is the Nyaya school and the second one is the Kapila Samkhya school. But the Vedanta philosophy- has expounded the form of the Brahman in a third way altogether, after proving that the propositions laid down by both of those systems of thought are incomplete. Therefore,. before considering the arguments advanced in the Vedanta phi- losophy, it is necessary for us to see what the ideas of the Nyaya school and of the Samkhya school are. In the Vedanta- Sutras of Badarayanacarya, the same method has been adopted, and the opinions of the Nyaya school and of the Samkhya. school have been refuted in the second chapter. Although the whole of this subject-matter cannot be given here, yet, I have in this and the next chapter given as much information about it as is necessary for understanding the mystic import of the Bhagavadgita. The propositions laid down by the Samkhya school are of greater importance than those laid down by the Nyaya school. Because, as Badarayanacarya has said (Ve. Su. 2. 1. 12 and 2. 2. 17), though no respectable and

leading Vedanta philosopher has accepted as correct the Nyaya doctrines laid down by the followers of Kanada, yet, as many of the propositions of the Kapila Samkhya-sastra are to be- found in the Smrti writings of Manu and others and also in. the Gita, my readers must first become acquainted with them. Nevertheless, it must be stated right in the beginning that though many ideas of the Samkhya philosophy are to be found in the Vedanta philosophy, yet the readers must not forget that the ultimate doctrines laid down by the Samkhya school and the Vedanta school are extremely different from each other. There has also been raised an important question, namely, whether the Vedantists or the Samkhya philosophers are the originators of those ideas which are common to the Vedanta and the Samkhya philosophy. But it is not possible to go so deep into that subject-matter in this book. Possibly, the Upanisads (Vedanta) and the Samkhya philosophy grew up side by side like two children, and the doctrines found in. the Upanisads, which are similar to the Samkhya doctrines, may have been independently arrived at by the writers of the Upanisads ; or on the other hand, the writers of the Upanisads may have borrowed some of these doctrines from the Samkhya philosophy ; or thirdly, Kapilacarya may have improved upon the doctrines laid down by the ancient Upanisads according to his own opinions, and formulated the Samkhya philosophy. All these three positions are possible. But taking into account the fact that though the Upanisads. and the Samkhya philosophy are both ancient, the Upanisads are the more ancient (Srauta) of the two, the last supposition seems to be the most credible of the three. Whatever may be the truth, when one has once become acquainted with the doctrines laid down by the Nyaya and the Samkhya schools of philosophy, it becomes easier to grasp the principles of Vedanta, especially of the Vedanta in the Gita. Therefore, let us first consider what the opinions of these two Smarta sastras about the formation of the universe are.

Some persons have a wrong idea that the only object of Nyaya (i. e,, Logic) is to decide what conclusions can subsequently be- drawn by inference from some desired or given data and which of these inferences are correct, and which wrong, and why.

Proving by means of inference etc. is a part of Logic. But that is not the most important part ; classifying or enumerat- ing the various things in the world, that is to say, the subject- matter of proof (apart from the question of proving them), finding out what are the fundamental classes or things under which all the substances in the world can be classified, as a result of the gradual evolution of things in the lower orders into things in the higher orders, finding out what their nature and qualities are, and how other things came into existence out of these things, and how all these things can be proved, and all such other questions are included in Logic. Nay, one may go further and say that this science has come into exist- ence only for this purpose, and not merely for considering the question of inference. It is in this way that the Nyaya-sutras of Kanada are begun and worked out. The followers of Kanada are known as Kanadas. In their opinion the root cause of the world is Atoms. The definition of atoms given by Kanada and the one given by Western natural scientists is the fame. When after dividing and sub-dividing things you come to the stage when division is no more possible, you have reached the atom or 'paramanu' ( parama + anu ), that is, the ultimate entity. As these atoms coalesce, they acquire new qualities as a result of the union, and new things are created. There are also atoms of the Mind and of the Body, and when these unite, life results. The atoms of the earth, water, fire and air are fundamentally different from each other. The fundamental atoms of the earth, have four qualities, namely, form, taste, smell, and touch ; those of water have three such qualities, those of fire, two, and those of air, only one. In this way the entire cosmos is from the very beginning filled with perma- nent and subtle atoms. There is no other root cause of the world except the atoms. The commencement (arambha) of the mutual coalition or union of the original and permanent atoms results in all the perceptible things in the world com- ing into existence. This theory propounded by the Nyaya school regarding the creation of the perceptible universe is technically known as ' arambha-vada ' (Theory of Commence- ment), and some followers of that school never go beyond this. There is a story about one of them, that when those who were

around him at the moment of his death, asked him to take the name of God, he uttered the words: "pilavah ! pilavah ! pilavah ! " " atoms ! atoms ! atoms ! ". Nevertheless, other followers of the Nyaya school believe that Isvara is responsible for bringing' about the fusion or union of atoms and they in that way complete the chain of the creation of the universe; and these are known as theistic Logicians. In the second sub-division of the second chapter of the Vedanta-Sutras ( 2. 2. 11-17 ), this Atomic theory, and immediately thereafter, also the theory that the Isvara is merely the immediate cause (2. 2. 37-39) has been refuted.

Reading what is stated above regarding this Atomic theory, those of my readers who have studied English will at once think of the Atomic theory advanced by the modern chemist Dalton. But in the Western countries, the Atomic theory of Dalton has now been put into shade by the' Evolution theory of the well-known biologist Darwin. In the same way, in India in ancient times, the Samkhya philosophy has put into the background the theories of Kanada. Not only can the Kanada school not explain satisfactorily how Activity was first imparted to atoms, but their theories cannot also- explain how the rising gradation of living things like trees, animals, and man came into existence, nor also how that which was lifeless became living, and several other things. This expla- nation was given in the 19th Century in the Western count- ries by Lamarque and Darwin, and in our country in ancient times by Kapila. The summary of the opinions of both these- schools is that the Cosmos or universe came to be created by the bursting forth of the constituents of one original substance; and on this account, the Atomic theory lost ground in India in ancient times, and now in the Western countries. Similar- ly, modern physicists have now also proved that the atom is not indivisible. It was not possible in ancient times to prove the Atomic theory or the Evolution theory by analysing and examining various material objects in the world by means of physics and other natural sciences. Experimenting again and again on the various objects in the world, or determining their qualities by analysing them in various ways, or making a comparison between the organs of the bodies of numerous present

and former living things in the living world, and such other present day devices of the natural sciences were not available to Kanada or to Kapila. They have deduced their propositions from whatever material was before their eyes at the time. Still it is a matter of great surprise that the philosophical propositions laid down by the Samkhya philosophers as to how the growth or formation of the universe must have come about are not much different from the scientific propositions laid down by modern natural scientists. As the knowledge of biology has grown, the material proof of these opinions can now be given more logically, and by the growth of know- ledge of the natural sciences, human beings have undoubtedly benefited to a considerable extent from the Material point of view. But in order to impress on the minds of my readers that the modern natural scientists cannot tell us much more than Kapila as to how diverse perceptible created things came into existence out of one impercep- tible prakrti (Matter), I have in various places later on referred shortly to the propositions laid down by Haeckel for comparison side by side with the propositions of the Kapila Samkhya school. These propositions were not for the first time promulgated by Haeckel, and he has himself clearly admitted in his works that he was expounding his propositions on the authority of the works of Darwin, Spencer, and other previous natural scientists. Yet Haeckel has for the first time described succinctly and in an easily intelligible way all these various propositions, after properly co-ordinating them, in his book known as The Riddle of the Universe; and I have therefore, for the sake of convenience, taken Haeckel as the protagonist of all these natural scientists, and referred prin- cipally to his opinions in this and the next Chapter. I need not say that this reference is only brief, because it is not possible to consider those propositions in this book in greater detail, and those who want further information about them must refer to the original works of Spencer, Darwin, Haeckel and other scholars.

Before considering the Kapila Samkhya philosophy, it must be mentioned that the word 'Samkhya' is used in two different meanings. The first meaning is the Samkhya

philosophy expounded by Kapilacarya, and that meaning has been adopted in this Chapter and in one place in the Bhagavad- gita (Gi. 18. 13). But besides this specific meaning, it is usual to include philosophy of every kind in the general name 'Samkhya', and it also includes the Vedanta philosophy In the phrase ' Samkhya-nistha ' or ' Samkhya-yoga ' this ordinary meaning of the word ' Samkhya ' is intended; and wherever the scients who follow this nistha (doctrine) have been referred to as ' Samkhya ' in the Bhagavadgita later on (Gi. 2. 39; 3. 3; 4. 5; and 13. 34), not only the followers of the Kapila Samkhya school, but also the Vedantists who have abandoned all Actions by atmanatma-vicara (by considering what does and what does not pertain to the Self); and who are lost in the contemplation of the Brahman, are intended. As the word ' Samkhya ' comes from the root ' Sam-khya ' (calculation), its primary meaning is ' one who counts '; and etymologists say that, as the fundamental elements according to the Kapila philosophy are just twenty-five, the followers of that philo- sophy originally got the specific name of 'Samkhya' (in the sense of " counters "), and later on the word 'Samkhya' acquired the comprehensive meaning of philosophy of every kind. I, therefore, think that after the practice of referring to Kapila ascetics as ' Samkhya ' had first come into vogue, Vedanta ascetics also later on came to be known by that name. Whatever may be the case, in order that confusion should not arise as a result of this double meaning of the word ' Samkhya ', I have used the elongated heading of ' Kapila Samkhya-Sastra ' for this chapter. There are sutras (Aphorisms) in the Kapila Samkhya-Sastra just as in the Kanada Nyaya philosophy. But as neither Gaudapada nor Sri Samkaracarya, who wrote the Sarira-bhasya, have taken these sutras as authorities in their works, many scholars are of opinion that they could not be ancient. The Samkhya-Karika written by Isvarakrsna is considered to be older than them. Gaudapada, the chief preceptor of Samkaracarya, has written a bhasya (Commentary) on that work and even in the Samkarabhasya itself, extracts have been taken from these Karikas, and the translation of that work into the Chinese language made before 570 A. D.

is now available. Isvarakrsna has stated at the end of these Karikas, that he has in his work given a summary in seventy couplets in the arya metre of a previous extensive- book of sixty chapters called Sasti-Tantra (omitting some chapters). The work Sasti-Tantra is now not available, and. I have, therefore, considered the fundamental propositions of the Kapila Samkhya-Sastra on the authority of these Karikas. In the Mahabharata, the Samkhya doctrines have been men- tioned in many chapters. But as in that work, the Vedanta doctrines have been always mixed up with the Samkhya doctrines, it becomes necessary to consider other treatises in order to decide what the pure Samkhya philosophy was ; and for that purpose, no work older than the Samkhya-Karikas is at present available. The pre-eminent worth of Kapila becomes clear from the following words of the Blessed Lord 1 in the Gita: " siddhanam Kapilo munih" (Gi. 10. 26 ), that is, " from among the Siddhas, I am the Kapila muni ". Nevertheless, it is not known where and when Kapila Rsi lived. There is a statement in the Santiparva of the Maha- bharata that Sanatkumara, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanatsujata, Sana, Sanatana and Kapila were the seven Mind-born sons of Brahmadeva, and that they were born with ' Knowledge (340.67); and in another place (San. 218), we find the Samkhya

philosophy explained to Janaka by Asuri, the disciple of Kapila, and Pancasikha, the disciple of Asuri. Again in the Santi- parva (301. 108, 109) Bhisma also says, that the science which was once propounded by Samkhya about the formation of the universe is everywhere to be found " in the Puranas, in history and in books on political economy and other places ". Nay, it may even be said that: "jnanam ca loke yad ihasti kimcit Sam- khyagatam tac ca mahan mahatntan ", that is, " all the knowledge in this, world originates in the Samkhya philosophy "(Ma. Bha. San. 301. 109). When one considers in what way the- Evolution theory is being everywhere taxed into commission by the Western writers, one should not be surprised if every one of our writers has to some extent or other drawn upon our ancient Samkhya philosophy, which is a match for the Evolu- tion theory. Stupendous ideas like the theory of gravity of the earth, or the utkranti-tattva G. R._14 (Evolution theory) in the science of the creation, or the theory of the unity of Brahman and the Atman, come into the mind of some superman once in a way in thousands of years. Therefore, the practice of ex- pounding one's own arguments, on the authority of any universal doctrine or comprehensive theory accepted at the: time,, is seen followed in books in all countries.

This introduction has become necessary because the study of the Kapila Samkhya philosophy is now out of date. Let us now consider what the principal propositions of the Kapila Samkhya philosophy are. The first proposition of the- Samkhya philosophy is that nothing new comes into existence in this world; because, only sunya (nothing) and nothing else- can be produced by sunya (that is, which did not exist before). Therefore, it must always be taken for granted that all the

qualities which are to be seen in the created products (karya) must be found at least in a subtle form in the karana from which the products were created (Sam. Ka. 9). Accord- ing to the opinions of Buddhists and of Kanada, one- thing is destroyed and out of it another thing comes into existence; for instance, the seed is destroyed, and from that the sprout comes into existence, the sprout is destroyed, and from that the tree comes into existence, and so on. But the Samkhya and the Vedanta philosophers do not accept this proposition. They maintain that those elements which existed in the seed of the tree are not destroyed, but they have absorbed other elements into themselves from the earth and from the air, and thereby the new form or state of a sprout is taken up by the seed (Ve. Su. Sam. Bha. 2. 1. 18). Similarly, even if wood is burnt, it is only transformed into smoke, ashes etc., and not that the ele- ments in the wood are totally destroyed and a new thing in the form of smoke comes into existence. It is stated in the Chandogyopanisad that: " katham asatah. saj jayeta?", i.e., how can something which exists come out of something which never existed?" (Chan. 6. 2. 2). The fundamental , Cause of the universe is sometimes referred to as ' asat ' in the Upanisads (Chan. 3. 19. 1 ; Tai. 2. 7. 1). But Vedanta philo- sophy has laid down that that word is not to be interpreted as meaning 'a-bhava' (non-existing) but as indicating only the non-existence of such a perceptible state as can be denoted by name or form (Ve. Su. 2. 1. 16, 17). Curds can be made only out of milk, not from water ; oil comes out of ' til' (sesamum), not out of sand; from these and other actual experi- ences, one must draw the same conclusion; because, if one accepts the position that those qualities which do not exist in the karana (cause) can arise independently in the karya (pro- duct), one cannot explain why it should not be possible to produce curds from water. In short, that which is now in exist- ence cannot have come into existence out of something which originally did not exist. Therefore, the Samkhya philosophers have laid down the proposition, that whatever product you may take, its present concomitants and qualities must in some form or other have been in existence in its original cause. This proposition is known as ' satkarya-vada ' (theory of some-

thing being produced out of something which existed). Even modern natural scientists have laid down the proposition that the gross elements and the potential energy in all things are permanent, and whatever changes of form anything may go through, yet in the end the sum total of all material concomi- tants and of all potential energy in the world is always the same. For instance, even if we see a lamp burning and the oil disappearing, yet the atoms of oil are not totally destroyed, but continue to exist in the form of soot, smoke, or other subtle components; and, if all these subtle components are taken together and weighed, their weight will be the same as the total weight of the oil and of all those other matters from the air which were mixed with it when it was burning; and it has now been proved that the same rule applies to potential energy. But although these two propositions of modern phy- sics and of the Samkhya philosophy may be apparently similar, yet it must not be forgotten that the proposition of the Samkhya philosophy has reference only to the fact of one thing being created out of another thing, that is to say, it refers specifically to the theory of Causes and Effects, whereas the proposition of modern physics is much more comprehensive. The very important difference between these two proposi- tions which has now been proved by actual experiments and mathematics, is that no quality in any product can arise out of any quality which was not in the cause, and what is more, that the material elements and the potential energy in the causes are in no way destroyed by reason of their having been transformed into products, and that the sum total of the weights of the material elements and the potential energy of any product in its various states is always the same, and is neither increased nor decreased. Looking at the matter from this point of view, it will be seen that the propositions which have been given at the commencement of the second chapter Of the Bhagavadgita. (Gi. 2. 16), such as : " nasato vidyate bhavah". I e., "that which is not, will never come into existence " etc., have greater similarity with the proposition of modern physics, than with the mere satkaryamda which deals with causes and products, though they apparently look like

satkaryavada. The purport of the above quotation from the Chandogyopanisad is also the same. In short, the doctrine of of satkaryavada is acceptable to the Vedanta philosophy. Nevertheless, according to the Monistic (advaita) Vedanta philosophy, this proposition does not apply to anything beyond the qualified (saguna) universe, and how the qualified universe appears to have come into exsistence out of the qualityless (nirguna) must be explained in some other way. This theory of the Vedanta will be fully dealt with later on in the chapter on Metaphysics (adhyatma). As in this place we have to consider only how far the Samkhya philosophers have gone, we will take for granted the doctrine of satkaryavada and see how the Samkhya philosophers have made use of it in dealing with the question of the Mutable and the Immutable.

When once this satkaryavada is taken as proved, then, according to the Samkhya science, the theory that . the visible universe came into existence out of sunya, there having been, nothing whatsoever in existence before, naturally falls to the ground. Because, sunya means non-existing, and that which exists can never come into existence out of that which does not exist. Therefore, it becomes absolutely clear that the universe must have come into existence out of some substance or other, and that all those constituents (gunas) which we now see in the universe must have also been in this original substance. Now, if you look at the universe, many objects in it, such as trees, animals, men, stones, gold, silver, diamonds, water, air etc., are perceptible to our organs, and their forms and qualities are all different. The Samkhya doctrine is that this diversity or difference is neither permanent, nor funda- mental and that the fundamental substance in all things, or Matter, is only one. Modern chemists had analysed various objects and had originally arrived at 62 fundamental elements. But as the Western natural scientists have now proved that these 62 elements are not eternal and that there must have been some one fundamental substance from which the sun the moon, the earth, the stars, and the rest of the universe was created, it is not necessary to further labour this proposition. This original or fundamental substance at the root of all the things in the universe is known in Samkhya philosophy as-

'PRAKRTI '. Prakrti means 'fundamental' and all things which subsequently arise out, of prakrti' are called ' vikrti ' or the vikaras (transformations) of the fundamental substance.

But though there is only one fundamental substance in all things, if this substance had also only one constituent quality, then according to the satkaryavada, other qualities could not have arisen out of this one quality ; whereas, looking at the stones, earth, water, gold, and various other things in the world, we find that they have numerous qualities. Therefore, the Samkhya philosophers have first carefully considered the constituents of all the various things and divided these constituents into three classes, namely, the sattva, the rajas and the tamas, (the placid, the active and the ignorant). Because, whatever object may be taken, it naturally has two states, namely, its pure, unadulterated, or perfect state and the opposite of it, its imperfect state ; and it is seen that its tendency is to move from its imperfect state to its perfect state. Out of these three states, the state of perfection is called by the Samkhya philosophers the sattviki state, the imperfect state is called the rajasi state, and the state of progression is called the rajasi state; and according to them the three qualities, sattva, rajas and tamas, are to be found from the very beginning in Matter (prakrti), which is the fundamental substance of all things. Nay, it may even be said, that these three constituents together make up Matter. In as much the strength of each of these qualities is the same in the beginning, Matter is originally equable. This equability exist- ed in the beginning of the world and will come again when the world comes to an end. In this equability, there is no activity and everything is at rest ; but, later on, when these three constituents begin to vary in intensity, various things spring out of Matter as a result of the progressive constituent, and the creation begins. Here the question arises as to how the difference arises in the intensity of the three constituents, sattva, rajas and tamas, which were originally equal in intensity. To this the reply of the Samkhya philosophers is, that that is the inherent characteristic of Matter (Sam, ka, 61 ). Though Matter is gross, yet it carries out all this activity of its own accord. Out of these three constituents, knowledge

or intelligence is the sign of the sattva, and the rajas constituent, has an inspirational tendency, that is to say, it inspires a, person to do some good or evil act. These three constituents can never exist by themselves independently. In everything, there is a mixture of all the three constituents ; and in as much as the mutual ratio of the three constituents in this mixture always varies, the fundamental Matter, though originally one,, assumes the various forms of gold, earth, iron, water, sky, the human body etc. as a result of this diversity in constituents. As the intensity or proportion of the sattva constituent is higher than that of the rajas and tamas constituents in the object which we consider as sattvika, all that happens is that these constituents being kept in abeyance are not noticed by us. But strictly speaking, it must be understood that the three constituents sattva, rajas and tamas are to be found even in those objects which are sattvika by nature. There does not exist a single object which is purely sattvika, or purely rajasa or purely tamasa, In each object, there is an internal warfare going on between the three constituents, and we describe a. particular object as sattvika, rajasa, or tamasa according to- that one of these three constituents which becomes predominant. (Sam. Ka. 12; Ma. Bha. Asva-Anugita-36 and San. 305). For instance, when in one's own body the sattva consti- tuent assumes preponderance over the rajas and tamas consti- tuents, Knowledge comes into being in our body and we begin to realise the truth about things and our mind becomes peaceful. It is not that in this mental condi- tion, the rajas and the tamas constituents cease to exist in the body; but as they are repressed, they do not produce any effect. (Gi. 14. 10). If instead of the sattva constituent, the rajas con- stituent assumes preponderance, then avarice arises in the human heart, and the man is filled with ambition and he is- inspired to do various actions. In the same way, when the tamas constituent assumes preponderance over both the sattva and the rajas constituents, faults like sleep, idleness, confused memory etc. arise in the body. In short, the diversity which exists among the various objects in the world, such as gold,, iron, mercury etc. is the result of the mutual warfare or diversity in intensity of the three constituents, sattva, rajas

and Tamos. The consideration as to how this diversity arises when there is only one fundamental Matter is known as 'vijnana '; and this includes all the natural sciences. for example, chemistry, the science of electricity, physics etc. are all diverse kinds of jnana, that is, they are vijnana.

This fundamental Matter, which is in an equable state, is ' AVYAKTA ', that is, not perceptible to the organs ; and all the various objects which come into existence as a result of the mutual internal warfare of its sattva, rajas and tamas consti- tuents, and become perceptible to the organs, that is to say, all which we see or hear or taste or smell, or touch, goes under the name of ' vyakta ' according to the Samkhya philosophy. ' AVYAKTA ' means all the objects which are definitely percept- ible to the organs, whether they become perceptible on account of their form, or colour, or smell, or any other quality. Perceptible objects are numerous, and out of them, trees, stones etc. are GROSS (sthuta); whereas others like the Mind, Reason, Ether etc., though perceptible to the organs, ara SUBTLE (suksma). The word suksma does not here have its- ordinary meaning of ' small '; because, though ether is suksma, it has enveloped the entire universe. Therefore, suksma is to be taken to mean the opposite of ' sthula ', or even thinner than air. The words 'gross' or 'subtle' give one an idea about the conformation of the body of a particular thing ; and the words 'vyakta' (perceptible) and 'avyakta '(imperceptible) show whether or not a particular thing can be perceived by us in reality. Therefore, although two different things may both be subtle, yet one of them may be perceptible and the other imperceptible. For instance, though the air is subtle, yet as it is perceptible to the sense of touch, it is considered to be vyakta ; and prakrti (Matter), the fundamental substance of all things, being much more subtle than air itself, is not percept- ible by any of the organs and is, therefore, avyakta. Here a question arises, namely : if prakrti is not perceptible to any organ, then, what evidence is there that it exists ? To this the reply of the Samkhya philosophers is, that by considering the various objects, it is proved by inference by the law of ' satkaryavada' that the root of all of them, though not actually perceptible to the organs, must nevertheless be in

existence in a subtle form (Sam. Ka. 8); and the Vedalita philosophers have accepted the same line of argument for proving the existence of the Brahman. (See the Samkarabhasya on Katha. 6. 12, 13). When you once in this way acknow- ledge prakrti to be extremely subtle and imperceptible, the atomic theory of the Nyaya school naturally falls to the ground. Because, even if atoms are considered imperceptible and innumerable, yet, in as much as each atom is, according to the Nyaya theory, an independent entity or part, the question as to what matter any two atoms are composed of still remains. Therefore, the doctrine of the Samkhya philosophy is, that in prakrti there are no different parts in the shape of atoms, that it is consistent and homogeneous or unbroken in any part, and that it perpetually pervades everything in a form which is avyakta (that is, not perceptible to the organs) and inorganic. In describing the Parabrahman, Sri Samartha Ramadasa Svami says in the Dasabodha (Da. 20. 2. 3.) :-

" In whichever direction you see, it is endless; there " is no end or limit anywhere ; there is one independent "homogeneous substance; there is nothing else".'

The same description applies to the prakrti of the Samkhya philosophy. Matter, made up of three constituents, is im- perceptible, self-created, and homogeneous, and it eternally saturates everything on all sides. The Ether, the air, and other different things came into existence afterwards ; and although they may be subtle, yet they are perceptible; and 'prakrti ' which is the fundament or origin of all these is imperceptible, though it is homogeneous and all-pervading. Nevertheless, there is a world of difference between the Parabrahman of Vedanta philosophy and the prakrti of Samkhya philosophy; because, whereas the Parabrahman is Vitalising and unqualified, prakrti is inactive ( gross ) and is qualified, since it possesses the sattva, rajas and tamas qualities. But this subject-matter will be more fully con- sidered later on. For the moment, we have only to consider what the doctrines of the Samkhya philosophy are. ; When the words suksma, sthula vyakta, and avyakta have been defined as above, one comes to the inevitable conclusion

that in the beginning of the universe, every object is in the form of subtle and imperceptible prakrti and that it after- wards becomes vyakta ( perceptible to the organs ), whether it is subtle or gross; and that at the time of pralaya (total destruction of the universe), when this its perceptible form is destroyed, it again becomes merged into imperceptible Matter and becomes imperceptible. And the same opinion has been expressed in the Gita (Gi. 2. 28 and 8. 18). In the Samkhya philosophy, this imperceptible Matter is also known as 'aksara (Immutable) and all things which are formed out of it are known as 'ksara' (Mutable). ' ksara' is not to be understood as meaning something which is totally destroyed, but only the destruction of the perceptible form is here meant, 'prakrti ' has also other names, such as, ' pradhana ' (fundamental), ' guna- ksobhini ' (stirrer up of the constituents), 'bahudhanaka ' (many- seeded), and ' prasava-dharmini ' (generative). It is 'pradhana' (fundamental), because, it is the fundamental root of all objects in the universe; it is 'gunaksobhini (stirrer up of constituents), because, it of its own accord breaks up the equable state of its three constituents (gunas); it is ' bahudhanaka ' (many-seeded), because, it contains the germs of differentiation between various objects in the shape of the three constituents; and it is ' prasava-dharmini" (generative), because, all things are born or come into existence out of it. That is why these different names are given to Matter. This prakrti is known in Vedanta philosophy as 'Maya' (Illusion) or an illusory appearance.

"When all things in the world are classified under the two divisions of ' Perceptible ' and ' Imperceptible ' or ' Mutable ' and 'Immutable', the next question which arises is into what categories the Atman, the Mind, Intelligence, Individuation, and the organs, which have been mentioned in the last chapter on the ksetra-ksetrajna-vicara, are to be put according to Samkhya philosophy. The ksetra and the organs being gross, they will of course be included in the category of the Percepti- ble. But how is one to dispose of the Mind, Individuation, Intelligence, and especially of the Atman ? The modern eminent European biologist Haeckel says in his books that

the Mind, Intelligence, Individuation and the Atman are all faculties of the body. We see that when the brain in a. man's head is deranged, he loses memory and even becomes- mad, Similarly, even if any part of the brain is deadened on account of a blow on the head, the mental faculty of that, part is seen to come to an end. In short, mental faculties are only faculties of gross Matter and they can never be separated from gross Matter. Therefore, the mental faculties and the Atman must be classified along with the brain in the category of the Perceptible. When you have made this classification,, the imperceptible and gross Matter is ultimately the only thing which remains to be disposed of, because all perceptible- objects have sprung out of this fundamental imperceptible- There is no other creator or generator of the world except- prakrti. When the Energy of the fundamental Matter ( prakrti ) gradually increases, it acquires the form of caitanya (conscious- ness) or of the Atman. This fundamental prakrti is governed by fixed laws or rules like the satkaryavada, and in accordance- with those laws, the entire universe, as also man, is acting like a prisoner. Not only is the Atman not something different from Matter, but it is neither imperishable nor independent ; then, where is the room for salvation ?. The idea which a person has that he will do a particular thing- according to his own will is a total illusion ; he must go where prakrti (Matter or Nature) drags him. In short, as the late- Mr. Shankar Moro Ranade has stated in the 'Dhrupad' (stanza) at the commencement of the drama Kalahapuri--

" The world is a vast prison, all created beings are " prisoners, the inherent qualities of Matter are " shackles which nobody can break ".

Haeckel's opinion is that this is the way in which the existence of the living and the non-living world goes on. And because according to him the universe originates from a single, gross, and imperceptible prakrti, he has named his doctrine 'advaita' (non-dualism). But in as much as- this advaita

doctrine is based on something which is gross, and as it incorporates everything within gross Matter, I have named it 'jadadvaita ' (Gross Non-dualism) or Non-dualism based on the Natural sciences.

But the Samkhya philosophy does not accept this Gross Non-dualism. They accept the position that the Mind, Reason and Individuation are qualities of Gross Matter which consists of the five primordial elements and consequently it is stated in the Samkhya philosophy that Reason, Individuation, and other qualities gradually spring out of the fundamental imperceptible Matter. But according to the Samkhyas, it is impossible that consciousness (caitanya) should spring out of gross Matter; not only that, but the words " I know a particular thing " cannot come to be used unless the one who knows, understands, or sees Matter, is different from Matter, in the same way as no one can sit on his own shoulders; and looking at the affairs of the world, it is the experience of every one that whatever he knows or sees is different from himself. The Samkhya philosophers have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the one who knows (jnata) and that which is to he known (jneya), the one who sees and that which is to be seen, or the one who sees prakrti and Gross prakrti muet be two fundamentally different things (Sam. Ka.17). The one which has been described in the last chapter as the ksetrajna, or the Atman, is the one which sees, knows or enjoys, and it is known in the Samkhya philosophy as PURUSA (Spirit), or ' jna ' (jnata). As this Knower is different from Matter, it follows that the Knower is inherently quality- less, that is, beyond the three constituents of prakrti, namely, sattva, rajas and tamas; that the Knower does not go through any change of form and does nothing else except seeing and knowing, and that all the activity which is going on in the world is only the activity of prakrti. In short, the doctrine of the Samkhya philosophers is that if MATTER (prakrti) is acetana (lifeless), SPIRIT (purusa) is sacetana (vitalised); if Matter is responsible for all activity, Spirit is apathetic and non-active; if Matter has three constituents, Spirit is unconstituted ; if Matter is blind, Spirit is seeing; and that these two different elements in this world are eternal, inde- pendent, and self-created. And it is with reference to this-

doctrine that the Bhagavadgita first says : " prakrtim purusam caiva viddhy anadi ubhav api ", that is, " prakrti and purusa are both without a beginning and are eternal " (Gi. 13. 19), and then goes on to say : " karyakarana kartrtve hetuh prakrtir ucyate", i.e., the activities of the body and of the organs are carried on by prakrti : and that, "purusa sukhaduhkhanam bhoktrtve hetur ucyate", i. e., "the purusa is responsible for our experience of pain and happiness ". But although the doctrine, that prakrti and purusa (Matter and Spirit) are both eternal, is acceptable to the Gita, yet it must be borne in mind that the Gita does not look upon these two elements as independent and self-created, as is done by Samkhya philosophers. Because, in the Gita itself the Blessed Lord has referred to Matter as his Illusion (Gl. 7. 14; 14. 3); and as regards the Spirit, he has said : " mamaivamso jivaloke " (Gi. 15. 7), i. e., " It is a part of me ". Therefore, the Gita has gone further than the Samkhya philosophy. But we will keep aside this aspect for the time being, and consider further what pure Samkhya philosophy says.

According to Samkhya philosophy, all the objects in the world are divided into three classes :-the avyakta (the fundamental Matter or nature), the vyakta (the forms taken by it), and the purusa (jna), the Spirit or the Knower. But in as much as the form of perceptible objects out of these is destroyed at the time of pralaya ( total destruction ), imperceptible Matter (prakrti) and Spirit (purusa) are the only two elements which remain in the end ; and in as much as it is a proposition of the Samkhya philosophers, that these two fundamental principles are eternal and self-created, ,they are called ' dvaiti ' (those who accept TWO principles). They do not accept any other fundamental principle besides Matter and Spirit, such as Isvara, Time, inherent Nature or anything else. Because, in as much as

according to that philosophy the qualified Isvara, Time, or inherent Nature are all perceptible, they are included in the perceptible objects which arise out of imperceptible Matter; and if you look upon the Isvara as qualityless, then having, regard to the law of satkaryavada, Matter with its three consti- tuents cannot spring out of a qualityless fundamental element. Therefore, they have definitely laid down that there is no third fundamental element in addition to prakrti and purusa as a cause of the universe; and having in this way defined only two fundamental elements, they have according to their own opinion worked out how the entire universe was created out

of these two fundamental elements. They say that though the qualityless parusa (Spirit) is unable to do anything itself, yet,, in the same way as the cow gives milk for its calf, or iron acquires the quality of attraction by the proximity of a magnet, so also immediately on the purusa coming into union with prakrti, prakrti which was originally imperceptible "begins to place before the purusa the subtle, and the gross perceptible diffusion of its own constituents ( Sam. ka. 57) . Although the purusa may be sacetana (vitalised) and a jnata (knower), yet, in as much as it is kevala (isolated), that is, qualityless, it has not got the necessary perquisites for performing actions itself'; and although prakrti can perform actions, yet, in as much as it is gross and acetan" (lifeless), it cannot understand what to do and what not to do. Therefor?, just as when there is a partnership between a blind man and ft lame man, the lame man sits on the siirmlders of the blind man, and both of them begin to loiiow tits road, so also when lifeless Matter becomes united with the vitalised Spirit, all the activities in the world come into existence (Sam. Ka.21 ): and just as in a drama an actress once takes one part and after some time again another part and performs her dance for the entertain- ment of the audience, so also prakrti for the benefit of the purusa ( for 'purusartha' ), and though the purusa gives nothing in return, takes up numerous parts in the drama by changing the mutual ratio of the sattva, rajas, and tamas constituents, and continually performs its dance before the purusa (Sam. Ka. 59). But so long as the Spirit, being entranced by this dance of Matter or Ky false pride (Gl. 3. 37) unjustifiably arrogates to itself this activity of Matter, and enmeshes itself in the strands of pain and happiness, it will never attain salvation. But on that day, when the Spirit realises that Matter with its three constituents is different and that it, the Spirit, is something different, the Spirit may well be said to be released, (Gl. 13. 29, 30 ; 14. 20). Because, strictly speaking, the Spirit is fundamentally neither a doer nor is it bound. It is independent and by its very nature isolated, that is,- it is non-active. Whatever happens is being done by Matter. . Nay, in as much as the Mind and even Reason are manifestations of Matter, whatever knowledge is acquired by Reason is the result of the

activity of matter . This knowledge is three-fold, namely, sattvika, rajasa and tamasa (Gi.18.20-22). Out of these, when Reason acquires the sattvika kind of knowledge, the spirit realises that it is different from Matter, not of the spirit. The spirit is qualityless and prakrti with its three constituents, is its mirror (Ma. Bha. San. 204. 8.) When this mirror become clear, that is to say, when the reason, which is a manifestation of matter, become sattvika, then the spirit sees in this clear mirror its own clear identity, namely, that it is different from matter, and Dame matter, becoming shame- faced, stops her dance before the spirit. When this state is acquired, the spirit is released from all bonds and attains its inherent isolation. Isolation (kaivalya) means the state of being 'kevala' (isolated), that is being single and not being joint with matter; and it is this natural state of the spirit Which is called moksa ( Release ) or salvation by the samkhya philosophers. But some samkhya philosophers have raised the delicate question whether in this state, it is the spirit which abandons Matter or Matter which abandons the spirit. This question is of the same type as the question whether the wife is too tall for the husband or the husband too short for the wife, and some may think it is equally useless. Because when two things are divorced from each other, there is no point in considering who has left whom, as we see that both leave each other. But if one gives this question of the samkhya philo- sophers deep consideation,it will be seen not to be improper from their point of view, in as much as according to the samkhya philosophy, the spirit being without qualities, non-active, and apathetic, the spirit being without qualities, non-active and apathetic, the performance of the actions of 'giving-up' or 'stricking to ' cannot technically speaking be ascribed to the spirit ( Gi. 13. 32 ). Therefore,the Samkhyas have come to the conclusion that it is matter,(which has got the quality of activity ), which must be said to leave the spirit, that is to say, it is " prakrti "which obtains its own release from the spirit (Sam. ka. 62 and Gi. 13. 34 ). in short release is not an independent state which is different from its fundamental and inherent state; just as the

outer skin of a stick of grass is different from the the internal stock or :as the fish in water is different from the water, so are matter and Spirit relationed towards each other. ordinary persons being steeped in ignorance as a result of the constituents of Matter, do not realise this distinction and remain tied up within the .periphery of family affairs. But he who has realised this distinction may well be said to be released. It is stated in the Mahabharata that such a person is called a ` knower or buddha (wise) or krtakrtya', i.e., one who has done whatever ought to have been done by him ( See Ma. Bha. San. 194. 58 ; 248. 11 and 306. 308 ). And the meaning of the word ` buddhiman ' ( intelligent) in the sentence ,,etad buddhva buddhiman syat , i. e., "be understanding this a man becomes ' buddhiman ' or ` buddha ', that is, becomes a

knower (GI. 15. 20) is the same. The true form of Release

even according to the science of the Atman (adhyatma) is also the same (Ve. Su, Sam. Bha. 1. 1. 4 ). But the advaita (Monistic) Vedanta philosophers give a different explanation about it : instead of saying that the Spirit is inherently isolated, they say that in as much as the Atman is fundamen- tally of the form of the Parabrahman ( Supreme Spirit ), Moksa is the realisation by the Atman of its fundamental form, namely of the Parabrahman. This difference between the Samkhya philosophy and the Vedanta philosophy will be made clear in the next chapter. Although the advaita (Monistic) Vedanta philosophy fully accepts the Samkhya theory that the Spirit is qualityless, apathetic, and inactive, yet the other doctrine of the Samkhya philosophy, namely, that there are fundamentally innumerable independent Spirits which see the dance of one and the same Matter is not acceptable to the Vedantisits (GI. 8. 4;13.20- 22 ; Ma. Bha. san. 351; and Ve. Su. Sam. Bha. 2. 1). According to the Vedanta philosophy, living beings appear different as a result of difference of environment ; but, as a matter of fact everything is Brahman. According to the Samkhya philosophers in as much as the life and death and the family of every man is different, in the world and in as much this difference in the world that one man is happy and anotherman is unhappy ,every Atman or purusa must be originally

different from another, and their number is innumerable (Sam. Ka. 18 ). It is true that Matter and Spirit are the two funda- mental principles of the entire universe ; but the Samkhya philosophers interpret the word ` Spirit' as meaning a collec- tion of innumerable Spirits. They say that the world goes on as a result of the union between these innumerable Spirits and Matter with its three constituents. When each Spirit becomes united with Matter, it. places before that Spirit the diffusion of its constituents, and the Spirit goes on enjoying it. After this has gone on for a long time, when in the case of a particular Spirit, the activity of prakrti takes the sattvika ( placid) form, that Spirit alone(not all Spirits) acquires true knowledge, and the activity of Matter comes to an end so far as it is concerned; and it reaches its, fundamental isolatated state. But even if it attains salvation, the worldly life of the other Spirits continues. Some people are likely to think that when a Spirit reaches the state of isolation, it. must at once escape from the meshes of Matter. But according to the Samkhya philosophers such is not the case, and the body and the organs which are the manifestations of Matter do not leave it till the body dies. The reason given by the Samkhya philosophers for this is : in the same way as the wheel of the potter goes on revolving for some time as a result of previous motion, even after the pot on it has been finished and taken away from it, so also does the body of even that man who has attained the state of isolation continue to 'exist for some time" (Sam. Ka. 67 ). But the man who has attained that isolated state is not in any way obstructed, nor does he experience either pain or pleasure, on account of his body ; because, in an much as this body, which is a manifestation of gross or lifeless Matter, is in itself gross or lifeless, he looks upon both pain and pleasura or happiness as the same ; and if you say that the Spirit will be affected by pain or pleasure then, as it has realised that it is different from the activity of Matter, and that the entire activity is of Matter and not its own, it remains apathetic, howmuchsoever active Matter may continue. That man who has not acquired this know- ledge by transcending the three constituents of Matter, does G. R,-15

not escape the cycle of birth and death; then he may take birth in the sphere of gods, as a result of the preponderance of the sattva constituent or in the sphere of humans, as a result of the preponderance of the rajas constituent, or in the sphere of animals, as a result of the preponderance of the tamos consti- tuent (Sam. Ka. 44, 54). These results, in the shape of the cycle of birth and death, befall a man as a result of the preponderance or minimisation of the sattva, rajas and tamas constituents in the Matter which envelopes him, that is, in his Reason. It is stated even in the Gita (Gi. 14. 18), that :- "urdhvam gacchanti sattvasthah", that is, " persons in whom the sattvika constituent predominates go to heaven", and tamasa parsons go to perdition. But these resulting states in the shape of heaven etc., are non-permanent. For that Spirit which wishes to become released from the cycle of birth and death, or according to the terminology of the Samkhya philosophy, which has to maintain its difference or isolation from Matter, there is no other way except transcending the "three constituents and becoming virakta ( desireless ). Kapila- carya had acquired this asceticism and Knowledge from his very birth. But it is not possible that every man can be in this state from the moment of his birth. Therefore, everyone must by means of the discrimination of fundamental prin- ciples realise the difference between Matter and Spirit and try to purify his Reason. When by such efforts, the Reason becomes sattvika, there arise in that Reason itself the qualities of Realisation ( jnana ), Asceticism (vairagya), and Power (aisvarya), and the man ultimately reaches isolation. The word 'aisvarya' (power) is used here in the sense of the Yogic power of acquiring whatever may be desired. According to the Samkhya philosophy, Righteousness (dharma) is included in the sattvika constituent ; but Kapilacarya has ultimately made the distinction, that by mere dharma one acquires only heaven, whereas Knowledge and Asceticism give Release or Isolation, and effect a total annihilation of the unhappiness of a man. That man who, as a result of the preponderance of the sattvika constituent in his bodily organs and in his Reason, has realised that he is distinct from Matter with its three con- stituents, is called trigunatita (one who has transcended the sattva

rajas and tamas constituents) by the Samkhyas. In this state of a trigunatita, neither the saitva, nor the rajas, nor the tamas constituent continues to exist ; therefore, considering the matter minutely, one has to admit that this state is different from either the sattvika, or rajasi, or tarmsi states of mind; and following this line of argument the Bhagavata religion, after dividing Devotion (bhakti) into ignorant, progressive, or placed, has described the disinterested and non-differentiating de- votion of the man who has transcended the three constituents as nirguna, that is, unaffected-by-quality (Bhag. 3. 29. 7-14). But it is not proper to extend the principle of division beyond the three divisions of placid, progressive, and ignorant. Therefore, the Samkhya philosophers include the trigunatita state of transcending the three constituents in the placid (sattvika) state on the basis that it results from the highest expansion of the placid constituent ; and the same position has also been accepted in the Gita. For instance, the non-differen- tiating knowledge that every thing is one and the same is, according to the Gita, placid knowledge (Gi. 18. 20); and where the description of the sattvika state of mind is given in the fourteenth chapter of the Gita, the description of the state of transcending the three constituents is given later on at the end of the same chapter. But it must he borne in mind that in as much as the Gita does not accept the duality of Matter and Spirit, the words 'prakrti ', 'purusa ', ' trigunatita ', which are technical terms of Samkhya philosophy are always used in a slightly different meaning in the Gita; or in short, the Gita permanently keeps the rider of the monistic (advaita) Para- brahman on the Dualism (dvaita) of the Samkhya philosophy. For instance, the difference between Matter and Spirit according to the Samkhya philosophy has been described in the 13th chapter of the Gita (Gi. 13. 19-34). But there the words 'prakrti' and 'purusa' are synonymous with the words

• 'ksetra ' and ' ksetrajna '. Similarly, the description in the

14th chapter of the state of transcending the three constituents (Gi. 14. 22-27) is of the siddha or released man who, having escaped the meshes of Maya (Illusion) with its three consti- tuents, has realised the Paramatman (Supreme Spirit) which

is beyond both Matter and Spirit, and not of a Samkhya philosopher, who looks upon Matter and Spirit as two distinct principles and who looks upon the isolation of the Spirit as the state of transcending the three constituents of Matter. This difference has been made perfectly clear by me in the subsequent chapter on adhyatma (philosophy of the Highest Self). But as the Blessed Lord has, while supporting the adhyatma or Vedanta philosophy in the Gita, in many places made use of the Samkhya terminology and arguments, one is likely to get the wrong idea, while reading the Gita, that it accepts as correct the pure Samkhya philosophy. Therefore, I have repeated here this difference between the Samkhya philosophy and the propositions similar to it in the Gita. Samkaracarya has stated in the Vedanta Sutra-bhasya, that he is prepared to accept all the propositions of the Samkhya philosophy but not to give up the advaita theory of the Upanisads that there is only one fundamental principle in the world, namely, the Parabrahman (Supreme Spirit), which is beyond both Matter and Spirit and from which the entire creation, including Matter and Spirit, has sprung (Ve. Su. Sam. Bha. 2. 1. 3); and the same line of argument applies to the arguments in the Gita.